

30 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of ONE Board on Unidentified Flying Objects

1. The subject briefing was given by Mr. (F. G. Strong,) assisted by Mr. (F. C. Durant,) at 1000 hours, 29 January. A history of O/SI interest in and action on this subject was followed by a showing of the motion picture films of sightings at Trenton, Utah, and Great Falls, Montana. Copies of the Report of the Scientific Advisory Panel on Unidentified Flying Objects had previously been made available to the Board. This briefing was given for background prior to the ONE requested briefing by ATIS scheduled for 0900, 30 January.

2. ONE personnel briefed were as follows:

Admiral Bernhard Hara
 Dr. Huger Hoover
 General H. R. Bull
 Ambassador Nelson Johnson
 Mr. William Bundy
 Dr. Abbot Smith
 Dr. Ludwell Montague
 Mr. Willard Matthias
 Dr. De Forest Van Slyck
 Dr. R. J. Sontag
 F. A. Boral

O/SI, was also present.

F. C. DURANT

OSI/FCDurant

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Dr. Edgar Hoover
General H. R. Pull
Ambassador Nelson Johnson
Mr. William Bundy
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Dr. Lucwell Montague
Mr. Willard Matthias
Dr. De Forest Van Slyck
Dr. R. J. Sontag
P. A. Borel

O/SI, was also present.

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[Signature]
F. C. DURANT

OSI/FCDurant

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TO DCD/ [REDACTED] INFO

15678

NUMBER

SUBJECT: CASE [REDACTED] - UFO RESEARCH/ORD REQUEST FOR
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION [REDACTED]

REFERENCE: A. [REDACTED]
B. [REDACTED]

1. ORD HAS EXHIBITED SOME INTEREST IN THE WORK OF [REDACTED] A QUALIFIED ANALYST IS CURRENTLY ATTEMPTING TO EVALUATE [REDACTED] SYSTEM AND HAS REQUESTED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.
2. WE NOTE THAT IN SOME OF THE EARLIER CORRESPONDENCE FROM YOUR OFFICE (REFERENCE B) MENTION WAS MADE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING^A MORE COMPLETE DESCRIPTION OF [REDACTED] SYSTEM. IF THIS POSSIBILITY STILL EXISTS, ORD WOULD APPRECIATE SEEING WHATEVER IS AVAILABLE.
3. PLEASE KEEP US ADVISED OF ANY NEW DEVELOPMENTS.

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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ORIG: [REDACTED]		CLASSIFICATION [REDACTED]		FILE TIME
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25 June 1976	1425	1	1	

TO DCD, [REDACTED] INFO

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[REDACTED]

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CLASSIFICATION

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

[REDACTED]

COORDINATING OFFICERS

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
CLASSIFICATION [REDACTED]

RELEASING OFFICER

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TECHNICAL REPORT SUPPLEMENT

TO

STAT

ANNUAL CONSOLIDATED REPORT ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS: CSCRD-1

DA Project 599-01-004

Ord Corps Project TB2-0001

STAT

ORDNANCE BASIC RESEARCH

Calender Year 1957

STAT

List No. 1

30 April 1958

The technical reports listed herein have been published and distributed, or have been submitted for publication in scientific journals, since the compilation of the above-captioned Annual Report for the Calendar Year 1957.

Following the convention established for the Annual Report, this list has been set up by Scientific Field and Sub-Field, and the Research Proposals have been listed numerically under each Sub-Field. The number assigned to each report in this list, e. g., 270:12, indicates that it is the 12th report in a series prepared in connection with Research Proposal 270. The preceding 11 reports in the series are listed in the Annual Report, and may be found on the appropriate pages.

Requests for copies of these reports (excepting manuscripts) can be made first to Installation libraries, since in practically every instance they have been given wide distribution to R & D Installations direct from the contractors. In the event that this is not the case for a particular report desired, the report may be ordered from ASTIA, through the normal channels. Reports may also be secured from the OOR for a limited period on loan; in the event this is desired, only the number appearing in this list need be furnished to identify the report requested.

Manuscripts generally are not available for distribution, since only one copy is received in the OOR.

Publication of future lists will be at bimonthly intervals.

Information Processing Office
Office of Ordnance Research, U. S. Army
Box CM, Duke Station
Durham, North Carolina

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

I PHYSICS

A. Astronomy and Geophysics	1
B. Atomic and Molecular Physics	1
C. Cosmic Rays and Elementary Particles	3
D. Cryogenics and Liquids	3
E. Gases and Gaseous Electronics	3
F. General Physics	4
G. Instrumentation	4
H. Nuclear Physics	4
I. Optics and Photography	4
J. Solid State Physics	5

II CHEMISTRY

A. Chemical Engineering and Materials	7
B. Combustion and Fuel Chemistry	8
C. Deterioration Prevention	8
D. Electrochemistry and Corrosion	8
E. Explosives and Propellants	8
F. Inorganic and Analytical Chemistry	9
G. Lubrication and Surface Phenomena	10
H. Molecular Structure and Physical Properties	10
I. Organic Chemistry	12
J. Plastics and Polymers	15
K. Reaction Kinetics and Equilibria	16

III MATHEMATICS

A. Algebra and Number Theory	18
B. Analysis	18
C. Foundation and Game Theory	20
D. Geometry and Topology	20
E. Mechanics	21
F. Numerical and Graphical Methods	21
G. Probability and Statistics	22
H. Operations Analysis	24

IV ENGINEERING

A. Combustion and Fuels	26
B. Fluid Mechanics	26
C. Friction and Lubrication	26
D. Heat and Mass Transfer	26
E. Human Engineering	26
F. Measurement and Control	26
G. Materials and Material Processing	27
H. Solid Mechanics	27

TABLE OF CONTENTS

IV	ENGINEERING (continued)	
	I. Symposia and Conferences	28
	J. Vibration and Acoustics	28
	K. Field Operations	28
	L. Aerodynamics	28
V	METALLURGY	
	A. Solid State Metallurgy	29
	B. Metallography and Structure	29
	C. Mechanical and Thermal Metallurgy	29
	D. Chemical Metallurgy	29
	E. Process Metallurgy	30
	F. Symposia and Conferences	30

I P H Y S I C S

A. Astronomy and Geophysics

- 1478:3. Thermal Radiation from the Sun at 8.5 - Millimeter Wavelength by F. H. Mitchell, R. N. Whitehurst and R. R. Weaver. 20 November 1957, 6 p., figures. (University of Alabama, Department of Physics, Technical Report No. 3, Contract No. DA-01-009-ORD-456).
- 1482:4. A Note on the Analysis of the Old Climax Coronal Plates, by D. E. Billings. 3 September 1957, 49 p., tables. (University of Colorado, Report No. HAO-37, Contract No. DA-23-072-ORD-929).
- 1482:5. Intensity of Coronal Emission Lines, by Richard T. Hansen. 21 February 1958, various paging. (University of Colorado, Final Report, Contract No. DA-23-072-ORD-929).

B. Atomic and Molecular Physics

- 291:23. Electron Spin Resonance Studies of Radiation Damage to Amino Acids, by Howard Shields and Walter Gordy. 20 p., figures. (Duke University, Department of Physics, Progress Report No. 23: 1 November 1957 - 1 February 1958, Contract No. DA-36-034-ORD-1233).
- 434:13. Valence Band Spectra of the Metals in the 3d Transition Group, by D. H. Tomboulion. January 1958, 23 p., figures. (Cornell University, Department of Physics, Contract No. DA-30-115-ORD-669).
- 845:11. Mass Loss in Barrels of Ballistic Accelerators, by C. R. Whited and W. S. Partridge. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of Applied Physics, Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-451).
- 845:12. Ionization in the Trail of High-Velocity Pellets, by William S. Partridge and L. Dale Harris, in the Journal of Applied Physics, vol. 28, no. 11 (19 November 1957), p. 1269 - 1271, Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-451.
- 845:13. Time Lag Between High-Speed Pellets and the Ionization in Their Trails, by R. A. Davidson and W. S. Partridge, in the Journal of Applied Physics, vol. 28, no. 11 (November 1957), p. 1304 - 1308, Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-451).
- 845:14. Time Delay Between High-Speed Pellets and Associated Luminosity and Ionization, by P. E. Tucker and R. A. Davidson and W. S. Partridge. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of Applied Physics, Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-451).

I P H Y S I C S

B. Atomic and Molecular Physics (continued)

- 845:15. Ionization by Ultra-Speed Pellets, by Charles D. Hendricks, Jr., in the Journal of Applied Physics, vol. 28, no. 11 (November 1957), p. 1339-1341, Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-451).
- 1505:4. Design and Construction of a Vacuum-Grating Spectrograph for the Infrared, by John A. Herndon and Alvin H. Nielsen. 2 December 1957, 122 p., figures, tables. (The University of Tennessee, Departments of Physics and Chemistry, Technical Report No. 2, Contract No. DA-33-008-ORD-1166).
- 1505:5. The Infrared Spectra and Potential Constants of $N^{14}O_2$ and $N^{15}O_2$, by Edward Arakawa and Alvin H. Nielsen. 5 December 1957, 133 p., figures, tables. (University of Tennessee, Departments of Physics and Chemistry, Technical Report No. 3, Contract No. DA-33-008-ORD-1166).
- 1505:6. Infrared Spectrum of Formyl Fluoride, by Roy F. Stratton and Alvin H. Nielsen. 5 December 1957, 159 p., figures, tables. (The University of Tennessee, Departments of Physics and Chemistry, Technical Report No. 4, Contract No. DA-33-008-ORD-1166).
- 1505:7. The Infrared Spectra of Dimethyl Sulfide; Dimethyl Disulfide and Dimethyl Trisulfide, by Barbara Jean Miley and William H. Fletcher. 15 January 1958, 35 p., figures, tables. (University of Tennessee, Departments of Physics and Chemistry, Technical Report No. 5, Contract No. DA-33-008-ORD-1166).
- 1523:1. Emission Lines from Preionized Levels in Krypton and Xenon, by M. Thekaekara and G. H. Dieke. (Manuscript submitted to the Physical Review, Contract No. DA-36-034-ORD-2037).
- 1624:4. Ionization Potentials of Ammonia and Some Amines, by K. Watanabe and Joseph R. Mottl, in the Journal of Chemical Physics, vol. 26, no. 6 (June 1957), p. 1773-1774, Contract No. DA-04-200-ORD-480.
- 1624:5. Absorption and Photoionization Coefficient of Furan Vapor, by K. Watanabe and Toshio Nakayama. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of Chemical Physics, Contract No. DA-04-200-ORD-480).
- 1816:2. Preservation of Spin State in Free Atom-Inert Surface Collisions, by H. G. Robinson, E. S. Ensberg and H. G. Dehmelt, in the Journal of the American Physical Society, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 9; Technical Report No. 2: 1 April - 13 November 1957, Contract No. DA-04-200-ORD-620.

I P H Y S I C S

C. Cosmic Rays and Elementary Particles

- 531:14. Proposed Experiment Bearing Directly on Helicity of Neutrinos, by Lorne A. Page. (Manuscript submitted to Il Nuovo Cimento, Contract No. DA-36-061-ORD-559).
- 531:15. Annihilation Method for Measuring Transverse Polarization of Energetic Positrons, by Lorne A. Page. (Manuscript submitted to the Physical Review, Contract No. DA-36-061-ORD-559).

D. Cryogenics and Liquids

- 787:9. Unsolved Problems in Acoustics and the Liquid State, by Theodore Litovitz. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, Contract No. DA-36-034-ORD-1221).
- 787:10. Ultrasonic Velocity in the Liquid-Glass Transition Region, by T. A. Litovitz and T. Lyon. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, Contract No. DA-36-034-ORD-1221).
- 1508:2. The Study of Progressive Ultrasonic Waves by Means of Light Refraction, by M. A. Brezeale and E. A. Hiedemann. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, Contract No. DA-20-018-ORD-13854).

E. Gases and Gaseous Electronics

- 442:7. Dissociation Limit of O_2 , by P. L. Randolph and R. Geballe. 21 January 1958, 5 p., figures. (University of Washington, Technical Report No. 5, Contract No. DA-04-200-ORD-664).
- 623:4. The Effect of Mercury on a Metal High Vacuum Valve, by Robert H. McFarland, Richard Anderson and Joseph Wells. (Manuscript submitted to the Review of Scientific Instruments, Contract No. DA-23-072-ORD-1012).
- 623:5. A Study of the Effectiveness of a Copper Foil Trap for Mercury Vapor in Vacuum, by Robert H. McFarland and Donald G. McDonald. (Manuscript submitted to the Review of Scientific Instruments, Contract No. DA-23-072-ORD-1012).
- 623:6. An Improved U. V. Filter for Isolation of the 2537A line of a Mercury Low Pressure Lamp, by Robert McFarland, Richard A. Anderson and others. (Manuscript submitted to the Review of Scientific Instruments, Contract No. DA-23-072-ORD-1012).

I P H Y S I C S

E. Gases and Gaseous Electronics (continued)

- 1543:6. Thermodynamic Studies of Some Gaseous Metallic Carbides, by M. G. Inghram. 31 December 1957, 8 p., tables. (University of Chicago, Technical Report No. 6, Contract No. DA-11-022-ORD-1993).

F. General Physics

- 1571:8. Topological Formulas for Active Networks, by Wataru Mayeda. 30 January 1958, 48 p., figures, tables. (University of Illinois, Technical Report No. 8, Contract No. DA-11-022-ORD-1983).

G. InstrumentationH. Nuclear Physics

- 893:42. Energy Dependence of Reactions at Thresholds, by G. Breit, in the Physical Review, vol. 107, no. 6 (September 1957), p. 1612-1615. (Technical Report No. 40, Contract No. DA-19-059-ORD-1447).
- 893:43. Velocity Dependent Features of a Static Nucleon-Nucleon Potential, by G. Breit. (Manuscript submitted to the Physical Review, Contract No. DA-19-059-ORD-1447).
- 1353:12. Nuclear Scattering of Nucleons and Antinucleons, by Hans Peter Duerr. Not Dated, 15 p., figures. (University of California, Department of Physics, Technical Report No. 8, Contract No. DA-04-200-ORD-171, T.O. 11).
- 1353:13. Interaction of Antiprotons with Complex Nuclei, by A. E. Glassgold. Not Dated, 15 p., figures, tables. (University of California, Physics Department, Technical Report No. 9, Contract No. DA-04-200-ORD-171, T.O. 11).
- 1488:7. Measurement and Analysis of Reactivity Values of Control Rods, by Thomas LeRoy Jackson. 1958, 88 p., figures, tables. (North Carolina State College, MS Thesis, Contract No. DA-36-034-ORD-1656).

I. Optics and Photography

- 1601:3. Theory of the Phase Contrast Principle, by A. G. Smith, M. J. Saunders and others. 31 January 1958, 81 p., figures, tables. (University of Florida, Final Report, Contract No. DA-01-009-ORD-469).

I P H Y S I C S

J. Solid State Physics

- 421:17. The Superconducting Transition in Aluminum: Part II, by John F. Cochran and D. E. Mapother. (Manuscript submitted to the Physical Review, Contract No. DA-11-022-ORD-992).
- 421:18. The Isotope Effect on the Superconducting Transition in Lead, by R. R. Hake, D. E. Mapother, and D. L. Decker. (Manuscript submitted to the Physical Review, Contract No. DA-11-022-ORD-992).
- 431:23. Theory of the Anomalous Skin Effect in Normal and Superconducting Metals, by D. C. Mattis and J. Bardeen. (Manuscript submitted to the Physical Review, Contract No. DA-11-022-ORD-1001).
- 431:24. The Meissner Effect and Gauge Invariance, by G. Rickayzen. (Manuscript submitted to the Physical Review, Contract No. DA-11-022-ORD-1001).
- 826:10. Compression and Densities of Four Solidified Hydrocarbons and Carbon Tetrafluoride at 77°K, by John W. Stewart and Ralph I. La Rock. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of Chemical Physics, Contract No. DA-36-034-ORD-2219).
- 1176:9. Research and Development of Electron Density Distribution in Semi-Conductors, by G. A. Jeffrey. September 1957, 52 p., figures, tables. (University of Pittsburgh, Technical Report, Contract No. DA-36-061-ORD-516).
- 1190:1. Thermionic Ions from Hydrogen-Palladium, by C. H. Bachman and P. A. Silberg. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of Applied Physics, Contract No. DA-30-115-ORD-643).
- 1190:2. Diffusion of Hydrogen in Palladium, by P. A. Silberg and C. H. Bachman. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of Applied Physics, Contract No. DA-30-115-ORD-643).
- 1190:3. Apparatus for the Production of CdS Crystals by Coevaporation in a Vacuum, by C. H. Bachman and R. J. Miller. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of Applied Physics, Contract No. DA-30-115-ORD-643).
- 1190:4. The Production of Cadmium Sulfide Crystals by Coevaporation in a Vacuum, by R. J. Miller and C. H. Bachman. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of Applied Physics, Contract No. DA-30-115-ORD-643).

I P H Y S I C S

J. Solid State Physics (continued)

- 1689:1. Lack of Metallic Transition in LiH and LiAlH_4 Under Static Pressure, by D. T. Griggs, W. G. McMillan, E. D. Michael and others. (Manuscript submitted to the Physical Review, Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-785).
- 1722:2. Optical Properties of Al for $h\nu$ between 10 and 26 ev, by W. C. Walker, Jr., A. R. Samson, and O. R. Rustgi, in the Journal of the Optical Society of America, vol 48, no. 1 (January 1958), p. 71, Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-846.
- 1729:2. Rayleigh Scattering from Charged Dislocation Lines in Sodium Chloride Crystals, by C. A. Plint, O. Theimer, and W. A. Sibley. (Manuscript submitted to the Philosophical Magazine, Contract No. DA-23-072-ORD-1089).
- 1845:1. Semiconducting Properties of Boron, by Vincent P. Jacobsmeyer, S. J., Frank L. Gebhart, and Edward F. Juenke. 54 p., figures, tables. (St. Louis University, Final Report: 1 February 1957 - 31 January 1958, Contract No. DA-23-072-ORD-1101).
- I-68:1. Mass Spectrometric Analysis of Low Concentration HD in Mixtures with Hydrogen, by Edward R. Washwell, William J. McMahon, and Arthur Kant. November 1957, 6 p., figures, tables. (Watertown Arsenal Laboratories, Technical Report 833/7).

II C H E M I S T R Y

A. Chemical Engineering and Materials

- 349:10. Intermolecular Correlation in Light Scattering from Dilute Polymer Solutions, by Andreas C. Albrecht, in Journal of Chemical Physics, vol. 27, no. 5 (November 1957), p. 1014-1023. Contract No. DA-19-020-ORD-1545.
- 349:11. Random Flight Model in the Theory of the Second Virial Coefficient of Polymer Solutions, by Andreas C. Albrecht, in the Journal of Chemical Physics, vol. 27, no. 5 (November 1957), p. 1002-1013, Contract No. DA-19-020-ORD-1545.
- 834:29. Studies of the Decomposition Mechanism, Erosive Burning, Sonance and Resonance for Solid Composite Propellants, by R. Schultz, L. Green, Jr. and S. S. Penner. (Manuscript submitted to the Third AGARD Combustion and Propulsion Colloquium in Palermo, Italy, Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-446).
- 834:30. The Theory of Monopropellant Droplet Burning, by F. Williams. February 1958, 108 p., figures, tables. (California Institute of Technology, Technical Report No. 21, Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-446).
- 834:31. Apparent Emission Intensities from a Wrinkled Laminar Flame Model of a Turbulent Flame, by A. E. Fuhs. March 1958, 38 p., figures. (California Institute of Technology, Technical Report No. 22, Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-446).
- 834:32. An Elementary Derivation of the Multicomponent Diffusion Equation, by F. A. Williams. (Manuscript submitted to the American Journal of Physics, Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-446).
- 907:4. Gas Compressibilities with the Burnett Apparatus, by I. H. Silberberg and K. A. Kobe. 1 January 1958, 23 p., figures, tables. (The University of Texas, Contract No. DA-23-072-ORD-685).
- 1430:9. Dielectric Dispersion of Solutions of High Polymers, by Philip C. Scherer. 6 p., figures. (Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Quarterly Progress Report No. 9: 15 August 1957 - 15 November 1957, Contract No. DA-36-034-ORD-1943).
- 1430:10. Dielectric Dispersion of Solutions of High Polymers, by Philip C. Scherer. 17 p., figures, tables. (Virginia Polytechnic Institute Quarterly Progress Report No. 10: 15 November 1957 - 15 February 1958, Contract No. DA-034-ORD-1943).

II C H E M I S T R Y

B. Combustion and Fuel ChemistryC. Deterioration PreventionD. Electrochemistry and Corrosion

- 873:7. Initiation of Styrene Polymerization at a Cathode, by Jacob Kleinberg and W. E. McEwen. 3 p. (University of Kansas, Department of Chemistry, Technical Report No. 7: 1 May 1957 - 31 August 1957, Contract No. DA-23-072-ORD-1048).
- 873:8. Anodic Reductions. IV. Reduction of Nitrobenzene, Nitrosobenzene, Azoxybenzene and Azobenzene, by John Y. Yang, William E. McEwen and Jacob Kleinberg. 15 p. (University of Kansas, Department of Chemistry, Technical Report No. 8: 1 August 1956 - 15 October 1957, Contract No. DA-23-072-ORD-1048).
- 1486:7. Impedence and Polarization Measurements in Fused Lithium Chloride-Potassium Chloride, by H. A. Laitinen and H. C. Gaur, in the Journal of the Electrochemical Society, vol. 104, no. 12 (December 1957), p. 730-737, Contract No. DA-11-022-ORD-1987).
- 1541:1. Radiotracer Studies of Metal-Metal Ion Exchange I. Cadmium, by Cecil V. King and Robert Skomoroski. February 1958, 28 p., figures, tables. (New York University, Technical Report No. 1, Contract No. DA-30-069-ORD-1682).
- 1541:2. Radiotracer Studies of Metal-Metal Ion Exchange II. Iron, by Cecil V. King and Robert Skomorski. March 1958, 20 p. (New York University, Technical Report No. 2, Contract No. DA-30-069-ORD-1682).
- 1541:3. Radiotracer Studies of Metal-Metal Ion Exchange III. Zinc, by Cecil V. King and Sheldon Evans. April 1958, 18 p., figures, tables. (New York University, Technical Report No. 3, Contract No. DA-30-069-ORD-1682).

E. Explosives and Propellants

- 1422:19. Reactions of Sodium Phenylacetylide and Sodium Alkoxide with Tosyl and Mesyl Azides by J. H. Boyer, C. H. Mack, N. Goebel and others. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of Organic Chemistry, Contract No. DA-01-009-ORD-428).
- 1422:20. A One-Step Transformation of Acetophenone into Benzaldehyde, by J. H. Boyer. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of the American Chemical Society, Contract No. DA-01-009-ORD-428).

II C H E M I S T R Y

F. Inorganic and Analytical Chemistry

- 1171:2. Studies of Thermal Decomposition of Chlorates and Perchlorates at Constant Temperatures and Pressures, by Aubrey E. Harvey. 17 p., figures, tables. (University of Arkansas, Department of Chemistry, Final Summary Report: 1 September 1954 - 31 January 1958, Contract No. DA-23-072-ORD-1049).
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(continued)
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(continued)
Suppl List 1

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(continued)
Suppl List 1

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(continued)
Suppl List 1

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(continued)
Suppl List 1

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- 1469:2. Simplification of Systems of Linear Differential Equations Involving A Turning Point, by H. L. Turritin and W. A. Harris, Jr. 13 December 1957, 35 p. (University of Minnesota, Technical Report No. 2, Contract No. DA-11-022-ORD-2042).
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(continued)
Suppl List 1

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(continued)
Suppl List 1

III M A T H E M A T I C S

F. Numerical and Graphical Methods (continued)

- 1210:51. Determination of Three Percentiles of the Wn Distribution Function, by Bernard Sherman, in the Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery, vol. 4, no. 4 (October 1957), p. 472-476, Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-559).
- 1210:52. Mathematics: Polynomials of Best Approximation on a Real Finite Point Set, by J. L. Walsh and T. S. Motzkin, in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 43, no. 9 (September 1957), p. 845-846, Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-559).
- 1210:53. A Sturmian Theorem for Partial Differential Equations, by R. M. Redheffer, in the Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 8, no. 3 (June 1957), p. 458-462, Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-559).
- 1210:54. On Paris of Harmonic Functions, by R. M. Redheffer, in the Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 8, no. 3 (June 1957), p. 450-457, Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-559).
- 1210:55. Inversion of Matrices by Biorthogonalization and Related Results, by Magnus R. Hestenes. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-559).
- 1210:56. Maximizing Functions of Rotations-Experiments Concerning Speed of Diagonalization of Symmetric Matrices Using Jacobi's Method, by David A. Pope and C. Tompkins, in the Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery, vol. 4, no. 4 (October 1957), p. 459-466, Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-559).
- 1210:57. Solution of a Heat Equation for a Bounded Line by a Method Involving Sine Transforms, by C. Tompkins. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery, Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-559).
- 1210:58. On the Behavior of the Solution of the Dirichlet Problem at Analytic Corners, by Pentti Laasonen, in Annals Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae, Series A. I. Mathematica, 241 (1957), p. 1-12, Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-559).

G. Probability and Statistics

- 362:27. Effect of Expansion of the Universe on the Distribution of Images of Galaxies on Photographic Plates--A Simplified Model, by Martin Fox. (Manuscript submitted to the Astronomical Journal, Contract No. DA-04-200-ORD-171, T. O. 3).

III M A T H E M A T I C S

G. Probability and Statistics (continued)

- 362:28. Contributions to the Statistical Theory of Cloud Chamber Data, by Robert Richard Read. (Manuscript submitted for publication, Contract No. DA-04-200-ORD-171, T. O. 3).
- 362:29. A Counterexample to a Theorem of Kolmogorov, by Leo Breiman, in the Annals of Mathematical Statistics, vol. 28, no. 3 (September 1957), p. 811-814, Contract No. DA-04-200-ORD-171, T. O. 3).
- 362:30. Densities for Stochastic Processes, by Charlotte T. Striebel. (Manuscript submitted to the Annals of Mathematical Statistics, Contract No. DA-04-200-ORD-171, T. O. 3).
- 362:31. On a Locally Most Powerful Similar Test for the Independence of Two Poisson Variables, by Mohamed Salahuddin Ahmed. Not Dated, 73 p. (University of California, PhD Thesis; also submitted to the Annals of Mathematical Statistics under the title "On a Locally Most Powerful Boundary Randomized Similar Test for the Independence of Two Poisson Variables," Contract No. DA-04-200-ORD-171, T. O. 3).
- 832:19. Some Results on the Probability Distribution of the Latent Roots of a Symmetric Matrix of Continuously Distributed Elements, and Some Applications to the Theory of Response Surface Estimation, by H. R. van der Vaart. January 1958, 40 p. (University of North Carolina, Technical Report No. 18, Contract No. DA-36-034-ORD-1517).
- 832:20. The Comparison of Regression Variables, by Evan J. Williams. April 1958, 13 p. (University of North Carolina, Technical Report No. 19, Contract No. DA-36-034-ORD-1517).
- 1166:37. Lectures on the Theory of Least Squares, by R. Lowell Wine and William A. Glenn. December 1957, 176 p. (Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Technical Report No. 35, Contract No. DA-36-034-ORD-1527).
- 1175:9. Research in Unbiased Estimation, Integral Equations with Unknown Distribution Functions, and Non-Parametric Methods, by Julius R. Blum. 1 February 1958, 12 p. (Indiana University Foundation Research Division, Technical Report No. 8, Contract No. DA-33-008-ORD-965).
- 1715:9. The Propagation of Errors, Fluctuations and Tolerances - Supplementary Formulas, by John W. Tukey. Not Dated, 14 p., tables. (Princeton University, Department of Mathematics, Technical Report No. 11, Contract No. DA-36-034-ORD-2297).

(continued)
Suppl List 1

III M A T H E M A T I C S

G. Probability and Statistics (continued)

- 1715:10. The Propagation of Errors, Fluctuations and Tolerances. 3 - An Exercise in Partial Differentiation, by John Tukey. Not Dated, 72 p., figures, tables. (Princeton University, Department of Mathematics, Technical Report No. 12, Contract No. DA-36-034-ORD-2297).
- 1715:11. The Propagation of Errors, Fluctuations and Tolerances-Basic Generalized Formulas, by John W. Tukey. Not Dated, Various paging. (Princeton University, Department of Mathematics, Technical Report No. 10, Contract No. DA-36-034-ORD-2297).
- 1715:12. Some General Considerations in Process Optimisation, by G. E. P. Box. Not Dated, 28 p., figures. (Princeton University, Department of Mathematics, Technical Report No. 13, Contract No. DA-36-034-ORD-2297).
- 1840:2. A Characterization of the Normal Distribution, by S. G. Ghurye and I. Olkin. 15 October 1957, 6 p. (Michigan State University, Technical Report No. 8, Contract No. DA-20-018-ORD-14735).
- 1840:3. An Inequality Satisfied by the Gamma Function, by Ingram Olkin. 9 December 1957, 4 p. (Michigan State University, Technical Report No. 9, Contract No. DA-20-018-ORD-14735).
- 1840:4. A Class of Integral Identities with Matrix Argument, by Ingram Olkin. 5 February 1958, 12 p. (Michigan State University, Technical Report No. 10, Contract No. DA-20-018-ORD-14735).
- I-88:1. A Statistical Distribution Applicable to Certain Redundant Systems, by Helen J. Coon and Frank E. Grubbs. September 1957, 22 p., figures, tables. (Ballistic Research Laboratories, Report No. 1099).

H. Operations Analysis

- 968:15. Calculation of Non-Stationary Queuing Probabilities for Landing Congestion of Aircraft, by Clyde Wheeler and Herbert P. Galliher. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of the Operations Research Society of America, Contract No. DA-19-020-ORD-2684).
- 968:16. Monte Carlo Simulation Studies, by Herbert P. Galliher. (Manuscript submitted to the Proceedings of the Symposium on System Simulation, Contract No. DA-19-020-ORD-2684).

III M A T H E M A T I C S

H. Operations Analysis (continued)

- 968:17. A High-Speed Computer Technique for the Transportation Problem, by Jack B. Dennis. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery, Contract No. DA-19-020-ORD-2684).

IV ENGINEERING

A. Combustion and FuelsB. Fluid Mechanics

- 1074:5. Flow Behavior of Concentrated (Dilatant) Suspensions, by A. B. Metzner and Malcolm Whitlock. (Manuscript submitted to the Society of Rheology, Contract No. DA-36-034-ORD-1495).
- 1074:6. Turbulent Heat Transfer Inside Tubes, by W. L. Friend and A. B. Metzner. (Manuscript submitted to the American Institute of Chemical Engineers Journal, Contract No. DA-36-034-ORD-1495).

C. Friction and LubricationD. Heat and Mass Transfer

- 1366:3. Heat Transfer to Boiling Liquids under Conditions of High Temperature Difference and Forced Convection, by S. Rankin. 20 February 1958, 80 p., figures, tables. (University of Delaware, Department of Chemical Engineering, Final Report UD-FB-13, Contract No. DA-36-034-ORD-1797).
- 1540:3. Results of Oil Quenching Experiments, by Victor Paschkis. Not Dated, 7 p., figures, tables. (Columbia University, Technical Report No. 6, Contract No. DA-30-069-ORD-1621).
- 1540:4. Numerical Evaluation Techniques, by Victor Paschkis. 15 November 1957, 22 p., figures, tables. (Columbia University, Technical Report No. 5, Contract No. DA-30-069-ORD-1621).

E. Human Engineering

- 1492:5. Controlled Contact Cutting Tools, by B. T. Chao and K. J. Trigger. (Manuscript submitted to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Contract No. DA-11-022-ORD-1980).

F. Measurement and Control

- 1538:4. Compensation of Nonlinear Feedback Systems by Means of An Inexact Model, by Kenneth R. Kaplan and John G. Truxal. 8 January 1958, 9 p., figures. (Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn, Contract No. DA-30-069-ORD-1560).
- 1586:1. Some Topological Considerations in Electrical Circuit Theory, by F. M. Reza. September 1957, 54 p., figures. (Syracuse University Research Institute, Technical Report No. 1, Contract No. DA-30-115-ORD-722).

IV ENGINEERING

G. Materials and Material Processing

- 1282:6. Curved Bar and Related Problems Involving Plastic Flow, by Bernard W. Shaffer. February 1958, 7 p. (New York University: Final Report, Contract No. DA-30-069-ORD-1398).
- 1282:7. Mechanics of the Sheet-Bending Process, by Bernard W. Shaffer and Eric E. Ungar. January 1958, 19 p., figures. (New York University, Technical Report No. 6, Contract No. DA-30-069-ORD-1398).

H. Solid Mechanics

- 1235:4. The Transition Temperature in a Notched Bar Impact Test, by J. A. Hendrickson, D. S. Wood, and D. S. Clark. March 1958, 35 p., figures. (California Institute of Technology, Technical Report No. 4; also submitted to the American Society for Metals, Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-171).
- 1253:11. Problems of Spherical Stress Waves in Materials, by Donald E. Dawson. 15 September 1957, 36 p., figures, tables. (The Pennsylvania State University, Technical Report No. 11, Contract No. DA-36-061-ORD-465).
- 1253:12. Stress Waves of Penetration in Plates, by Norman Davids. 1 February 1958, 20 p., figures. (Pennsylvania State University, Technical Report No. 12, Contract No. DA-36-061-ORD-465).
- 1253:13. Scabbing in Bars and Plates-Further Studies, by Sudhir Kumar. 1 March 1958, 19 p., figures. (Pennsylvania State University, Technical Report No. 13, Contract No. DA-36-061-ORD-465).
- 1283:5. Studies in Photoplasticity, by M. M. Frocht and R. A. Thomson. December 1957, 15 p., figures. (Illinois Institute of Technology, Technical Report No. 5, Contract No. DA-11-022-ORD-1609).
- 1283:6. A Non-Destructive Method for Three-Dimensional Photoelasticity, by M. M. Frocht and L. S. Srinath. December 1957, 12 p., figures. (Illinois Institute of Technology, Technical Report No. 6, Contract No. DA-11-022-ORD-1609).
- 1348:6. A Statistical Method for Determining Fatigue Strengths with a Limited Number of Specimens, by J. J. Coleman and W. N. Findley. June 1957, 21 p., figures. (Brown University, Technical Report No. 5, Contract No. DA-19-020-ORD-3520).

IV ENGINEERING

H. Solid Mechanics (continued)

- 1563:1. The Elasticity Solution of a Long Circular Cylindrical Shell Subjected to a Uniform Circumferential Radial Line Load, by Jerome M. Klosner and Frederick V. Pohle. July 1957, 42 p., figures, tables. (Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn, Final Report, Contract No. DA-30-069-ORD-1723).
- 1969:1. Analysis of Shells of Revolution Composed of Work-Hardening Material, by E. T. Onat. January 1958, 34 p., figures. (Brown University, Technical Report No. 1, Contract No. DA-19-020-ORD-4564).
- I-1:1. Terrain Evaluation in Automotive Off-The-Road Operations, by M. G. Bekker. March 1957, 23 p., figures. (Ordnance Tank Automotive Command, Report No. 13).
- I-1:2. Mobility on Land, Challenge and Invitation, by M. G. Bekker. May 1957, 12 p., figures. (Ordnance Tank Automotive Command, Report No. 15).
- I-1:3. Study of Snow Values Related to Vehicle Performance, by William L. Harrison, Jr. December 1957, 32 p., figures. (Ordnance Tank Automotive Command, Technical Report No. 23).
- I-71:1. Singularities in the Plane Theory of Elasticity. Part I. by Oscar L. Bowie. March 1958, 44 p. (Watertown Arsenal Laboratories, WAL TR 893/203).

I. Symposia and ConferencesJ. Vibration and AcousticsK. Field OperationsL. Aerodynamics

- 1600:18. Measurement of Turbulent Heat Transfer Rates on the Aft Portion and Blunt Base of a Hemisphere-Cylinder in the Shock Tube, by Josef Rabinowicz. 1 November 1957, 24 p., figures. (California Institute of Technology, Memorandum No. 41; also submitted to Jet Propulsion, Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-19).

V M E T A L L U R G I C A L S C I E N C E S

A. Solid State Metallurgy

- 157:17. A Study of Reversion Phenomena in the Carbon-Alpha-Iron System, by Donald Keefer and Charles Wert. (Manuscript submitted to Transactions of the AIME, Contract No. DA-11-022-ORD-1731).
- 906:7. Liquid Tin Solution Calorimeter for Measuring Heats of Formation of Alloys, by Raymond L. Orr, Alfred Goldberg and Ralph Hultgren, in the Review of Scientific Instruments, vol. 28, no. 10 (October 1957), p. 767-773. (Technical Report No. 5, Contract No. DA-04-200-ORD-171, T. O. 8).

B. Metallography and StructureC. Mechanical and Thermal MetallurgyD. Chemical Metallurgy

- 1425:9. On the Thermodynamics of the III-V Compounds InSb, GaSb and InAs, by W. F. Schottky and M. B. Bever. 23 p., figures, tables. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Report No. 9: 1 August 1956 - 31 July 1957, Contract No. DA-19-020-ORD-3661).
- 1425:10. Phase Relations in the System Ag-Sb-S at 400°C, by Jan Barstad. 10 p., figures, tables. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Report No. 10: 1 October 1956 - 31 May 1957, Contract No. DA-19-020-ORD-3661).
- 1425:11. The Formation of Ag_3SbS_3 and AgSbS_2 from Ag_2S and Sb_2S_3 by Solid State Reactions at 400°C, by A. G. Verduch and Carl Wagner. 10 p., figures, tables. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Report No. 11: 1 January 1956 - 30 June 1957, Contract No. DA-19-020-ORD-3661).
- 1425:12. Outline of Investigations on the Reaction of Silver-Antimony Alloys with Sulfur, by Carl Wagner. 21 p., figures. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Report No. 12: 1 April 1957 - 31 July 1957, Contract No. DA-19-020-ORD-3661).
- 1425:13. Determination of the Electronic Conductivity in Silver Halides by Means of Polarization Measurements, by Bernhard Ilschner. 13 p., figures, tables. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Report No. 13: 15 January 1957 - 15 December 1957, Contract No. DA-19-020-ORD-3661).

V METALLURGICAL SCIENCES

D. Chemical Metallurgy (continued)

- 1425:14. Electrical Conductivity of Liquid Magnesium-Bismuth Alloys, by Bernhard Ilschner and Carl Wagner. 4 p., figures. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Metallurgy, Report No. 14: 1 July 1957 - 31 December 1957, Contract No. DA-19-020-ORD-3661).

E. Process Metallurgy

- 1472:2. Micrographic Study of the Growth of Crystals by Condensation from the Vapor Phase In the Case of Cadmium, by André Accary and Robert F. Mehl, in The Proceedings of Academie des Sciences, t. 244 (May 1957), p. 2713-2716, Contract No. DA-36-061-ORD-530.
- 1567:1. Investigation of the Kinetics and Mechanism Involved in the Hydrogen Reduction of Metal Halide Vapors, by H. S. Spacil and J. Wulff. 31 January 1958, 55 p., figures. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Final Report, Contract No. DA-19-020-ORD-3760).
- 1657:2. The Measurement of Grain Contiguity in Two-Phase Alloys, by J. Gurland. November 1957, 14 p., figures. (Brown University, Technical Report No. 2, Contract No. DA-19-020-ORD-3976).

F. Symposia and Conferences


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ANNUAL CONSOLIDATED REPORT ON
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

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Office of the Chief of Ordnance
Research and Development Division



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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

PROJECT 599-01-004

ORDNANCE BASIC RESEARCH

VOLUME II, PART 2
TERMINATED CONTRACTS, 1957

OFFICE OF ORDNANCE RESEARCH, U. S. ARMY
BOX CM, DUKE STATION
DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA

CSCRD-1

ANNUAL CONSOLIDATED REPORT ON
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Office of the Chief of Ordnance
Research and Development Division

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
PROJECT 599-01-004
ORDNANCE BASIC RESEARCH

Volume II, Part 2
Terminated Contracts, 1957

OFFICE OF ORDNANCE RESEARCH, U. S. ARMY
Box CM, Duke Station
DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA

F O R E W O R D

Volume II Part 2 of the Annual Report of the Office of Ordnance Research contains progress summaries and technical report listings for contracts terminating during Calendar Year 1957. This publication is a continuation of Volume II of the Annual Report for 1956, which listed contracts terminating during the period 1951-1956, and is paged consecutively with that report. The indexes provided in the rear of this part of the 1957 Annual Report are complete indexes of all terminated projects from 1951 through 1957.

It is hoped that indexes, progress summaries, and listings of technical reports may be of assistance in the continued retrieval of the scientific information produced under the Ordnance Basic Research Program.

GEORGE F. LEIST
Colonel, Ordnance Corps
Commanding

15 April 1958

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	PHYSICS	643
	A. Astronomy and Geophysics	644
	B. Atomic and Molecular Physics	-
	C. Cosmic Rays and Elementary Particles	646
	D. Cryogenics and Liquids	647
	E. Gases and Gaseous Electronics	649
	F. General Physics	-
	G. Instrumentation	653
	H. Nuclear Physics	-
	I. Optics and Photography	656
	J. Solid State Physics	-
II.	CHEMISTRY	663
	A. Chemical Engineering and Materials	669
	B. Combustion and Fuel Chemistry	-
	C. Deterioration Prevention	672
	D. Electrochemistry and Corrosion	674
	E. Explosives and Propellants	678
	F. Inorganic and Analytical Chemistry	684
	G. Lubrication and Surface Phenomena	685
	H. Molecular Structure and Physical Properties	698
	I. Organic Chemistry	-
	J. Plastics and Polymers	705
	K. Reaction Kinetics and Equilibria	-
III.	MATHEMATICS	707
	A. Algebra and Number Theory	710
	B. Analysis	-
	C. Foundations and Game Theory	717
	D. Geometry and Topology	723
	E. Mechanics	724
	F. Numerical and Graphical Methods	728
	G. Probability and Statistics	731
	H. Operations Analysis	-
IV.	ENGINEERING SCIENCES	733
	A. Combustion and Fuels	737
	B. Fluid Mechanics	743
	C. Friction and Lubrication	749
	D. Heat and Mass Transfer	-
	E. Human Engineering	751
	F. Measurement and Control	-
	G. Materials and Material Processing	752
	H. Solid Mechanics	-
	I. Symposia and Conferences	-
	J. Vibration and Acoustics	-
	K. Field Operations	-
	L. Aerodynamics	771
V.	METALLURGICAL SCIENCES	773
	A. Solid State Metallurgy	-
	B. Metallography and Structure	-
	C. Mechanical and Thermal Metallurgy	777
	D. Chemical Metallurgy	-
	E. Process Metallurgy	780
	F. Symposia and Conferences	-
	INDEXES	783

I P H Y S I C S

A. Astronomy and Geophysics

1072 SEARCH FOR SMALL SATELLITES OF THE EARTH WITH A NEW OPTICAL INSTRUMENTATION TECHNIQUE

Contractor: Lowell Observatory
Flagstaff, Arizona

Chief Investigator: C. W. Tombaugh

Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-521
Duration: 29 December 1953 - 30 June 1956
Amount: \$ 26,375.16
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research

Scope: Research will be conducted, in cooperation with White Sands Proving Ground, which will have as its objective the development of object-following devices and techniques. The devices developed or assembled will be used to conduct a complete systematic search of the space about the earth for satellites. Suspects will be checked to ascertain if they are real or only film defects. An equatorial mount will be used with due allowances for parallax. Star trails will be used as reference marks for positions of satellite suspects. Wherever possible, the techniques developed will be further tried out through observance of other objects (small planetoids, small comets, and flare stars).

Progress (to 30 June 1956): A large number of photographs have been taken of several zones of the sky, with the direction and tracking rate of the telescope adjusted for each exposure to a reasonable satellite orbit. Suggestive images were recorded and some zones were rephotographed in an attempt to recover the satellite suspects. However, none of the suspects have been confirmed as a satellite. A new type of observational science has evolved in the course of the work, and results to date point out possible applications of new methods and knowledge to artificial satellites. Search equipment used in this study has been transferred to Quito, Ecuador, where the proximity of the equator will simplify the geometrical problems. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Proposed Geodetic Triangulation from an Unmanned Orbital Vehicle by Means of Satellite Search Technique, by Clyde W. Tombaugh. Not dated, 5 p. (Lowell Observatory).
2. Search for Small Earth Satellites, by Clyde W. Tombaugh. 29 p. (New Mexico College, Final Report: 1953 - 1956).

I PHYSICS

B. Atomic and Molecular Physics

1016 DETERMINATION OF MOLECULAR CONSTANTS BY MICROWAVE AND RADIO FREQUENCY SPECTROSCOPY

Contractor: Georgia Tech Research Institute
Engineering Experiment Station
Research Building, Institute of Technology
Atlanta, Georgia

Chief Investigators: T. L. Weatherly
J. Q. Williams

Contract No. DA-01-009-ORD-353	Renewed: DA-01-009-ORD-465
Duration: 1 Oct 53 - 31 Dec 55	1 Jan 1956 - 31 May 1957
Amount: \$ 33,438.88	\$ 21,888.08
Type of Contract: Fixed Price	Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research
Scientific Cognizance: Ballistic Research Laboratories; Picatinny Arsenal

Scope: Research will be conducted on the rotational constants, internuclear distances, bond angles, dipole moments, and nuclear quadrupole coupling of various molecules by several methods of microwave and radio-frequency spectroscopy. Study will in particular be made of nitrosyl bromide and nitryl chloride, and if possible, also of nitromethane, methyl nitrite, and nitroethane.

Progress (to 31 May 1957): A large number of chlorine compounds have been investigated for pure nuclear quadrupole resonance in the frequency region 20 to 45 mc, and resonance absorption lines were found in 14 of these. The work on microwave spectroscopy included the study of the microwave spectrum of NOBr and NO₂Cl in the region 20,000 to 40,000 mc. A complete analysis has been made of the $J = 2 \rightarrow 3$ transition for NOBr and the $J = 2 \rightarrow 3$ and $J = 3 \rightarrow 4$ transitions for NO₂Cl. The Stark effect for both molecules has also been studied. Calculations from the spectra give the rotational constants, moments of inertia, internuclear distances, bond angles, quadrupole coupling constants and dipole moments. The Stark effect for the $J = 2 \rightarrow 3$ transition of CClF₃ has also been observed and preliminary calculations have been made. Complete results are set forth in the technical reports listed below. The final report has been received and the project has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Nuclear Quadrupole Resonances in Some Chlorine Compounds, by J. Q. Williams and T. L. Weatherly, in Journal of Chemical Physics, vol. 22, no. 3 (March 1954), p. 572.

I PHYSICS

B. Atomic and Molecular Physics

1016 (continued)

2. Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance in Ethyl Chloroformate and Ethyl Trichloroacetate, by T. L. Weatherly and Quitman Williams, in Journal of Chemical Physics, vol. 22, no. 5 (May 1954), p. 958.
3. Microwave Spectrum and Molecular Constants of Nitrosyl Bromide, by T. L. Weatherly and Quitman Williams. 19 September 1955, 11 p. (Georgia Institute of Technology, Engineering Experiment Station, Technical Report No. 1; also submitted to Physical Review). ASTIA AD-72 188
4. The Stark Effect in the Rotational Spectrum of Nitrosyl Bromide, by D. F. Eagle, T. L. Weatherly and Quitman Williams. 2 October 1956, 6 p., figures, tables. (Georgia Institute of Technology, Engineering Experiment Station, Technical Report No. 2). ASTIA AD-108 268
5. Determination of Molecular Constants by Microwave and Radio Frequency Spectroscopy, by T. L. Weatherly, Quitman Williams and Lorimer Clayton, Jr. 63 p., figures, tables. (Georgia Institute of Technology, Engineering Experiment Station, Final Report: 1 October 1953 - 31 May 1957).

I PHYSICS

D. Cryogenics and Liquids

674 ABSORPTION OF ULTRASONIC ENERGY IN LIQUIDS

Contractor: Boston College
Chestnut Hill 67, Massachusetts

Chief Investigator: Frederick E. White

Contract No. DA-19-020-ORD-2569
Duration: 1 February 1953 - 1 December 1956
Amount: \$ 35,472.76
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research

Scope: Research will be performed in the absorption of ultrasonic energy in various liquids to obtain reliable data over wide ranges of frequency and temperature and to try to fit these data to existing theories or to develop a new theory of absorption. The range of temperature will be from 0° to 100°C or more, the frequency range from 1 to 300 mc/s or greater.

Progress (to 1 December 1956): Ultrasonic absorption in various liquids was measured over wide ranges of frequency and temperature. These measurements were made using a pulse rather than some other known method in order to avoid heating effects and any difficulties which might arise due to the presence of standing waves. The experimental procedure is explained in detail in technical report #1. Several liquids were studied, with particular emphasis on ethyl acetate. Data were obtained for carbon tetrachloride, toluene, ethyl acetate and methyl acetate at frequencies between 30 and 90 mc. Extensive work was done on ethyl acetate at the constant temperature 20°C at frequencies from 30 mc to 150 mc. Other measurements were made at constant frequency 136 mc varying the temperature from 0°C to 35°C. Results indicate agreement with those of Pinkerton for ethyl acetate in the frequency range 7.5 to 66.7 mc. Complete results are set forth in the report listed below. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Absorption of Ultrasonic Energy in Liquids, by Frederick E. White. 44 p., figures, tables. (Boston College, Department of Physics, Final Report: 2 February 1953 - 1 December 1956). ASTIA AD-118 798

I PHYSICS

E. Gases and Gaseous Electronics

838 QUENCHING OF FLUORESCENCE BY FOREIGN GASES OR VAPORS

Contractor: University of Minnesota
(The Regents of the University)
Minneapolis 14, Minnesota

Chief Investigator: Howard G. Hanson

Contract No. DA-11-022-ORD-1223
Duration: 1 March 1953 - 15 November 1956
Amount: \$ 20,517.63
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research

Scope: Continuation of a research program on the quenching fluorescence of sodium atoms by foreign gases or vapors such as H₂, N₂, CO₂, and H₂O. In particular, the work will include: (a) Completion of taking of data on the ratio of fluorescent intensities of the sodium D₁ and D₂ lines as it depends on quenching agents; (b) an extended measurement of the intensity of fluorescence of the NaI molecule as it depends on the wavelength of the exciting ultraviolet light--this in turn will be used to deduce the trend of the upper repulsive potential curve for an excited sodium atom together with an iodine atom; (c) further studies of the dependence of quenching on the relative velocity of the quenching molecule and excited sodium atom--the velocity of the excited sodium after dissociation is obtained from (b) above; and (d) development of a technique of rapid recording of fluorescent intensities as they depend on exciting wavelength of the ultraviolet light by use of an oscilloscope and recording camera.

Progress (to 15 November 1956): Necessary equipment has been set up for recording the intensity of NaI fluorescence as a function of time, and measurements have been made of the dependence of the quenching of H₂, CO₂, and HCl on the wavelength of the exciting light. The intensity distribution in the ultraviolet for the hydrogen discharge lamp and the high pressure xenon arc lamp have been determined. A method of producing a stream of NaI molecules has been devised which will permit interpreting the measurements of fluorescence as they depend on ultraviolet wavelength, and determining the repulsive potential curve for the NaI molecule along which the molecule dissociates. The intensity ratio D₂/D₁ for the Na doublet has been measured for radiation from excited Na atoms which result from the optical dissociation of NaI vapor by ultraviolet light in the 2000 to 2450 Å region. With shorter wavelength ultraviolet as the exciting source, the D₂/D₁ ratio was found to be approximately 1, and with the longer wavelengths the ratio was approximately 1.5. Addition of foreign gases such as argon or water vapor caused the D₂/D₁ ratio to increase to approximately 1.8. Cross sections for the transfer of excited Na atoms from the 3²P_{3/2} to the 3²P_{1/2} state and vice versa have been measured as

I PHYSICS

E. Gases and Gaseous Electronics

838 (continued)

they depend on the relative velocity of the excited sodium atoms with respect to the foreign gas atoms or molecules. A study has been made of the effects of Doppler broadening of the D_2 and D_1 lines separately. The absorption of the D_2 and D_1 lines from the atomic fluorescence of NaI by relatively cool Na vapor was measured to test whether a significant difference in the velocity of dissociation into the $3^2P_{3/2}$ and $3^2P_{1/2}$ states could be detected. Both components showed the same broadening within the accuracy of the experiment. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. The Quenching of Sodium Iodide Fluorescence by H_2 , HCl, CO_2 and H_2O , by Howard G. Hanson, in Journal of Chemical Physics, vol. 23, no. 8 (August 1955), p. 1391-1397. (A part of #3).
2. D_2/D_1 Ratio of Atomic Fluorescence of NaI, by H. G. Hanson. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of Chemical Physics). (A part of #3).
3. Quenching of Fluorescence by Foreign Gases and Vapors, by Howard G. Hanson. Various paging, figures, tables. (University of Minnesota, Final Report: 1 March 1953 - 15 November 1956, consisting of #1 and #2). ASTIA AD-118 739

I PHYSICS

F. General Physics

1013 MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF ANTENNA RADIATION

Contractor: Michigan State University
(Michigan State Board of Agriculture)
East Lansing, Michigan

Chief Investigator: Charles P. Wells

Contract No. DA-20-018-ORD-13354
Duration: 1 February 1954 - 30 June 1957
Amount: \$ 43,618.56
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Ballistic Research Laboratories
Scientific Cognizance: Signal Corps Engineering Laboratory

Scope: A mathematical study of the properties of unusual antennas will be continued and will include but not be limited to (a) extension of the calculations of the properties of spheroidal antennas to the case where $ka = 3, 4$, (b) applications of the Wiener-Hopf technique to the problem of the biconical antenna, (c) computation of the radiation patterns for the case of the plane wave at normal incidence to the axis of the spheroid, and (d) study of the problem of the sleeve dipole.

Progress (to 30 June 1957): Two main projects were undertaken in the course of this investigation: (1) the study of the radiating prolate spheroidal antenna and (2) the study of the Wiener-Hopf technique and its application to radiation problems. Center and off-center gap antennas were studied during the investigation of prolate spheroidal antennas. Expansions of the field components in terms of the spheroidal functions for arbitrary gap widths and locations were obtained. Using a step function voltage over the gap, radiation patterns were determined for spheroids of several different length width ratios, for $ka = 1, 2, 3$ and for various gap locations. It was found that for far field calculations, the small gap theory is adequate and that more refined calculations are unnecessary. The behavior of the integral equation for antennas was studied in detail using the prolate spheroid as the model. The integral equation was solved, but results on convergence of successive approximations were inconclusive. The problem of a plane wave normally incident on a prolate spheroid with its electric vector parallel to the axis of the spheroid was studied. In the investigation of problems in antenna radiation, work was begun by considering three scalar radiation problems where the mathematical techniques were the same as in vector radiation problems. The Wiener-Hopf method was applied together with the Lebedev integral transform and was successful in obtaining solutions in explicit form for the first of the three problems studied. In the second and third, however, the method was unsuccessful in obtaining explicit solutions.

I PHYSICS

F. General Physics

1013 (continued)

The Wiener-Hopf complex function method was again applied to the problem of the biconical antenna of arbitrary apex angle. The method led to an infinite linear system which has not been analyzed in detail. An expression for the input impedance has been formulated. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. On the Radiation by Disks and Conical Structures, by A. Leitner and C. P. Wells. August 1955, 40 p. (Michigan State University, Departments of Mathematics and Physics, Technical Report No. 1; also submitted to Institute of Radio Engineers). ASTIA AD-68 753 (mc)
2. The Integral Equation for the Prolate Spheroidal Antenna, by P. J. Wells and A. Leitner. September 1955, 29 p. (Michigan State University, Departments of Mathematics and Physics, Technical Report No. 2; also submitted to the Quarterly of Applied Mathematics). ASTIA AD-71 881
3. Radiation Patterns of Unsymmetrically Fed Prolate Spheroidal Antennas, by H. A. Myers, in I. R. E. Transactions on Antennas and Propagation, vol. AP-4, no. 1 (January 1956), p. 58-64. (Technical Report No. 3). ASTIA AD-101 084
4. The Prolate Spheroidal Antenna: Current and Impedance, by C. P. Wells. January 1957, various paging, figures, tables. (Michigan State University, Department of Mathematics, Technical Report No. 4; also submitted to the Institute of Radio Engineers Transactions). ASTIA AD-119 534
5. Diffraction of a Plane Electromagnetic Wave by a Thin Prolate Spheroid. Radiation Patterns, by C. P. Wells. April 1957, 10 p., figures. (Michigan State University, Technical Report No. 5).
6. Mathematical Theory of Antenna Radiation, by Charles P. Wells. 30 June 1957, 12 p., tables. (Michigan State University, Final Report).
7. Biconical Antenna, by J. A. Meier and A. Leitner. June 1957, 28 p. (Michigan State University, Departments of Mathematics and Physics, Technical Report No. 6).

I PHYSICS

F. General Physics

1201 PENETRATION OF BALLISTIC PROJECTILES

Contractor: University of South Carolina
Columbia 1, South Carolina

Chief Investigator: A. P. French

Contract No. DA-36-034-ORD-1531
Duration: 1 February 1954 - 30 September 1957
Amount: \$ 5,976.90
Type of Contract: Fixed Price

Primary Scientific Liaison: Ballistic Research Laboratories

Scope: Research on the penetration of ballistic projectiles into unconsolidated targets will be continued, and will include tests of penetration into additional types of soil-simulating materials under controlled conditions, and analysis of these tests in the light of theoretical work already accomplished.

Progress (to 30 September 1957): Studies to date have indicated that the penetration of non-deforming projectiles into glass spheres targets can, over the range of velocities studies, be described in terms of (a) a momentum transfer proportional to the projectile velocity, (b) a production of comminution proportional to the square of the projectile velocity and (less certainly) to the initial particle diameter, and (c) an effective lower limiting velocity at which the residual penetration presumably becomes negligible. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Calculations on Ballistic Penetration into an Unconsolidated Aggregate of Brittle Spheres, by F. T. Rogers, Jr. 31 August 1954, 26 p. (University of South Carolina, Technical Note No. 10-54-P3). ASTIA AD-52 107 (mc)
2. On R. M. S. and R. M. C. Diameters of Glass Particles before and after Ballistic Comminution, by D. F. Kiper and others. 31 October 1954, 15 p., figures, tables. (University of South Carolina, Department of Physics, Technical Note No. 11-54-P3). ASTIA AD-53 265 (mc)
3. On Some Special Stopping-Power Laws, by F. T. Rogers, Jr., and Marguerite M. Rogers. (Manuscript submitted to Physical Review).
4. On Testing a Formula for Ballistic Penetration, by F. T. Rogers, Jr. 31 January 1955, 25 p., tables. (University of South Carolina, Department of Physics, Technical Note No. 3-55-P3). ASTIA AD-59 663

I PHYSICS

F. General Physics

1201 (continued)

5. Improved Measurements on Ballistic Comminution of Glass Spheres, by R. L. Kernell, P. A. Teel, and others. Not dated, 24 p., tables. (University of South Carolina, Department of Physics, Technical Note No. 9-55-P3). ASTIA AD-78 394 (mc)
6. Experiments on Penetration of .22-Caliber Projectiles into Glass Spheres Targets, by Marguerite M. Rogers, L. G. Barre, and others. Not dated, 30 p., tables. (The University of South Carolina, Department of Physics, Technical Note No. 9-55-P4: 1 May 1955 - 30 September 1955). ASTIA AD-78 395
7. On an Improved Formula for Ballistic Penetration into Brittle Targets, by A. P. French. Not dated, 25 p., figures, tables. (The University of South Carolina, Department of Physics, Technical Note No. 7-56-P3). ASTIA AD-103 477 (mc)
8. Measurements of the Penetration of a Non-Deforming .22-Caliber Steel Projectile into Targets Consisting of Aggregates of Discrete Particles, by Marguerite M. Rogers, R. I. Turbeville, and A. R. Lowrey. 40 p., figures, tables. (University of South Carolina, Department of Physics, Technical Note No. 8-56-P3: 1 April 1956 - 31 July 1956). ASTIA AD-110 965
9. Statistical Significance of a Body of Penetration Data, by D. F. Kiper, 23 p., figures, tables. (University of South Carolina, Department of Physics, Technical Note No. 6-55-P2: 1 February 1955 - 31 May 1955).
10. Ballistic Penetration Into Glass-Spheres Targets: Theory Versus Experiment, by F. T. Rogers, Jr. 21 p., figures, tables. (University of South Carolina, Department of Physics, Technical Note No. 11-55-P3: 1 October 1955 - 15 November 1955). (C)
11. Further Measurements on Ballistic Comminution of Glass Spheres, by B. T. Fogle, A. P. French and R. L. Kernell. Not dated, 14 p., figures, tables. (University of South Carolina, Department of Physics, Technical Note No. 12-56-P3). ASTIA AD-120 253
12. Penetration of Ballistic Projectiles, by A. P. French. 40 p., figures, tables. (University of South Carolina, Department of Physics, Final Report: 1 February 1954 - 30 September 1957).

I PHYSICS

H. Nuclear Physics

408 ISOMERIC TRANSITIONS IN NUCLEI

Contractor: University of Pennsylvania
(The Trustees of the University)
Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania

Chief Investigator: S. Frankel

Contract No. DA-36-034-ORD-938	Renewed: DA-36-034-ORD-1351
Duration: 20 May 52 - 19 May 53	19 May 1953 - 1 January 1957
Amount: \$ 16,335.00	\$ 53,694.50
Type of Contract: Fixed Price	Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research

Scope: The program of basic research in low-energy nuclear spectroscopy will be extended and will include: (a) Making additional measurements aimed to gain an understanding of electric transitions in odd-neutron nuclei and to determine angular correlation phases, (b) gaining more experimental information on nuclear phases in an odd-proton nucleus, (c) extending theoretical work on nuclear phases, (d) finishing investigations on Ag^{105} and Hf^{181} ; and (e) measuring experimentally magnetic moments of excited states of nuclei, by using the strong magnetic fields existing in atoms.

Progress (to 1 January 1957): Experimental work completed under this project is described in the technical reports listed below. The decay of Hf^{181} to Ta^{181} was studied by angular correlation measurements, conversion coefficient measurements, K/L ratios, and coincidence measurements. The spin assignments were found to be in agreement with the calculations of Nilsson on the strong coupling model. The results of this study have been submitted for publication. Studies on related phases of competing nuclear matrix elements on the single particle model have been completed. Angular correlation measurements in the decay of Hg^{197+} were made, and the results have been prepared for publication. An investigation has been made of the decay of Ag^{105} . The final report has been received and the project has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. The Decay Scheme of Krypton⁷⁹, by Joseph E. Lannutti and Sherman Frankel.
2. Methods for the Detection of Nuclear Resonant Scattering and Their Connection with Angular Correlation Measurements, by Sherman Frankel.

I P H Y S I C S

H. Nuclear Physics

408 (continued)

3. Geometrical Corrections in Angular Correlation Measurements, by Arnold M. Feingold and Sherman Frankel: Angular Correlation Measurements in Tel_{21} and Tel_{23} , by Norman Goldber. 1 May 1954, various paging, figures, tables. (University of Pennsylvania, Department of Physics, Technical Report No. 1). ASTIA AD-36 838
4. The Effect of Spin-Orbit Interaction on Nuclear Electric Dipole Absorption, by Sherman Frankel, in the Physical Review, vol. 99, no. 1 (July 1955), p. 169. (A part of #11).
5. Angular Correlation Measurements in Sn^{117} , by R. Golden and S. Frankel. 15 April 1955, 45 p., figures. (University of Pennsylvania, Department of Physics, Technical Report No. 2). ASTIA AD-60 542 (mc); ASTIA AD-63 940 (mc)
6. Geometrical Corrections in Angular Correlation Measurements, by Arnold M. Feingold and Sherman Frankel, in the Physical Review, vol. 97, no. 4 (February 1955), p. 1025-1030. (A part of #11).
7. Angular Correlation Measurements on Tel_{21} and Tel_{23} , by Norman Goldberg and Sherman Frankel, in the Physical Review, vol. 100, no. 5 (December 1955), p. 1350-1354. (A part of #11).
8. Electron Scattering in the K-Electron-Gamma Angular Correlation in Sn^{117} , by R. K. Golden and S. Frankel, in the Physical Review, vol. 102, no. 4 (May 1956), p. 1053-1057. (A part of #11).
9. Angular Correlation Measurements in the Decay of Hg^{197+} , by H. H. Coburn, J. V. Kane and Sherman Frankel. (Manuscript submitted to the Physical Review). (A part of #11).
10. The Decay of Hf^{181} , by Evan Snyder and Sherman Frankel. (Manuscript submitted to the Physical Review). (A part of #11).
11. Isomeric Transition in Nuclei, by Sherman Frankel. Various paging, figures. (University of Pennsylvania, Final Report: 20 May 1953 - 31 December 1956, containing #4, #6, #7, #8, #9, and #10).

VII - 654

I P H Y S I C S

H. Nuclear Physics

920 STUDY OF NUCLEAR DISINTEGRATION

Contractor: Tulane University
New Orleans 18, Louisiana

Chief Investigator: Charles L. Peacock

Contract No. DA-01-009-ORD-344 Renewed: DA-01-009-ORD-458
Duration: 1 July 53 - 30 Nov 55 1 Dec 1955 - 31 May 1957
Amount: \$ 17,143.49 \$ 11,226.00
Type of Contract: Fixed Price Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research
Scientific Cognizance: Ballistic Research Laboratories; Watertown Arsenal

Scope: Continuation of basic research in nuclear physics, in particular, study of the radiations from selected radioactive nuclei by means of magnetic and scintillation spectrometers, and if possible, by means of a photographic β -ray spectrometer. Attempts will be made to formulate, (a) energies of the radiations, (b) energy levels, (c) gamma ray intensities, (d) internal conversion coefficients, and (e) spins.

Progress (to 31 May 1957): Investigations were made of the following radioisotopes: Ag^{110} , Sb^{124} , Ce^{134} , Br^{82} , Ba^{140} , and Sc^{46} . It was determined that the β -spectrum of Ag^{110} is composed of three component groups, and the photoelectron and internal conversion electron studies indicate fourteen γ -rays. Studies of Sb^{124} revealed that the β -spectrum is very complex and can be resolved into five component groups. Photoelectron, internal conversion and scintillation studies indicate seven γ -rays for this radioisotope. The β -spectrum of Ce^{134} was found to be much more complex than that previously reported. Gamma rays of seven different intensities were found with some evidence in the β -spectrum of an eighth γ -ray with energy of 200 kev. From these data it was possible to construct a consistent decay scheme. The β -rays from Br^{82} were simple with a maximum energy of 444 kev. The γ -spectrum indicated eight γ -rays. The principal result in the study of Ba^{140} was the confirmation of the previously postulated group of β -rays whose maximum energy is 586 kev. The study of Sc^{46} was concerned only with the high energy group of β -rays which has a maximum energy of 1250 kev. The final report has been received and the project has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Study of Nuclear Disintegrations, by Charles L. Peacock. Various paging, figures, tables. (Tulane University, Final Report: 1 July 1953 - 31 May 1957).

VII - 655

I. PHYSICS

J. Solid State Physics

392 ABSOLUTE PHOTOELECTRIC YIELD OF SURFACES FOR RADIATION IN THE EXTREME ULTRAVIOLET

Contractor: University of Southern California
3518 University Avenue
Los Angeles, California

Chief Investigator: G. L. Weissler

Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-323
Duration: 16 June 1952 - 31 October 1956
Amount: \$ 39,464.92
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research

Scope: Research will be continued on the measurement of the number of electrons released from the clean or oxide-coated surfaces of various metals as a result of irradiation by monochromatic light in the ultraviolet wavelength range, between 450 and 1400A. Observation will be made of the effects of purposeful surface contamination by exposure to gases and vapors, and measurements will be taken of the energy distribution of the emitted photoelectrons as a function of the angle of incidence of the radiation. The investigation will include: (a) Yield studies of metals subjected to various surface treatments, (b) securing of representative energy distributions at various wavelengths for some of the above surfaces, (c) yield studies of some characteristic N and P type semiconductors, (d) electron energy distribution measurements for these semiconductors, (e) yields from insulators, (f) optical transmission of thin metallic films as a function of wavelength in the far ultraviolet, and (g) front and back yield and energy distributions of the above films, if possible, determined as a function of angle incidence and film thickness. This work is being continued under Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-346, Research Proposal 1722.

Progress (to 31 October 1956): The experimental procedures used in the investigation of absolute photoelectric yield of surfaces for radiation of the extreme ultraviolet is discussed in detail in Technical Report #1. A large number of surfaces were investigated in this manner and were subjected to the following treatment: exposure to a variety of gases, thus encouraging the formation of certain cathode surface films either by adsorption, absorption or by the formation of oxides; and then the removal of such films by positive ion bombardment or by glowing the surfaces in the highest vacuum available in the apparatus. The yields from these surfaces are discussed in Technical Report #4. The significance of the results obtained is indicated by the appearance of a volume photoelectric effect with a threshold wavelength in the neighborhood of 1200A or 10 ev. This volume effect is characterized by much higher yields than those which were measured for similar surfaces near the photoelectric threshold.

I. PHYSICS

J. Solid State Physics

392 (continued)

The highest yields occurred in the case of non-outgassed photocathodes such as tungsten or nickel. In all gases the volume yields were surprisingly reproducible. They became apparent at approximately 1200A and rose monotonically to a maximum 900A and 600A. In the case of impure metals the yields decreased noticeably towards shorter wavelengths, whereas in the case of outgassed metals the yields remained constant to 480A. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Preliminary Results on Photoelectric Yields of Pt and Ta and on Photoionization in O₂ and N₂ in the Vacuum Ultraviolet, by N. Wainfan and others, in Journal of Applied Physics, vol. 24, no. 10 (October 1953), p. 1318-1321. (Technical Report No. 1). ASTIA AD-50 823
2. The Photoelectric Yield of Platinum in the Vacuum Ultraviolet, by W. C. Walker and N. Wainfan, in Bulletin of the American Physical Society, vol. 27, no. 6 (December 1952).
3. Energy Distributions of Photoelectrons for Au and Ge in the Far Ultraviolet, by W. C. Walker and G. L. Weissler, in the Physical Review, vol. 97, no. 4 (February 1955), p. 1178-1179. (Technical Report No. 2).
4. Photoelectric Yields in the Vacuum Ultraviolet, by W. C. Walker and others, in Journal of Applied Physics, vol. 26, no. 11 (November 1955), p. 1366-1371. (Technical Report No. 3).
5. Absolute Photoelectric Yield of Surfaces for Radiation of the Extreme Ultraviolet, by G. L. Weissler, 31 October 1956, 6 p. (University of Southern California, Department of Physics, Final Report). ASTIA AD-117 994

I PHYSICS

J. Solid State Physics

667 INTERACTION OF THERMAL ATOMS WITH SURFACES

Contractor: Syracuse University
Syracuse, New York

Chief Investigator: Henry Levinstein

Contract No. DA-30-115-ORD-420
Duration: 1 February 1953 - 30 January 1957
Amount: \$ 33,691.00
Type of Contract: Fixed Price

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research
Scientific Cognizance: Ordnance Materials Research Office;
Ballistic Research Laboratories

Scope: Through measurement of the length of time of contact, research will be done on the interaction of gas molecules with surfaces against which they collide. This will include a study of relationships between "sitting time" and (1) the type of vapor, type of surface, the surface temperature, and surface treatment, (2) heat of absorption, (3) the phenomena of corrosion, oxidation, and formation of surface films, and (4) the effects of various gases on the electrical properties of sections of single crystals having a thickness of several microns.

Progress (to 30 January 1957): Work on this contract has been divided into two parts. The first is concerned with the interaction of alkali atoms with a hot tungsten surface; the second is concerned with studying the effects of oxygen on crystal surfaces which cannot be heated. In order to investigate hot tungsten surfaces, methods have been developed for forming single crystal tungsten wire from a polycrystalline array of randomly oriented crystallites. By exposing the tungsten wire to a pulsed atom beam and observing the pulse shape of the reevaporated ions, it has been possible to measure the time during which the atoms are adsorbed on the wire. Both the magnitude of the adsorption time and its temperature variation have been found to be dependent on surface conditions. Measurements on single crystal wire surfaces containing less than .001 monolayer of oxygen as well as on contaminated surfaces have been made. In the second part of the project, the effect of oxygen on a semiconductor surface was investigated. It was found that SnSe which is first grown into single crystals may be cleaved into sections less than 10 microns thick. Electrical conductivity, carrier mobility, and concentration and band gap have been determined from electrical, optical absorption, and photoconductivity measurements. A study is underway to determine the effect of different ambients on the surface. For subsequent progress, see Research Proposal No. 1844, this report.

I PHYSICS

J. Solid State Physics

667 (continued)

Technical Reports:

1. Interaction of Thermal Atoms with Surfaces, by F. Hughes. 1 September 1956, 16 p., figures. (Syracuse University Research Institute). ASTIA AD-104 520

I P H Y S I C S

J. Solid State Physics

718 ELECTRICAL PROPERTIES OF THORIUM OXIDE AND SIMILAR MATERIAL AT HIGH TEMPERATURES

Contractor: Bartol Research Foundation of the
Franklin Institute
20th and Parkway
Philadelphia 3, Pennsylvania

Chief Investigator: W. E. Danforth

Contract No. DA-36-034-ORD-1487
Duration: 1 November 1953 - 31 January 1957
Amount: \$ 45,605.00
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Frankford Arsenal
Scientific Cognizance: Redstone Arsenal

Scope: Research will be continued in high-temperature solid-state physics on the properties of thorium oxide, in particular: (a) Experimental study of polarization and conductivity, as a function of temperature, with a view toward establishment of a new method for determining ionic densities and mobilities; (b) study of long-time polarization to determine more precisely the electron transport number, its temperature dependence, and the activation energy of electronic conductivity; (c) study of high-field effects and their bearing upon the mechanism of electrolysis; (d) studies of ionic polarization effects in materials other than thorium oxide, particularly sodium chloride and barium oxide; and (e) mathematical problems regarding phenomena in mixed conductors, particularly perturbing effects of small numbers of electrons.

Progress (to 31 January 1957): Investigations were carried out and results were obtained on the following topics: (a) Polarization phenomena in thorium oxide and associated theoretical considerations, (b) Hall effect in thorium metal, and (c) thermoelectric power of thorium vs. platinum. The polarization studies led to the conclusion that conduction in fresh thorium oxide crystals is more than 99 percent ionic. Optical absorption spectra in single crystals of ThO_2 have been studied extensively. The polarization effects in sodium chloride and in silver chloride were also studied. Complete results are set forth in the technical reports listed below. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Studies in Mixed Conduction in Solids, by W. E. Danforth. 31 August 1956, 62 p., figures, tables. (Bartol Research Foundation of the Franklin Institute, Technical Report No. 3). ASTIA AD-110 902 (mc)

I P H Y S I C S

J. Solid State Physics

718 (continued)

2. Hall Coefficient and Thermoelectric Power of Thorium Metal, by J. H. Bodine, in The Physical Review, vol. 102, no. 6 (June 1956), p. 1459. (Technical Report No. 4). ASTIA AD-112 063
3. Polarization in Thorium Oxide Crystals, by W. E. Danforth, in The Journal of Chemical Physics, vol. 23, no. 3 (March 1955), p. 591-592. (Technical Report No. 1).
4. Polarization in Thorium Oxide Crystals, by W. E. Danforth and J. H. Bodine, in The Journal of the Franklin Institute, vol. 260, no. 6 (December 1955), p. 467-483. (Technical Report No. 2).
5. Electrical Properties of Thorium Oxide and Similar Materials at High Temperature, by W. E. Danforth. 15 February 1957, 12 p. (Bartol Research Foundation of the Franklin Institute, Final Report). ASTIA AD-122 411

II CHEMISTRY

A. Chemical Engineering and Materials

544 RESEARCH ON STRUCTURE OF CELLULOSE

Contractor: University of Minnesota
(Regents of the University)
Minneapolis, Minnesota

Chief Investigator: Fred Smith

Contract No. DA-11-022-ORD-999
Duration: 24 June 1952 - 30 June 1957
Amount: \$ 39,287.00
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research

Scope: Research will be continued in the structure of cellulose, and experiments will be designed and conducted (a) to permit a close examination of cleavage products of cellulose polyalcohol, to verify the structural possibilities indicated by the present identification of glycerol and glucose, (b) to extend these studies to hemicellulose, and (c) to clarify further the fine structural details required to supplement these findings by appropriate methods.

Progress (to 30 June 1957): Work has been directed toward developing a new method for the structural characterization of polysaccharides which will permit a closer examination of the fine structure of cellulose. An approach has been developed and is set forth in report #7 below. Some experimental data collected during this investigation have led to the speculation that there are some anomalous chemical features in the long-accepted linear or homogeneous nature of cellulose. Complete results of this investigation are reflected in the technical reports below. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Reduction of the Products of Periodate Oxidation of Carbohydrates. IV. Hydrogenation with Palladium--Charcoal of the Dialdehydes from Methyl Glycosides, by J. E. Cadotte, F. Smith, and others, in the Journal of the American Chemical Society, vol. 79 (February 1957), p. 691-695. (A part of #7).
2. Synthesis of D-3,4-Di-O-Methyl Erythritol, by Irwin J. Goldstein and F. Smith, in the Journal of the American Chemical Society, vol. 79 (March 1957), p. 1188-1190. (A part of #7).
3. Synthesis of D- and L- α -O-Methyl Glycerol, by Irwin J. Goldstein, J. K. Hamilton and F. Smith, in the Journal of the American Chemical Society, vol. 79 (March 1957), p. 1190-1193. (A part of #7).

II CHEMISTRY

A. Chemical Engineering and Materials

544 (continued)

4. Reduction of the Products of Periodate Oxidation of Carbohydrates. V. The Constitution of Cellulose, by Irwin J. Goldstein, F. Smith and others. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of the American Chemical Society).
5. The Structure of Dialdehydes Formed by Periodate Oxidation of Sugar Glycosides, by Irwin J. Goldstein, Bertha A. Lewis and F. Smith. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of the American Chemical Society). (A part of #7).
6. Nature of a Hemicellulose Extracted from Cellulose with Water, by G. W. Huffman, F. Smith and others, in Nature, vol. 175 (June 1955), p. 990-992. (A part of #7).
7. The Constitution of Cellulose and Related Substances, by I. J. Goldstein and F. Smith. 24 July 1957, various paging, figures, tables. (University of Minnesota, Final Report containing #1, #2, #3, #5, and #6).
8. The Steric Inhibition of Periodate Oxidation, by E. F. Garner, Irwin J. Goldstein and Fred Smith. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of the American Chemical Society).

II CHEMISTRY

A. Chemical Engineering and Materials

574 EFFECT OF PRESSURE ON PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF GASES AND ON PROPERTIES OF CHEMICALLY REACTING SYSTEMS

Contractor: Yale University
New Haven, Connecticut

Chief Investigator: Barnett F. Dodge

Contract No. DA-19-059-ORD-971	Renewed: DA-19-059-ORD-1500
Duration: 17 June 52 - 10 June 53	11 June 1953 - 31 Dec 1956
Amount: \$ 18,691.26	\$ 47,670.00
Type of Contract: Fixed Price	Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research

Scope: Study of (1) the effect of pressure on physical properties such as compressibility, viscosity, thermal conductivity, composition of coexisting liquid and vapor phases and the like, (2) the effect of pressure on the equilibrium and rate of chemical reactions, (3) catalytic reactions of carbon monoxide at high pressure, (4) effect of pressure on the rate and equilibrium of the water-gas reaction, and (5) pressure-volume-temperature relationships in binary and ternary gas mixtures at high pressure.

Progress (to 31 December 1956): Work under this project has been confined to a study of the following phases, (1) catalytic reactions of carbon monoxide at high pressure, (2) reactions of butadiene in the liquid phase, (3) effect of high pressure on the equilibrium in the water-gas reaction, (4) compressibilities of nitrogen, hydrogen, and ammonia in the gas phase, and (5) equilibrium in the heterogeneous system ethanol-ethyl ether-ethylene-water at elevated pressures. Results of these phases appear in report #2 listed below. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Equilibrium of the Water-Gas Shift Reaction at High Pressures. Equipment Design, by Kaoru Iwasaki. June 1955, 67 p., figures, tables. (Yale University, M.S. thesis).
2. Effect of Pressure on the Physical Properties of Gases and on the Properties of Chemically Reacting Systems, by Barnett F. Dodge, Randolph H. Bretton and others. 22 February 1957, 18 p. (Yale University, Final Report). ASTIA AD-123 694

II CHEMISTRY

A. Chemical Engineering and Materials

887 MASS TRANSFER INTO GAS STREAMS AT LOW PRESSURES AND HIGH VELOCITIES

Contractor: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Memorial Drive
Cambridge 39, Massachusetts

Chief Investigator: Thomas K. Sherwood

Contract No. DA-19-020-ORD-3244
Duration: 30 December 1953 - 31 December 1956
Amount: \$ 26,142.00
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research
Scientific Cognizance: Ballistic Research Laboratories; Redstone Arsenal

Scope: An investigation will be made of mass transfer from solid surfaces to gas streams by a study of (a) the rate of sublimation of a solid into air streams at high Mach numbers, and (b) the rate of sublimation into air at very low pressures. The results are expected to contribute significantly to current development of understanding the nature of turbulent flow over surfaces, and the relationships between mass, heat, and momentum transfer.

Progress (to 31 December 1956): Basic information has been obtained regarding the rate of sublimation of materials at sub-atmospheric pressures in both stagnant and flowing systems, using various gases as the surrounding atmosphere. Small spheres of solid naphthalene were sublimed into air, helium, carbon dioxide, and freon-12, and the rate of sublimation was measured as a function of pressure. Studies have been made to determine and correlate mass transfer rates of materials at air velocities up to twice the speed of sound in air. Rates of sublimation of naphthalene, camphor, and thymol from cone cylinders of these materials were determined by insertion of the cylinders into various wind tunnels. Average coefficients of mass transfer over the entire area of the subliming solid were determined by weight loss; local coefficients at various locations along the model were determined by measuring the decrease in the diameter of the cylinder. A turbulent boundary layer was used exclusively in this work. Additional work has been directed toward obtaining an insight into the nature and relationship of the factors by which changes in concentration of the diffusing compound affect the rates of mass transfer between a gas and a wet surface. For this purpose the evaporation of water into steam-air mixtures was used. The experimental program included the study of a wetted-wall tower, and the evaporation of water from a porous wet cylinder. In all the runs, turbulent conditions were maintained in the gas phase. The results obtained in both the wetted-wall tower and the wet cylinders indicated that concentration changes affect the turbulent and molecular transfer process in a similar way and

II CHEMISTRY

A. Chemical Engineering and Materials

887 (continued)

confirm the inverse proportionality between the mass transfer coefficient and the mean partial pressure of the non-diffusing gas. Complete results of the above studies appear in the reports listed below. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Mass Transfer into Gas Streams at Low Pressures: The Effect of Pressure on the Rate of Sublimation, by N. E. Cooke and T. K. Sherwood. 1 May 1955, 10 p., figures. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Technical Report No. 1). ASTIA AD-62 353 (mc)
2. Mass Transfer at Low Pressures, by T. K. Sherwood and N. E. Cooke. 1 December 1955, 214 p., figures, tables. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Part I of the Final Report). ASTIA AD-80 230 (mc)
3. Mass Transfer through Compressible Turbulent Boundary Layers, by Thomas K. Sherwood and Howard S. Bryant, Jr. 1 April 1956, 199 p., figures, tables. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Part II of the Final Report; also published in the Canadian Journal of Chemical Engineering, vol. 35, no. 2 (August 1957), p. 51-93). ASTIA AD-90 353 (mc)
4. The Evaporation of Water at High Humidities, by Thomas K. Sherwood and Oliverio Phillips. 15 April 1957, 215 p., figures, tables. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Part III of the Final Report).

II CHEMISTRY

A. Chemical Engineering and Materials

1562 APPLICATION OF THE TRACER DISPLACEMENT TECHNIQUE TO THE MEASUREMENT OF MASS TRANSFER AND DIFFUSION COEFFICIENTS

Contractor: North Carolina State College
Raleigh, North Carolina

Chief Investigator: Frances M. Richardson

Contract No. DA-36-034-ORD-2199
Duration: 1 January 1956 - 30 April 1957
Amount: \$ 12,361.00
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research

Scope: Research will be performed on (1) the adaptation of the tracer displacement technique to the measurement of coefficients of molecular diffusion, and (2) the possibility of adapting the tracer displacement technique to measurements of mass transfer of dissolved materials in liquids flowing in turbulent flow.

Progress (1 January 1956 - 31 January 1958): The tracer displacement technique has been applied to the evaluation of the study of diffusion in dilute aqueous solutions of Pontamine blue dye and potassium permanganate. The differential equation describing the transfer of mass by diffusion and convection in the particular system has been formulated and various attempts at its solution have been made. Experimental results have been obtained in terms of an empirical correlation, and despite the somewhat inconclusive nature of the data, these results are encouraging. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Application of the Tracer Displacement Technique to the Measurement of Mass Transfer and Diffusion Coefficients, by James K. Ferrell and F. M. Richardson. 75 p., figures, tables. (North Carolina State College, Final Report: 1 February 1956 - 31 January 1958).

II CHEMISTRY

B. Combustion and Fuel Chemistry

664 DEVELOPMENT OF EQUATION OF STATE AND TRANSPORT PROPERTIES OF LIQUIDS AND GASES AT HIGH DENSITIES

Contractor: University of Wisconsin
(The Regents of the University)
Madison 6, Wisconsin

Chief Investigator: J. O. Hirschfelder

Contract No. DA-11-022-ORD-994
Duration: 23 June 1952 - 22 June 1957
Amount: \$ 100,246.60
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research
Scientific Cognizance: Redstone Arsenal

Scope: Theoretical treatments will be made of the following problems: Use of a pseudolattice theory to improve the equation of state of liquids and of dense gases; use of a conventional equation of state for mixtures of chemical species; improvement of the existing corresponding-states relationships for properties of gases and liquids; and development of the theory of transport properties at high temperatures.

Progress (30 September 1956 - 30 June 1957): An equation of state for pure substances has been derived and it covers the full range of gases and liquids. The standard form of the equation is based on a generalized principle of corresponding states which includes two additional experimental parameters, the critical compressibility factor, and a parameter determined from the vapor pressure. The equation for liquids also includes experimental densities at saturation. Considerable flexibility exists since the equations can be used when experimental parameter values are missing, and the standard form can be improved when extensive data are available. Based on the above equation of state, explicit expressions have been derived for the thermodynamic functions. A complete description of the above work appears in reports #16 and #17 below. Additional work has been directed toward developing a perturbation method for treating mixtures. In this connection, the work of Zwanzig and Kirkwood is being extended. This extension considers the molecules in a mixture to interact with an average potential and then considers as the perturbation, the difference between the actual intermolecular forces and the averaged potential. Further work along this line is in progress. Future studies will include the theoretical development of Henry's law constants. For subsequent progress see Research Proposal No. 1898, this report.

II CHEMISTRY

B. Combustion and Fuel Chemistry

664 (continued)

Technical Reports:

1. Theory of Phase Transition in Anisotropic Colloidal Solutions, by Taro Kihara. 4 October 1952. (University of Wisconsin, Department of Chemistry, Technical Report Wis-OOR-1). ATI 172 451
2. The Separation of the Rotational Coordinates from the N-Particle Schroedinger Equation. II, by C. F. Curtiss. 4 December 1952, 53 p. (University of Wisconsin, Department of Chemistry, Technical Report Wis-OOR-2; also published in the Journal of Chemical Physics, vol. 21 (July 1953), p. 1199). ASTIA AD-5 838 (mc)
3. The Kinetic Theory of Dense Gases, by C. F. Curtiss. 28 January 1953. (University of Wisconsin, Department of Chemistry, Technical Report Wis-OOR-3). ASTIA AD-6 699 (mc)
4. The Quantum Mechanics of Collisions between Diatomic Molecules, by C. F. Curtiss. 30 January 1953, 23 p. (University of Wisconsin, Department of Chemistry, Technical Report Wis-OOR-4; also published in the Journal of Chemical Physics, vol. 21 (November 1953), p. 2045). ASTIA AD-13 252
5. The Mathematical Theory of Electrical Discharges in Gases. B. Velocity-Distribution of Positive Ions in a Static Field, by Taro Kihara. 25 March 1953, 24 p. (University of Wisconsin, Department of Chemistry, Technical Report No. Wis-OOR-5; also published in Reviews of Modern Physics, vol. 25, no. 4 (October 1953), p. 844-852). ASTIA AD-7 754 (mc)
6. Theoretical Treatment of Adiabatic Chemical Reactions, by E. F. Haugh and others. 15 April 1953, 20 p. (University of Wisconsin, Technical Report Wis-OOR-6). ASTIA AD-7 753 (mc)
7. Virial Coefficients and Models of Molecules in Gases, by Taro Kihara. 5 June 1953, 49 p., figures, tables. (University of Wisconsin, Department of Chemistry, Technical Report Wis-OOR-7; also published in Reviews of Modern Physics, vol. 25 (1953), p. 831). ASTIA AD-13 251
8. The Quantum Mechanics of Collisions between Rigid Axially Symmetric Molecules, by George Gioumousis and C. F. Curtiss. 10 June 1953, 21 p. (University of Wisconsin, Department of Chemistry, Technical Report Wis-OOR-8). ASTIA AD-13 252
9. The Effects of Concentration Dependence of Diffusion Coefficients, by Robert F. Snider and C. F. Curtiss. 17 February 1954, 28 p., tables. (University of Wisconsin, Department of Chemistry, Technical Report Wis-OOR-9). ASTIA AD-30 142 (mc)

II CHEMISTRY

B. Combustion and Fuel Chemistry

664 (continued)

10. The Kinetic Theory of Moderately Dense Gases, by C. F. Curtiss and R. F. Snider. 20 May 1954, 55 p. (University of Wisconsin, Department of Chemistry, Technical Report Wis-OOR-10). ASTIA AD-33 203
11. The Theory of Rotational-Vibrational Interaction in Polyatomic Molecules, by Lewis J. Bodi. 30 August 1954, 133 p. (University of Wisconsin, Department of Chemistry, Technical Report Wis-OOR-11). ASTIA AD-41 542 (mc)
12. The Theory of Rotational-Vibrational Interaction in Polyatomic Molecules, by Lewis J. Bodi and C. F. Curtiss. 4 January 1956, 20 p. (University of Wisconsin, Department of Chemistry, Technical Report Wis-OOR-11a). ASTIA AD-83 153 (mc)
13. A Generalized Equation of State for Both Gases and Liquids, by J. O. Hirschfelder, R. J. Buehler, and others. 22 March 1956, 47 p., figures, tables. (University of Wisconsin, Department of Chemistry, Technical Report Wis-OOR-12). ASTIA AD-93 093 (mc)
14. Properties of Caseous and Liquid Mixtures, by Walter K. Tang. 9 August 1956, 198 p., tables. (University of Wisconsin, Department of Chemistry, Technical Report Wis-OOR-13). ASTIA AD-109 594 (mc)
15. The Permutation Group and Electron Quantum Mechanics, by F. A. Matsen. 28 August 1956, 30 p. (University of Wisconsin, Department of Chemistry, Technical Report Wis-OOR-14). ASTIA AD-109 595 (mc)
16. A Generalized Equation of State for Both Gases and Liquids, I., by J. O. Hirschfelder, R. J. Buehler, H. A. McGee, Jr., and J. R. Sutton. 5 October 1956, 67 p., figures, tables. (University of Wisconsin, Department of Chemistry, Technical Report Wis-OOR-15; also submitted to Industrial and Engineering Chemistry). ASTIA AD-116 764
17. Generalized Thermodynamical Excess Functions for Gases and Liquids, II., by J. O. Hirschfelder and others. 7 November 1956, 19 p., figures, tables. (University of Wisconsin, Department of Chemistry, Technical Report Wis-OOR-16; also submitted to Industrial and Engineering Chemistry).
18. The Properties of a Gaseous or Liquid Mixture, by J. O. Hirschfelder and R. J. Buehler. 9 January 1957, 13 p., tables. (University of Wisconsin, Department of Chemistry, Technical Report Wis-OOR-17). ASTIA AD-119 723

II CHEMISTRY

D. Electrochemistry and Corrosion

485 KINETICS OF ANODE FILMS

Contractor: University of Illinois
(Trustees of the University)
Urbana, Illinois

Chief Investigator: J. H. Bartlett

Contract No. DA-11-022-ORD-939
Duration: 1 June 1952 - 31 August 1957
Amount: \$ 36,871.00
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Rock Island Arsenal
Scientific Cognizance: Frankford Arsenal

Scope: The investigation in the general field of the kinetics of electrode films will be continued, and will be extended to electrodes other than Cu. Present techniques will be applied to a study of the build-up of diffusion layers at the cathode and to a study of the mechanisms of electropolishing. These studies will include (a) calculation of the temporal behavior of the concentrations in the diffusion layers, and (b) a study of the mechanism of layer growth.

Progress (to 30 September 1957): Studies have been made of the Cu-HCl system and the following results have been obtained: (1) observation of the growth of the solid anode film, (2) identification of the reaction products and potentials, (3) development of quantitative kinetics for the current transient behavior, and (4) observation of the effect of natural convection on the steady state, overshoot, and oscillations. A schlieren microscope was developed to observe complicated diffusion and convection phenomena. Concentration gradients were measured in the anolyte and the parabolic concentration distribution in the convection layer was confirmed. The Cu-H₂PO₄ system was studied to some extent and resulted in the determination of polishing conditions. Complete results of this investigation are reflected in the reports listed below. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. The Kinetics of Anodic Films with an Appendix on the Schlieren Microscope, by Lee Stephenson and James H. Bartlett. 30 September 1953, 122 p., figures. (University of Illinois, Department of Physics, Technical Report No. 1). ASTIA AD-18 651 (mc)
2. Anodic Behavior of Copper in HCl, by Lee Stephenson and J. H. Bartlett, in Journal of the Electrochemical Society, vol. 101, no. 11 (November 1954), p. 571-581.

II CHEMISTRY

D. Electrochemistry and Corrosion

485 (continued)

3. Dissolution and Electropolishing of Copper in Phosphoric Acid, by Frederick H. Giles and James H. Bartlett. 15 June 1955, 138 p., figures. (University of Illinois, Department of Physics, Technical Report No. 2). ASTIA AD-75 996
4. Anodic Transients of Copper in Hydrochloric Acid, by Ralph S. Cooper. 1 March 1956, 23 p., figures. (University of Illinois, Department of Physics, Technical Report No. 33; also published in the Journal of the Electrochemical Society, vol. 103, no. 6 (June 1956), p. 307-315). ASTIA AD-93 227 (mc)
5. Anodic Behavior of Copper in Hydrochloric Acid, by Ralph S. Cooper. 15 March 1957, 127 p., figures. (University of Illinois, Department of Physics, Technical Report No. 4).
6. Anodic Behavior of Copper in Hydrochloric Acid and in Phosphoric Acid, by J. H. Bartlett, R. S. Cooper and others. 30 September 1957, 18 p. (University of Illinois, Department of Physics, Final Report).

II CHEMISTRY

E. Explosives and Propellants

613 QUALITATIVE KINETIC INVESTIGATION OF AROMATIC SUBSTITUENTS FOR SULFINIC ACID AZIDE

Contractor: Texas Technological College
Lubbock, Texas

Chief Investigator: Samuel H. Lee, Jr.

Contract No. DA-23-072-ORD-491
Duration: 1 February 1953 - 31 August 1956
Amount: \$ 9,200.00
Type of Contract: Fixed Price

Primary Scientific Liaison: Picatinny Arsenal

Scope: To continue the investigation of the decomposition of certain sulfinic acid azides. In particular studies will continue on the preparation and the kinetics of various substituted benzenesulfinazides.

Progress (31 August 1956): Benzenesulfinazide, 4-nitrobenzenesulfinazide, and 4-bromobenzenesulfinazide have been prepared by the reduction of the arylsulfonyl chloride by alkaline sodium sulfite, acidification of the product to the arylsulfinic acid, conversion of the acid to the sulfinyl chloride by thionyl chloride in excess, and formation of the azide by reaction of the sulfinyl chloride with activated sodium azide. An alternative method involving conversion of the acid chloride to the hydrazide followed by diazotization to the azide with nitric acid has also been explored. In the first method, the presence of a small amount of thionyl chloride in the last step (reaction of sulfinyl chloride with activated sodium azide) was found to have a beneficial effect, but upon further investigation it was found that SOCl_2 is unnecessary if the acid chloride is sufficiently dispersed and the temperature is not kept too low. Additional studies have indicated that the role of SOCl_2 is that of improving contact between insoluble reacting phases. An investigation of the effect of unreacted acid chloride in sulfinazide before making kinetic measurements has indicated that removal of the acid chloride is not as essential as might have been supposed. The effect of benzene as solvent has been shown as inhibiting decomposition at the lower temperatures, and promoting it at higher temperatures. Approximately 150 rate determinations have been made on the three sulfinazides in three solvents at seven temperatures, and the majority of these were based on pressure measurements confined to one solvent, petroleum ether. From a careful inspection of the rate constant data, especially the averages for the three compounds at each temperature in a common solvent, the following conclusions were reached: (1) 4-Nitrobenzenesulfinazide is definitely more stable, i.e., less rapid in its decomposition than either of the others, and (2) it is very difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between benzenesulfinazide and its bromo derivative according to their relative thermal stabilities. These

II CHEMISTRY

E. Explosives and Propellants

613 (continued)

conclusions have been further reinforced by considering the energies and entropies of activation, for which the nitro compound has distinctly lower values for both quantities and the values for the other two are virtually impossible to differentiate. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Qualitative Kinetic Investigation of Aromatic Substituents for Sulfinic Acid Azides, by Samuel H. Lee, Jr., Henry L. King and Satya Pal Sood. 52 p., figures, tables. (Texas Technological College, Final Report: 1 February 1953 - 31 August 1956). ASTIA AD-121 518

II CHEMISTRY

E. Explosives and Propellants

1179 REPLACEMENT OF HALOGEN BY HYDROGEN IN NITRO ARYL HALIDES

Contractor: Queens College
Flushing, New York

Chief Investigator: A. H. Blatt

Contract No. DA-30-069-ORD-1289
Duration: 1 June 1954 - 31 December 1956
Amount: \$ 8,858.00
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research
Scientific Cognizance: Redstone Arsenal

Scope: To study the replacement of halogen by hydrogen in nitric aryl halides; specifically to determine: (a) the nature, number, and locations of the substitutes necessary in the halides, (b) the kinetics of the reaction, and (c) application of the reaction to structural and preparative problems.

Progress (to 31 December 1956): In the course of working out a procedure for preparing picryl iodide from the corresponding chloride and sodium iodide, a color test was developed for aromatic nitro compounds and the number of nitro groups they contain. The test depends upon the colors developed by aromatic nitro compounds and iodide ions when they are together in acetone solution. Attempts to secure useful kinetic data on the reaction between picryl iodide and hydriodic acid were unsuccessful since the data were not sufficiently reproducible. The difference in reactivity between sodium iodide-acetic acid and hydriodic acid-sodium acetate has been shown to be due to the hypophosphorous acid present as a stabilizer in the hydriodic acid. Hypophosphorous acid alone was found to be the most effective reagent for reducing picryl iodide to trinitrobenzene. Reduction of picryl iodide by hydriodic acid in acetone was strongly inhibited by added water. Reduction with an alkali iodide and an added acid increased the rate with the strength of the added acid. Reduction of a nitroaryl halide to a nitro aromatic compound using dilute hydriodic acid stabilized with hypophosphorous acid was found to require the presence of three nitro groups on the aromatic ring as in the picryl halides. Reduction with hydriodic acid and with hypophosphorous acid was studied in the thiophene series and it has been possible to get as far as 2,3,4-trinitro-5-bromothiophene and 2,3,4-trinitrothiophene. Attempts to prepare tetranitrothiophene from 2,3,4-trinitrothiophene were unsuccessful. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

II CHEMISTRY

E. Explosives and Propellants

1179 (continued)

Technical Reports:

1. The Replacement of Halogen by Hydrogen in Nitro Aryl Halides, by A. H. Blatt and Norma Gross. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of Organic Chemistry). (A part of #3).
2. Replacement of Halogen by Hydrogen in Nitro Aryl Halides: Some Applications in the Thiophene Series, by A. H. Blatt, Norma Gross, and E. W. Tristram. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of Organic Chemistry). (A part of #3).
3. Replacement of Halogen by Hydrogen in Nitro Aryl Halides, by A. H. Blatt and Norma Gross. Not dated, various paging. (Queens College, Final Report containing #1 and #2).

II CHEMISTRY

F. Inorganic and Analytical Chemistry

817 THE CHEMISTRY OF THE HYDRIDES OF THE GROUP IV ELEMENTS

Contractor: Illinois Institute of Technology
3300 South Federal Street
Chicago 16, Illinois

Chief Investigator: Sei Sujishi

Contract No. DA-11-022-ORD-1264
Duration: 15 June 1953 - 30 June 1957
Amount: \$ 23,632.00
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research

Scope: Within the field of the Group IV hydrides, investigations will be made in particular on the chemistry of silylphosphorus compounds. Possible methods of synthesizing trisilylphosphine will be studied by reaction with trimethylboron and by other suitable means. Additional studies will include the possible synthesis of silylphosphines and their basicity, and an exploration of the possible synthesis of germanyl amines and silylsulfide and to determine their basic properties. In addition, a study of the acids containing the same substitutes will be made.

Progress (to 30 June 1957): Work on the reactions of phosphine and the methylphosphines with silyl bromide and iodide has been completed. Results of this work appear in report #1 below. The reactions of siloxane and disilyl sulfide with diborane, boron trifluoride, and trimethylaluminum have been studied as well as silicon-oxygen and silicon-sulfur π -bonding. Studies have also been made of the reactions of hexamethyldisilazine with trimethylborane, diborane, boron trifluoride, and boron trichloride. Reactions of germanium tetrachloride with lithium aluminohydrides, and lithium tri-*t*-butoxyaluminumhydride have been investigated for use as an effective reagent for the preparation of germane. The preparation of germyl isocyanide has been studied and a comparison has been made of some of its chemical properties with those of silyl isocyanide. Reactions of germyl bromide with amines and phosphines have also been studied. Results of the above studies appear in report #3 listed below. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Chemistry of the Group Four Hydrides, by Sei Sujishi and Samuel Witz. 1 March 1954, 35 p., figures, tables. (Illinois Institute of Technology, Department of Chemistry, Technical Report No. 1). ASTIA AD-27 159 (mc)

II CHEMISTRY

F. Inorganic and Analytical Chemistry

817 (continued)

2. Effect of Replacement of Carbon by Silicon in Trimethylamine on the Trimethylboron Addition Compounds. Estimation of the Resonance Energy for Silicon-Nitrogen Partial Double Bond, by S. Sujishi and S. Witz, in Journal of the American Chemical Society, vol. 76 (1954), p. 4631.
3. Chemistry of the Group Four Hydrides, by Sei Sujishi. 1 August 1957, 59 p., figures, tables. (Illinois Institute of Technology, Department of Chemistry, Final Report).

II CHEMISTRY

F. Inorganic and Analytical Chemistry

841 DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW METHOD FOR THE SPECTROSCOPIC ANALYSIS OF MIXTURES

Contractor: Florida State University
Tallahassee, Florida

Chief Investigator: Russell J. Keirs

Contract No. DA-01-009-ORD-327	Renewed: DA-01-009-ORD-457
Duration: 1 July 53 - 30 Nov 55	30 Nov 1955 - 31 Aug 1957
Amount: \$ 13,825.23	\$ 8,640.00
Type of Contract: Fixed Price	Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research
Scientific Cognizance: Picatinny Arsenal

Scope: A determination will be made of the upper and lower concentration limits for the detection of phosphorescence for each compound to be studied, the solubility limits will be ascertained in the solvents used, and the effects of impurities will be studied. Quantitative photometric data will be obtained on binary mixtures, relating intensity of phosphorescence to concentration, with special emphasis on reproducibility. A method and technique will be developed for the analysis of multicomponent mixtures, especially when all components absorb radiation in the same spectral region. All phosphorescence spectra studied will be catalogued.

Progress (to 31 August 1957): Work under this project has indicated that certain organic compounds can be determined by analysis of the phosphorescent emissions excited in the compounds under appropriate conditions. Where this method has been challenged by using compounds of very similar absorption or phosphorescent characteristics, initial results have been satisfactory. The average relative error found upon determining the concentrations of known solutions by this method was about 10%, excluding an unfavorable result involving benzophenone in a mixture with acetophenone, where the concentration was $3.5 \times 10^{-4}M$. Data substantiate a statement that the precision determined by running replica samples is much higher than the accuracy obtained in the initial runs, indicating that the accuracy can be improved by controlling experimental parameters more carefully. It has been found possible to analyze mixtures containing more than two phosphorescent substances, without physical separation, by the proper choice of excitation frequency, resolution time, and emission frequency. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

II CHEMISTRY

F. Inorganic and Analytical Chemistry

841 (continued)

Technical Reports:

1. Phosphorimetry: A New Method of Analysis, by R. J. Keirs and others, in Analytical Chemistry, vol. 29 (February 1957), p. 202-209. (Technical Report No. 1). ASTIA AD-124 013
2. Basic Research in the General Field of Spectroscopic Analysis, by Russell J. Keirs. 52 p., figures, tables. (Florida State University, Department of Chemistry, Final Report: 1 July 1953-31 August 1957).

II CHEMISTRY

F. Inorganic and Analytical Chemistry

1111 THE BORON BASES

Contractor: University of Houston
Cullen Boulevard
Houston 4, Texas

Chief Investigator: George W. Campbell, Jr.

Contract No. DA-23-072-ORD-761 Renewed: DA-23-072-ORD-964
Duration: 1 Nov 53 - 31 Jan 56 1 Feb 1956 - 31 Jan 1957
Amount: \$ 12,803.70 \$ 6,191.50
Type of Contract: Cost Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research
Scientific Cognizance: Frankford Arsenal

Scope: Research will be continued in the general field of the boron bases and will include (1) a study of the chemistry of $\text{Na}_2\text{HB}(\text{CH}_3)_2$ from the standpoint of its base activity and also its hydride activity toward a variety of reagents, (2) attempts to prepare $\text{Na}_2\text{HB}(\text{CH}_3)_2$ in large quantities, (3) a study of the process of having $\text{Na}_2\text{HB}(\text{CH}_3)_2$ react with $(\text{CH}_3)_4\text{B}_2\text{H}_2$ in liquid ammonia, and (4) a study of the properties of compounds analogous to $\text{Na}_2\text{HB}(\text{CH}_3)_2$, with special emphasis on $\text{Li}_2\text{HB}(\text{CH}_3)_2$.

Progress (to 31 January 1957): The work on boron bases has reached the stage where it appears that a number of such bases are capable of existence, but their extreme reactivity makes it very difficult to prepare them in good purity except on a very small scale. However, the Na and Ca salts of the $\text{HB}(\text{CH}_3)_2^-$ ion have been studied in some detail, and evidence that the Li salt can be prepared is reasonably good. The synthesis of the dimethylborohydrides of Ca and Li has been accomplished and the ammoniate of tetramethyldiborane has been studied in an effort to learn more about the reaction of tetramethyldiborane with active metals in liquid ammonia. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Further Studies of Boron Bases, by G. W. Campbell, Jr., and Anton B. Burg. (Manuscript submitted to Journal of the American Chemical Society).
2. Further Studies on the Boron Bases: $\text{CaHB}(\text{CH}_3)_2$, by George W. Campbell, Jr., in the Journal of the American Chemical Society, vol. 79 (August 1957), p. 4023-4029.
3. The Boron Bases, by George W. Campbell, Jr. and Louis A. Martineck. 1 February 1957, 34 p., figures, tables. (University of Houston, Final Report). ASTIA AD-123 238

II CHEMISTRY

G. Lubrication and Surface Phenomena

684 STUDY OF PARAFFIN-CHAIN MOLECULES

Contractor: University of Washington
Board of Regents
Seattle 5, Washington

Chief Investigator: E. C. Lingafelter

Contract No. DA-04-200-ORD-236
Duration: 1 February 1953 - 30 June 1957
Amount: \$ 41,976.00
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Frankford Arsenal

Scope: To study the structure of paraffin chain molecules by x-ray diffraction methods in solution and specifically including atoms of large scattering power within the paraffin chain; to study the crystal structures of certain paraffin chain compounds in order to study the packing requirements of the polar and ionic groups and the variations of carbon-carbon bond lengths and C-C-C bond angles; to study the properties of solutions of metalloalkane sulfonates in relation to molecular structure and micellar properties of paraffin-chain salt solutions.

Progress (31 October 1956 - 30 June 1957): Programming of the IBM 650 computer has been completed and programs are available for the following calculations: (1) Structure factors for any centrosymmetric zone on any space group, (2) Fourier, Patterson, or difference syntheses (2-dimensional) at various intervals from 25ths to 200ths, (3) overall isotropic temperature by least squares treatment, (4) overall isotropic temperature factor by Wilson's method, (5) interatomic distances and angles for crystals of monoclinic and higher symmetry, (6) hydrogen coordinates for CH_2 and CH_3 groups from carbon coordinates, and (7) best plane through any given set of atoms. The crystal structure of bis-ethylenediamine-nickel (II) thiocyanate has been essentially completed, with the discrepancy index being below 15% for all three axial projections. Since the difference syntheses showed peculiarities in the region of the Ni atom, the validity of the scattering factor, and the advisability of including the dispersion correction will be investigated. For subsequent progress see Research Proposal No. 1907, this report.

Technical Reports:

1. The X-Ray Crystallography of the Amides of the n-Aliphatic Acids, by J. D. Turner and E. C. Lingafelter. 30 October 1953, 32 p., figures, tables. (University of Washington, Department of Chemistry, Technical Report No. 1). ASTIA AD-20 725 (mc)

II CHEMISTRY

G. Lubrication and Surface Phenomena

684 (continued)

2. Study of Paraffin-Chain Molecules: The Effect of Gegenions on Micelles, by Russel F. Fogle, Jr., and E. C. Lingafelter. 31 July 1954, 9 p. (University of Washington, Technical Report No. 2). ASTIA AD-37 360 (mc)
3. Primary Salt Effects with Some Paraffin-Chain Salt Solutions, by J. A. Erikson and E. C. Lingafelter, in the Journal of Colloid Science, vol. 10, no. 1 (February 1955), p. 71-87. (Technical Report No. 3). ASTIA AD-58 621
4. X-Ray Crystallography of the Sodium n-Alkyl Sulfates, by F. F. Rawlings, Jr., and E. C. Lingafelter, in the Journal of the American Chemical Society, vol. 77 (February 1955), p. 870-872. (Technical Report No. 4). ASTIA AD-61 608
5. The Crystal Structure of Tetra-Decanamide, by J. D. Turner and E. C. Lingafelter, in Acta Crystallographica, vol. 8, no. 9 (September 1955), p. 551-557.
6. Linear to Log Converter, by J. R. Brathovde and J. D. Breazeale, in Review of Scientific Instruments, vol. 26, no. 9 (September 1955), p. 892-893. (Technical Report No. 5). ASTIA AD-81 747
7. The X-Ray Crystallography of the n-Aliphatic Amides, by J. D. Turner and E. C. Lingafelter, in Acta Crystallographica, vol. 8, no. 9 (September 1955), p. 549-550.
8. The Crystal Structure of Decanamide, by J. R. Brathovde and E. C. Lingafelter. (Manuscript submitted to Acta Crystallographica).

II CHEMISTRY

H. Molecular Structure and Physical Properties

525 STUDIES BEARING ON THE RELATION OF STRUCTURE TO PROPERTIES IN LIQUID SOLUTIONS

Contractor: University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh 13, Pennsylvania

Chief Investigators: Henry S. Frank
T. H. Dunkelberger

Contract No. DA-36-061-ORD-295	Renewed: DA-36-061-ORD-472
Duration: 1 Jan 53 - 31 Mar 55	1 April 1955 - 30 Sept 1956
Amount: \$ 22,454.99	\$ 6,755.00
Type of Contract: Fixed Price	Fixed Price

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research

Scope: To establish and extend correlations between thermodynamic data, kinetic data, and structural features of liquids and solutions. This objective will be accomplished by means of research along any or all of the lines listed below: (1) Measurement of e.m.f.'s of concentration cells within transference, using solutions of sodium chloride and potassium chloride in pure or nearly pure deuterium oxide (heavy water), (2) calorimetric measurements of heats of dilution and viscosities of aqueous solutions of additional amino acids, including the three aminobenzoic acids and some dipeptides, and (3) further study of the distribution of acetanilide and related compounds between water and non-polar solvents such as benzene and carbon tetrachloride.

Progress (to 30 September 1956): An evaluation has been made of developments in electrolyte theory during 1953, and the results have been published. An experimental study has been completed on the viscosities, activity coefficients, and heats of dilution of taurine and 2-aminobutane-1-sulfonic acid in aqueous solution. Results of this study revealed new regularities in structural influences of amino acids. A parallel study of *cis*- and *trans*-1,4-aminocyclohexanecarboxylic acids shed additional light on structural effects. In addition a study was made of the activity coefficient of LiCl in dilute aqueous solutions at 25°C. Results of the above studies appear in the technical reports listed below. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Solutions of Electrolytes, by Henry S. Frank and Maak Sang Leao in Annual Review of Physical Chemistry, vol. 5 (1954), p. 43-70. (Technical Report No. 1). ASTIA AD-48 611

II CHEMISTRY

H. Molecular Structure and Physical Properties

525 (continued)

2. Some Thermodynamic and Flow Properties of Aqueous Solutions of Two Amino Sulfonic Acids, by Wilbert Eugene Keder. 1956, 65 p., figures, tables. (University of Pittsburgh, Technical Report No. 2, Ph.D. thesis). ASTIA AD-106 722(mc)
3. Some Thermodynamic and Flow Properties of Aqueous Solutions of cis and trans-1,4-Aminocyclohexanecarboxylic Acids, by William Allan Plummer. 1956, 89 p., figures, tables. (University of Pittsburgh, Technical Report No. 3, Ph.D. thesis). ASTIA AD-106 723(mc)
4. The Activity Coefficient of LiCl in Dilute Aqueous Solutions at 25°C, by Henry S. Frank, T. H. Dunkelberger and others. 1956, 75 p., figures, tables. (University of Pittsburgh, Department of Chemistry, Technical Report No. 4, Ph.D. thesis).
5. Structure and Properties in Liquid Solutions, by Henry S. Frank and T. H. Dunkelberger. Not Dated, 10 p. (University of Pittsburgh, Department of Chemistry, Final Report).

II CHEMISTRY

H. Molecular Structure and Physical Properties

670 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE FORMATION AND PROPERTIES OF CHELATE COMPLEXES OF METAL IONS WITH VARIOUS SUBSTITUTED HYDROXAMIC ACIDS

Contractor: Purdue Research Foundation
Lafayette, Indiana

Chief Investigator: W. W. Brandt

Contract No. DA-33-008-ORD-607
Duration: 1 February 1953 - 31 August 1956
Amount: \$ 18,000.00
Type of Contract: Fixed Price

Primary Scientific Liaison: Frankford Arsenal

Scope: Basic research will be carried out involving factors influencing the formation and properties of chelate complexes of metal ions with various substituted hydroxamic acids.

Progress (to 31 August 1956): Work has been directed toward developing and understanding reactions of metals with hydroxamic acids, particularly of the iron-, vanadium-, and uranium-benzohydroxamic acid systems. Several new species have been identified, and the influence of structural variations in the reagent upon the properties of the complexes has been evaluated. The analytical applications of three metal systems have been demonstrated and evaluated to permit a better understanding of the variables influencing these methods. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. The Spectrophotometric Determination of Vanadium in Crude and Residual Oils, by Warren M. Wise and Warren B. Brandt, in Journal of American Chemical Society, vol. 27, no. 9 (September 1955). p. 1392-1395. (A part of #4). ASTIA AD-119 400
2. An Investigation of Some Hydroxamic Acids, by Warren M. Wise and Warren W. Brandt in the Journal of the American Chemical Society vol. 77 (20 February 1955), p. 1058-1059. (A part of #4). ASTIA AD-119 399
3. Extraction Studies of Metal-Hydroxamic Acid Complexes, by Warren W. Brandt and others. (Manuscript submitted to Journal of the American Chemical Society).
4. Factors Influencing the Formation and Properties of Chelate Complexes of Metal Ions with Various Substituted Hydroxamic Acids, by Warren W. Brandt, Warren M. Wise and others. 15 December 1956, 41 p., figures, tables. (Purdue Research Foundation, Department of Chemistry, Final Report, containing #1 and #2). ASTIA AD-119 398

II CHEMISTRY

H. Molecular Structure and Physical Properties

695 STUDIES OF SALT EFFECTS ON SOLUBILITY AND ION-PAIR EQUILIBRIA IN SOLVENTS OF LOW DIELECTRIC CONSTANT

Contractor: University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas

Chief Investigator: Ernest Griswold

Contract No. DA-23-072-ORD-493	Renewed: DA-23-072-ORD-965
Duration: 1 Feb 53 - 31 Jan 56	1 Feb 1956 - 31 July 1957
Amount: \$ 19,440.00	\$ 6,775.00
Type of Contract: Fixed Price	Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research

Scope: In the field of solvents of low dielectric constant, investigation concerning solubility phenomena involving electrolytes will be carried out by (a) determining the solvent effect of different soluble salts upon one or more slightly soluble salts in such a solvent, and (b) measuring the conductances of the individual salts in the solvents. Evaluation and appropriate interpretation of the results will be made.

Progress (to 31 July 1957): The solubility of silver acetate has been determined at 30° in acetic acid alone and in the presence of sodium acetate, silver nitrate, and lithium nitrate, each at several concentrations. Also the solubility of silver nitrate has been measured in acetic acid solutions of silver acetate, lithium nitrate, and sodium acetate at the same temperature. It has been determined that the solubility of ammonium bromide in acetic acid at 30° is roughly tripled in the presence of 0.1 molal lithium acetate, potassium acetate or sodium acetate. Ammonium acetate produced about a 30% increase at this concentration. The solubility of KBr has been determined in fourteen different mixtures of acetic acid and acetonitrile with each mixture containing various concentrations of sodium acetate. Similar measurements were made using potassium acetate as added salt in nine different acetic acid-acetonitrile mixtures. Conductance measurements have been made at 25° and 30° on potassium bromide, sodium bromide, potassium acetate, and sodium acetate over a range of concentrations in acetic acid and in three acetic acid-acetonitrile mixtures. These results have been used to calculate ion pair dissociation constants and limiting equivalent conductances for the salts. Studies have indicated that ion-pair metathesis in solvents of the kind used in this investigation plays an important role in salt effect on solubility. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

II CHEMISTRY

H. Molecular Structure and Physical Properties

695 (continued)

Technical Reports:

1. The Effect of Some Salts on the Solubility of Silver Acetate and of Silver Nitrate in Acetic Acid at 30°, by Ralph K. Birdwhistell and Ernest Griswold. Not Dated, 11 p., tables. (University of Kansas, Department of Chemistry, Technical Report No. 1; also published in the Journal of the American Chemical Society, vol. 77 (February 1955), p. 873-875). ASTIA AD-50 489 (mc)
2. Studies of Salt Effects on Solubility and Ion-Pair Equilibria in Solvents of Low Dielectric Constant, by Ernest Griswold. 42 p., figures, tables. (University of Kansas, Department of Chemistry, Final Report: 1 February 1953 - 31 July 1957).

II CHEMISTRY

H. Molecular Structure and Physical Properties

967 ABSORPTION INTENSITIES IN THE POLARIZED SPECTRA OF SIMPLE MOLECULAR CRYSTALS

Contractor: Cornell University
Ithaca, New York

Chief Investigator: R. M. Hexter

Contract No. DA-30-115-ORD-513	Renewed: DA-30-115-ORD-704
Duration: 15 Oct 53 - 14 Dec 55	15 Dec 1955 - 30 June 1957
Amount: \$ 14,263.76	\$ 8,437.18
Type of Contract: Fixed Price	Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research
Scientific Cognizance: Redstone Arsenal

Scope: The investigation will be concerned with the use of polarized infrared spectroscopic techniques in the study of crystal and molecular structure. In particular, it is intended to study iodine monobromide and several "pseudo-diatomic" molecular systems. Two such cases are hexachloroethane and symmetric tribromo-trichloroethane. In addition, the infrared techniques will be supplemented by an investigation of the Raman spectra.

Progress (to 30 June 1957): The polarized infrared spectrum of crystalline iodoform has been obtained. A complete assignment of all fundamentals was possible including at least two of the lattice frequencies of the crystal. A study has been made of the effect of librations of molecules about axes perpendicular to those of the transition moments of molecular vibrations upon the dichroic ratios associated with such vibrations in the infrared spectra of molecular crystals. It has been demonstrated that if such librations are harmonic and of small amplitude, the root-mean-square deviation of the molecular orientation from its equilibrium orientation is sufficient to account for the deviation of observed dichroic ratios from those predicted by the "oriented gas model". An analysis was made of the spectrum of $Mg(OH)_2$ and $Ca(OH)_2$, based upon the use of energy level diagrams for restricted rotators in a potential field of the appropriate symmetry for such crystals, and it has been concluded that this development constitutes a valuable new approach toward the understanding of the notion of molecules in solids. Studies have also been made of the high resolution, temperature dependent spectra of calcite and of sodium nitrate, and preliminary results have been obtained on the spectra of $LiOH$, $NaBH_4$, KBH_4 , and SiH_4 . Complete results of the above studies appear in report #5 listed below. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

II CHEMISTRY

H. Molecular Structure and Physical Properties

967 (continued)

Technical Reports:

1. The Infrared Absorption Anisotropy of Crystalline Iodoform, by R. M. Hexter and H. Cheung. Not dated, 16 p., figures. (Cornell University, Technical Report No. 1: June 1954 - June 1955; also published in the Journal of Chemical Physics, vol. 24, no. 6 (June 1956), p. 1186-1195)
2. Absorption Intensities in the Polarized Spectra of Simple Molecular Crystals, by R. M. Hexter. 21 p., tables. (Cornell University, Technical Report No. 2: June 1955 - January 1956). ASTIA AD-80 828
3. High Resolution, Temperature Dependent Spectra of Calcite, by R. M. Hexter. 22 p., figures, tables. (Cornell University, Technical Report No. 3: 15 December 1955 - 14 June 1956).
4. Low-Frequency Librations and the Vibrational Spectra of Molecular Crystals, by R. M. Hexter and D. A. Dows, in Journal of Chemical Physics, vol. 25, no. 3 (September 1956), p. 504-509.
5. Absorption Intensities in the Polarized Spectra of Simple Molecular Crystals, by R. M. Hexter. 31 p., figures, tables. (Cornell University, Final Report: 15 October 1953 - 15 June 1957).

II CHEMISTRY

H. Molecular Structure and Physical Properties

1087 DIELECTRIC PROPERTIES OF HYDROGEN BONDING LIQUIDS AND SOLIDS

Contractor: Brown University
Providence 12, Rhode Island

Chief Investigators: Donald F. Hornig
Robert H. Cole

Contract No. DA-19-020-ORD-3177
Duration: 30 October 1953 - 30 October 1956
Amount: \$ 26,000.00
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research
Scientific Cognizance: Redstone Arsenal

Scope: One or more of the following topics will be treated in this investigation: (a) Measuring dielectric dispersion and loss in representative liquids, (b) measuring the effect of pressure on dielectric relaxation at low temperatures, and (c) investigating the dielectric properties of several inorganic acids.

Progress (to 30 October 1956): The dielectric properties of the solid phases of three hydrogen and deuterium halides have been measured from 63°K to the melting points in the frequency range 20 c/sec to 2 mc/sec. The static and dynamic electrical properties of five of the lower monohydric aliphatic alcohols have been investigated. In addition, various compositions of a solution of two of the alcohols were studied in the frequency range from 0.1 c/sec to 2 mc/sec with the temperature range such that dispersion was characterized both above and below the melting point. The effect of pressures to 1000 atmospheres on the dielectric constant and loss of l-propanol and glycerol has been studied and liquid equation of state data have been obtained for interpreting the dielectric results as a function of pressure. Techniques for measuring dielectric properties of liquids in the 1-250 mc/sec range have been developed, and a special test cell which can be thermostatted adequately down to -78°C has been designed and used successfully. Additional work has included a critical study of previous measurements on liquid alkali halides, and of equimolar mixtures of i-butyl bromide and i-butyl chloride and of a mixture of i-amyl bromide and l-propanol. Attempts have been made to measure the dielectric constant and loss of sulfuric acid. Further work is necessary before any conclusions can be made as to the accuracy of the measurements. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. The Design and Construction of Two Low Temperature Thermostats, by Andrew Gilchrist, in the Review of Scientific Instruments, vol. 26, no. 8 (August 1955), p. 773-775. (A part of #6).

II CHEMISTRY

H. Molecular Structure and Physical Properties

1087 (continued)

2. On the Analysis of Dielectric Relaxation Measurements, by R. H. Cole, in Journal of Chemical Physics, vol. 23, no. 3, (March 1955), p. 493-499. (A part of #6).
3. Dielectric Properties of Methanol and Methanol l-Propanol Solutions, by Donald J. Denny and R. H. Cole, in The Journal of Chemical Physics, vol. 23, no. 10 (October 1955), p. 1767-1772. (A part of #6).
4. Dielectric Properties of Liquid Butyl Alcohols, by Walter Dannhouser and R. H. Cole, in Journal of Chemical Physics, vol. 23, no. 10 (October 1955) p. 1762-1766. (A part of #6).
5. On Dielectric Properties of Solid Hydrogen and Deuterium Halides, by S. Havriliak, Jr. and R. H. Cole, in Journal of Chemical Physics, vol. 23, no. 12 (December 1955) p. 2455-2456. (A part of #6).
6. Dielectric Properties of Hydrogen Bonding in Liquids and Solids, by R. H. Cole, 16 March 1956, various paging, figures, tables. (Brown University, Metcalf Research Laboratory, Technical Report No. 1, containing #1 through #5). ASTIA AD 107-142
7. Effect of Pressure on Dielectric Properties and Volume of l-Propanol and Glycerol, by A. Gilchrist and others. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of Chemical Physics). (A part of #11).
8. Dielectric Properties of Some Liquid Alkyl Halides, by Donald J. Denny. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of Chemical Physics). (A part of #11).
9. A Coaxial Dielectric Cell for Liquids, by R. H. Cole and S. E. Lovell. (Manuscript submitted to The Review of Scientific Instruments).
10. Dielectric Relaxation in Solid Hydrogen Halides, by R. H. Cole and S. Havriliak, Jr. (Manuscript submitted to Discussions of the Faraday Society). (A part of #11).
11. Dielectric Properties of Hydrogen Bonding Liquids and Solids, by R. H. Cole and others. 15 April 1957, various paging, figures, tables. (Brown University, Metcalf Research Laboratory, Final Report containing #7, #8, #9 and #10).

II CHEMISTRY

H. Molecular Structure and Physical Properties

1173 PROPOSAL TO FURNISH FURTHER STRUCTURAL INFORMATION REGARDING OXIDES, OXYACIDS, AND OXYHALIDES OF NITROGEN

Contractor: Stanford University
(Board of Trustees of the
Leland Stanford Junior University)
Palo Alto, California

Chief Investigator: Richard A. Ogg, Jr.

Contract No. DA-04-200-ORD-318
Duration: 1 June 1954 - 31 May 1957
Amount: \$ 31,586.64
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research
Scientific Cognizance: Picatinny Arsenal

Scope: Research will be conducted to furnish further structural information regarding oxides, oxyacids and oxyhalides of nitrogen. The problem will be attacked by studying nuclear magnetic resonance in nitrogen compounds. In particular such compounds as NO, N₂O₄ and NClO₂ will be studied.

Progress (to 31 May 1957): The following studies have been completed and the results are in various stages of publication: (1) Quadrupole relaxation and structures in nitrogen magnetic resonances of ammonia and ammonium salts, (2) quadrupole relaxation broadening of the magnetic resonance spectrum of methylammonium ion, (3) proton and nitrogen magnetic resonance spectra and structure of nitramide and nitrourethane, (4) proton magnetic resonance spectra of some alkyl nitrites, (5) nuclear magnetic N¹⁴ resonance spectra, molecular structures and exchange reactions in the system N₂O₅-NO₂⁺-NO₃⁻-H₂O, (6) preparation and proton magnetic resonance studies of anhydrous ammonia, and (7) molecular structure determination from nitrogen magnetic resonance spectra. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Proton Magnetic Resonance Spectra of Some Alkyl Nitrites, by L. H. Piette, James D. Ray, and R. A. Ogg, Jr., in the Journal of Chemical Physics (1957). (A part of #7).
2. Nuclear Magnetic H¹ and N¹⁴ Resonance Spectra of Nitramide and Nitrourethane, by James D. Ray and R. A. Ogg, Jr., in the Journal of Chemical Physics (1957). (A part of #7).

II CHEMISTRY

H. Molecular Structure and Physical Properties

1173 (continued)

3. Nuclear Magnetic N¹⁴ Resonance Spectra, Molecular Structures and Exchange Reactions in the System N₂O₅-NO₂⁺-NO₃⁻-H₂O, by James D. Ray and R. A. Ogg, Jr., in the Journal of Chemical Physics, vol. 25, no. 6 (December 1956), p. 1285-1286. (A part of #7).
4. Quadrupole Relaxation and Structures in Nitrogen Magnetic Resonances of Ammonia and Ammonium Salts, by R. A. Ogg, Jr., and James D. Ray, in the Journal of Chemical Physics (1957). (A part of #7).
5. Quadrupole Relaxation Broadening of the Magnetic Resonance Spectrum of Methylammonium Ion, by R. A. Ogg, Jr., and James D. Ray, in the Journal of Chemical Physics, vol. 26, no. 5 (May 1957), p. 1340-1341. (A part of #7).
6. Preparation and Proton Magnetic Resonance Studies of Anhydrous Ammonia, by James D. Ray and R. A. Ogg, Jr., in the Journal of Chemical Physics (1957). (A part of #7).
7. Study to Furnish Further Structural Data on Oxides, Oxyacids, and Oxyhalides of Nitrogen, by R. A. Ogg, Jr., James D. Ray, and L. H. Piette. Various paging, figures. (Stanford University, Final Report containing #1, #2, #3, #4, #5, #6, and #8: 1 June 1954 - 31 May 1957).
8. Molecular Structure Determination from Nitrogen Magnetic Resonance Spectra, by James D. Ray and R. A. Ogg, Jr. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of Chemical Physics). (A part of #7).

II CHEMISTRY

H. Molecular Structure and Physical Properties

1277 HYBRIDIZATION STUDIES AND THE STRUCTURE AND BOND TYPE IN MOLECULAR COMPLEXES WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE METAL CARBONYLS

Contractor: Florida State University
(The Board of Control of the University)
Tallahassee, Florida

Chief Investigators: R. E. Johnson
Richard Wolfgang

Contract No. DA-01-009-ORD-406	Renewed: DA-01-009-ORD-461
Duration: 1 Feb 55 - 31 Jan 56	1 Feb 1956 - 30 June 1957
Amount: \$ 6,243.00	\$ 7,952.50
Type of Contract: Fixed Price	Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research
Scientific Cognizance: Frankford Arsenal

Scope: A number of metal cyanides, carbonyls, and hydrocarbons will be synthesized and studied by infrared spectroscopy. These will include but not be limited to mixed and individual cyanides, carbonyls and hydrocarbons of ruthenium, osmium, iron, nickel, and cobalt. Particular emphasis will be placed upon the normal coordinate analysis of representative compounds.

Progress (to 30 June 1957): Attempts have been made to analyze the structure and bond types in molecular complexes by spectroscopic methods and by isotopic exchange reactions, and the following results have been obtained: (1) The infrared spectra of cobalt tricarbonyl was determined and a tentative assignment of absorption peaks was made, (2) the infrared spectra of two nickel cyanides, $K_4Ni_2(CN)_6$ and $K_4Ni(CN)_4$, were determined and their structure was predicted, (3) a normal coordinate analysis of the $Fe(CO)_5$ molecule was made and a tetragonal pyramid structure was assigned, (4) the thermochemistry of some metal carbonyls was investigated, and (5) the isotopic rates of exchange of carbon monoxide with $Fe(CO)_5$, $Co_2(CO)_8$, $Ni(CO)_4$, $Co_2(CO)_6$, $C_6H_5C \equiv C_6H_5$ and $Mn_2(CO)_{10}$ were measured. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Bond Hybridization and Structure in the Metal Carbonyls, by J. W. Cable and R. K. Sheline. 68 p., figures, tables. (Florida State University, Technical Report No. 1: 1 February 1955 - 1 August 1955; also submitted to Chemical Reviews). ASTIA AD-69 715 (mc)
2. The Structure and Bond Type in Molecular Complexes, by Raymond K. Sheline, Richard W. Wolfgang and Rowland E. Johnson. 14 p. (Florida State University, Final Report: 1 February 1955 - 30 June 1957).

II CHEMISTRY

H. Molecular Structure and Physical Properties

1394 A STUDY OF SYSTEMS OF WATER, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE, AND SALTS

Contractor: University of Virginia
Charlottesville, Virginia

Chief Investigator: Paul Gross, Jr.

Contract No. DA-36-034-ORD-2019
Duration: 1 July 1955 - 15 September 1957
Amount: \$ 17,710.44
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research

Scope: To investigate systems of hydrogen peroxide/water containing salts with the broad objective of obtaining quantitative thermodynamic data that could lead to a quantitative evaluation of the solvation of the ions. Some of the methods used may be vapor pressure determinations, solubility determinations, conductivity measurements, and distribution measurements.

Progress (1 July 1955 - 15 September 1957): A series of vapor pressure and vapor composition measurements have been made of water-hydrogen peroxide solutions. These mixtures had previously shown interesting solvation effects in salt systems. In addition, a series of partial molal volume determinations, a number of experiments characterizing the solid phases in equilibrium with saturated solutions, and a limited number of solubility determinations have been made to explain the properties of the salt solutions. Complete results of these studies appear in the report listed below. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. A Study of Systems of Water, Hydrogen Peroxide, and Salts, by Paul M. Gross, Jr. 23 p., figures. (University of Virginia, Final Report: 1 July 1955 - 15 September 1957).

II CHEMISTRY

I. Organic Chemistry

735 ACYLATION OF ALICYCLIC KETONES AND RELATED COMPOUNDS WITH ESTERS, AND OF ACTIVE HYDROGEN COMPOUNDS WITH LACTONES

Contractor: University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Massachusetts

Chief Investigator: G. W. Cannon

Contract No. DA-19-059-ORD-1317	Renewed: DA-19-059-ORD-2196
Duration: 11 May 53 - 31 May 55	1 June 1955 - 10 June 1957
Amount: \$ 8,983.91	\$ 9,598.00
Type of Contract: Fixed Price	Fixed Price

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research

Scope: Research will be continued on, but not limited to, the following topics: (a) Acylation and alkylation of alicyclic compounds with esters and active hydrogen compounds with lactones including the possible evolution of useful synthetic methods; and (b) to study substituted cyclopropane structures in an effort to determine if hyperconjugation exists sufficiently to activate neighboring positions analogous to the effects produced by the inclusion of unsaturation, carbonyl groups, etc. This can involve alkylations, acylations, or whatever other reactions are relevant toward the attainment of the above cited objectives.

Progress (to 10 June 1957): A study was made of the transmission of conjugative effects in certain cyclopropanes. Cyclopropyl esters, ketones, and nitriles were synthesized and the acylation, alkylation, aldolization, and cyanoethylation at the contiguous methyl group was investigated. Studies were also made of the ultraviolet and infrared absorption spectra of the cyclopropanes. Acylation studies of active hydrogen compounds with lactones have been completed. γ -Butyrolactone, γ -valerolactone, and δ -valerolactone were studied in this connection. Studies were made of the structure of the condensation products, of the infrared and ultraviolet absorption spectra, and of the reaction of the products with ammonia and hydrazine. The infrared and ultraviolet spectra of certain β -alkoxy- α,β -unsaturated ketones were investigated for use in interpreting the spectra and elucidating the structure of the products obtained from the condensation of lactones with ketones. Complete results of the above studies appear in the reports listed below. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

II CHEMISTRY

I. Organic Chemistry

735 (continued)

Technical Reports:

1. Acylation of Alicyclic Ketones and Related Compounds with Esters, and of Active Hydrogen Compounds with Lactones, I. Acylation of Active Hydrogen Compounds with Lactones, II. The Infrared and Ultraviolet Spectra of Certain β -Alkoxy- α,β -Unsaturated Ketones, and III. A Study of the Transmission of Conjugative Effects in Certain Cyclopropanes, by George W. Cannon and others. June 1957, 63 p., tables. (University of Massachusetts, Final Report).

II CHEMISTRY

I. Organic Chemistry

1252 A QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF THE RELATIVE INFLUENCE OF POLAR SUBSTITUENTS AND HYPERCONJUGATION ON THREE-CARBON TAUTOMERISM

Contractor: Columbia University
(Trustees of Columbia University)
Broadway at 116th Street
New York 27, New York

Chief Investigator: Fausto Ramirez

Contract No. DA-30-069-ORD-1316
Duration: 1 September 1954 - 31 August 1956
Amount: \$ 20,206.00
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research

Scope: A quantitative study will be made of the effects which polar substituents (such as *para* and *meta* NO₂, NH₂, OH, and Cl) and alkyl groups (such as methyl, ethyl, isopropyl) exert on the position of the equilibria of certain tautomeric systems. Also, a study will be made of the rate of equilibration of the butenolides including the position of equilibrium and rate constants of the system, and an examination will be made of the mechanism of formation of lactones from ketoacids.

Progress (to 31 August 1956): A study was made of the mechanism of the conversion of γ -ketoacids to butenolides. Racemic and optically active α -alkyl- β -aroylpropionic acids were converted into racemic and optically active, crystalline, symmetrical anhydrides by treatment with acetic anhydride. The decomposition of the anhydrides was studied under a variety of conditions. It was shown that the product obtained when an optically active symmetrical anhydride is heated for 30 minutes at 100° in the absence of solvents, consists of optically active ketoacid and a mixture of mostly racemic butenolides. It was shown that the product obtained when a symmetrical anhydride is heated for 100 minutes at 100° in acetonitrile, consists of a clean mixture of ketoacid and β - γ -butenolide. Kinetic runs revealed that a symmetrical anhydride decomposes at 100° in dioxane to ketoacid anion and an intermediate which slowly generates β - γ -butenolide. In acetonitrile, at 100°, the anhydride decomposition was somewhat faster and the subsequent transformation of the intermediate to β - γ -butenolide was considerably accelerated. The above results were compared with those obtained when the reaction of the ketoacids with acetic anhydride was allowed to proceed to the butenolide stage without isolation of intermediates, and a probable over-all mechanism was formulated. The information obtained was utilized in attempts to prepare optically active α -alkyl- γ -aryl- β - γ -butenolides, and it has been concluded that the preparation is feasible when the *para*-substituent in the γ -aryl ring is bromo, methoxy, and hydrogen, if proper conditions are selected. Preparation of the butenolides was desired in order to study hydrogen mobility in

II CHEMISTRY

I. Organic Chemistry

1252 (continued)

three-carbon tautomerism and to ascertain the effect of alkyl groups on the hydrogen mobility by measuring the rates of racemizations. It was concluded that rate measurements on optically active butenolides by polarimetric techniques was the best method to determine hydrogen mobility. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. A Quantitative Study of Relative Influence of Polar Substituents and Hyperconjugation on Three-Carbon Tautomerism, by Fausto Ramirez, Charles E. Dills and Samuel Dershowitz. 62 p., tables. (Columbia University, Final Report: 1 October 1954 - 30 July 1956).

II CHEMISTRY

I. Organic Chemistry

1258 RESEARCH IN ORGANIC SULFUR COMPOUNDS

Contractor: Wayne University
(Board of Education of the City of Detroit)
4841 Cass Avenue
Detroit 1, Michigan

Chief Investigator: Carl Djerassi

Contract No. DA-20-018-ORD-13474
Duration: 1 September 1954 - 1 December 1956
Amount: \$ 13,411.62
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research
Scientific Cognizance: Redstone Arsenal; Picatinny Arsenal

Scope: To perform basic research in the area of organic sulfur chemistry, investigating in particular: (a) Chemistry of beta-ketosulfonic acids, (b) the synthesis of substituted beta-mercaptoethanols, their condensation with carbonyl compounds to hemithioketals and the behavior of such hemithioketals as well as their corresponding sulfoxides and sulfones.

Progress (to 1 December 1956): The desulfurization of β -mercaptoethanols with Raney nickel in acetone solution yielded mainly the alcohol. Desulfurization of the corresponding hemithioketals (1,3-oxathiolanes) under the same conditions involved introduction of oxygen from an outside source. Acid cleavage of spiro-(5-diphenylmethyl-1,3-oxathiolane-2,3'-cholestane) (I) followed by lithium aluminum hydride reduction of the resulting disulfide led to optically pure 1,1-diphenyl-3-mercapto-propan-2-ol. Raney nickel desulfurization of this β -mercaptoethanol or of its O,S-dibenzoate furnished 1,1-diphenyl-propan-2-ol, yielded benzoates. The rotations of this alcohol and its derivatives were identical to those of the earlier prepared desulfurization product of the hemithiokeetal I. The results have indicated that no racemization occurs in the formation of alcohols by Raney nickel desulfurization of hemithioketals or of β -mercaptoethanols. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Studies in Organic Sulfur Compounds. VIII. Introduction of Oxygen in the Raney Nickel Desulfurization of Hemithioketals, by Carl Djerassi and others, in Journal of the American Chemical Society, vol. 77 (1955), p. 4647-4651.

II CHEMISTRY

I. Organic Chemistry

1258 (continued)

2. Studies in Organic Sulfur Compounds. IX. Preparation and Desulfurization of Optically Active 1,1-Diphenyl-3-Mercaptopropan-2-ol, by Carl Djerassi and J. Grossman. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of the American Chemical Society). (A part of #3).
3. Research in Organic Sulfur Compounds, by Carl Djerassi. Various paging, figures. (Wayne State University, Final Report: 1 September 1954 - 30 November 1956, consisting of #1 and #2). ASTIA AD-117 617

II CHEMISTRY

I. Organic Chemistry

1464 PREPARATION AND PROPERTIES OF TRIALKYLFLUOROSILANES

Contractor: Duquesne University
Pittsburgh 19, Pennsylvania

Chief Investigators: H. H. Szmant
Kurt C. Schrieber

Contract No. DA-36-061-ORD-489	Renewed: DA-36-061-ORD-544
Duration: 15 June 55 - 14 June 56	15 June 1956 - 31 July 1957
Amount: \$ 4,900.00	\$ 4,680.00
Type of Contract: Fixed Price	Fixed Price

Primary Scientific Liaison: Frankford Arsenal
Scientific Cognizance: Rock Island Arsenal

Scope: Basic research will be performed in the area of substituted fluorosilanes and will include but not be limited to: (1) Synthesis of trialkylfluorosilanes in which the alkyl groups are identical, (2) synthesis of trialkylfluorosilanes containing dissimilar alkyl groups, (3) a study of the physical properties of the above described compounds and mixtures, and (4) synthesis of branched alkylfluorosilanes and a study of their susceptibility to atmospheric oxidation.

Progress (to 31 July 1957): A series of trialkylfluorosilanes has been prepared. Analyses have been made and the physical constants have been determined. Samples of tri-dodecylfluorosilane and tri-(3,5,5-trimethylhexyl) fluorosilane have been submitted to Frankford Arsenal for testing as lubricant constituents. A number of unsymmetrical trialkylfluorosilanes have been synthesized, and samples of amyl-di-dodecylfluorosilane and of 3,5,5-trimethylhexyl-di-dodecylfluorosilane have also been sent to Frankford Arsenal for testing purposes. The branched chain compounds, in general, have appeared most promising; e.g., 3,5,5-trimethylhexylfluorosilane compared well with petroleum for lubricity and showed a viscosity of 10,000 centistokes at -40°. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Trialkylfluorosilanes, by H. Harry Szmant and Gerald W. Miller. October 1955, 4 p., tables. (Duquesne University, Technical Report No. 1). ASTIA AD-79 534
2. Preparation and Properties of Trialkylfluorosilanes, by H. H. Szmant, Kurt C. Schrieber and others. August 1957, 11 p., tables. (Duquesne University, Final Report).

II CHEMISTRY

K. Reaction Kinetics and Equilibria

403 TRANSPORT PROPERTIES IN LIQUID SYSTEMS

Contractor: University of Southern California
3518 University Avenue
Los Angeles 7, California

Chief Investigator: Arthur W. Adamson

Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-364
Duration: 27 June 1952 - 1 November 1956
Amount: \$ 25,855.00
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research

Scope: The investigation of certain transport properties in liquids and liquid solutions will be continued, and will include (a) a theoretical and experimental investigation of the parameter dependence of self-diffusion coefficients, (b) extension of measurements of ion self-diffusion coefficients to salt solutions and to concentration ranges not previously studied, (c) a study of self-diffusion of ions of polyvalent metal salts as a means of obtaining information of the physical state of these ions in solution, (d) a study of the mechanisms of proton transfer in water, and (e) if time permits, a comparison will be made of the self-diffusional mobility of small charged and uncharged species in aqueous media.

Progress (to 15 January 1957): Studies have been made of the diffusional behavior of ions and of neutral molecules in liquid systems in order to (1) obtain fairly complete information about the diffusional and other properties of selected systems so that existing theories could be checked, (2) develop more structurally detailed diffusion treatments, and (3) explain the serious discrepancies that existed between various laboratories as to the actual values of the self-diffusion coefficients of ions in electrolyte solutions, and to determine why different experimental methods seemed to yield different results. The sources of the experimental difficulties have been found to lie partly in the method of calibrating the diaphragm cells and partly in the stirring procedure used in the open-end capillary method. These findings have been published. In addition, a complete set of physical data has been obtained for the sucrose-water system and for water itself. This work has involved measuring or supplementing existing data on the binary and the two self-diffusion coefficients over the entire concentration range of sucrose concentrations in the first system, and of H₂O-D₂O composition in the second system, as well as filling in viscosity, density, and activity coefficient data. In addition a partially successful effort was made to obtain a measure of the nature of coupling between the components of a binary system, through the use of inert markers. The results which were obtained in the above studies were used to test the various theories of binary

II CHEMISTRY

K. Reaction Kinetics and Equilibria

403 (continued)

diffusion and it was concluded that they were not at all adequate. However, some progress has been made towards developing a theory which will have more general utility. This phase of the investigation is discussed in report #5 listed below. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Diffusion and Self-Diffusion of Electrolytes and Hydration Effects, by Arthur W. Adamson. June 1953, 28 p., figures. (Department of Chemistry, University of Southern California; also published in the Journal of Physical Chemistry, vol. 58 (July 1954), p. 514-523). ASTIA AD-52 920 ASTIA AD-13 441 (mc)
2. A Proposed Approach to the "Chelate Effect", by Arthur W. Adamson, 4 p., tables. (University of Southern California, Department of Chemistry). ASTIA AD-24 370 (mc)
3. The Measurement of Self-Diffusion in Liquid Media, by Arthur W. Adamson and R. G. Mills. February 1954, 15 p., figures, tables. (University of Southern California, Department of Chemistry). ASTIA AD-42 259
4. A Modified Equation of State for Monolayers of Linear Macromolecules, by H. L. Frisch.
5. Transport Processes in Liquid Systems, by Arthur W. Adamson. 31 p., figures, tables. (University of Southern California, Department of Chemistry, Final Report: 27 June 1952 - 15 January 1957).

III MATHEMATICS

A. Algebra and Number Theory

1194 INVESTIGATIONS OF LINEAR ALGEBRAS AND OPERATOR ALGEBRAS

Contractor: University of Chicago
5801 Ellis Avenue
Chicago 37, Illinois

Chief Investigators: A. A. Albert
Irving Kaplansky

Contract No. DA-11-022-ORD-1571
Duration: 1 October 1954 - 31 March 1957
Amount: \$ 28,040.20
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research

Scope: A. A. Albert has studied a number of cases of power-associative algebras and has obtained a quite complete theory for the commutative case. There are a number of open questions still to be studied in the commutative case, and the non-commutative cases are still in a chaotic state. A recent contribution along this line is Albert's work on right alternative algebras. The algebras called Lie algebras are also power-associative algebras which are non-commutative. The theory of Lie algebras is connected with the theory of continuous groups and the new theory of Lie algebras of characteristic p is of great importance in the study of finite groups. Both Albert and Kaplansky will investigate the latter theory. The structure theory of linear algebras forms a model for the structure theory of operator algebras on Banach and Hilbert space. Kaplansky will continue his studies of such algebras.

Progress (to 31 March 1957): Studies completed by A. A. Albert include (1) new classes of simple Lie algebras of characteristic p in which the results represent a major break-through for the theory of Lie algebras of characteristic p , (2) the consideration of a property of associative involutorial algebras which has provided a new and very simple proof of some properties used in the theory of abelian varieties, (3) a study of ordered rings satisfying a polynomial identity, (4) a study of the structure of partially stable simple commutative power-associative algebras, (5) a study of certain trinomial equations in finite fields, and (6) a proof that the conjecture of Nathan Jacobson that every Jordan algebra is the homomorphic image of a special Jordan algebra A is false when A is finite dimensional. I. Kaplansky obtained a proof that any orthocomplemented complete modular lattice is a continuous geometry. He also wrote a short book which contains many new results, especially on algebraic groups. He made a study of the multiplicative group of a C^* algebra in which it has been shown that certain groups proved by Kadison to be topologically simple are simple. He also developed a new algebraic approach to the theory of rings of operators. R. Block completed a study of new classes of simple Lie algebras of characteristic p in which he showed that certain algebras

III MATHEMATICS

A. Algebra and Number Theory

1194 (continued)

considered by A. A. Albert and M. S. Frank were restricted while others were not. G. Weiss obtained a theorem on interpolation of sublinear operators in H_p spaces. E. C. Posner completed a study concerning the connection between commutative differential rings and simple rings. D. Hertzog made a study of the cohomology of a group with coefficients in an algebra. He filled a gap in the structure theory of Lie algebra caused by the existence of Cartan's spin automorphism, and extended to degree two Kolchin's classification of strongly normal fields. G. Kolettis studied and extended the theory of primary abelian groups beyond its previous limits. The final report has been received and the project has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. On Involutorial Algebras, by A. A. Albert, in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 41, no. 7 (July 1955), p. 480-482. ASTIA AD-99 217
2. Simple Lie Algebras of Characteristic p , by A. A. Albert and M. S. Frank, in Rendiconti del Seminario Matematico dell' Università e Politecnico di Torino, vol. 14 (1954-1955). ASTIA AD-112 600
3. A Property of Ordered Rings, by A. A. Albert, in Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 8, no. 1 (February 1957), p. 128-129.
4. On Partially Stable Algebras, by A. A. Albert, in Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 84, no. 2 (March 1957), p. 430-443.
5. On Matrices of Trace Zero, by A. A. Albert and B. Muckenaupt, in Michigan Mathematical Journal, vol. 4 (1957). ASTIA AD-123 676
6. A Property of Special Jordan Algebras, by A. A. Albert, in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 42, no. 9 (September 1956), p. 624-625.
7. On Certain Trinomial Equations in Finite Fields, by A. A. Albert, in Annals of Mathematics, vol. 66, no. 1 (July 1957), p. 170-178.
8. Investigations of Linear Algebras and Operator Algebras, by A. A. Albert. 11 p. (University of Chicago, Department of Mathematics, Final Report: 1 October 1954 - 30 September 1956). ASTIA AD-106 973

III MATHEMATICS

A. Algebra and Number Theory

1194 (continued)

9. Any Orthocomplemented Complete Modular Lattice is a Continuous Geometry, by Irving Kaplansky. 17 p. (University of Chicago, Department of Mathematics; also published in Annals of Mathematics, vol. 61, no. 3 (May 1955), p. 524-541. ASTIA AD-111 692
10. An Interpolation Theorem for Sublinear Operators on H_p Spaces, by Guido Weiss, in Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 8, no. 1 (February 1957), p. 92-99.
11. Derivations in Prime Rings, by Edward C. Posner. Not dated, 13 p. (University of Chicago, Department of Mathematics).

III MATHEMATICS

B. Analysis

888 EXPANSION OF ANALYTIC FUNCTIONS BY A SERIES OF POWERS OF A POLYNOMIAL

Contractor: Illinois Institute of Technology
3300 South Federal Street
Chicago 16, Illinois

Chief Investigator: Gordon Pall

Contract No. DA-11-022-ORD-1494
Duration: 2 October 1953 - 19 April 1957
Amount: \$ 40,523.65
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research

Scope: In research on the expansion of analytic functions in series of powers of polynomials, one or more of the following areas will be included: (1) Properties of these expansions analogous to those of ordinary power series, (2) conformal mapping, (3) function theoretic problems such as Tauberian problems, and (4) applications to eigenvalue problems in the theory of differential equations.

Progress (to 19 April 1957): Investigations have been conducted which show that the Jacobi expansion of a function f in powers of a polynomial h of degree n (the coefficients polynomials of lower degree) can be characterized in terms of a kind of generalized derivative, with the Taylor series and the ordinary derivative as a special case. This has led to new expansions and applications. The concepts of bi-derivative and bi-integral have been clarified, giving direct definitions of these at point pairs relative to j^2 and other functions. Geometrical illustrations have been given and the bi-derivatives of certain functions have been computed. An explicit formula for $D_h f$ has been derived. A thesis concerned with the application of Jacobi series to the computation of eigenvalues in Sturm-Liouville systems has been written. The partial sums of a Jacobi series were used as trial functions in the collocation and least squares methods. The method seems to give rapid convergence, but the proof of convergence was carried through only in special cases. One advantage of this method is that it leads to the study of a determinant of a fixed order rather than one of increasing order as in the classical treatments. It has been proved that the zeros of certain determinants whose limits are the desired real eigenvalues are never real themselves except in a specific case, and actually occur in conjugate complex pairs. The calculus of operators of J. Mikusinski has been extended to bi-derivatives. Work has also been concerned with matrix operators and matrix functions, and necessary and sufficient conditions for a matrix operator to reduce to a classical matrix function have been found. A solution of Van der Pol's equation has been obtained which has proved valid not only for small values of the parameter, but quite generally. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

III MATHEMATICS

B. Analysis

888 (continued)

Technical Reports:

1. A Simple Definition of Analytic Functions and General Multifunctions, by Karl Menger, in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 40, no. 9 (September 1954), p. 819-821.
2. The Behavior of a Complex Function at Infinity, by Karl Menger, in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 41, no. 7 (July 1955), p. 512-513.
3. Generalized Derivatives and Expansions, by Karl Menger and S. S. Shit, in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 41, no. 8 (August 1955), p. 591-595.
4. Expansion of Analytic Functions by Series of Powers of a Polynomial, by Gordon Pall. 21 October 1955, 4 p. (Illinois Institute of Technology, Department of Mathematics, Second Annual Report).
5. A Symmetric Generalization of the Lagrange Interpolation Formula, by Berthold Schweizer, in Journal of Mathematics and Physics, vol. 34, no. 3 (October 1955), p. 157-159.
6. Jacobi Series and the Numerical Solution of Eigenvalue Problems, by Berthold Schweizer. June 1956, 55 p. (Illinois Institute of Technology, Ph.D. thesis).
7. Expansion of Analytic Functions by Series of Powers of a Polynomial, by Gordon Pall. 7 p. (Illinois Institute of Technology, Final Report: October 1953 - May 1957).
8. Multiderivatives and Multiintegrals, by Karl Menger. (Manuscript submitted to the Slaughter Memorials of the Mathematical Association of America).
9. Generalized Jacobi Expansions and Corresponding Derivatives, by Gordon Pall. (Manuscript submitted to the Slaughter Memorials of the Mathematical Association of America).
10. On Approximate Eigenvalues Obtained by the Method of Least Squares, by Berthold Schweizer. (Manuscript submitted to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Journal of Mathematics and Physics).

III MATHEMATICS

B. Analysis

1045 EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF SOLUTIONS IN THE CALCULUS OF VARIATIONS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO PARAMETRIC DOUBLE INTEGRAL PROBLEMS

Contractor: University of Wisconsin
(The Regents of the University)
Madison 6, Wisconsin

Chief Investigator: L. C. Young

Contract No. DA-11-022-ORD-1511
Duration: 12 November 1953 - 30 June 1957
Amount: \$ 26,949.00
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research
Scientific Cognizance: Redstone Arsenal

Scope: The primary objective of the work will be to continue to obtain results on the existence and of solutions in the calculus of variations, especially for parametric double integral problems. By means of the method of generalized surfaces employed in the present research project, a very complete existence theory and certain basic information on the nature of solutions is being obtained for those parametric double integral problems which concern surfaces of preassigned topological type. The work depends partly on new inequalities connecting the area of a surface S with the product of the lengths of two suitable cycles on S . It is desirable to obtain more complete information on the nature of solutions and to make a corresponding study for problems in which the topological type is not prescribed.

Progress (to 30 June 1957): The results obtained in this investigation were based on the following methods: (a) Elementary methods which were concerned with inequalities between area and a product of two lengths. In this connection it was found that the area of a polyhedron is not less than half the product of a pair of lengths, a result connected with a minimal property of the hemisphere. It was also found that closed polyhedra whose areas are bounded and whose "pinching constants" have a positive lower bound are equivalent (by slitting) to discs whose perimeters have bounded lengths. (b) Banach methods, i.e., methods based on the techniques of general linear spaces and in particular of Banach spaces. In this connection it was found that even the problem of least area, with a single rectifiable rim, requires for its solution surfaces of infinitely many handles. An algorithm was provided which turns out to be necessary and sufficient for an absolute minimum irrespective of topological type. A solution of a variational problem was made up from pieces which possess Lipschitzian tracks and satisfy roughly the classical differential equations. More complete results are set forth in the technical reports listed below. The final report has been received and the project has been terminated.

III MATHEMATICS

B. Analysis

1045 (continued)

Technical Reports:

1. An Example in the Problem of Least Area, by Wendell H. Fleming. (Manuscript submitted to the Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society).
2. A Variational Algorithm, by L. C. Young, in the Rivista di Matematica del Università di Parma, vol. 5 (1954), p. 255-268. ASTIA AD-84 733.
3. Some New Methods in Two-Dimensional Variational Problems with Special Reference to Minimal Surfaces, by L. C. Young. December 1955, 12 p. (University of Wisconsin, Department of Mathematics, Technical Report No. 1). ASTIA AD-80 914 (mc)
4. Representations of Generalized Surfaces as Mixtures, by W. H. Fleming and L. C. Young. (Manuscript submitted to Rendiconti del Circolo Matematico di Palermo).
5. Fields of Vectors Attached To A Plane Measure, by Lawrence C. Young. October 1956, 19 p. (University of Wisconsin, Technical Report No. 2; also submitted to the Journal de Mathématiques). ASTIA AD-109 984
6. Estimates for the Lengths of Certain Closed Geodesics on a Polyhedron, by L. Young. November 1956, 9 p. (University of Wisconsin, Department of Mathematics, Technical Report No. 3). ASTIA AD-116 915
7. Minimal Perimeter of a Disc Equivalent To A Closed Polyhedron, by L. Young. November 1956, 8 p. (University of Wisconsin, Department of Mathematics, Technical Report No. 4). ASTIA AD-116 917
8. A Proposition of Rigid Statics Related to Area and to the Calculus of Variations, by L. Young. December 1956, 17 p. (University of Wisconsin, Department of Mathematics, Technical Report No. 5). ASTIA AD-116 919
9. Generalized Surfaces with Prescribed Elementary Boundary, by W. H. Fleming and L. C. Young, in Rendiconti del Circolo Matematico di Palermo, serie 2 (1956), tomo 5, p. 1-21.
10. Existence and Nature of Solutions in the Calculus of Variations with Special Reference to Parametric Double Integral Problems, by L. Young. 5 p. (University of Wisconsin, Department of Mathematics, Final Report).

III MATHEMATICS

B. Analysis

1239 RESEARCH IN ANALYSIS AND GEOMETRY

Contractor: The Institute for Advanced Study
Olden Lane
Princeton, New Jersey

Chief Investigators: Deane Montgomery
Atle Selberg

Contract No. DA-36-034-ORD-1622
Duration: 1 September 1954 - 31 August 1957
Amount: \$ 68,125.00
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research

Scope: Research in analysis and geometry will be continued and attempts will be made to (a) give transcendental proofs of arithmetic theorems by means of recursive propositions, (b) study generalizations of classical LP spaces, (c) investigate the nature of the set of limits of Riemann sums of vector value functions, (d) investigate periodic transformations on an infinite dimensional space, and (e) investigate the problem of imbedding an n -complex in Euclidean space.

Progress (to 31 August 1957): Principal results obtained under this contract are reflected in the technical reports listed below. A study was made of groups of transformations with special emphasis on finite groups and toral groups. Definite results were obtained by using spectral sequences in the study of transformation groups. Considerable information was obtained on the set of fixed points for a toral group on a manifold and about the base space. These results indicate that so far as cohomology is concerned the fixed points and the base space resemble these sets in the case where the group acts linearly. The investigation on Banach spaces was completed, and a paper describing the study has been written. The final point has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. A Universal Covering Semigroup for Groups with Abelian Commutator Subgroups, by Eugene Schenkman. March 1955, 24 p. (Institute for Advanced Study). ASTIA AD-56 469
2. On Abelian Varieties over Function Fields, by Wei-Liang Chow. (Manuscript submitted to Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences). ASTIA AD-61 981
3. Uniformly Bounded Representations of Groups, by L. Ehrenpreis and F. I. Mautner, in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 41 (1955), p. 231-233.

III MATHEMATICS

B. Analysis

1239 (continued)

4. Some Properties of the Fourier Transform on Semi-Simple Lie Groups, Part II, by L. Ehrenpreis and F. I. Mautner. Not dated, various paging. (Institute for Advanced Study). ASTIA AD-66 587
5. On the Engle Condition of Order 2 for Groups, by Eugene Schenkman. August 1955, 3 p. (Institute for Advanced Study). ASTIA AD-68 525
6. The Principal Ideal Theorem for Some Infinitely Generated Groups, by Eugene Schenkman. August 1955, 5 p. (Institute for Advanced Study). ASTIA AD-68 524 (mc)
7. Algebraic Varieties with Rational Dissections, by Wei-Liang Chow. July 1955, 8 p. (Institute for Advanced Study). ASTIA AD-68 526 (mc)
8. Approaches to the Theory of Distributions, by J. C. Burkill. January 1956, 16 p. (Institute for Advanced Study). ASTIA AD-88 538 (mc)
9. Geodesic Flows on Symmetric Riemann Space, by F. I. Mautner. December 1955, 29 p. (Institute for Advanced Study; also submitted to Annals of Mathematics). ASTIA AD-88 533 (mc)
10. Some Properties of the Fourier Transform Semi-Simple Lie Groups III, by L. Ehrenpreis and F. I. Mautner. April 1956, various paging. (Institute for Advanced Study). ASTIA AD-93 037
11. On the Action of a Finite Group on $S^2 \times S^2$, by P. E. Conner. November 1956, 3 p. (Institute for Advanced Study). ASTIA AD-115 455
12. A Note on Banach Function Spaces, by H. W. Ellis, December 1956, 10 p. (Institute for Advanced Study). ASTIA AD-118 603
13. Eine Unableitbarkeitsbeweismethode Für Den Intuitionistischen Aussagenkalkül, by G. Kreisel and H. Putnam. January 1957, 7 p. (Institute for Advanced Study).
14. Mathematical Significance of Consistency Proofs, by G. Kreisel. March 1957, 37 p. (Institute for Advanced Study).
15. Orbit Spaces of Circle Groups of Transformations, by P. E. Conner and E. E. Floyd. March 1957, 12 p. (Institute for Advanced Study).
16. Theorie Des Fonctions - Fonctionnelles Récursivement Définissables et Fonctionnelles Récursives, by Georg Kreisel, Daniel Lacombe and Joseph R. Shoenfield. August 1957, 4 p. (Institute for Advanced Study).

III MATHEMATICS

B. Analysis

1239 (continued)

17. Concerning the Action of a Torus on the Euclidean Space, by P. E. Conner, Jr. August 1957, 5 p. (Institute for Advanced Study).
18. Research in Analysis and Geometry, by Pierre E. Conner, Jr., H. W. Ellis and others. 3 p. (Institute for Advanced Study, Final Report: 1 September 1956 - 31 May 1957).

III MATHEMATICS

D. Geometry and Topology

1014 THE THEORY OF CONVEX SETS

Contractor: University of Washington
Seattle 5, Washington

Chief Investigator: V. L. Klee

Contract No. DA-04-200-ORD-292
Duration: 2 October 1953 - 1 October 1957
Amount: \$ 37,062.67
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Ballistic Research Laboratories

Scope: This investigation will deal with (a) basic questions relating to convex sets in infinite-dimensional linear spaces, and (b) intersection properties of convex sets in Euclidean space. Typical questions to be considered in (a) are represented by the following: (1) Is the Tychonoff theorem valid that a compact convex subset of a locally convex linear topological space has the fixed point property, without the hypothesis of local convexity? (2) Must a closed convex of a Banach space be supported by a hyperplane at one of its points? With reference to (b), an attempt will be made to initiate a careful and complete investigation with a view toward obtaining unifying results and toward answering the following question of Borsuk: Can every bounded subset of Euclidean n -space be covered by $(n + 1)$ sets of smaller diameter?

Progress (to 1 October 1957): Complete results obtained under this project are set forth in the technical reports listed below. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Common Secants for Plane Convex Sets, by V. L. Klee, Jr., in Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 5, no. 4 (August 1954), p. 639-641.
2. A Characterization of Reflexivity by the Lattice of Closed Subspaces, by E. E. Floyd and V. L. Klee. January 1954, 13 p. (University of Washington, Technical Report No. 1; also published in Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 5, no. 4 (August 1954), p. 655-661). ASTIA AD-25 304 (mc)
3. A Characterization of Extreme Points, by V. L. Klee, Jr. January 1954, 4 p. (University of Washington, Technical Report No. 2). ASTIA AD-25 305 (mc)

III MATHEMATICS

D. Geometry and Topology

1014 (continued)

4. Boundedness and Continuity of Linear Functionals, by V. L. Klee. Not dated, various paging. (University of Washington, Technical Report No. 3; also published in Duke Mathematical Journal, vol. 22 (1955), p. 263-270). ASTIA AD-26 238 (mc)
5. Separation Properties of Convex Cones, by V. L. Klee, Jr. 30 June 1954, 9 p. (University of Washington, Technical Report No. 4; also published in Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 6, no. 2 (April 1955), p. 313-318). ASTIA AD-34 592
6. On Metric Independence and Linear Independence, by V. L. Klee and L. M. Blumenthal, in Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 6, no. 5 (October 1955), p. 732-734. (A part of #8).
7. Solution of a Problem of E. M. Wright on Convex Functions, by V. L. Klee, Jr., in American Mathematical Monthly, vol. 63, no. 2 (February 1956), p. 106-107. (A part of #8).
8. Convex Sets, by V. L. Klee, Jr. 1 December 1954, various paging. (University of Washington, Technical Report No. 5, containing #6 and #7). ASTIA AD-52 561
9. Remarks on a Previous Paper (Convex Bodies and Periodic Homeomorphisms in Hilbert Space, by V. L. Klee, Jr., in Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 74, 1953, p. 10-43). (Manuscript submitted to Transactions of the American Mathematical Society). (A part of #11).
10. Strict Separation of Convex Sets, by V. L. Klee, Jr., in Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 7, no. 4 (August 1956), p. 735-737. (A part of #11).
11. Convex Sets, by V. L. Klee, Jr. 15 January 1955, various paging. (University of Washington, Technical Report No. 6, containing #9 and #10). ASTIA AD-53 013 (mc)
12. Some Intersection Properties of Infinite Families of Convex Sets, by V. L. Klee, Jr. Not dated, 9 p. (University of Washington, Technical Report No. 7: 16 January 1955 - 15 July 1955; also submitted to Mathematica Scandinavica). ASTIA AD-71 473 (mc)
13. A Note on Extreme Points, by V. L. Klee, Jr., in American Mathematical Monthly, vol. 62, no. 1 (January 1955), p. 30-32.
14. Some Topological Properties of Convex Sets, by V. L. Klee, Jr., in Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 78, no. 1 (January 1955), p. 30-45.

III MATHEMATICS

D. Geometry and Topology

1014 (continued)

15. Fixed-Point Sets of Periodic Homeomorphisms of Hilbert Space, by V. L. Klee, Jr. (Manuscript submitted to Annals of Mathematics). (A part of #19).
16. Iteration of the "Lin" Operation for Convex Sets, by V. L. Klee, Jr. (Manuscript submitted to Mathematica Scandinavica). (A part of #19).
17. Homogeneity of Infinite-Dimensional Parallelotopes, by V. L. Klee, Jr. (Manuscript submitted to the Annals of Mathematics). (A part of #19).
18. An Example in the Theory of Topological Linear Spaces, by V. L. Klee, Jr. (Manuscript submitted to the Archiv der Mathematik). (A part of #19).
19. The Theory of Convex Sets, by V. L. Klee, Jr. Various paging. (University of Washington, Technical Report No. 8: 16 July 1955 - 15 July 1956 consisting of #15 through #18). ASTIA AD-99 981
20. A Note on Topological Properties of Normed Linear Spaces, by V. L. Klee, Jr., in the Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 7, no. 4 (August 1956), p. 673-674.
21. Convex Sets and Nearest Points, by R. R. Phelps. 21 p. (University of Washington, Technical Report No. 9: 16 July 1956 - 31 October 1956; also submitted to the Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society). ASTIA AD-112 464
22. The Structure of Semispaces, by V. L. Klee, Jr. (Manuscript submitted to Scandinavica Mathematica).
23. Extremal Structure of Convex Sets. I, by V. L. Klee, Jr. (Manuscript submitted to Archiv der Mathematik). (A part of #29).
24. Convex Sets and Nearest Points. II, by R. R. Phelps. (Manuscript submitted to the Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society). (A part of #29).
25. Extremal Structure of Convex Sets. II, by V. L. Klee, Jr. (Manuscript submitted to Mathematische Zeitschrift). (A part of #29).
26. Semi-Convexity and Locally Bounded Spaces, by Robert Trull Ives. (Manuscript submitted to the Duke Mathematical Journal).

III MATHEMATICS

D. Geometry and Topology

1014 (continued)

27. On a Method of Mapping Due to Kadece and Bernstein, by V. L. Klee, Jr. and R. G. Long. (Manuscript submitted to Archiv der Mathematik). (A part of #29).
28. Some Characterizations of Convex Polyhedra, by V. L. Klee, Jr. (Manuscript submitted to Acta Mathematica). (A part of #29).
29. Convex Sets, by V. L. Klee, Jr., R. R. Phelps and R. G. Long. Various paging. (University of Washington, Technical Report No. 9: 1 November 1956 - 15 August 1957, containing #23, #24, #25, #27, and #28).
30. Convex Sets, by V. L. Klee, Jr. 4 p. (University of Washington, Final Report: 1 October 1953 - 30 September 1957).

III MATHEMATICS

D. Geometry and Topology

1503 DIFFERENTIAL GEOMETRIC STRUCTURES AND THEIR RELATED SYSTEMS OF DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS

Contractor: University of California
(The Regents of the University)
Berkeley 4, California

Chief Investigator: Harley Flanders

Contract No. DA-04-200-ORD-456
Duration: 1 September 1955 - 16 September 1957
Amount: \$ 19,375.95
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research
Scientific Cognizance: Ballistic Research Laboratories

Scope: A program of research will be conducted on differential geometric structure and differential equations, and will include one or more of the following areas: (1) Geometric entities and operators of affine connection theory, (2) the topological nature of the invariant of the curvature operator on an affinely connected manifold, (3) a geometric interpretation of a parallel curvature tensor, (4) application of operator algebras to Hermitian manifolds, Lie groups, and harmonic integrals, and (5) invariant integrals and completely integrable systems of exterior differential forms.

Progress (to 16 September 1957): A weekly seminar on advanced differential geometry was conducted during the period September 1955 - June 1956. The material presented at this seminar has been incorporated into a technical report. Considerable progress was made in the study of differential geometry on complex varieties. A study of the theory of prolongations has been completed. The theory of complex structures and Kähler manifolds and their applications to differential manifolds was studied. The techniques of modern differential geometry were applied to the classical theory of contact and canonical transformations and some interesting results were obtained. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

III MATHEMATICS

D. Geometry and Topology

1503 (continued)

Technical Reports:

1. Seminar on Exterior Differential Forms, by Harley Flanders. June 1957, 58 p. (University of California, Technical Report No. 1).
2. Systems of Differential Forms, Including Kuranishi's Theory of Total Prolongations, by Harold H. Johnson. Not Dated, 80 p. (University of California, Technical Report No. 2).
3. Prolongations of Differential Systems, by Harold H. Johnson. July 1957, 38 p. (University of California, Technical Report No. 3).
4. Differential Geometry, by Harley Flanders. Various paging. (University of California, Department of Mathematics, Final Report. 1 September 1955 - 16 September 1957).

III MATHEMATICS

E. Mechanics

1823 SUMMER SEMINAR IN APPLIED MATHEMATICS

Contractor: American Mathematical Society
University of Colorado
Boulder, Colorado

Chief Investigator: J. H. Curtiss

Contract No. DA-19-020-ORD-4373
Duration: 28 January 1957 - 27 January 1958
Amount: \$ 9,775.00
Type of Contract: Fixed Price

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research

Scope: The contractor, under the direction of Dr. J. H. Curtiss, will plan, make arrangements for, administer, and conduct a seminar in applied mathematics to be held at the University of Colorado from the period on or about 24 June 1957 to on or about 20 July 1957. The symposium will be jointly sponsored by the Office of Ordnance Research, the Office of Naval Research, the Office of Scientific Research (ARDC), the National Science Foundation, and the Atomic Energy Commission. The seminar will consist of lectures to be made by lecturers selected by the contractor, informal seminars, and discussion groups, and will include 2 main lecturers and approximately 8 supplementary lecturers.

Progress: The Summer Seminar in Applied Mathematics was held from 23 June 1957 to 19 July 1957 at Boulder, Colorado. Among the subjects treated were solid mechanics, fluid dynamics, probability theory, magneto gas dynamics, and partial differential equations. Manuscripts of the presentations have been received and the contract has been terminated.

III MATHEMATICS

F. Numerical and Graphical Methods

1089 RESEARCH IN THE FIELD OF PROBABILITY, STATISTICS, AND NUMERICAL ANALYSIS

Contractor: New York University
Washington Square
New York 53, New York

Chief Investigator: John H. Curtiss

Contract No. DA-30-069-ORD-1257
Duration: 1 September 1953 - 31 March 1957
Amount: \$18,219.30
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research

Scope: The primary objective will be to evaluate the so-called "Monte Carlo" method with reference to the estimation of the eigenvalues of linear partial differential equations and several independent variables. The particular goal will be an evaluation of the usefulness of this method for the Schrodinger equation in the case of reasonably complicated potentials. The eigenvalue problem will be approached via discrete Markov processes and matrix methods. Various methods for cutting down sample size will be tried, the central ones being the techniques of "importance sampling" and "sampling with probabilities proportional to size", the main idea being to utilize *a priori* knowledge of the solution of the problem as fully as possible. It is hoped that useful answers relative to the computation of matrix eigenvalues and eigenvalues of elliptic partial differential equations will be obtained, whether a final evaluation of the applicability to the Schrodinger case can be made or not. Beyond the eigenvalue problem the investigator will consider the whole question of interrelation between partial differential equations and stochastic processes from a theoretical point of view, as well as from the point of view of numerical analysis.

Progress (to 31 March 1957): Work under this contract proceeded along two main lines: (a) Numerical analysis, with particular reference to linear computations, and (b) statistical inference. Results obtained under (a) are contained in technical reports #1, #2, #4 and #6. The work under (b) consisted in organizing facts already known and existing in scattered forms in the literature. The results of this study may be found in technical reports #2, #3 and #5. The terminal report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

III MATHEMATICS

F. Numerical and Graphical Methods

1089 (continued)

Technical Reports:

1. Methods for Matrix Inversion and for the Solution of Simultaneous Linear Algebraic Equations, by J. H. Curtiss. March 1954, 22 p. (New York University, Institute of Mathematical Sciences, Technical Report No. 1). ASTIA AD-32 481 (mc)
2. A Theoretical Comparison of the Efficiencies of Two Classical Methods, and a Monte Carlo Method for Computing One Component of the Solution of a Set of Linear Algebraic Equations, by J. H. Curtiss. May 1954, 56 p., tables. (New York University, Institute of Mathematical Sciences, Technical Report No. 3) ASTIA AD-40 173 (mc)
3. Lectures on the Theory of Industrial Sampling, by J. H. Curtiss. April 1955, 134 p. (New York University, Institute of Mathematical Sciences, Technical Report No. 4). ASTIA AD-60 618 (mc)
4. A Generalization of the Method of Conjugate Gradients for Solving Systems of Linear Algebraic Equations, by J. H. Curtiss, in Mathematical Tables and Other Aids to Computation, vol. 8, no. 48 (October 1954), p. 189-193.
5. Lectures on the Theory of Industrial Sampling: Preface and Summary of the Text, by J. H. Curtiss. March 1954, 18 p. (New York University, Institute of Mathematical Sciences, Technical Report No. 2).
6. Matrix Inversion and the Solution of Linear Equations, by J. H. Curtiss. August 1955, 85 p. (New York University, Technical Report No. 5). ASTIA AD-115 793
7. Research in the Field of Probability, Statistics, and Numerical Analysis, by J. H. Curtiss. April 1957, 3 p. (New York University, Terminal Report).

III MATHEMATICS

F. Numerical and Graphical Methods

1145 LOGICAL DESIGN COMPUTING MACHINERY

Contractor: Stanford University
(Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford
Junior University, Palo Alto)
Stanford, California

Chief Investigator: Robert McNaughton

Contract No. DA-04-200-ORD-436
Duration: 1 July 1955 - 31 October 1957
Amount: \$ 12,896.66
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Ballistic Research Laboratories
Scientific Cognizance: White Sands Proving Ground; Ordnance
Tank and Automotive Command

Scope: The objectives are in general to apply the methods of symbolic logic to the task of constructing the most economical computing machine. In particular the research will be concerned with one or more of the following problems: (1) Minimality of complete decoding nets when the net is composed of arbitrary truth functions, (2) the determination of a mathematical function which reflects the true cost of the complete decoding net, and (3) a coherent theory in which a wide variety of problems concerning minimality of switching circuits could be formulated and solved.

Progress (to 31 October 1957): The problem of complete decoding nets with elements realizing arbitrary truth functions was studied. A study was made of the "Don't Care" problem and the results obtained are included in the report on rectifier nets with multiple outputs. The concept of "prime implicant" was extended to the synthesis of multiple output "don't care" diode nets. An attempt was made to prove the minimality of the balanced multiplicative switch nets in the class of all well-formed nets made up of elements realizing arbitrary truth functions, but the results obtained have not been substantiated. The problem ofunate truth functions was studied. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

III MATHEMATICS

F. Numerical and Graphical Methods

1145 (continued)

Technical Reports:

1. On the Measure of Normal Formulas, by Robert McNaughton. 28 December 1955, 31 p. (Stanford University, Applied Mathematics and Statistics Laboratory, Technical Report No. 1; also submitted to the Pacific Journal of Mathematics). ASTIA AD-79 833 (mc)
2. The Minimality of Rectifier Nets with Multiple Outputs Incompletely Specified, by Robert McNaughton and Bernon Mitchell. 18 April 1957, 40 p., tables. (Stanford University, Technical Report No. 2).
3. A Proof That Addition is Not Arithmetically Definable in Terms of a Single Unary Operator, by Robert McNaughton. 1 May 1957, 14 p. (Stanford University, Technical Report No. 3). ASTIA AD-130 287
4. Logical Design of Computing Machinery, by Robert McNaughton. 2 p. (Stanford University, Final Report: 1 July 1957 - 30 October 1957).
5. Unate Truth Functions, by Robert McNaughton. 21 October 1957, 18 p. (Stanford University, Technical Report No. 4).

III MATHEMATICS

G. Probability and Statistics

1550 A STUDY OF METHODS FOR DEVELOPING MISSILE RELIABILITY THROUGH ANALYSIS OF FAILED COMPONENT PARTS

Contractor: United Geophysical Corporation
Pasadena, California

Chief Investigator: Leslie W. Ball

Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-669
Duration: 1 July 1955 - 30 September 1956
Amount: \$ 4,708.37
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research

Scope: A study will be made of the extent to which failure analysis methods are currently being used, and the degree of success that is being achieved in complex systems which have reliability problems similar to those encountered in Ordnance missiles. Original analytical studies of modes of failure will be performed, and with each mode, tests will be associated that may be specified to detect them, and quality controls specified to reduce the frequency of their occurrence.

Progress (31 July 1956 - 30 September 1956): Delays in obtaining failure case histories from direct component test programs resulted in concentration on studies based on published literature and on analyses of well-documented case histories provided by White Sands Proving Ground Test Plan 63. The available data, particularly the reported shapes of failure rate curves with time as the abscissa, stimulated extensive and rather radical interpretation of the phenomenological basis for failure in guided missiles and other complex systems. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Guided Missile Component Failures: A Study of Their Underlying Causes and Recurrence Prevention, by Leslie W. Ball. September 1956, 37 p., figures. (United Geophysical Corporation, United Electrodynamics, Final Report). ASTIA AD-118 534

III MATHEMATICS

G. Probability and Statistics

1599 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

Contractor: University of Chicago
5801 Ellis Avenue
Chicago 37, Illinois

Chief Investigator: Ingram Olkin

Contract No. DA-11-022-ORD-1998
Duration: 1 October 1955 - 30 September 1956
Amount: \$ 6,986.00
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: White Sands Proving Ground
Scientific Cognizance: Ballistic Research Laboratories

Scope: A program in multivariate analysis will be conducted in which either or both of the following will be considered: (a) Multivariate tests with a priori information, and (b) nonparametric multivariate analysis.

Progress (to 30 September 1956): A determination has been made of unbiased estimates of (1) the ordinary bivariate correlation coefficient, (2) the intraclass correlation coefficient, (3) the squared multiple correlation coefficient, and (4) the partial correlation coefficient. Tables have been prepared to facilitate the use of the estimates. A paper has been prepared concerning Tchebycheff type inequality for the probability that an n dimensional point falls in a certain hyper-rectangle. The result is a generalization of a bivariate inequality due to Berge. Studies have also been made on the extrema of quadratic forms and applications to statistics, extrema of functions of a matrix in terms of the eigenvalues, sequential estimation for a finite population, multivariate ratio estimation for finite populations, and multivariate tests on means with a priori information. Intraclass correlation models have been considered and a number of problems of estimating and testing have been formulated. The final report has been received and the project has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Unbiased Estimation of Certain Correlation Coefficients, by Ingram Olkin and John W. Pratt. Not dated, 18 p., tables. (University of Chicago, Technical Report No. 1; also submitted to Annals of Mathematical Statistics under the title "Estimation of Certain Correlation Coefficients").
2. On a Multivariate Tchebycheff Inequality, by Ingram Olkin and John W. Pratt. Not dated, 8 p. (University of Chicago, Technical Report No. 2).

III MATHEMATICS

G. Probability and Statistics

1599 (continued)

3. Extrema of Quadratic Forms With Applications to Statistics, by K. A. Bush and I. Olkin. Not dated, 10 p. (University of Chicago, Technical Report No. 3).
4. Extrema of Functions of a Matrix in Terms of the Eigenvalues, by K. A. Bush and I. Olkin. Not dated, 1 p. (University of Chicago, Technical Report No. 4).
5. Multivariate Ratio Estimation for Finite Populations, by Ingram Olkin. 24 August 1956, various paging. (University of Chicago, Technical Report No. 6). ASTIA AD-105 773
6. Sequential Estimation From a Finite Population, by Ingram Olkin and Herbert T. David. 15 September 1956, various paging. (University of Chicago, Technical Report No. 5). ASTIA AD-108 948 (mc)
7. Multivariate Analyses, by Ingram Olkin and others. 1 October 1956, 3 p. (University of Chicago, Final Report).

III MATHEMATICS

H. Operations Analysis

1529 AUTOMATION RESEARCH

Contractor: Columbia University
(Trustees of the University)
Broadway at 116th Street
New York 27, New York

Chief Investigator: Merrill M. Flood

Contract No. DA-30-069-ORD-1622
Duration: 19 December 1955 - 18 December 1956
Amount: \$ 26,600.00
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Ordnance Weapons Command
Scientific Cognizance: Ballistic Research Laboratories; Frankford Arsenal; White Sands Proving Ground

Scope: To perform basic research on automation, a field relating to the design, operation, and management of efficient productive systems. The investigation will be limited to research on ordinary manufacturing operations yielding present types of products. Chief research aims will be (a) to determine the general nature of the productive systems and their mathematical models that are most amenable to treatment by the types of analytical and simulation techniques to be used in this investigation, and (b) to clarify the character and extent of the problems arising because of interaction between men and machines in order to better understand the extent to which various behavioral models now available can be adapted to the purposes of this automation research.

Progress (to 18 December 1956): A simple machine tool operation has been observed and analyzed in order to understand and explain mathematically the human decision-making skills that are and are not better than mechanical counterparts. This study of a simple lathe-turning operation at Watertown Arsenal was intended as an example of how some of the human decisions made in a manufacturing operations might profitably be automated, not as a practical evaluation of the methods in actual use. The methods developed in this study could be applied equally well to other manufacturing operations. Details of this study appear in Technical Report No. 2. The final report has been received and the project has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. The Optimal Design of Devices Requiring Positioning, by Raymond N. Auger and Richard J. Herman. November 1956, 10 p., figures. (Columbia University, Technical Report No. 1).

III MATHEMATICS

H. Operations Analysis

1529 (continued)

2. Automation Research, by Richard J. Herman and Lamont M. La Robardier. December 1956, various paging, figures, tables. (Columbia University, Final Report). ASTIA AD-115 720
3. Costwise Optimization: A Mathematical Approach to Minimizing Machining Cost, by Richard J. Herman and Lamont La Robardier. (Manuscript submitted to Business Week, to American Machinist and to Factory Management and Maintenance).
4. Proposed Procedure for Experiments on Machine Tool Operation at Watertown Arsenal, by Richard J. Herman and Lamont La Robardier. 25 July 1956, 27 p., figures. (Columbia University).

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

A. Combustion and Fuels

1515 SIXTH COMBUSTION SYMPOSIUM

Contractor: The Combustion Institute
200 Alcoa Building
Pittsburgh 19, Pennsylvania

Chief Investigator: Bernard Lewis

Duration: 1 April 1956 - 1 December 1957

Amount: \$ 4,000.00

Type of Contract: Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request

Primary Scientific Liaison: Air Force Office of Scientific Research

Scope: Business and fiscal details will be handled for the Sixth International Combustion Symposium to be sponsored jointly by the Office of Naval Research, Air Force Office of Scientific Research, and the Office of Ordnance Research. Technical papers will be solicited, clerical functions incident to holding the actual symposium will be performed, and the tasks of editing and correcting the manuscripts of the papers presented at the symposium, appending the pertinent discussion, and preparing a final manuscript to be used by the publishers of the symposium volume will be carried out.

Progress (1 April 1956 - 1 December 1957): The Sixth International Combustion Symposium was held at Yale University in August, 1956. Up-to-date advances in the field of combustion were presented in 125 papers which are being published in one volume. Included in this volume are papers on structure and propagation of laminar flame, structure and propagation of turbulent flames, high speed reactions, flame stabilization in fast streams, instability in combustion chambers, ignition, combustion of solid fuels, combustion of explosives and solid propellants, evaporation and combustion of droplets and sprays, experimental and analytical techniques in combustion, and the applications of combustion.

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

A. Combustion and Fuels

1549 MEASUREMENT OF COMPRESSION TEMPERATURES IN SPARK IGNITION ENGINES

Contractor: University of Wisconsin
(Regents of the University)
Madison 6, Wisconsin

Chief Investigators: P. S. Myers
O. A. Uyehara

Contract No. DA-11-022-ORD-1989
Duration: 1 October 1955 - 31 October 1956
Amount: \$ 20,000.00
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Detroit Arsenal

Scope: This project will involve the measurement of compression temperatures in spark ignition engines and will include the following work: (a) to continue the development and improvement of experimental techniques for gas temperature measurements, in particular the infrared technique, and (b) to use the instrumentation and techniques developed to obtain data on an operating engine. The effect of operating variables and fuel composition will be studied. (A continuation of research conducted under Proposal No. 1320).

Progress (to 31 October 1956): Investigations were directed towards the development of two methods of measuring the compression and end gas temperatures, the iodine technique and the infrared technique. Under the iodine technique a preliminary calibration of the iodine absorption pyrometer was made, and engine data were taken primarily to check the instrument. In the infrared technique, a complete filter monochromator was designed utilizing the water vapor wavelength region between 2.6 and 2.8 microns. Other mechanical and electronic improvements were made to improve the signal-to-noise ratio and scaling accuracy. Data were taken on an engine under various operating conditions, and appear in the report listed below. The final report has been received and the project has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Measurement of Compression Temperatures in Spark-Ignition Engines, by Marshall Burrows, B. K. Ghandi and Shyoski Shimiye. 67 p., figures, tables. (University of Wisconsin, Mechanical Engineering Department, Final Report: October 1955 - November 1956). ASTIA AD-116 911

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

A. Combustion and Fuels

1553 DEVELOPMENT OF THE VELOCITY OF SOUND METHOD FOR MEASUREMENT OF GAS TEMPERATURES IN THE COMBUSTION CHAMBER OF AN INTERNAL COMBUSTION ENGINE

Contractor: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Memorial Drive
Cambridge 39, Massachusetts

Chief Investigator: C. F. Taylor

Contract No. DA-19-020-ORD-3699
Duration: 1 October 1955 - 30 September 1956
Amount: \$ 21,700.00
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research
Scientific Cognizance: Frankford Arsenal; Redstone Arsenal

Scope: Research will be primarily concerned with development of the velocity of sound methods for measurement of gas temperatures in the combustion chamber of an internal combustion engine. In particular, the investigation will be concerned with (a) measurement of end-gas temperature in a firing engine, (b) the problem of interpreting the velocity of sound in a gas in terms of its "temperature" which will involve the molecular behavior of the gas, including the internal degree of freedom of polyatomic molecules, (c) the behavior of high frequency sound waves in a medium which contains temperature gradients (as in the case of a thermal boundary layer or in turbulent flow), and (d) the design of transducer elements for the transmission and reception of sound energy through the gas. (A continuation of research conducted under Proposal No. 1320).

Progress (to 30 September 1956): A second modified CFR engine suitable for use with the sound velocity measuring equipment has been put into operation. The combustion chamber of the existing engine was modified by providing additional access holes into the test zone. Tables of gas properties have been prepared for the fuel/air residual mixtures encountered in engine operation, and engine data using isooctane have been obtained. A new piston has been made for achieving higher compression ratios. A series of runs has been made for investigating the effects of inlet valve shrouding. Engine test data have been accumulated and analyzed in an attempt to investigate the magnitude of the effects of different values on end-gas temperature and to demonstrate the applicability of the method to the measurement of temperature in an engine combustion chamber. Results of this study appear in the report listed below. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

A. Combustion and Fuels

1553 (continued)

Technical Reports:

1. Development of a Method of Measuring Gas Temperatures in an Internal Combustion Engine, by J. C. Livengood, E. A. Jeffery and P. C. Wu. 54 p., figures, tables. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Final Report: 15 September 1955 - 30 September 1956). ASTIA AD-120 566

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

B. Fluid Mechanics

760 DIABATIC FLOW PHENOMENA

Contractor: Purdue Research Foundation
Lafayette, Indiana

Chief Investigator: Harold M. DeGroot

Contract No. DA-33-008-ORD-888
Duration: 15 December 1953 - 15 September 1957
Amount: \$ 47,217.00
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Ballistic Research Laboratories
Scientific Cognizance: Redstone Arsenal

Scope: Efforts will be devoted to studies and experimentation in nonsteady laminar motion. Further experimentation and analysis will be made of the interrelation of skin-friction, heat transfer, and acoustical phenomena in nonsteady, shearing compressible, heat conducting fluid motion. A compressible boundary layer literature survey will be continued, and a new phase of the program will consist of performing experiments in the turbulent region with existing apparatus.

Progress (to 16 September 1957): A study was made of the dependence of properties of fluids on temperature. In this connection both the equilibrium properties and transport properties of fluids were investigated. The results of this study are set forth in report #6. The influence of nonlinear viscous dissipation on skin friction and heat transfer was studied in detail. Steady-state hot-wire anemometry was used in experimental investigations of diabatic flow and was found to be an effective means of measuring low air velocities at elevated temperatures. Some heat transfer data were obtained in the range of velocities where both free convection and forced convection contribute to the heat transfer. The study of aero-thermo-acoustic effects for nonsteady flow between concentric rotating cylinders resulted in an experimental verification that transverse velocities, or waves, can be generated by a pure longitudinal shearing motion. An experimental study was made of combined free and forced convection flow between concentric rotating cylinders. Velocity and temperature profiles were obtained for various combinations of wall temperatures and velocities. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

B. Fluid Mechanics

760 (continued)

Technical Reports:

1. Calibration of a Hot Wire Anemometer for Low Velocities in Steady Flow with Temperature Gradients, by Leslie A. Hromas and C. P. Kentzer. July 1955, 30 p., figures. (Purdue University, School of Aeronautics). ASTIA AD-68 631 (mc)
2. Viscous Heating in Couette Flow, by Harold DeGroff. September 1955, 25 p., figures. (Purdue University, School of Aeronautical Engineering, Report No. A-55-2). ASTIA AD-75 391 (mc)
3. Nonsteady Laminar Motion of a Viscous, Compressible, Heat-Conducting Fluid, by Harold DeGroff. September 1955, 19 p., figures. (Purdue University, School of Aeronautical Engineering, Report No. A-55-3). ASTIA AD-75 350 (mc)
4. On Viscous Heating, by H. M. DeGroff, in Journal of the Aeronautical Sciences, vol. 23, no. 4 (April 1956), p. 395-396. ASTIA AD-112 645
5. Experimental Investigation of Flow with Heat Transfer between Concentric Rotating Cylinders, by Leslie A. Hromas and Thomas R. Thompson. October 1956, 84 p., figures. (Purdue University, School of Aeronautical Engineering, Report No. A-56-3). ASTIA AD-116 412
6. A Survey of Compressibility and Dissociation Effects on Steady Laminar Boundary Layer Flow, Part I. The Flow Without Pressure Gradient, by Robert J. Goulard. December 1956, 139 p., figures. (Purdue University, School of Aeronautical Engineering, Report No. A-56-4). ASTIA AD-120 312
7. Unsteady Couette Flow, by Leslie A. Hromas. June 1957, 43 p., figures. (Purdue University, Report No. A-57-3).
8. A Survey of Compressibility and Dissociation Effects on Steady Laminar Boundary Layer Flow, Part II. The Flow with Pressure Gradient, by Robert J. Goulard. July 1957, 227 p., figures. (Purdue University, School of Aeronautical Engineering, Report No. A-56-4).
9. On Catalytic Recombination Rates in Hypersonic Stagnation Heat Transfer, by Robert J. Goulard. September 1957, 48 p., figures. (Purdue University, Report No. A-57-9, PhD thesis; also submitted to the Proceedings of the American Rocket Society).
10. A Summary of Research in Diabatic Flow, by H. M. DeGroff, R. J. Goulard and L. A. Hromas. September 1957, 69 p., figures. (Purdue Research Foundation, Final Report, Report No. A-57-10).

VII - 738

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

B. Fluid Mechanics

1336 NONLINEAR PROPERTIES OF FLUID FLOW THROUGH CIRCULAR ORIFICES

Contractor: Oklahoma State University of Agriculture and Applied Science
Stillwater, Oklahoma

Chief Investigator: George B. Thurston

Contract No. DA-23-072-ORD-876	Renewed: DA-23-072-ORD-583
Duration: 15 Sept 54 - 14 Oct 55	1 Oct 1955 - 31 Aug 1957
Amount: \$ 11,763.84	\$ 16,428.05
Type of Contract: Fixed Price	Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research
Scientific Cognizance: Detroit Arsenal

Scope: (1) The pressure-flow relation as has now been determined for circular orifices will be compared with that for rectangular orifices to determine to what extent orifice geometry is important under the conditions of nonlinear operation. The ability to adapt the empirical equation to rectangular geometry will be tested. (2) Multiple orifices and screens will be studied to determine whether or not interactions between openings appreciably modify their behavior as compared with a single orifice. (3) Work will be continued toward developing a suitable pressure-flow relation for the single orifice from theoretical considerations. (4) The experimentally determined flow-optic relations for aqueous milling yellow solutions for two-dimensional fluid flow will be applied to determine the conditions of fluid motion in the neighborhood of a two-dimensional orifice such as a slit or elongated rectangle. Flow-optic relations established for two-dimensional flow will be extended to three-dimensional flow having radial symmetry as with circular orifice.

Progress (to 31 August 1957): The details of the results and conclusions of the work to date are contained in the reports listed below. The results of an experimental study of the nonlinear fluid flow properties of thin, square edged, circular orifices appear in report #1 below. Results of a study of the effect of some geometrical conditions on the nonlinear properties of fluid flow through orifices of varying geometry appear in report #3 below. Work directed toward developing a method of visually studying fluid motion in the neighborhood of an orifice is summarized in reports #2 and #4 below. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Nonlinear Properties of Circular Orifices, by George B. Thurston, Logan E. Hargrove, Jr. and Bill D. Cook. May 1957, 22 p., figures. (Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College, Technical Report No. 2; also submitted to the Journal of the Acoustical Society of America).

VII - 739

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

B. Fluid Mechanics

1336 (continued)

2. An Optical Method for Analysis of Fluid Motion, by Logan E. Hargrove, Jr. and George B. Thurston. May 1957, 5 p., figures. (Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College, Technical Report No. 1; also published in the Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, vol. 29, no. 8 (August 1957), p. 966-968).
3. Some Geometrical Effects on the Nonlinear Properties of Orifices, by George B. Thurston and Bill D. Cook. May 1957, 7 p., figures. (Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College, Technical Report No. 3).
4. Optical Birefringence Induced by Shear Wave Propagation in Aqueous Milling Yellow Solutions, by George B. Thurston. June 1957, 69 p., figures. (Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College, Technical Report No. 4).
5. Research in Nonlinear Properties of Fluid Flow Through Circular Orifices, by George B. Thurston. June 1957, 3 p. (Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College, Final Report).

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

B. Fluid Mechanics

1364 STABILITY OF STRATIFIED FLOW

Contractor: State University of Iowa
Iowa City, Iowa

Chief Investigator: C. S. Yih

Contract No. DA-11-022-ORD-1729
Duration: 29 December 1954 - 28 December 1956
Amount: \$ 19,449.50
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research
Scientific Cognizance: Ballistic Research Laboratories

Scope: To conduct an analytical and experimental investigation of the characteristics of flow with density stratification.

Progress (to 28 December 1956): Efforts to achieve completely uniform flow in a previously constructed metal water-tunnel were unsuccessful because of end conditions which were such that an undesirable third layer of fluid slowly but persistently developed. A lucite tunnel of smaller size with a closed tank at one end and an open-head tank at the other was constructed, and uniform two-layer flow has been achieved. For a given slope, discharge measured with the latter tunnel and the measured depth ratio have been consistently found to have the same functional relationship as predicted by a theoretical calculation based on the assumption of laminar flow. The hot-wire method of measuring velocity distribution in the flow was abandoned in favor of a photographic method in which liquid drops with approximate gravity 1 and highly reflective surfaces are used as tracers. The experiments on the incipient instability of stratified flow have been concluded, and a manuscript dealing with potential flows of two fluid layers with a common interface and with flows with continuous stratification has been prepared for publication. Additional work has involved a series of experiments performed with a previously constructed concrete channel. The problems of two-dimensional flow with thermal stratification and of thermal recirculation have been investigated both analytically and experimentally. The analysis deals with boundary-layer development at the interface, established stratified flow, and the experimental determination of the form of the hot wedge which intrudes upstream from the intake on top of the submerged cold water. Experiments were performed both to confirm some of the results from the analysis and to obtain information concerning the temperature distribution and recirculation. Details of this study appear in report #1 listed below. An investigation has also been made of the three-dimensional case in which both the intake of the cooling water and its point of outlet after use are located at one side of the main canal. In this study, determinations have been made of the amount of thermal recirculation that occurs because of the formation of the wedge of heated water and its intrusion upstream. The amount of

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

B. Fluid Mechanics

1364 (continued)

recirculation in the three-dimensional case was found to depend directly on the form of the hot wedge. Results of this study appear in report #2 listed below. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. An Investigation of Recirculation in Stratified Flows, by Geza L. Bata. August 1956, 107 p., figures. (State University of Iowa, M.S. thesis).
2. Recirculation of Cooling Water Discharged from Thermo-Electric Plants, by Geza L. Bata. 1956, 61 p., figures, tables. (State University of Iowa, Iowa Institute of Hydraulic Research; also published in condensed form in the Journal of the American Society of Civil Engineers, paper 1265, (June 1957), under the title "Recirculation of Cooling Water in Rivers and Canals").
3. Stability of Stratified Flow, by Hunter Rouse. June 1957, 11 p. (State University of Iowa, Iowa Institute of Hydraulic Research, Final Report).
4. On Stratified Flows in a Gravitational Field, by Chia-Shun Yih, in Sartryck ur Tellus, vol. 2, no. 9 (1957), p. 220-228.
5. Stability of Laminar Flow in Curved Channels, by Chia-Shun Yih and W. M. Sangster, in The Philosophical Magazine, Reprint 150 (March 1957), p. 2-6.

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

C. Friction and Lubrication

375 A FUNDAMENTAL STUDY OF THE MECHANISM OF METAL TRANSFER AND WEAR

Contractor: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Memorial Drive
Cambridge 39, Massachusetts

Chief Investigator: B. G. Rightmire

Contract No. DA-19-020-ORD-1767
Duration: 30 April 1952 - 30 September 1956
Amount: \$ 49,300.00
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Frankford Arsenal

Scope: Continuation of research on friction and wear, with emphasis on the experimental study of wear factors such as crystal structure, crystallographic orientation, grain size, grain orientation, normal load, sliding speed, bulk temperature, distance of travel, and effect of surrounding atmosphere. In addition, attempts will be made to determine the values of the various constants that appear in the wear equation and the way in which these constants are affected by surface film nature and thickness, normal pressure, speed, etc.

Progress (to 30 September 1956): This project was concerned with the metal transfer and wear occurring when two identical specimens of the same commercially pure metal are rubbed together under controlled conditions of load, speed, atmosphere, and ambient temperature. Copper and iron were chosen as the metals to be tested since they are elements of known structure and properties. Tests were made on the effect of speed and load on the wear of copper in atmospheres of dry air plus alcohol vapor, prepurified nitrogen, and dry air. It was found that the wear drops with increase in velocity up to about 10 cm/sec, while at higher velocities the wear tends to remain constant. The results obtained, while subject to modification as new evidence becomes available, were sufficient to permit qualitative explanations of the effects of atmosphere, speed, and load on wear. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. The Mechanism of Fretting, by I-Ming Feng and B. G. Rightmire in Lubrication Engineering, vol. 9, no. 3 (June 1953), p. 134-136. ASTIA AD-4 463
2. Effect of the Surrounding Atmosphere on Wear of Pure Copper, by I-Ming Feng and C. M. Chang: 15 February 1954, 23 p., figures. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Lubrication Laboratory, Department of Mechanical Engineering, Technical Report No. 1). ASTIA AD-25 819 (mc)

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

C. Friction and Lubrication

375 (continued)

3. An Analysis of the Effect of Various Factors on Metal Transfer and Wear Between Specimen Pairs of Same Metal and Same Shape. I. The Basic Scheme of Formulation of Metal Transfer and Wear, by I-Ming Feng, in the Journal of Applied Physics, vol. 26, no. 1 (January 1955), p. 24-27. ASTIA AD-13 374 (mc)
4. An Analysis of the Effect of Various Factors on Metal Transfer and Wear Between Specimen Pairs of Same Metal and Same Shape. II. Effect of the Surrounding Atmosphere, by I-Ming Feng, in the Journal of Applied Physics, vol. 26, no. 1 (January 1955), p. 28-32. ASTIA AD-10 275 (mc)
5. An Analysis of the Effect of Various Factors on Metal Transfer and Wear Between Specimen Pairs of Same Metal and Same Shape. III. Effect of the Normal Load, by I-Ming Feng. 15 November 1954, 20 p., figures. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Mechanical Engineering, Supplement C). ASTIA AD-49 531 (mc)
6. Fundamental Study of the Mechanism of Metal Transfer and Wear, by I-Ming Feng. 15 December 1954, 8 p., figures. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Mechanical Engineering, Technical Report No. 2). ASTIA AD-51 025

VII - 744

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

C. Friction and Lubrication

665 INVESTIGATION OF SLIDING FRICTION WITH EMPHASIS ON SURFACE PHENOMENA

Contractor: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Memorial Drive
Cambridge 39, Massachusetts

Chief Investigator: Brandon Rightmire

Contract No. DA-19-020-ORD-2451
Duration: 30 December 1952 - 1 September 1955
Amount: \$ 10,700.00
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research

Scope: Tests will be conducted on the frictional behavior of thin films of various materials which are deposited on a very hard sub-layer. A slider of very hard material is to be used, and particular emphasis is to apply to the adhesive and deformation characteristics of the deposited material. Measurements of sliding velocity will be made as a function of tangential force and temperature. The effects of the following parameters will be investigated; normal load, geometry and material of the sliding members, surface finish, and lubrication.

Progress (to September 1955): Experiments designed to elucidate the mechanism of sliding friction have been conducted and the following conclusions have been drawn: (1) The low-speed sliding of rubber-like material is a rate process in which the slowest step is the slip of interfacial spots or islands offering more resistance to slip than their surroundings. (2) The islands tend to increase in area as the applied tangential force is reduced, thus leading to a rapid drop in the sliding speed which was observed experimentally. (3) Two kinds of islands are present: one for which slip occurs through the yielding of some nonrubbery material, and a second for which slip occurs within the highly elastic substance itself. (4) Transfer and wear can occur through the agency of contacts of the second type, even though the rate of sliding is controlled by those of the first type. (5) Transition of control from one type of contact to the other may occur over such a narrow temperature range as to justify the concept of a critical or transition temperature. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Friction Experiments on Thin Film: Low Speed Sliding of Rubber, by B. G. Rightmire, O. F. Hedden and Kwan-Lok So. 12 p., figures, tables. (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Final Report: 30 December 1952 - 1 September 1955).

VII - 745

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

C. Friction and Lubrication

1156 THEORETICAL STUDY OF THE HYDRODYNAMICAL THEORY OF LUBRICATION

Contractor: Carnegie Institute of Technology
Schenley Park
Pittsburgh 13, Pennsylvania

Chief Investigator: Edward Saibel

Contract No. DA-36-061-ORD-444	Renewed: DA-36-061-ORD-495
Duration: 1 Sept 54 - 30 Nov 55	1 Sept 1955 - 31 Aug 1957
Amount: \$ 15,300.00	\$ 28,787.55
Type of Contract: Fixed Price	Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research
Scientific Cognizance: Frankford Arsenal; Rock Island Arsenal

Scope: To investigate the mathematical and physical aspects of certain problems in lubrication theory, specifically (a) the problem of the finite journal bearing for any eccentricity with various boundary conditions, (b) the hydrodynamical problem of gear lubrication, (c) the problem of the elastic bearing, in particular the effect of deformation of the surfaces on lubrication, (d) some aspects of friction and wear of metal surfaces from a theoretical point of view, (e) to apply the findings to problems connected with the machining of metals, and (f) to investigate theoretical aspects of solid lubrication.

Progress (to 31 August 1957): Concerning the hydrodynamic theory of lubrication, problems were investigated and solved for the effect of elasticity of surfaces, the effect of lubricant inertia, the effect of heat conductance in the lubricant, the effect of heat leakage to the surrounding surfaces and numerical methods for handling such problems. In the field of friction and wear, work has been done on sliding friction between unlubricated metallic surfaces and on the thermal aspects of galling. Results of these studies appear in the technical reports listed below. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Slider Bearing with Transverse Curvature: Exact Solution, by Andrew S. C. Ying and others. 10 November 1954, 10 p., figures, tables. (Carnegie Institute of Technology, Department of Mathematics, Technical Report No. 1; also submitted to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers). ASTIA AD-48 195 (mc)
2. The Rheodynamic Squeeze-Film, by F. Osterle and others. 1 February 1955, 8 p., figures. (Carnegie Institute of Technology, Department of Mathematics, Technical Report No. 2; also submitted to the American Society of Lubrication Engineers). ASTIA AD-62 706 (mc) ASTIA AD-56 338 (mc)

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

C. Friction and Lubrication

1156 (continued)

3. The Rheostatic Thrust Bearing, by F. Osterle and E. Saibel. 1 April 1955, 12 p., figures. (Carnegie Institute of Technology, Department of Mathematics, Technical Report No. 3; also submitted to American Society of Lubrication Engineers). ASTIA AD-62 712 (mc)
4. The Spring-Supported Thrust Bearing, by E. Saibel and F. Osterle. Not dated, 8 p., figures. (Carnegie Institute of Technology, Department of Mathematics, Technical Report No. 4; also submitted to American Society of Lubrication Engineers). ASTIA AD-74 112 (mc)
5. Thermal Aspects of Galling of Dry Metallic Surfaces in Sliding Contact, by E. Saibel and F. F. Ling. November 1955, 15 p., figures. (Carnegie Institute of Technology, Department of Mathematics, Technical Report No. 5; also submitted to American Society of Lubrication Engineers). ASTIA AD-81 191 (mc)
6. The Spring-Supported Thrust Bearing, by E. Saibel and F. Osterle. Not dated, 8 p., figures. (Carnegie Institute of Technology, Department of Mathematics, Technical Report No. 4a, corrected). ASTIA AD-84 630
7. The Effect of Lubricant Inertia in Journal Bearing Lubrication, by E. A. Saibel and others. Not dated, 9 p., figures, tables. (Carnegie Institute of Technology, Department of Mathematics, Technical Report No. 6; also published in Journal of Applied Mathematics, Paper No. 57-APM-37). ASTIA AD-89 666 (mc)
8. Research and Development on Theoretical Study of the Hydrodynamical Theory of Lubrication, by Edward Saibel. 29 February 1956, 2 p. (Carnegie Institute of Technology, Department of Mathematics, Final Report under DA-444). ASTIA AD-90 567
9. On Sliding Friction Between Unlubricated Metallic Surfaces, by F. F. Ling and Edward Saibel. Not dated, 8 p., figures. (Carnegie Institute of Technology, Department of Mathematics, Technical Report No. 7). ASTIA AD-94 630
10. The Effect of Elastic Deformations in Slider-Bearing Lubrication, by F. Osterle and E. Saibel. 15 June 1956; 11 p., figures. (Carnegie Institute of Technology, Department of Mathematics, Technical Report No. 8). ASTIA AD-99 471

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

C. Friction and Lubrication

1156 (continued)

11. An Extension of the Concept of the Minimum in Calculus, and the Calculus of Variations, by A. Bombardieri and E. Saibel. Not dated, 20 p., figures. (Carnegie Institute of Technology, Department of Mathematics, Technical Report No. 9).
12. Numerical Methods of Solution of the Adiabatic Slider-Bearing Without Side Leakage, by Willis H. Guillinger and Edward Saibel. Not dated, 25 p., figures. (Carnegie Institute of Technology, Department of Mathematics, Technical Report No. 10).
13. Surface Deformations in the Hydrodynamic Slider-Bearing Problem and Their Effect on the Pressure Development, by F. Osterle and E. Saibel. 8 January 1957, 12 p., figures. (Carnegie Institute of Technology, Department of Mathematics, Technical Report No. 11).
14. The Effect of Heat Conductance on Slider-Bearing Characteristics, by Willis H. Guillinger and Edward Saibel. February 1957, 26 p., figures. (Carnegie Institute of Technology, Department of Mathematics, Technical Report No. 12).
15. The Effect of Turbulence on Slider-Bearing Lubrication, by Ye Teang Chou and Edward Saibel. June 1957, 25 p., figures, tables. (Carnegie Institute of Technology, Department of Mathematics, Technical Report No. 13).
16. Theoretical Study of the Hydrodynamical Theory of Lubrication, by Edward Saibel. 3 p. (Carnegie Institute of Technology, Department of Mathematics, Final Report: 1 September 1955 - 31 August 1957).

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

D. Heat and Mass Transfer

940 EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF HEAT AND MASS TRANSFER THROUGH BOUNDARY LAYERS ESTABLISHED ON CYLINDERS IN FLOW PARALLEL TO CYLINDRICAL AXIS

Contractor: Illinois Institute of Technology
3300 South Federal Street
Chicago 16, Illinois

Chief Investigator: Stotho P. Kezios

Contract No. DA-11-022-ORD-1508
Duration: 1 November 1953 - 31 December 1956
Amount: \$ 23,245.82
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Frankford Arsenal
Scientific Cognizance: Redstone Arsenal

Scope: A continuation of the investigation will be made on the nature of heat and mass transfer through boundary layers established on cylinders in flow parallel to the cylindrical axis. Primary emphasis will be given to determining the possible effects of curvature on transport processes in the boundary layers. Work will be carried out in a wind tunnel under conditions where both laminar and turbulent boundary layers would be developed but where the flow would be essentially incompressible.

Progress (to 31 December 1956): The construction of the wind tunnel has been completed, and an investigation has been made of the mass transfer by sublimation from the outer surfaces of hollow naphthalene cylinders in parallel air streams at velocities between 20 and 120 feet per second. A profilometric technique was developed whereby the local mass transfer could be obtained by determining changes in the radius of the subliming cylinders. Turbulent boundary layers were obtained by artificial generation of turbulence at the leading edges of the cylinders, and the local mass-transfer rates measured for these boundary layers were found to depend greatly on the manner in which turbulence was induced. Pressure distributions were measured on a one-inch hollow cylinder having a leading edge identical to those of the subliming cylinders, and the results showed that the real cylinders behaved very nearly like the ideal model with respect to the flow pattern over the outer surfaces. Data for the two cylinders employed have indicated substantially no effect of surface curvature on the mass transfer through turbulent boundary layers. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Heat and Mass Transfer Through Boundary Layers Established on Cylinders in Flow Parallel to the Cylindrical Axis, by W. J. Christian and S. P. Kezios. Not Dated, 199 p., figures, tables. (Illinois Institute of Technology, Final Report).

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

D. Heat and Mass Transfer

1164 WETTING EFFECTS ON BOILING HEAT TRANSFER

Contractor: Georgia Tech Research Institute
Engineering Experiment Station
Research Building, Institute of Technology
Atlanta, Georgia

Chief Investigator: William B. Harrison

Contract No. DA-01-009-ORD-368	Renewed: DA-01-009-ORD-444
Duration: 1 Mar 54 - 30 June 55	1 Sep 1955 - 31 Aug 1957
Amount: \$ 12,552.00	\$ 21,939.00
Type of Contract: Fixed Price	Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research

Scope: Boiling experiments will be conducted with stearic acid and single crystals of Ni. A search will be made for other liquid-solid combinations which exhibit similar effects of crystal orientation on degree of wetting. Force convection experiments will be conducted with stearic acid in a thermal entrance region having a Cu single crystal surface.

Progress (to 30 September 1957): Wetting effects on convective heat transfer have been studied with a copper-stearic acid system and with a copper-sodium system. These convective studies were each made in experimental apparatus which incorporated a thermal entrance region so as to maximize the effect of additional thermal resistance created by non-wetting conditions at the heat transfer surface. The general considerations involved in bubble formation and wetting effects were studied. The work demonstrated a significant wetting effect on boiling stearic acid from different faces of copper single crystals, but wetting effects were not observed with stearic acid in forced convection past the same crystal surfaces without boiling. The convective studies with sodium were inconclusive. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Wetting Effects on Boiling Heat Transfer, by W. B. Harrison and others. 62 p., figures, tables. (Georgia Institute of Technology, Engineering Experiment Station, Final Report under DA-368: 1 March 1954 - 31 May 1955). ASTIA AD-66 755 (mc)
2. Wetting Effects on Heat Transfer, by W. B. Harrison. 121 p., figures, tables. (Georgia Institute of Technology, Final Report: 1 September 1955 - 30 September 1957).

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

F. Measurement and Control

1581 WAVEFORM STUDIES

Contractor: Columbia University
(Trustees of Columbia University)
Broadway at 116th Street
New York, New York

Chief Investigator: Jacob Millman

Contract No. DA-30-069-ORD-1725
Duration: 30 April 1956 - 29 April 1957
Amount: \$ 9,198.00
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Redstone Arsenal

Scope: Consideration will be given to the following problems: (a) A study of x-transforms of transient problems which have an especially cumbersome Laplace transformation solution, (b) an extension of the x-transforms method to the solution of partial differential equations, (c) an exploration of the possibility of time domain synthesis employing x-transforms, (d) a study of circuits containing nonlinear elements controlled by more than one variable, and (e) an examination of nonlinear circuits containing pulse transformers or delay lines.

Progress (to 29 April 1957): The x-transform method for obtaining approximate solutions of linear differential equations has been extended to systems with time varying coefficients. The approach has been compared with classical numerical methods, in particular, the Runge-Fox method. Advantages of this method when applied to higher order equations or systems of equations have been demonstrated. Correlation between the x-transform method and the difference equation method has also been obtained. A detailed comparison between the method of Boxer and Thaler and the x-transform approach has been made with respect to accuracy and the amount of labor involved. The accuracy was found to be about the same in both methods, but the Boxer-Thaler solution is usually more complicated, particularly for time varying problems. An error analysis for the x-transform method has been devised. Although it may not be practical in a complex problem, it does give some insight into the nature of the error in the x-transform. In addition, the similarity of the x-transform method and a simple Runge-Kutta method has been found. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Comparison of the X-Transform Method with Other Numerical Methods, by C. Heizman, J. Millman and A. Vigants. 4 September 1956, 34 p., tables. (Columbia University, Engineering Center, Technical Report No. T-81C). ASTIA AD-124 717
2. Waveform Studies, by Jacob Millman. 30 April 1957, 13 p., figures, tables. (Columbia University, Engineering Center, Final Report).

IV. ENGINEERING SCIENCES

H. Solid Mechanics

234 STRESS-STRAIN RELATIONS IN PLASTICITY AND RELATED TOPICS

Contractor: University of Michigan
(The Regents of the University)
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Chief Investigator: Paul M. Naghdi

Contract No. DA-20-018-ORD-12099
Duration: 1 February 1952 - 31 January 1957
Amount: \$ 66,070.00
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Watertown Arsenal

Scope: Investigation and determination of the plastic deformation behavior of certain structures, to be carried out using the tension-torsion machine. The experimental work will be correlated with results predicted by flow and deformation theories of plasticity. In addition to work being continued, studies will be made of (1) the adaptation of the tension-torsion machine to provide reverse torque, (2) theoretical investigation of problems in conjunction with the experimental program, (3) an experimental program at high temperatures will be conducted, (4) certain three-dimensional problems such as the hollow sphere and cylinder under point loading distributed over a small area, and (5) plastic stress-strain relations, especially for anisotropic strain hardening materials.

Progress (to 31 January 1957): Principal results are reflected in the technical reports listed below. An experimental investigation in plasticity has been completed in which ten tubular 24S-T4 aluminum alloy specimens having severe initial anisotropy were tested by subjecting them initially to tension and later to torsion with increasing or decreasing tension. Twenty-seven additional specimens of aluminum alloy were subjected to combined torsion-tension-reversed torsion with variable loading paths in a study of initial and two subsequent yield surfaces covering the first and the fourth quadrants of the axial stress-shear stress plane. In addition an experiment on the load-carrying capacities of circular plates in the plastic range was carried out and compared with the theoretically predicted limit loads given by Prager and Hopkins. An investigation of elastic shells of revolution has been completed in which the deformation of thin elastic ellipsoidal shells of revolution of uniform thickness under axisymmetric loading was considered at length. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Fundamental Experiments in Plasticity: Instrumentation and Preliminary Phases, by P. M. Naghdi and J. C. Rowley. September 1952, 26 p., tables. (University of Michigan, Engineering

IV. ENGINEERING SCIENCES

H. Solid Mechanics

234 (continued)

Research Institute, Technical Report No. 1). ASTIA AD-170 183

2. An Experimental Study of Biaxial Stress-Strain Relations in Plasticity, by P. M. Naghdi and J. C. Rowley. December 1953, 54 p., figures. (University of Michigan, Engineering Research Institute, Technical Report No. 2; also published in the Journal of the Mechanics and Physics of Solids, vol. 3 (1954), p. 63-80). ASTIA AD-25 497 (mc)
3. On the Deformation of Elastic Shells of Revolution, by P. M. Naghdi and C. Nevin De Silva. November 1953, 26 p., tables, figures. (University of Michigan, Engineering Research Institute, Technical Report No. 3; also published in Quarterly of Applied Mathematics, vol. 12, no. 4 (January 1956), p. 369-374). ASTIA AD-22 453 (mc)
4. An Experiment on Circular Plates in the Plastic Range, by R. M. Cooper and G. A. Shifrin. March 1954, 21 p., figures, tables. (University of Michigan, Engineering Research Institute, Technical Report No. 4; also published in Proceedings of the Second U. S. National Congress of Applied Mechanics, (1955), p. 527-534). ASTIA AD-29 050 (mc)
5. Experiments Concerning the Yield Surface and the Assumption of Linearity in the Stress-Strain Relations, by P. M. Naghdi and others. April 1954, 7 p., figures. (University of Michigan, Engineering Research Institute, Technical Report No. 5; also published in Journal of Applied Mechanics, Paper No. 55-APM-5). ASTIA AD-32 855 (mc)
6. On Elastic Ellipsoidal Shells of Revolution, by P. M. Naghdi and C. Nevin De Silva. August 1954, 12 p., figures. (University of Michigan, Engineering Research Institute, Technical Report No. 6; also published in Proceedings of the Second U. S. National Congress of Applied Mechanics (1955), p. 333-343). ASTIA AD-40 115 (mc)
7. Some Remarks on a Class of Shells of Revolution of Variable Thickness, by C. Nevin De Silva and P. M. Naghdi. December 1955, 11 p. (University of Michigan, Technical Report No. 4; also submitted to Journal of Mathematical Physics). ASTIA AD-81 383 (mc)
8. An Experimental Study of Initial and Subsequent Yield Surfaces in Plasticity, by P. M. Naghdi, F. Essenburg and W. Koff. January 1957, 14 p., figures. (University of Michigan, Technical Report No. 8; also submitted to the Journal of the Mechanics and Physics of Solids). ASTIA AD-121 839
9. Stress-Strain Relations in Plasticity and Related Topics, by P. M. Naghdi. June 1957, 5 p. (University of Michigan, Final Report).

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

H. Solid Mechanics

744 FATIGUE FAILURES AND BREAKING STRENGTH

Contractor: Columbia University
(Trustees of Columbia University)
Broadway at 116th Street
New York 27, New York

Chief Investigator: E. J. Gumbel

Contract No. DA-30-069-ORD-1061
Duration: 1 April 1953 - 30 June 1956
Amount: \$ 59,521.60
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research

Scope: (a) To develop a statistical theory of fatigue failure appropriate for small samples in which the following factors will be considered: dimensions of the specimen, and chance variation of stress, and (b) to study various physical models which may lead to other statistical models for use in experimental fatigue failure data.

Progress (to 30 June 1956): Completed phases of the project are reflected in the technical reports listed below. This investigation is being continued as Proposal I716, this report page IV-66.

Technical Reports:

1. Minimum Life in Fatigue Failure, by A. M. Freudenthal and others. 11 December 1953, 45 p., figures, tables. (Columbia University, Department of Industrial Engineering, Technical Report No. T-1A). ASTIA AD-28 858
2. Standard Errors of Estimate of Parameters of Fatigue Failure Survivorship Functions, by C. Derman, and others. 12 May 1954, 22 p., tables. (Columbia University, Department of Industrial Engineering, Technical Report No. T-2A). ASTIA AD-36 681
3. Statistical Estimation of the Endurance Limit, by E. J. Gumbel. 1 April 1955, 32 p., figures, tables. (Columbia University, Department of Industrial Engineering, Technical Report No. T-3A; also published in Annals of Mathematical Statistics, vol. 26, no. 1 (March 1955), p. 158). ASTIA AD-67 323
4. Minimum Life in Fatigue, by A. M. Freudenthal and E. J. Gumbel, in Journal of the American Statistical Association, vol. 49 (September 1954), p. 575-597.

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

H. Solid Mechanics

744 (continued)

5. Failure and Survival in Fatigue, by A. M. Freudenthal and E. J. Gumbel, in Journal of Applied Physics, vol. 25, no. 11 (November 1954), p. 1435.
6. Some Remarks on the Endurance Limit Problem, by Cyrus Derman. 1 August 1955, 9 p. (Columbia University, School of Engineering, Technical Report No. T-4A). ASTIA AD-75 144
7. Some Tests for Minimal Life of Fatigue Failure Survivorship Functions, by Seiji Sugihara, 31 January 1956, 15 p. (Columbia University, Department of Industrial Engineering, Technical Report No. T-5A). ASTIA AD-84 867 (mc)
8. Statistische Theorie der Ermüdungserscheinungen von Metallen, by E. J. Gumbel and Z. Z. Freie, in Zeitschrift für angewandte Mathematik und Mechanik, vol. 35, no. 9/10 (September - October 1955).
9. Physical and Statistical Aspects of Fatigue, by A. M. Freudenthal and E. J. Gumbel, in Advances in Applied Mechanics, vol. 4 (1956), p. 117-158.
10. Statistical Estimation of the Endurance Limit, by E. J. Gumbel. 1 May 1956, 28 p., figures, tables. (Columbia University, Department of Industrial Engineering, Technical Report No. T-6A).
11. Extreme Values in Technical Problems, by E. J. Gumbel, in Industrial Laboratories, vol. 7, no. 12 (December 1956). (Technical Report No. T-7A). ASTIA AD-120 920
12. Statistical Research on Fatigue Failures and Breaking Strength, by Sebastian B. Littauer. Various paging. (Columbia University, Comprehensive Report No. 1, Final Report: 1 April 1953 - 30 June 1956).

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

H. Solid Mechanics

1086 STATIC AND DYNAMIC TESTS ON BEHAVIOR OF METAL PARTS IN THE PLASTIC RANGE

Contractor: Brown University
Providence 12, Rhode Island

Chief Investigator: D. C. Drucker

Contract No. DA-19-020-ORD-3172
Duration: 30 October 1953 - 30 September 1957
Amount: \$ 77,905.00
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Watertown Arsenal
Scientific Cognizance: Frankford Arsenal

Scope: Static tests on non-circular plates will be concluded and an interpretation of test results will be made. A test will be made on two types of structures for limit load theories. The first structure will be the shell subject to a band of internal pressure, the other, the beam curved in plane. A modification of the theory will be attempted if the tests so indicate. Modifications will be incorporated in the present impact testing machine for plate tests. An evaluation will be made of approximate methods using simple models to obtain plastic deformation in structures under dynamic loads.

Progress (to 30 September 1957): An attempt has been made to assess the physical validity of mathematical solutions to the strength and deformation of structural metal elements. Experimental results were obtained which led to useful refinements in the theory which in turn were checked against experiments. Considerable work was done for static loading and a good start made for dynamic loading. Completed phases of the investigation appear in the reports listed below and report #12 contains a summary of the accomplishments. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. The Deflection of Plates in the Elastic-Plastic Range, by R. M. Haythornthwaite. February 1954, 19 p., figures. (Brown University, Division of Engineering, Technical Report No. 1; also published in Proceedings of Second U. S. National Congress of Applied Mechanics (1954), p. 521-526). ASTIA AD-29 685 (mc)
2. Combined Concentrated and Distributed Load on Ideally-Plastic Circular Plates, by D. C. Drucker and H. G. Hopkins. February 1954, 14 p., figures. (Brown University, Division of Engineering, Technical Report No. 2; also published in Proceedings of Second U. S. Congress of Applied Mechanics (1954), p. 517-520). ASTIA AD-29 686

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

H. Solid Mechanics

1086 (continued)

3. Tests of the Behavior of Circular Plates under Transverse Load, by J. Foulkes and E. T. Onat. May 1955, 13 p., figures. (Brown University, Division of Engineering, Technical Report No. 3). ASTIA AD-64 120 (mc)
4. The Load Carrying Capacity of Circular Plates at Large Deflection, by E. T. Onat and R. M. Haythornthwaite. December 1954, 29 p., figures. (Brown University, Division of Engineering, Technical Report No. 4; also published in Journal of Applied Mechanics, Paper No. 55-A-14, p. 1-7). ASTIA AD-50 920
5. The Load Carrying Capacity of Initially Flat Circular Steel Plates under Reversed Loading, by R. M. Haythornthwaite and E. T. Onat. August 1954, 7 p., figures. (Brown University, Division of Engineering, Technical Report No. 5; also published in the Journal of Aeronautical Sciences, vol. 22, no. 12 (December 1955), p. 867-869). ASTIA AD-41 020
6. Plastic Behavior of Constrained Beams with Finite Deformation, by R. M. Haythornthwaite. September 1955, 9 p., figures, tables. (Brown University, Division of Engineering, Technical Report No. 6). ASTIA AD-78 554 (mc)
7. The Effect of Shear on the Plastic Bending of Beams, by D. C. Drucker. October 1955, 16 p., figures. (Brown University, Division of Engineering, Technical Report No. 7; also published in Journal of Applied Mechanics, Paper No. 56-APM-28, p. 1-6).
8. The Plastic Deformation Due to Impact of a Cantilever Beam with an Attached Tip Mass, by T. J. Mentel. March 1956, 43 p., figures. (Brown University, Division of Engineering, Technical Report No. 8). ASTIA AD-91 635 (mc)
9. Plastic Behavior of Beams with Elastic End Constraints, by R. M. Haythornthwaite. August 1956, 6 p., figures. (Brown University, Division of Engineering, Technical Report No. 10; also submitted to Proceedings of IX International Congress of Applied Mechanics). ASTIA AD-105 030 (mc)
10. Deformation of Circular and Annular Plastic Plates under Transverse Impact Loads, by Ray C. Alverson. August 1956, various paging, figures. (Brown University, Division of Engineering, Technical Report No. 9). ASTIA AD-111 601 (mc)

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

H. Solid Mechanics

1086 (Continued)

11. Design for Minimum Weight, by D. C. Drucker and R. T. Shield. September 1956, 10 p., figures. (Brown University, Division of Engineering, Technical Report No. 11; also submitted to Proceedings of IX International Congress of Applied Mechanics). ASTIA AD-111 480
12. Static and Dynamic Tests on Behavior of Metal Parts in the Plastic Range, by Daniel C. Drucker. 31 October 1957, 5 p. (Brown University, Division of Engineering, Final Report).

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

H. Solid Mechanics

1230 CORRELATION OF THERMAL FATIGUE WITH MECHANICAL FATIGUE OF METALS

Contractor: University of Alabama
University, Alabama

Chief Investigator: Harry Majors, Jr.

Contract No. DA-01-009-ORD-396	Renewed: DA-01-009-ORD-454
Duration: 1 Sep 54 - 31 Aug 55	1 Sep 1955 - 31 Aug 1957
Amount: \$ 16,542.54	\$ 19,660.92
Type of Contract: Fixed Price	Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Watertown Arsenal
Scientific Cognizance: Frankford Arsenal

Scope: Experimental data will be obtained on thermal cycling fatigue and mechanical load fatigue employing commercially pure Ti and Ni. If possible, present equipment will be used to determine the effect of a higher mean temperature on thermal and mechanical load cycling fatigue using Ti and Ni. The possibility of conducting thermal cycling tests under combined stress conditions will be investigated. In this case, slight modifications of existing equipment will be made so that thin-walled tubes can be tested under internal pressure. In addition, the magnitude of the effect of thermal cycling upon the temperature of brittle fracture will be studied.

Progress (to 1 September 1957): Thermal cycling apparatus was constructed to produce a periodic stress under periodic temperature vibrations by means of a restraint. Experimental conditions were established and data were taken from tests of commercially pure Ni and Ti. Tests revealed that for the same mean temperature and life to rupture, total plastic strain sustained under thermal cycling is very much less than under load cycling at constant temperature. Type "A" nickel under load cycling absorbed 21 times the total plastic strain in a thermal cycle test; type Ti-75A titanium under load cycling absorbed approximately 5.5 times the total plastic strain in a thermal cycle test. Thermal cycling had a tendency to smooth the grain boundaries, and the Ti and Ni showed no structural changes or heavy oxidation. Thermal cycling under constant load displayed heavy intergranular oxidation on the inner surfaces of the tubular specimens. No influence on the coefficient of thermal expansion was observed with cycles of thermal cycling under constant load. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Thermal Shock and Fatigue: A Literature Survey, by Harry Majors, Jr. September 1956, 35 p., figures, tables. (University of Alabama, Bureau of Engineering Research, Technical Report No. 1). ASTIA AD-116 007

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

H. Solid Mechanics

1230 (continued)

2. Comparison of Thermal Fatigue with Mechanical Fatigue Cycling, by Harry Majors, Jr. 78 p., figures, tables. (University of Alabama, Final Report: 1 September 1954 - 1 September 1957).
3. Influence of Thermal Cycling on the Brittle Transition Temperature of Low Carbon Steel, by Harry Majors. October 1957, 22 p., figures, tables. (University of Alabama, Technical Report No. 2).

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

H. Solid Mechanics

1232 BENDING OF PLATES, USING TRIGONOMETRIC SERIES

Contractor: Brigham Young University
Provo, Utah

Chief Investigator: Harvey J. Fletcher

Contract No. DA-04-495-ORD-560
Duration: 15 June 1954 - 14 June 1957
Amount: \$ 13,459.42
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Watertown Arsenal
Scientific Cognizance: Ballistic Research Laboratories

Scope: Solutions will be sought to problems involving the deflection, vibration, and stretching of thin rectangular, skew, and tapered plates, subjected to various transverse loads and boundary conditions. A method of attack will be used consisting of seeking approximate solutions for an infinite set of equations with an infinite number of unknowns. The convergence of the solutions and the following specific problems will be studied: (1) deflection of a simply supported skew plate, under a constant load, (2) deflection of a simply supported tapered plate, (3) natural frequencies of a cantilever plate, under a constant load, and (4) deflection of a plate due to variable end thrusts.

Progress (to 14 June 1957): Plate studies completed to date include isosceles right triangle plates simply supported along one edge, plates with two adjacent edges simply supported or all four edges free, convergence of the infinite set of equations involved in plate problems, isosceles right triangular plates supported on two legs, bending of isosceles right triangular plates, and natural frequencies of plates with opposite edges supported. Results of these studies appear in reports #1 through #6 listed below. Problems of the vibration of a rectangular plate with opposite edges supported, and with every edge clamped or supported, have been solved, and appear in reports #7 and #8 below. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Isosceles Right Triangle Plates Simply Supported Along One Edge, by H. J. Fletcher. 31 December 1954, 10 p. (Brigham Young University, Technical Report No. 1). ASTIA AD-51 283
2. Plates with Two Adjacent Edges Simply Supported or All Four Edges Free, by K. Harrison and others. 31 December 1954, 8 p. (Brigham Young University, Technical Report No. 2). ASTIA AD-51 284

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

H. Solid Mechanics

1232 (continued)

3. Convergence of the Infinite Set of Equations Involved in Plate Problems, by H. J. Fletcher, 32 p., figures. (Brigham Young University, Technical Report No. 3: 15 June 1954 - 31 January 1955). ASTIA AD-61 628 (mc)
4. Isosceles Right Triangle Plates Supported on Two Legs, by Kenneth M. Larson and others. 20 February 1956, 22 p. (Brigham Young University, Technical Report No. 4). ASTIA AD-90 102 (mc)
5. Bending of Isosceles Right Triangular Plates, by Kenneth M. Larsen. 15 August 1956, 30 p. (Brigham Young University, Technical Report No. 5).
6. Natural Frequencies of Plates with Opposite Edges Supported, by H. J. Fletcher and others. 12 September 1956, 14 p., tables. (Brigham Young University, Technical Report No. 6). ASTIA AD-107 224 (mc)
7. Bending of Thin Rectangular Plates, by H. J. Fletcher and C. J. Thorne, in Proceedings of the Second U. S. National Congress of Applied Mathematics, (June 1954), p. 389-406.
8. The Natural Frequencies of Certain Vibrating Rectangular Plates, by Norman R. Woodfield. April 1957, 34 p., tables. (Brigham Young University, M.S. thesis).
9. Bending of Plates Using Trigonometric Series, by H. J. Fletcher. Various paging. (Brigham Young University, Final Report: 15 June 1954 - 15 June 1957).

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

H. Solid Mechanics

1288 THEORETICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES OF MECHANICAL PROPERTIES OF METALS SUBJECTED TO TRIAXIAL STRESSES

Contractor: Pennsylvania State University
University Park, Pennsylvania

Chief Investigators: L. W. Hu
Joseph Marin

Contract No. DA-36-061-ORD-446	Renewed: DA-36-061-ORD-505
Duration: 16 Sept 54 - 15 Sept 55	16 Sept 1955 - 15 Sept 1957
Amount: \$ 16,066.69	\$ 30,577.40
Type of Contract: Fixed Price	Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Frankford Arsenal
Scientific Cognizance: Ordnance Materials Research Office

Scope: Studies will be concerned with the effect of hydrostatic pressure on (1) the mechanical properties of metals under hydrostatic pressure up to 400,000 psi, (2) the creep behavior of metals subjected to axial load with superimposed hydrostatic pressure up to 200,000 psi, and (3) the buckling strength of cylindrical tubes under various hydrostatic pressures.

Progress (to 15 September 1957): Work on this project consisted of three main parts: development of triaxial stress testing machinery and triaxial stress experiments, determination of the mechanical properties of metals subjected to triaxial stresses, and analysis of combined stress problems. Four new testing methods to study the mechanical properties of metals under high pressure were developed. Studies were made of the applications of electrical resistance strain gages under high pressure. The fracture strength of metals under triaxial stress state of three unequal principal stresses was studied at high pressure level. The plastic stress-strain relations in tension for metals under high pressure were directly determined without interruption in loading. The applications of the concept of associated flow rules to the plastic flow of anisotropic bodies were studied and the results of this study are included in report #2. Methods for determining the yield stress components in combined stress experiments were developed. The final report has been received and the contract had been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Research and Development on Theoretical and Experimental Studies of Mechanical Properties of Metals Subjected to Triaxial Stresses, by L. W. Hu and Joseph Marin. 15 September 1955, 71 p., figures. (The Pennsylvania State University, Department of Engineering Mechanics and Engineering Research, Final Report under DA-446). ASTIA AD-75 117 (mc)

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

H. Solid Mechanics

1288 (continued)

2. Modified Tresca's Yield Condition and Associated Flow Rules for Anisotropic Materials and Applications, by L. W. Hu. October 1956, 27 p., figures, tables. (Pennsylvania State University, Department of Engineering Mechanics and Engineering Research, Technical Report No. 1). ASTIA AD-111 298 (mc)
3. Elastoplastic Analysis of Rotating Annulus by A Perturbation Method, by M. J. Owen. October 1956, 21 p., tables. (Pennsylvania State University, Department of Engineering Mechanics and Engineering Research, Technical Report No. 2). ASTIA AD-111 299 (mc)
4. Analysis of Die Profiles in Wire Drawing, by L. W. Hu. (Manuscript submitted to the Journal of The Franklin Institute).
5. Determination of Yield Stress Components in Combined Stress Experiments, by L. W. Hu. November 1956, 14 p., figures. (The Pennsylvania State University, Departments of Engineering Mechanics and Engineering Research, Technical Report No. 3). ASTIA AD-116 262
6. Plastic Behavior of Aluminum Alloy 17S-T4 Subjected to Triaxial Stresses, by L. W. Hu and M. J. Owen. December 1956, 25 p., figures, tables. (The Pennsylvania State University, Departments of Engineering Mechanics and Engineering Research, Technical Report No. 4). ASTIA AD-116 261
7. Experimental and Theoretical Studies on the Mechanical Properties of Metals Under Triaxial Stresses, by L. W. Hu and J. Marin. 98 p., figures, tables. (Pennsylvania State University, Final Report: 15 September 1955 - 15 September 1957).

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

H. Solid Mechanics

1301 AN ANALYTICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF THE TORSIONAL BUCKLING OF THIN CYLINDRICAL SHELLS

Contractor: University of Florida
Gainesville, Florida

Chief Investigator: William A. Nash

Contract No. DA-01-009-ORD-404	Renewed: DA-01-009-ORD-462
Duration: 1 Jan 55 - 31 Dec 55	1 Jan 56 - 30 June 57
Amount: \$ 8,400.21	\$ 9,510.00
Type of Contract: Fixed Price	Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Watertown Arsenal
Scientific Cognizance: Ballistic Research Laboratories

Scope: An experimental and analytical investigation of the torsional buckling strength of cylinders with known initial deviations from perfect circularity.

Progress (to 30 June 1957): Tests have been completed on twenty-six thin cylindrical shells subject to torsion. In all cases the geometries of the specimens were such that failure occurred by elastic buckling at stresses well below the elastic limit of the material. Data collected include not only the buckling load but also measurements of the initial imperfections present in each specimen prior to application of load as well as electric strain gage measurements of strains in the pre-buckled state. Two analytical treatments found in the literature explain the observed reduction in buckling load of a thin cylindrical shell subject to torsion from the load value indicated by linear small-deflection theory using a nonlinear large-deflection analysis. A series of tests has corroborated to a large extent the validity of each of these theories. The peak load-carrying capacity of imperfect shells as indicated by these two theories was found to range from approximately 60 to 80% of the classical small-deflection value. Elastic buckling of these shells was usually found to occur in just this range. It was found that, in general, for a shell with known initial imperfections, the two theories bracket the experimentally determined elastic buckling load. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Buckling of Initially Imperfect Cylindrical Shells Subject to Torsion, by W. A. Nash. Not dated, 20 p., figures. (University of Florida; also published in the Journal of Applied Mechanics, vol. 24, no. 1 (1957), p. 125-130.

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

H. Solid Mechanics

1301 (continued)

2. Buckling of Initially Imperfect Clamped-End Cylindrical Shells Subject to Torsion, by W. A. Nash. April 1956, 21 p., figures. (University of Florida). ASTIA AD-95 671 (mc)
3. An Experimental Investigation of the Torsional Buckling of Initially Imperfect Cylindrical Shells, by W. A. Nash and C. N. Tang.
4. An Experimental Analysis of the Buckling of Thin Initially Imperfect Cylindrical Shells Subject to Torsion, by William A. Nash. August 1957, 26 p., figures, tables. (University of Florida, Final Report).

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

H. Solid Mechanics

1307 EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF STRESS WAVES IN ELASTIC SOLIDS

Contractor: The Pennsylvania State University
University Park, Pennsylvania

Chief Investigator: J. N. Brenman

Contract No. DA-36-061-ORD-448
Duration: 17 September 1954 - 15 September 1956
Amount: \$ 12,427.41
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Watertown Arsenal

Scope: An experimental and theoretical investigation will be conducted on (a) the propagation of elastic stress waves in cylindrical bars when the wave length is of the same order of magnitude as the radius of the bar, and (b) the propagation of ultrasonic pulses in elastic media subjected to large hydrostatic stresses.

Progress (to 15 September 1956): An apparatus has been developed which can be used to measure displacements of the order of microinches at rates from a few cycles per second to more than 100 kc/sec. Its chief advantage is that in no way does it touch or influence the object whose vibrations are being studied and it can be easily used for measuring relative amplitudes over a surface. In connection with the study of the effect of large hydrostatic pressure on the propagation velocity of ultrasonic pulses in metals, a test chamber capable of withstanding a working pressure of 100,000 psi has been developed, together with means for producing the required pressure, and an electronic pulse system and transducer for producing the required pulses. Driving rings used to couple the transducer to the disk have been constructed strong enough to withstand the inertial forces involved. Attempts to excite resonance in a specimen having a radius wavelength ratio of 0.6 failed; however, in a specimen having a ratio of 0.4, many different resonances could be excited in the frequency range from 15 to 40 kc. Several of these frequencies were close to the calculated theoretical value of 17.5 kc. Attempts to determine which of the frequencies, if any, correspond to the fundamental axial mode have been unsuccessful. There were indications that the frequency is 22 kc instead of the theoretical value of 17.5 kc. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. A Dynamic Capacitance Type Micrometer, by Edwin F. Dobies. 30 October 1955, 17 p., figures. (The Pennsylvania State University, Engineering Research Department). (A part of #3).

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

H. Solid Mechanics

1307 (continued)

2. Effect of Large Hydrostatic Pressure on the Propagation Velocity of Ultrasonic Pulses in Metals, by L. Y. Tu. October 1955, 23 p., figures. (The Pennsylvania State University, Engineering Research Department). (A part of #3).
3. Experimental Investigation of Stress Waves in Elastic Solids, by J. N. Brennan. 15 February 1956, 41 p., figures. (The Pennsylvania State University, Engineering Research Department, Technical Report No. 1 containing #1 and #2). ASTIA AD-87 503 (mc)
4. Experimental Investigation of Stress Waves in Elastic Solids, by J. N. Brennan. 15 February 1957, 78 p., figures, tables. (The Pennsylvania State University, Engineering Research Department, Technical Report No. 2, Final Report).

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

H. Solid Mechanics

1502 STATICS AND DYNAMICS OF CURVED AND TWISTED BARS

Contractor: Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Troy, New York

Chief Investigator: Enrico G. Volterra

Contract No. DA-30-115-ORD-709

Duration: 1 December 1955 - 30 November 1957

Amount: \$ 23,420.00

Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research

Scope: To apply the so-called method of internal constraints to static and dynamic problems of curved and twisted bars. Static problems will comprise curved bars bent by external forces which may or may not lie in the plane of initial curvature. Dynamic studies will be concerned with the vibrations of straight and curved bars, taking account of shear and of rotatory inertia.

Progress (to 30 November 1957): Differential equations of motion derived in a previous paper by applying the method of internal constraints to a curved elastic bar of finite length have been solved. The solutions have been expressed in terms of the eigenvalues and eigenfunctions of the corresponding equations of motion for the case of a straight bar. The problem of dispersion of longitudinal waves in elastic rods of infinite lengths and of rectangular cross-section has been studied by applying the one-dimensional theory of wave propagation based on the method of internal constraints. The results have been compared with those given by the Elementary, Love, and Bishop approximate theories, and in the case of two-dimensional elasticity, with the exact theories given by Rayleigh and Lamb. Equations of motion for cylindrical shells and elastic plates have been derived, taking into account the effects of shear and rotatory inertia by assuming that during motion a condition of constraint is present. Equations of motion for curved and twisted elastic bars of uniform cross-section have been derived, taking into account the influence of shear and of rotatory inertia. A study has also been made of free and forced vibrations of straight bars of uniform cross-section, taking into account the effects of shear and of rotatory inertia. A second approximation of the method of internal constraints has been developed taking into account second-order terms in the equations of constraint and by satisfying the requirement that normal stresses vanish on the surface of the bar or the plate under consideration. In addition, problems of wave dispersion in infinite bars and of free vibrations of finite bars have been investigated. A one-dimensional theory of longitudinal wave propagation in cylindrical elastic rods has been postulated, and takes into account second-order terms in the equation of constraints and brings to an engineering level the otherwise complicated numerical work involved in the exact theory. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

H. Solid Mechanics

1502 (continued)

Technical Reports:

1. Eigenvibrations of Curved Elastic Bars According to the Method of Internal Constraints, by E. Volterra. December 1955, 45 p. (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Progress Report No. 1; also published in Ingenieur-Archiv, vol. 24, no. 5 (1956), p. 317-329). ASTIA AD-85 397
2. On the Dispersion of Longitudinal Waves in Elastic Rods of Rectangular Cross-Section According to the One-Dimensional Theory of Wave Propagation, Based on the Method of Internal Constraints, by E. Volterra. January 1956, 43 p., figures. (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Progress Report No. 2). ASTIA AD-84 940
3. The Equations of Motion for Elastic Plates and Cylindrical Shells Deduced by the Use of Method of Internal Constraints, by E. G. Volterra. February 1956, 27 p. (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Technical Report No. 3). ASTIA AD-91 193 (mc)
4. The Equations of Motion for Curved and Twisted Elastic Bars Deduced by the Use of the Method of Internal Constraints, by E. G. Volterra. 7 March 1956, 32 p. (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Technical Report No. 4; also published in Ingenieur-Archiv, vol. 24, no. 6 (1956), p. 392-400). ASTIA AD-22 885
5. Free and Forced Vibrations of Straight Elastic Bars According to the Method of Internal Constraints, by E. G. Volterra and E. C. Zachmanoglou. Not dated, 29 p. (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Research Division, Technical Report No. 5). ASTIA AD-117 487
6. A Second Approximation of the Method of Internal Constraints as Applied to Dynamic Problems, by E. C. Zachmanoglou and Enrico Volterra. 20 May 1957, 38 p., figures. (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Technical Report No. 6).
7. An Engineering Theory of Longitudinal Wave Propagation in Cylindrical Elastic Rods, by E. C. Zachmanoglou and E. Volterra. 6 September 1957, 24 p., figures. (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Technical Report No. 7).
8. Statics and Dynamics of Curved and Twisted Bars, by E. C. Zachmanoglou and E. Volterra. September 1957, 8 p. (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Final Report).

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

L. Aerodynamics

1082 EXPERIMENTAL AND ANALYTICAL STUDY OF THE MAGNUS EFFECT

Contractor: Case Institute of Technology
University Circle
Cleveland 6, Ohio

Chief Investigators: R. E. Bols
G. Kuerti
W. M. Swanson

Contract No. DA-33-019-ORD-11134
Duration: 12 October 1953 - 31 December 1956
Amount: \$ 14,600.00
Type of Contract: Fixed Price

Primary Scientific Liaison: Office of Ordnance Research
Scientific Cognizance: Ballistic Research Laboratories; Redstone Arsenal

Scope: An experimental and analytical study of the Magnus effect will be undertaken. The experimental work involves measuring lift, drag, and moment in a rotating cylinder in a wind tunnel, mapping the flow field surrounding the cylinder, and determining the circulation as a function of radius. The effect of Reynolds number, angle of yaw, and cylinder roughness will be studied. The analytical study will have as its objective the establishment of a theory for the Magnus effect in at least the two-dimensional, non-turbulent case.

Progress (to 31 December 1956): A complete set of data on lift coefficient vs. velocity ratio has been taken on cylinders rotating at speeds up to 6000 rpm. Indicated lift coefficients covering a range of -0.8 to 17.5 have been obtained over a velocity ratio range of 0 to 16.5 and at Reynolds numbers from 3.4×10^4 to 4.2×10^5 . A complete set of drag coefficients as a function of velocity ratio and Reynolds number has also been taken. A modification of the original apparatus to permit utilizing an x-ray recorder made it possible to repeat the runs in a period of time substantially shorter than the original runs during which meter readings were made. Data taken by the two methods were in good agreement. No maximum lift coefficient was obtained during the investigation even though the velocity ratio was extended to a value of 17 at which point the lift coefficient had a value of 14.7 and was still increasing at a constant rate. Velocity and pressure data were taken for boundary layer and essentially irrotational-flow regions around the cylinder for velocity ratios of 1 and 2. Static pressure distributions around the cylinder were obtained for two values of velocity ratio. These were compared with the pressure distributions calculated from potential flow theory, the circulation being determined from the experimental lift coefficient. Pitotstatic surveys were made at 30° intervals around the cylinder surface to a distance of one-third of the radius out from the cylinder

IV ENGINEERING SCIENCES

L. Aerodynamics

1082 (continued)

and yielded total and static pressure profiles in both the boundary layer and potential flow regions. Velocity profiles were determined from these data and were compared with profiles calculated from potential-flow theory. As yet no satisfactory method has been devised for the solution of any analytical formulation of the problem. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. An Experimental Investigation of the Two-Dimensional Magnus Effect, by W. M. Swanson. 31 December 1956, 205 p., figures. (Case Institute of Technology, Final Report). ASTIA AD-122 946; ASTIA AD-122 945

V METALLURGICAL SCIENCES

A. Solid State Metallurgy

351 STUDY OF VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE DIFFUSION PROCESS IN ALLOYS APPLYING THE RELAXATION METHOD

Contractor: Yale University
New Haven, Connecticut

Chief Investigator: Arthur S. Nowick

Contract No. DA-19-059-ORD-848
Duration: 9 May 52 - 10 July 53
Amount: \$ 10,315.54
Type of Contract: Fixed Price

Renewed: DA-19-059-ORD-1480
10 July 1953 - 30 June 1955
\$ 22,973.00
Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Frankford Arsenal

Scope: The nature of the relaxation process based on anelastic relaxation produced by local rearrangement of solute atoms under an applied shear stress will be studied, together with the dependence of the heat and entropy of activation for diffusion on concentration for various alloy systems. An investigation will be made of the properties of vacancies in metals and will involve measuring the heat of formation of a vacancy, the mean lifetime of a vacancy, and the effects of dislocations on the mean lifetime. The possibility that vacancies may be created during plastic deformation will be considered, and study will be made of the relation between the rate of formation of superstructure (long range ordering) and the rate of atomic diffusion.

Progress (to 30 June 1955): A study has been made of the kinetics and thermodynamics of stress-induced ordering in substitutional solid solutions. Included in this study was an investigation of the effects of quenched-in vacancies in producing an increase in the rate of relaxation in Ag-Zn alloys. The most striking results were the verification of the vacancy mechanism, the independent measurement of the activation energy for the jump of a vacancy, and the discovery that vacancies anneal out of these alloys in two distinct stages. Attempts were also made to increase the relaxation rate through neutron irradiation. The negative results obtained offer strong evidence that the principal annealing process in irradiated metals and alloys is not the migration of vacancies. In addition, a study was made of the kinetics of the grain boundary relaxation in the quenched state. Work was also directed toward a study of the thermodynamics of stress-induced ordering in Ag-Zn alloys by measuring the variation of relaxation strength with temperature. These data provided the basis for obtaining the temperature of self-induced ordering in these alloys, i.e., the temperature at which ordering would proceed spontaneously, without the help of applied stress, if sufficient mobility existed. A study was made of the effects of dislocations on the kinetics of stress-induced ordering. In this connection, a survey was made of all known dislocation effects on internal friction and dynamic modulus of cold-worked metals, in which it was found that the effects could naturally be

V METALLURGICAL SCIENCES

A. Solid State Metallurgy

351 (continued)

subdivided into three types involving three distinct mechanisms. One type which appeared to be of greatest importance in freshly deformed metals was the Koster effect, and a further study was made of the relation of the recovery of this effect to other low-temperature recovery phenomena. Additional experiments were conducted to obtain a better understanding of the Koster effect, and the results revealed the importance of deformation temperature on the magnitude of the dislocation contribution to the internal friction and dynamic elastic moduli. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Anelastic Measurement of Atomic Mobility Under Non-Equilibrium Conditions, by A. S. Nowick and R. J. Sladek, in *Acta Metallurgica*, vol. 1 (March 1953), p. 131-140. (Technical Report No. 1).
2. The Decay of Lattice Defects Frozen into an Alloy by Quenching, by A. E. Roswell and A. S. Nowick, in *Journal of Metals* (September 1953), p. 1259-1266. (Technical Report No. 2).
3. Internal Friction and Dynamic Modulus of Cold-Worked Metals, by A. S. Nowick, in the *Journal of Applied Physics*, vol. 25, no. 9 (September 1954), p. 1129-1134. (Technical Report No. 3). ASTIA AD-47 623
4. On the Interpretation of Low-Temperature Recovery Phenomena in Cold-Worked Metals, by A. S. Nowick, in *Acta Metallurgica*, vol. 3, no. 4 (July 1955), p. 312-321. (Technical Report No. 4).
5. Study of Various Aspects of the Diffusion Process in Alloys Applying The Relaxation Method, by Arthur S. Nowick. 7 p. (Yale University, Final Report: 9 May 1952 - 30 June 1955).

V METALLURGICAL SCIENCES

A. Solid State Metallurgy

1153 ANELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTIONAL SOLID SOLUTIONS

Contractor: Yale University
New Haven, Connecticut

Chief Investigator: Arthur S. Nowick

Contract No. DA-19-059-ORD-2186
Duration: 1 July 1955 - 30 September 1957
Amount: \$ 13,700.00
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Frankford Arsenal
Scientific Cognizance: Ordnance Materials Research Office

Scope: (1) Complete a study of relaxation strength of the stress-induced ordering phenomenon as a function of crystal orientation in single crystals of AgZn alloys; (2) initiate a study of relaxation strength as a function of orientation in body-centered cubic solid solutions; (3) begin a study of criteria for occurrence of large internal friction peaks; and (4) determine how the state of long range order affects the anelastic behavior of an alloy.

Progress (to 30 September 1957): Investigations have been made which involve the Zener relaxation phenomenon in solid solutions. Investigations of the variation of the relaxation time after quenching with total time at appropriate annealing temperatures showed that the manner in which vacancies precipitate out of a solid solution is strongly affected by the presence of dislocations. The variation of relaxation strength with temperature for three AgZn solid solutions showed the existence of a critical temperature for spontaneous ordering in these alloys near 150°K. A study of the variation of relaxation strength with crystal orientation both in AgZn and MgCd solid solutions showed results which were in qualitative and quantitative disagreement with the predictions of present theories. The results gave a strong indication that next-nearest-neighbor effects may contribute the major part of the relaxation phenomena. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

V METALLURGICAL SCIENCES

A. Solid State Metallurgy

1453 (continued)

Technical Reports:

1. Atomic Mobility in a Cu-Al Alloy after Quenching and Neutron Irradiation, by Chi Yao Li and A. S. Nowick, in The Physical Review, vol. 103, no. 2 (July 1956), p. 294-303. (Technical Report No. 1).
2. Recovery of Internal Friction and Elastic Constants, by A. S. Nowick, in Proceedings of the American Society for Metals, (1957), p. 146-175. (Technical Report No. 2).
3. Anelasticity of Substitutional Solid Solutions, by Arthur S. Nowick, Arthur E. Roswell and others. 19 p., figures. (Yale University, Final Report: 1 July 1955 - 30 August 1957).

V METALLURGICAL SCIENCES

D. Chemical Metallurgy

1285 A STUDY OF THE THERMODYNAMIC PROPERTIES OF SILVER-MAGNESIUM ALLOYS

Contractor: New York University
45 Fourth Avenue
New York 3, New York

Chief Investigator: Polykarp Herasymenko

Contract No. DA-30-069-ORD-1405
Duration: 1 February 1955 - 31 January 1957
Amount: \$ 19,499.00
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Frankford Arsenal

Scope: To study the thermodynamic properties of silver-magnesium alloys in the range from 0 to 65 at. % magnesium by measuring the partial vapor pressure of magnesium. X-ray diffraction measurements will also be made on these alloys. The data will be used to study the correlation of the thermodynamic properties with the degree of ordering in the alloys.

Progress (to 31 January 1957): The vapor pressure of Mg over α and β alloys of Ag and Mg was investigated in the range from about 13 to 50 atomic percent Mg. The alloys were formed by heating pure Ag wire specimens in Mg vapor of constant partial pressure. Solid Mg located at the colder end of the iron reaction tube served as the source of Mg vapor. Abrupt changes in the curves of partial thermodynamic functions were observed at 16.6 and 25 atomic percent Mg in the α field, and at about 40 and 50 atomic percent Mg in the β field. The observed changes were found to be due to changes in ordering. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

Technical Reports:

1. Thermodynamic Properties of Silver-Magnesium Alloys, by P. Herasymenko. April 1956, 8 p., figures. (New York University, Technical Report No. 1). ASTIA AD-91 486
2. Vapor Pressure of Magnesium Over Alpha and Beta Silver-Magnesium Alloys, by P. Herasymenko. April 1957, 10 p., figures, tables. (New York University, Final Report).

V METALLURGICAL SCIENCES

D. Chemical Metallurgy

1500 THE FREE ENERGY CHANGE OF EUTECTOID AND NON-EUTECTOID TRANSFORMATIONS

Contractor: Carnegie Institute of Technology
Schenley Park
Pittsburgh 13, Pennsylvania

Chief Investigator: G. M. Pound

Contract No. DA-36-061-ORD-482	Renewed: DA-36-061-ORD-543
Duration: 1 June 55 - 31 May 56	1 June 1956 - 31 August 1956
Amount: \$ 8,944.00	\$ 2,250.00
Type of Contract: Fixed Price	Fixed Price

Primary Scientific Liaison: Watertown Arsenal
Scientific Cognizance: Ordnance Materials Research Office;
Frankford Arsenal

Scope: The investigation will include but will not be limited to studies of the free energy change of eutectoid transformations; specifically it will concern calorimetric studies on steels containing nickel, chromium, or boron, and similar studies on non-ferrous eutectoid systems such as Cu-Be and Al-Zn.

Progress (to 31 August 1956): A constant heat flow calorimeter has been developed to operate within the temperature range from 400 to 800°C giving thermal data with deviations in reproducibility of < 1%. Thermal measurements have been made on carbon and low-alloy eutectoid steels containing Mn, Mo, Ni, Co, Cu-Al, and Cu-Be eutectoids. The specific heat of pearlite in carbon eutectoid steel was found to be influenced above 600°C by the addition of Mo or Co as an alloying element, and the specific heat of Cu was increased by the addition of Be or Al. The enthalpy of the pearlite to austenite reaction changed with the addition Co, Mn, or Mo to plain-carbon eutectoid steel. A decrease in the enthalpy of the pearlite to austenite transformation with increasing ferrite-cementite interfacial area was observed, and indicated that approximately 12% of the free energy released in the austenite to pearlite reaction is consumed by the formation of the ferrite-cementite interface. The enthalpy of both the Cu-Al and Cu-Be eutectoid reaction was considerably less than that found in the Fe-C system. A decrease in the enthalpy with increasing interfacial area was detected for austenitization of the pearlite in the Cu-Al system, but this effect was not completely established as a result of the interfacial energy released. From the thermal data, the free energy change for the various eutectoid reactions can be calculated. The final report has been received and the contract has been terminated.

V METALLURGICAL SCIENCES

D. Chemical Metallurgy

1500 (continued)

Technical Reports:

1. Determination of the Free Energy Change of Eutectoid Reactions and the Interfacial Energy in Pearlitic Eutectoids, by John J. Kramer and Guy M. Pound. 30 September 1956, 167 p., figures, tables. (Carnegie Institute of Technology, Metals Research Laboratory, Final Report). ASTIA AD-121 881

V METALLURGICAL SCIENCES

F. Symposia and Conferences

1556 SAGAMORE RESEARCH CONFERENCE ON ORDNANCE MATERIALS

Contractor: Syracuse University Research Foundation
Syracuse, New York

Chief Investigator: George Sachs

Contract No. DA-30-115-ORD-667
Duration: 1 August 1955 - 30 September 1957
Amount: \$ 14,160.53
Type of Contract: Cost

Primary Scientific Liaison: Ordnance Materials Research Office

Scope: Necessary equipment and facilities will be provided for a Research Conference on Strength Limitations of Metals, and assistance will be furnished for planning, arranging, and administering it. The Conference will be held at Syracuse University Sagamore Conference Center, Sagamore Lake, N. Y., and sponsored by the University and by Ordnance Materials Research Office. Speakers will be secured, the conference program will be prepared, published, and distributed, and a resume of the conference program will be prepared and published. A second conference will be held at Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, cosponsored by The Ordnance Materials Research Office and The Office of Ordnance Research, U. S. Army. Speakers recommended by a committee on nominations will be secured, facilities will be provided, and a conference report will be prepared and distributed to acquaint Ordnance Corps personnel with current advances in the field of serviceability testing of Ordnance materials.

Progress (to March 1956): The conference on strength limitations of metals was held at the Sagamore Conference Center, 24 - 26 August 1955. Lectures were presented by nineteen speakers. The conference was attended by approximately eighty persons connected with some phase of metallurgical research or application. The lectures presented the principal relations which control, guide, and encourage the researcher in his quest for maximum strength for a particular alloy and for a particular application. Proceedings of this conference are set forth in report #1 listed below. The second conference was held at Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, 5 - 7 December 1956. The emphasis was placed on the advancements in testing techniques, and particularly on the development and design of more realistic tests. It was shown how either successful performance or failure of structural parts can now be predicted in certain instances, from the results of special laboratory tests. Proceedings of this conference on materials evaluation in relation to component behavior are set forth in report #2 listed below. This contract has been terminated.

V METALLURGICAL SCIENCES

F. Symposia and Conferences

1556 (continued)

Technical Reports:

1. Proceedings of the 1955 Sagamore Research Conference, "Strength Limitations of Metals." March 1956, 402 p., figures, tables; 2 vols. (Syracuse University Research Institute). ASTIA AD-99 249, ASTIA AD-99 183
2. Proceedings of the Third Sagamore Ordnance Materials Research Conference, "Materials Evaluation in Relation to Component Behavior." 5, 6 and 7 December 1956, 609 p., figures, tables. (Syracuse University Research Institute).

LISTING OF TERMINATED RESEARCH PROPOSALS

Proposal No.	4	Page VII-111	Proposal No.	222	Page VII-231
	5	VII-217		225	VII-164
	10	VII-155		227	VII-206
	12	VII-299		231	VII-512
	18	VII-219		232	VII-501
	23	VII-157		234	VII-752
	25	VII-561		246	VII-343
	26	VII-413		248	VII-346
	29	VII-141		256	VII-550
	64	VII-267		258	VII-347
	67	VII-311		262	VII-139
	68	VII-270		266	VII-395
	69	VII-272		269	VII-146
	71	VII-465		270	VII-1
	72	VII-185		275	VII-233
	78	VII-503		283	VII-235
	79	VII-506		287	VII-543
	82	VII-203		289	VII-3
	84	VII-312		293	VII-57
	87	VII-159		296	VII-59
	89	VII-143		300	VII-237
	97	VII-161		303	VII-116
	100	VII-163		304	VII-457
	111	VII-113		306	VII-208
	115	VII-220		308	VII-86
	117	VII-115		310	VII-301
	131	VII-313		312	VII-238
	140	VII-31		313	VII-514
	143	VII-145		316	VII-23
	146	VII-468		317	VII-470
	148	VII-341		326	VII-240
	151	VII-83		328	VII-9
	154	VII-415		329	VII-73
	155	VII-226		340	VII-148
	158	VII-79		341	VII-242
	165	VII-85		345	VII-552
	166	VII-418		347	VII-244
	168	VII-321		348	VII-89
	174	VII-81		351	VII-773
	175	VII-45		355	VII-472
	177	VII-229		361	VII-74
	178B	VII-539		363	VII-10
	179	VII-565		365	VII-517
	180	VII-541		366	VII-118
	187	VII-509		367	VII-275
	191	VII-557		375	VII-743
	202	VII-549		376	VII-61
	204	VII-204		377	VII-33
	205	VII-314		378	VII-303
	214	VII-511		380	VII-277
	216	VII-323		384	VII-246

LISTING OF TERMINATED RESEARCH PROPOSALS (Continued)

Proposal No.	Page	Proposal No.	Page
385	VII-165	526	VII-524
388	VII-248	533	VII-119
390	VII-349	534	VII-569
392	VII-656	536	VII-63
395	VII-210	538	VII-422
396	VII-545	539	VII-27
399	VII-249	543	VII-192
400	VII-577	544	VII-663
402	VII-518	547	VII-216
403	VII-705	548	VII-253
408	VII-653	561	VII-22
410	VII-397	562	VII-49
417	VII-279	565	VII-39
423	VII-34	568	VII-571
425	VII-187	570	VII-525
426	VII-12	571	VII-284
427	VII-281	572	VII-4
429	VII-520	573	VII-94
435	VII-189	574	VII-665
444	VII-352	586	VII-195
445	VII-24	587	VII-16
446	VII-282	590	VII-286
447	VII-150	592	VII-151
450	VII-491	602	VII-197
452	VII-437	613	VII-674
455	VII-166	615	VII-199
456	VII-489	619	VII-358
457	VII-212	622	VII-475
460	VII-445	626	VII-325
463	VII-46	627	VII-96
465	VII-250	629	VII-573
474	VII-419	631	VII-439
479	VII-92	640	VII-326
482	VII-13	642	VII-52
483	VII-316	644	VII-558
485	VII-672	655	VII-399
488	VII-48	658	VII-254
491	VII-547	664	VII-669
492	VII-36	665	VII-745
497	VII-354	667	VII-658
499	VII-567	669	VII-255
501	VII-214	670	VII-687
507	VII-483	672	VII-447
508	VII-252	674	VII-646
509	VII-190	675	VII-54
510	VII-37	679	VII-477
514	VII-420	684	VII-683
516	VII-356	688	VII-554
520	VII-14	689	VII-65
521	VII-191	690	VII-361
525	VII-685	695	VII-688

LISTING OF TERMINATED RESEARCH PROPOSALS (Continued)

Proposal No.	Page	Proposal No.	Page
698	VII-121	852	VII-289
703	VII-98	854	VII-427
708	VII-389	855	VII-331
712	VII-137	860	VII-366
715	VII-363	867	VII-368
716	VII-365	868	VII-6
718	VII-660	869	VII-153
720	VII-400	874	VII-531
723	VII-306	875	VII-291
729	VII-287	877	VII-495
730	VII-329	884	VII-133
735	VII-698	885	VII-406
736	VII-493	887	VII-666
737	VII-535	888	VII-710
738	VII-494	892	VII-429
739	VII-123	910	VII-370
740	VII-124	916	VII-176
741	VII-126	920	VII-655
742	VII-152	922	VII-372
744	VII-754	924	VII-485
747	VII-402	925	VII-374
749	VII-404	931	VII-68
751	VII-201	940	VII-749
757	VII-100	943	VII-409
759	VII-479	944	VII-376
760	VII-737	948	VII-178
761	VII-101	950	VII-333
762	VII-318	956	VII-378
763	VII-168	967	VII-690
765	VII-308	976	VII-480
767	VII-41	996	VII-70
771	VII-103	999	VII-529
775	VII-171	1000	VII-497
776	VII-459	1003	VII-18
779	VII-575	1013	VII-649
781	VII-128	1014	VII-717
782	VII-579	1016	VII-644
788	VII-527	1019	VII-461
794	VII-131	1040	VII-335
798	VII-55	1045	VII-712
808	VII-67	1050	VII-20
817	VII-678	1053	VII-392
828	VII-288	1058	VII-261
833	VII-76	1072	VII-643
836	VII-172	1081	VII-319
838	VII-647	1082	VII-771
841	VII-680	1086	VII-756
842	VII-257	1087	VII-692
844	VII-174	1089	VII-724
846	VII-259	1101	VII-451
851	VII-425	1106	VII-380

LISTING OF TERMINATED RESEARCH PROPOSALS (Continued)

Proposal No.	Page No.	Proposal No.	Page No.
1107	VII-294	1453	VII-775
1111	VII-682	1454	VII-265
1115	VII-441	1464	VII-704
1119	VII-431	1466	VII-72
1142	VII-537	1476	VII-411
1151	VII-533	1500	VII-778
1155	VII-499	1502	VII-769
1156	VII-746	1503	VII-721
1164	VII-750	1509	VII-107
1173	VII-694	1515	VII-733
1179	VII-676	1529	VII-731
1194	VII-707	1549	VII-734
1201	VII-651	1550	VII-728
1204	VII-462	1553	VII-735
1213	VII-530	1556	VII-780
1218	VII-296	1558	VII-297
1222	VII-382	1562	VII-668
1230	VII-759	1568	VII-487
1232	VII-761	1581	VII-751
1236	VII-337	1599	VII-729
1237	VII-263	1623	VII-109
1238	VII-433	1823	VII-723
1239	VII-714		
1245	VII-179		
1250	VII-43		
1252	VII-700		
1254	VII-453		
1258	VII-702		
1276	VII-182		
1277	VII-696		
1278	VII-442		
1285	VII-777		
1288	VII-763		
1301	VII-765		
1302	VII-384		
1307	VII-767		
1310	VII-534		
1315	VII-560		
1320	VII-463		
1322	VII-105		
1333	VII-444		
1336	VII-739		
1357	VII-338		
1362	VII-385		
1364	VII-741		
1369	VII-310		
1371A	VII-455		
1371B	VII-387		
1394	VII-697		
1409	VII-435		
1445	VII-726		

LISTING OF TERMINATED RESEARCH CONTRACTS

Contract No.	Proposal Number	Page	Contract No.	Proposal Number	Page
DA-01-009-ORD-100	18	VII-219	DA-04-200-ORD-180	483	VII-316
	-188	155		-181	520
	-191	262		-223	775
	-194	168		-236	684
	-217	166		-292	1014
	-229	310		-293	1053
	-231	266		-318	1173
	-251	456		-340	1357
	-253	446		-355	1254
	-257	380		-436	1445
	-268	455		-440	1466
	-294	798		-456	1503
	-300	658			
	-327	841	DA-04-495-ORD-160	26	VII-413
	-351	948		-209	12
	-344	920		-237	25
	-353	1016		-282	377
	-365	1107		-303	395
	-368	1164		-305	399
	-370	158		-306	417
	-396	1230		-310	429
	-397	1278		-318	445
	-404	1301		-323	392
	-406	1277		-364	403
	-422	158		-377	521
	-430	1369		-381	450
	-438	1278		-406	715
	-444	1164		-410	729
	-454	1230		-418	776
	-457	841		-444	931
	-458	920		-457	474
	-461	1277		-461	877
	-462	1301		-518	996
	-465	1016		-521	1072
				-557	1237
DA-04-200-ORD-65	177	VII-229		-560	1232
	-66	227		-613	1362
	-113	216		-669	1550
	-132	384			
	-135	111	DA-11-022-ORD-454	214	VII-511
	-171			-464	115
T.O. 1	363	VII-10		-471	140
T.O. 2	426	VII-12		-489	246
T.O. 4	708	VII-389		-571	64
T.O. 7	852	VII-289		-602	191
	-174	316		-656	89
	-175	425		-789	165
	-177	452		-828	763
	-178	396		-828	1245

LISTING OF TERMINATED RESEARCH CONTRACTS (Continued)

Contract No.	Proposal Number	Page	Contract No.	Proposal Number	Page
DA-11-022-ORD-875	516	VII-356	DA-19-020-ORD-1029	355	VII-472
-877	345	VII-552	-1093	328	VII-9
-878	402	VII-518	-1287	548	VII-253
-881	460	VII-445	-1323	283	VII-235
-939	485	VII-672	-1433	808	VII-67
-993	629	VII-573	-1614	347	VII-244
-994	664	VII-669	-1767	375	VII-743
-995	313	VII-514	-1816	479	VII-92
-997	571	VII-284	-1887	510	VII-37
-998	602	VII-197	-1891	539	VII-27
-999	544	VII-663	-1903	444	VII-352
-1038	587	VII-16	-2023	565	VII-39
-1048	759	VII-479	-2244	779	VII-575
-1121	507	VII-483	-2245	690	VII-361
-1156	570	VII-525	-2293	547	VII-216
-1167	590	VII-286	-2312	626	VII-325
-1207	592	VII-151	-2451	665	VII-745
-1213	828	VII-288	-2568	771	VII-103
-1214	874	VII-531	-2569	674	VII-646
-1223	838	VII-647	-2597	875	VII-291
-1246	910	VII-370	-2607	751	VII-201
-1247	860	VII-366	-2831	1019	VII-461
-1248	767	VII-41	-3100	885	VII-406
-1249	794	VII-131	-3172	1086	VII-756
-1264	817	VII-678	-3177	1087	VII-692
-1268	723	VII-306	-3244	887	VII-666
-1276	1276	VII-182	-3312	1142	VII-537
-1281	842	VII-257	-3431	1322	VII-105
-1309	1000	VII-497	-3538	1371A	VII-455
-1318	944	VII-376	-3699	1553	VII-735
-1345	1003	VII-18	-3754	1623	VII-109
-1490	115	VII-220	-3777	1371B	VII-387
-1494	888	VII-710	-4373	1823	VII-723
-1502	956	VII-378	DA-19-059-ORD-848	351	VII-773
-1507	976	VII-480	-849	326	VII-240
-1508	940	VII-749	-971	574	VII-665
-1511	1045	VII-712	-1317	735	VII-698
-1513	1058	VII-261	-1480	351	VII-773
-1571	1194	VII-707	-1494	326	VII-240
-1579	1218	VII-296	-1500	574	VII-665
-1581	1151	VII-533	-1611	925	VII-374
-1729	1364	VII-741	-1691	1155	VII-499
-1979	1476	VII-411	-1955	1236	VII-337
-1989	1549	VII-734	-2049	1222	VII-382
-1998	1599	VII-729	-2186	1453	VII-775
DA-19-020-ORD-592	10	VII-155	-2196	735	VII-698
-896	5	VII-217	-2300	1222	VII-382

LISTING OF TERMINATED RESEARCH CONTRACTS (Continued)

Contract No.	Proposal Number	Page	Contract No.	Proposal Number	Page
DA-20-018-ORD-11814	87	VII-159	DA-23-072-ORD-811	1213	VII-530
-11913	146	VII-468	-876	1336	VII-739
-11914	143	VII-145	-928	846	VII-259
-12079	269	VII-146	-964	1111	VII-682
-12099	234	VII-752	-965	695	VII-688
-12242	317	VII-470	DA-30-069-ORD-459	178B	VII-539
-12258	329	VII-73	-479	248	VII-346
-12277	410	VII-397	-609	232	VII-501
-12300	304	VII-457	-683	231	VII-512
-12332	640	VII-326	-750	447	VII-150
-12389	270	VII-1	-765	533	VII-119
-12720	427	VII-281	-782	388	VII-248
-12738	747	VII-402	-783	615	VII-199
-12763	87	VII-159	-791	688	VII-554
-12811	631	VII-439	-956	716	VII-365
-12853	573	VII-94	-980	509	VII-190
-12916	867	VII-368	-1004	568	VII-571
-13272	1101	VII-451	-1056	765	VII-308
-13281	1040	VII-335	-1061	744	VII-754
-13282	892	VII-429	-1069	855	VII-331
-13354	1013	VII-649	-1090	679	VII-777
-13474	1258	VII-702	-1113	869	VII-153
DA-23-072-ORD-196	23	VII-157	-1135	232	VII-501
-214	82	VII-203	-1137	836	VII-172
-216	29	VII-141	-1138	231	VII-512
-217	72	VII-185	-1158	533	VII-119
-222	84	VII-312	-1257	1089	VII-724
-231	117	VII-115	-1263	999	VII-529
-297	275	VII-233	-1289	1179	VII-676
-392	390	VII-349	-1316	1252	VII-700
-413	435	VII-189	-1324	1320	VII-463
-447	508	VII-252	-1326	1250	VII-43
-471	627	VII-96	-1405	1285	VII-777
-472	844	VII-174	-1622	1529	VII-731
-491	613	VII-674	-1725	1581	VII-751
-493	695	VII-688	DA-30-115-ORD-224	131	VII-313
-583	1336	VII-739	-225	174	VII-81
-585	627	VII-96	-226	100	VII-163
-596	1568	VII-487	-241	378	VII-303
-648	851	VII-425	-249	306	VII-208
-676	868	VII-6	-291	175	VII-45
-677	846	VII-259	-309	501	VII-214
-761	1111	VII-682	-317	361	VII-74
-764	1050	VII-20	-326	486	VII-522
-768	924	VII-485	-331	174	VII-81
-773	1081	VII-319	-378	655	VII-399
-783	1009	VII-292			

LISTING OF TERMINATED RESEARCH CONTRACTS (Continued)

Contract No.	Proposal Number	Page	Contract No.	Proposal Number	Page
DA-30-115-ORD-420	667	VII-658	DA-36-034-ORD-295		
-424	526	VII-524	T.O. 4	67	VII-311
-439	922	VII-372	T.O. 5	69	VII-272
-459	788	VII-527	T.O. 6	68	VII-270
-513	967	VII-690	T.O. 7	69	VII-272
-549	1315	VII-560	T.O. 8	67	VII-311
-651	1405	VII-86	T.O. 9	68	VII-270
-667	1556	VII-780	-421	148	VII-341
-704	967	VII-690	-491	180	VII-541
-709	1502	VII-769	-502	202	VII-549
			-506	151	VII-83
DA-33-008-ORD-123	4	VII-111	-573	205	VII-314
-187	225	VII-164	-587	300	VII-237
-223	97	VII-161	-614	287	VII-543
-262	258	VII-347	-670	303	VII-116
-263	256	VII-550	-694	179	VII-565
-264	204	VII-204	-727	308	VII-86
-377	365	VII-517	-843	348	VII-89
-379	341	VII-242	-853	340	VII-148
-394	562	VII-49	-865	289	VII-3
-408	296	VII-59	-935	457	VII-212
-453	561	VII-22	-938	408	VII-653
-454	538	VII-422	-940	488	VII-48
-467	154	VII-415	-969	187	VII-509
-485	97	VII-161	-975	720	VII-400
-556	536	VII-63	-977	689	VII-65
-575	497	VII-354	-978	492	VII-36
-607	670	VII-687	-1044	749	VII-404
-888	760	VII-737	-1084	672	VII-447
-1153	1454	VII-265	-1127	300	VII-237
			-1135	205	VII-314
DA-33-019-ORD-653	222	VII-231	-1140	312	VII-238
-876	514	VII-420	-1153	644	VII-558
-878	366	VII-118	-1169	703	VII-98
-1022	730	VII-329	-1176	669	VII-255
-1077	499	VII-567	-1182	698	VII-121
-1093	482	VII-13	-1194	308	VII-86
-1104	619	VII-358	-1206	348	VII-89
-1166	622	VII-475	-1217	287	VII-543
-1172	675	VII-54	-1240	303	VII-116
-1193	854	VII-427	-1261	762	VII-318
-1207	884	VII-133	-1266	833	VII-76
-1434	1082	VII-771	-1270	943	VII-409
-1996	1409	VII-435	-1274	749	VII-404
			-1292	950	VII-333
DA-36-034-ORD-295			-1311	488	VII-48
T.O. 1	67	VII-311	-1351	408	VII-653
T.O. 2	69	VII-272	-1456	187	VII-509
T.O. 3	68	VII-270	-1475	151	VII-83

LISTING OF TERMINATED RESEARCH CONTRACTS (Continued)

Contract No.	Proposal Number	Page	Contract No.	Proposal Number	Page
DA-36-034-ORD-1477	672	VII-447	DA-36-061-ORD-518	1558	VII-297
-1487	718	VII-660	-543	1500	VII-778
-1489	916	VII-176	-544	1464	VII-704
-1492	1106	VII-380			
-1519	644	VII-558			
-1531	1201	VII-651			
-1619	698	VII-121			
-1622	1239	VII-714			
-1645	1333	VII-444			
-1676	1238	VII-433			
-1774	1302	VII-384			
-2019	1394	VII-697			
-2035	1509	VII-107			
-2199	1562	VII-668			
DA-36-061-ORD-67	78	VII-503			
-106	79	VII-506			
-109	71	VII-465			
-149	293	VII-57			
-175	400	VII-577			
-176	376	VII-61			
-184	367	VII-275			
-205	534	VII-569			
-237	79	VII-506			
-275	543	VII-192			
-295	525	VII-685			
-312	71	VII-465			
-322	293	VII-57			
-326	586	VII-195			
-340	376	VII-61			
-345	761	VII-101			
-348	367	VII-275			
-350	534	VII-569			
-368	78	VII-503			
-379	79	VII-506			
-383	543	VII-192			
-392	463	VII-46			
-411	400	VII-577			
-444	1156	VII-746			
-446	1288	VII-763			
-448	1307	VII-767			
-472	525	VII-685			
-478	761	VII-101			
-482	1500	VII-778			
-489	1464	VII-704			
-495	1156	VII-746			
-505	1288	VII-763			
-511	463	VII-46			

LIST OF PRIMARY SCIENTIFIC LIAISON AND SCIENTIFIC COGNIZANCE (C) PARTICIPANTS

Office, Chief of Ordnance	Rock Island Arsenal
Proposal No. 1254(C) Page VII-453	Proposal No. 306 Page VII-208
	447 VII-150
	485 VII-672
Aberdeen Proving Ground	869 VII-153
Human Engineering Laboratory	884 VII-133
	924 VII-485
Proposal No. 1151(C) Page VII-533	1156(C) VII-746
	1164(C) VII-704
	1568 VII-487
Detroit Arsenal	
Proposal No. 1336(C) Page VII-739	White Sands Proving Ground
1445(C) VII-726	
1549 VII-734	Proposal No. 690(C) Page VII-361
	776 VII-459
Ordnance Weapons Command	1445(C) VII-726
	1529(C) VII-731
Proposal No. 1529 Page VII-731	1599 VII-729
Office of Scientific Research (ARDC)	Redstone Arsenal
Proposal No. 1515 Page VII-733	Proposal No. 586 Page VII-195
	664(C) VII-669
	718(C) VII-660
	760(C) VII-737
Office of Naval Research	887(C) VII-666
	916(C) VII-176
Proposal No. 1119 Page VII-431	940(C) VII-749
	976 VII-480
	1009(C) VII-292
Signal Corps Engineering Laboratory	1045(C) VII-712
	1058(C) VII-261
Proposal No. 1013(C) Page VII-649	1081(C) VII-319
	1082(C) VII-771
	1087(C) VII-692
Ordnance Materials Research Office	1179(C) VII-676
	1258(C) VII-702
Proposal No. 667(C) Page VII-658	1276 VII-182
1288(C) VII-763	1302(C) VII-384
1453(C) VII-775	1454 VII-265
1500(C) VII-778	1553(C) VII-735
1556 VII-780	1581 VII-751
1568(C) VII-487	
1623 VII-109	
	Picatinny Arsenal
	Proposal No. 12 Page VII-299
	64 VII-267
	87 VII-159

LIST OF PRIMARY SCIENTIFIC LIAISON AND SCIENTIFIC COGNIZANCE (C) PARTICIPANTS
(Continued)

Picatinny Arsenal (cont'd)	Watertown Arsenal (cont'd)
Proposal No. 222 Page VII-231	Proposal No. 689 Page VII-65
303 VII-116	920(C) VII-655
378 VII-303	996(C) VII-70
455 VII-166	1086 VII-756
543(C) VII-192	1230 VII-759
590 VII-286	1232 VII-761
613 VII-674	1301 VII-765
763 VII-168	1307 VII-767
771 VII-103	1322 VII-105
781 VII-128	1409 VII-435
841(C) VII-680	1500 VII-778
844 VII-174	1586(C) VII-487
846(C) VII-259	
916(C) VII-176	
948 VII-178	
1009 VII-292	Ballistic Research Laboratories
1016(C) VII-644	Proposal No. 71 Page VII-465
1173(C) VII-694	158 VII-79
1238 VII-433	174(C) VII-81
1245 VII-179	248 VII-346
1258(C) VII-702	248 VII-472
1362(C) VII-385	355 VII-349
1369 VII-310	390 VII-437
1466(C) VII-72	456 VII-489
	460 VII-455
	463(C) VII-46
	497 VII-354
	520 VII-14
	627(C) VII-96
	631 VII-439
	667(C) VII-658
	672 VII-447
	690(C) VII-361
	716 VII-365
	759 VII-479
	760 VII-737
	771(C) VII-103
	788 VII-527
	846(C) VII-259
	851 VII-425
	854 VII-427
	887(C) VII-666
	892 VII-429
	920(C) VII-655
	956 VII-378
	976(C) VII-480
	996(C) VII-70
	1009(C) VII-292
Watertown Arsenal	
Proposal No. 25 Page VII-561	
26 VII-413	
165 VII-85	
191 VII-557	
202 VII-549	
231 VII-512	
232 VII-501	
234 VII-752	
256 VII-550	
340 VII-148	
365 VII-517	
474 VII-419	
479 VII-92	
486 VII-522	
514 VII-420	
526 VII-524	
565 VII-39	
570 VII-525	
627(C) VII-96	
644(C) VII-558	

LIST OF PRIMARY SCIENTIFIC LIAISON AND SCIENTIFIC COGNIZANCE (C) PARTICIPANTS
(Continued)Ballistic Research Laboratories
(cont'd)

Proposal No.	Page
1013	VII-649
1014	VII-717
1016(C)	VII-644
1053	VII-392
1082(C)	VII-771
1101	VII-451
1201	VII-651
1213(C)	VII-530
1222(C)	VII-382
1232(C)	VII-761
1254(C)	VII-453
1278	VII-442
1301(C)	VII-765
1333	VII-444
1357	VII-338
1364(C)	VII-741
1445	VII-726
1503(C)	VII-721
1509(C)	VII-107
1529(C)	VII-731
1599(C)	VII-729

Frankford Arsenal

Proposal No.	Page
18	VII-219
82	VII-203
89	VII-143
97	VII-161
100	VII-163
151	VII-83
178B	VII-539
179	VII-565
180	VII-541
187	VII-509
205	VII-314
214	VII-511
262	VII-139
269	VII-146
283	VII-235
287	VII-543
289	VII-3
317	VII-470
345	VII-552
351	VII-773
367	VII-275
375	VII-743

Frankford Arsenal
(cont'd)

Proposal No.	Page
395	VII-210
396	VII-545
400	VII-577
402	VII-518
435	VII-189
457	VII-212
463(C)	VII-46
485(C)	VII-672
627(C)	VII-96
644(C)	VII-558
670	VII-687
684	VII-683
688	VII-554
703	VII-98
718	VII-660
846(C)	VII-259
924(C)	VII-485
940	VII-749
956(C)	VII-378
1086(C)	VII-756
1107(C)	VII-294
1111(C)	VII-682
1142	VII-537
1156(C)	VII-746
1218	VII-296
1230(C)	VII-759
1237	VII-263
1277(C)	VII-696
1285	VII-777
1288	VII-763
1315	VII-560
1453	VII-775
1464	VII-704
1466(C)	VII-72
1500(C)	VII-778
1529(C)	VII-731
1553(C)	VII-735
1558(C)	VII-297
1568(C)	VII-487

INDEX OF CONTRACTORS

Note: The first number in each line is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Air Research & Development Command 1204, VII-462	Brown University 10, VII-155 479, VII-92 1086, VII-756 1087, VII-692
Alabama, University of 658, VII-254 1230, VII-759	California, University of 363, VII-10 399, VII-249 426, VII-12 429, VII-520 445, VII-24 450, VII-491 474, VII-419 708, VII-389 852, VII-289 1254, VII-453 1503, VII-721
Alabama Polytechnic Institute 1278, VII-442	California Institute of Technology 729, VII-287 931, VII-68
American Institute of Physics 1250, VII-43	Carnegie Institute of Technology 293, VII-57 376, VII-61 400, VII-577 534, VII-569 1156, VII-746 1500, VII-778
American Mathematical Society 1371A, VII-455 1371B, VII-387 1823, VII-723	Case Institute of Technology 482, VII-13 499, VII-567 622, VII-475 854, VII-427 884, VII-133 1082, VII-771 1409, VII-435
Applied Science Laboratories, Inc. 586, VII-195	Catholic University of America 1302, VII-384
Arkansas, University of 844, VII-174	Chicago, University of 140, VII-31 767, VII-41 860, VII-366
Armour Research Foundation 214, VII-511	
Bartol Research Foundation 718, VII-660	
Boston College 674, VII-646	
Boston University 751, VII-201	
Brigham Young University 877, VII-495 996, VII-70 1232, VII-761	
Brooklyn College 855, VII-331	

INDEX OF CONTRACTORS (Continued)

Note: The first number in each line is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Chicago, University of (cont'd)	Delaware, University of
910, VII-370	179, VII-565
944, VII-376	308, VII-86
1003, VII-18	1509, VII-107
1194, VII-707	Duke University
1599, VII-729	67, VII-311
Cincinnati, University of	68, VII-270
4, VII-111	69, VII-272
97, VII-161	Duquesne University
Clarkson College of Technology	367, VII-275
501, VII-214	1464, VII-704
Colorado, University of	1558, VII-297
275, VII-233	Florida, University of
1009, VII-292	262, VII-139
1050, VII-20	380, VII-277
1213, VII-530	1301, VII-765
Columbia University	Florida, University of
178B, VII-539	Engineering Experiment Station
447, VII-150	158, VII-79
615, VII-199	Florida State University
744, VII-754	155, VII-226
1252, VII-700	841, VII-680
1529, VII-731	1277, VII-696
1581, VII-751	Forest Products Laboratory
Combustion Institute	465, VII-250
1515, VII-733	Franklin Institute
Coordinating Research Council, Inc.	703, VII-98
1320, VII-463	George Pepperdine College
Cornell University	521, VII-191
378, VII-303	Georgia, University of
486, VII-522	166, VII-418
526, VII-524	168, VII-321
922, VII-372	Georgia Tech Research Institute
967, VII-690	446, VII-282
DePaul University	456, VII-489
842, VII-257	1016, VII-644
	1107, VII-294
	1164, VII-750

INDEX OF CONTRACTORS (Continued)

Note: The first number in each line is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Harvard University	Institute for Advanced Study
355, VII-472	720, VII-400
444, VII-352	943, VII-409
885, VII-406	950, VII-333
Holy Cross, College of the	1106, VII-380
347, VII-244	1239, VII-714
Houston, University of	1333, VII-444
1111, VII-682	Iowa, State University of
Howard University	587, VII-16
340, VII-148	1058, VII-261
Illinois, University of	1364, VII-741
191, VII-557	Iowa State College
313, VII-514	165, VII-85
485, VII-672	1218, VII-296
507, VII-483	Johns Hopkins University
763, VII-168	488, VII-48
1151, VII-533	644, VII-558
1245, VII-179	698, VII-121
1476, VII-411	749, VII-404
Illinois Institute of Technology	Johns Hopkins University
115, VII-220	Institute of Cooperative Research
345, VII-552	833, VII-76
402, VII-518	Kansas, University of
460, VII-445	72, VII-185
570, VII-525	82, VII-203
571, VII-284	84, VII-312
590, VII-286	117, VII-115
592, VII-151	435, VII-189
629, VII-573	695, VII-688
794, VII-131	1081, VII-319
817, VII-678	Kansas City, University of
888, VII-710	508, VII-252
940, VII-749	Kansas State College
1276, VII-182	846, VII-259
Indiana University	Kenyon College
154, VII-415	619, VII-358
225, VII-164	
258, VII-347	
538, VII-422	
561, VII-22	
1119, VII-431	

INDEX OF CONTRACTORS (Continued)

Note: The first number in each line is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Kentucky, University of	Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Spectroscopy Lab
341, VII-242	5, VII-217
497, VII-354	
536, VII-63	Miami, University of
1454, VII-265	798, VII-55
Lehigh University	Michigan, University of
148, VII-341	87, VII-159
151, VII-83	143, VII-145
187, VII-509	146, VII-468
457, VII-212	234, VII-752
Linfield College	304, VII-457
775, VII-171	317, VII-470
Louisiana State University	329, VII-73
266, VII-395	410, VII-397
455, VII-166	631, VII-439
Lowell Observatory	747, VII-402
1072, VII-643	867, VII-368
Maine, University of	892, VII-429
283, VII-235	1040, VII-335
Maryland, University of	Michigan State College
669, VII-255	270, VII-1
Massachusetts, University of	573, VII-94
735, VII-698	Michigan State University
Massachusetts Institute of Technology	1013, VII-649
328, VII-9	Midwest Research Institute
375, VII-743	924, VII-485
510, VII-37	1568, VII-487
539, VII-27	Minnesota, University of
565, VII-39	64, VII-267
665, VII-745	246, VII-343
779, VII-575	544, VII-663
887, VII-666	602, VII-197
1019, VII-461	723, VII-306
1142, VII-537	759, VII-479
1553, VII-735	838, VII-647
1623, VII-109	874, VII-531
	976, VII-480
	Mount Holyoke College
	925, VII-374

INDEX OF CONTRACTORS (Continued)

Note: The first number in each line is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

National Bureau of Standards	Notre Dame, University of
572, VII-4	491, VII-547
642, VII-52	Oberlin College
712, VII-137	730, VII-329
736, VII-493	Office of Naval Research
737, VII-535	1310, VII-534
738, VII-494	Ohio State University
739, VII-123	Research Foundation
740, VII-124	222, VII-231
741, VII-126	366, VII-118
742, VII-152	675, VII-54
781, VII-128	Oklahoma, University of
782, VII-579	23, VII-157
New Hampshire, University of	Oklahoma State University
547, VII-216	1336, VII-739
690, VII-361	Oregon State College
New Mexico College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts	384, VII-246
776, VII-459	452, VII-437
New York University	Pennsylvania, University of
231, VII-512	180, VII-541
232, VII-501	408, VII-653
248, VII-346	492, VII-36
568, VII-571	Pennsylvania State University
679, VII-477	71, VII-465
869, VII-153	78, VII-503
1089, VII-724	79, VII-506
1115, VII-441	761, VII-101
1285, VII-777	1288, VII-763
North Carolina, University of	1307, VII-767
312, VII-238	Pittsburgh, University of
North Carolina State College	525, VII-685
202, VII-549	Polaroid Corporation
689, VII-65	1322, VII-105
1562, VII-668	
Northwestern University	
828, VII-288	
956, VII-378	

INDEX OF CONTRACTORS (Continued)

Note: The first number in each line is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn	Southern California, University of
509, VII-190	(cont'd)
533, VII-119	1237, VII-263
765, VII-308	1362, VII-385
836, VII-172	Stanford Research Institute
999, VII-529	1466, VII-72
Purdue Research Foundation	Stanford University
365, VII-517	396, VII-545
670, VII-687	520, VII-14
760, VII-737	1053, VII-392
Queens College	1173, VII-694
716, VII-365	1445, VII-726
1179, VII-676	Syracuse University
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute	100, VII-163
306, VII-208	131, VII-313
788, VII-527	174, VII-81
1315, VII-560	175, VII-45
1502, VII-769	665, VII-399
Rhode Island, University of	667, VII-658
875, VII-291	Syracuse University Research
Rochester, University of	Foundation
361, VII-74	1556, VII-780
Rutgers University	Temple University
388, VII-248	205, VII-314
688, VII-554	287, VII-543
Saint Louis University	289, VII-3
627, VII-96	916, VII-176
South Carolina, University of	Tennessee, University of
1201, VII-651	204, VII-204
1238, VII-433	562, VII-49
Southern California, University of	Texas, University of
377, VII-33	29, VII-141
392, VII-656	Texas A&M Research Foundation
395, VII-210	851, VII-425
403, VII-705	868, VII-6
417, VII-279	Texas Technological College
715, VII-363	613, VII-674

INDEX OF CONTRACTORS (Continued)

Note: The first number in each line is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Tufts College	Washington, State College of
626, VII-325	(cont'd)
771, VII-103	316, VII-23
Tulane University	1357, VII-338
18, VII-219	Washington, University of
920, VII-655	425, VII-187
948, VII-178	483, VII-316
Tuskegee Institute	684, VII-683
310, VII-301	1014, VII-717
1369, VII-310	Washington University
United Geophysical Corporation	390, VII-349
1550, VII-728	Wayne University
U. S. Bureau of Mines	269, VII-146
385, VII-165	427, VII-281
423, VII-34	640, VII-326
757, VII-100	1101, VII-451
U. S. Department of Agriculture	1258, VII-702
see Forest Products Laboratory	Wesleyan University
Utah, University of	808, VII-67
12, VII-299	West Virginia University
25, VII-561	463, VII-46
26, VII-413	543, VII-192
Vanderbilt University	Wisconsin, University of
256, VII-550	89, VII-143
296, VII-59	516, VII-356
Virginia, University of	664, VII-669
300, VII-237	1000, VII-497
348, VII-89	1045, VII-712
762, VII-318	1549, VII-734
1394, VII-697	Wyoming, University of
Virginia Polytechnic Institute	111, VII-113
303, VII-116	Yale University
672, VII-447	326, VII-240
Washington, State College of	351, VII-773
177, VII-229	548, VII-253
216, VII-323	574, VII-665
227, VII-206	1155, VII-499
	1222, VII-382
	1236, VII-337
	1453, VII-775

INDEX OF CONTRACTORS (Continued)

Note: The first number in each line is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Yerkes Observatory
140, VII-31
1003, VII-18

INDEX OF CHIEF INVESTIGATORS

(Note: The first number is the Proposal No., the second is the page no.)

Adamson, A. W. 403, VII-705	Beck, Clifford 689, VII-65	Brennan, J. N. 79, VII-506 1307, VII-767
Ahlfors, Lars B. 444, VII-352	Bender, Myron 590, VII-286	Brenner, J. 216, VII-323
Albert, A. A. 1194, VII-707	Benedict, W. S. 642, VII-52	Brenner, J. L. 1357, VII-338
Anderson, Carl M. 773, VII-171	Bigelow, L. A. 68, VII-270	Brewster, Ray Q. 82, VII-203
Anderson, R. B. 385, VII-165	Bijlaard, P. P. 486, VII-522	Brinkley, Stuart R., Jr. 757, VII-100
Argersinger, W. J., Jr. 84, VII-312	Blatt, A. H. 1179, VII-676	Broida, H. P. 712, VII-137
Arnold, J. R. 767, VII-41	Bloch, Ingram 296, VII-59	Brown, B. F. 202, VII-549
Ashkin, Julius 293, VII-57	Blomquist, R. F. 465, VII-250	Brown, Norman 180, VII-541
Audrieth, L. F. 763, VII-168 1245, VII-149	Bogdanoff, J. L. 365, VII-517	Brown, O. L. I. 131, VII-313
Bachman, Charles H. 174, VII-81	Boley, Forrest 808, VII-67	Brucker, W. H. 191, VII-557
Baenziger, N. C. 1058, VII-261	Bolz, R. E. 1082, VII-771	Buck, R. C. 516, VII-356
Baldwin, William M. 499, VII-567	Boyer, J. H. 87, VII-159	Bureau, Florent 944, VII-376
Ball, Leslie W. 1550, VII-728	Boyer, Joseph H. 948, VII-178	Burke, W. J. 12, VII-299
Barnes, R. G. 1509, VII-107	Boyle, A. J. 427, VII-281	Butler, George B. 380, VII-277
Bartlett, J. H. 485, VII-672	Brandt, W. W. 670, VII-687	Cameron, R. H. 246, VII-343
	Breckenridge, Robert G. 738, VII-494	

INDEX OF CHIEF INVESTIGATORS (Continued)

(Note: The first number is the Proposal No., the second is the page no.)

Campbell, G. W., Jr. 521, VII-191 1111, VII-682	Cramer, W. H. 158, VII-79	Deutsch, Martin 565, VII-39
Cannon, G. W. 735, VII-698	Cristol, Stanley J. 1009, VII-292	Dickey, Fred P. 675, VII-54
Chen, N. K. 644, VII-558	Crowell, Thomas I. 762, VII-318	Dieke, G. H. 488, VII-48
Chu, Ting Li 1558, VII-297	Culbertson, J. L. 227, VII-206	Djerassi, Carl 1258, VII-702
Churchill, Ruel V. 867, VII-368	Cunningham, G. 97, VII-161	Dodge, B. F. 574, VII-665
Glapp, Leallyn B. 10, VII-155	Cunningham, L. E. 426, VII-12	Donsker, M. 246, VII-343
Clark, R. A. 854, VII-427 1409, VII-435	Curtis, C. W. 187, VII-509	Douglas, Jesse 855, VII-331
Cleaves, H. E. 782, VII-579	Curtiss, John H. 1089, VII-724 1371A, VII-455 1371B, VII-387 1823, VII-723	Dow, W. G. 146, VII-468
Cleveland F. F. 115, VII-220	Danforth, W. E. 718, VII-660	Drucker, D. C. 1086, VII-756
Cohn, Harvey 640, VII-326	Davis, Martin 1333, VII-444	Dumond, Jesse W. M. 931, VII-68
Colbert, J. C. 23, VII-157	Davis, Robert B. 690, VII-361	Dunkelberger, T. H. 525, VII-685
Cole, Robert H. 1087, VII-692	Dawson, L. R. 341, VII-242	Dunlap, R. D. 283, VII-235
Conrad, A. G. 1155, VII-499	Day, M. M. 1476, VII-411	Durelli, A. J. 214, VII-511
Coughanour, L. W. 740, VII-124	DeGroff, Harold M. 760, VII-737	Dye, Henry A. 950, VII-333
Coulter, Lowell V. 751, VII-201		Early, H. C. 146, VII-468 317, VII-470

INDEX OF CHIEF INVESTIGATORS (Continued)

(Note: The first number is the Proposal No., the second is the page no.)

Eckert, E. R. G. 976, VII-480	Fassell, W. M., Jr. 25, VII-561	Frocht, M. M. 402, VII-518
Edelman, Seymour 737, VII-535	Fastie, William Q. 833, VII-76	Gaffney, Matthew 1106, VII-380
Edmison, Marvin T. 844, VII-174	Ferguson, A. L. 143, VII-145	Gardner, John H. 996, VII-70
Edmondson, F. K. 561, VII-22	Filler, Robert 1276, VII-182	Gerard, G. 231, VII-512
Edwards, Gerald 310, VII-301 1369, VII-310	Findley, W. N. 313, VII-514	Germann, F. E. E. 275, VII-233
Edwards, W. R., Jr. 455, VII-166	Fishel, W. P. 256, VII-550	Gibson, John A., Jr. 543, VII-192
Elsner, Melvin 868, VII-6	Fisk, H. G. 111, VII-113	Gilles, Paul W. 72, VII-185
Elliott, Joanne 925, VII-374	Flanders, Harley 1503, VII-721	Ginsburg, Nathan 175, VII-45
Elrod, H. G. 622, VII-475	Fledderman, R. G. 456, VII-489	Goldberg, J. E. 365, VII-517
Emmons, H. W. 355, VII-472	Fletcher, Harvey J. 1232, VII-761	Gordon, Paul 345, VII-552
Epstein, Benjamin 1101, VII-451	Fletcher, W. H. 562, VII-49	Gould, E. S. 836, VII-172
Ernst, P. J. 289, VII-3	Flood, Merrill M. 1529, VII-731	Graves, L. M. 860, VII-366
Evans, R. L. 246, VII-343	Fort, Tomlinson 166, VII-418 1238, VII-433	Greathouse, G. A. 262, VII-139
Evans, Robley D. 565, VII-39	Frank, Henry S. 525, VII-685	Gregor, H. P. 509, VII-190
Fanta, Paul E. 571, VII-284	Frankel, S. 408, VII-653	Gregory, N. W. 425, VII-187
Farnsworth, H. E. 479, VII-92	French, A. P. 1201, VII-651	Griswold, Ernest 695, VII-688
		Gross, Paul, Jr. 300, VII-237 1394, VII-697

INDEX OF CHIEF INVESTIGATORS (Continued)

(Note: The first number is the Proposal No., the second is the page no.)

Grosse, A. V. 916, VII-176	Harshbarger, Boyd 672, VII-447	Hoff, N. J. 999, VII-529
Grove, E. L. 658, VII-254	Hauser, C. R. 69, VII-272	Holt, M. L. 89, VII-143
Grunwald, E. 155, VII-226	Hawley, Newton S. 266, VII-395	Hornig, Donald F. 1087, VII-692
Gumbel, E. J. 744, VII-754	Healey, F. H. 457, VII-212	Howard, F. L. 712, VII-137
Gunder, Dwight F. 526, VII-524	Herasymenko, Polycarp 568, VII-571 1285, VII-777	Howe, Robert M. 631, VII-439
Gunton, Robert C. 463, VII-46	Hereford, F. L. 348, VII-89	Hu, Kuo Hao 384, VII-246
Gustin, W. S. 258, VII-347	Hermann, Rudolf 874, VII-531	Hu, L. W. 1288, VII-763
Hackerman, Norman 29, VII-141	Hexter, R. M. 967, VII-690	Hudson, George E. 679, VII-477
Hahn, Thomas M., Jr. 536, VII-63	Hiedemann, E. A. 270, VII-1	Huff, Gerald 168, VII-321
Haight, Gilbert P., Jr. 1081, VII-319	Hiltner, W. A. 140, VII-31	Hurty, W. C. 429, VII-520
Hales, Wayne B. 877, VII-495	Hine, Jack 446, VII-282	Hutchison, A. Witt 586, VII-195
Hall, James L. 543, VII-192	Hinman, George W. 376, VII-61	Jacchia, Luigi 328, VII-9
Hall, Lewis D. 396, VII-545	Hirschfelder, J. O. 664, VII-669	Jacobsmeier, V.P., S.J. 627, VII-153
Hanson, Howard G. 838, VII-647	Hlavaty, V. 154, VII-415	Jacobson, Nathan 1236, VII-337
Harrison, George R. 510, VII-37	Hoard, J. L. 378, VII-303	Jaumot, Frank E. 703, VII-98
Harrison, William B. 1164, VII-750	Hoelscher, H. E. 698, VII-121	Johnson, R. E. 1277, VII-696

INDEX OF CHIEF INVESTIGATORS (Continued)

(Note: The first number is the Proposal No., the second is the page no.)

Johnson, V. R. 924, VII-485	Kleinberg, Jacob 435, VII-189	Linford, Henry 447, VII-150
Johnson, Virgil R. 1568, VII-487	Knight, S. B. 312, VII-238	Lingafelter, E. C. 684, VII-683
Jonassen, H. B. 18, VII-219	Kolthoff, I. M. 602, VII-197	Lippincott, Ellis R. 846, VII-259
Kaplan, Irving 1194, VII-707	Kraus, Gerard 4, VII-111	Long, F. A. 378, VII-303
Kaslow, C. E. 225, VII-164	Krinsky, Albert 736, VII-493	Lonseth, A. T. 452, VII-437
Kassner, J. L. 658, VII-254	Kuczynski, G. C. 491, VII-547	Lord, R. C. 5, VII-217
Katz, Ernst 329, VII-73	Kuerti, G. 1082, VII-771	Lucas, H. J. 729, VII-287
Keirs, Russell J. 841, VII-680	Lane, Frank 1115, VII-441	Luther, H. A. 851, VII-425
Kerker, Milton 501, VII-214	Lee, Samuel H., Jr. 613, VII-674	Mackenzie, Scott 875, VII-291
Kezios, Stothe P. 940, VII-749	Leffler, J. E. 155, VII-226	Macon, Nathaniel 1278, VII-442
Kharasch, Norman 417, VII-279	Leighton, Walter 390, VII-349	Madow, W. G. 460, VII-445
King, A. J. 100, VII-163	Letsinger, Robert L. 828, VII-288	Majors, Harry, Jr. 1230, VII-759
King, Cecil V. 869, VII-153	Levedahl, W. J. 712, VII-137	Maloney, J. O. 117, VII-115
King, R. M. 366, VII-118	Levinstein, Henry 667, VII-658	Maltzman, Irving 450, VII-491
Kisslinger, Fred 629, VII-573	Lewis, Bernard 1515, VII-733	Mann, D. E. 781, VII-128
Klee, V. L. 1014, VII-717	Lieber, Paul 788, VII-527	Manning, L. A. 520, VII-14

INDEX OF CHIEF INVESTIGATORS (Continued)

(Note: The first number is the Proposal No., the second is the page no.)

Marin, Joseph 78, VII-503 1288, VII-763	Moore, Dwight G. 739, VII-123	Norris, C. B. 465, VII-250
Martus, J. A. 347, VII-244	Moore, G. A. 782, VII-579	Nowick, Arthur S. 351, VII-773 1453, VII-775
Mason, Charles 423, VII-34	Morawetz, Herbert 765, VII-308	Noyce, D. S. 852, VII-289
Masur, E. F. 570, VII-525	Morris, Kelso E. 340, VII-148	Noyes, Richard M. 615, VII-199
Mattice, H. C. 788, VII-527	Mostow, George D. 749, VII-404	Nyman, Carl J. 177, VII-229
McCullough, J. D. 399, VII-249	Muldawer, Leonard 287, VII-543	O'Brien, Brian 361, VII-74
McCuskey, S. W. 482, VII-13	Myers, Phillip S. 1000, VII-497	Ogg, Richard A., Jr. 1173, VII-694
McLeod, N. K. 1320, VII-463	Myers, P. S. 1549, VII-734	Olkin, Ingram 1599, VII-729
McNaughton, Robert 1445, VII-726	Naghdi, Paul M. 234, VII-752	Ollom, John F. 463, VII-46
Mehl, R. F. 400, VII-577	Nash, Ralph R. 1315, VII-560	Orchin, M. 385, VII-165
Milgram, A. N. 248, VII-346	Nash, William A. 1301, VII-765	Overberger, C. G. 533, VII-119
Millard, Ben 547, VII-216	Nassau, J. J. 482, VII-13	Owen, R. B. 548, VII-253
Millman, Jacob 1581, VII-751	Neyman, J. 1254, VII-453	Parham, William E. 64, VII-267
Mingins, Charles R. 771, VII-103	Nielsen, A. H. 562, VII-49	Paul, Gordon 888, VII-710
Moise, E. E. 410, VII-397	Nijenhuis, A. 943, VII-409	Peacock, Charles L. 920, VII-655
Montgomery, Deane 1239, VII-714	Nikodym, O. M. 619, VII-358	

INDEX OF CHIEF INVESTIGATORS (Continued)

(Note: The first number is the Proposal No., the second is the page no.)

Peck, R. E. 794, VII-131	Rickart, Charles 1222, VII-382	Schechter, Samuel 148, VII-341
Penico, Anthony J. 626, VII-325	Rigg, M. W. 205, VII-314	Scherer, P. C. 203, VII-116
Pepinsky, Ray 761, VII-101	Rightmire, B. G. 375, VII-743 665, VII-745 1142, VII-537	Schrieber, Kurt C. 1464, VII-704
Phillips, Ralph S. 715, VII-363 1362, VII-385	Roberts, Walter Orr 1050, VII-20	Schubert, W. M. 483, VII-316
Pierce, William A. 655, VII-399	Robertson, Harry S. 798, VII-55	Sears, P. G. 1454, VII-265
Pigford, R. L. 179, VII-565	Rosen, Joseph S. 508, VII-252	Selberg, Atle 1239, VII-714
Pollard, Harry 922, VII-372	Ross, S. 306, VII-208	Shaffer, B. W. 232, VII-501
Pound, G. Marshall 534, VII-569 1500, VII-778	Rubin, Bernard 742, VII-152	Shelton, J. Reid 884, VII-133
Quastler, Henry 1151, VII-533	Rubin, Sylvan 1466, VII-72	Shelton, George R. 741, VII-126
Rado, Tibor 514, VII-420	Runner, Mervin E. 592, VII-151	Sherburne, R. K. 776, VII-459
Ramirez, Fausto 1252, VII-700	Sachs, George 1556, VII-780	Sherwood, Thomas K. 887, VII-666
Read, T. A. 178B, VII-539	Saibel, Edward 1156, VII-746	Shull, C. G. 1623, VII-109
Reyerson, L. H. 723, VII-306	Samelson, Hans 720, VII-400	Simons, J. H. 158, VII-79
Reynolds, C. A. 72, VII-185	Sard, Arthur 716, VII-365	Sisler, H. H. 222, VII-231
Richardson, Frances M. 1562, VII-668	Sawyer, Raymond B. 151, VII-83	Smith, Frank C. 572, VII-4
		Smith, Fred 544, VII-663

INDEX OF CHIEF INVESTIGATORS (Continued)

(Note: The first number is the Proposal No., the second is the page no.)

Smith, Hilton A. 204, VII-204	Sujishi, Sei 817, VII-678	Trivich, Dan 269, VII-146
Smith, W. V. 308, VII-86 1509, VII-107	Suppes, Patrick 1053, VII-392	Trump, John G. 565, VII-39
Sogn, Leland T. 741, VII-126	Swanson, W. M. 1082, VII-771	Turittin, H. L. 874, VII-531
Sokolnikoff, I. S. 474, VII-419	Swenson, C. A. 539, VII-27	Uyehara, O. A. 1000, VII-497 1549, VII-734
Spence, R. D. 573, VII-94	Szmant, H. H. 367, VII-275 1464, VII-704	Van Biesbroeck, G. 1003, VII-18
Spurr, Robert A. 669, VII-255	Taam, Choy-Tak 1302, VII-384	Vaughan, Philip 388, VII-248
Stamm, A. J. 465, VII-250	Tarski, A. 708, VII-389	Villard, O. G. 520, VII-14
Stanfield, James A. 1107, VII-294	Taylor, C. F. 1019, VII-461 1553, VII-735	Vold, Marjorie 395, VII-210 1237, VII-263
Stebbins, Dean W. 165, VII-85	Thomas, T. Y. 538, VII-422 1119, VII-431	Vollrath, R. E. 377, VII-33
Stinchcomb, T. G. 316, VII-23	Thorne, C. J. 26, VII-413	Volterra, Enrico G. 1502, VII-769
Stoll, Robert R. 730, VII-329	Thrall, R. M. 1040, VII-335	Wagner, Carl 779, VII-575
Stone, Marshall 910, VII-370	Thurston, George B. 1336, VII-739	Wall, L. A. 781, VII-128
Stoner, R. G. 71, VII-465	Ticho, H. K. 445, VII-24	Wang, C. K. 1213, VII-530
Storch, H. H. 385, VII-165	Tombaugh, C. W. 1072, VII-643	Wang, C. T. 1115, VII-441
Straub, L. G. 759, VII-479	Trigger, K. J. 507, VII-483	Ward, James A. 497, VII-354
Struve, Otto 363, VII-10		

INDEX OF CHIEF INVESTIGATORS (Continued)

(Note: The first number is the Proposal No., the second is the page no.)

Waterfall, Wallace 1250, VII-43	Yih, C. S. 1364, VII-741
Weatherly, T. L. 1016, VII-644	Young, L. C. 1045, VII-712
Weir, Alexander, Jr. 304, VII-457	Zariski, Oscar 885, VII-406
Weissler, G. L. 392, VII-656	Zeiss, Harold H. 326, VII-240
Weissmann, S. 688, VII-554	Zettlemoyer, A. C. 457, VII-212
Wells, Charles P. 1013, VII-649	Ziomek, Joseph S. 842, VII-257
West, C. D. 1322, VII-105	
White, Frederick E. 674, VII-646	
Wiberg, K. B. 483, VII-316	
Wilder, Pelham, Jr. 67, VII-311	
Wilder, R. L. 747, VII-402	
Williams, J. Q. 1016, VII-644	
Wolfgang, Richard 1277, VII-696	
Wood, Frank B. 492, VII-36	
Wylie, C. C. 587, VII-16	
Wynberg, Hans 1218, VII-296	

SUBJECT INDEX

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Abelian Groups 855, VII-331
 Abelian Integrals 444, VII-352
 Abelian Subalgebras 950, VII-333
 Abelian Varieties 1239, VII-714
 Absorption Spectra 658, VII-254
 Accelerators
 SEE Particle Accelerators
 Accelerometers
 Applications 737, VII-535
 Accommodation Coefficients 794, VII-131
 Acetic Acid 586, VII-195
 Acetic Anhydride 155, VII-226; 586, VII-195
 Acetone
 Diffusion 378, VII-303
 Acetonitrile 592, VII-151; 695, VII-688
 Acetophenone 841, VII-680; 852, VII-289
 Acetyl Fluoride 367, VII-275
 Acetylene
 Combustion 776, VII-459
 Spectra 562, VII-49
 Acetylene Flame 175, VII-45; 642, VII-52
 Acetylenes 115, VII-220
 Acoustic Birefringence 270, VII-1
 Acylation 367, VII-275; 735, VII-698
 Adhesion 465, VII-250
 Adhesives 465, VII-250
 Adiabatic Reactions 664, VII-669
 Adipic Acid 204, VII-204
 Adjustable-Speed Drive 1155, VII-499
 Admissibility 460, VII-445
 Aerosols 501, VII-214
 Air
 Heat Conductivity 794, VII-131
 Airfoils
 Mathematical Analysis 925, VII-374
 Alcohols 1087, VII-692
 Synthesis 69, VII-272
 Aldol Condensation 852, VII-289
 Aldoximes 69, VII-272
 Algebra
 Theory 640, VII-236; 708, VII-389; 1040, VII-335; 1239, VII-714
 See also Banach Algebras
 Cartan Subalgebras
 Commutative Algebra
 Group Algebra
 Jordan Algebras
 Involutorial Algebras
 Linear Algebra
 Matrix Algebra
 Operator Algebra
 Vector Algebras

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Algebraic Functions 885, VII-406
 Algebraic Geometry 885, VII-406
 Algebraic Isomorphisms 950, VII-333
 Algebras
 Structure 626, VII-325; 1040, VII-335
 Alicyclic Compounds 735, VII-698
 Alicyclic Azides 87, VII-159; 948, VII-178
 Aliphatic Alcohols 1087, VII-692
 Alkali Halides 341, VII-242; 1087, VII-692
 Luminescence 384, VII-246
 Alkali Superoxides 435, VII-189
 Alkaline Earth Metals
 Peroxides 97, VII-161; 100, VII-163
 Alkaline Earth Metals
 Superoxides 97, VII-161
 Alkanesulfonates 684, VII-683
 Alkyl Azides 948, VII-178
 Alkyl Halides 1087, VII-692
 Reactions 828, VII-288
 Alkyl Nitrites 1173, VII-694
 Alkyl Sulfates 684, VII-683
 Alkylation 69, VII-272; 590, VII-286
 Alkynes 417, VII-279
 Allene 5, VII-217
 Spectra 562, VII-49
 Alloys
 Diffusion 703, VII-98
 Elasticity 178B, VII-539
 Heat Treatment 629, VII-573
 Internal Friction 178B, VII-539
 Ordering 351, VII-773; 491, VII-547; 568, VII-571; 1285, VII-777
 Oxidation 499, VII-567
 Phase Changes 703, VII-98
 Scaling 499, VII-567
 Transformations 287, VII-543
 Thermoelectricity 779, VII-575
 Allylamine 765, VII-308
 Allylic Esters 483, VII-316
 Aluminum 178B, VII-539
 Heat of Absorption 204, VII-204
 Internal Friction 79, VII-506
 Polyionization 688, VII-554
 Structure 644, VII-558
 Subgrain Structure 688, VII-554
 Ultraviolet Absorption 392, VII-656
 Aluminum Alloys 345, VII-552; 1453, VII-775; 1500, VII-778
 Anisotropy 313, VII-514
 Diffusion 703, VII-98

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Aluminum Alloys (continued)
 Internal Friction 79, VII-506
 Properties 738, VII-494; 1288, VII-763
 Stress Analysis 78, VII-503; 231, VII-512; 234, VII-752; 1288, VII-763
 Aluminum Catalysts 1107, VII-294
 Aluminum Compounds
 Structure 1509, VII-107
 Aluminum Films 833, VII-76
 Aluminum Halides 425, VII-187
 Aluminum Isotopes
 Decay 808, VII-67
 Aluminum Oxide 833, VII-76
 Aluminum Powder
 Combustion 916, VII-176
 Amides
 Dielectric Constants 341, VII-242
 Dipole Moments 341, VII-242
 Hydrolysis 67, VII-311
 Structure 684, VII-683
 Amines 509, VII-190; 762, VII-318
 Complex Compounds 177, VII-229
 Fluorination 68, VII-270
 Properties 380, VII-277
 Reactions 69, VII-272; 380, VII-277
 Synthesis 729, VII-287
 Amino Acids 525, VII-685; 1454, VII-265
 Aminotoluenes 948, VII-178
 Ammonia 574, VII-665; 1173, VII-694; 1245, VII-179
 Oxidation 763, VII-168
 Reactions 751, VII-201
 Ammonium Bromide
 Solubility 695, VII-688
 Ammonium Halides 341, VII-242
 Ammonium Salts 155, VII-226; 1173, VII-694
 Analysis of Variance 672, VII-447
 See also Multivariate Analysis
 Analytic Functions 497, VII-354; 516, VII-356; 888, VII-710
 Analytic Structures 1503, VII-721
 Anelasticity 1453, VII-775
 Anemometers 759, VII-479; 760, VII-737; 877, VII-495
 Anilinium 155, VII-226
 Anisaldehyde 852, VII-289
 Anisotropy 313, VII-514
 Anodes 485, VII-672
 Anodic Films 485, VII-672
 Anolytes 485, VII-672
 Antennas 1013, VII-649

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Antimony
 Quadrupole Moment Spectra 308, VII-86
 Antimony Alloys
 Properties 738, VII-494
 Thermoelectricity 779, VII-575
 Antimony Isotopes
 Decay 808, VII-67; 920, VII-655
 Antioxidants 884, VII-133
 Antiozonants 884, VII-133
 Appell Polynomials 516, VII-356
 Applied Mathematics Seminar 1823, VII-723
 Applied Mechanics Congress 1310, VII-534
 Approximation 716, VII-365; 922, VII-372
 Argon
 Heat Conductivity 794, VII-131
 Properties 539, VII-27
 Spectra 488, VII-48
 Aromatic Compounds
 Spectra 658, VII-254
 Aryl Chlorides 69, VII-272
 Arsenic
 Analytical Methods 72, VII-185
 Quadrupole Moment Spectra 308, VII-86
 α -Arylalkyl Chlorides 69, VII-272
 Asteroids 561, VII-22
 Astronomy
 Instrumentation 1072, VII-643
 Atmosphere
 Density 328, VII-9
 Ionization 520, VII-14
 Properties 587, VII-16
 Temperature 328, VII-9
 Attapulgit 306, VII-208
 Austenite 202, VII-549; 534, VII-569; 629, VII-573; 1500, VII-778
 Automation 1529, VII-731
 Automorphisms 1040, VII-335
 Azides
 Structure 761, VII-101
 Azides (Organic) 87, VII-159; 613, VII-674; 948, VII-178
 Azidocarbonyl Compounds 87, VII-159; 948, VII-178
 Azines 533, VII-119
 Azo Compounds 533, VII-119
 Azulenes
 Synthesis 417, VII-279

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Baecklund Transformations 956, VII-378
 Banach Algebras 715, VII-363; 1222, VII-382; 1239, VII-714
 Banach Space Methods 1045, VII-712
 Banach Spaces 860, VII-366; 1014, VII-717
 Barium Chloride 695, VII-688
 Barium Isotopes
 Decay 920, VII-655
 Barium Peroxide 97, VII-161; 100, VII-163
 Barium Sulfate 547, VII-216; 602, VII-197
 Barium Titanate 741, VII-126; 771, VII-103
 Bars
 Stresses 1307, VII-767; 1502, VII-769
 Vibrations 1502, VII-769
 Base Drag 456, VII-489
 Batemann's Method 452, VII-437
 Battacharrya Bounds 460, VII-445
 Batteries 742, VII-152
 Beams
 Stresses 26, VII-413; 570, VII-525; 1086, VII-756; 1213, VII-530
 Vibrations 631, VII-439
 Bearings 1156, VII-746
 Benzaldehyde 762, VII-318; 841, VII-680
 Condensation 852, VII-289
 Benzamide
 Hydrolysis 67, VII-311
 Benzene 204, VII-204
 Diffusion 378, VII-303
 Spectra 658, VII-254
 Synthesis 117, VII-115
 Benzene Derivatives 308, VII-86
 Spectra 658, VII-254
 Benzenesulfonazides 613, VII-674
 Benzofuroxanes 948, VII-178
 Benzohydroxamic Acid 670, VII-687
 Benzoic Acid
 Halogenation 427, VII-281
 Benzophenone 841, VII-680
 Hydrogenation 1558, VII-297
 Benzoylation 69, VII-272; 367, VII-275
 Benzyltrimethylammonium Iodide 69, VII-272
 Bernstein Approximation Problem 922, VII-372
 Beryllium
 Oxidation 1081, VII-319
 Beryllium Isotopes 767, VII-41
 Decay 931, VII-68
 Beryllium Alloys 1500, VII-778
 Bessel Functions 516, VII-356
 Beta Brass
 SEE Brass

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Beta Radiation 376, VII-61
 Betaines 1276, VII-182
 Biaxial Stress Analysis 78, VII-503; 231, VII-512
 Bicyclic Groups 855, VII-331
 Bicyclo Compounds 446, VII-282
 Bifluorides
 Structure 761, VII-101
 Biphenyls 23, VII-157
 Biradical Catalysts 533, VII-119
 Birefringence 270, VII-1
 See also Acoustic Birefringence
 Bismuth
 Interdiffusion in Lead 396, VII-545
 Bismuth Alloys 151, VII-83
 Thermoelectricity 779, VII-575
 Bismuth Isotopes
 Decay 931, VII-68
 Bismuth Trioxide
 Electrolysis 340, VII-148
 Blacks
 SEE Carbon Blacks
 Gastex Blacks
 Blasius Function 355, VII-472
 Blunt-Based Bodies
 Drag 456, VII-489
 Boiling Heat Transfer 1164, VII-750
 Bond Dissociation 846, VII-259
 Boolean Lattices 619, VII-358
 Boring 232, VII-501
 Boron 536, VII-63
 Crystal Growth 627, VII-96
 Properties 627, VII-96
 Resistivity 627, VII-96
 Structure 627, VII-96
 Boron Compounds (Organic) 781, VII-128; 817, VII-678; 1111, VII-682
 Boron Fluoride 69, VII-272
 Boron Hydrides 521, VII-191; 1111, VII-682
 Boron Steel 1500, VII-778
 Boron Trifluoride
 Spectra 562, VII-49
 Boron Trifluoride Etherate 543, VII-192
 Boundary Layer Problems 1082, VII-771
 Boundary Layers 622, VII-475
 Boundary Value Problems 26, VII-413; 148, VII-341; 690, VII-361;
 867, VII-368; 944, VII-376; 1238, VII-433;
 1254, VII-453; 1362, VII-385
 Bounds
 SEE Battacharrya Bounds

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Boxer-Thaler Solution 1581, VII-751
Branch Points 860, VII-366
Brass
 Corrosion 179, VII-565
 Properties 180, VII-541
 Stress Analysis 187, VII-509
 Ultrasonic Propagation 79, VII-506
Brightening Agents
 SEE Plating Brightners
Brittle Materials
 Stresses 214, VII-511
Bromination 367, VII-275
Bromine 308, VII-86
Bromine Isotopes
 Decay 920, VII-655
4-Bromobenzenesulfonamide 613, VII-674
Bromoquinolines 312, VII-238
Brownian Motion 1371A, VII-455
Bundles (Mathematics) 720, VII-400
Butadiene
 Reactions 574, VII-665
Butane
 Combustion 776, VII-459
t-Butanol 868, VII-6
Butenolides 1252, VII-700
s-Butyl Bromide 155, VII-226
Butyl Hypochlorite 763, VII-168
t-Butyl Hypochlorite 1245, VII-179
Butylamines 762, VII-318; 775, VII-171
Butyric Acids
 Chelation 347, VII-244
Butyrolactones 735, VII-698

Cadmium
 Corrosion Prevention 869, VII-153
Cadmium Alloys 287, VII-543; 568, VII-571
 Thermoelectricity 779, VII-575
Cadmium Complexes 347, VII-244
Cadmium Compounds 174, VII-81
Cadmium Crystals
 Growth 400, VII-577
Cadmium Isotopes
 Decay 376, VII-61
Calcite
 Spectra 967, VII-690
Calcium Hydroxide
 Spectra 967, VII-690

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Calcium Octanesulfonate 684, VII-683
Calcium Peroxide 97, VII-161; 100, VII-163
Calcium Titanate 111, VII-113; 740, VII-124
Calculus
 SEE Operational Calculus
 Sentential Calculus
Calculus of Variations 1045, VII-712; 1371B, VII-387
Calorimeters 131, VII-313; 227, VII-206; 1500, VII-778
Camphor 887, VII-666
Cantor Processes 619, VII-358
Capacitors 736, VII-493
Carbide Tools
 Wear 507, VII-483
Carbon
 Activity in Steel 629, VII-573
 Diffusion in Iron 202, VII-549
Carbon Blacks
 Properties 723, VII-306
 Surface Area 4, VII-111
Carbon Monoxide 574, VII-665; 916, VII-176
Carbon Monoxide Flame 642, VII-52
Carbon Tetrachloride 669, VII-255; 674, VII-646
Carbonyl Compounds 762, VII-318; 1277, VII-696
Carboxylic Acids 367, VII-275; 525, VII-685; 1218, VII-296
 Spectra 669, VII-255
Cardinal Numbers 708, VII-389
Carlson's Theorem 516, VII-356
Cartan Subalgebras 626, VII-325
Cartan-Kahler Theory 1503, VII-721
Castolite 402, VII-518
Catalyst Tubes 698, VII-121
Catalysts 533, VII-119; 698, VII-121
 See also Biradical Catalysts
Catalytic Reduction 1107, VII-294
Cathodes
 Polarization 143, VII-145; 447, VII-150
Cauchy Problem 715, VII-363; 910, VII-370; 944, VII-376
Cauchy Process 925, VII-374
Celestial Mechanics 426, VII-12; 1003, VII-18
Cellulose 262, VII-139
 Derivatives 262, VII-139; 544, VII-663
 Structure 544, VII-663
 Synthesis 544, VII-663
Cellulose Acetate 303, VII-116; 378, VII-303
Cellulose Nitrate 303, VII-116; 378, VII-303
Cementite 534, VII-569
Ceramic Coatings 739, VII-123
Ceramic Combustion Chambers 304, VII-457

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Ceramic Dielectrics 740, VII-124
 Ceramics
 Piezoelectric Properties 741, VII-126
 Properties 771, VII-103
 Cesium
 Properties 539, VII-27
 Cesium Isotopes
 Decay 920, VII-655
 Chains (Mathematics) 619, VII-358
 See also Markov Chains
 Chalcane
 Synthesis 852, VII-289
 Chelate Complexes 670, VII-687
 Chelate Resins 509, VII-190
 Chelation 347, VII-244
 Chemical Analysis
 Methods 72, VII-185; 543, VII-192; 841, VII-680
 Chip Formation 232, VII-501
 Chloramines 1245, VII-179
 Properties 763, VII-168
 Chloranil 427, VII-281
 Chlorine 308, VII-86
 Chlorine Compounds
 Quadrupole Resonance 1016, VII-644
 Chlorine Trifluoride 115, VII-220
 Chlorides
 Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance 1509, VII-107
 p-Chlorobenzaldehyde 852, VII-289
 Chlorobenzenes 1509, VII-107
 Chlorocarbonates 483, VII-316
 Chloroform 5, VII-217; 10, VII-155
 Chloroformates
 Rearrangement Reactions 483, VII-316
 p-Chlorophenol 12, VII-299
 Chloroquinolines 312, VII-238
 Chlorosuccinimide 1245, VII-179
 Chlorotrifluoroethylene 781, VII-128
 β -Chlorovinyl 2,4-Dinitrophenyl Sulfides 417, VII-279
 Chromate Esters
 Decomposition 326, VII-240
 Chromatography
 Applications 12, VII-299; 69, VII-272; 205, VII-314; 455, VII-166
 Chromic Acid 326, VII-240
 Chromic Anhydride 326, VII-240
 Chromium 794, VII-131
 Meson Capture 445, VII-24
 Properties 227, VII-206

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Chromium Alloys 499, VII-567; 629, VII-573
 Electroplating 89, VII-143
 Chromium Compounds
 Structure 388, VII-248
 Chromium Compounds (Organic) 326, VII-240
 Chromium Halides 425, VII-187
 Chromium Steel 1500, VII-778
 Claisen Reaction 69, VII-272
 Classification Problem 460, VII-445
 Clifford-Klein Spaces 720, VII-400
 Cloud Chambers 377, VII-33
 Coatings, Protective 366, VII-118
 Cobalt
 Complex Ions 18, VII-219
 Ferromagnetism 573, VII-94
 Cobalt Alloys 499, VII-567; 534, VII-569
 Diffusion 703, VII-98
 Electroplating 89, VII-143
 Cobalt Catalysts 204, VII-204
 Cobalt Carbonyl 1277, VII-696
 Coding
 SEE Computer Coding
 Cold Working 351, VII-773
 Collineations 943, VII-409
 Colloids 501, VII-214; 664, VII-669
 Packing 395, VII-210
 Structure 1237, VII-263
 Color Vision 844, VII-174
 Columbium
 Oxidation 25, VII-561
 Combustion 712, VII-137; 776, VII-459
 Boundary Layer 355, VII-472
 Combustion Chambers 304, VII-457; 1515, VII-733
 Pressure 1019, VII-461
 Temperature 1019, VII-461; 1320, VII-463; 1553, VII-735
 Combustion Symposium 1204, VII-462; 1515, VII-733
 Combustion Tunnels 355, VII-472
 Comets 426, VII-12
 Observations 1003, VII-18
 Commutative Algebra 497, VII-354; 885, VII-406; 1040, VII-335;
 1194, VII-707; 1222, VII-382
 Complex Compounds 155, VII-226
 Compressible Flow 622, VII-475; 679, VII-477
 Compression Temperature
 Measurement 1000, VII-497
 Compressor Blades
 Flutter 1115, VII-441
 Computer Effect 348, VII-89

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Computer Coding 640, VII-326; 1333, VII-444; 1445, VII-726
 Computer Programming 684, VII-683; 1278, VII-442; 1333, VII-444
 Computers 1445, VII-726
 Applications 631, VII-439
 Condensation Reactions 69, VII-272; 852, VII-289
 Conductometric Analysis 543, VII-192
 Confidence Intervals 460, VII-445; 672, VII-447
 Conformal Mapping 258, VII-347; 888, VII-710; 1371B, VII-387
 Conjugate Gradients 1089, VII-724
 Contacts
 Welding to Crystals 718, VII-660
 Continued Fractions 452, VII-437; 888, VII-710; 1278, VII-442
 Convergents 1278, VII-442
 Convex Cones 1014, VII-717
 Convex Functions 1014, VII-717
 Convex Polyhedra 1014, VII-717
 Convex Sets 1014, VII-717
 Convolution Transforms 922, VII-372
 Copper 178B, VII-539
 Chelate Compounds 509, VII-190; 765, VII-308
 Complex Compounds 347, VII-244
 Corrosion 179, VII-565
 Determination 543, VII-192
 Heat of Adsorption 204, VII-204
 Heat Transfer 1164, VII-750
 Nuclear Energy Levels 536, VII-63
 Oxidation 25, VII-561; 366, VII-118
 Photoelectric Yield 392, VII-656
 Ultrasonic Propagation 79, VII-506
 Wear 375, VII-743
 Copper Alloys 499, VII-567; 1453, VII-775; 1500, VII-778
 Diffusion 703, VII-98
 Ordering 491, VII-547
 Vacancies 351, VII-773
 Copper Anodes 485, VII-672
 Copper Catalysts 1107, VII-294
 Copper Films
 Structure 479, VII-92
 Copper Oxide 833, VII-76
 Copper Phthalocyanine 306, VII-208
 Copper Selenide 779, VII-575
 Copper Sulfide 779, VII-575
 Copperplating 269, VII-146
 Corona
 SEE Solar Corona
 Correlation Coefficients 1599, VII-729
 Corrosion 29, VII-141
 Corrosion Inhibitors 869, VII-153

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Cosmic Ray Research 316, VII-23; 445, VII-24
 Couette Flow 760, VII-737
 Coulometric Analysis 72, VII-185
 Covariants 168, VII-321
 Critical Point Theory 747, VII-402
 Cryogenics 539, VII-27
 Cryostats 539, VII-27
 Crystalline Aggregates
 Orientation 395, VII-210
 Crystals
 Orientation 967, VII-690
 Spectra 967, VII-690
 Structure 688, VII-554
 Structure Calculations 399, VII-249; 684, VII-683
 X-Ray Analysis 761, VII-101
 Cubic Algorithm 640, VII-326
 Cumyl Hydroperoxide
 Reactions 1009, VII-292
 Cutting Tools
 Wear 507, VII-483
 Cyanates
 Structure 761, VII-101
 Cyanogen 916, VII-176
 Cyanogen Halides
 Spectra 562, VII-49
 Cycles (Mathematics) 885, VII-406
 Cyclic Reactions 483, VII-316
 Cyclization
 Catalysts 117, VII-115
 Cycloalkenes 446, VII-282
 Cyclobutane 5, VII-217
 Cyclobutene 5, VII-217
 Cyclohexene 417, VII-279
 Cyclooctatetraene 5, VII-217
 Cylinders
 Aerodynamic Characteristics 940, VII-749; 1082, VII-771
 Buckling 1301, VII-765
 Heat Transfer 940, VII-749
 Stresses 78, VII-503; 234, VII-752; 854, VII-427; 999, VII-529;
 1307, VII-767
 Cyclopropanes
 Conjugation 735, VII-698

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Damping 79, VII-506
 Decanamide 684, VII-683
 Decision Problem 460, VII-445; 1053, VII-392; 1333, VII-444
 See also Mathematical Decision Problem
 Deformation 187, VII-509; 234, VII-752; 474, VII-419; 1409, VII-435
 See also Elastic Deformation
 Dehalogenation Reactions 12, VII-299
 Density
 Discontinuities 1254, VII-453
 Derivatives 888, VII-710
 Desarguesian Planes 655, VII-399
 Design of Experiments
 See Experiments - Design
 Desulfurization Reactions 1218, VII-296; 1258, VII-702
 Determinants
 Bounds 1357, VII-338
 Detonation 423, VII-34; 916, VII-176
 Deuterated Hydrocarbons 5, VII-217; 115, VII-220
 Deuterium
 Properties 539, VII-27
 Deuterium Halides 1087, VII-692
 Deuteroacetylene
 Spectra 562, VII-49
 Deuteroallene
 Spectra 562, VII-49
 Deuterons
 Photodisintegration 348, VII-89
 Dextrin
 Applications 269, VII-146
 Diabatic Flow 760, VII-737
 Diacetylene 115, VII-220
 Diatomic Molecules
 Dissociation 846, VII-259
 Diazomethane 562, VII-49
 Diazonium Salts 1276, VII-182
 Diborane 817, VII-678
 p-Dibromobenzene
 Polymerization 1369, VII-310
 Dichloroethane 463, VII-46
 Dicycloalkanes 82, VII-203
 Dielectric Cells 1087, VII-692
 Dielectric Constants
 Measurement 543, VII-192
 Dielectrics 740, VII-124; 1087, VII-692
 Diels-Alder Reaction 446, VII-282
 Difference Equations 166, VII-418; 1238, VII-433
 Difference Structures 1053, VII-392

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Differential Equations 246, VII-343; 390, VII-349; 514, VII-420;
 516, VII-356; 622, VII-475; 631, VII-439;
 860, VII-366; 888, VII-710; 956, VII-378;
 1302, VII-348; 1371A, VII-455; 1409, VII-435;
 1503, VII-721
 Differential Geometry 943, VII-409
 Differential Operators 516, VII-356; 925, VII-374; 1106, VII-380
 Differentials 444, VII-352
 Diffraction Patterns 270, VII-1; 684, VII-683
 Diffusion 1239, VII-714; 1562, VII-668
 Diffusion Coefficients 378, VII-303; 664, VII-669
 Difluorobenzene 781, VII-128
 Digital Computers 1333, VII-444
 Applications 399, VII-249
 Diiodoethylene 115, VII-220
 Diisobutylene 1320, VII-463
 Dimethyl Glyoxime 543, VII-192
 Dimethyldiacetylene 115, VII-220
 Dimethylethylenimine 729, VII-287
 Dimethylphosphine 817, VII-678
 Dimethylphosphinoborane 781, VII-128
 Dimethyltriacyetylene 115, VII-220
 2,4-Dinitrobenzenesulfonyl Chloride 417, VII-279
 Dinitrogen Pentoxide 222, VII-231
 1,4-Dioxane 222, VII-231
 1,3-Dioxolane 222, VII-231
 Diphenylacetylene 417, VII-279
 Diphenylalkanes 82, VII-203
 Dipolar Ions 1454, VII-265
 Dirichlet Problem 1371A, VII-455
 Discharge Tubes 798, VII-55
 Discriminants 640, VII-326
 Dislocations 365, VII-517
 Disodium Versenate 543, VII-192
 Displacement Reactions 69, VII-272
 Distribution 1239, VII-714
 See also Hypergeometric Distribution
 Normal Distribution
 Rectangular Distribution
 Distributive Lattices 619, VII-358
 Dithiadienes 64, VII-267
 Divergent Integrals 944, VII-376
 Domains 885, VII-406
 Drive
 SEE Adjustable-Speed Drive
 Dropping Mercury Electrode 592, VII-151
 Dynkin's Theorem 1239, VII-714

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Eigenfunction Expansions 925, VII-374
 Eigenvalue Problems 888, VII-710; 1089, VII-724
 Eigenvalues 1371B, VII-387
 Eisenstein Series 640, VII-326
 Elastic Deformation 538, VII-422
 Elasticity 79, VII-506; 474, VII-419; 570, VII-525; 1119, VII-431;
 1371B, VII-387
 Mathematical Analysis 497, VII-354
 Electric Arcs 317, VII-470
 Electric Generators
 Design 1155, VII-499
 Electric Motors
 Design 1155, VII-499
 Electric Spark Discharges 317, VII-470
 Electrical Conductivity 151, VII-83
 Electrical Discharges 146, VII-468
 Electrical Resistivity
 Measurement 491, VII-547
 Electrode Reactions 143, VII-145
 Electrodes 485, VII-672
 Electrolysis 340, VII-148
 Effects of Ultrasonics 143, VII-145
 Electrolytes 485, VII-672; 525, VII-685
 Activity Coefficients 155, VII-226
 Compressibility 548, VII-253
 Diffusion 403, VII-705
 Properties 695, VII-688
 Electromagnetic Waves
 Refraction 851, VII-425
 Electron Diffraction Analysis 479, VII-92
 Electron Exchange 158, VII-79
 Electrons
 Emission 392, VII-656
 Scattering 408, VII-653
 Electroplating 89, VII-143; 447, VII-150
 Brightness 269, VII-146
 Electropolishing 485, VII-672
 Elements
 SEE Idempotent Elements
 Elimination Reactions 69, VII-272; 828, VII-288
 Ellipsoids 1014, VII-717
 Elliptic Equations 910, VII-370
 Elliptic Partial Differential Equations 390, VII-349; 690, VII-361
 Emission Spectra 642, VII-52
 Endurance Limit
 Estimation 744, VII-754
 Engle Condition 1239, VII-714
 Equations of State 664, VII-669

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Error
 SEE Truncation Error
 Error Estimates 1278, VII-442
 Esters
 Rearrangement Reactions 483, VII-316
 Estimation 460, VII-455; 1101, VII-451; 1254, VII-453; 1599, VII-729
 Ethane
 Combustion 776, VII-459
 Ethanes 115, VII-220
 Ethanol 155, VII-226; 574, VII-665; 868, VII-6
 Adsorption 457, VII-212
 Ethers
 Reactions 828, VII-288
 Ethyl Acetate
 Properties 674, VII-646
 Ethyl Cellulose 303, VII-116
 Ethyl Chloroformate 1016, VII-644
 Ethyl Ether 574, VII-665
 Ethyl Isobutyrate 69, VII-272
 Ethyl Isocyanide
 Fluorination 68, VII-270
 Ethyl- α -Propionylpropionate 875, VII-291
 Ethyl Trichloroacetate 1016, VII-644
 Ethylbenzene
 Spectra 658, VII-254
 Ethylene 574, VII-665
 Combustion 776, VII-459
 Ethylenediaminetetraacetic Acid 543, VII-192
 Ethylenimines 10, VII-155
 Fluorination 68, VII-270
 Eutectoid Transformations 1500, VII-778
 Evaporation 887, VII-666
 Existence Theorem 1106, VII-380
 Expansion Joints 854, VII-427; 1409, VII-435
 Expansion Theorems 516, VII-356
 Expansions
 SEE Eigenfunction Expansions
 Polynomial Expansions
 Explosions
 Photography 361, VII-74
 Explosives 916, VII-176
 Combustion 1515, VII-733
 Stabilization 761, VII-101
 Exponential Functions 1278, VII-442
 Extremal Functions 444, VII-352
 Extreme Points 1014, VII-717

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Failure
 Mathematical Analysis 1550, VII-728
 Failure of Materials 214, VII-511; 744, VII-754; 1101, VII-451
 Faisceaux (Mathematics) 1106, VII-380
 Fano's Configuration 655, VII-399
 Fatigue of Materials 744, VII-754
 Fatigue Failure 313, VII-514
 Fatigue Testing Machines 313, VII-514
 Fatigue Tests 1101, VII-451
 Fatty Acids
 Synthesis 1218, VII-296
 Ferrite 202, VII-549; 534, VII-569
 Fracture 191, VII-557
 Ferrocene 836, VII-172
 Ferrocene Derivatives 836, VII-172
 Ferromagnetism 573, VII-94
 Fiber Bundles (Mathematics) 266, VII-395
 Filters
 SEE Optical Filters
 Finite Groups 855, VII-331
 First Order Equations 956, VII-378
 Fixation
 SEE Target Fixation
 Flame Kernels
 Growth 776, VII-459
 Flames 1515, VII-733
 Dimensions 355, VII-472
 Photochemical Effects 304, VII-457
 Propagation 712, VII-137
 Radiation 304, VII-457
 Spectra 175, VII-45; 304, VII-457; 642, VII-52
 Stability 355, VII-472
 Temperature 175, VII-45
 Velocity 355, VII-472
 Flanges
 Stresses 486, VII-522
 Flow
 SEE Compressible Flow
 Couette Flow
 Diabatic Flow
 Fluid Flow
 Heat Flow
 Isentropic Flow
 Knudsen Flow
 Laminar Flow
 Poiseuille Flow
 Shear Flow
 Steady State Flow

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Flow (continued)
 Stratified Flow
 Subsonic Flow
 Supersonic Flow
 Transient State Flow
 Turbulent Flow
 Vortex Flow
 Fluid Dynamics 1823, VII-723
 Fluid Flow 154, VII-415; 538, VII-422; 760, VII-737; 892, VII-429;
 956, VII-378; 1336, VII-739
 Fluid Mechanics 1119, VII-431
 Fluids
 Properties 1119, VII-431
 Fluorescence 275, VII-233; 384, VII-246
 Quenching 838, VII-647
 Fluorination 68, VII-270
 Fluorine 916, VII-176
 Fluorine Compounds (Organic) 283, VII-235
 Fluoropyridine 115, VII-220
 Fluorosilanes 1464, VII-704
 Fluorotrichloromethane 115, VII-220
 Flutter
 Calculations 1115, VII-441
 Forced Vibrations 1371B, VII-387
 Formaldehyde 12, VII-299; 916, VII-176
 Reactions 380, VII-277
 Formate Esters 483, VII-316
 Foundations (Mathematics) 708, VII-389
 Fourier Analysis 1239, VII-714
 Fourier Integral Formula 867, VII-368
 Fourier Transforms 922, VII-372
 Fourth Order Equations 690, VII-361
 Fractions
 SEE Continued Fractions
 Fracture 187, VII-509
 Frameworks
 Stresses 570, VII-525
 Fredholm Equation 452, VII-437
 Fretting 375, VII-743; 1142, VII-537
 Friction 375, VII-743; 457, VII-212; 665, VII-745; 924, VII-485;
 1568, VII-487
 Friedel-Crafts Reaction 367, VII-275
 Fuels
 Combustion 355, VII-472
 Ignition 712, VII-137; 1000, VII-497; 1019, VII-461; 1320, VII-463
 Function Series 619, VII-358
 Functional Analysis 715, VII-363; 716, VII-365; 860, VII-366;
 1362, VII-385

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Functional Calculus 538, VII-422
 Functional Equations 452, VII-437; 516, VII-356
 Function Spaces 716, VII-365
 Functionals
 SEE Linear Functionals
 Quadratic Functionals
 Functions
 SEE Algebraic Functions
 Analytic Functions
 Bessel Functions
 Blasius Function
 Convex Functions
 Exponential Functions
 Extremal Functions
 Green's Functions
 Harmonic Functions
 Hyperbolic Functions
 Logarithmic Potential Functions
 Measure Functions
 Meromorphic Functions
 Modular Functions
 Nuclear Wave Functions
 Probability Density Functions
 Galaxy
 Structure 482, VII-13
 Gallium 1156, VII-746
 Gallium 131, VII-313
 Gallium Alloys
 Properties 738, VII-494
 Gallium Compounds
 Structure 1509, VII-107
 Galois Groups 640, VII-326
 Game Theory 1053, VII-392
 Gamma Radiation 296, VII-59; 348, VII-89; 376, VII-61; 408, VII-653
 536, VII-63; 808, VII-67; 920, VII-655
 Gas Discharges 146, VII-468; 488, VII-48; 798, VII-55
 Gas Flow 4, VII-111; 148, VII-341; 538, VII-422; 679, VII-477;
 877, VII-495; 976, VII-480
 Gas Mixtures
 Ignition 776, VII-459
 Gas Temperatures
 Measurement 1320, VII-463; 1549, VII-734; 1553, VII-735
 Gaseous Ions
 SEE Ions, Gaseous
 Gases
 Accommodation Coefficients 794, VII-131
 Conductivity 664, VII-669

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Gases (continued)
 Equation of State 664, VII-669; 757, VII-100; 874, VII-531
 Heat Conductivity 794, VII-131
 Properties 574, VII-665; 664, VII-669
 Sound Velocity 1320, VII-463; 1553, VII-735
 Spectra 175, VII-45
 Surface Reactions 667, VII-658
 Transport Properties 874, VII-531
 Gastex Blacks
 Surface Area 4, VII-111
 Gear Lubrication 1156, VII-746
 Gels
 Structure 1237, VII-263
 Generators (Mathematics) 855, VII-331
 Geodesics 720, VII-400; 1045, VII-712
 Geodetic Triangulation 1072, VII-643
 Geometric Structures 1503, VII-721
 Geometry
 Theory 640, VII-326
 See also Algebraic Geometry
 Differential Geometry
 Germane 817, VII-678
 Germanium
 Photoelectric Yield 392, VII-656
 Germanium Alloys 345, VII-552
 Germanium Compounds (Organic) 5, VII-217; 817, VII-678
 Germanium Isotopes
 Decay 808, VII-67
 Germanium Tetrafluoride 115, VII-220
 Glass
 Applications 366, VII-118
 Glasses 1322, VII-105
 Glucosides 544, VII-663
 Glycerol 1087, VII-692
 Gold
 Photoelectric Yield 392, VII-656
 Gold Alloys 287, VII-543; 568, VII-571; 1453, VII-775
 Ordering 491, VII-547
 Goniometers 761, VII-101
 Gradients
 SEE Conjugate Gradients
 Grain Boundaries 644, VII-558
 Graphite 306, VII-208
 Graphon
 Adsorption of Organic Compounds 457, VII-212
 Grassman Varieties 885, VII-406
 Gratings 510, VII-37
 Gravitation 154, VII-415

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Greases 306, VII-208
 Properties 395, VII-210; 1237, VII-263
 Structure 395, VII-210; 1237, VII-263
 See also Lithium Stearate Greases
 Green's Functions 390, VII-349; 622, VII-475; 1238, VII-433
 Grignard Reagents 326, VII-240
 Group Algebra 1040, VII-335
 Group Characters
 Theory 1040, VII-335
 Group Theory 708, VII-389
 Groups (Mathematics) 216, VII-323; 390, VII-349; 747, VII-402;
 950, VII-333; 1194, VII-707; 1239, VII-714;
 1357, VII-338; 1476, VII-411
 See also Abelian Groups
 Bicyclic Groups
 Finite Groups
 Galois Groups
 Holonomy Groups
 Lie Groups
 Guided Missile Reliability 1550, VII-728
 HMX
 Structure 761, VII-101
 Hafnium Isotopes
 Decay 408, VII-653; 931, VII-68
 Halides
 Replacement 1179, VII-676
 Hall Effect 627, VII-96; 718, VII-660
 Halogenation 427, VII-281
 Haloquinolines 312, VII-238
 Hammett's Sigma Values 1509, VII-107
 Hankel Transforms 922, VII-372
 Hardness Tests 429, VII-520
 Harmonic Forms 1106, VII-380
 Harmonic Functions 444, VII-352; 925, VII-374
 Harmonic Integrals 1503, VII-721
 Harmonic Mappings 148, VII-341
 Heat Conductivity 151, VII-83; 794, VII-131
 Heat Equation 1106, VII-380
 Heat Flow 631, VII-439
 Heat Flow Equation 246, VII-343
 Heat Transfer 456, VII-489; 760, VII-737; 874, VII-531; 940, VII-749;
 1164, VII-750
 See also Boiling Heat Transfer
 Heats of Wetting
 Measurement 227, VII-206
 Heavy Water
 Spectra 675, VII-54

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Helium
 Heat Conductivity 794, VII-131
 Spectra 488, VII-48
 Helium Ions 158, VII-79
 Helley's Theorem 619, VII-358
 Hemicellulose
 Structure 544, VII-663
 See also Cellulose
 Hemimellitine 69, VII-272
 Hemithioketals 1258, VII-702
 Heptane 227, VII-206
 Cyclization 117, VII-115
 Heptene
 Cyclization 117, VII-115
 Hermite Polynomials 887, VII-368
 Hermitian Manifolds 1503, VII-721
 n-Hexadecyl Hydrazine 684, VII-683
 Hexane
 Cyclization 117, VII-115
 Hexane Flames 712, VII-137
 Hexanes 82, VII-203
 Properties 283, VII-235
 Hexafluoroazomethane
 Fluorination 68, VII-270
 Hexafluoroethane 781, VII-128
 Hexadienes 1276, VII-182
 Hilbert Space 1014, VII-717; 1222, VII-382; 1476, VII-411
 Hilbert Space Methods 1106, VII-380
 Hodge's Existence Theorem 1106, VII-380
 Holograph Transformations 956, VII-378
 Holonomy Groups 943, VII-409
 Homeomorphisms 1014, VII-717
 Homogeneity-of-Means Test 672, VII-447
 Honeycomb Panels
 Stresses 1086, VII-756
 Hydrazine 385, VII-165
 Synthesis 763, VII-168; 1245, VII-179
 Hydrazines 533, VII-119; 1276, VII-182
 Hydriodic Acid 1179, VII-676
 Hydrocarbon Flames 175, VII-45; 642, VII-52
 Hydrocarbons
 Combustion 776, VII-459
 Properties 115, VII-220; 283, VII-235
 Spectra 5, VII-217; 115, VII-220
 Structure 115, VII-220; 283, VII-235; 684, VII-683
 Synthesis 5, VII-217; 82, VII-203; 417, VII-279; 446, VII-282;
 767, VII-41; 1218, VII-296
 Thermodynamic Constants 115, VII-220

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Hydrocarbons 1277, VII-696
 Hydrodynamical Stability 690, VII-361
 Hydrodynamics 538, VII-422
 Hydrofluoroethylene 781, VII-128
 Hydrogen 574, VII-665; 916, VII-176
 Combustion 776, VII-459
 Compressibility 539, VII-27
 Deposition Potential 447, VII-150
 Heat Conductivity 794, VII-131
 Hydrogen Bond 846, VII-259; 1087, VII-692
 Hydrogen Bromide 425, VII-187
 Hydrogen Flame 642, VII-52
 Hydrogen Fluoride 592, VII-151
 Hydrogen Halides 1087, VII-692
 Hydrogen Ions 158, VII-79; 174, VII-81
 Hydrogen Peroxide 97, VII-161; 300, VII-237; 1394, VII-697
 Hydrogenation 204, VII-204; 698, VII-121; 1107, VII-294
 Hydroperoxides (Organic) 205, VII-314
 Hydrotroponitrile 380, VII-277
 Hydroxamic Acids 670, VII-687
 Hydroxybiphenyls 23, VII-157
 Hydroxylamine-Isomonosulfonic Acid 1058, VII-261
 Hydroxylamine-O-Sulfonic Acid 1245, VII-179
 Hyperbolic Differential Equations 910, VII-370
 Hyperbolic Functions 1278, VII-442
 Hypergeometric Distribution 460, VII-445

 Idempotent Elements 626, VII-325
 Ignition 712, VII-137; 776, VII-459; 1515, VII-733
 Ignition Regulators 836, VII-172
 Image Tubes 140, VII-31
 Imine Ring 729, VII-287
 Iminobutanes
 Reactions 729, VII-287
 Impact Tubes 231, VII-512
 Indium
 Properties 539, VII-27
 Indium Alloys
 Properties 738, VII-494
 Indium Compounds
 Structure 1509, VII-107
 Indium Isotopes
 Decay 808, VII-67
 Information Theory 1151, VII-533
 Infrared Spectra 5, VII-217; 115, VII-220; 669, VII-255; 967, VII-690;
 1549, VII-734

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Integral Equations 390, VII-349; 452, VII-437; 925, VII-374;
 1013, VII-649
 Integral Transforms 867, VII-368; 922, VII-372
 Integrals
 SEE Abelian Integrals
 Divergent Integrals
 Integration 390, VII-349
 Integro-Differential Operators 925, VII-374
 Interferometers 548, VII-253; 868, VII-6
 Applications 71, VII-465
 Interferometry
 Applications 510, VII-37
 Interlingua 115, VII-220
 Internal Combustion Engines 1000, VII-497; 1320, VII-463
 Compression Temperature 1549, VII-734
 Gas Temperatures 1553, VII-735
 Internal Constraints 1502, VII-769
 Interpolation 888, VII-710
 Intervals
 SEE Confidence Intervals
 Invariance 460, VII-445
 Invariant Means 1476, VII-411
 Inventory Theory 1053, VII-392
 Involutorial Algebras 1194, VII-707
 Iodides
 Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance 1509, VII-107
 Iodination 367, VII-275
 Iodine 308, VII-86
 Iodine Isotopes
 Decay 920, VII-655
 Iodine Monobromide 463, VII-46
 Iodine Monofluoride 463, VII-46
 Iodoform
 Spectra 967, VII-690
 Iodoquinolines 312, VII-238
 Ion Beams (Negative) 174, VII-81
 Ion Exchange 695, VII-688
 Ion Exchange Resins 84, VII-312; 509, VII-190
 Ions, Gaseous 158, VII-79
 Ion Sources 158, VII-79; 174, VII-81
 Iron
 Adsorption of Organic Compounds 437, VII-212
 Complex Ions 18, VII-219; 670, VII-687
 Corrosion 29, VII-141
 Corrosion Prevention 869, VII-153
 Ferromagnetism 573, VII-94
 Heat of Adsorption 204, VII-204
 Neutron Scattering 536, VII-63
 Oxidation 366, VII-118

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Iron (continued)
 Preparation 782, VII-579
 Properties 782, VII-579
 Iron Alloys 345, VII-552; 499, VII-567; 629, VII-573
 Transformations 256, VII-550
 Iron Carbides 202, VII-549
 Iron Carbonyls 1277, VII-696
 Iron Chloride
 Reduction 1558, VII-297
 Iron Compounds 29, VII-141
 Iron Halides 425, VII-187
 Iron Oxide 111, VII-113
 Isentropic Flow 679, VII-477; 892, VII-429
 Isometrics 943, VII-409
 Isomorphisms
 SEE Algebraic Isomorphisms
 Isotopes
 Abundance 996, VII-70
 Masses 996, VII-70
 Jacobi Expansions 888, VII-710
 Jacobian Varieties 885, VII-406
 Jet Phenomena
 Photography 361, VII-74
 Joints
 SEE Expansion Joints
 Jordan Algebras 626, VII-325; 1194, VII-707; 1236, VII-337
 Jordan Rings 626, VII-325; 1236, VII-337
 Kahler Varieties 885, VII-406
 Kahlerian Manifolds 1503, VII-721
 Kernel Expansion Method 516, VII-356
 Ketene
 Spectra 562, VII-49
 Keto Acids 1252, VII-700
 β -Keto Esters 69, VII-272
 Ketones 367, VII-275; 1258, VII-702
 Klein Spaces 749, VII-404
 See also Clifford-Klein Spaces

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Knudsen Flow 4, VII-111
 Kohlrausch's Law 341, VII-242
 Köster Effect 351, VII-773
 Krypton
 Adsorption 547, VII-216
 Properties 539, VII-27
 Spectra 488, VII-48
 Krypton Isotopes
 Decay 408, VII-653
 Lactones 735, VII-698; 1252, VII-700
 Lagrange Interpolation Formula 888, VII-710
 Laguerre Polynomials 867, VII-368
 Lamb Shift 293, VII-57
 Laminar Flow 760, VII-737
 Lanthanum Isotopes
 Decay 931, VII-68
 Latent Images 329, VII-73
 Lattice Vacancies 351, VII-773
 Lattices (Mathematics) 619, VII-358; 640, VII-326; 672, VII-447;
 708, VII-389; 730, VII-329; 1014, VII-717;
 1194, VII-707
 See also Boolean Lattices
 Distributive Lattices
 Laurent Series 390, VII-349
 Lead
 Interdiffusion in Bismuth 396, VII-545
 Interdiffusion in Zinc 396, VII-545
 Properties 289, VII-3
 Lead Alloys 151, VII-83
 Thermoelectricity 779, VII-575
 Lead Isotopes 767, VII-41
 Lead Silicate 739, VII-123
 Lead Stannate 741, VII-126
 Lead Sulfate 602, VII-197
 Lead Titanate 741, VII-126
 Lead Zirconate 741, VII-126
 Least Area Problem 1045, VII-712
 Least Squares Method 888, VII-710
 Legendre Transforms 867, VII-368
 Lie Algebras 1194, VII-707
 Lie Groups 720, VII-400; 749, VII-404; 1239, VII-714; 1503, VII-721
 Lie Rings 626, VII-325; 1040, VII-335
 Lie Tests 744, VII-754; 1101, VII-451

SUBJECT INDEX.(Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Ligands 347, VII-244
 Light
 Atmospheric Attenuation 844, VII-174
 Light Scattering Functions 501, VII-214
 Lime 740, VII-124
 Applications 111, VII-113
 Limit Problems 1238, VII-433
 Lin Operation 1014, VII-717
 Linear Algebra 497, VII-354; 1194, VII-707
 Linear Algebraic Equations 1089, VII-724
 Linear Differential Equations 246, VII-343; 390, VII-349
 Linear Equations 956, VII-378; 1357, VII-338
 Linear Functionals 1014, VII-717
 Linear Integral Equations 452, VII-437
 Linear Molecules
 Spectra 115, VII-220
 Linear Operators 1476, VII-411
 Linear Spaces 1476, VII-411
 Linear Systems 885, VII-406
 Liquids
 Dielectric Properties 1087, VII-692
 Diffusion 403, VII-705
 Equations of State 664, VII-669; 874, VII-531
 Properties 270, VII-1; 289, VII-3; 525, VII-685; 664, VII-669;
 674, VII-646; 686, VII-6
 Structure 868, VII-6
 Transport Properties 403, VII-705; 874, VII-531
 Lithium 751, VII-201
 Lithium Chloride 341, VII-242; 525, VII-685
 Lithium Compounds
 Solubility 300, VII-237; 1394, VII-697
 Lithium Compounds (Organic) 828, VII-288
 Lithium Hydride 916, VII-176
 Lithium Hydroxide 425, VII-187; 967, VII-690
 Lithium Stearate Greases 1237, VII-263
 Logarithmic Potential Functions 867, VII-368
 Logic
 SEE Mathematical Logic
 Low Temperature Research
 SEE Cryogenics
 Lubricants 1464, VII-704
 Adsorption 457, VII-212
 Properties 924, VII-485
 Synthesis 82, VII-203
 Thickeners 306, VII-208
 Lubrication 1156, VII-746; 1568, VII-487
 See also Gear Lubrication

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Lucite
 Properties 79, VII-506
 Luminescence 384, VII-246
 Lustrex
 Properties 79, VII-506
 Lutecium Isotopes 767, VII-41
 Decay 931, VII-68

 Machining 232, VII-501
 Magnesite 740, VII-124
 Magnesium
 Creep 1315, VII-560
 Magnesium Alloys 287, VII-543
 Creep 1315, VII-560
 Properties 1285, VII-777
 Stress Analysis 78, VII-503
 Magnesium Complexes 347, VII-244
 Magnesium Hydroxide 967, VII-690
 Magnesium Powder
 Combustion 916, VII-176
 Magnetohydrodynamics 1823, VII-723
 Magnus Effect 1082, VII-771
 Maleic Anhydride
 Hydrogenation 1558, VII-297
 Manganese
 Complex Ions 18, VII-219
 Determination 615, VII-199
 Meson Capture 445, VII-24
 Manganese Alloys 499, VII-567; 534, VII-569
 Manganese Carbonyls 1277, VII-696
 Manganese Complexes 347, VII-244
 Manifolds (Mathematics) 258, VII-347; 266, VII-395; 410, VII-397;
 720, VII-400; 943, VII-409; 1106, VII-380;
 1503, VII-721
 Manich Reaction 380, VII-277
 Manufacturing Systems
 Mathematical Analysis 1529, VII-731
 Mappings - 1014, VII-717
 See also Conformal Mapping
 Markov Chains 1254, VII-453

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Mass Spectrographs 355, VII-472
 Mass Spectrometers 158, VII-79; 174, VII-81
 Mass Transfer 874, VII-531; 887, VII-666; 940, VII-749; 1562, VII-668
 Materials
 Failure 744, VII-754
 Fatigue 744, VII-754
 Tests 1556, VII-780
 Mathematical Decision Problem 708, VII-389
 Mathematical Logic 1333, VII-444; 1445, VII-726
 Mathematical Systems 708, VII-389
 Matrices (Mathematics) 888, VII-710; 1194, VII-707
 Functions 168, VII-321
 Matrix Algebra 168, VII-321; 216, VII-323; 730, VII-329; 1357, VII-338
 Matrix Inversion 1089, VII-724
 Maxwell-Boltzmann Equation 1119, VII-431
 Measure Functions 1053, VII-392
 Measures (Mathematics) 619, VII-358
 See also Shannon-Weiner Measure
 Measuring Instruments 510, VII-37; 1307, VII-767
 Membranes
 Vibration 166, VII-418
 Mercaptans
 Spectra 669, VII-255
 Mercaptoethanols 1258, VII-702
 Mercury
 Complex Compounds 177, VII-229
 Mercury Aerosols 501, VII-214
 Mercury Electrodes 592, VII-151
 Mercury Isotopes
 Decay 376, VII-61; 408, VII-653; 808, VII-67
 Meromorphic Functions 444, VII-352
 Mesityl Oxide
 Hydrogenation 1558, VII-297
 Mesons 293, VII-57; 348, VII-89; 445, VII-24
 Metal Carbonyls 1277, VII-696
 Metal Crystals
 Growth 400, VII-577
 Polishing 165, VII-85
 Metal Cyanides 1277, VII-696
 Metal Halides 425, VII-187
 Metal Ions
 Chelate Complexes 670, VII-687
 Metal Oxides
 Electrolysis 340, VII-148
 Metals
 Adsorption of Organic Compounds 204, VII-204; 227, VII-206;
 457, VII-212

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Metals (continued)
 Coating 366, VII-118
 Corrosion 25, VII-561; 29, VII-141; 179, VII-565; 366, VII-118;
 869, VII-153
 Damping 79, VII-506
 Deformation 187, VII-509
 Electrical Conductivity 151, VII-83
 Electrodeposition 447, VII-150
 Fatigue Failure 313, VII-514
 Fracture 187, VII-509
 Friction 375, VII-743
 Grain Growth 345, VII-552
 Heat Conductivity 151, VII-83
 Machining 232, VII-501
 Neutron Scattering 536, VII-63
 Oxidation 25, VII-561; 499, VII-567
 Plastic Deformation 644, VII-558; 688, VII-554; 1086, VII-756
 Plasticity 78, VII-503; 232, VII-501
 Strength Limitation 1556, VII-780
 Stresses 313, VII-514; 1288, VII-763
 Strip-Rolling 78, VII-503
 Ultrasonic Propagation 79, VII-506
 Wear 375, VII-743
 Meteor Trails 328, VII-9
 Meteorites 587, VII-16
 Meteors 587, VII-16
 Methacrylic Polymers 765, VII-308
 Methane 916, VII-176
 Combustion 776, VII-459
 Methane Flame 642, VII-52
 Methanes 115, VII-220
 Methanol 115, VII-220; 155, VII-226; 868, VII-6
 Methyl Acetate
 Properties 674, VII-646
 1-Methyl- α -Fenchene 326, VII-240
 Methylacetamide 341, VII-242
 α -Methylacrylic Acid 483, VII-316
 Methylammonium Ion 1173, VII-694
 Methylbenzyl Alcohols 69, VII-272
 Methylbenzylidimethylamine 69, VII-272
 Methylbutyramide 341, VII-242
 2-Methylfenchol 326, VII-240
 Methylene Chloride 378, VII-303
 Methylenediamines 380, VII-277
 Methylethyl Ketone 852, VII-289
 Methylphosphine 817, VII-678
 Methylpropionamide 341, VII-242
 Micelles 684, VII-683

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Micrometers 1307, VII-767
 Microphotometers 1050, VII-20
 Minimal Surface Equations 148, VII-341
 Missile Trajectories 747, VII-402
 Mixtures
 Properties 664, VII-669
 Volume 508, VII-252
 Models (Mathematics) 708, VII-389; 1371A, VII-455
 Modular Functions 640, VII-326
 Molecular Complexes 1277, VII-696
 Molecular Constants 463, VII-46
 Molecular Weight
 Determination 501, VII-214
 Molecules
 Bonds 846, VII-259
 Collisions 644, VII-669
 Dissociation 846, VII-259
 Scattering 664, VII-669
 Vibrations 115, VII-220
 Molybdate Ions
 Reduction 1081, VII-319
 Molybdenum
 Oxidation 25, VII-561
 Photoelectric Yield 392, VII-656
 Sublimation 165, VII-85
 Molybdenum Alloys 345, VII-552; 534, VII-569
 Electroplating 89, VII-143
 Molybdenum Complexes 1081, VII-319
 Molybdenum Disulfide 924, VII-485; 1568, VII-487
 Molybdenum Trioxide 340, VII-148
 Monochloramine
 Absorption Spectra 763, VII-168
 Monochlorogermane 5, VII-217
 Montang's Theorem 655, VII-399
 Monte Carlo Method 1089, VII-724
 Multiple Comparisons Test 672, VII-447
 Multiple F Tests 672, VII-447
 Multiple Range Test 672, VII-447
 Multiplicity Theory 452, VII-437
 Multivariate Analysis 460, VII-445; 1599, VII-729

 Naphthalene 887, VII-666
 Sublimation 940, VII-749
 Naphthalides 1558, VII-297
 Naphthols
 Halogenation 427, VII-281
 Negative Ions 174, VII-81

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Neocupferron 869, VII-153
 Neon
 Properties 539, VII-27
 Spectra 488, VII-48
 Neon Ions 158, VII-79
 Neon Isotopes
 Decay 376, VII-61
 Net Systems
 Vibration 166, VII-418
 Neutron Beams 1623, VII-109
 Neutrons
 Scattering 536, VII-63
 Newton's Method 452, VII-437
 Nickel
 Fatigue 1230, VII-759
 Ferromagnetism 573, VII-94
 Heat Transfer 1164, VII-750
 Oxidation 25, VII-561
 Photoelectric Yield 392, VII-656
 Nickel Alloys 499, VII-567; 629, VII-573
 Diffusion 703, VII-98
 Electroplating 89, VII-143
 Subgrain Structure 688, VII-554
 Nickel Catalysts 204, VII-204
 Nickel Chelates 509, VII-190
 Nickel Chloride
 Reduction 1558, VII-297
 Nickel Complexes 347, VII-244
 Characterization 1277, VII-696
 Nickel Compounds (Organic) 684, VII-683
 Nickel Cyanides 1277, VII-696
 Nickel Steel 1500, VII-778
 Niobium
 Oxidation 25, VII-561
 Nitramide 1173, VII-694
 Nitramine 761, VII-101
 Nitrate Esters 1009, VII-292
 Nitrates (Organic)
 Hydrolysis 1009, VII-292
 Nitration 23, VII-157; 225, VII-164
 Nitric Acid 586, VII-195
 Nitrite Esters 1009, VII-292
 Nitro Compounds 455, VII-166
 Determination 1179, VII-676
 Nitro Compounds (Organic) 10, VII-155; 590, VII-286
 Quadrupole Resonance 1016, VII-644
 Synthesis 571, VII-284

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Nitro Group 23, VII-157; 225, VII-164
Spectra 669, VII-255
Nitroaryl Azides 87, VII-159; 948, VII-178
Nitroaryl Halides
Reactions 1179, VII-676
p-Nitrobenzaldehyde 852, VII-289
Nitrobenzene 592, VII-151; 948, VII-178; 1179, VII-676
4-Nitrobenzenesulfonamide 613, VII-674
Nitroethanes 10, VII-155
Nitrogen 574, VII-665
Bond Energy 775, VII-171
Properties 539, VII-27
Nitrogen Compounds 1173, VII-694
Nitrogen Compounds (Organic) 225, VII-164; 455, VII-166; 1276, VII-182
Quadrupole Resonance 1016, VII-644
Nitrogen Dioxide
Spectra 562, VII-49
Nitrogen Pentoxide 1173, VII-694
Nitrogen Phosphorus Systems 1276, VII-182
Nitrogen Tetroxide 586, VII-195
Nitromethane 155, VII-226
Nitronic Esters 590, VII-286
Nitroparaffins 10, VII-155; 590, VII-286
Nitrophenyl Azides 87, VII-159
2-Nitropropane 380, VII-277
Nitropropanes 10, VII-155
Nitropyridine 571, VII-284
Nitropyridones 571, VII-284
Nitropyrimidines 571, VII-284
Nitroquinolines 225, VII-164
Nitrosamines 1245, VII-179
Nitroso Compounds 455, VII-166
Nitrosyl Bromide 1016, VII-644
Nitrotoluenes 948, VII-178
Nitrourethane 1173, VII-694
Nitryl Chloride 1016, VII-644
n-Nonadecanoic Acid 204, VII-204
Nonlinear Circuits 1581, VII-751
Nonlinear Equations 956, VII-378; 1302, VII-384
Nonlinear Integral Equations 246, VII-343; 452, VII-437
Nonlinear Systems 910, VII-370
Non-Newtonian Fluids
Motion 538, VII-422
Normal Distribution 460, VII-445
Novolacs 12, VII-299
Nuclear Magnetic Resonance 868, VII-6
Nuclear Particles 445, VII-24
Scattering 293, VII-57

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Nuclear Reactions 536, VII-63
Nuclear Reactors 689, VII-65
Nuclear Theory 920, VII-655
Nuclear Wave Functions 296, VII-59
Nuclei 408, VII-653
Energy Levels 931, VII-68
Structure 296, VII-59; 536, VII-63
See also Radioactive Nuclei
Number Theory 708, VII-389
Nylon
Properties 79, VII-506

Octafluorocyclobutane 781, VII-128
Octadecanes 82, VII-203
Octadienes 446, VII-282
Octane
Cyclization 117, VII-115
Octanol-2 380, VII-277
Octatrienes 446, VII-282
2-Octyl Nitrate
Hydrolysis 1009, VII-292
Olefins 417, VII-279
Reactions 698, VII-121
Synthesis 69, VII-272
Omegetrons 996, VII-70
Operational Calculus 867, VII-368
Operator Algebras 1194, VII-707; 1503, VII-721
Operators (Mathematics) 516, VII-356; 1106, VII-380; 1362, VII-385; 1476, VII-411
See also Differential Operators
Integro-Differential Operators
Linear Operators
Optical Coatings 833, VII-76
Optical Filters 833, VII-76
Organic Compounds
Absorption Spectra 658, VII-254
Adsorption by Metals 204, VII-204; 227, VII-206; 457, VII-212
Halogenation 427, VII-281
Racemization 875, VII-291
Organometallic Compounds 828, VII-288
Orifices
Fluid Flow 1336, VII-739
Orr-Sommerfeld Equation 246, VII-343
Osmium Isotopes
Decay 931, VII-68
Oxalate Ions 615, VII-199
Oxalic Acid 204, VII-204
Oxalyl Chloride 115, VII-220

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Oxidation 25, VII-561
Oxidation-Reduction Reactions 1081, VII-319
Oximes 115, VII-220
Oxygen
Properties 539, VII-27
Oxygenation 18, VII-219
Ozone 115, VII-220; 916, VII-176

PETN

Detonation 423, VII-34
Painleré Equations 956, VII-378
Palladium 174, VII-81
Photoelectric Yield 392, VII-656
Palladium Alloys 1453, VII-775
Diffusion 703, VII-98
Palladium Isotopes
Decay 808, VII-67
Palmitic Acid 204, VII-204
Parabolic Equations 248, VII-346
Paradichlorobenzene
Polymerization 1369, VII-310
Quadrupole Moment Spectra 308, VII-86

Paraffins

Structure 684, VII-683
Parallelotopes 1014, VII-717
Parametric Double Integral Problems 1045, VII-712
Partial Differential Equations 148, VII-341; 248, VII-346; 390, VII-349;
497, VII-354; 538, VII-422; 631, VII-439;
690, VII-361; 860, VII-366; 867, VII-368;
910, VII-370; 944, VII-376; 956, VII-378;
1089, VII-724; 1362, VII-385; 1581, VII-751;
1823, VII-723

Particle Accelerators 536, VII-63; 565, VII-39; 996, VII-70

Patterson Diagrams 1058, VII-261

Pearlite 534, VII-569; 1500, VII-778

Pentanes

Properties 283, VII-235

Pentosan

Structure 544, VII-663
Perborates 97, VII-161
Perfluorocyclobutane 781, VII-128
Perfluoroethylene 781, VII-128
Periodates
Oxidation 544, VII-663
Permanganate Ions 615, VII-199
Permutation Group 664, VII-669

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Peroxides 97, VII-161; 100, VII-163
Synthesis 435, VII-189
Phenol-Formaldehyde Polymers 12, VII-299
Phenylchromium Compounds 326, VII-240
Phenyldiazomethane 590, VII-286
Phenylhydrazines 1276, VII-182
Phenylquinolines 225, VII-164
Phenylsilane 367, VII-275
2-Phenyltetrahydrofuran 828, VII-288
Phi Equation 538, VII-422
Phosphines 817, VII-678
Phosphorescence 275, VII-233; 841, VII-680
Phosphorimetry 841, VII-680
Phosphors 384, VII-246
Deterioration 174, VII-81
Phosphorus Halides 842, VII-257
Phosphorus Isotopes
Decay 808, VII-67
Photoelasticity 402, VII-518; 1322, VII-105
Photoelectrons
Emission 392, VII-656
Photographic Emulsions 329, VII-73
Photographic Light Sources 317, VII-470
Photography
Apparatus 140, VII-31; 361, VII-74; 423, VII-34
Applications 423, VII-34
Photometers 492, VII-36
Photometry 1050, VII-20
Applications 402, VII-518
Photons
Scattering 348, VII-89
Phototubes 492, VII-36
Picard Varieties 885, VII-406
Picryl Halides
Reactions 1179, VII-676
Piperidazines 533, VII-119
Piperidines 533, VII-119
Planes 655, VII-399
See also Desarguesian Planes
Planets
Orbits 426, VII-12; 1003, VII-18
Planing 232, VII-501
Plastic Deformation 187, VII-509; 234, VII-752; 526, VII-524;
644, VII-558; 688, VII-554
Plasticity 78, VII-503; 232, VII-501; 234, VII-752; 538, VII-422;
1371B, VII-387

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Plates
 Bending 1232, VII-761
 Fracture 1086, VII-756
 Stresses 26, VII-413; 234, VII-752; 365, VII-517; 486, VII-522;
 570, VII-525; 1086, VII-756
 Vibration 1232, VII-761; 1502, VII-769
 Plating Brighteners 269, VII-146
 Platinum
 Heat of Adsorption 204, VII-204
 Photoelectric Yield 392, VII-656
 Platinum Isotopes
 Decay 931, VII-68
 Plexiglas
 Properties 79, VII-506
 Pochhammer-Chree Equation 187, VII-509
 Poiseuille Flow 4, VII-111
 Poisson Formula 246, VII-343
 Poisson Transform 922, VII-372
 Polarization 29, VII-141; 718, VII-660
 Polarography 592, VII-151
 Polyacrylic Acid 509, VII-190
 Polyampholytes 765, VII-308
 Polyatomic Molecules
 Dissociation 846, VII-259
 Polychromates 388, VII-248
 Polyethyleneimine 509, VII-190
 Polygonization 644, VII-558; 688, VII-554
 Polyisobutylene 378, VII-303
 Polymerization 1369, VII-310
 Polymers
 Characterization 403, VII-705
 Degradation 781, VII-128
 Properties 303, VII-116; 310, VII-301; 378, VII-303; 781, VII-128
 Structure 310, VII-301; 378, VII-303; 781, VII-128
 Synthesis 12, VII-299; 533, VII-119; 765, VII-308; 781, VII-128;
 1369, VII-310
 Polynomial Expansions 888, VII-710; 925, VII-374
 Polynomial Sets 516, VII-356
 Polynomials
 SEE Appell Polynomials
 Hermite Polynomials
 Laguerre Polynomials
 Polyphenyl Polymers 310, VII-301
 Polyphenylchromium Compounds 326, VII-240
 Polyphenyls 1369, VII-310
 Polystyrene 303, VII-116; 378, VII-303
 Properties 270, VII-1
 Polytetrafluoroethylene 781, VII-128

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Polyvanadates 388, VII-248
 Polyvinyl Acetate 303, VII-116; 378, VII-303
 Polyvinyl Alcohol 303, VII-116
 Polyvinyl Chloride
 Properties 79, VII-506
 Polyvinylamine 509, VII-190
 Pontryagin Rings 720, VII-400
 Porosity 4, VII-111
 Positronium 348, VII-89
 Positrons 348, VII-89
 Potassium
 Properties 539, VII-27
 Potassium Acetate 695, VII-688
 Potassium Borohydride
 Spectra 967, VII-690
 Potassium Bromide
 Solubility 695, VII-688
 Potassium Chloride 341, VII-242
 Properties 548, VII-253
 Potassium Compounds 384, VII-246
 Solubility 300, VII-237; 1394, VII-697
 Potassium Perchlorate 844, VII-174
 Potassium Superoxide 435, VII-189
 Praesodymium Isotopes
 Decay 931, VII-68
 Precipitates
 Aging 602, VII-197
 Presburger's Procedure 1333, VII-444
 Pressure
 Effects 508, VII-252; 574, VII-665
 Measurement 355, VII-472
 Transmission 539, VII-27
 Principal Ideal Theorem 1239, VII-714
 Probability 460, VII-445; 1053, VII-392; 1254, VII-453; 1371A, VII-455;
 1823, VII-723
 Probability Density Functions 148, VII-341
 Production Systems
 Mathematical Analysis 1529, VII-731
 Projectiles
 Deformation 1201, VII-651
 Effectiveness 1201, VII-651
 Penetration 1201, VII-651
 Vibration 737, VII-535
 Projections (Mathematics) 950, VII-333
 Propane
 Combustion 355, VII-472; 642, VII-52; 712, VII-137; 776, VII-459
 1-Propanol 1087, VII-692
 Propellants
 Combustion 1515, VII-733

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Propionic Acids
Chelation 347, VII-244
Propionitrile
Fluorination 68, VII-270
Propylene 5, VII-217
Combustion 776, VII-459
Propylsodium
Reactions 828, VII-288
Protective Coatings
SEE Coatings, Protective
Protons
Scattering 1466, VII-72
Psychomotor Tests 450, VII-491
Pulse Counting 492, VII-36
Pyridine 310, VII-301
Complex Compounds 177, VII-229
Derivatives 312, VII-238
Spectra 312, VII-238
Pyrimidine 571, VII-284
Pyrometers 1549, VII-734
γ-Pyrone 5, VII-217
Pyrotechnics 844, VII-174

Quadratic Functionals 390, VII-349
Quadrupole Moment Spectra 308, VII-86
Quantum Electrodynamics 293, VII-57
Quantum Theory 1371A, VII-455
Quinoline 312, VII-238
Quinuclidine 10, VII-155

RDX
Detonation 423, VII-34
Racemization 875, VII-291
Radiation
Detection 316, VII-23; 377, VII-33; 392, VII-656; 445, VII-24;
757, VII-41
Radioactive Dating Techniques 757, VII-41
Radioactive Nuclei
Decay 408, VII-653; 808, VII-67; 931, VII-68
Radioactive Tracers 869, VII-153; 1562, VII-668
Radiocarbon 767, VII-41
Radiography 565, VII-39
Radioisotopes 767, VII-41
Raman Spectra 5, VII-217; 115, VII-220; 669, VII-255
Random Current 1254, VII-453
Raney Catalysts 1107, VII-294

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Raney Nickel 204, VII-204; 1258, VII-702
Rare Gases
Analysis 488, VII-48
Purification 488, VII-48
Raschig Synthesis 1245, VII-179
Rearrangement Reactions 69, VII-272; 483, VII-316
Rectangular Distribution 460, VII-445
Rectifier Nets 1445, VII-726
Red Giant Stars 482, VII-13
Redox Reactions
SEE Oxidation-Reduction Reactions
Reduction of Order Theorem 690, VII-361
Reflective Coatings 833, VII-76
Reformatsky Reaction 69, VII-272
Refractometers 1322, VII-105
Refractory Materials 111, VII-113
Reisz Theory 860, VII-366
Relativity 154, VII-415; 1119, VII-431
Relaxation 351, VII-773
Reliability 1550, VII-728
Resins
SEE Chelate Resins
Ion Exchange Resins
Resistors
Temperature Factors 736, VII-493
Riccati Equations 956, VII-378
Riemann Spaces 154, VII-415; 258, VII-347; 943, VII-409; 1239, VII-714
Riemann Surfaces 444, VII-352
Riemann-Roch Theorem 444, VII-352
Rijke Tube 355, VII-472
Ring Expansion Joints 854, VII-427; 1409, VII-435
Rings (Mathematics) 626, VII-325; 730, VII-329; 1194, VII-707;
1222, VII-382
See also Jordan Rings
Lie Rings
Pontryagin Rings
Rock Salt 178B, VII-539
Rockets
Vibration 737, VII-535
Rods
Stresses 526, VII-524
Rotating Disc Experiment 313, VII-514
Rubber
Aging 884, VII-133
Oxidation 884, VII-133
Properties 884, VII-133

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Rubidium

Properties 539, VII-27
Ruling Engines 510, VII-37
Runge-Fox Method 1581, VII-751

Sagamore Research Conferences 1556, VII-780

Sampling 460, VII-445; 672, VII-447; 1089, VII-724; 1101, VII-451
Satellites 1072, VII-643

Orbits 1003, VII-18

Scaling 499, VII-567

Scatter-Sounding

Analysis 520, VII-14

Schiff Bases 762, VII-318

Schlieren Photography 423, VII-34; 485, VII-672

Applications 456, VII-489

Schmidt Reaction 948, VII-178

Schmidt Theory 452, VII-437

Schrodinger Equation 664, VII-669; 1089, VII-724

Scintillation Counters 316, VII-23; 767, VII-41

Second Order Equations 956, VII-378

Sediments

Transportation 874, VII-531

Selenium

Reduction 1558, VII-297

Selenium Compounds 667, VII-658

Selenium Compounds (Organic) 399, VII-249

Semiconductors 627, VII-96; 738, VII-494

Semigroups 715, VII-363; 730, VII-329; 925, VII-374; 1239, VII-714;

1362, VII-385; 1476, VII-411

Semispace 1014, VII-717

Sentential Calculus 708, VII-389

Sequential Estimation 1599, VII-729

Set Theory 708, VII-389

Sets (Mathematics) 390, VII-349

See also Polynomial Sets

Shannon-Weiner Measure 460, VII-445

Shaped Charges

Photography 361, VII-74

Shear Flow 622, VII-475

Shear Stress 313, VII-514

Shear-Webs

Stresses 1213, VII-530

Sheaves (Mathematics) 943, VII-409; 1503, VII-721

Shells

Buckling 1301, VII-765

Stresses 234, VII-752; 854, VII-427; 999, VII-529; 1086, VII-756

Vibration 1502, VII-769

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Shells of Revolution 1409, VII-435

Shock Tubes 71, VII-465

Shock Waves 622, VII-475

Propagation 71, VII-465

Refraction 71, VII-465

Silane

Spectra 967, VII-690

Silica 306, VII-208

Silicon Compounds (Organic) 367, VII-275; 463, VII-46; 817, VII-678;

1464, VII-704

Silicon Tetrafluoride 115, VII-220

Silver 178B, VII-539

Corrosion Prevention 869, VII-153

Photoelectric Yield 392, VII-656

Silver Acetate

Solubility 695, VII-688

Silver Alloys 287, VII-543; 351, VII-773; 568, VII-571

Properties 1285, VII-777; 1453, VII-775

Silver Bromide 602, VII-197

Silver Chloride

Polarization 718, VII-660

Silver Compounds 174, VII-81

Silver Halides 779, VII-575

Silver Isotopes

Decay 408, VII-653; 920, VII-655

Silver Nitrate

Solubility 695, VII-688

Silver Sulfide 779, VII-575

Silylphosphorus Compounds

Synthesis 817, VII-678

Single Crystals

Preparation 269, VII-146

Sliding Friction 665, VII-745

Slip Bands 644, VII-558

Sodium 751, VII-201

Fluorescence 838, VII-647

Properties 539, VII-27

Sodium Acetate 695, VII-688

Sodium Amide 69, VII-272

Sodium Borohydride

Spectra 967, VII-690

Sodium Bromide 695, VII-688; 751, VII-201

Sodium Chloride 341, VII-242

Polarization 718, VII-660

Properties 548, VII-253

Sodium Compounds

Solubility 300, VII-237; 1394, VII-697

Sodium Compounds (Organic)

Reactions 828, VII-288

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Sodium Halides 341, VII-242
 Sodium Iodide 536, VII-63; 751, VII-201
 Fluorescence 838, VII-647
 Reactions 1009, VII-292
 Sodium Isotopes
 Decay 376, VII-61
 Sodium Molybdate 340, VII-148
 Sodium Naphthalide
 Reactions 1558, VII-297
 Sodium Nitrate
 Spectra 967, VII-690
 Sodium Nitromalonaldehyde 571, VII-284
 Sodium Superoxide 435, VII-189
 Soils
 Propagation of Sound 572, VII-4
 Properties 788, VII-527
 Solar Corona 1050, VII-20
 Solid Mechanics 1823, VII-723
 Solid Solutions
 Anelasticity 1453, VII-775
 Internal Friction 1453, VII-775
 Solids
 Properties 289, VII-3; 1119, VII-431; 1322, VII-105
 Solubility 695, VII-688
 Solutions
 Properties 525, VII-685
 Standardization 543, VII-192
 Solvmanifolds 749, VII-404
 Sound
 Propagation 572, VII-4
 Space; Spaces
 SEE Banach Spaces
 Hilbert Space
 Klein Spaces
 Linear Spaces
 Riemann Space
 Spinor Spaces
 Vector Spaces
 Spectra
 SEE Absorption Spectra
 Raman Spectra, etc.
 Spectroscopy
 Applications 841, VII-680
 Gas Discharges 488, VII-48
 Instrumentation 140, VII-31; 510, VII-37
 Spheres
 Electrostatic Properties 538, VII-422
 Stress Analysis 234, VII-752

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Spinner Spaces 154, VII-415
 Stability
 SEE Hydrodynamical Stability
 Stannous Tin
 Reduction 1081, VII-319
 Starch
 Derivatives 544, VII-663
 Stark Effect 1016, VII-644
 Stars
 Observations 1003, VII-18
 Red Giants 482, VII-13
 Statistics 460, VII-445; 1254, VII-453
 Steady State Flow 4, VII-111
 Stearic Acid 227, VII-206; 1164, VII-750
 Steel
 Corrosion 29, VII-141
 Fatigue 313, VII-514
 Fretting 1142, VII-537
 Heat of Adsorption 204, VII-204
 Heat Treatment 313, VII-514; 629, VII-573
 Properties 151, VII-83
 Radiography 565, VII-39
 Stresses 78, VII-503; 231, VII-512; 1086, VII-756
 Transformations 534, VII-569
 Ultrasonic Propagation 79, VII-506
 Wear 1142, VII-537
 Stellar Atmospheres
 Turbulence 363, VII-10
 Stochastic Processes 246, VII-343; 460, VII-445; 925, VII-374;
 1371A, VII-455
 Strain Gages 187, VII-509; 465, VII-250
 Applications 1288, VII-763
 Stratified Flow 1364, VII-741
 Stress
 Anodic Phase 179, VII-565
 Stress Analysis 26, VII-413; 78, VII-503; 187, VII-509; 214, VII-511;
 231, VII-512; 234, VII-752; 313, VII-514; 365, VII-517;
 402, VII-518; 429, VII-520; 474, VII-419; 486, VII-522;
 491, VII-547; 526, VII-524; 538, VII-422; 788, VII-527;
 854, VII-427; 1213, VII-530; 1230, VII-759; 1288, VII-763;
 1301, VII-765; 1307, VII-767; 1322, VII-105; 1409, VII-435
 See also Biaxial Stress Analysis
 Triaxial Stress Analysis
 Stress Waves
 Propagation 1307, VII-767
 Stroboscopes
 Applications 737, VII-535
 Strontium Peroxide 100, VII-163

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued).

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Structures

Design 570, VII-525
 See also Analytic Structures
 Sturmian Theory 1302, VII-384
 Styrene 417, VII-279; 1009, VII-292
 Subalgebras
 SEE Abelian Subalgebras
 Sublimation 887, VII-666
 Subsonic Flow 622, VII-475; 1119, VII-431
 Substitution (Mathematics) 855, VII-331
 Substitution Reactions 69, VII-272; 367, VII-275
 Sucrose
 Transport Properties 403, VII-705
 Suess Effect 767, VII-41
 Sulfamic Acid 1454, VII-265
 Sulfanilimide 1454, VII-265
 Sulfenic Acids
 Derivatives 417, VII-279
 Sulfenyl Halides 417, VII-279
 Sulfonates (Organic)
 Solvolysis 1009, VII-292
 Sulfonic Acids 525, VII-685; 1058, VII-261
 Sulfur
 Reduction 1558, VII-297
 Sulfur Aerosols 501, VII-214
 Sulfur Compounds 174, VII-81
 Sulfur Compounds (Organic) 64, VII-267; 417, VII-279; 1258, VII-702
 Sulfur Dichloride
 Spectra 562, VII-49
 Sulfur Dioxide
 Spectra 562, VII-49
 Sulfur Halides
 Spectra 562, VII-49
 Sulfuric Acid 586, VII-195
 Superconductors 539, VII-27
 Superoxides 97, VII-161
 Supersonic Flow 892, VII-429
 Surface Reactions 667, VII-658
 Surfaces
 Analysis 1466, VII-72
 Boundary 1045, VII-712
 Properties 514, VII-420
 See also Riemann Surfaces
 Suspensions
 Viscosity 874, VII-531

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Tantalum

Oxidation 25, VII-561
 Photoelectric Yield 392, VII-656
 Tantalum Isotopes 767, VII-41
 Decay 931, VII-68
 Target Fixation 450, VII-491
 Targets
 Penetration by Projectiles 1201, VII-651
 Tarski's Procedure 1333, VII-444
 Tauberian Theorems 888, VII-710
 Taurine 525, VII-685
 Tautomerism 1252, VII-700
 Taylor Instability 355, VII-472
 Taylor Series 888, VII-710
 Teflon 781, VII-128
 Properties 539, VII-27
 Tellurium
 Reduction 1558, VII-297
 Tellurium Compounds (Organic) 399, VII-249
 Tellurium Isotopes
 Decay 408, VII-653; 920, VII-655
 Temperature
 Control 1250, VII-43
 Measurement 1250, VII-43; 1320, VII-463; 1549, VII-734;
 1555, VII-735
 Temperature Symposium 1250, VII-43
 Tensor Fields 943, VII-409
 Tensors 1503, VII-721
 Tertiary Alcohols
 Oxidation 326, VII-240
 Test-to-Failure Method 1550, VII-728
 Tetradecanamide 684, VII-683
 Tetraethylenediamine 380, VII-277
 Tetraethylenepentamine 18, VII-219
 Tetrafluoromethane 781, VII-128
 Tetrahydropyran 222, VII-231
 Tetraphenylchromiumdioxide 326, VII-240
 Tetrazenes 1276, VII-182
 Tetrazoles 1276, VII-182
 Tetryl
 Detonation 423, VII-34
 Thallium
 Properties 539, VII-27
 Thallium Chloride 384, VII-246
 Theory of the Base 885, VII-406
 Thermal Batteries 742, VII-152
 Thermal Conductivity
 SEE Heat Conductivity

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Thermistors
Applications 877, VII-495
Thermocouples
Calibration 539, VII-27
Thermostats 1087, VII-692
Thiadienes 64, VII-267
Thienyl Ketones 1218, VII-296
Thiophenes 1218, VII-296
Thiourea
Applications 269, VII-146
Third Order Equations 690, VII-361
Thorium
Hall Effect 718, VII-660
Thorium Oxide
Properties 718, VII-660
Thrust Bearings 1156, VII-746
Thymol 887, VII-666
Timing Circuits 445, VII-24
Tin Compounds 667, VII-658
Tin Isotopes
Decay 408, VII-653
Tin Selenide 667, VII-658
Titania 111, VII-113; 740, VII-124
Titanium
Corrosion 479, VII-92
Fatigue 1230, VII-759
Internal Friction 79, VII-506
Passivity 479, VII-92
Structure 479, VII-92
Titanium Alloys 345, VII-552
Stress Analysis 231, VII-512
Transformations 256, VII-550
Titanium Dioxide
Adsorption of Organic Compounds 457, VII-212
Titanium Powder
Combustion 916, VII-176
Titrimetry 543, VII-192
p-Tolualdehyde 762, VII-318
Toluene
Properties 674, VII-646
Synthesis 117, VII-115
Tool Wear 507, VII-483
Tracers
SEE Radioactive Tracers
Trajectories 747, VII-402
Transducers 231, VII-512

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Transformations (Mathematics) 26, VII-413; 246, VII-343; 266, VII-395; 715, VII-363; 885, VII-406; 956, VII-378
See also Baecklund Transformations
Hodograph Transformations
Transforms (Mathematics) 390, VII-349; 452, VII-437; 516, VII-356; 867, VII-368; 922, VII-372
See also Convolution Transforms
Fourier Transforms
Hankel Transforms
Integral Transforms
Legendre Transforms
Poisson Transform
Transient State Flow 4, VII-111
Transistors 627, VII-96
Transport Phenomena 874, VII-531
Transport Processes 403, VII-705
Treatment Means 672, VII-447
Trialkylfluorosilanes 1464, VII-704
Triangulation 1072, VII-643
See also Geodetic Triangulation
Triaxial Stress Analysis 78, VII-503; 1288, VII-763
Triazines 1276, VII-182
Tribolium Model 1254, VII-453
Trigonometric Series 26, VII-413
Trimethylbenzene 69, VII-272
Trimethylbromosilane 463, VII-46
Trimethylfluorosilane 463, VII-46
Trimethyliodosilane 463, VII-46
Trimethylphosphine 817, VII-678
Trinitrobenzene 1179, VII-676
Trinitrotoluene
Detonation 423, VII-34
Trinomial Equations 1194, VII-707
1,2,3-Triphenyl Azulene 417, VII-279
Triphenylmethyl Chloride 155, VII-226
Truncation Error 1278, VII-442
Trusses
Buckling 570, VII-525
Stability 570, VII-525
Tubes
Buckling 1288, VII-763
Tungstate Ions
Reduction 1081, VII-319
Tungsten
Oxidation 25, VII-561
Photoelectric Yield 392, VII-656
Sublimation 165, VII-85
Surface Reactions 667, VII-658

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Tungsten Alloys 345, VII-552
 Electroplating 89, VII-143
 Tungsten Isotopes
 Decay 931, VII-68
 Tungsten Sulfide 1568, VII-487
 Turbine Blades
 Flutter 1115, VII-441
 Turbulence 538, VII-422; 1371A, VII-455
 Mathematical Analysis 363, VII-10
 Turbulent Flow 887, VII-666; 1562, VII-668
 Tychonoff Theorem 1014, VII-717

Ultrasonic Waves
 Absorption 270, VII-1; 674, VII-646; 868, VII-6
 Optical Effects 270, VII-1

Ultrasonics
 Applications 143, VII-145; 289, VII-3; 548, VII-253; 751, VII-201;
 1307, VII-767

Ultraviolet Absorption Spectra 658, VII-254
 Ultraviolet Radiation 392, VII-656
 Unate Truth Functions 1445, VII-726
 Undecidability 708, VII-389
 Undefinability 708, VII-389

Uranium
 Complex Ions 670, VII-687

Valerolactone 735, VII-698

Vanadium
 Complex Ions 670, VII-687
 Meson Capture 445, VII-24
 Vanadium Alloys 345, VII-552
 Transformations 256, VII-550
 Vanadium Compounds 388, VII-248
 Vanadium Isotopes
 Decay 808, VII-67
 Variance 460, VII-445
 See also Analysis of Variance
 Variation Theory 1045, VII-712
 Variations
 SEE Calculus of Variations
 Varieties (Mathematics) 885, VII-406; 1194, VII-707
 See also Grassman Varieties
 Jacobian Varieties
 Kahler Varieties
 Picard Varieties
 Vector Algebras 538, VII-422

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Vector Fields 1045, VII-712
 Vibrating Membranes 1238, VII-433
 Vibration
 Mathematical Analysis 497, VII-354
 Measurement 737, VII-535
 Vidicon Unit 140, VII-31
 Vinyl Ethers 64, VII-267
 Vinyl Polymers 303, VII-116
 Vision
 SEE Color Vision
 Volume Calculations 508, VII-252
 Vortex Flow 679, VII-477; 892, VII-429; 976, VII-480
 Vulcanizates 884, VII-133

Walden Inversion 729, VII-287

Water, Heavy
 SEE Heavy Water

Water Vapor
 Diffusion 378, VII-303
 Water-Gas Equilibrium 574, VII-665
 Wave Equation 166, VII-418; 497, VII-354; 1238, VII-433; 1362, VII-385

Waves
 Propagation 538, VII-422; 631, VII-439; 851, VII-425;
 1371B, VII-387

Wear 375, VII-743; 507, VII-483
 See also Tool Wear

Wedges
 Stresses 365, VII-517

Wiener-Hopf Method 1013, VII-649

Wind
 Velocity Measurement 759, VII-479
 Wind Tunnels 146, VII-468; 456, VII-489; 940, VII-749

Wire Drawing 1288, VII-763

X-Ray Research 565, VII-39
 X-Ray Tubes 761, VII-101

X-Rays
 Applications 395, VII-210; 688, VII-554; 761, VII-101;
 1237, VII-263
 Scattering 287, VII-543
 X-Transforms 1581, VII-751

Xenon
 Spectra 488, VII-48

SUBJECT INDEX (Continued)

Note: The first number following each subject heading is the Proposal Number, the second is the page number.

Zeeman Effect 1509, VII-107
 Zener Relaxation 1453, VII-775
 Zinc
 Complex Compounds 177, VII-229
 Corrosion 179, VII-565
 Corrosion Prevention 869, VII-153
 Interdiffusion in Lead 396, VII-545
 Zinc Alloys 287, VII-543; 351, VII-773
 Ordering 491, VII-547
 Properties 1453, VII-775
 Thermoelectricity 779, VII-575
 Zinc Chelates 509, VII-190
 Zinc Complexes 347, VII-244
 Zinc Compounds 174, VII-81
 Zinc Isotopes
 Decay 808, VII-67
 Zirconium
 Oxidation 25, VII-561
 Zirconium Oxide 740, VII-124; 833, VII-76

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
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John Richard Hawke



Count Henri de Montmarin



Gregory Board

The Case of

THE BUMBLING HAWKIE, THE MYSTERIOUS SPARROW AND THE SEVEN WANDERING BIRDS

Did the CIA mastermind the plot
to smuggle bombers to Portugal? No, insists the CIA.
Yes, say the smugglers now awaiting trial.

Before I plunge recklessly into a wholesale breach of national security by telling all about Project Sparrow, I should point out that the Central Intelligence Agency vigorously denies it played any role whatever in the caper. The CIA's public-relations office—which you can reach at 351-7676 (Area Code 202) in Washington in case you have any questions—has stood firm on that score from the start.

I should add, too, that there is a certain neurotic propensity on the part of many Washington newspapermen to see CIA men under the bed. One CIA man I know attributes this to what he calls "The James Bond syndrome" and deplores the fascination of both the press and public for his spying business. "The press never knows all the facts," he says,

"and it loves to make us look bad. Nothing ought to be printed about the CIA. Nothing!"

My CIA contact also stressed the fact that spying is an amoral business and that when it comes to any moment of truth in a covert operation (as a member of the In Group he called it a "black operation") every good CIA man will lie. He included himself, which did not add to the limited confidence I had in his flat denials about the CIA's role in Sparrow. Still, one must give some weight to the CIA's protestations of innocence, since my CIA man says they came "from On High."

Having thus been scrupulously fair to the much-maligned CIA, and working on the premise that if a newspaperman can find out, so can the

ns, I shall tell you how I became aware of Sparrow, which was a smuggling plot that was full blast during the first eight months of 1965. It received some attention in the press, but was still classified "Secret" in Washington, New Paris, Lisbon, Ottawa, Goose Bay, Winnipeg, Miami and, presumably, Moscow. I am keeping in mind that the CIA says it knows a lot that I don't—all of which it absolutely refused to tell me about—the reader must draw his own conclusions.

The wire story that moved during the afternoon of September 18, 1965, reported that a Frenchman and an Englishman were being held in lieu of \$25,000 bond each on charges of smuggling "airplanes, parts, arms and munitions, including World War II 'electronic bombs and gunsights,' apparently to an undisclosed Caribbean nation." The UPI item went on to say that federal authorities were doing all they could to "hush up" the matter, which involved an "unfriendly government." Two men, said UPI, were in the Dade County jail in Florida and both had attempted unsuccessfully to get the extraordinarily high bond lowered. A third man, who had been sought by the U.S. Bureau of Customs on the same charges, had fled the country. The chief of Customs in Miami, Fred Patton, refused to say anything. The CIA buff can spot that kind of spooky story comes from the teleprinter.

I made a few telephone calls and found out that the Frenchman was a distinguished-looking count Paris named Henri Marie François de Montmarin, a 58-year-old industrialist and an ex-pilot who was also the director of an electronics firm called EURAFRICAIR. On the other hand, he was an aircraft broker. He was listed in the French version of *Who's Who* and is an officer in the Legion of Honor. He spoke practically no English, but did manage to make it known that he was innocent.

The Englishman's background was equally interesting. His name was John Richard Hawke. He was a resident alien retired from the Royal Air Force, in which he was an ace acrobatic pilot. He was also the author of several RAF technical manuals. At 23 he had been an instructor with the RAF's precision-acrobatic flying team, "The Red Arrows," then a test pilot, a ferry pilot and jet-fighter instructor in Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., where he had been. Hawke also pleaded, in an apparently expressive British accent, that he was innocent.

The fugitive was Gregory Board, a 37-year-old former Australian who had become an American citizen. A charming, easygoing character with a friendly moustache, Board owns a company in Tucson, Ariz., called Hamilton Associates, Inc., which sells World War II military aircraft and parts and flies them for motion picture companies. He was supposed to be hiding out in his home in Port Antonio, Jamaica, and wasn't talking to anybody.

The same instinct that tells you that the blond, crew-cut fellow in the trench coat and horsehide overcoat leaning against the American Embassy in Managua, Nicaragua, is not what he pretends to be, immediately signaled that all was not as it seemed. This was not a run-of-the-mill aircraft export to some Caribbean island; the planes involved were too overtly reputable, too prominently too intelligent, apparently too honorable to get mixed

Hawke made only \$700 profit on each flight

up in grubby private deals with either bankrupt tyrants or guerrillas in this hemisphere.

As it turned out, the UPI story had erred in two respects: (1) The country to which the planes were smuggled was really a U.S. ally, and (2) the destination was not Latin American, but European. The planes—it took a few hours to find out that seven Douglas B-26 bombers were involved—had been flown to Portugal, one of our NATO partners. This was in violation of a U.S. pledge in the United Nations that such military aircraft would not be sold to Portugal because she might use them against black rebels in her overseas colonies of Angola and Mozambique.

From all the initial evidence it seemed as if the CIA had pulled an international boner. But while it is relatively easy to uncover clandestine CIA operations in Latin America—a region the CIA regards as bush-league—to do so with a European operation is virtually hopeless. The quality of U.S. spying in Europe is very high.

I did not realize then that John Richard Hawke, the pilot who had flown all seven of the B-26's out of the United States and into Portugal, was taking it all so seriously. He did not like the Dade County jail, even though it is air-conditioned and probably the most comfortable confinement in the country. Neither did I know that U.S. Customs and the U.S. Attorney in Buffalo, N.Y., a pleasant fellow named John T. Curtin, were so serious about pressing prosecution. And nobody knew then that sometime this late summer or fall in U.S. District Court, Western District of New York, the case actually would come to trial.

The case for the defense: Everyone was working, or thought he was working, for the CIA, which gives a man carte blanche to break any and all U.S. laws. The case for the U.S.: The CIA had nothing whatever to do with it.

The biggest problem for the prosecution is going

to be antihero Hawke. If it comes to pass that Hawke is convicted of being a willful lawbreaker, he certainly will rank as one of the most deftly direct, righteously indignant and increasingly naïve lawbreakers in the annals of espionage flights to Portugal, he insists, were done in the name "of your Uncle Sam," and it is very easy to believe him: The CIA man at 351-7676 denies of course, but one can't believe him.

Hawke's tale goes this way:

In London in July of 1963, Hawke met Gregory Board for the first time. Knowing Hawke's reputation as a crack pilot, Board asked him to fly the U.S. two vintage Messerschmitts which Board had bought in Germany. Hawke accepted the job and, after making the proper arrangements with Count de Montmarin (who acted as broker in the deal), he headed off for America. Enough, a pilot whom Hawke had hired to fly the second plane suffered a broken oil line and landed off Labrador. Hawke delivered his share but was penalized half the fee.

Except for a few letters of explanation about the crash, Hawke had no contact with Board until late April of 1965, when Board called Hawke and asked if he would like to ferry 10 B-26's to Europe. By then Hawke had fallen on hard times, having just finished a jet-training school in which he was an instructor who had failed. He was selling encyclopedias door-to-door. Hawke expressed excited interest.


"Then two weeks went by and I still hadn't heard anything, so I called Board," says Hawke. "He told me the project would be getting underway fairly soon. He arranged to meet with Board in Florida in a few days." When Hawke and he met Board for dinner, Board told them that the 10 planes were to go to Bordeaux, France, then to Lisbon, Portugal, for the Portuguese Air Force. He added that 10 more B-26's might be bought by Portugal. Hawke would be paid \$3,000 per flight, out of which would come expenses, including repairs, fuel, lodging, and airline tickets back home. The net to Hawke would be only \$700. Hawke later found out that the price tag on the entire deal amounted, according to federal officials, to almost one million dollars.

In the third week of May, Hawke left Florida for Tucson to prepare for the first flight. At the time there were Count de Montmarin and an aircraft mechanic named Keat Griggers, who was to see the repair of the B-26's and then

Portugal to service the planes.

The day after his arrival, Hawke was shown around the Hamilton Aircraft Co. plant where the planes were being modified and finished. Gordon Hamilton, the plant's owner and the one who was to deliver the planes to Board, was his boss. For the next few days Hawke was briefed by Board and de Montmarin on radio frequencies, and routes. "They change the original destination," says Hawke, "from Bordeaux to the Portuguese Air Force Base at Tancos, which is about 90 miles northeast of Lisbon. I was also given crystals for special radio frequencies to use during the flight."

In addition, Hawke was provided with copies of a contract between Board and a Canadian, Woodrow Wilson Roderick, who was the middleman purchasing the B-26's from Board. He also had a copy of a contract between himself and Roderick for the flight. "Then I was briefed," Hawke says, "on what to do if there was



with the Customs, particularly in Canada. Given the name of a customs broker in St. Newfoundland, and I was to call him after at Torbay, Newfoundland. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000300510087-1

asterly point in the province and the per- ce to jump off on a long Atlantic flight." ke insists that he and the mechanic, Grig- were convinced that the contract was "gov- nt sponsored—in effect a contract between S. government and the Portuguese govern- But it was arranged in such a way as to no public interest, for political reasons I ed were valid." Remarks by Board, Hamil- de Montmarin reinforced their conviction e flights were CIA-sponsored.

the Memorial Day weekend of 1965, Grig- and Hawke flew to Rochester, N.Y., where a ange fuel tank was to be fitted on the B-26. ank turned out to be old, rusty and leaky, took five days to repair and install it. Mean- Griggers got a call from Board to return to . Hawke was on his own.


at 4 P.M. on June 3—after checking with eather Bureau and getting a clearance from Customs to Torbay—Hawke filed his flight d took off. Canadian Customs was waiting n when he arrived four hours later; with e filed a general customs declaration. There -trouble at all with Canadian Customs, and t morning Hawke was on his way.

first crisis arose about 500 miles out when s high-frequency radio quit working. Since I filed a flight plan to Santa Maria in the and then to Paris (for, as Hawke puts it, al reasons again"), he was expected to n contact with Canadian Air Traffic Con- the control center in New York. When he o make contact, a general alert across the Atlantic was put into effect.

en Hawke finally landed at Santa Maria, superintendent of the airport was furious Hawke's "violation" of air traffic regula- He insisted on impounding the B-26 until gh-frequency radio was fixed. "I understood little problems like that would not hinder Hawke says, "and after I talked to the man's or I got all the proper clearances in a hurry." e filed a new flight plan for Lisbon—and d for the airfield at Tancos.

out four hours later," he says, "I landed at s and was greeted by a multitude of digni- including a man I now know to be the t of Beaumont (Antoine de Beaumont, a ct man with Luber Inc., a small Swiss arms hemical dealer handling the Project Sparrow for the Portuguese), another who is the chief rtuguese military security, a colonel in charge force matériel, and the head of the civil secret . They were all terribly glad to see me and rplane. After chatting about the flight, I ted the special VHF radio crystals—which of no use to me since I was never contacted y of the special frequencies—and I was taken air force staff car to Monsanto air base, near n, where I was put up in officers' quarters." e Portuguese Secret Police wanted Hawke to for the U.S. by way of Zurich or Paris be- Hawke's flight plans said that was where he eaded. But Hawke insisted on returning the est way possible. He eventually talked the -police agents into letting him fly straight o New York. Two high-ranking secret police- escorted him to the Lisbon Airport, whisked hrough all the formalities and helped him ase a ticket on a commercial flight.

he drank in the Lisbon Airport lounge, e mused over the ins and outs of the over- tion business. During his sessions with the guese secret police he had been given a new powerful code word—it was Sparrow—"which



Two cast members check out B-17 in Arizona in 1961. They are Board, second from left, and Griggers, third from

would open air doors, close air mouths, and smooth over just about anything. This seemed a little melodramatic, but I accepted it."

His trip home to Ft. Lauderdale was eventless. Then, about June 18, Hawke flew to Tucson to get ready for flight No. 2. He complained to Board and Hamilton that everything had not gone smoothly as far as the airplane was concerned and he also rapped the airport controller at Santa Maria. That mixup, Hawke was told, would be taken care of promptly. He also talked to W. W. Roderick, in Winnipeg, Manitoba. Hawke says that Roderick assured him that Sparrow would now settle any such future mishaps. Then, says Hawke, "I met with a gentleman whose name was sort of Polish—like 'Cenevsky' or something like that—and he briefed me again. He was cognizant of what had happened throughout the flight. He told me he was from the U.S. Government, and he showed me a credential which I did not photostat in my mind but which looked very impressive."

The mysterious gentleman, Hawke says, told him that the United Nations would be most up- set if it was found out that the B-26's were going to Portugal. The State Department once had been asked by the Portuguese government if it would approve the sale of the planes outright; the U.S. had refused, but there was considerable sympathy with the request and—according to the mystery man—another agency took over the job of get- ting them to the proper people. That was the end of the session. Was "Cenevsky" a CIA man? Hawke is not certain.

Hawke left Tucson on June 23 at 4 A.M. after getting \$3,000 in cash from the Southern Arizona Bank & Trust Co. "There was bad weather and I had some radio trouble and the compass was not working very well," he says. He flew to Wash- ington National Airport and leave the plane there overnight for repairs while I caught a commercial flight to Miami to see my

wife on our wedding anniversary. I could get the next morning and still have plenty of t

It is well to recall here that Hawke now is u indictment for illegally exporting B-26's. why would a smuggler land a B-26 at, o places, the nation's capital, if he didn't really to? The U.S. Customs is constantly on the out for such planes. Countless B-26's are s annually on suspicion that they might be ille leaving the country. And yet Hawke fle Washington—and not without incident.

"I found my way through the murky we to Washington," Hawke recalls. "and I was f cleared to join the landing pattern with se other aircraft. I was descending behind se other planes when the engines commence backfire. The trouble was fuel starvation. I low on fuel in the tanks I was using and in scent the fuel was all going to the wrong part o tanks. I switched the tanks, and the en started again, but that wasn't the end of it.

"Unbeknownst to me I had flown over White House, which is strictly off limits. And I at a low altitude. The Control Tower was r little upset. They advised me of this over the immediately. They said, 'B-26 flying over White House please come back to the flying tern immediately.' This was while I was still ing trouble with the engines, I believe, and I them, 'Shut up, I'm busy.' A few moments la asked them again what they had said and told me that when I landed I was to report t tower because of the violation."

A Federal Aviation Agency car with a pa FAA agents inside was waiting when Hawke parked his plane. They were duly agitated. "I told me that a violation would be filed and ally it is a \$1,000 fine no matter what th cause. One doesn't threaten the life of Presi Johnson with a bomber and get away wi lightly they warned. And they weren't kid-

careful CIA student must pause and ask himself: Why, if the export B-26's was without incident, didn't the FAA, the U.S. Customs, Secret Service from the White House, FBI or somebody stop Hawke right? Had Hawke invented the whole bird thing? That's what I thought. I got a copy of the FAA report which was sent to Hawke last March at the FAA installation at Washington National Airport. It read in part:

SUMMARY OF INCIDENT: Approx. 2120Z ["Z" means Greenwich time—4:20 P.M. EST] N9422Z reported miles northwest of the airport and was directed to report downwind west of the airport. Approx. 2123Z a B-26 was observed westbound, north of the Washington Monument in P-56 [the prohibited zone over the White House]. Approx. 2124Z White House called in reference to a two-engine silver-colored aircraft in the same position and same heading. Approx. 2125Z, N9422Z landed on runway 18. Washington weather at 2127Z: ceiling broken, visibility eight miles.

The filing was signed by Facility Chief Glen Tigner, and the date of the filing was February 2, 1965. It took eight months for the report to reach Hawke, and during the interim every FAA official I questioned said that Hawke must have cooked up the whole affair; no such violation was on record.

The FAA agents questioned Hawke nearly three hours and Hawke invented the word "Sparrow" several times. I still doesn't know whether the code word is responsible for his being permitted to leave. Hawke managed to catch a plane in Miami and spent what must have been an excruciatingly fleeting hour or so with his wife. He came back in Washington by 10 A.M. the next day, February 24, and he has the airline tickets to prove he actually made the trip.

Hawke spent an hour dickering over the cost of gasoline and finally managed to wheedle four cents a gallon off the usual rate. "Every penny counted," he says. "I had to scrimp here and there, and the trip to Miami had cost me good money. You can certainly see that if I had been arrested about going to jail for twenty years for doing something illegal I bloody well wouldn't be bothered about the price of petrol."

He gassed up the bomber and revved up the engines. Then Hawke was startled to see "two men in dark suits—and I always worry about men in dark suits"—waving at him to stop the engines. They turned out to be FBI agents.

"What are you planning to do with this military plane?" one asked.

"I'm taking it to France," Hawke said.

"What are the long-range fuel tanks for?" the other FBI man wanted to know.

"So I can fly over the sea," Hawke said.

"How far can it fly with those tanks?"

Hawke told them, and they realized that the plane was not enough to avoid U.S. radar and fly undetected to the strife-torn Dominican Republic, which was, as Hawke puts it, "a place they said is in the height of fashion for smugglers."

With nothing to get under way, Hawke climbed back

into the B-26 and started up the engines again. Then two more men—"in black suits, of course"—popped up and waved for him to stop the engines. They were from the FAA, and they insisted that Hawke check out his engines with an FAA mechanic at the cost of several hours and considerable expense. Meanwhile, Hawke took the suggestion of one of the FBI men and cleared U.S. Customs at Washington National instead

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A CIA source swears Hawke got ensnared in a masterful non-CIA hoax.

of going first to Rochester, N.Y., as he had originally planned. He filed his general declaration through Canada to the Azores to Paris, and finally got ready to take off, when the weather went bad for two hours. That night fog forced a very frustrated Hawke to land in Portland, Maine. And again he was stopped, this time by two FAA men who wanted to know where he intended going with a military airplane. "I told them, and I also mentioned the code word Sparrow. One of them made a few calls, and when he came back he said I could be off without any more trouble."

The rest of flight No. 2 was pretty routine. Just to be sure there was no repetition of the first flight's delay at Santa Maria, he overflew that airport and went directly to Tancos's airfield, where he again was welcomed. Hawke was driven to Monsanto, slept at the officers' mess, and flew to New York on a commercial liner.

A week or so later, on flight No. 3, bad weather forced Hawke down in Detroit, where he cleared U.S. Customs, again without incident. Then the plane's brakes stuck and Hawke spent an hour roaring up and down the taxiway trying to ungum them. Bad weather forced him down again in London, Ontario, where Canadian Customs seized the bomber because they claimed he was carrying cargo. The "cargo" turned out to be a modification kit for the B-26, and Canadian Customs soon realized their error and let Hawke go.

In Lisbon, Hawke met with a partner of de

Montmarin's named Lucien Ber who was handling the financial matters of Sparrow in Portugal, and two Frenchmen. They advised him that the deal for 20 B-26's had been made first, questioned him intensely on whether not Hamilton Aircraft was maintaining the quality of the planes. They warned him not to do anything to attract any publicity. Hawke flew directly to Tucson to pick up No. 4. That and the others through No. 7, were entirely routine.

There was an interval of about weeks between the return of Hawke's flight No. 7 and the takeoff date of No. 8. Hawke and his wife took the time to spend a week's vacation at Board's in Jamaica, and after that, Hawke and Board and de Montmarin began traveling around the country in Board's C-46, picking up spare parts for the B-26's were already in Portugal.

But on the 10th of September something began to happen to Hawke and his companions. FAA and U.S. Customs agents in Rochester, Pittsburgh, Ocala, Fla., suddenly began taking a peculiar interest in their C-46 and cargo of B-26 spare parts and baggage. Hawke felt, he says, that there was merely some mix-up in signals. Board seemed concerned and said he was going to call people in Washington to get the Customs off our necks."

At Taylor Field in Ocala, where he insisted the C-46 should park at night, a Customs agent from Miami named Sam Johnson turned up and warned the three men not to leave

country with or without the airplane. Board assured agent Johnson that they had no plan to go anywhere but to Miami, and added they would leave all their cargo in Ocala. That was what was bothering Customs. Johnson allowed them to leave the next day.

Although more Customs agents met them at Miami International Airport and made a complete search of the plane, no arrests were made. The case, according to federal officials who were not named, still had not jelled.

But Hawke was growing suspicious, and good cause. Two days before he was finally released, Hawke noticed that two men were following him in a car. "I thought that rather funny," he says.

"I played a few games with them, turning them sharply. We eventually stopped at a crossing. I got out and approached them in my car. I was a little alarmed to see a gun in the front seat. I said, 'Who are you and why are you following me?' One of them said that 'We don't follow anybody we like, there's no law against that.'"

Then Hawke told them that if they did continue following him, he was going to go straight to the FBI. That didn't seem to faze them, and so he did go to the local FBI office.

"Please, sir," Hawke says he said to the agent on duty, "there are two men following me and I want to know who they are."

At that point, one of the two men stepped into the FBI office and asked to use the telephone. The other was, of course, Customs agent

On Thursday, September 16, just 48 hours

after the scene at FBI headquarters, U.S. Customs agent Wallace Shanley came to Hawke and gently broke the news that he was being arrested. At the time, Hawke was having a good time with the Customs men assigned to tail him. They had become good pals.

In early October a four-count indictment was brought against Hawke, Board, Grigori Montmarin, Roderick and Aero Association

'Please, sir, there are two men following me.'

there are two men following me.'

following me.'

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retained a Miami Beach lawyer-pilot in Marger and was free under \$5,000 was becoming increasingly difficult the whole affair.

One thing, Board had slipped out of the to avoid arrest, and with him, according al authorities, he carried at least \$53,000 to him by de Montmarin as payment for B-26 parts obtained outside the U.S. There sign that Board, like Hawke, was going to re charges and maintain that it was all a big of the CIA would eventually straighten out. Board was said by a friend to have protested may about the whole mess in an unsigned postmarked from Saudi Arabia. Board was xious to come home. Why had he been al to flee the U.S.? There are only lame answers question. "He got out before we were ready ke arrests," is the best any government can do.

de Montmarin—who maintains that he evely a good broker—languished in jail for four weeks before a New York lawyer fi him out. While he was in jail, his wife re in Paris to run EURAFRAIR's odd affairs. he urging of lawyer Marger, who worked arrangement with U.S. Attorney Curtin, s returned to the U.S. from Portugal (to he had gone between flights No. 5 and 6) for ment. Then he went home to California. s, too, was sure the CIA was going to put ing right; he is no longer certain.

a beginner at the game of CIA must have aware of the obvious question which arises: seven—not one, two, three or five, but the bombers leave the U.S. and fly to without the vigilant CIA being aware of The answer of the CIA, and the other ent agencies concerned, is that "an un-

fortunate mistake" was made somewhere along the line. In that case, one must wonder just how reliable the CIA's intelligence reporting is when a CIA agent like Hawke can buzz the White House with a B-26 and still be in the illegal export business five planes later. A CIA student's alternate theory: If the CIA was not directly involved, then somebody at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., certainly averted his eyes.

There is also the really ticklish issue of justice being done. For even if the U.S. mounts a massive case for conspiracy against Hawke & Co., how can the prosecution remove the nagging suspicion that the CIA was actually behind it all? The CIA can swear it is clean, but admittedly, that is all part of the CIA game.

To complicate matters, Sparrow has become a matter of concern in the United Nations. At the Trusteeship Committee of the U. N. General Assembly late last year, any chance of getting at the whole truth may have been diminished again.

Hungarian Delegate Zoltan Szilagyi had charged that the U.S. had instructed the secret delivery of the B-26's to Portugal. But Mrs. Eugenie Anderson (a U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations), although admitting that the planes had been delivered to Portugal, said they got there "without the U.S. authorities having the slightest knowledge of the operation." Then Mrs. Anderson proceeded to all but convict Hawke & Co. before their trial. She said, according to the Provisional Summary Record of the United Nations Fourth Committee, that "those concerned had been indicted on October 6 (1965) ... for exporting aircraft without a license. The reason why the individuals in question had to resort to fraudulent methods in order to get the aircraft out of the U.S., and had been prosecuted for so doing, was precisely that the U.S. Government ... had forbidden the provision of arms or military

equipment to Portugal without assurances they would not be used in Portuguese territory. The U.S. authorities had made known to the Portuguese government its deep concern over the transgression of known U.S. arms policy. . . ."

Pity poor U.S. Attorney Curtin. If he comes to trial as expected, and Hawke and colleagues are set free, the Soviet bloc and Afr delegates in the United Nations will, according highly qualified U.N. observers, charge that Sparrow thus had been proven a CIA operation that Mrs. Anderson lied. So Curtin has more t a newsworthy conviction riding on the outcome of the Sparrow case. He feels under pressure to get away with, in the courtroom and outside.


Again, in all fairness to the CIA, I must point out that there is the chance that Hawke got himself ensnared in a masterfully complex hoax CIA lawyer I spoke with not long ago insists that was the real answer, although he, too, admitted that he would never tell the truth in national security matters. With its U.N. implications, Sparrow is a matter of national security.

"Then how can I believe you even if I realize it is possible that Hawke was actually duped Board and de Montmarin?" I asked.

"You just have to," he said.

"Then how can you explain Board's easy escape the seven successful missions, the fact that nobody has tried to get Board sent back here for trial and all the other questions?"

"I can't tell you," he said. "But I'll tell you one thing. We're working up a hell of a case against those guys. I think we'll win because we're really in the clear this time."



to trouble with Canadian Customs in June, 1965, when flier John Richard Hawke put down at Torbay, Newfoundland, prior to his first flight over the Atlantic to Portugal.

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**THE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE OFFENDER:
A REVIEW OF CURRENT RESEARCH
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PERSONNEL SECURITY**

Suzanne Wood

August 1988

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<p>At the request of the Navy Appeals Board which is sometimes required to adjudicate cases of people requiring security clearances who have histories of committing child sexual abuse, a literature review was conducted on child sexual abuse offenders. This review, based on Finkelhor's <u>Sourcebook on Child Sexual Abuse</u>, covers the areas of offender profiles, treatment efficacy and recidivism rates. Theories of adult sexual interest in children are described according to Finkelhor's typology, but it is emphasized that adult sexual relationships with children are not explainable with single theories. The paucity of good research on offender recidivism and on efficacy of treatment is described. A bibliography is appended.</p>				
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THE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE OFFENDER:
A REVIEW OF CURRENT RESEARCH
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Preface

Part of PERSEREC's mission, in addition to performing research and analysis for DOD to improve personnel security procedures, programs and policies, is to provide educational assistance to DOD agencies on personnel security matters. This technical note represents PERSEREC's response to a request from the Navy Appeals Board for help in conducting a literature review in the area of child sexual abuse--offender profiles, treatment efficacy and recidivism rates.

PERSEREC will provide similar research reports on various topics relevant to screening, selection, and adjudication of personnel requiring security clearances.

Carson K. Eoyang
Director

PERS-TN-88-002

August 1988

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Summary

Issue and Background

The Navy Appeals Board is required from time to time to adjudicate relatively rare cases of people requiring Top Secret or SCI clearances who have histories of committing child sexual abuse. Often these individuals have been declared cured. This situation has posed a problem for members of the Appeals Board, many of whom are as yet unfamiliar with practice and research in the area of child sexual abuse.

Objective

PERSEREC was asked to review research literature in these areas in order to educate the Appeals Board on current theories on offender recidivism and treatment efficacy.

Approach

An extensive bibliographic search was undertaken on the research on child sexual abuse, offender profiling, recidivism rates and efficacy of treatment. Finkelhor's Sourcebook on Child Sexual Abuse was found to be the only work that reviewed all recent literature and was thus used as the basis for examining the subject.

Results

Theories of adult sexual interest in children were described according to Finkelhor's typology, emphasizing that adult sexual relationships with children cannot be explained by single-factor theories.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Due to the paucity of good research on offender recidivism and on treatment efficacy, personnel security adjudicators were advised to consult one or more of the books reviewed in this research and, lacking real guidance from current research, consider the special circumstances of each individual case in assessing the personal strengths and weaknesses as they pertain to security reliability.

Foreword

From time to time the Navy Appeals Board is required to adjudicate cases of people requiring Top Secret or SCI clearances who have histories of committing child sexual abuse.* Often these individuals have been convicted and have received treatment for long periods of time. Many have been declared cured by therapists, ministers and parole and probation officers and consequently may be suitable candidates for high level security clearances. This situation has posed a dilemma for members of the Appeals Board, many of whom are as yet unfamiliar with practice and research in the field of child sexual abuse. PERSEREC was asked to conduct a literature review in the general areas of offender profiles, treatment efficacy and recidivism rates. This review is intended to inform Board members about the theoretical and empirical work on child sexual abuse offenders. An extensive bibliography is appended for the reader requiring indepth information.

*See "Definitions" at end of this paper.

Table of Contents

Preface	i
Summary	ii
Foreword	iv
Introduction	1
Research on the Offender	1
Emotional Congruence	4
Sexual Arousal	4
Blockage	4
Disinhibition	5
Research on Offender Recidivism	6
Research on Efficacy of Treatment	7
Significance for Personnel Security	8
Definitions	11
Bibliography	13
General	13
The Offender	15
Treatment	20

Introduction

Child sexual abuse is often referred to as the "last frontier of child abuse." The battered-child syndrome was first described in France in 1860 by Ambroise Tardieu. However, it was not until the early 1960s that the phenomenon of child abuse was again recognized as a major issue. This increased attention resulted from the publication of C. Henry Kempe's 1962 pivotal article on the battered-child. The following decade witnessed a confirmation of Kempe's work by other professionals and scholars in the field. Studies of incidence, epidemiology, characteristics of abusing families, and other variables appeared in the literature. Child abuse was found to be an alarmingly common occurrence across all social classes.

The specific issue of sexual abuse of children emerged in the mid-1970s and has developed quickly. There has been a dramatic increase in the number of cases reported to authorities, and the public has become aware of the epidemic proportions of the problem through media attention. Professionals and academic researchers have also shown an interest in the subject, resulting in a growing body of literature.

Finkelhor (1987) has conducted a thorough review of the present literature on child sexual abuse. As might be expected, special methodological problems confront researchers in this area. Victims, offenders, and other family members are loath to discuss such a delicate subject; this is particularly true in the case of incest. Additionally, research interest is recent and researchers are scattered across a number of disciplines. This retards communication and fertilization across disciplines. Finkelhor's major problem in reviewing the new literature and linking it with older research is the disparate quality of the work. It is marred by "inadequate samples, oversimplistic research design, conflicting definitions, and unsophisticated analyses." Despite these problems, certain common findings emerge. It is these patterns which are the topic of this review.

Research on the Offender

Most theories of adult sexual interest in children derive from psychoanalytic theory and, more recently, from theories of social learning and feminism. Finkelhor criticizes these efforts for their single-factor explanation and their inability to handle the full range of pedophilic behavior; no single factor can begin to explain child sexual abuse in its diverse manifestations. Finkelhor classifies the theories of adult sexual interest in children into four psychological categories: emotional congruence, sexual arousal, blockage,

and disinhibition. These sets of theories answer respectively the following questions: (1) Why does a person find sexual relations with a child emotionally gratifying and congruent? (2) Why is a person sexually aroused by a child? (3) Why is a person frustrated or blocked from obtaining sexual and emotional gratification from more conventional sources? and (4) Why is a person not deterred by social constraints and inhibitions against having sexual relations with a child.

TABLE 1

Summary of Empirical Evidence for
Explanations of Child Molesting^a

Theory	Evidence
(1) <u>Emotional congruence</u>	
Children attractive because of lack of dominance	One positive study.
Arrested development/immaturity	Some support but inferences weak.
Low self-esteem	Some support but inferences weak.
Mastery of trauma through repetition	Several studies show frequent histories of sexual abuse in offenders' backgrounds.
Identification with aggression	Several studies show frequent histories of sexual abuse in offenders' backgrounds.
Narcissism	Untested.
Male socialization to dominance	Untested.
(2) <u>Sexual arousal</u>	
Heightened arousal to children	Clear experimental evidence except for incest offenders.
Conditioning from early childhood	Several studies show frequent histories of sexual abuse in offenders' backgrounds.

^aAdapted from Finkelhor(1986).

TABLE 1 (continued)

Modeling from earlier childhood	Several studies show frequent histories of sexual abuse in offenders' backgrounds.
Hormonal abnormalities	Mixed evidence.
Misattribution of arousal ("parental" or "affectionate" labels mistaken for sexual by some individuals)	Untested.
Socialization through pornography or advertising	Untested.
(3) <u>Blockage</u>	
Difficulty relating to adult females	Generally positive evidence.
Inadequate social skills	Suggested by 2 studies.
Sexual anxiety	Some support from uncontrolled studies.
Unresolved Oedipal dynamics	Family problems evident, but not necessarily the ones Oedipal theory would predict.
Repressive norms about sexual behavior	Suggested by 2 studies.
(4) <u>Disinhibition</u>	
Impulse disorder (e.g. poor impulse control)	True for some small group of offenders, but not for all.
Senility	Negative.
Mental retardation	Negative.
Alcohol	Present in great many instances, exact role unclear.
Failure of incest avoidance	Two studies show higher rates of abuse in stepfather families.
Situational stress	Only anecdotal evidence.
Patriarchal/cultural norms	Untested.

Emotional Congruence

These theories assume offenders have an emotional defect such that children are suitable sexual objects. Some theories of pedophilia (e.g., Howells, 1979) suggest that abusers select children for sexual partners because children have some driving emotional meaning for them. Another (Hammer & Glueck, 1957) posits that child molesters suffer from arrested psychosexual development, are emotionally immature and, therefore, relate to the child at the child's level. Still another theory maintains that molesters have a low self-esteem and few social skills so that relating to children gives them a feeling of omnipotence and control (e.g., Loss & Glancy, 1983). It has also been proposed that abusers, in relating to children, try to overcome the effects of some trauma in their own childhood by visiting a similar trauma on a child, who is less powerful (e.g., Howells, 1981).

Sexual Arousal

Theories grouped under this heading assume that early conditioning accounts for sexual preference for children, i.e., early sexual experiences with children leads to a sexual fixation on children (Wenet, Clark & Hunner, 1981). Some researchers (e.g., Atwood & Howell, 1971; Quinsey et al., 1975) assert that pedophiles have an arousal preference for children, but the preference may be mediated by the notion of the relationship between victim and offender. For example, Quinsey et al. (1979) found that incestuous child molesters have more appropriate sexual age preferences (adults) than those who are nonincestuous. One consistent finding in this area is that many child molesters were themselves the subjects of sexual abuse while children (e.g., Groth & Burgess, 1979). It is hypothesized that such experiences for various reasons condition arousal to children in later life.

Blockage

These theories assert that child molestation occurs because offenders are blocked from satisfying sexual needs through conventional relationships. Often the blockage is attributed to problems in the maternal relationship which make it difficult to relate to other women (e.g., Hammer & Glueck, 1957; Gillespie, 1964). Trauma in early sexual experiences is seen as another possible cause for blockage. Related theories suggest that child molesters are timid, awkward and have poor social skills which prevent them from attaining adult relationships with women (e.g., Gebhard et al., 1965; Langevin, 1983).

Research on Offender Recidivism

It is unfortunate that recidivism, one of the most important issues for policy in connection with child abuse, has received so little attention. Professionals who work with child molestation offenders have scant information available to predict whether a person will continue to commit this crime. Finkelhor uncovered ten recidivism studies, and these are difficult to compare because of different research designs and variables. The results are presented below.

TABLE 2

Recidivism Rates from Various Studies of Convicted Offenders

	Recidivism Rate (percentage)		N	Years of Follow-Up	% of Sample Who Are Child Molesters
	Any Offense	Sex Offense			
Christiansen et al.	24	11	3175	14-24	68
Fitch	42	25	139	4-9	100
Groth	30	13	194	3	a
Frisbie & Dondis female victims		18	1035	1-7	100
male victims		35	428	1-7	100
Hall		23	313	5	100
Meyer & Romero	44	6	48	10	100
Prentky	50	30	137	1-24	100
Radzinowicz	28	18	404	4	100
Soothill & Gibbons	48	23	174	23	85
Tracy et al.	23	13	141	5	<52

^aCombines 122 untreated and 72 treated sex offenders, exact offense unspecified.

The percentage of sex offenders who subsequently committed a specifically sexual offense ranged from 6% to 35%.

Finkelhor breaks down the blockage category into two types: developmental blockages in which a person appears to be prevented for some reason from moving into the adult heterosexual stage of development, and situational blockages where a person with seeming adult sexual interests is prevented from normal sexual activity by some temporary crisis. The blockage theory which receives most support is that sex abusers for various reasons have problems relating to adult females (Hammer & Glueck, 1957) and perhaps even to adults in general (Panton, 1978).

Disinhibition

In this category, child sexual molestation results from ineffective moral inhibitors that do not prevent abhorrent behavior. Some theorists have suggested that child molesters have generally poor impulse control (e.g., Gebhard et al., 1965; Groth et al., 1982). Situational factors may also contribute to abusive behavior. Stressors such as unemployment or loss of a loved one are recognized as factors which might lower a person's inhibition to pedophilic behavior (e.g., Mohr et al., 1964). Many theories see alcohol as playing a major role in the commission of sexual offenses against children (e.g., Rada, 1976). Also incest against stepdaughters, more common than against daughters, is theorized to be a weakening of the normal incest avoidance mechanisms developed naturally by biological fathers over years of bonding and care-giving (e.g., Finkelhor, 1980; Russell, 1986). The strongest theories of disinhibition implicate alcohol as the major contributing factor in sexual molestation, with abuse of stepdaughters considered a special case because the incest taboo is severely weakened.

It cannot be overemphasized that adult sexual relationships with children are not explainable with single theories. While it is true that many molesters have a history of child abuse during their childhood, most of the studies contending this were conducted on imprisoned child molesters--a small sample of all offenders and a group whose behavior was so compulsive and flagrant as to require imprisonment. A high incidence of sexual abuse in the backgrounds of this more pathological group is to be expected. In any case, it is clear there are many molesters who do not have a history of childhood abuse. Moreover, not all people with such a history become molesters.

Finkelhor cautions these results probably underestimate the amount of recidivism since researchers only counted offenses that came to the attention of the authorities, and often only those that resulted in conviction. On the other hand, the samples were taken from populations most likely to reoffend in the first place--hardened cases in prison. One other study (Smith & Wolfe, 1985) with a nonincarcerated population reported unusually low recidivism rates (3%). However, the information on re-offenses was not obtained from records but from self-reports or reports from family members or police; this may explain the low rate. Abel et al. (1984) reported that of a group of 24 outpatient child molesters 21% had committed another sexual offense.

Finkelhor suggests that another problem with these studies is the short follow-up time. The only long-term follow-up study (Soothill & Gibbons, 1978) indicated that recidivism increased dramatically with a longer period of time.

There is solid agreement among researchers concerning who is most likely to reoffend: abusers of boys as opposed to girls (Frisbee & Dondis, 1965; Radinowicz, 1957) and exhibitionists (Frisbee & Dondis, 1965; Meyer & Romero, 1980). Studies also agree that incest offenders tend to have lower recidivism rates than other offenders against girls (Frisbee & Dondis, 1965). Once a daughter or stepdaughter has grown up, incest offenders are less likely than other child molesters to reoffend (Abel et al., 1984) although there are cases of men who at a later point in their lives sexually abuse their grandchildren (Goodwin, Cormeir, & Owen, 1983).

Other characteristics associated with higher recidivism are prior arrest for a sex offense in adulthood and a self-reported history of indecent exposure (Meyer & Romero, 1980). It also seems likely that offenders who begin offending at a younger age continue to commit more crimes (Christensen et al., 1965).

Research on Efficacy of Treatment

Finkelhor decries the lack of helpful research in the area of treatment efficacy. Only three studies directly compare treatment and nontreatment groups. Of these, Meyer and Romero (1980) find no difference between the groups after ten years; Hall (1985) finds no difference between groups after five years. Groth (1983) reports treatment differences after five years, but Finkelhor claims the short follow-up measurement flawed the study. There are many studies (cf. Kelley, 1982, for a review) which describe treatment improvements, but Finkelhor cautions these are short-term successes

and do not address the problem of reoffense in the longer run. In addition, Finkelhor points out that there have been many advances and innovations recently in treatment techniques which have not yet been studied in terms of long-term recidivism.

Significance for Personnel Security

Finkelhor's comment about the absence of evaluations of good treatment programs in relation to long-term recidivism is a somewhat disappointing outcome of this review. In the absence of any definitive estimates of recidivism probabilities, adjudicators can only fall back on conventional wisdom (e.g., frequency, severity, and recency of offenses) which are largely unsubstantiated by scientific evidence.

It is difficult for the average person not to consider child sexual abuse, which runs the gamut from simple exhibitionism to fondling to rape and other physical violence, as a heinous crime. A child is psychologically and often physically harmed, and the reaction of a normal person is abhorrence. The commission of such acts demonstrates a character defect in the perpetrator which flies in the face of conventionally accepted behavior standards.

Some may argue that the sexual offender, whether reformed or still active, poses no threat to national security. The rationale for this assertion is that as long as the offender continues to perform the job efficiently and loyally protects sensitive information he/she is entitled to a private life free from scrutiny. The counter-argument suggests that crimes against children are extremely serious and that a person who, for whatever reason, engages in sexually abusive behavior against children may lay himself open to pressures of blackmail or extortion. There is sufficient social approbation of child sexual abusers that few if any of them are willing to acknowledge publicly their sexual orientation. Consequently fear of exposure or prosecution would make child abusers especially vulnerable targets of hostile intelligence services. If the theories of child sexual abuse discussed earlier are true, child molestation may well cluster with other personality "weaknesses" that could be exploited by foreign agents.

There is no doubt that therapists believe sex abusers can be cured, and doubtless many are. A penitent and willing client will spend two years in therapy and may go on to live a good and productive life. The evidence on recidivism and treatment efficacy is equivocal at best. There is little information on treatment effects and the results of the few studies of recidivism are uneven. Controlled, long-term

studies are clearly needed. This is a relatively new field of research endeavor and it is premature to make definitive recommendations without more detailed research.

It is suggested that meantime the Board should refer further to Finkelhor's book, A Source Book on Child Sexual Abuse, and to the bibliography appended to this paper as a way of familiarizing themselves with this subject. There are certain kinds of child sexual abuse which research has shown to have high recidivism rates. These are abusers of boys as opposed to girls; exhibitionists; persons with prior arrests for sex offense in adulthood and a self-reported history of indecent exposure; and offenders who begin offending at a younger age. Future research will give more insight into the causes of child sexual abuse, recidivism rates and treatment outcomes for abusers.

Definitions

Literature about sexual abuse of children often uses terms interchangeably. Precise definitions have been offered by Ruth S. and C. Henry Kempe in Child Abuse; Robert L. Geiser in Hidden Victims: The Sexual Abuse of Children; and Fay Honey Knopp's Retraining Adult Sex Offenders: Methods & Models. The following definitions are generally accepted:

- Child sexual abuse: The exploitation of immature children and adolescents in sexual activities they do not fully comprehend, to which they are unable to give informed consent, or that violate the social taboos of family roles. These include:
- Pedophilia: An adult's preference for or addiction to sexual relations with children. This often involves an adult's nonviolent sexual contact with a child. Can never be cured, but the behavior may be brought under control.
- Child Rape: Sexual intercourse with a child without his/her consent, by force or threats of force. No cure for an aggressive sociopath who commits this crime.
- Molestation: Various forms of sexual contact between an adult and a child short of actual intercourse. Considered as equivalent to rape by some.
- Incest: Sexual acts committed on young children, forceful or otherwise, by family members, often continued over many years. Treatable.
- Paraphiliac: Person with compulsive thoughts and urges to carry out sexually aggressive behaviors.

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
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Attachment to:
TCS 7902-60-KH

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SUMMARY

OFFICE	TALENT Clearances	Present T-KH Billets	Additional T-KH Billets Needed	Total T-KH Billets Requires
DCI				
DDI				
DDS				
DDP				
TOTAL				

50X1

TOP SECRET

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Attachment to:
TCS 7902-60-KH

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR/INTELLIGENCE



50X1

1. Directs production of Intelligence in CIA.
2. Policy direction of CIA activities in exploitation of T-KH Material.
3. Supervises CIA responsibilities in services of common concern to Intelligence Community on exploitation of T-KH material.
4. Formulates CIA Requirements for collection by satellite and other reconnaissance systems.

TOP SECRET

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KEYHOLE CHANNELS
ONLY

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ONLY

TCP SECRET

Attachment to:
TCS 7902-60-KH

TALENT AND T-KH CLEARANCES FOR THE DD/I AREA OF CIA

	Talent Clearances	Present T-KH Billets Authorized	Additional T-KH Billets Needed	Total T-KH Billets Required
Senior Officials				
Analysts and Estimators				
Photo- Interpreters				

50X1

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**TOP SECRET
OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE**

**Attachment to:
TCS 7902-60-KH**



50X1

1. Supports PIC and other members of the intelligence community with collateral information for the effective exploitation of T-KH material.
2. Contributes collateral material to SAC and other Air Force targeting activities. A limited number of T-KH clearances are essential in order that this work may be done with maximum efficiency.

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ONLY**

TOP SECRET

**Attachment to:
TCS 7902-60-KH**

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE



50X1

1. Uses T-KH material on guided missiles, atomic energy, aircraft, and other military fields in the production of current intelligence for the White House, Secretary of State, Joint Chiefs of Staff, etc.
2. Participates in the formulation of requirements for collection by satellite and other reconnaissance vehicles.

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Attachment to:
TCS 7902-60-KH

50X1

1. Acts as the substantive staff for the DCI and USIB in drafting and coordinating national estimates related to Soviet capabilities and other matters of the greatest importance to US national policy. It is essential that key members of the Board of National Estimates and the ONE Staff be cleared in order that the results of the KEYHOLE program may be reflected in the most authoritative US intelligence publications.

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**TOP SECRET
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS**

**Attachment to:
TCS 7902-60-KH**

50X1

1. Produces intelligence on the production and deployment of guided missiles and a wide range of economic activity of great importance to Soviet military capabilities.
2. Brings technical background to the assistance of the photo interpreters in the accurate assessment of photography.
3. Takes part in the formulation of requirements for collection by satellite and other reconnaissance systems.

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TOP SECRET

**Attachment to:
TCS 7902-60-KH**

OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE

50X1

1. Produces scientific and technical intelligence on nuclear weapons, guided missiles, chemical and biological warfare, and a number of other high priority intelligence subjects related to Soviet capabilities.
2. Brings technical background to the assistance of the photo interpreter in making the proper analysis of photography. A substantial number of these people will actually work with the photo interpreters.
3. Takes part in the formulation of requirement for collection by satellite and other reconnaissance systems.

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KEYHOLE CHANNELS
ONLY**

TOP SECRET
PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE CENTER

**Attachment to:
TCS 7902-60-KH**



50X1

1. Major processor and manager of the exploitation of the T-KH material. The requested increases in billets is a minimum that will be needed to keep up with the increasing work load imposed by this high priority material.

TOP SECRET

**HANDLE VIA TALENT
KEYHOLE CHANNELS
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ONLY**

TOP SECRET

**Attachment to:
TCS 7902-60-KH**

OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

TALENT Clearances	Present T-KH Billets	Additional T-KH Billets Needed	Total T-KH Billets Required

50X1

1. Directs and manages T-KH collection capability.
2. Provides T/O for communications operations for transmission to the field.
3. Provides planning, mounting and control for other programs on basis of information obtained through T-KH.

TOP SECRET

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EX-1
Job. 65-~~45~~ Box 4
Solder #2
Item #3



Communist Interrogation and Indoctrination of "Enemies of the States"

Analysis of Methods Used by the Communist State Police (A Special Report)

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AND

HAROLD G. WOLFF, M.D.,

NEW YORK

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HAROLD G. WOLFF, M.D., New York

Table of Contents

I: Introduction	19. Public Confessions
II: Practices of the KGB	20. Punishment
1. Background of the Russian State Police	III: Practices in Communist China
2. Present Structure of the KGB	1. A Comparison of Chinese Methods with Those of the KGB
3. The Suspect	2. Background and Organization of the Chinese State Police
4. The Accumulation of Evidence	3. The Suspects
5. The Arrest Procedure	4. Investigation and Arrest
6. The Detention Prison	5. Chinese Prison Routine
7. The Regimen Within the Detention Prison	6. The Interrogator
8. Effects of the Regimen Within the Isolation Cell	7. The Interrogation Procedure
9. The Feelings and Attitudes of the Prisoner During the Isolation Regimen	8. The Indoctrination Procedure in the Group Cell
10. Other Pressures of the Isolation Regimen	9. The Reaction of the Prisoner to the Procedure in the Cell
11. The Interrogator	10. The Conversion
12. Interrogation	11. The Trial
13. Pressures Applied by the Interrogator	12. The "Brain-Washed"
14. The "Friendly Approach"	13. Effectiveness of Chinese Communist Indoctrination Procedures
15. The Course of the Interrogation	IV: Relation of State Police Procedures, Military Interrogation, and Indoctrination of Civilians and Prisoners of War in Communist Countries
16. The Psychological Interaction Between Prisoner and Interrogator	V: Some Theoretical Considerations
17. The Reaction of the Prisoner to the Interrogation	VI: Epitome
18. The "Trial"	

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New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center.

The information contained in this paper was assembled at a time when the authors were serving as consultants to the Department of Defense. The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the U. S. Government. The authors wish to acknowledge that the data upon which this report was based were accumulated through the selfless efforts of many able people, who must remain anonymous.

I. Introduction

THE COMMUNISTS are skilled in the extraction of information from prisoners and in making prisoners do their bidding. It has appeared that they can force men to confess to crimes which have not been committed, and then, apparently, to believe in the truth of their confessions and express sympathy and gratitude toward those who have imprisoned them. Many have found it hard to understand that the Communists do not possess new and remarkable techniques of psychological manipulation. Some have recalled the confessions of men such as Cardinal Mindszenty and William Oatis and the unusual behavior of the old Bolsheviks at the purge trials in the 1930's, and have seen an alarming parallel. These prisoners were men of intelligence, ability, and strength of character. They had every reason to oppose their captors. Their confessions were palpably untrue. Such behavior is, if anything, more difficult to explain than that of some of our prisoners of war in Korea.

The techniques used by the Communists have been the subject of speculation. A number of theories about them have been advanced, most of them suggesting that these techniques have been based upon some modification of the conditioned reflex techniques of I. P. Pavlov, the Russian neurophysiologist. The term "brain washing," originated by a reporter who interviewed Chinese refugees in Hong Kong, has caught the public fancy and has gained wide acceptance. Various authors have attempted to provide a scientific definition for this term. This has had the effect of confirming the general impression that "brain washing" is an esoteric technique for the manipulation of human behavior, designed by "scientific investigators" on the basis of laboratory experiments and controlled observations, and producing highly predictable results.

Many of the public speculations about "brain washing" are not supported by the available evidence. However, the Communists do make an orderly attempt to obtain information from their prisoners, and to convert their prisoners to forms of behavior and belief acceptable to their captors. They have had some success in their efforts, and this success has had a good deal of propaganda value for them. For this reason, if for no other, it is important that we have as clear an understanding as possible about how these methods originated, how they are applied, their effectiveness, and their purpose.

The information contained in this report was obtained from a number of sources. Details of the Communist arrest and interrogation systems, and a great deal of information about the purposes, attitudes, and training of those who administer them, were obtained from experts in the area, who for security reasons must remain anonymous.

Knowledge of the prisoners' reactions to their experiences was obtained by the direct observation of persons recently released from Communist prisons. Some of these observations continued for weeks and were supplemented by follow-up observations over periods of months. They included complete physical, neurological, and psychiatric examinations, and often psychological testing as well. They were supplemented by information supplied by families, friends, and former associates. Among those studied intensively were military and civilian prisoners of diverse ranks and backgrounds, women as well as men, defectors and resisters, persons "brain-washed" and "not brain-washed," some who admittedly cooperated with their captors and some who said they did not.

In supplement to this, pertinent information from investigations carried out

by the U. S. Army and the U. S. Air Force and from the material assembled for the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War has been utilized. The very large public literature on these subjects has been reviewed also, and drawn upon when it was helpful. Finally, various laboratory and clinical investigations have been carried out in order to throw light upon the psychological and physiological processes involved in some of the interrogation and indoctrination procedures.

The evidence from every source has been consistent with that from the others and provides a basis for confidence in the validity of the statements which are made in this report and the conclusions which have been drawn from them, which may be summarized thus:

1. The interrogation methods used by the state police in Communist countries are elaborations and refinements of police practices, many of which were known and used before the Russian Communist Revolution.
2. The principles and practices used by the Communist state police in the development of suspects, the accumulation of evidence, and the carrying out of arrest, detention, interrogation, trial, and punishment are known. The effects of these upon prisoners are known also.
3. The "confessions" obtained by Communist state police are readily understandable as results of the methods used.
4. Communist methods of indoctrinating prisoners of war were developed by the Russians and subsequently refined by the Chinese. These methods and their effects are known also.
5. Chinese methods of dealing with political prisoners and "enemies of the state" were adapted from those of the Russians.
6. The intensive indoctrination of political prisoners is a practice primarily used by the Chinese Communists. The methods used in this indoctrination are known, and their effects are understandable.

Part II. Practices of the KGB

1. Background of the Russian State Police

It is illuminating to consider Communist behavior in the light of the doctrines espoused by those who are committed to Communism. Lenin and the other old Bolsheviks who established the Russian Communist Party had spent most of their lives as underground revolutionaries and terrorists, as prisoners, as exiles in Siberia, and as refugees and plotters in various parts of Europe. They accepted behavior which would have been called criminal had it not been carried out in the name of political reform. The unique contributions which they made to Communism were their willingness to use any means in order to attain Socialist ends, their insistence upon religious dedication to the Party, and their demand for unquestioned obedience to Party directives. Their chief concern was not with ideals, but with means of attaining power, ostensibly for the Party and "the people."

In the Byzantine Empire, from which the Russians received much of their cultural heritage, internal espionage and the arbitrary exercise of power by a bureaucracy reporting only to the Emperor were prominent features. As Russia developed from feudalism into a national state under Ivan the Terrible, a centralized, independent, and all-powerful bureaucracy was established, responsible only to the monarch. Subsequent Czars were perhaps less terrible than Ivan, but no less ruthless. The chancery of the Imperial Court was always independent and arbitrary, and the "rights of individual men" of all ranks never had the meaning in Russia which they had in Western Europe, even under absolute monarchs. In all of the period prior to 1917 the secret police system

in Russia was probably the most highly organized, effective, and powerful of that of any European state.

By the early decades of the present century, most of the features which characterized present-day secret police systems had already been evolved, and were exhibited by the Czarist Okhrana. The Okhrana at that time was nation-wide, and centrally directed. It was empowered to make arrests and to punish arbitrarily without regard for other legal institutions. Its operations were secret; they were concealed from other arms of the government and the armed services, as well as from the general population. It operated through a great number of spies and informers, who were recruited by payment, threat, or compromise from among the general population, and especially from among criminals and those suspected of political activity against the state. Its apparatus extended even into the highest arms of all branches of the government; neither officials nor private citizens were immune from suspicion or arrest by it.

The Okhrana had learned to use many modern secret police procedures also. It had means of getting people to implicate themselves in criminal activity when there was a desire to compromise them or their associates. It shared with other police systems practices which had developed over a period of many years and which experience had shown to be effective in extracting information and confessions from persons suspected of crimes. These methods were known to police systems all over the world, and many of them are still in use at the present day.

Prisoners of the Okhrana were aware that they could be held indefinitely without trial, under very severe conditions of inadequate food, filth, lack of sanitation or exercise, and continuous interrogation. They knew that ultimately they might be banished or executed arbitrarily, if they did not die of other causes. All of this knowledge, and all of the pressures of their treatment, acted powerfully upon those who were exposed to it. It would be wrong to suppose that the Czarist police were either as effective or as thorough as those in modern Russia and other Communist states, but many of the practices used by these modern Communist police have been in use for many years and were well known long before the Communist Revolution.

Reform of the prison system was one of the foremost tenets of all of the prerevolutionary socialist parties, to which Bolsheviks subscribed no less than others. As far as the Bolsheviks were concerned, these reforms might be generally stated thus: The secret police apparatus was to be abolished outright, and those who had taken part in it were to be punished; the old prison system was to be abolished also. In the new state, the police would be the friends of the people and the guardian of their interests. Those who had committed crimes would not be tried before "arbitrary courts," with all the legal apparatus used in Western nations, for the courts in Western nations were thought of as arms of bourgeois tyranny, in which the wealthy secured justice and the poor injustice. Communist courts would dispense Communist justice. In the Communist state, the criminal would be detained in a place of detention. This would be not a prison but a place in which the accused could sit down with those who arrested him and discuss the crimes which he had committed and the reasons why he had committed them. No one would be arrested unless it was clear that he had committed a crime. If the prisoner would not admit his crimes, or if he were not aware that he had committed criminal acts, by persuasion and

teaching he would be brought to understand the nature of his crimes and the reason why they were injurious to the interest of the people. Having come to understand his crimes, and the necessity for his punishment, the prisoner and the court might agree upon the type of punishment and reeducation which should be carried out. The prisoner would have an opportunity to make a written statement of his deposition, with a declaration that no force had been put upon him in order to obtain it. After the investigation of his case had been completed, he would be taken before the court, where he could explain his crimes, and his sentence would be passed. It was only after this sentencing that he would actually be put in prison. Nor would the new prisons be like the old. In them, the prisoner would be allowed to reform and rehabilitate himself by wholesome work and reeducation, instead of being incarcerated in a cell. Ultimately he would rejoin the socialist society as a "new man."

After the 1917 Revolution the Czarist secret police system was abolished. For a few months Russia operated without secret police. But when they were threatened by counter-revolution and chaos, it did not take the Communists long to turn to the idea of reestablishing a secret police system, this time controlled by the Communist Party. In November, 1917, Lenin established the "Cheka," or "Extraordinary Commission," for the suppression of counter-revolutionary activities, with the power of summary arrest, judgment, and execution. Under this euphemism the secret police system was reincarnated. At its head Lenin placed Felix Dzerzhinsky, a dedicated revolutionary, who gathered around him a group of zealous young Bolsheviks that were regarded as the cream of the Communist Party, the guardians of its principles and its power. It was long a proud boast among Communists when one said that he was "an old Chekist." But these men also shared a conspiratorial background, a willingness to use any means to attain their ends, and a freedom from "bourgeois morality."

The Chekists thought of themselves as members of a new order sweeping away the old, but what they inherited was the old Czarist prison system and all of the apparatus that went with it. They also inherited the concepts and attitudes of old Russia to a much greater degree than is generally realized, for these were the concepts and attitudes under which they and all other Russians had been reared. Just what proportion of the former personnel of the Okhrana and the old Russian prison system was utilized by the Cheka at the outset is not known; but it is a safe assumption that at the working level many of the police, the jailers, the spies, and the investigators used by the Cheka had been previously employed by its predecessor.* This is not to say that the Chekists did not set up their apparatus in accordance with Communist theory. It is characteristic of the Communists that they organize all of their institutions in a manner which is nominally in accordance with their theory. A rational and idealistic purpose is ascribed to every aspect of their actions. This is no less true of the police system than of any other segment of the Communist state.

Since that time the secret police system in Russia has passed through a number of reorganizations and has appeared under several names. The relation between the secret police system and the Ministry of Internal Affairs is confusing to those not intimately acquainted with the ramifications of the Soviet bureaucracy, for this Ministry also has been reorganized under a number of

* In this connection it is of interest that the Communist parties of Eastern Europe have absorbed many former Nazis and police operatives from the old regime into their new police system.

names, and from time to time the state police have been under its nominal jurisdiction. It is a popular custom to use the same initials to denote both the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the secret police system, but it is important to distinguish between the two. Since the purging of Beria, in 1953, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and the State Police (KGB—Committee for State Security) have been administratively separate. In this report we shall refer to the Soviet State Police as the KGB. Where the terms Cheka, GPU, OGPU, NKVD, and MVD are used, it is understood that they refer to the state police functions of these former organizations, and not to their other functions, which were various.

There is a wealth of evidence that the methods of pressure, interrogation, and persuasion which are now used by state police throughout the Communist world had been developed in all of their essentials before the purge trials of 1936-1939. The differences between these methods and those which we can assume were inherited from the Okhrana in 1918 are chiefly improvements of organization and refinements of technique and the addition of the persuasive activities of the interrogator with his Communist logic. Tradition has it that these refinements were introduced by the Cheka. According to one report, Dzerzhinsky himself designed the methods of the Cheka, drawing upon his experience with the Polish police, as well as that of the Okhrana and the Bolshevik Party. Present-day KGB officers look upon the "ideological approach" and persuasive activities of the interrogator as the distinctive feature of the method of the KGB, and the one which is responsible for most of its effectiveness. Careful planning and the detailed organization of the arrest and interrogation procedures are important aspects of the KGB procedures, but are not unique.

The mass indoctrination of prisoners of war is a different matter. This appears to have been originated by the NKVD. At the outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union, in 1941, the interrogation and subsequent internment of military prisoners was the function of the Red Army. Prior to 1943 the Russians took few German prisoners, and most of those who fell into their hands were murdered or otherwise disposed of by front-line military units. Very few Germans who were captured in 1941 and 1942 survived the war. This became a problem to the Soviet High Command, which was being deprived of the military information which might be obtained from prisoners-of-war interrogation. A directive was issued in the spring of 1942 to the effect that the lives of prisoners should be protected in order that the information which they possessed might be obtained from them. The custody of prisoners behind the area of combat was turned over to the NKVD in 1943. During the next two years this organization developed the methods of interrogating and indoctrinating prisoners of war which were subsequently adopted by the Chinese Communist Army and eventually, with many Chinese modifications, were used upon our military personnel in Korea.

Because the methods of the Russian state police became the model for those used in other Communist countries, they shall be considered in detail. At the time of writing (January, 1956) there are public reports that the Russian state police are in temporary eclipse, and their activities are said to have been restricted; but there is every reason to believe that this is only partially true. The reader should bear in mind that, in effect, some form of state police system has existed in Russia since the 17th century. From time to time public resent-

ment has caused the organization having this function to be "reformed," or even "abolished," but it has always reappeared within a few years, often under a new name, but operating in the same manner. This has been true under the Communists no less than under the Czars.

2. Present Structure of the KGB

The KGB, like its predecessors, is directed from Moscow. Within Russia it is divided into sections, which correspond to the various federal republics, and subsections, corresponding to districts, or oblasts. Within each of these districts the organization has an investigation section, which is primarily concerned with the detection, arrest, and punishment of those who commit crimes against the state. The functions of this section are conducted primarily by a group of relatively junior officers in their late 20's or 30's, each of whom has been especially trained for this type of work. These men operate under the direction of superiors, who ultimately report to Moscow. It is the task of these junior KGB officers to become aware of any political crimes in the area assigned to them and to secure evidence leading to the arrest and punishment of the criminals. It is the task of other junior officers in the interrogation section to obtain a signed deposition from each prisoner confessing to his crimes.

In the following sections the various steps of the procedure used by the KGB will be outlined. The Communist principle which is the ostensible reason for using each step in the procedure will be discussed. This will be followed by a description of the procedure as it is actually carried out.

3. The Suspect

Those who fall under the suspicion of the KGB usually have some reason for exciting its suspicion. To the victim himself, such suspicion may appear to be capricious or arbitrary because he may be utterly unaware of the basis for it. The Russian definition of "crimes against the state," or political crimes, is a broad one, and the interpretation of these Russian laws is largely in the hands of the KGB; for all practical purposes, it may find reason to suspect anyone. From long practice this organization has developed the thesis that those who conspire against the state will fall into recognized categories. First of all, there are those members of the Communist Party who have come under suspicion by the Party apparatus, or who have been criticized for failure in some activity. Since "the Party can do no wrong," failure may become the equivalent of sabotage or treason. Second, there are those who have traveled abroad or who have had association with foreigners. This, of course, includes all foreigners; but it also includes former prisoners of war, Soviet functionaries who have served abroad, and even members of the KGB itself. Third, members of certain Soviet nationalities which are suspected of nationalist aspirations may also be suspected as a group. The Volga Germans and the Chichen-Ingush are examples. The most recent example was the suspicion cast upon all Jews during the period from 1950 to 1952, when complaints of "cosmopolitanism" were being made against this group. Fourth, certain segments of Soviet society, such as the "Kulaks" of the early 1930's or the Army in 1937-1939, may be suspect. Fifth, there are those whose class origin is considered bourgeois or aristocratic. These are fewer in number than they used to be, but they formerly constituted a large group of natural suspects. In times of unrest or mass hysteria, such as occurred during

the purge trials or during World War II, all persons in a category may become "suspects" and subject to arrest.

In addition to these "general suspects," there are "specific suspects," who become such either because suspicion has been cast upon them by one of the many informers among the general population or because they are relatives, friends, or former associates of other persons who have been arrested or are suspected. Other specific suspects are those who either intentionally or unintentionally have made statements, or carried out acts, which the police regard as evidence of criminal, antistate activity.

The following general assumptions can be made:

1. Although the suspect may not know why he is suspected, the KGB has some reason for singling him out.

2. Because of the broad nature of Soviet laws, and the free manner in which the KGB can interpret these, any "suspect" has committed some "crime against the state" as the KGB defines the term.

The implications of this statement are significant. In a nation in which the state owns all property, where everyone works for the state, and where only approved opinions may be held, a person who has accidentally broken or lost some of the "people's property," who has made a mistake, who has not worked hard enough, who has talked to a foreigner, or who has merely expressed what he inferred was an innocent opinion, may be *ipso facto* guilty of a "crime against the state."

Thus, those who fall into the various categories of "natural suspects" constitute a reservoir of potential victims for the secret police. A person who belongs to one of these groups may go unmolested for a long period. His arrest, when it ultimately takes place, will occur when the KGB needs arrests. For example, when party policy decrees that there shall be a widespread campaign against "foreign spies," the KGB will seek its victims from those whom it regards as potential foreign agents. If the Party decides upon a campaign against nationalist tendencies among Soviet citizens, the KGB will select its victims from the nationality which has been singled out as an "example." If there is a struggle for power within the Party hierarchy, the victims of the KGB will be selected from those members of the Party who lose out in the struggle. Sometimes purely bureaucratic needs within the secret police organization are the occasion for arrest. Since the effectiveness of the organization in the various districts is judged by the number of arrests and convictions obtained, when the leader of a district fears that his organization is falling behind, he will generate local pressures for more arrests; the victims, of course, will be selected from appropriate groups of suspects. The result of all of this is that many of the victims of the secret police apparatus are seized for reasons quite beyond their own control, which are not immediately related to anything that they may have done.

4. The Accumulation of Evidence

It is an administrative principle of the Soviet government that no one may be arrested unless there is evidence that he is a criminal.

According to the practice of the KGB this means that when a man falls under the suspicion of a KGB officer, this officer must accumulate "evidence" that the man is a "criminal" and take this evidence to the state prosecutor,

who must then issue a warrant before the arrest can be carried out. When a man falls under the suspicion of the KGB, an officer in the investigation section draws up a plan for the investigation of his case. The plan describes why the man is suspected, who are his suspected associates, what evidence is needed to arrest him, how he shall be placed under surveillance, how the evidence shall be gathered, and how he shall be arrested. This plan is submitted to his superiors for comment, criticism, and approval, and is then put into action. The investigating officer accumulates "evidence" by showing that the victim had a reason to be a criminal (i.e., that he was a member of a suspect group) and by accumulating the statements of spies and informers with regard to him. If this "evidence" is not sufficient to satisfy the officer, he places the suspect and the suspect's friends and associates under surveillance. These friends and associates may be held for interrogation in order to supply evidence against the suspect, the reason for their seizure being that they are associates of a suspect, and therefore suspect themselves.

Covert surveillance and the arrest of associates are carried out carefully, but they cannot always be concealed from the suspect. He may become aware of it, or his friends may tell him. As he comes a marked man in the eyes of his friends, they begin to avoid him. Their demeanor sometimes indicates to him that he is under suspicion. The knowledge that he will be arrested, without knowledge of when this will occur, obviously creates anxiety in the intended victim. Although KGB officers know about the psychological effect which surveillance has upon suspects, and make use of it, they do not use it with the calculated cunning that the victim sometimes supposes. Poorly concealed surveillance, and the arrest of friends and associates, followed after an indefinite period by the arrest of the main suspect, are not necessarily stage maneuvers to frighten the victim. Often they are simply evidence of rather slow and clumsy police activities.

The investigating officer in charge of the "case" is usually not above the rank of major. His standing in the eyes of his superiors and his future career in the organization are dependent upon his ability to achieve arrest and convictions. His superiors themselves have a similar relation to their superiors. Thus it often happens, especially in times of internal tension, that members of the organization compete with one another in trying to turn up suspects and secure their conviction. To a certain extent, officers are judged by the number of arrests which they obtain. Since Communist legal principles demand that no person be arrested except when it is clear that he is a criminal, officers who arrest men who must later be released are subject to censure. They have made a mistake because they have arrested a man who is not a criminal.

The consequences are important from the point of view of the victim. In effect, any man who is arrested is automatically in the position of being "guilty".†

If the "evidence" should be insufficient to substantiate his guilt, those in charge of his case are subject to censure. In theory, those making the arrest should have accumulated beforehand sufficient evidence of guilt to satisfy both their superior officers and the state prosecutor. It is usually not difficult to satisfy these officials. Nevertheless, this requirement for sufficient evidence of guilt puts pressure upon the junior officers of the KGB, who are anxious

† A discussion of the Communist concept of "guilt" and the meaning of this term to the KGB is presented in Part II, Section 16.

to establish a reputation for themselves, and sometimes they may falsify the "evidence" which they present to the prosecutor. This is a forbidden practice, for which the offending officer could be punished if he were "officially" found out. The officers who took part in staging the famous "doctor's plot" of 1952 were punished later for "falsifying the evidence." But when the KGB is under pressure to secure convictions, and when this pressure comes from high in the Party, "falsification of evidence," like the use of physical brutality in obtaining confessions, may be a widespread procedure. It is never "officially" condoned.

Anyone arrested by the KGB must know that in the eyes of the Soviet state, and in the eyes of those who have arrested him, he is a "criminal." The only question to be settled after his arrest is the extent of his criminal activity and the precise nature of his crimes. The officers in charge of his case, both those who have made the arrest and those who will carry out the interrogation, have a personal interest in seeing that the arrested man makes a prompt and extensive confession, for their own reputations are at stake. These officers work on a "time table": They are expected to "settle the case" within six weeks to three months after their victim has been seized by producing a satisfactory protocol, upon which a "trial" can be based.

5. The Arrest Procedure

It is a Communist principle that men should be arrested in a manner which will not cause them embarrassment and that the police should carry out arrests in a manner which will not unduly disturb the population.

In the United States, it is said that a man is "arrested" when the police seize him, detain him, or otherwise deprive him of his freedom; and United States law requires that the police obtain a "warrant" or comply with certain other legal procedures before carrying out an arrest. In the Soviet Union the KGB may obtain a "warrant" from the state prosecutor before seizing a man, but it is not required to do so. It may "detain" a man on suspicion and interrogate him "to see if he is a criminal." What would be called "arrest" in the United States may be carried out in the Soviet Union with or without a warrant. The process of seizure is the same in either case.

For more than 20 years it has been the practice of the Russian State Police to seize their suspects in the middle of the night. The "midnight knock on the door" has become a standard episode in fiction about Russia. The police are well aware of the fact that the intended victim, forewarned by his previous surveillance and the changing attitude of his friends, is further terrified by the thought that he may be awakened from his sleep almost any night and taken away. The official explanation for the nighttime arrests is that such a procedure avoids the embarrassment and alarm which would be created if the victim were seized in the daytime. It is customary for the arresting officer to be accompanied by several other men. He usually reads to the prisoner the arrest warrant, if there is one. It does not, of course, specify the details of the crimes committed. The prisoner is then taken promptly to a detention prison.

An alternate method of arrest, for which the same official explanation is given, is to carry out the procedure in a city not the home of the suspect. In order to accomplish this, men under suspicion are ordered by their superiors to travel on some pretext or other. Before the victim reaches his destination, he is arrested and taken from the train. A third method, said to be preferred

when there is no warrant, is to seize the victim suddenly as he walks down the street. All of these procedures create intense anxiety in the victim, and in the population at large they create all of the alarm which may be generated by the sudden and unexplained disappearance of a person from the midst of his family and friends.

6. The Detention Prison

According to Soviet administrative principle, a man who is arrested by the state police is not "imprisoned." He is merely "detained." In theory, he is detained in a quiet, healthy atmosphere, where he has an opportunity to meditate upon his crimes, and a chance to talk them over freely and at length with police officers, without being prejudiced by friends, associates, or lawyers, who might induce him to distort the truth.

In most of the large cities of the Soviet Union the KGB operates detention prisons. These prisons contain only persons under "investigation," whose cases have not yet been "settled." The most modern of these prisons are separate institutions, well built and spotlessly clean. In addition to the cells for the prisoners, they contain offices for the KGB units, rooms in which interrogations are carried out, and other rooms, usually in the basement, in which prisoners are executed when such punishment is decided upon. There are attached medical facilities and rooms for the care of the sick detainees. An exercise yard is a standard facility. In outlying areas or undeveloped regions, the KGB may occupy a separate wing of a general prison and use this as a detention prison. Facilities in these areas may be ancient or inadequate, depending upon what is available; but the detention wing itself is administered separately from that of the rest of the prison, and prisoners under detention are segregated from general prisoners.

Most of the cells in Soviet detention prisons are designed for one occupant. The typical cell is a small cubicle, about 10 ft. long by 6 ft. wide, containing a single bunk and a slop jar. It usually has no other furnishings. Its walls are barren, and it is lighted by a single electric lamp in the ceiling. One wall usually contains a small window above eye level, from which the prisoner can see nothing of his outside environment. The door contains a peephole, through which the guard in the corridor outside may observe the prisoner at will without the prisoner's knowledge.

There also may be cells which are large enough to hold two or more prisoners. Except for size, such cells are not different from the others. In general, prisoners whose cases are relatively unimportant, those against whom the evidence is "complete," and those who have indicated a willingness to talk freely are placed in cells with other prisoners, some of whom are usually informers. Those whose cases are important or "incomplete," those from whom information is desired, and those for whom public trials or propaganda confessions are planned are put in solitary confinement.

Such typical cells will not, of course, be found in all prisons, and especially not in those which are old or improvised; but the general aspect of barrenness and complete lack of access to the outside world is characteristic.

7. The Regimen Within the Detention Prison

The arresting officers usually do not give the prisoner any reason for his arrest beyond that in the warrant which they read to him. They usually search

him, and also search the place in which he lives. They then take him directly to the prison. Here he is asked a few questions about his identity, and his personal valuables and outer clothing are taken from him. These are carefully catalogued and put away.† He may or may not be given a prison uniform. He is usually examined by a prison physician shortly after his incarceration.

The entire introduction to the detention prison is brief and is carried on without explanation. Within a few hours after his arrest the prisoner finds himself locked up within a cell.

An almost invariable feature of the management of any important suspect under detention is a period of total isolation in a detention cell. The prisoner is placed within his cell; the door is shut, and for an indefinite period he is totally isolated from human contact except by the specific direction of the officer in charge of his case. He is not allowed to talk to the guards or to communicate with other prisoners in any manner. When he is taken from his cell for any reason, he is accompanied by a guard. If another prisoner approaches through the corridor, he turns his face to the wall until the other prisoner has passed.

The hours and routine of the prisoner are rigidly organized. He is awakened early in the morning and given a short period in which to wash himself. His food is brought to him. He has a short and fixed time in which to eat it; the standard diet is just adequate to maintain nutrition. He must clean himself and police his own cell; but he is not allowed enough time to keep it spotlessly clean. At some time in the morning he usually has an exercise period. Typically, his exercise consists of walking alone in the exercise yard. If he is in rigid isolation, he may not be allowed to exercise at all. He is usually allowed a slop jar in his cell which he can utilize for defecation and urination, but sometimes this is taken away. Then he must call the guard and perhaps wait for hours to be taken to the latrine.

At all times except when he is eating, sleeping, exercising, or being interrogated, the prisoner is left strictly alone in his cell. He has nothing to do, nothing to read, and no one to talk to. Under the strictest regimen, he may have to sit or stand in his cell in a fixed position all day. He may sleep only at hours prescribed for sleep. Then he must go to bed promptly when told, and must lie in a fixed position upon his back with his hands outside the blanket. If he deviates from this position, the guard outside will awaken him and make him resume it. The light in his cell burns constantly. He must sleep with his face constantly toward it.

If the prisoner becomes ill, he is taken to a prison physician, by whom he is treated with the best medical care available, according to the practices common to Soviet medicine. If necessary, he may be placed under hospital care; but as soon as he has recovered, the regimen will be resumed.

Prisoners who attempt to commit suicide are thwarted and carefully nursed until they recover; then the regimen is resumed.

Deviations from the prescribed regimen are promptly noticed by the guards and are punished. Disturbed behavior is punished also. If this behavior persists

† It is an interesting comment on the "legalistic" behavior of the KGB that prisoners who have been detained, interrogated, tortured, imprisoned at length, and ultimately released after many years may then receive all of their original clothing and personal valuables, which have been scrupulously cared for during their imprisonment.

and the officer in charge of the case is convinced that the prisoner has become mentally ill, the man may be placed under medical care until his health has returned; then the regimen is resumed.

8. Effects of the Regimen in the Isolation Cell

The effects upon prisoners of the regimen in the isolation cell are striking. § It has been mentioned that the man who has been arrested by the KGB is usually intensely apprehensive. Often he has known for weeks that he would be arrested, but has had no clear knowledge of when, or for what reason. He has been seized in the middle of the night and taken without explanation to a formidable prison. He knows that no friend can help him, and that the KGB may do with him what they please.

A major aspect of his prison experience is isolation. Man is a social animal; he does not live alone. From birth to death he lives in the company of his fellow men. When he is totally isolated, he is removed from all of the interpersonal relations which are so important to him, and taken out of the social role which sustains him. His internal as well as his external life is disrupted. Exposed for the first time to total isolation in a KGB prison, he develops a predictable group of symptoms, which might almost be called a "disease syndrome." The guards and KGB officers are quite familiar with this syndrome. They watch each new prisoner with technical interest as his symptoms develop.

The initial appearance of an arrested prisoner is one of bewilderment. For a few hours he may sit quietly in his cell looking confused and dejected. But within a short time most prisoners become alert and begin to take an interest in their environment. They react with expectancy when anyone approaches the door to the cell. They show interest and anxiety as they are exposed to each new feature of the prison routine. They may ask questions or begin conversations. Some make demands: They demand to know why they are being held and protest that they are innocent. If they are foreign nationals, they may insist upon seeing their consular officers. Some take a "You can't do this to me" attitude. Some pass through a brief period of shouting, threatening, and demanding. All of this is always sternly repressed. If need be, the officer in charge of the case will see the prisoner, remind him of the routine, threaten him with punishment, and punish him if he does not subside. || During this period the prisoner has not yet appreciated the full import of his situation. He tries to fraternize with the guards. He leaves part of his food if he does not like it. He tries to speak to prisoners whom he passes in the corridors and reaches back to close the door behind him when he is taken to the latrine. The guards refer to this as the period of getting "acclimatized" to the prison routine.

After a few days it becomes apparent to the prisoner that his activity avails

§ The reaction to be described in this and in the following sections is that of a "typical" man, previously untrained, who has never been imprisoned or isolated before, and who has been arrested for a serious, but not specified, crime against the state of which he could be "guilty." Even among such men, there are wide differences in the capacity to tolerate the isolation regimen. Some become demoralized within a few days, while others are able to retain a high degree of self-control for months. In addition to this, most men possess the capacity to adapt to isolation, and those who experience the isolation regimen a second time almost always tolerate it better, and longer. Previous training and the circumstances of seizure are important also.

|| The punishments used are described in Sections 10 and 13.

him nothing, and that he will be punished or reprimanded for even the smallest breaches of the routine. He wonders when he will be released or questioned. His requests have been listened to but never acted upon. He becomes increasingly anxious and restless, and his sleep is disturbed. He begins to look up alertly when anyone passes in the corridor. He jumps when the guard comes to the door. He becomes "adjusted" to the routine in his cell and goes through it punctiliously; but he still leaves some of his food, and occasionally he reveals by small gestures his lack of complete submission to his environment.

The period of anxiety, hyperactivity, and apparent adjustment to the isolation routine usually continues from one to three weeks. As it continues, the prisoner becomes increasingly dejected and dependent. He gradually gives up all spontaneous activity within his cell and ceases to care about his personal appearance and actions. Finally, he sits and stares with a vacant expression, perhaps endlessly twisting a button on his coat. He allows himself to become dirty and disheveled. When food is presented to him, he eats it all, but he no longer bothers with the niceties of eating. He may mix it into a mush and stuff it into his mouth like an animal. He goes through the motions of his prison routine automatically, as if he were in a daze. The slop jar is no longer offensive to him. Ultimately he seems to lose many of the restraints of ordinary behavior. He may soil himself. He weeps; he mutters, and he prays aloud in his cell. He follows the orders of the guard with the docility of a trained animal. It usually takes from four to six weeks to produce this phenomenon in a newly imprisoned man.

9. The Feelings and Attitudes of the Prisoner During the Isolation Regimen

The man who for the first time experiences isolation in prison is, of course, experiencing far more than simple isolation. He usually feels profoundly anxious, helpless, frustrated, dejected, and entirely uncertain about his future. His initial reaction to the isolation procedure is indeed one of bewilderment and some numbness at the calamity which has befallen him. This is followed by a period of interest and apprehension about every detail of the prison regimen, accompanied by hope that he can explain everything as soon as he gets a chance, or an expectation that he will be released when the proper authorities hear about his plight. Such hopes last but a few days, but they keep him alert and interested during that time.

As hope disappears, a reaction of anxious waiting supervenes. In this period, the profound boredom and complete loneliness of his situation gradually overwhelm the prisoner. There is literally nothing for him to do except ruminate, and because he has so much to worry about, his ruminations are seldom pleasant. Frequently, they take the form of going over and over all the possible causes for his arrest. His mood becomes one of dejection. His sleep is disturbed by nightmares. Ultimately he may reach a state of depression in which he ceases to care about his personal appearance and behavior and pays little attention to his surroundings. In this state the prisoner may have illusory experiences. A distant sound in the corridor sounds like someone calling his name. The rattle of a footstep may be interpreted as a key in the lock opening the cell.

Some prisoners may become delirious and have visual hallucinations. God may seem to appear to such a prisoner and tell him to cooperate with his

interrogator. He may see his wife standing beside him, or a servant bringing him a large meal. In nearly all cases the prisoner's need for human companionship and his desire to talk to anyone about anything becomes a gnawing appetite, which may be as insistent as the hunger of a starving man. If he is given an opportunity to talk, he may say anything which seems to be appropriate, or to be desired by his listener, for in his confused and befuddled state he may be unable to tell what is "actually true" from what "might be" or "should be" true. He may be highly suggestible, and he may "confabulate" the details of any story suggested to him.

Not all men who first experience total isolation react in precisely this manner. In some, these symptoms are less conspicuous. In others, dejection and utter despondence set in earlier, or later. Still others, and especially those with pre-existing personality disturbances, may become frankly psychotic. However, frank psychotic manifestations, other than those of the "prison psychosis" described above, are not usual, primarily because those having charge of the prisoners usually break the routine of total isolation when they see that disorganization of the prisoner's personality is imminent.

10. Other Pressures of the Isolation Regimen

Not all of the reaction to this imprisonment experience can be attributed to isolation alone. Other potent forces are acting upon the newly imprisoned man. The prisoner's *anxiety* about himself is compounded by worry about what may happen to his friends and associates, and, in the case of those who possess information which they wish to hide, apprehension about how much the KGB knows or will find out. Even in the absence of isolation, profound and uncontrolled anxiety is disorganizing. *Uncertainty* compounds his anxiety also. The newly arrested prisoner does not know how long he will be confined, how he will be punished, or with what he will be charged. He does know that his punishment may be anything up to death or permanent imprisonment. Many prisoners say that uncertainty is the most unbearable aspect of the whole experience. *Sleep disturbances* and nightmares lead to further fear and fatigue.

The effects of isolation, uncertainty, and anxiety are usually sufficient to make the prisoner eager to talk to his interrogator and to seek some method of escape from a situation which has become intolerable. But, if these alone are not enough to produce the desired effect, the officer in charge has other simple and highly effective ways of applying pressure. Two of the most effective of these are *fatigue* and *lack of sleep*. The constant light in the cell and the necessity of maintaining a rigid position in bed compound the effects of anxiety and nightmares in producing sleep disturbances. If these are not enough, it is easy to have the guards awaken the prisoner at intervals. This is especially effective if the prisoner is always awakened as soon as he drops off to sleep. The guards can also shorten the hours available for sleep, or deny sleep altogether. Continued loss of sleep produces clouding of consciousness and a loss of alertness(both of which impair the victim's ability to sustain isolation. It also produces profound fatigue.

Another simple and effective type of pressure is that of maintaining the *temperature of the cell* at a level which is either too hot or too cold for comfort. Continuous heat, at a level at which constant sweating is necessary in order to maintain body temperature, is enervating and fatigue-producing. Sustained cold

is uncomfortable and poorly tolerated. Yet another method of creating pressure is to reduce the food ration to the point at which the prisoner is constantly hungry. This usually involves loss of weight, which is often associated with weakness and asthenia. Furthermore, *deprivation of food* produces lassitude, loss of general interest, and some breakdown of courage. Some people become profoundly depressed when deprived of food. Chronically hungry people can sometimes be induced to overcome a surprising number of their inhibitions in order to relieve their hunger.

The effects of isolation, anxiety, fatigue, lack of sleep, uncomfortable temperatures, and chronic hunger produce disturbances of mood, attitudes, and behavior in nearly all prisoners. The living organism cannot entirely withstand such assaults. The Communists do not look upon these assaults as "torture." Undoubtedly, they use the methods which they do in order to conform, in a typical legalistic manner, to overt Communist principles, which demand that "no force or torture be used in extracting information from prisoners." But all of them produce great discomfort, and lead to serious disturbances of many bodily processes; there is no reason to differentiate them from any other form of torture.

11. The Interrogator

The KGB officer who has charge of a case during the period of suspicion, surveillance, and arrest is now supplanted by another officer who is charged with the interrogation of the prisoner and the preparation of the deposition. (Prisoners commonly refer to this document as the "confession"). The officers who specialize in interrogation are relatively junior also; they come from a generation which has grown up under the Communist regime and are selected for the KGB in part because of their evident devotion to the Party and its program. The majority are first recruited from the ranks of the armed services, or the Komsomol. They are usually chosen on the basis of demonstrated Party loyalty and a "horseback opinion" of their aptitude for KGB work. Nearly all of them have had the equivalent of a secondary school education, and some have had more schooling. Many of them are ardent Party members, with an almost religious dedication to the organization.

Within the KGB, assignments to interrogation are not highly regarded. Most KGB officers prefer to go into offensive espionage or join paramilitary units. Relatively few of them wish to become involved in political counterespionage, investigation, and interrogation. Such work is not looked upon as glamorous or exciting. Very often it involves assignment to outlying and relatively dull regions of the Soviet Union, and usually is hard and thankless. The interrogation of prisoners is a tiring and an emotionally trying procedure. Thus, there is often a deficiency of applicants for work in this section of the secret police, and local district officers of the KGB must assign men to fill the necessary quota at the state police school. The assignment is often given to the least desirable men in the organization. It can be assumed that a majority of those involved in the investigation and interrogation of unimportant prisoners are men of average ability with no great enthusiasm for their job. However, the KGB does also possess highly skilled, well-educated, extremely knowledgeable, experienced, and able interrogators who are devoted to their profession and proud of their abilities. The interrogator assigned to an important prisoner can be expected to be a man of such high caliber.

Some of those who go into secret police activity receive only a sort of "on-the-job" training under the guidance of more senior and experienced men, but a fair proportion of these police officers are especially trained at a KGB school. The course in the conduct of interrogations includes a description of the various interrogation methods that will be discussed shortly. Trainees are allowed to observe a demonstration interrogation, but do not actually conduct interrogations themselves. No formal training in psychology, psychiatry, pharmacology, or physiology is included in the curriculum. There are no representatives of any of these sciences on the faculty and, as far as we have been able to ascertain, there never have been. Trainees do receive information from experienced police officers on how to prepare a dossier, how to "size up" a man, and how to estimate what sort of methods to use in "breaking" him; but the instructors draw entirely upon police experience. They have a contempt for theoretical psychiatry and psychology, and for instruments such as the polygraph, which most of them regard as a useless gadget.

12. Interrogation

When the prisoner has been arrested and incarcerated in his cell, the officer in charge of his case submits to his superiors a plan for the interrogation of the prisoner. This plan is drawn up on the basis of what is already known about the prisoner. It describes the methods to be used upon him, the attitudes to be taken toward him, the type of crimes which he is believed to have committed, and the assumed motivation for them. His superiors may criticize or comment upon this plan and offer added suggestions, based upon their own experience. The purpose of this plan appears to be primarily that of making the interrogator approach the prisoner with a definite conception of what he wants to do and how he is going to proceed in doing it. The plan need not be adhered to rigidly if the development of the case indicates that changes should be made. In some prisons the interrogator reviews the plan with his superiors after each session and describes to them how he intends to conduct the next session.

If a prisoner indicates at the time he is seized that he is aware of his guilt and is prepared to describe his crimes, the interrogator may begin to question him very soon after his imprisonment. This is true especially when the police already possess a great deal of "evidence" and the prisoner readily confesses to the "crimes" which the interrogator wishes to establish.

Likewise, if the prisoner is seized without a warrant, the interrogator is likely to begin the questioning early. Soviet law specifies that if a man is "detained on suspicion" the first protocol of his interrogation must be given to the state prosecutor within 10 days, so that an arrest warrant may be issued or the man may be released. In general, interrogators are constrained to comply with this regulation, and they try to produce enough evidence to obtain an arrest within 10 days. In many such cases, because they have little except suspicion to guide their questioning, they are necessarily vague in describing the prisoner's crimes to him. They must be cautious lest the prisoner get wind of what they want him to say and refuse to say it. It is probably this, more than any calculated cunning, which causes them to make to the prisoner such enigmatic statements as, "It is not up to me to tell you what your crimes are; it is up to you to tell me"—statements which lead the perplexed prisoner to rack his brain for an answer. The prosecutor is not hard to satisfy, and the interrogator nearly always obtains enough evidence to make an "arrest." If not, he can apply for an extension of

the detention period. The law provides no real protection for the prisoner.

Interrogations, once begun, are continued until "the case is complete," but in some circumstances they are intentionally delayed in their onset. It appears that his delay is imposed when the prisoner is defiant, when he is thought to be withholding information, when the KGB is seeking a confession to crimes other than those for which it has "evidence," and especially when it wants to use the prisoner for a public trial or to obtain a propaganda confession from him. In such cases, the interrogation begins when the officer in charge feels that the prisoner is ripe for it. This is usually when he observes that the prisoner has become docile and compliant and shows evidence of deterioration in his mood and personal appearance.

Interrogations are almost uniformly carried out at night. It is said that this practice of night interrogation originated not from any preconceived idea of its effectiveness, but because the early Chekists were so overburdened with police duties during the day that they could find time for interrogations only at night. For one reason or another, it has become standard procedure, possibly because the physical and psychological effects of night interrogations produce added pressure upon the prisoner. He is deprived of sleep, and placed in a state of added uncertainty by never knowing when he will be awakened and questioned. Typically, he will be awakened suddenly by the guard shortly after he has dropped off to sleep. Without explanation, he is taken from his cell and down several corridors to a small and barren interrogation room, equipped with a desk and chair for the interrogator and a stool for the prisoner. The lighting is arranged so that the prisoner can be placed in a bright light, while the interrogator sits in relative darkness. Sometimes a stenographer is present in one corner of the room to take notes. More frequently the interrogator makes his own notes, writing as the prisoner speaks. Usually only one interrogator is present, but occasionally other officers are introduced. Sometimes interrogators alternate, for psychological reasons, one being "friendly" and the other "hostile." If his work is successful, the original interrogator may carry the case through to a conclusion; but if he does not achieve the desired goal, he may be removed, and a new officer takes over the interrogation.

The atmosphere of the interrogation room generally has some degree of formality about it. The interrogator may be dressed in full uniform. If he wishes to impress the prisoner, he may take out a pistol, cock it, and lay it on the desk before him; but this psychological gambit does not seem to be a required part of the protocol. The interrogator adjusts his attitude toward the prisoner according to his estimate of the kind of man he is facing. If the dossier indicates that the prisoner is a timid and fearful man, the interrogator may adopt a fierce and threatening demeanor. If the prisoner is thought to be proud and sensitive, the interrogator may be insulting and degrading. If the prisoner has been a man of prestige and importance in private life, the interrogator may call him by his first name, treat him as an inferior, and remind him that he has lost all rank and privilege. If the prisoner is thought to be suggestible, the interrogator will try to influence him by suggestion. If the prisoner is known as venal and self-seeking, the interrogator may try to bribe him with promises of reward for cooperation. If the prisoner has a tendency to blame others, the interrogator may try to let him place the blame upon others, while describing his own activities as harmless. If the prisoner is known to have a wife and children for whom he

cares deeply, the interrogator may threaten harm to them if the prisoner does not cooperate, and promise to protect and help them if he does. If it is known that the prisoner has been unfaithful to his wife or has committed some crime, such as embezzlement, the interrogator may blackmail him by threatening exposure or punishment unless he cooperates. All these, and many other tricks, may be employed. They are not based upon a scientific theory of human behavior; they are tricks of the trade, so to speak, developed out of police experience and applied on a "rule-of-thumb," "common-sense" basis.

Almost invariably the interrogator takes the attitude that the prisoner is guilty and acts as though all of his crimes were known. Almost invariably he points out to the prisoner that he is completely helpless and that there is no hope for him unless he cooperates fully and confesses his crimes completely. Almost never does the interrogator state specifically what the prisoner's crimes actually are. This is left up to the prisoner, who is told, in effect, that he knows the extent of his own crimes and need only make a complete statement of them.

Almost invariably the interrogator does not accept the early statement of the prisoner. No matter what crimes he confesses, the interrogator forces the prisoner to repeat his statements again and again, and to elaborate on them endlessly. Almost always he uses any discrepancies as indications of lying and questions the prisoner at length about them.

The first interrogation sessions are nearly always concerned with a complete review of the entire life experience of the prisoner. The interrogator wishes to know about the prisoner's background; his class origin; his parents, brothers, and sisters; his friends and associates, and everything that he has done throughout his life. If the case is of any importance, no detail is overlooked, and every period of the prisoner's life must be accounted for.

This review of the prisoner's life may occupy several interrogation sessions. It has several purposes. The primary one is to complete the prisoner's dossier. It gives the interrogator a thorough picture of the type of man he is dealing with and further guides him to the man's weaknesses, which can be exploited. Furthermore, requiring a man to account for every detail of his life produces a voluminous and involved story, and the prisoner can scarcely avoid being trapped into inconsistencies if he is concealing anything. The information obtained from the life history can be compared with that already in the police files, which are usually extensive. It enables the police to know the associates of the prisoner—information which is important, because these may be his "accomplices in crime," who can be made suspects also, and interrogated for further information. Perhaps its most important purpose is that it reveals many "criminal" features of the prisoner, such as "reactionary class origin," "membership in reactionary organizations," and "association with enemies of the state," which are, by Communist definition, "crimes" no matter how long ago they were "committed."

The prisoner, taken from his cell after a long period of isolation, anxiety, and despair, usually looks upon the first interrogation as a welcome break. The mere opportunity to talk to someone is intensely gratifying. Many prisoners have reported that after long periods of isolation they eagerly anticipate interrogation sessions and try to prolong them simply for the companionship which they afford. Not infrequently the prisoner also regards interrogation as an opportunity to justify himself, and feels a false assurance that he can "explain everything" as soon as he is given a chance.

Usually he is much taken aback by the fact that his crimes are not specified and that his guilt is assured. He is further distressed when his protestations of innocence are greeted as lies. But the opportunity to talk about his life experiences is generally looked upon, especially by a person from Western society, as an opportunity to justify his behavior. Many men willingly divulge all that they can remember about themselves, because they feel quite sure that they have done nothing which may be regarded as criminal. They are unaware that, from the point of view of Communist theory and of the KGB, much of their past behavior undoubtedly will be construed as "criminal" and held against them. If the interrogator offers them the opportunity to have paper and pencil in their cells and to write out their biographies, they seize upon this avidly as a means of relieving the boredom of the tedious, lonely routine to which they are exposed.

13. Pressures Applied by the Interrogator

As the interrogation proceeds, the interrogator changes his behavior according to his previous plan and the development of the case. If the prisoner is cooperating and talking freely, the interrogator continues to show a relatively friendly attitude. But sooner or later he invariably expresses dissatisfaction with the information which the prisoner has given, no matter how complete it may be. He demands new details, and usually shows an especially great interest in the "accomplices" of the prisoner and the "organization" to which he is supposed to have been attached. When the prisoner protests that he has told all, and denies any other crimes or accomplices, the interrogator becomes hostile and begins to apply pressure.

Some of the pressures which can be applied simply by altering the routine within the cell have been described. The interrogator has many others at his command. Continuous and repetitive interrogation is an effective and very common form of pressure. Another which is widely used is that of requiring the prisoner to stand throughout the interrogation session or to maintain some other physical position which becomes painful. This, like other features of the KGB procedure, is a form of physical torture, in spite of the fact that the prisoners and KGB officers alike do not ordinarily perceive it as such. Any fixed position which is maintained over a long period of time ultimately produces excruciating pain. Certain positions, of which the standing position is one, also produce impairment of the circulation. Many men can withstand the pain of long standing, but sooner or later all men succumb to the circulatory failure it produces. After 18 to 24 hours of continuous standing, there is an accumulation of fluid in the tissues of the legs. This dependent edema is produced by the extravasation of fluid from the blood vessels. The ankles and feet of the prisoner swell to twice their normal circumference. The edema may rise up the legs as high as the middle of the thighs. The skin becomes tense and intensely painful. Large blisters develop, which break and exude watery serum. The accumulation of the body fluid in the legs produces impairment of the circulation. The heart rate increases, and fainting may occur. Eventually, there is a renal shutdown, and urine production ceases. Urea and other metabolites accumulate in the blood. The prisoner becomes thirsty and may drink a good deal of water, which is not excreted but adds to the edema of his legs. Men have been known to remain standing for periods as long as several days. Ultimately they usually develop a delirious state, characterized by disorientation, fear, delusions, and visual hallu-

cinations. This psychosis is produced by a combination of circulatory impairment, lack of sleep, and uremia.

Periods of long standing are usually interrupted from time to time by interrogation periods, during which the interrogator demands and threatens, while pointing out to the prisoner that it would be easy for him to end his misery merely by cooperating.

The KGB hardly ever uses manacles or chains, and rarely resorts to physical beatings. The actual physical beating is, of course, repugnant to overt Communist principles, and is contrary to KGB regulations also. The ostensible reason for these regulations is that they are contrary to Communist principles. The practical reason for them is the fact that the KGB looks upon direct physical brutality as an ineffective method of obtaining the compliance of the prisoner. Its opinion in this regard is shared by police in other parts of the world. In general, direct physical brutality creates only resentment, hostility, further defiance, and unreliable statements.

It is a general policy that the interrogator must obtain the written permission of his superiors before using extreme coercive measures of any sort upon prisoners. In actual practice such permission is sought only if the officer in charge of a case feels that there is a need for a direct brutal assault. The KGB recognizes that some men who are intensely afraid of physical assault may break down if beaten once or twice, and it does use this procedure deliberately, though uncommonly. Generally speaking, when an interrogator strikes a prisoner in anger, he does so "unofficially." The act may be a true expression of his exasperation, and evidence that he, himself, is under emotional strain.

The use of brutality in the Russian secret police waxes and wanes in cycles that recur throughout the years. When feelings of insecurity develop within those holding power, they become increasingly suspicious and put great pressures upon the secret police to obtain arrests and confessions. At such times police officials are inclined to condone anything which produces a speedy "confession," and brutality may become widespread. Later, when the Party leadership again feels secure, its suspiciousness subsides. Meanwhile, demands arise for "reform," and the cessation of "irregular practices" by the secret police. Soon stern orders are issued that prisoners shall not be subjected to brutality, and some unfortunate police officers are punished for their past behavior. After this, brutality will be scrupulously avoided until the next wave of suspicion arises.

Regardless of brutality, it can be taken for granted that some period of intense pressure and coercion will be applied to every prisoner, no matter how cooperative he tries to be at first. This period of pressure will be accompanied by expressions of displeasure and hostility from the interrogator, and sometimes from the guards also. It appears to be a working principle of the KGB that no man ever reveals everything voluntarily. It has been a universal experience of prisoners of Communist state police that no matter how much a man tells, he is always pressed to tell more—in fact, those who talk are often the ones who are hounded the longest. Men who immediately, and without pressure, volunteer all that they know do not thus allay the suspicions of their interrogator. Eventually, when their flow of information runs out, and persuasion yields no more, they find themselves put through the same routine of repetitive torture which more recalcitrant prisoners encounter.

14. The "Friendly Approach"

The interrogator will continue this pressure until he feels that the prisoner is nearly at the end of his rope. At this point he introduces a psychological gambit which is probably the most successful of any of the tricks at his command. He suddenly changes his demeanor. The prisoner, returned once again to an interrogation session that he expects will be a repetition of torture and villification, suddenly finds that the entire scene has changed. The interrogation room is brightly lighted. The interrogator is seated behind his desk, relaxed and smiling. Tea and cigarettes are waiting on the table. He is ushered to a comfortable chair. The guard is sent away, and sometimes the secretary also. The interrogator remarks about his appearance. He is sympathetic about the discomfort which he has been suffering. He is sorry that the prisoner has had such a difficult time. The interrogator himself would not have wished to do this to the prisoner—it is only that the prison regulations require this treatment, because of the prisoner's own stubbornness. "But let us relax and be friends. Let us not talk any more about crimes. Tell me about your family"—and so on. The usual line is to the effect that, "After all, I am a reasonable man. I want to get this business over as much as you do. This is as tiresome to me as it is to you. We already know about your crimes; it is a mere formality for you to write out your confession. Why don't we get it over with so that everything can be settled and you can be released?"

Prisoners find this sudden friendship and release of pressure almost irresistible. Nearly all of them avidly seize the opportunity to talk about themselves and their feelings, and then go on to talk about their families. Most of them proceed from this almost automatically to giving the information which the interrogator seeks. Even if they do not provide everything the interrogator wants at this time, he may continue his friendly demeanor and the relaxation of pressure for several more sessions before resuming the old regimen of torture. But if the prisoner does reveal significant information and cooperates fully, the rewards are prompt and gratifying. The interrogator smiles and congratulates him. Cigarettes are forthcoming. There is a large meal, often excellently prepared and served; and after this the prisoner returns to his cell and sleeps as long as he likes, in any position that he chooses.

15. The Course of the Interrogation

Such friendly and rewarding behavior will continue for several days—usually as long as the interrogator feels that a significant amount of new information is being produced. At this point the prisoner may conclude that his ordeal is over; but invariably he is disappointed. For as soon as the interrogator decides that no new information is being yielded, the regimen of constant pressure and hostile interrogation is resumed. Again it is carried to the point at which the prisoner is near breakdown. Again it is relaxed, and again the prisoner is rewarded if he cooperates. In this manner, proceeding with regular steps, alternating punishment with reward, the interrogator constantly presses the prisoner to revise and rewrite the protocol until it contains all the statements which he desires, and is in a final form which meets with his approval. When it has at last been agreed upon and signed, the pressure is relaxed "for good"; but the prisoner continues to live in his cell, and remains under the threat of renewed pressure, until such

the prisoner and the interrogator. In many respects this is like the relationship that grows up between a psychiatrist and his patient. The prisoner, for all the pressure that he has been under, eventually finds in the interrogator the one human being in his environment to whom he can relate. The interrogator, on his part, has no personal hostility to his victim. He may actually like him. Especially when dealing with a Communist, he may feel that but for chance he would be in the prisoner's place. Interrogator and prisoner spend many hours of many days together. A certain comradeship and understanding grows up between them.

Many of these KGB officers impress the prisoner by the sincerity of their dedication to Communism and its ostensible ideals. The interrogator often displays a patient sympathy which becomes apparent to the prisoner. His attitude that "this is something we must go through with, and neither you nor I can stop until you have cooperated and signed a proper confession" is to some extent a genuine attitude. The KGB system allows of no other solution from the interrogator's point of view. It is in fact true that the interrogation will have to go on until a proper deposition has been signed. The prisoner often comes to recognize this sincerity. Many see that indeed the interrogator must follow the system, and there is nothing which he can do about it. Thus, the prisoner, in his need for companionship, may displace his hostility from the interrogator to the "system." Many interrogators genuinely plead with the prisoner to learn to "see the truth," to "think correctly," and to "cooperate."

There are instances of prisoners who signed depositions largely out of sympathy for their interrogators, because they felt that these men would be punished if a proper deposition were not forthcoming. In other words, the warm and friendly feelings which develop between the prisoner and the interrogator may have a powerful influence on the prisoner's behavior. Not infrequently, the prisoner develops a feeling that the interrogator is the only warm and sympathetic person in the hostile and threatening world in which he exists. His need for human companionship and acceptance is such that he overlooks the pressures which the interrogator puts upon him and ascribes them to the necessities of the system rather than to the willful activity of his "friend." If the interrogator rejects the prisoner or implies that he disapproves of him, the prisoner may feel bereft. He may blame himself for having let the interrogator down or for not having cooperated with the man who was trying to help him. His efforts to maintain his good standing in the eyes of his "friend" become an important motive for him to seek a rationalization which will allow him to produce a protocol of the type his "friend" needs. This same desire "not to go back on a friend" also becomes one of the reasons why he does not repudiate the protocol later when it is presented in court.

17. The Reaction of the Prisoner to the Interrogation

The way in which a prisoner reacts to the whole process of interrogation is to a great extent dependent upon the manner of man he is, his preexisting attitudes and beliefs, and the circumstances surrounding his arrest and imprisonment. All prisoners have this in common: They have been isolated and have been under unrelenting pressure in an atmosphere of hostility and uncertainty. They all find themselves in a dilemma at the time that the interrogation begins. The regimen of pressure and isolation has created an over-all discomfort which is well nigh intolerable. The prisoner invariably feels that "something must be done to end

this." He must find a way out. Death is denied to him. Ultimately, he finds himself faced with the choice of continuing interminably under the intolerable pressures of his captors or of accepting the "way out" which the interrogator offers. The "way out" is a rationalization. It allows the prisoner to meet the demands of his interrogator by degrees, at the same time retaining within himself some shred of belief that by his own standards he has not capitulated. With rare exceptions prisoners always accept this "way out," provided the pressures are sufficiently prolonged and intense and the interrogator can adjust his persuasiveness in a proper manner.

Various categories of prisoners respond to different types of persuasion. Persons who have been lifelong members of the Communist Party are familiar with the Communist concept of "crime" and the functions of the KGB. Furthermore, they have all been trained in the ritual of self-criticism, confession, punishment, and rehabilitation, which has been part of Communist procedure since before the Revolution. Many Communists can rationalize a belief that they are actually criminals, as specified by the KGB, and come to see their punishment as necessary for the good of the State and the Party. To the true Party member, martyrdom for such a reason carries with it an air of triumph.

Those who have studied the purge trials of the old Bolsheviks are convinced that this form of reasoning was behind their apparently peculiar behavior at the trials. These men held nothing sacred but the Party. They had dedicated their lives to the principle that the Party could do no wrong. They themselves looked upon deviationists as criminals worthy of the ultimate punishment. Zinoviev, Kammenev, and their followers knew themselves to be chronic oppositionists. Lenin had expelled them from the Party during the 1917 revolution and had reinstated them after they had confessed and recanted. In 1927 they had again been expelled by the Party and temporarily exiled; they had made abject recantations and had again been reinstated. But these men were chronic nonconformists. In some way, by their attitudes rather than by any deed, they had continued to be in partial disagreement with Stalin and other members of the party leadership. When they were arrested in 1936, it is said that the NKVD did not have very great difficulty in convincing them that they were criminals. They readily agreed to it. There was more difficulty in convincing them that the good of the Party demanded that they be publicly tried and executed; but after much tortuous logic they accepted this also. It is said that the interrogators and prisoners broke down and wept together when the final agreement was reached. Their "confessions" before the court contained an exposition of their crimes of which they were guilty "according to Communist theory," expressed as if these crimes had "actually been committed" in the Western, or popular, use of the word, whereas they were actually only "objective" or "consequential" crimes as defined by the Communist theory.

Non-Communist prisoners of idealistic beliefs or Socialist sympathies apparently make ready targets for the logic of the interrogator. Such persons are usually compelled to agree that the ostensible and idealistic motives of the Communist Party are "good," and that those who oppose these ideals are "bad." The rationalization in this case takes the form of getting the prisoner to say that the Communist Party has the same value system that he does. Something which the prisoner has done is "bad" by his own definition. From this point the prisoner proceeds through the usual steps to the ultimate signing of the deposition.

Persons who carry with them strong feelings of guilt associated with highly organized systems of moral values likewise become ready targets for the persuasion of the interrogator. Very few people are entirely free of guilt feelings, but often such feelings are found in the highest degree in those in whom they are least appropriate. For example, many strongly religious people have a profound sense of sin. They feel guilty of shortcomings of their own, which are much smaller than those found in most of their fellow men. They constantly see themselves as transgressing their own moral code, and in the need of forgiveness for doing so. Skilled interrogators make use of this. They point out that many of the ostensible ideals of Communism are the same as the ideals to which the prisoner himself subscribes. Since he has transgressed his own code, he is a criminal in Communist eyes also. Thus, Chinese interrogators who are experienced in the interrogation of priests develop an extensive knowledge of the Bible and Christian theology. They can draw parallels between Christianity and Communism, and, in fact, often identify the two as being different aspects of the same philosophical system. It is not hard to show the prisoner many points at which he has failed to live up to the Christian code. It is usually not very difficult to create within him a feeling of guilt about this. From here, it is also not difficult to get him to agree that, because of his un-Christian acts, he has injured "the people," whom Christ loved. The Communist Party is also interested in the welfare of "the people"; therefore, all the prisoner needs to do is confess that he has sinned against "the people" and has committed crimes against them. A confession of "crime against the people" is a satisfactory confession in a Communist court.

An additional vulnerability of highly moral people is that they find it difficult to tell a lie under any circumstances. Priests, for example, often give aid and comfort to those oppressed by Communist states. It is not too difficult for the police to find out about this, and it sometimes is very difficult for the priest to lie about it when presented with the evidence. From this point, it is not difficult to persuade the priest to confess that he has indeed given comfort to the enemies of the regime.

On the other hand, persons with so-called sociopathic or psychopathic personalities, who have few or no moral scruples, may also be vulnerable. Such persons have very little attachment to friends and to moral principles. They may be readily accessible to bribes and to various promises of reward. Under pressure they quite readily reveal all of the information they possess and freely implicate their associates. They readily rationalize the necessity for finding a "way out" of their situations and have little or no conflict about deserting any principles which they were supposed to possess. They need only to see what the KGB wants in the form of a "confession" in order to fabricate one without compunction. KGB officers are not entirely taken in by this lying. They do not hesitate to use the "confession," but they edit out the more fantastic parts from the final deposition.

Persons who are "caught with the goods" in actual crimes are equally vulnerable. This includes persons who have "actually" in the Western sense of the word committed espionage or treason. If the KGB has uncovered real evidence of this, it is quite likely that sooner or later, with constant pressure and interrogation, they will get the prisoner to admit it also. In this instance, the facts of the case are agreed upon by all concerned, and it remains only to determine the punishment.

The maze in which any prisoner finds himself has so many ramifications that it is almost impossible for him to escape from it without signing a protocol and being convicted. Anything he has done may be a crime. He has been adjudged guilty before his arrest. He is put in a situation of intolerable pressure. It is made clear to him that his only way out of this situation is to cooperate with the interrogator. He is offered a reasonable rationalization for doing so. Sooner or later under these circumstances, the prisoner and the interrogator almost inevitably come to an agreement upon a deposition which satisfies the interrogator. But not inevitably: There are reported instances of prisoners who have refused to sign any form of deposition and have remained in detention indefinitely, with their cases still unresolved, or have been tried summarily by an administrative court of the state police. Gomulka resisted the Polish UB. Elizabeth Lermolo, a woman who was implicated in the Kirov murder, resisted the NKVD and later escaped. It is alleged that she remained in detention, with periodic interrogation from 1936 until 1941, when the Germans overran her prison and she was released. It is said that she never signed a deposition. Whether this is a true story or not is not known. But it is known that of all the millions who passed through the hands of NKVD during the time of the purges, and who have fallen into the hands of its successors since then, few have escaped without signing a deposition which amounted to a confession of crime, as crimes are defined in Communist Russia.

18. The "Trial"

When the prisoner has finally reached the point of admitting his "crimes," and he and the interrogator have agreed upon a protocol satisfactory to both of them, he experiences a profound feeling of relief, which is sometimes shared by the man who has been questioning him. Even though his crimes may be serious and the punishment for them severe and of unknown degree, he welcomes a surcease from the unrelenting pressures and miseries of the interrogation procedure. Whatever the future may hold for him, he has for the moment found a way out of an intolerable situation.

When a satisfactory deposition has been prepared and signed, the pressures upon the prisoner are customarily relaxed. He is allowed to sleep as long as he wishes; he may have reading and writing material in his room. Sometimes he can join with other prisoners in periods of exercise. His meals improve and his guards become friendly, or even solicitous. This easy treatment is continued until he is thoroughly rested and his health has been restored. Then, in most cases, he is taken before a "court." The state prosecutor presents the court with the signed protocol and questions the prisoner about his crimes. Sometimes a "defense attorney" is assigned; this man invariably limits himself to requesting leniency from the court. The whole procedure is usually brief and formal. There are no verdicts of "not guilty." The function of the "judge" is solely that of presiding over the trial and passing upon the prisoner a sentence which has usually been agreed upon beforehand by the prosecutor and the KGB officer in charge of the case.

It is this aspect of the proceedings which is most bewildering to Western observers. It is easy to understand how prisoners can be tortured into signing confessions of crimes which they did not commit, but it is difficult to understand why the prisoners do not renounce these confessions later at the public trials.

Beginning with the purge trials of the 1930's, the NKVD and its successors

and offspring in Russia, the Eastern European nations, and China have presented the world with a series of public trials at which the prisoners calmly and seemingly without coercion make outrageous "confessions" of unbelievable crimes, praise their captors, and ask for the severest punishment for themselves. These prisoners have included important Communist officials, former NKVD officers, non-Communist citizens of various categories, and foreigners of the most diverse backgrounds. All of these prisoners were apparently "innocent"; some faced certain death, and many were profoundly anti-Communist. Men of the highest caliber and integrity, such as Cardinal Mindszenty, William Oatis, and Robert Vogeler, seemed to have the strongest possible motivations to resist; but none of them stood up in court and denounced the confession and his captors. This phenomenon demands an explanation.

The explanation is available, but it is not simple. It is necessary to examine the proposition in detail in order to view it in its proper light.

First, it is by no means true that "all prisoners confess freely at a public trial." Only a very small minority of prisoners of the Communist state police ever appear at a public trial. The KGB will not expose a prisoner to a public trial unless it is convinced that he will go through with his confession as planned. If there is any doubt about this, no public trial is held. But even with this precaution the KGB is not infallible. At the purge trials several of the prisoners tried to recant parts of their confessions. When a prisoner tried to recant, the prosecutor halted the examination of that person. Usually, when the man returned from his cell several days later, he was again docile and cooperative. In the Bulgarian trials, Traicho Kostov repudiated his entire protocol on two occasions. Some of these so-called "public trials" have not actually been public. They have been carried out in the presence of a select audience while movies and recordings are made of the prisoner's words, which are later transmitted to the public.

The majority of prisoners do "come to trial," but these trials are not public. They are held *in camera*. The state police are concerned only with political crimes and espionage. Their prisoners are tried before "military tribunals," which are not public courts. Those present are only the interrogator, the state prosecutor, the prisoner, the judges, a few stenographers, and perhaps a few officers of the court. At such a trial there is no opportunity for "public protest," and any protest which is made can be readily expunged from the record. So far as the prisoner is concerned, this so-called trial appears as nothing more than the next step in his process of imprisonment. He has been imprisoned, tortured, and interrogated and has signed a "confession." Following that, he has experienced more lenient treatment and has had a period of rest and rehabilitation. But he has not been out of the prison. He has not seen any of his friends or family or anyone interested in defending him. He has remained entirely in the hands of his interrogators and guards, with access to no one else. When he finally comes before the "court," he sees no one except the state prosecutor, the judge, and the court officials. The defense attorney, if one is assigned, shows not the slightest interest in refuting any of the "evidence" in the confession or in establishing a plea of "not guilty." He never questions the fact that the prisoner is guilty as charged. Sometimes he asks the judge for leniency; but not infrequently he informs the court that he is convinced the prisoner is just as big a monster as the prosecution says he is, and that he cannot bring himself to ask the court for leniency. The judge likewise shows no interest in the question of guilt or innocence. He limits

himself to maintaining order in the court and passing sentence. If the prisoner has any illusions that the prosecutor, the judge, and the defense attorney are going to allow him any opportunity to dispute the "facts in the case," these are soon dispelled.

By no means do all prisoners receive a "trial" of any sort. Those who are stubborn or repeatedly recant their confessions during the interrogation procedure will not be trusted, even at private trials. Uncooperative and stubborn prisoners, and those who might make embarrassing statements are "dealt with administratively." For many years the state police have had the right to carry out "administrative" trials for any prisoners whom they do not wish to expose to the usual trial procedure. These administrative trials consist of simply presenting the prisoner to a group of three senior police officers (the Troika), who pass sentence immediately and have it carried out forthwith. These administrative trials took place within the detention prison. Sometimes the prisoner was not even present at them; sentence was passed by the Troika merely upon the basis of the signed protocol. Sometimes the alleged records of these trials were made public, but generally the fact that such a trial had taken place was never revealed. For every Soviet citizen who has appeared at a public trial, there have been thousands who have been tried only at private trials by military tribunals, and hundreds who were dealt with administratively by the police themselves. Thus, a great number of high Communist officials, captured German officers, and similar prisoners who fell into the hands of the Russian secret police were not tried at all. So far as the public was concerned, they merely disappeared.

During the last few months there have been press reports that the right of administrative trial has been withdrawn from the KGB. It remains to be seen whether or not this is true.

19. Public Confessions

If we exclude from consideration all those prisoners who are dealt with administratively, two questions remain: 1. Why do all of those prisoners who are tried in private confess almost without exception? 2. Why do some prisoners confess at public trials, where there is actually some opportunity to make an open denial of guilt?

In response to the question of why prisoners at private trials confess almost without exception, the following answers can be given:

1. The setting of the private trial, as we have just described it, makes it apparent to the prisoner that any attempt at recantation is useless.

2. The prisoner at a private trial is always under actual threat by the KGB. The officer in charge of his case has clearly indicated to him that any attempt to alter or recant any part of his confession will lead to an immediate resumption of the interrogation-torture regimen. This threat is as poignant as a cocked pistol. The prisoner has just finished being carried through torture and interrogation over and over again to the point at which it is absolutely intolerable to him. He has already decided that, whatever his sentence may be, he prefers to receive his punishment rather than to return to the horrible ordeal through which he has just passed. In the opinion of KGB officers, this is the most potent reason why no prisoner changes his story.

3. Warm and positive feelings between prisoners and their interrogating officers often develop during the interrogation process, and many prisoners come to trial with the feeling that if they attempt to alter their testimony they will be

dishonoring an agreement with their interrogators (see Section 16).

4. Finally, it is to be emphasized that, in spite of all these detriments, some prisoners do recant at their private trials. The court then decides that these prisoners have not yet reached a full awareness of their crimes. They are sent back to the detention prison and once again put through the torture-interrogation regimen. Sooner or later, they learn that pleas of "not guilty" are not acceptable in Soviet courts, and that they must behave themselves at their trials. Otherwise, they are indefinitely detained or executed.

In answering the question of why some prisoners confess publicly when there is some opportunity for them to renounce their confessions and thereby embarrass their captors, one must consider the various categories of those who have been tried in public. Widely publicized trials are staged by the Communists only under exceptional circumstances and always for propaganda purposes. They are carefully managed "set pieces" in which every performer must play his role exactly as prescribed. The KGB and other Communist police organizations select the prisoners for these shows with great care.

The first category of those who have made public confessions are prominent Bolsheviks who have fallen from grace: Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, Bukharin, Radek and their associates, at the time of the great purges; more recently, Laslo Rajk, in Hungary; Traicho Kostov, in Bulgaria, and Slansky, Clementis, and others, in Czechoslovakia. The list is extensive, but not nearly so extensive as the list of prominent Communist officials who were liquidated administratively.

But why did those confess; who did so? The old Bolsheviks "confessed" primarily because they were lifelong, dedicated Communists. They had committed their lives to the belief that nothing is sacred but the Party, and the Party is always right. If there be a central point in the Communist creed, it is this. These men all subscribed to the belief that opposition to the Party line, as expressed by the Party leaders, is a crime. Whatever else they were, they were "chronic oppositionists," and knew themselves to be so. They all subscribed to the Communist ritual of public self-criticism and punishment. Nearly all of them had at one time or another publicly criticized themselves and had been punished. Several had been expelled from the Party, not once but several times. They all knew themselves to be in opposition to the Party leadership, and they all felt guilty about this. In spite of this, they still considered themselves to be Bolsheviks, and were prepared in principle to accept any demand which the Party might make upon them, even to the point of death.

All of the evidence points to the fact that the NKVD, using the interrogation-pressure process which we have described, persuaded these men to accept the concept that because they were opposed to Stalin, the leader of the party, they were wrecking the Party. As good Bolsheviks, the Party called upon them to make the ultimate sacrifice by denouncing themselves and giving up their lives so that the world could know that opposition to the Party leadership was both criminal and futile. The "crimes" to which they confessed publicly were not "actual" crimes in the Western sense of the term, but were "objective" or "consequential" crimes, which must result from their opposition according to Communist theory. Ultimately they made their confessions almost with an air of triumph, and went to their deaths seeing themselves as martyrs to the cause to which they had devoted their lives. Some of them—Krestinsky, for example—had difficulty, recanted a bit, and defied the prosecutor briefly; but after a few

days of persuasion they resumed their roles and carried the trial through to its end.

This behavior on the part of the highly disciplined and religiously dedicated "old Bolsheviks" is not unusual in the annals of human behavior. It is not inexplicable that these men who hated Stalin nevertheless played their roles and went to their deaths for the sake of the Party. The reader has but to consider how many soldiers, in wars throughout the course of history, have proceeded to certain death in response to what they knew to be stupid and disastrous orders, given by incompetent officers whom they hated; and how many wives have spent a lifetime in supporting and defending drunken and brutal husbands, whom they detested. People dedicated to a cause will destroy both their lives and their reputations for it. That Communists will do this we know well from our experiences in this country. The Rosenbergs could have escaped death had they been willing to confess to their espionage and reveal their contacts, but they refused to do so.

The information available to us about the trials of the Communist leaders in the Eastern European satellites indicates that their behavior can be explained on the same basis as that of the old Bolsheviks. These trials were not the success that one might assume from their awesome popular reputation. Rajk confessed obediently and went to his death like a proper Bolshevik; but Kostov denounced his accusers and proclaimed his innocence. The Polish police never dared to expose Gomulka to a trial of any sort. Tito defected and purged his would-be purgers. There have been no truly public trials since those times. The trials of Slansky and his colleagues were recorded in private, and selected excerpts of the transcripts were broadcast. Beria and Abakumov were tried entirely *in camera* by a military tribunal.

Another category of those who have confessed publicly is that group of intellectually or idealistically motivated people who were thought to be opposed to Communism, or at least to be non-Communist, prior to their arrest. Most prominent in this group is Cardinal Mindszenty; also included in this are other Roman Catholic priests from the satellite countries.

The Mindszenty case is the best known. In the public mind Mindszenty is the prototype of "Communist brain washing." Among the known facts of his case are these:

Cardinal Mindszenty came from an old and aristocratic Hungarian family; he had many friends among the Hungarian aristocracy and the nobility. He had always supported the monarchical form of government. During the period between the wars, when Hungary was a regency, he had been in favor of the restoration of the Hapsburgs to the Hungarian throne. He was a man of strong religious convictions, who held himself, as well as others, to a high code of moral conduct. Governmental administrators sometimes found him a difficult man to deal with because he was inflexible in upholding his moral principles.

During the Second World War he came into open conflict with the Nazis, and with the members of the Hungarian Fascist Arrow-Cross organization; but these organizations did not dare arrest him because of his position in the church and because of the respect and admiration in which the Roman Catholic population of Hungary held him. It was partly because he had become such a symbol of the integrity and independence of the church that he was elevated to the position of Cardinal in 1945.

Cardinal Mindszenty did not hesitate to make known his opposition to the Communist regime. He made no attempt to conceal his sympathy for many of

those oppressed by it. He maintained his association with his friends among the former aristocracy. He gave support and encouragement to those, both inside and outside the country, who, he thought, might end the Communist dictatorship and restore a legal government. He was arrested in December, 1948, after a propaganda campaign had been carried on against him for several years. Approximately six weeks later, he "confessed" at a public trial. All of the evidence indicates that the treatment which Cardinal Mindszenty received during his period of interrogation did not differ in any important detail from that which is used by the KGB, which we have described above. The only drugs which the Cardinal received were stimulants to keep him awake during the long hours of interrogation, and possibly sedatives to allow him to sleep when he was exhausted. There is no reason to believe that any new, esoteric, or unknown method was used in handling him and no need to assume that there was.

Cardinal Mindszenty's confession is published in the "Hungarian Yellow Book." In his published depositions, he acknowledges that he is a royalist, that he had favored the restoration of the monarchy, and that he had hoped that the international situation would develop in a way which would cause the United States to intervene and allow the monarchy to be restored. He agrees that he had continued to communicate with his monarchist friends, both in Hungary and abroad, and with various American authorities. He agrees that he was hostile to the Communist regime. "It was in the interests of this that I did everything to support American politics in Hungary, partly by my activity against the Hungarian Republic, and partly by constantly urging their interference, by a regular service of facts, and by espionage." This sentence, translated by Hungarian Communists, is typical of those found in Communist depositions; it can equally well be interpreted to mean that Mindszenty had committed espionage (in the Communist sense of the word) or that he had urged the Americans to make known the facts and to commit espionage. The "facts" in the "Yellow Book," even if accepted at face value, reveal the Cardinal to have been a Hungarian patriot and a vigorous anti-Communist, but not a spy.

Cardinal Mindszenty's trial was "public," but not all of his statements were broadcast. The broadcast portions were cut, evidently at points where he made significant reservations. But, even so, his widely publicized confession was no declaration of profound guilt. At his trial Cardinal Mindszenty stated that he recognized that some of his activities had been contrary to the laws of the Communist state. He stated that he was sorry he had violated the laws. If his actions had in any way harmed the people of Hungary or the Roman Catholic Church, he asked forgiveness for this. He agreed that he would be willing to step aside as leader of the Hungarian Church if this would be in the best interest of the people and the Church.

On the basis of this confession the Communists convicted him of being a "reactionary criminal" and of taking part in a "treasonable monarchist plot" to secure United States intervention and to overthrow the government of Hungary. He was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Still a third category of those who have confessed publicly are various foreign businessmen, newspapermen, and military men who were arrested or captured in the course of their routine duties, of whom Robert Vogeler, in Hungary, and William Oatis, in Czechoslovakia, are examples. In all these cases the following factors are evident:

1. The confessions made by the prisoners were "actually true" in the sense that some of the specific acts described in the confessions actually occurred, although not necessarily in the way in which they were described.

2. The interpretation put upon these acts was the Communist interpretation.

3. The prisoner had been brought to agree that in the country in which he was arrested the Communist laws applied and, therefore, these acts constituted a crime. The prisoner, therefore, pleaded guilty to "crimes" which were "crimes" by Communist definition, but which he had not intended as crimes, or considered to be crimes at the time that he carried them out. This qualification, however, was missing from the statements made by the prisoners at the trials.

4. All of these prisoners were under the threat of renewed interrogation-torture if they recanted or changed their confessions.

5. Many of them had the actual or implied promise, as well as the firm belief, that they would be released if they cooperated with the police.

6. Furthermore, all of them were able to rationalize that their confessions would not be believed by Americans in any case. This rationalization was essentially a correct one—their confessions were widely disbelieved in the United States, but in some other areas of the world their confessions are accepted as factual.

20. Punishment

The period of interrogation and detention, no matter how long and terrible it may be, is not considered imprisonment. The "punishment" begins only after the sentence has been passed. Sometimes a "lenient" judge will allow the prisoner to count his period of detention as a part of a prison sentence, but often this period is discounted altogether. According to Communist theory, the purpose of prison systems is to rehabilitate criminals through wholesome work, productive activity, and education. For this "purpose" prisoners are transported to Siberia or the Arctic, where most of them spend their terms working in mines and construction projects under brutal and primitive conditions. Those who are fortunate enough to receive any education during this procedure are "educated" by further indoctrination with Communist ideas.

III. Practices in Communist China

1. A Comparison of Chinese Methods with Those of the KGB

The methods used by the state police in China are basically similar to those used by the KGB, but they are not "carbon copies," like those of the Communist-dominated countries of Eastern Europe. They are different in several important details.

1. The goal of the KGB detention and interrogation procedure is the preparation of a protocol upon which a suitable punishment can be based, so that the KGB can then deal with the prisoner according to its preconceived idea of what must be done for the good of the Party and the Soviet State. In a minority of cases, this includes a public trial for propaganda purposes. The KGB does not appear to be greatly concerned about the future attitudes and behavior of the prisoner, so long as he behaves properly during the period of trial and sentencing.

The goal of the Chinese detention and interrogation procedure, on the other hand, is primarily that of ensuring that the prisoner will develop a relatively long-lasting change in his attitudes and overt behavior, which will be sustained after his release, so that he will not again constitute a danger to the Communist

state.¶ The securing of information by interrogation, the preparation of proper protocols and "confessions," and the participation of the prisoners in public propaganda trials are secondary to this primary goal.

2. Unlike the KGB, the Chinese make extensive use of group interaction among prisoners, in obtaining information, applying pressures, and carrying out indoctrination.

3. Whereas in the Soviet Union and Eastern European states the ritual of public self-criticism, confession, self-degradation, punishment, and rehabilitation is a Party procedure confined to Communists, the Chinese have extended this practice to the non-Party population, and to the prison population in particular, and have made it an important feature of their indoctrination procedure.

4. In China, at the moment at least, the period of detention is greatly prolonged. Whereas in the Soviet Union trial and sentencing take place fairly soon after the completion of the interrogation and the preparation of a suitable protocol, in China the preparation of a first confession is only a prelude to a long period of indoctrination and reeducation, which may go on for years, and is not terminated until those in charge of the prisoner believe that he has finally adopted a "correct" attitude and behavior. It is only then that the "trial," the "sentencing" and the formal term of imprisonment or other punishment begins.

Procedures in China are much less standardized than those in Russia, and many variations upon them can be expected. This is in part the result of the newness of the Chinese Communist regime and the lack of homogeneity of its personnel and facilities. The procedure outlined below is carried out in the large prisons in major cities. In outlying areas there may be differences in detail, but the general principles and practices are the same.

2. Background and Organization of the Chinese State Police

The Chinese Communist Party was formed in 1919; from that time forward a steady flow of young Chinese Communists were trained in Russian Party schools. Nevertheless, Chinese Communism developed along lines which were in many ways different from those of Western Communist parties. Communism was able to sustain itself only in rural China, where it fed upon poverty and discontent of the Chinese peasants. Mao's army lived off the countryside and of necessity became closely identified with the value systems of the peasant group, from which most of its numbers originated.

In the years from 1936 to 1946, while these Chinese Communists were busy expanding and recruiting new members from the general Chinese population, they gradually developed a highly organized and vigorous indoctrination program. It was aimed at all potential recruits who happened to fall into their hands. Uneducated peasants, city workers, and captured KMT troops, as well as interested students from the universities, were subjects for this indoctrination.

In order to create in this heterogeneous group a feeling of comradeship and identification with the peasant Communists, it was necessary to make them "cut their ties to the past." Therefore, the training program included a deliberate as-

¶ The official regulations for Chinese detention prisons include the following statement: "In dealing with the criminals, there shall be regularly adopted measures of collective study classes, individual interviews, study of assigned documents, and organized discussion, to educate them in the admission of guilt and obedience to law, political and current events, labor production, and culture, so as to expose the nature of the crime committed, thoroughly wipe out criminal thoughts, and establish a new moral code."

sault upon all of the traditional "bourgeois," "reactionary," "upper-class" attitudes, beliefs, and practices the recruits brought with them. Trainees were forced to abandon their refinements of speech, manner, and behavior, their reverence for family ties and worldly goods, and to adopt the crude and earthy attitudes and behavior of the new "people's army." This questioning and discussion of behavior and value systems was accompanied by the inculcation of a fanatical enthusiasm for the Communist movement, built around the ideal of the rejuvenation of China and its reestablishment of a dynamic, modern society (an ideal which had been shared by the majority of Chinese intellectuals and reformers since the days of Sun Yat Sen). The combination of Communist practices, such as public confession and self-criticism, with traditional Chinese methods of learning by rote and repetition resulted in a highly effective method of persuasion. These methods, as applied to the general population following the success of the revolution in 1949, have been referred to as methods of "thought reform" or "ideological reform" #; and, as we have seen, these phrases were finally transferred into English under the generic term of "brain washing."

The Chinese have shown great skill in the development of these methods and their application, but, like the Russians, they developed their methods by trial and error, through practice, and through the application of known principles. There is no evidence that psychologists, neurophysiologists, or other scientists participated in their development.

After the Communist triumph in 1949 a large number of "special advisers" were sent from Russia to help set up the Chinese state police and espionage systems, and to train the Chinese in Soviet methods.

The Chinese state police are organized on the same lines as the KGB. The central direction is at Peking and resides in the "Ministry of Public Safety," which is similar to the MVD. This Ministry has diverse functions, such as the control of frontiers, the uncovering of economic and political offenses, the management of traffic on waterways, and even the administration of certain public health measures. Those under its control include 2,000,000 members of the "Public Safety Corps" (similar to the paramilitary units of the KGB) and 10,000,000 "militia," or local police. Both the rural and the city police are responsible to it. The secret police organization, itself, is only one part of the over-all structure of this Ministry.

There are administrative divisions of the state police in each of the administrative areas into which China was divided after the Communist take-over. In each village and hamlet, in addition to the militia and rural police, the Communists set up what they call "Public Safety Subcommittees." These have three to five members selected from the local citizenry on the basis of their loyalty and enthusiasm for the new regime. Their job is essentially that of carrying out "census" investigations. The "census" is an all-embracing record of everything that goes on in the village. It covers the name, sex, age, nativity, occupation, education, family status, political affiliation, social relations, economic condition, and activities of every resident. Everyone who wishes to change his residence, change his occupation, or visit a friend is supposed to report this fact to the Public Safety Subcommittee. Those who wish to travel from one locality to another must obtain a travel pass in order to do so.

The term "brain washing" is not used by the Chinese, and should be avoided, for it has no precise meaning. The Chinese phrase is "Szu hsing K'ei Tsao," which means "ideological reform." It is sometimes shortened to "K'ai Tsao," or "reform."

Undoubtedly, the records maintained by these rural subcommittees are not so voluminous or detailed as they are alleged to be, and it is quite probable that the peasants have developed various means of circumventing their surveillance. Nevertheless, the men who make up these committees know their villages, and all that goes on within them. They are urged to increase their knowledge by frequent and unexpected visits among their neighbors, and evidently they do so. The result is that the committee is able to extend to the individual Chinese the direct control of the administrative apparatus of the central government to a degree to which this control has not been felt for many centuries. The "census" and the "Public Safety Subcommittee" have been among the most important means by which the Communists have fastened their control upon the vast Chinese population. They are, in effect, an all-pervading arm of the state police.

The local prison is usually at the "hsien," or county, headquarters. This headquarters, like its Soviet counterpart, is divided into an "inquiry and detection" section, a "detention" section, and other sections dealing with staff and administrative work and open police activities. Also, like their Russian counterparts, the Chinese police exercise both police and judicial powers. They not only "investigate" and "arrest"; they also "try" and "sentence." This is one reason why Western prisoners of the Chinese often refer to their interrogations by the police as their "trials." The Chinese state police make no clear distinction between the "trials" and the "interrogations," in spite of the fact that they often carry out a *pro forma* trial and sentencing at the end of the detention period.

The original members of the Chinese Communist police system were drawn from the guerrilla training schools. After 1949 the Communists established large police-training academies. Each of these has a student body of several hundred, who receive a training similar to that of KGB officers. Many former Nationalist police have been retrained and absorbed directly into the Communist apparatus.

3. The Suspects

In China, as in the Soviet Union, those whom the Party decides are a threat to its program automatically fall into the category of suspects. Because China is still in the midst of its revolution, there are large groups of people of "bourgeois" or "reactionary" class background, all of whom are automatically suspect. This includes all members of the "official" class, all of the rural gentry, all of the business and commercial classes of the cities, and property owners in general. All of those who were in any way connected with the Nationalist government are suspect. Unlike the Russians, the Chinese apparently have not yet decided that any national minority groups indigenous to China are automatically suspect. However, all foreigners, and especially all those of Western European or American background, are automatically suspect. All Christians, and especially Roman Catholics, are suspect.

As in Russia, there are "specific" suspects, as well as general categories of suspects. Such specific suspects include persons who are the associates and relatives of other suspects, persons about whom police spies and informers have reported derogatory information, and persons who have been accused of acts or attitudes which threaten the Party or any of its programs. That those who are actual enemies of the regime are all potential suspects goes without saying. In China, as in Russia, nearly anyone in the population may become a suspect; and when he is arrested, the police always have some reason for making the arrest, whether or not this is apparent to the victim.

4. Investigation and Arrest

Observations of the investigation methods of the Chinese state police indicate that they are similar to those used by the KGB. When local security officers decide that a person is a threat to the Party or its program, they satisfy themselves that he should be arrested and then arrest him. From the point of view of the victim, it is important that the Chinese investigating procedures sometimes are not as prolonged and comprehensive as those of the KGB and the prospective victim may have much less opportunity to get wind of what is afoot. Apparently, the Chinese occasionally make quick and arbitrary decisions to carry out arrests, basing these upon the report of a single informer; thus the police may swoop down suddenly upon an unsuspecting victim, who is utterly unaware that they might have any interest in him. There are, however, other occasions on which friends, relatives, and associates have gradually disappeared, or have been questioned by the police over a period of weeks before the final arrest of the central victim, who becomes all too aware of what is in store for him.

As in Russia, the arrest procedure is usually carried out suddenly, and often at night; but the Chinese make no pretense at carrying out their arrests covertly. Often they make a large show of force. The arresting authorities may drive up in a truck with a squad of heavily armed soldiers, surround the home of the victim, and cart him off with much military ceremony. If there is a desire to impress the populace, the arrest may be staged in broad daylight under humiliating circumstances. The arresting officers do sometimes read a "warrant" to the victim. As in Russia, this warrant does not name specific crimes, but names only general ones. The victim is given only a few moments to gather together the barest of his personal essentials before being taken away.

5. Chinese Prison Routine

Usually the prisoner is taken first to a police station, where he is immediately interrogated by several police officers. This initial interrogation is relatively brief, and takes the form of an accusation. Usually, it is carried out by three officers, in full uniform. Their demeanor is invariably arrogant and hostile. As in Russia, they never state specific crimes, but they tell the prisoner that he is accused of "crimes against the people," "treason," "espionage," or some similar broad category of malefaction. Sometimes they simply state to him that he knows why he is there, and what has he to say for himself?

Usually this initial shouting and accusatory interrogation is a brief one, and the prisoner is promptly placed in a cell. However, for psychological reasons, and because of lack of prison facilities, some prisoners are put under "house arrest" immediately after their initial arrest. A single room in the prisoner's home is fixed up as a cell, and guards are assigned. The prisoner stays in this room for a indefinite period of time and is transported back and forth to the prison for further interrogations (which the prisoners often call "trials"). Under standard conditions, however, the prisoner is confined immediately to a prison cell and usually goes through an initial period of solitary confinement.

Chinese prison facilities are much more primitive than many of those in Russia and are utterly inadequate to the prison population which they must at present sustain. Crude, improvised, and extremely primitive prison conditions are often encountered.

The Chinese prisons, like the Soviet prisons, are separated into "detention

prisons" (often called "detention houses"), where prisoners are kept during the period of "investigation" up to the time the cases are "settled," and "punishment prisons" and labor camps, in which sentences are served. The "detention prisons" in large cities are modeled along the lines of the Soviet detention prisons.

In important cases, when there is a need to elicit a good deal of accurate information from the prisoner, the Chinese utilize a routine of isolation, pressure, and interrogation, which is almost identical with that used by the KGB and is described in Part II. The prisoner is placed in a small and barren cell in total isolation. His food, his sleep, his exercise, his position, his activities, and even his eliminative functions are rigidly controlled. After a suitable initial period he is interrogated nightly with increasing pressure until he capitulates. Usually his cell is dirtier and less well heated than those in Russia, and his regimen is different in details—some minor and some major. In China, for example, prisoners in isolation may be required to sleep with their hands inside the blankets rather than outside. The Chinese have a predilection for severely restricting the activities of their prisoners. It seems to be much commoner for them to require men in total isolation to sit rigidly on their bunks at all times when they are not eating, sleeping, or exercising. This adds greatly to their discomfort.

An aspect of their isolation regimen which is especially onerous to Western prisoners is the arrangement for the elimination of urine and feces. The "slop jar" that is usually present in Russian cells is often absent in China. It is a Chinese custom to allow defecation and urination only at one or two specified times each day—usually in the morning after breakfast. The prisoner is hustled from his cell by a guard, double-timed down a long corridor, and given approximately two minutes to squat over an open Chinese latrine and attend to all of his wants. The haste and the public scrutiny are especially difficult for women to tolerate. If the prisoners cannot complete their action in about two minutes, they are abruptly dragged away and back to their cells. The guards customarily allow only this one opportunity for defecation, but they may allow one or more other opportunities to urinate during the day.

All Western prisoners experience extreme discomfort and marked disturbances of bowel function when first exposed to this regimen. Many of them think of it as one of the most fiendish tortures devised by the Chinese Communists, but the practice may simply be an old routine which has been customary in China for many years. It seems to be common to all Chinese prisons, even those in the provinces. Open latrines and public defecation are the custom in rural China, and they do not seem to be regarded as unpleasant by most Chinese.

Similarly, the diet in Chinese prisons is often regarded by Western prisoners as a device for creating discomfort. Rice, millet, and bean soup are the staples. As in Soviet prisons, these are presented to the prisoner in an amount just sufficient to maintain his nutrition if he eats all that he is given. Some Western prisoners regard Chinese prison food as nauseating or distasteful and suffer accordingly. However, there is reason to believe that the Chinese Communists intend to provide in their prisons a diet equivalent to that of an average Chinese peasant or soldier.

The chief features of the isolation regimen in China are the same as those of the Soviet Union: total isolation, utter boredom, anxiety, uncertainty, fatigue, and lack of sleep; rejection, hostile treatment, and intolerable pressure; and reward and approval for compliance.

6. The Interrogator

The interrogation in Chinese prisons is sometimes carried out by two or three officers; but usually one of these is in charge of the case, and it is he who acts as the "friendly" interrogator at times when pressure is released. As in Russia, there may be only one interrogator, and sometimes two interrogators alternate. These men are relatively junior officers. Like their KGB counterparts, many of them are dedicated Communists. They may approach the prisoner with a set of preformed ideas, which are impervious to logic. Some Chinese interrogators are university graduates, and some of them have studied abroad; but many others are men whose limited education has been entirely in Communist Party schools. Such men have an ignorance of the outside world and of Western ideas which makes it even more difficult for Western prisoners to cope with them.

On the whole, Western prisoners have reported that one of the most persuasive features of Communist Chinese interrogators is their evident devotion to their cause and the enthusiastic idealism with which they subscribe to the ostensible goals of Communism. Their patient attempts to teach prisoners "the right attitude" and to get them to understand the Chinese Communist viewpoint has a potent effect upon unsophisticated or idealistic people. At the same time, the relative ignorance of some of these police officers and their dogmatic adherence to Communist beliefs in the face of obviously contrary facts may be profoundly exasperating. Under the pressures of interrogation, prisoners are usually prepared to admit to acts which actually occurred and in time to accept the Communist definition of the nature of these acts; but they have great difficulty in bringing themselves to make confessions which are wildly contrary to fact. The interrogator may insist upon such confessions because of his erroneous beliefs about the nature of Western institutions and Western motives. This may in part explain why protocols are rewritten so many times in Communist prisons, and why the confession is so often rejected as unsatisfactory after the prisoner thinks that he has finally written it in an acceptable form.

7. The Interrogation Procedure

The interrogation procedure is much the same as that used by the KGB. It is usually carried out at night and in a special room; it proceeds stepwise, with a gradual building up of pressure upon the prisoner to an intolerable point, sudden release of pressure, friendly interrogation, rewards for cooperation, and then a repetition of the whole process until a presumably satisfactory first protocol is signed. As in the Soviet Union, the Chinese interrogators adjust their attitudes to the type of man with whom they think they are dealing. They are more likely to shout, revile, and humiliate. Possibly they take this attitude more toward Western prisoners than toward members of their own populace. Their procedures seem to be less formalized, and their pressures are more apt to be primitive and brutal. Important or recalcitrant prisoners are usually interrogated during a period of isolation in a detention cell, under a routine similar to that used in Russia. Less important prisoners may be interrogated while incarcerated in "group cells." In this case the members of the cell group alter their behavior to fit the needs

of the interrogators. Prisoners in group cells may be isolated if their "confessions" are not developing in a satisfactory manner.

In addition to the procedure of long-continued standing, which is frequently employed, the Chinese also use manacles and leg chains, devices which are no longer used by the KGB. Leg chains are hobbling and uncomfortable, but the most excruciating discomfort is produced by the manacles. These are commonly in the form of iron bracelets, several inches in width, and joined rigidly together. The prisoner's hands are placed behind his back, and his wrists are locked within the manacles. The rigid joint of the manacles holds his forearms together side by side, tightly behind his back. This position is a painful one to assume for even a few moments. When a man's arms are held in this position for many hours, he develops almost unbearable pain, primarily in his shoulders and hands. The circulation to his hands is interfered with also. They become swollen and exceedingly tender. The manacles may cut into his wrists and produce wounds which become infected. The Chinese may manacle a prisoner for days or weeks at a time. Such a prisoner is helpless and degraded. In order to eat, he must lie on the floor and lap up his food. He cannot urinate or defecate without help, and frequently he soils himself. He cannot find a comfortable position for sleep. Lying on either side causes pain in the shoulders, and lying on his back is impossible because of tenderness of his hands.

Chinese interrogators and prison guards are more likely to resort to direct physical brutality than their Russian counterparts. When asked to explain the difference between Chinese methods and those of the KGB, one Russian said simply, "The Chinese use torture." This is the exception rather than the rule in their behavior, but nevertheless it occurs. Angry interrogators may slap or beat prisoners and kick them in the shins. Guards may do likewise. Among their most sadistic practices are milking the fingers of manacled prisoners and binding the ankles of those who are forced to stand. Milking pressure on the swollen fingers of a manacled hand is excruciatingly painful. Whenever loose gauze bandages are applied around the ankles of a man who is forced to stand, they seriously constrict his legs as they begin to swell. This also produces intense pain.

As in Russian prisons, medical attention is given prisoners. This is not intended to be inadequate, but it is usually grossly so by Western standards. Some Chinese physicians, like their Russian counterparts, are skilled in estimating the capacity of prisoners to withstand punishment, and usually call a halt to tortures before death or irreparable physical damage occurs.

The content of the interrogation procedure is not merely the tortures which are applied. As in Russia, the persuasion and discussion of the interrogator, which seems to provide a "way out" for the prisoner, is an essential tool in producing the desired confession.

The Chinese more frequently ask the prisoner to write out, rather than relate, his own biography, and often require him to revise it in detail. The interrogation sessions themselves can be taken up with the discussion of this biographic material, but only rarely is the biography itself obtained by direct questioning. All of the psychological devices used by the KGB interrogators are also used by the Chinese interrogators. Night interrogation, with repetitive questioning, undefined crimes, changing attitudes, and increasing pressures alternate with periods of relaxed pressure, "friendship," and reward. Cigarettes, tea, and a friendly

attitude may be the sum total of a reward for cooperation; but even this provides profound relief from the usual interrogation procedures.

The KGB rarely requires a prisoner to fabricate a completely untrue act which is logically absurd. They concentrate more upon persuading him that his actual acts constitute crimes. Chinese interrogators, on the other hand, when they are intent upon establishing charges, such as bacteriological warfare or espionage, may insist that the prisoner include in his confession detailed statements which are not only untrue but logically absurd. One has the impression that this insistence is based upon a combination of ignorance and ineptitude. Prisoners usually balk at making such statements and tend to retract them even after they have been made.* This seems to produce a profound exasperation in many interrogators. It is in such settings that much brutality occurs. Men have been kicked, beaten, starved, locked up in small boxes, hung up by their thumbs or legs, or subjected to other primitive tortures under these circumstances. This has happened especially in POW interrogations.

Persuasion and friendly discussion nevertheless play a major part in the preparation of the original confession. The same types of rationalization are used by the Chinese as are used by the KGB, and the peculiar forms of Communist logic are common to both.

8. The Indoctrination Procedure in the Group Cell

At the time the first protocol or "confession" is signed, the prisoner is usually sullen and only half-convinced, if at all. It is at this point that the Chinese procedure diverges radically from that of the other Communist countries. The Chinese are less interested in immediate trial and punishment; they are more concerned with reforming the prisoner's thoughts and acts.

At some stage in his imprisonment the prisoner can expect to find himself placed in a cell with about eight other prisoners. If he was initially isolated and interrogated, this may be shortly after his first "confession" is accepted; but many prisoners are placed in group cells from the outset of their imprisonment. The cell is usually barren, and scarcely large enough to hold the group it contains. There may be a sleeping platform, but all of the prisoners sleep on the floor; and when all lie down, every inch of floor space may be taken up. The atmosphere is extremely intimate. Privacy is entirely nonexistent. Poor food and all of the other hardships of the prison routine are present, and a new and extraordinary hardship is added as well—the psychological atmosphere.

In societies which require a rigid conformity of belief and provide severe punishment for deviation, periods of great fear may be accompanied by widespread hysterical accusations and brutal punishments. This has been an outstanding feature of the present Communist Revolution in China. Under the pressures of the Communist demands for conformity and the fear of relentless punishment, men have turned against men and children against their parents. People compete with each other to demonstrate their loyalty to the new regime and freely accuse their neighbors of deviations or suspected crimes. The Chinese Communists have intentionally fostered this fear among the general population and use it for their own ends. Certainly, they do so in the prisons. One of their most ingenious

* A person who has finally been forced into making an absurd confession will sometimes accept the confession after the most absurd parts have been deleted, even though the remaining protocol is patently untrue.

prison devices is that of turning prisoner against prisoner, and requiring the enemies of the regime to beat each other into conformity.

During his original interrogation, as he is urged to confess his crimes, the prisoner is told repeatedly that only when he has completely confessed his crimes and has come to realize the error of his ways can his case be settled. After he is transferred to a cell with other prisoners, it becomes clear to him what this entails. It is necessary for him to compete with other prisoners in studying, in thoughts, and in behavior until he has demonstrated to them, as well as to his jailers, that he is thoroughly "reformed" and a true adherent of Communism.

The regimen in the new cell is completely organized. The prisoners arise at a fixed hour, have a brief period for cleaning themselves, eat a frugal breakfast, and have the usual march to the latrine. Thereafter, they spend the morning in lectures, discussion sessions, and brief exercise periods. They spend the afternoon in the same sort of routine—more lectures, more discussions and self-criticism sessions. In the evenings, the discussions and self-criticism go on continuously until bedtime.

The lectures are relatively formal study sessions given by an instructor, who is either a member of the prison staff or a prisoner who is further along in his indoctrination. The textbooks are the standard books of Marxist theory.[†] The lecturer assigns topics for reading in these books. These are later taken up in "discussion sessions." Such group discussions of general topics are designed to ensure that everyone understands what he is being taught. On each point it is necessary for everyone in the group to come to precisely the same understanding, which is the one that meets with the approval of the teacher and the more thoroughly indoctrinated students. These sessions are held in the cell. Everyone is forced to participate. Attempts at nonparticipation are noticed immediately by the other prisoners, who then insist upon an expression of an opinion from the recalcitrant member and a thorough discussion and dissection of his views. Prisoners and instructors are equally assiduous at ferreting out other standard devices for avoiding commitment, such as platitudinous statements, or the mere parroting of the words of the instructors and the group without conviction. Prisoners who attempt to escape by the use of such maneuvers find themselves set upon by the other students and sharply criticized for their insincerity.

The exercise period is like that in Soviet prisons. During the earlier phase of indoctrination it usually consists of walking in the prison yard or doing calisthenics. At later stages, more advanced prisoners are permitted to play games, such as volley ball or baseball.

Further lectures and more group discussions take place in the afternoon. In addition, there are the "self-criticism" sessions, during which each prisoner is supposed to criticize his behavior in the light of proper Communist behavior and to admit all his faults. Not only one's present failures but all of one's past actions are subject to review. The biographical material from each prisoner's life history is available, and sooner or later he must review most of the items. Furthermore, all prisoners must take part in vigorous criticism of other prisoners. One is not allowed to criticize vaguely or lightly. One must criticize specific points and criticize them forcefully. The result of this is an intense outpouring of hostile accusations upon the prisoner who is the recipient of the criticism. The hostility

[†] For example, "The Communist Manifesto"; "Socialism-Utopian and Scientific"; "Imperialism—the Highest Stage of Capitalism"; "Foundations of Leninism"; "The History of Social Development"; "The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik)."

of the group grows in intensity and continues until the uncommitted prisoner shows a genuine emotional reaction that indicates a satisfying willingness to reform.

A special aspect of the group criticism is what prisoners call "the struggle." This takes place when prisoners are undergoing interrogations while being confined to group cells. The cell group is made aware of the progress of the interrogation, apparently by direct instructions from the jailers to the group leader. When the prisoner returns fatigued after an interrogating session, the group surrounds him and "struggles" to help him with his confession. They stand around him in a group, shouting at him, reviling him, and accusing him for hours at a time, constantly telling him that he must confess all in order to be treated better. Such "struggles" are often initiated when a prisoner returns from an interrogation session wearing manacles and leg chains as a sign of his unsatisfactory performance. When the prisoner finally produces a satisfactory confession and the interrogator changes his attitude, the cell group is made aware of this also, and changes its attitude toward the prisoner to a milder one.

Another technique used is that of stopping all interrogations and instructions for a period of days and ordering the prisoner to concentrate upon writing his confession and self-criticism. During this time, he is not allowed to speak to anyone in his cell, and his cell mates do not speak to him. The effect of this is to produce anxiety and doubts in the prisoner, who continues to expand his writing in the hope that he will finally produce something which will satisfy his interrogators.

This routine of lectures, discussions, self-criticism, and group criticism goes on from morning until evening throughout the week. The formal lectures alone may occupy as much as 56 hours a week. Literally no part of the prisoner's waking life is left free.

9. The Reaction of the Prisoner to the Procedure in the Group Cell

Whether by design or by accident, the psychological atmosphere within one of these group prison cells is such that ultimately the prisoner comes to see that the only hope for a "solution to his case" lies in his complete conformity in speech and behavior to the doctrine outlined by his jailers. He also learns that he must demonstrate his zeal not merely by his own behavior but also by vigorously tearing down the defenses of many other prisoners. Fear and tension in the group are thus maintained at a high pitch, and the cell mates vie with one another in accusing, criticizing, degrading, and brutally punishing their fellow prisoners.

A prisoner newly introduced into one of these cells finds himself faced with an almost irresistible assault upon the integrity of his personality. Often he is already tired, discouraged, and psychologically whipped by the previous extraction of a "confession." Furthermore, he is usually somewhat confused about his value systems, and at least partly convinced that, by Communist standards, he is a criminal. He enters the cell as a newcomer and an unregenerate. He finds that his cell mates are all people who have "changed their attitudes." Regardless of their status prior to arrest, they all seem to regard themselves as criminals; some take pride in the fact that they were the worst criminals in the lot. He may be surprised to find that the cell leader who has charge of the discussion and criticism sessions is a former Nationalist officer, or possibly a priest, or a former high Communist official.

The new prisoner's protestations of innocence are not accepted by his fellow prisoners. They derisively tell him that he will soon change. They all tell him that resistance is useless, that the Communist party is all-powerful, and that no one who is innocent is ever imprisoned. They promptly turn upon him and begin to "help him" in his reform. They criticize him vigorously and brutally. They point out every error in his thinking. They detect his every attempt to evade commitment and destroy it.† They do not allow protestation of innocence. Thenceforth he has no moment of peace and no shred of privacy.

The brutalities of prisoners to other prisoners are far more frequent than those of the guards. This is another interesting example of Communist legalism. The Chinese, like the KGB, have a regulation that prisoners shall not be tortured, beaten, or otherwise maltreated. Usually the interrogator and guards follow this rule. They leave physical brutality to the prisoners themselves. Amid the tensions of the group cell, prisoners can revile and degrade their fellow prisoners to an unbelievable degree. When the group decides that a prisoner is recalcitrant or reactionary, they may turn upon him and beat him mercilessly. They may deprive him of sleep, take his food away from him, spit upon him, make him stand all day, and insist that he be manacled. It is said that prisoners have even killed or seriously injured other prisoners. Occasionally the guards even intervene to protect prisoners from their cell mates. Such pressure of prisoners upon other prisoners is intentionally permitted and is interrupted only when danger to the life of the prisoner, or the policy of the prison officials, indicates that it should be stopped.

Hence, in addition to the physical discomforts inherent in this situation, the prisoner is placed under profound psychological pressure. To reiterate: Man is a social animal. His health is as much dependent upon the maintenance of satisfactory relationships with his associates as it is upon his food and drink. Even if nothing else at all were done to a prisoner, he would find it almost intolerable to be confined so intimately with seven other people who revile him and openly despise him. Some sort of psychological *modus vivendi* leading to a degree of acceptance is necessary for any man who exists in a group of other men. Absence of such an adaptation is profoundly disturbing. Added to this burden is the fact that the prisoner is a bewildered, anxious, and beaten man from the start. Furthermore, he has no privacy whatever. Every moment of his life is spent within a few inches of his fellow prisoners. There is nothing that he can do or say that escapes them. Not even his past and private life is sacred to him. Everything he has ever done or said may be held up before him. On top of this, he is physically abused, fatigued, and degraded to the point of complete collapse; but, as in the interrogation situation, he is never allowed to die and is always snatched back just before the final breaking point.

Here, again, is an intolerable situation in which no man can exist indefinitely. The prisoner must conform to the demands of the group sooner or later. Indeed, one is amazed not so much at the fact that prisoners ultimately conform as at the remarkable amount of punishment which some prisoners absorb before they do so. One would think that no man would actively resist these pressures for more than a few months; but even men who were predisposed toward conforming in the first place have been known to put up some degree of resistance for years

† Various names have been given to the tricks commonly used by prisoners to avoid commitment, such as "finding a loophole," "assuming an appearance," "spreading a smoke screen," "window dressing," etc. Each of these can become a subject for special criticism.

before finally conforming in all minor details to the demands put upon them. Even those who have a wholehearted desire to embrace Communism find themselves faced with some demands which they cannot accept, and seem to find it necessary to exhaust themselves in resisting these points before they finally "give in." It is as if the prisoner cannot accept total conformity as a solution until he has convinced himself that it is indeed inevitable.

Prisoners who enter into the cell groups may be defiant for a while but they soon learn that this brings punishment upon them, and they try some trick of ostensible compliance. This is detected, with further punishment, and rejection. Other ruses fail also. Finally, many reach a point of emotional breakdown. The mood common to this is profound depression, with crying, whimpering, and the loss of all care about personal appearance. Some prisoners become disoriented. Evidently a few have delusory experiences, but this is less common. Sometimes these emotional disturbances go on for several months, and they may recur.

In this new situation of intolerable pressure, the prisoner is again offered an attractive "way out." This attractive way out lies in the adoption of the ostensible ideals of Communism. At the expense of belaboring the point, it must be said again that the "exoteric" or "open" doctrine of Communism purports to be an espousal of the ideals of self-sacrifice, equality, peace, freedom from want, and freedom from fear, which are common to most of the major ethical systems of mankind. The prisoner is told, in effect, that the reason he is being punished is that he has failed to live up to this set of ideals. When he realizes his errors, has cleansed his thoughts, and has become a wholehearted believer, his ordeal will end. All the rationalizations of Communist logic are brought into play to make his conversion easier. From morning until night he has this drummed into him in teaching sessions from which he cannot escape.

Not only do prisoners revile and criticize each other; some of them show a sincere desire to help the new prisoner to "reform" himself. The behavior of prisoners to other prisoners cannot be seen as simply the free acting out of hostility and aggression. Intermingled with this there is a truly sincere desire on the part of some to make the new prisoner see that only by conforming and adopting the proper attitudes and beliefs can he ameliorate his situation. Some of them have sincerely adopted Communism and see themselves as actually trying to make the prisoner into a better person; others see themselves as only trying to get him to do what he must do in order to survive. In all cases this rationalization enables the prisoners to take the attitude that they are "only punishing the new prisoner for his own good." This attitude causes no difficulty for those who are Communists, or who truly regard the new prisoner as a criminal; but it is a source of great conflict for some, including some priests and missionaries, who realize that their efforts to convert the new prisoner may stem from some selfish motives on their own part, and that they have the effect of causing him to deny principles to which they themselves are dedicated. In any case, the new prisoner does become aware of the fact that there are members of the cell group who have partly concealed sympathy for him and are sincerely trying to help him. He responds to this offer of help as much as he succumbs to the constant rejection and brutality.

From time to time, he is taken out of the cell to see his interrogator for private discussions and further opportunity to confess. Private persuasion is thus added to group persuasion. The attractiveness of the "way out" is as effective in producing conversion as is the necessity of escaping torture.

The duration of the period of imprisonment in the group cell does not appear to bear any direct relation to the progress made by the prisoner in adopting Communist views. The prisoner may assume that he has been converted, but his mentors are hard to satisfy. The interrogator and the other prisoners make conversion difficult to attain. It is common practice for them to ask for a new deposition and a new "confession" from a prisoner as soon as he appears to have achieved a certain amount of "progress." This new "confession" usually goes so far beyond the previous one that the prisoner has great difficulty in accepting it. This initiates a new period of conflict and resistance on his part and starts the cycle over again. Western prisoners find it especially difficult when the interrogators ask them to confess to belonging to nonexistent espionage rings or to make other grossly invalid "confessions."

10. The Conversion

The prisoner faced with a KGB interrogation in preparation for a trial is placed in a position in which he must rationalize only a portion of his beliefs and actions in order to reach a tolerable *modus vivendi*, but the prisoner in a Chinese prison has a much more difficult adaptation; he must rationalize all of his beliefs and actions. It gradually becomes apparent to him that his ordeal may be of indefinite duration, and that there is no escape from it short of complete compliance with the demands of his captors. Sooner or later most prisoners make the necessary adaptation. They come to the point of being able to say and do the things required of them. They are able to change their thinking enough to begin to identify themselves with the values held by the prisoner group.

Here, again, the rewards of rationalization help the prisoner, just as they helped him to confess. For example, most people are not without some sense of guilt about parts of their past behavior. Such guilt, possessed by prisoners, is greatly enhanced by the criticism and accusations of their fellow prisoners. Confession, even if it is entered into with some reservations, gives a sense of relief. The feeling of "joining," "belonging," and "being accepted" by the prisoner group provides a most intense satisfaction to one who has been rejected and reviled. Nor is it always very difficult for him to accept the ostensible ideals for which the group is working. Prisoners make rationalizations such as "after all, Communism and Christianity are essentially the same thing," or others, such as "I did not think of myself as a spy, but, after all, I am a foreigner, and foreigners have done great harm to China." All evidences of "reform" and "conversion" are fostered by the patient help and teaching which the prisoner receives from some of his associates and by the approval of the interrogator.

When he finally submits, the prisoner receives a substantial reward from a feeling of acceptance and belonging. Suddenly, he has "friends." He may even be a "hero." He unites himself with the others and is buoyed up by a sense of dedication to the "mission" that they are carrying out. At this stage, he may be transferred to a "free and easy cell" where conditions are less harsh. Here he has an opportunity for reading, and he may be allowed to teach other prisoners and to take part in games. His new-found enthusiasm is abetted by recurrent "drives" that take place within the prison—drives against "hypocrisy," "waste," "graft," "corruption," and the like—all of which are fostered with enthusiastic fervor by competitions among the cell groups.

Those who have been through the Communist prison procedure often come out with the feeling that no matter how difficult it was, it was worth while. They

may even feel grateful to their mentors. They feel as if they had been destroyed, and then had been reintegrated. Some feel as if they were more "mature" than they had ever been before. This is especially true of those who had previously felt at loss for a goal in life, or who had not been committed to a set of beliefs, friendships, or an occupation. It is also true of those who have carried a heavy load of guilt about earlier behavior. In this last group, something akin to a religious "conversion" is recognizable. Such prisoners have experienced a period of degradation and intense punishment, which they find not entirely unacceptable because of their preexisting feelings of guilt and unworthiness; following this, they experience an "acceptance" and "group identification" which is more valuable to them than ever before because of the fact that they have already "confessed" and "atoned" for their sins. The previously uncommitted, and those who felt rejected by their society, may develop an exhilarating feeling of "purpose" and "belonging" which they never had before.

Even those prisoners who were previously well integrated and on good terms with their fellow men, and who were committed to certain goals and beliefs, experience a profound feeling of relief when they are finally able to make the necessary rationalizations and to join with the prisoner group. This feeling of relief probably stems from the release of tensions and restorations of body processes that occur in a man when he is finally able to make an adaptation to a very difficult environment.

Long after the prisoner has developed a willingness to conform, he continues to be exposed to an unrelenting course of Communist studies. During all of his imprisonment he is denied access to any information which might contradict what he is being told. Over a period of years this combination of misinformation and absence of contrary evidence produces some areas of distorted belief in even the most skeptical.

11. The Trial

The period of indoctrination within Chinese detention prisons has been known to continue for as long as four years. A prisoner's release from the detention prison often appears to be decided upon on the basis of general policies rather than any specific aspects of his case. The release of foreign nationals is usually determined upon the basis of propaganda needs or the requirements of international agreements. Often release comes upon a prisoner quite unexpectedly. He is suddenly told that he will be freed. Within a few days he is taken before a "court," which is much like a Soviet military tribunal. There is a "judge," a "prosecutor," perhaps a few stenographers, and sometimes a "defense attorney." The prisoner repeats his confession in what he has long since learned is the proper manner. The defense attorney asks for lenience. (There are no pleas of "not guilty.") The "judge" then "passes sentence." If it has been decided to free the prisoner entirely, he is usually sentenced to a term in "prison" equal to the amount of time he has spent in the "detention prison," and then (if he is a foreigner) to deportation. The "lenient" judge then allows the prisoner to count his time in the "detention prison" as if it were "real imprisonment," and he is forthwith released. But if he is "to be punished," he will be sent to a labor camp or to some other punishment institution to begin his sentence.

12. The "Brain-Washed"

The people who have been described in the public press as "brain-washed"

have been prisoners suddenly released after periods as long as four years in Chinese detention prisons. Such persons have appeared at the border at Hong Kong, looking calm, fit, and sane. They praise their captors, praise Communism, and damn "American imperialism." It is said that their old acquaintances are amazed, and that their political attitudes seem to have "changed completely." The fact that they praise their captors is regarded as the most amazing of all, for it is known that they have been through many horrible experiences in the course of their imprisonment. It is from this pattern of behavior that the impression has arisen that the Chinese possess esoteric and devilish methods of "thought control" which no man can resist.

A number of people called "successfully brain-washed" have been studied intensively. A great deal is known about these people and what was done to them. The study of these people reveals that they possessed certain characteristics in common before they were imprisoned. These can be enumerated.

1. They were people who, long before their imprisonment, were in rebellion against their parents and the way of life of the segment of society to which their parents belonged, including many of its standards, beliefs, and practices.

2. They were people who had few friends within their homeland, and no place, organization, or occupation there with which they were firmly identified. So far as their native country was concerned, they were emotionally rootless.

3. They were people who had previously identified themselves with the "under-dog." They felt a strong sympathy for all people whom they regarded as "oppressed" or "exploited," and especially for minority groups of different racial or cultural origin.

4. They all spoke Chinese fluently, and for many years had had a strong interest in China and all things Chinese.

5. Most of them were previously familiar with the exoteric concepts of Marxist socialism, and most of them had been intellectually sympathetic to socialist ideas for many years before their imprisonment. Several of them had been members of Communist and fellow-traveler groups, and at least one of them is known to have been a Party member.

6. These people had been offered repatriation after the Communist Revolution, but they had elected to remain in China, most of them primarily because they were both sympathetic to the Chinese Communist Revolution and curious to see how it would work out. They were anxious to help develop the new China, if they were allowed to do so. For months prior to the time of their imprisonment, several of them were engaged in studying Chinese Communist literature and translating it into other languages.

Most of these people were not actually Communist Party members before their arrest and imprisonment. Most of them were sympathetic to Communist ideas and to the new China, but they had not committed themselves to Communism. They had toyed with their beliefs and found them intellectually attractive, but they were content to let their identification remain at this level. They had studied Chinese, and some went to Chinese schools; but they continued to associate with the members of the Western colony, and the forms of their lives were those common to expatriate Americans and Europeans living in Chinese cities. At the time of their arrests they were still rootless, uncommitted people.

7. Nearly all of these people were arrested on charges which included "espionage." The treatment which they received in prison was that which has been described above. These people confessed to "espionage," and after their release

some of them continued for a while to state that they had been "spies." None of them had actually committed espionage, and none were actually associated with American intelligence organizations. But all of them had, with innocent intent, done various things, such as describing economic conditions in letters or discussing the morale of Communist troops with their consular officials, which were "ostensibly" espionage by Communist definition and which were forbidden by Chinese Communist law. By Communist definition, all of them were of "reactionary background" and "the agents of an Imperialist power," and they had all "committed espionage." During the course of their imprisonment, they "admitted" their acts and accepted the Communist definition of them. The rationalizations which they utilized in making their confessions were like those which have been described above.

8. To a certain extent, they were also "converted" to the acceptance of Communist doctrine. That is to say, after much soul searching and profound emotional turmoil, they committed themselves to have faith in, and to work for, some of the overt Communist ideals which they had previously accepted only on an intellectual basis. Some of them emerged from prison with a sense of purpose and worthiness which they had not felt before. They remained overtly and actively pro-Communist for periods up to several months. After that time most of them appear to have reverted to their former positions of intellectual acceptance of some Communist beliefs, while outwardly conforming to a proper middle-class life.

In summary, the study of these "successfully brain-washed" people revealed them to be persons who had previously lost their identification with the society in which they originated, and who under years of intense pressure were temporarily persuaded to "commit" themselves to beliefs which most of them already found intellectually attractive.

13. The Effectiveness of Chinese Communist Indoctrination Procedures

Just how effective are these procedures? How long-lasting are their effects? Do they actually affect brain function? Are they "irresistible"? The answer to these questions, like the answer to those about Russian "public confession" trials, is not simple, but it is available.

The Chinese prison indoctrination procedure is never more than partly effective, but it always has some effect. No human can live through months or years of this experience without suffering emotional turmoil. In order to survive and not suffer an emotional breakdown, he must make some rationalization which allows him to identify with the prison group and to relieve some of the pressures upon himself. The extent of this rationalization need not be greater than a belief that his present situation justifies his present behavior and statements. Usually, it goes further than this. He usually finds some aspects of Communist doctrine which he can admire and which he can identify with his own value systems. Also, because of his long period (sometimes years) of incarceration and exposure to propaganda, with a total absence of accurate information from the outside world, he may unwittingly adopt some Communist beliefs about current events. On some other questions, he may have at least a tentative acceptance of Communist attitudes because he has been presented with a great deal of plausible propaganda "evidence."

Thus, a man who spends a long period in a Chinese civil prison and survives

can be expected to have experienced anxiety, despair, and doubt; he must have complied with the prison rules; he must have "confessed" to something, and he must have taken part in the various aspects of the indoctrination procedure. If the procedure was as vigorous and thoroughgoing as that described above, he must have shown enough evidence of conversion to satisfy his cell mates and jailers, and this usually means that he must have found at least some part of the Chinese Communist value system which he can identify with his own and can tentatively accept.

On the other hand, even though some of his attitudes and beliefs may have changed, his capacity to think is not altered. So-called "brain washing" produces no permanent changes in the function of the brain. Any form of imprisonment may induce a prison psychosis, and inhuman treatment may produce physical damage to the nervous system; but these effects are not peculiar to "brain washing."

Nor is there any unexplainable deficiency in the memory of former prisoners. Prisoners do not remember things which happened when they were delirious or otherwise psychotic. They may forget minor details of their experiences with the passage of time. Many of them do not wish to discuss some points of their treatment, because the memories of these are painful and the discussion of them is disturbing. But even the "most brain-washed" are capable of a vivid recollection of what occurred during their imprisonment.

Furthermore, the majority of those released carry with them an intense bitterness about some part of their imprisonment. Usually this is directed at certain other prisoners or jailers, but it may be directed at the whole Communist system. All prisoners come out with a realization that they have been cut off from the Western world for a long time, and with a suspicion that not everything in the outside world will turn out to be as it was presented to them in prison. All of them have a tentative orientation toward whatever new beliefs they may have, and most of them have reservations about their entire experience.

Upon their release, former prisoners set about a process of "reality testing." Without committing himself, each newly released man characteristically begins to talk to friends, and to listen to accounts of what has happened while he was away in prison. He begins to read back copies of books and magazines. He begins to compare what was told him with the facts as observed and reported in the American press. The available evidence suggests that within a period of months he readjusts himself to the outside world and resumes a set of beliefs roughly similar to those he held prior to his imprisonment.

Thus, it is quite erroneous to think that those who have experienced prison indoctrination in Communist China emerge as thoroughly indoctrinated Communists who express praise and admiration for their captors. Such people are as unusual as the public confessors in Russian purge trials. The vast majority of released prisoners say little or nothing. What pro-Communist beliefs they have they keep to themselves and express only in private. Many are bitterly anti-Communist. Although they are willing to admit that there are good aspects about the regime and agree that they cooperated and "confessed" while in prison, they do not have any genuine identification with Communism.

IV. Relation of State Police Procedures, Military Interrogation, and Indocrination of Civilians and Prisoners of War in Communist Countries

In Western states the custody of prisoners of war is in the hands of the armed

forces. In the Soviet Union during the latter part of the Second World War this was not the case. In 1942 an arrangement was arrived at between the Red Army and the NKVD which gave to the army custody of prisoners shortly after their capture and during the period of field interrogation, but turned over to the NKVD the problem of their ultimate custody and utilization. The fact that the NKVD was primarily a police organization was probably responsible for the methods and attitudes which it adopted in handling the war prisoners. In the extraction of information from prisoners, it simply applied the standard secret police techniques which had found to be so effective in handling civilian prisoners during the previous 25 years. The NKVD training program rapidly produced a large body of interrogators who were proficient in speaking German. A dossier was prepared on each German prisoner of war, which included a long biographical statement from him, as well as information gathered from the interrogation of other prisoners and from captured records. This was used in his interrogation. When prisoners gave information voluntarily, no additional pressure was put upon them; but when the interrogators felt that the prisoner was withholding information, they put him through the standard isolation pressures—repetitive interrogation techniques of the NKVD.

In typical Communist legalistic fashion, the NKVD rationalized its use of torture and pressures in the interrogation of prisoners of war. When it desired to use such methods against a prisoner or to obtain from him a propaganda statement or "confession," it simply declared the prisoner a "war-crimes suspect" and informed him that, therefore, he was not subject to international rules governing the treatment of prisoners of war. This legalism later had great importance for the United States, because it was also used against American military personnel in the Korean War. We can expect that it will be used against us in any future conflict. When it signed the Geneva agreements in 1949, the Soviet Union made specific exceptions to the effect that prisoners accused of war crimes would not be protected by the code, but would be subject to the laws of the nation against whom the crimes were committed.

Thus, German prisoners of war found themselves the subjects for criminal interrogation by secret police interrogators at the will of their Soviet captors. Similarly, they found themselves exposed to the same type of treatment that the Soviets provide for civilian political prisoners. The officers were separated from the enlisted men, and the enlisted men were utilized as a source of labor. Those prisoners who lived together in camps were also exposed to the type of indoctrination which the NKVD had developed for civilian prisoners according to the Communist philosophy of "rehabilitating" prisoners by "education and healthful work." This indoctrination consisted of lectures on Communism and group-discussion sessions, using the standard Marxist texts. The prison camps were infiltrated by large numbers of informers, who created internal dissension among the prison group and prevented the development of any organized resistance. In spite of this, the indoctrination program does not seem to have been outstandingly successful. It is estimated that only some 10% of German prisoners of war developed any sympathy for Communism, although many more cooperated with the Russians in order to secure better treatment. This proportion of successful converts is not especially high when one considers the fact that Germany had a large and vigorous Communist party before the advent of Hitler. The German army must have contained a fairly large number of men of underlying Communist sympathies.

Against the Japanese, the Russians used methods which were essentially the same as those which they used against the Germans, and with perhaps equal success. It is noteworthy that during the period 1945-1946 the deliberately increased the hardships and neglect within their prison camps, and thereby caused the death of a large number of prisoners they then held. Their policy was as much one of extermination as of conversion, but a higher proportion of those who were cooperative or converted survived because of the better treatment which they received.

The conversion of POW's always played a much greater role in the Chinese Communist military program than in that of the Soviet. It has been said that the Chinese Communists looked upon the entire Chinese nation as potential converts. They made their conversion and indoctrination program one of the most important aspects of their revolutionary effort. In 1943 this program was placed in the hands of Liu Shao-Ch'i, who was responsible for the form which it took thereafter. The conversion program within the Chinese prisons, which we have previously described, was developed out of the program which Liu Shao-Ch'i developed for use against the population in general.

Every prisoner or potential convert who fell into the hands of the Chinese Communists was evaluated on the basis of his life history, class background, education, and abilities. Those with revolutionary sympathies who possessed the proper background and abilities (especially students, intellectuals, and some proletarians and peasants) were trained to become Communist activists. These are the people whom the Communists commonly refer to as "cadres," both individually and in groups. For the purpose of the cadres' training, schools were set up offering a course of one year's duration. Students who entered these schools were isolated from the rest of society. They were put through an intensive and unrelenting program of study and physical work, which occupied every moment of their waking hours and left them no time for reflection. The first phase of this program consisted of "tail cutting," or the devaluation of old methods of thought and behavior and old value systems. This was accompanied by the use of the self-criticism and group-criticism techniques and by exhaustive lectures on Communism. As in the prisons, the emotional fervor of the group was maintained at a high pitch by the stimulation of intense competitiveness and the organization of "moves" and "drives" of one sort or another with "voluntary participation," from which no student could shrink because of group pressure. An atmosphere of fear was created by the occasional disappearance of students who were doing poorly, accompanied by rumors about their imprisonment or transfer to labor battalions.

In many respects the atmosphere within these training schools paralleled that within the prisons. Under the relentless pressure of hard work, fatigue, increasing demands, group pressures, criticism, doubts, and ridicule, the majority of students ultimately reached the point at which they went through an emotional crisis associated with tears and depression. At this point some dropped out, but most found themselves able to make the necessary adaptation by reorienting their value systems and identifying themselves with the Communist group. A religious fervor and a feeling of "conversion" frequently accompanied this emotional breakdown and recovery. His new Communist fervor and group identification continued as long as the student remained an active member of the class group and often later in his party group, but it is said that a fair proportion of students

suffered from one or more relapses of tears and doubts. It is known that some defected later when the opportunity presented itself.

In the population at large, the Chinese Communists have not been able to carry out indoctrination in nearly so tightly organized a fashion, but their approach has been essentially the same as their approach to the cadres. They aim their indoctrination primarily at the younger groups and carry out their programs with a special vigor in the schools and universities. Villages have been exposed to propaganda and a certain amount of lectures and teaching. Group-discussion and self-criticism sessions have been held. These are accompanied by an attempt to devalue the old practices and substitute the Communist value system. An atmosphere of fear produced by liquidations, arrests, and accusations is exploited. All of this has had the effect of producing superficial conformity and acquiescence.

Americans have had firsthand experience with the Chinese methods of indoctrination of prisoners of war. These methods have been made the subject of exhaustive studies by the Army and Air Force and by the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War. We shall not attempt to add to their voluminous documentation. However, we may consider briefly the experiences of our prisoners in the light of what we know about Russian and Chinese practices in general.

It is evident that the North Koreans were ill prepared to cope with American prisoners from any point of view. They possessed very few English-speaking interrogators and had no prepared facilities for the semipermanent custody of prisoners of war. Much of what appeared to be calculated brutality and deliberate extermination on the part of the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists in the winter of 1950-1951 was probably the result of lack of facilities, the breakdown of supply and communication, and callousness of Oriental peasant soldiers. The initial demoralization of American prisoners by the physical hardships of their captivity was probably not intentionally designed. Attempts to indoctrinate American prisoners were poorly organized and ineptly carried out when compared with the procedures used by the Chinese on their own populace. All too often the lecturers were absurdly ignorant of American conditions. The preparation of dossiers on individual prisoners was not nearly so thoroughgoing as that employed by the Soviets or by the Chinese in their own prisons. But the use of informers among the prisoner group and the isolation and removal of natural leaders were relatively successful in demoralizing the prisoners and in preventing the organization of active resistance groups.

The Chinese used the technique of accusing American prisoners of "war crimes" when they wished to expose them to a "criminal interrogation" with the aim of obtaining a propaganda confession, or when they wished to mete out some "appropriate" punishment to a marked man. This device was primarily used in obtaining bacteriological-warfare confessions from the aviators captured during the period of 1952-1953. All told, 78 aviators are known to have been exposed to such interrogation within North Korea. Of these, 38 "confessed," and 40 did not. The methods used in obtaining these confessions were similar to those used in the Chinese-Soviet prisons. They were characterized by a striking, and often extreme, degree of physical brutality. These officers were isolated, sometimes in unheated huts or water-soaked holes in the ground. They were deprived of sleep, food, warmth, and exercise. They were insulted, threatened, beaten, and repeatedly interrogated, and they were intermittently offered kind treatment if they assented to the demands of their captors. One gains the im-

pression that a good deal of this brutality, which included such things as mock firing squads, dousing prisoners with water in subzero weather, and the incarceration of men in small boxes, was simply a result of lack of sophistication and callousness on the part of the North Korean interrogators. Also, brutality was precipitated by the exasperating resistance of many of the prisoners. These men were being asked to confess to something which they knew to be palpably untrue, and there was no way of looking upon it in any other fashion. It is notoriously difficult to get men to make such confessions.

The resistance of these prisoners appeared to bear no direct relation to the amount of physical pressure put upon them by their Communist captors. Some men were brutalized for months without giving in; others succumbed almost immediately, sometimes with scarcely as much as a threat. Statistical correlations made by research groups of the U. S. Air Force indicate that resistance did not correlate with rank, education, religion, geographical area of origin, length of service, or regular or reserve status. The information from our own studies suggests very strongly that resistance or nonresistance is related to highly personal factors involving motivations, value systems, character structure, and the circumstances of imprisonment.

The available information all points to a readily understandable explanation for the defection of those few Americans who elected to remain in Communist lands. Nearly all of these men were of limited schooling and experience. It appears that few of them had any real interest in Communism. They defected primarily because they were afraid to be repatriated. Most of them had been regarded by their fellow prisoners as informers and collaborators, and they all had good reason to expect charges to be preferred against them if they returned to the jurisdiction of the United States. They were lured into defection by what amounted to rosy promises of further education and economic betterment if they went to China. When it turned out that their situation in China was far less rosy than they expected it to be, some were sorely disappointed and returned to the United States.

It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the behavior of our prisoners of war. This has been dealt with ably in publications of the U. S. Army and U. S. Air Force, and in the report of the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War. Suffice it to say that in every case that has been investigated, the statements and behavior of the men have been found to have a readily understandable basis.

V. Some Theoretical Considerations

A central theme of this paper has been the proposition that there is no need to assume that the Communists utilize occult methods in managing their prisoners. The results obtained are readily understandable on the basis of the methods known to be used. Theory has been avoided, because many present-day concepts of human behavior are still in a formulative state. Notwithstanding this, there is a sufficient body of evidence to allow us to state that we understand why the results obtained flow from the methods used.

It is helpful to consider the individual man as a living system entirely dependent upon maintaining a satisfactory relationship with his total environment. A man's life is dependent upon his ability to maintain a satisfactory body temperature; a satisfactory intake of food, fluids and air; a satisfactory elimination of waste products, and a satisfactory amount of rest and activity. It is equally necessary for him to maintain a satisfactory relationship with the other human beings in his

environment, and especially with those humans who by kinship or long association have acquired a special meaning for him.

When any of these necessary relationships between a man and his environment are disturbed, there develop within him feelings which are unpleasant, and which stimulate him to take whatever action is necessary to bring them to an end. Among these unpleasant sensations are hunger, thirst, fatigue, sleeplessness, excessive warmth or coldness, and all sorts of pain. These sensations originate within the human body as a result of disturbances of bodily processes. There are other unpleasant feelings, such as anxiety, fear, anger, loneliness, sadness, and dejection, which arise out of disturbed relations to the total environment and the people in it. When beset by these feelings, man is strongly motivated to make whatever adjustments in his relation to his environment are necessary.

The Communist arrest-imprisonment procedure has the effect of seriously disturbing man's total relation to his environment. It produces many disturbing and unpleasant sensations within him. In the description of the procedures of arrest, isolation, interrogation, and torture, it was mentioned that these produce anxiety, fear, tension, resentment, uncertainty, loneliness, boredom, fatigue, sleeplessness, hunger, coldness, and pain.

When men are put into situations which produce pressures similar to those produced by the Communist imprisonment situation, many follow a similar pattern of reaction. The first part of this reaction is a period of patient and purposeful exploratory activity. The man carefully tries every possible solution to the situation which may relieve him of the pressures upon him. If one arranges the experimental situation so that the man cannot find a satisfactory solution by his exploratory activities, his next reaction is an increasing and random exploration, with a general increase of motor activity and an overflow of this activity into other behavior, of a nonpurposive nature. He appears to "become excited" and shows evidences of anxiety, hyperactivity, and sometimes panic. If the pressures of the experimental situation are continued, the hyperactivity of the subject will gradually subside, with the exception of isolated repetitive acts. He may settle upon one form of response, which he repeats endlessly and automatically, even though this endlessly repeated action can never produce a solution. If the pressures are continued long enough, his ultimate response is one of total inactivity. He becomes first exasperated, and finally dejected and dependent upon anyone who offers to help him. He becomes unusually receptive to approval or human support.

For want of a better term, the experimental situation just described has been called a "situation of frustration." Situations of frustration are the common denominator of many of the Communist prison experiences. The reaction of the prisoner to the isolation routine closely reproduces that which occurs in an artificially frustrating situation. It is a more all-embracing reaction, slower in its development and more devastating in its effects, but it is basically similar. Situations of frustration also occur in the interrogation situation, where the prisoner must prepare a satisfactory confession and finds that no matter what he does or says he cannot satisfy the interrogator. Likewise, situations of frustration occur again and again in a group cell in the Chinese prison. Here also the prisoner finds that no matter how much he attempts to comply with the demands of the interrogator and the other prisoners, his confession is never satisfactory, and his ordeal is renewed. Much the same situation occurs in the training schools for Communist cadres, where there are increasing demands for more thorough study, more work, more en-

thusiasm, and more self-criticism, until the student ultimately breaks down, showing emotional reactions, such as crying and behavior of hopelessness and despair.

Thus, all of the Communist interrogation and indoctrination programs have much in common. In all of them the subject is faced with pressure upon pressure and discomfort upon discomfort, and none of his attempts to deal with his situation lead to amelioration of his lot. Psychiatrists may refer to a man in such a situation as "emotionally bankrupt." Some of the patients who seek the help of psychiatrists are in a similar state. The pressures and convolutions of their lives have reached a point at which they can no longer deal with them, and they must have help. It is recognized that such a state of "emotional bankruptcy" provides a good opportunity for the therapist. Indeed, there are therapists who are of the opinion that successful psychotherapy is rare unless a patient has reached such a state of readiness. This appears to be a recognition of the fact that a man will not turn to a therapist for help as long as he feels that there are other means of deliverance.

When a man is at the "end of his rope," he accepts avidly any help that is offered. In the experimental situation of frustration, the subject who has reached this stage will readily accept suggestions for solving the experimental problem, however absurd. His response to words of encouragement is striking. His own intense needs have prepared him to accept suggestions which he previously would have rejected. Similarly, the patient who has reached a point of desperation may abjectly put himself into the hands of a psychiatrist toward whom he has previously displayed contempt and hostility, and he will enter into a course of treatment, however painful it may be.

A characteristic of those who are "bankrupt" and need help is their need to talk. They obtain deep satisfaction simply from unburdening themselves to another human being. In Communist prisons this need to talk is greatly fortified by the regimen of total isolation. This is an important reason why the Communist interrogator, being the only man to whom the prisoner talks, is in such an advantageous position for obtaining information from him. The interrogator is dealing with a man who might be looked upon as an intentionally created patient; the interrogator has all of the advantages and opportunities which accrue to a therapist dealing with a patient in desperate need of help.

Although the Communist management of prisoners was not designed by psychiatrists or neurophysiologists, and those who carry out this management do not have formal psychological training, nevertheless the interrogator does deal with the prisoner by using many of the same methods which the physician uses in the management of his patients. He allows the prisoner to talk at length about his family and his life. This produces in the prisoner a warm and dependent relationship toward him. The interrogator approves and rewards proper attitudes and behavior, and disapproves and punishes improper attitudes and behavior. Because of his dependence upon the interrogator, the prisoner develops an intense desire to please him. The prisoner glows when he is rewarded, and is deeply disturbed when he is rejected.

The interrogator has in his hands knowledge of most of the life history of his victim. He does not hesitate to pick out from this history the disturbing and unpleasant episodes. He uses them as a lever to humiliate the prisoner and to increase his feelings of guilt and unworthiness. The potent effect which this procedure can have upon man has been demonstrated many times in the laboratory. It has been observed that when threatening episodes from a patient's life are introduced by the

physician and discussed intensively with indications of disapproval, the patient may be greatly disturbed. Not only are his mood and behavior disturbed, but profound and potentially dangerous alterations in his bodily processes occur also. Thus, the power which the interrogator possesses in dealing with the prisoner is great; his ability to manipulate both the physical and the interpersonal aspects of the prisoner's environment place his victim in a highly vulnerable position.

It is readily understandable that the prisoner ultimately adopts the suggestions of the interrogator with regard to the protocol. It is not at all incomprehensible that some prisoners can be carried to the point of confessing to crimes for which death is the certain punishment. Since the intimate interpersonal relation between prisoner and interrogator continues through the period of the trial, it is also understandable that prisoners may continue to play their prescribed roles before the judge and the state prosecutor.

The situation within the group prison cell in the Chinese prison is akin to that of the interrogator and prisoner. Here, the important relationship is between the prisoner and the group, with the prisoner striving to gain the acceptance of the group and to identify himself with them. In this setting the pressures are more prolonged and the situation of frustration may be repeated many times, because the prisoner is called upon not only to accept a protocol or confession but to adopt a whole new attitude. It may take a long time before such a state of utter defeat is achieved; but when it is, the prisoner's reaction has many of the features of a religious conversion.

Those who have experienced a true religious conversion maintain their new attitudes and behavior for an unpredictable length of time. It has been a general experience that most of the religious conversions experienced at camp meetings or revivals are of evanescent nature. The experience is a powerful one, but the convert usually reverts to his former patterns within a short time. But this is not necessarily so. Some religious conversions have long-lasting, or even permanent, effects. So it appears to be with the conversion which takes place in Communist prisons or indoctrination schools. Those who go through the experience often feel that it was unpleasant but worth while. Its effects upon their attitudes and behavior are usually evanescent. They disappear within a few weeks after the convert is removed from his Communist environment. But a small proportion of converts appear to experience long-lasting, or even permanent, changes in their attitudes and behavior, especially if they are among the "most susceptible group."

VI. Epitome

The methods used in Communist countries for the interrogation and indoctrination of persons regarded as enemies of the state have their roots in secret police practices which go back for many years. These methods have been refined and systematized by much use and experience. Data about these procedures have been collected and analyzed. The general dynamic features which underlie them are understandable.

Those who live in Communist states recognize that at times the state police are almost unlimited in their power and their action may be swift and arbitrary. When residents of such communities become aware that they are suspected by the police, their feelings of impotence and uncertainty are greatly augmented. As they are increasingly avoided by their friends and associates, they feel isolated

and rejected, and develop intense anxiety, often colored by feelings of guilt. Their sudden seizure under dramatic circumstances is additionally traumatizing. They usually enter upon their prison experience feeling fearful, vaguely guilty, helpless, and completely uncertain of their fate.

When the initial period of imprisonment is one of total isolation, such as that used by the KGB, the complete separation of the prisoner from the companionship and support of others, his utter loneliness, and his prolonged uncertainty have a further disorganizing effect upon him. Fatigue, sleep loss, pain, cold, hunger, and the like augment the injury induced by isolation. The cumulative effects of the entire experience may be almost intolerable. With the passage of time, the prisoner usually develops an intense need to be relieved of the pressures put upon him and to have some human companionship. He may have a very strong urge to talk to any human and be utterly dependent upon anyone who will help him or befriend him. At about this time he also becomes mentally dull and loses his capacity for discrimination. He becomes malleable and suggestible, and in some instances he may confabulate.

The interrogator exploits the prisoner's need for companionship. He uses items from the prisoner's biography derived from police files, from the prisoner's associates, and from hours of interrogation to arouse further guilt, conflict, and anxiety. He makes use of the dependence of the prisoner, which is strengthened by the intimate sharing of information about his life. He frustrates and further disorganizes the prisoner by rejecting his statements. He scolds, punishes, and threatens him when he does not cooperate, and approves and rewards him when he does. Then, by suggesting that the prisoner accept half-truths and plausible distortions of the truth, he makes it possible for the prisoner to rationalize and thus accept the interrogator's viewpoint as the only way out of an intolerable situation.

The methods of interrogation and indoctrination used in Communist China are in many respects similar to those of the Russian state police, from which they were in part derived; but in some respects they are quite different because of the special needs and traditions of the Chinese. In the Chinese prison, the individual interrogator is still important, and in occasional cases the management of the prisoner may quite closely duplicate that of the KGB. But in most instances the efforts of the interrogator are supplemented by the effects of the interaction between the prisoner and six or eight of his fellow prisoners with whom he is incarcerated in a crowded cell. Here the group replaces the interrogator as the focus of the prisoner's relationships. In this setting of complete lack of privacy, there is an unrelenting routine of self-criticism sessions, group-discussion sessions, rote learning, constant repetition of Communist viewpoints, and the repeated rewriting and rejection of autobiographical essays. The group exploits the feeling of emotional nakedness and unworthiness which the self-criticism sessions engender, dwelling upon items obtained from the prisoner's life history during these sessions which arouse in him guilt, conflict, and anxiety. These feelings are greatly potentiated when the group rejects, isolates, and reviles him because of his "improper" attitudes and past behavior. The prisoner is thus placed in a situation in which he cannot avoid having his past life reviewed and questioned and cannot avoid hearing an exposition of the Communist position. Moreover, for a period, sometimes of years' duration, he has access to nothing but Communist-oriented history and Communist inter-

pretation of current events. Like the KGB interrogator, the group rewards and approves the prisoner when he cooperates and behaves in accordance with their aims, and thus indicates to him that the only possible solution to an intolerable situation is the acceptance of the "proper" point of view.

Under pressures such as these, prisoners usually rationalize a change in attitude and hold it for an indefinite time. In general, this change in attitude is only so great as the prisoner feels it must be to enable him to relieve himself of the intolerable pressures under which he labors. In the KGB pre-trial interrogation, the achievement of a successful rationalization and a satisfactory protocol is usually accompanied by a profound feeling of relief, and an unspoken agreement with the interrogator that may even have overtones of warmth and friendliness. In the Chinese group cell, where the pressures are much more prolonged and the demands upon the prisoner are correspondingly more intense, the ultimate achievement of a proper rationalization and group acceptance is associated with feelings of relief that are occasionally exhilarating, and sometimes show some of the features of a religious "conversion."

Men under the complete control of Communist police have been made to say and do many things which their captors desire. Some people have proved to be much more malleable than others; but even under the most strenuous circumstances some men are remarkably refractory and refuse to cooperate with their captors up to the point at which they develop confusional states and delirium. The most effective features of the Communist procedures are those which would operate even in the absence of control. Prisoners who were not excessively abused and who encountered men who appeared to be dedicated, selfless, and even "idealistic" in their attachment to the ostensible goals of Communism have acknowledged these features of their captors; and those who were presented with plausible evidence have accepted it tentatively. When they have discovered that they would be rejected, reviled, and punished for non-cooperative behavior, they have refrained from doing or saying anything which would bring such abuse upon them when they were in Communist control. Those whose past lives have been colored by feelings of much guilt, by lack of purpose or commitment, and those who were previously sympathetic to Communist views have been more amenable to the Communist methods.

Prisoners who have been released from Communist control and have been able to assure themselves that they will no longer be punished for "improper" opinions have gradually readjusted their attitudes to their new environment. Their memories of the punishments and brutalities which they have endured have been lively. For most prisoners these memories override all others. When they have felt safe to acknowledge their resentment, they have expressed extreme hostility toward those responsible for their bad prison experiences, and they have nearly always rejected Communism and all those connected with it.

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Communist Interrogation and Indoctrination of "Enemies of the States"

Analysis of Methods Used by the Communist State Police (A Special Report)

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NEW YORK

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Table of Contents

I: Introduction	19. Public Confessions
II: Practices of the KGB	20. Punishment
1. Background of the Russian State Police	III: Practices in Communist China
2. Present Structure of the KGB	1. A Comparison of Chinese Methods with Those of the KGB
3. The Suspect	2. Background and Organization of the Chinese State Police
4. The Accumulation of Evidence	3. The Suspects
5. The Arrest Procedure	4. Investigation and Arrest
6. The Detention Prison	5. Chinese Prison Routine
7. The Regimen Within the Detention Prison	6. The Interrogator
8. Effects of the Regimen Within the Isolation Cell	7. The Interrogation Procedure
9. The Feelings and Attitudes of the Prisoner During the Isolation Regimen	8. The Indoctrination Procedure in the Group Cell
10. Other Pressures of the Isolation Regimen	9. The Reaction of the Prisoner to the Procedure in the Cell
11. The Interrogator	10. The Conversion
12. Interrogation	11. The Trial
13. Pressures Applied by the Interrogator	12. The "Brain-Washed"
14. The "Friendly Approach"	13. Effectiveness of Chinese Communist Indoctrination Procedures
15. The Course of the Interrogation	IV: Relation of State Police Procedures, Military Interrogation, and Indoctrination of Civilians and Prisoners of War in Communist Countries
16. The Psychological Interaction Between Prisoner and Interrogator	V: Some Theoretical Considerations
17. The Reaction of the Prisoner to the Interrogation	VI: Epitome
18. The "Trial"	

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I. Introduction

THE COMMUNISTS are skilled in the extraction of information from prisoners and in making prisoners do their bidding. It has appeared that they can force men to confess to crimes which have not been committed, and then, apparently, to believe in the truth of their confessions and express sympathy and gratitude toward those who have imprisoned them. Many have found it hard to understand that the Communists do not possess new and remarkable techniques of psychological manipulation. Some have recalled the confessions of men such as Cardinal Mindszenty and William Oatis and the unusual behavior of the old Bolsheviks at the purge trials in the 1930's, and have seen an alarming parallel. These prisoners were men of intelligence, ability, and strength of character. They had every reason to oppose their captors. Their confessions were palpably untrue. Such behavior is, if anything, more difficult to explain than that of some of our prisoners of war in Korea.

The techniques used by the Communists have been the subject of speculation. A number of theories about them have been advanced, most of them suggesting that these techniques have been based upon some modification of the conditioned reflex techniques of I. P. Pavlov, the Russian neurophysiologist. The term "brain washing," originated by a reporter who interviewed Chinese refugees in Hong Kong, has caught the public fancy and has gained wide acceptance. Various authors have attempted to provide a scientific definition for this term. This has had the effect of confirming the general impression that "brain washing" is an esoteric technique for the manipulation of human behavior, designed by "scientific investigators" on the basis of laboratory experiments and controlled observations, and producing highly predictable results.

Many of the public speculations about "brain washing" are not supported by the available evidence. However, the Communists do make an orderly attempt to obtain information from their prisoners, and to convert their prisoners to forms of behavior and belief acceptable to their captors. They have had some success in their efforts, and this success has had a good deal of propaganda value for them. For this reason, if for no other, it is important that we have as clear an understanding as possible about how these methods originated, how they are applied, their effectiveness, and their purpose.

The information contained in this report was obtained from a number of sources. Details of the Communist arrest and interrogation systems, and a great deal of information about the purposes, attitudes, and training of those who administer them, were obtained from experts in the area, who for security reasons must remain anonymous.

Knowledge of the prisoners' reactions to their experiences was obtained by the direct observation of persons recently released from Communist prisons. Some of these observations continued for weeks and were supplemented by follow-up observations over periods of months. They included complete physical, neurological, and psychiatric examinations, and often psychological testing as well. They were supplemented by information supplied by families, friends, and former associates. Among those studied intensively were military and civilian prisoners of diverse ranks and backgrounds, women as well as men, defectors and resisters, persons "brain-washed" and "not brain-washed," some who admittedly cooperated with their captors and some who said they did not.

In supplement to this, pertinent information from investigations carried out

by the U. S. Army and the U. S. Air Force and from the material assembled for the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War has been utilized. The very large public literature on these subjects has been reviewed also, and drawn upon when it was helpful. Finally, various laboratory and clinical investigations have been carried out in order to throw light upon the psychological and physiological processes involved in some of the interrogation and indoctrination procedures.

The evidence from every source has been consistent with that from the others and provides a basis for confidence in the validity of the statements which are made in this report and the conclusions which have been drawn from them, which may be summarized thus:

1. The interrogation methods used by the state police in Communist countries are elaborations and refinements of police practices, many of which were known and used before the Russian Communist Revolution.
2. The principles and practices used by the Communist state police in the development of suspects, the accumulation of evidence, and the carrying out of arrest, detention, interrogation, trial, and punishment are known. The effects of these upon prisoners are known also.
3. The "confessions" obtained by Communist state police are readily understandable as results of the methods used.
4. Communist methods of indoctrinating prisoners of war were developed by the Russians and subsequently refined by the Chinese. These methods and their effects are known also.
5. Chinese methods of dealing with political prisoners and "enemies of the state" were adapted from those of the Russians.
6. The intensive indoctrination of political prisoners is a practice primarily used by the Chinese Communists. The methods used in this indoctrination are known, and their effects are understandable.

Part II. Practices of the KGB

1. Background of the Russian State Police

It is illuminating to consider Communist behavior in the light of the doctrines espoused by those who are committed to Communism. Lenin and the other old Bolsheviks who established the Russian Communist Party had spent most of their lives as underground revolutionaries and terrorists, as prisoners, as exiles in Siberia, and as refugees and plotters in various parts of Europe. They accepted behavior which would have been called criminal had it not been carried out in the name of political reform. The unique contributions which they made to Communism were their willingness to use any means in order to attain Socialist ends, their insistence upon religious dedication to the Party, and their demand for unquestioned obedience to Party directives. Their chief concern was not with ideals, but with means of attaining power, ostensibly for the Party and "the people."

In the Byzantine Empire, from which the Russians received much of their cultural heritage, internal espionage and the arbitrary exercise of power by a bureaucracy reporting only to the Emperor were prominent features. As Russia developed from feudalism into a national state under Ivan the Terrible, a centralized, independent, and all-powerful bureaucracy was established, responsible only to the monarch. Subsequent Czars were perhaps less terrible than Ivan, but no less ruthless. The chancery of the Imperial Court was always independent and arbitrary, and the "rights of individual men" of all ranks never had the meaning in Russia which they had in Western Europe, even under absolute monarchs. In all of the period prior to 1917 the secret police system

in Russia was probably the most highly organized, effective, and powerful of that of any European state.

By the early decades of the present century, most of the features which characterized present-day secret police systems had already been evolved, and were exhibited by the Czarist Okhrana. The Okhrana at that time was nation-wide, and centrally directed. It was empowered to make arrests and to punish arbitrarily without regard for other legal institutions. Its operations were secret; they were concealed from other arms of the government and the armed services, as well as from the general population. It operated through a great number of spies and informers, who were recruited by payment, threat, or compromise from among the general population, and especially from among criminals and those suspected of political activity against the state. Its apparatus extended even into the highest arms of all branches of the government; neither officials nor private citizens were immune from suspicion or arrest by it.

The Okhrana had learned to use many modern secret police procedures also. It had means of getting people to implicate themselves in criminal activity when there was a desire to compromise them or their associates. It shared with other police systems practices which had developed over a period of many years and which experience had shown to be effective in extracting information and confessions from persons suspected of crimes. These methods were known to police systems all over the world, and many of them are still in use at the present day.

Prisoners of the Okhrana were aware that they could be held indefinitely without trial, under very severe conditions of inadequate food, filth, lack of sanitation or exercise, and continuous interrogation. They knew that ultimately they might be banished or executed arbitrarily, if they did not die of other causes. All of this knowledge, and all of the pressures of their treatment, acted powerfully upon those who were exposed to it. It would be wrong to suppose that the Czarist police were either as effective or as thorough as those in modern Russia and other Communist states, but many of the practices used by these modern Communist police have been in use for many years and were well known long before the Communist Revolution.

Reform of the prison system was one of the foremost tenets of all of the prerevolutionary socialist parties, to which Bolsheviks subscribed no less than others. As far as the Bolsheviks were concerned, these reforms might be generally stated thus: The secret police apparatus was to be abolished outright, and those who had taken part in it were to be punished; the old prison system was to be abolished also. In the new state, the police would be the friends of the people and the guardian of their interests. Those who had committed crimes would not be tried before "arbitrary courts," with all the legal apparatus used in Western nations, for the courts in Western nations were thought of as arms of bourgeois tyranny, in which the wealthy secured justice and the poor injustice. Communist courts would dispense Communist justice. In the Communist state, the criminal would be detained in a place of detention. This would be not a prison but a place in which the accused could sit down with those who arrested him and discuss the crimes which he had committed and the reasons why he had committed them. No one would be arrested unless it was clear that he had committed a crime. If the prisoner would not admit his crimes, or if he were not aware that he had committed criminal acts, by persuasion and

teaching he would be brought to understand the nature of his crimes and the reason why they were injurious to the interest of the people. Having come to understand his crimes, and the necessity for his punishment, the prisoner and the court might agree upon the type of punishment and reeducation which should be carried out. The prisoner would have an opportunity to make a written statement of his deposition, with a declaration that no force had been put upon him in order to obtain it. After the investigation of his case had been completed, he would be taken before the court, where he could explain his crimes, and his sentence would be passed. It was only after this sentencing that he would actually be put in prison. Nor would the new prisons be like the old. In them, the prisoner would be allowed to reform and rehabilitate himself by wholesome work and reeducation, instead of being incarcerated in a cell. Ultimately he would rejoin the socialist society as a "new man."

After the 1917 Revolution the Czarist secret police system was abolished. For a few months Russia operated without secret police. But when they were threatened by counter-revolution and chaos, it did not take the Communists long to turn to the idea of reestablishing a secret police system, this time controlled by the Communist Party. In November, 1917, Lenin established the "Cheka," or "Extraordinary Commission," for the suppression of counter-revolutionary activities, with the power of summary arrest, judgment, and execution. Under this euphemism the secret police system was reincarnated. At its head Lenin placed Felix Dzerzhinsky, a dedicated revolutionary, who gathered around him a group of zealous young Bolsheviks that were regarded as the cream of the Communist Party, the guardians of its principles and its power. It was long a proud boast among Communists when one said that he was "an old Chekist." But these men also shared a conspiratorial background, a willingness to use any means to attain their ends, and a freedom from "bourgeois morality."

The Chekists thought of themselves as members of a new order sweeping away the old, but what they inherited was the old Czarist prison system and all of the apparatus that went with it. They also inherited the concepts and attitudes of old Russia to a much greater degree than is generally realized, for these were the concepts and attitudes under which they and all other Russians had been reared. Just what proportion of the former personnel of the Okhrana and the old Russian prison system was utilized by the Cheka at the outset is not known; but it is a safe assumption that at the working level many of the police, the jailers, the spies, and the investigators used by the Cheka had been previously employed by its predecessor.* This is not to say that the Chekists did not set up their apparatus in accordance with Communist theory. It is characteristic of the Communists that they organize all of their institutions in a manner which is nominally in accordance with their theory. A rational and idealistic purpose is ascribed to every aspect of their actions. This is no less true of the police system than of any other segment of the Communist state.

Since that time the secret police system in Russia has passed through a number of reorganizations and has appeared under several names. The relation between the secret police system and the Ministry of Internal Affairs is confusing to those not intimately acquainted with the ramifications of the Soviet bureaucracy, for this Ministry also has been reorganized under a number of

* In this connection it is of interest that the Communist parties of Eastern Europe have absorbed many former Nazis and police operatives from the old regime into their new police system.

names, and from time to time the state police have been under its nominal jurisdiction. It is a popular custom to use the same initials to denote both the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the secret police system, but it is important to distinguish between the two. Since the purging of Beria, in 1953, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and the State Police (KGB—Committee for State Security) have been administratively separate. In this report we shall refer to the Soviet State Police as the KGB. Where the terms Cheka, GPU, OGPU, NKVD, and MVD are used, it is understood that they refer to the state police functions of these former organizations, and not to their other functions, which were various.

There is a wealth of evidence that the methods of pressure, interrogation, and persuasion which are now used by state police throughout the Communist world had been developed in all of their essentials before the purge trials of 1936-1939. The differences between these methods and those which we can assume were inherited from the Okhrana in 1918 are chiefly improvements of organization and refinements of technique and the addition of the persuasive activities of the interrogator with his Communist logic. Tradition has it that these refinements were introduced by the Cheka. According to one report, Dzerzhinsky himself designed the methods of the Cheka, drawing upon his experience with the Polish police, as well as that of the Okhrana and the Bolshevik Party. Present-day KGB officers look upon the "ideological approach" and persuasive activities of the interrogator as the distinctive feature of the method of the KGB, and the one which is responsible for most of its effectiveness. Careful planning and the detailed organization of the arrest and interrogation procedures are important aspects of the KGB procedures, but are not unique.

The mass indoctrination of prisoners of war is a different matter. This appears to have been originated by the NKVD. At the outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union, in 1941, the interrogation and subsequent internment of military prisoners was the function of the Red Army. Prior to 1943 the Russians took few German prisoners, and most of those who fell into their hands were murdered or otherwise disposed of by front-line military units. Very few Germans who were captured in 1941 and 1942 survived the war. This became a problem to the Soviet High Command, which was being deprived of the military information which might be obtained from prisoners-of-war interrogation. A directive was issued in the spring of 1942 to the effect that the lives of prisoners should be protected in order that the information which they possessed might be obtained from them. The custody of prisoners behind the area of combat was turned over to the NKVD in 1943. During the next two years this organization developed the methods of interrogating and indoctrinating prisoners of war which were subsequently adopted by the Chinese Communist Army and eventually, with many Chinese modifications, were used upon our military personnel in Korea.

Because the methods of the Russian state police became the model for those used in other Communist countries, they shall be considered in detail. At the time of writing (January, 1956) there are public reports that the Russian state police are in temporary eclipse, and their activities are said to have been restricted; but there is every reason to believe that this is only partially true. The reader should bear in mind that, in effect, some form of state police system has existed in Russia since the 17th century. From time to time public resent-

ment has caused the organization having this function to be "reformed," or even "abolished," but it has always reappeared within a few years, often under a new name, but operating in the same manner. This has been true under the Communists no less than under the Czars.

2. Present Structure of the KGB

The KGB, like its predecessors, is directed from Moscow. Within Russia it is divided into sections, which correspond to the various federal republics, and subsections, corresponding to districts, or oblasts. Within each of these districts the organization has an investigation section, which is primarily concerned with the detection, arrest, and punishment of those who commit crimes against the state. The functions of this section are conducted primarily by a group of relatively junior officers in their late 20's or 30's, each of whom has been especially trained for this type of work. These men operate under the direction of superiors, who ultimately report to Moscow. It is the task of these junior KGB officers to become aware of any political crimes in the area assigned to them and to secure evidence leading to the arrest and punishment of the criminals. It is the task of other junior officers in the interrogation section to obtain a signed deposition from each prisoner confessing to his crimes.

In the following sections the various steps of the procedure used by the KGB will be outlined. The Communist principle which is the ostensible reason for using each step in the procedure will be discussed. This will be followed by a description of the procedure as it is actually carried out.

3. The Suspect

Those who fall under the suspicion of the KGB usually have some reason for exciting its suspicion. To the victim himself, such suspicion may appear to be capricious or arbitrary because he may be utterly unaware of the basis for it. The Russian definition of "crimes against the state," or political crimes, is a broad one, and the interpretation of these Russian laws is largely in the hands of the KGB; for all practical purposes, it may find reason to suspect anyone. From long practice this organization has developed the thesis that those who conspire against the state will fall into recognized categories. First of all, there are those members of the Communist Party who have come under suspicion by the Party apparatus, or who have been criticized for failure in some activity. Since "the Party can do no wrong," failure may become the equivalent of sabotage or treason. Second, there are those who have traveled abroad or who have had association with foreigners. This, of course, includes all foreigners; but it also includes former prisoners of war, Soviet functionaries who have served abroad, and even members of the KGB itself. Third, members of certain Soviet nationalities which are suspected of nationalist aspirations may also be suspected as a group. The Volga Germans and the Chichen-Ingush are examples. The most recent example was the suspicion cast upon all Jews during the period from 1950 to 1952, when complaints of "cosmopolitanism" were being made against this group. Fourth, certain segments of Soviet society, such as the "Kulaks" of the early 1930's or the Army in 1937-1939, may be suspect. Fifth, there are those whose class origin is considered bourgeois or aristocratic. These are fewer in number than they used to be, but they formerly constituted a large group of natural suspects. In times of unrest or mass hysteria, such as occurred during

the purge trials or during World War II, all persons in a category may become "suspects" and subject to arrest.

In addition to these "general suspects," there are "specific suspects," who become such either because suspicion has been cast upon them by one of the many informers among the general population or because they are relatives, friends, or former associates of other persons who have been arrested or are suspected. Other specific suspects are those who either intentionally or unintentionally have made statements, or carried out acts, which the police regard as evidence of criminal, antistate activity.

The following general assumptions can be made:

1. Although the suspect may not know why he is suspected, the KGB has some reason for singling him out.

2. Because of the broad nature of Soviet laws, and the free manner in which the KGB can interpret these, any "suspect" has committed some "crime against the state" as the KGB defines the term.

The implications of this statement are significant. In a nation in which the state owns all property, where everyone works for the state, and where only approved opinions may be held, a person who has accidentally broken or lost some of the "people's property," who has made a mistake, who has not worked hard enough, who has talked to a foreigner, or who has merely expressed what he inferred was an innocent opinion, may be *ipso facto* guilty of a "crime against the state."

Thus, those who fall into the various categories of "natural suspects" constitute a reservoir of potential victims for the secret police. A person who belongs to one of these groups may go unmolested for a long period. His arrest, when it ultimately takes place, will occur when the KGB needs arrests. For example, when party policy decrees that there shall be a widespread campaign against "foreign spies," the KGB will seek its victims from those whom it regards as potential foreign agents. If the Party decides upon a campaign against nationalist tendencies among Soviet citizens, the KGB will select its victims from the nationality which has been singled out as an "example." If there is a struggle for power within the Party hierarchy, the victims of the KGB will be selected from those members of the Party who lose out in the struggle. Sometimes purely bureaucratic needs within the secret police organization are the occasion for arrest. Since the effectiveness of the organization in the various districts is judged by the number of arrests and convictions obtained, when the leader of a district fears that his organization is falling behind, he will generate local pressures for more arrests; the victims, of course, will be selected from appropriate groups of suspects. The result of all of this is that many of the victims of the secret police apparatus are seized for reasons quite beyond their own control, which are not immediately related to anything that they may have done.

4. The Accumulation of Evidence

It is an administrative principle of the Soviet government that no one may be arrested unless there is evidence that he is a criminal.

According to the practice of the KGB this means that when a man falls under the suspicion of a KGB officer, this officer must accumulate "evidence" that the man is a "criminal" and take this evidence to the state prosecutor,

who must then issue a warrant before the arrest can be carried out. When a man falls under the suspicion of the KGB, an officer in the investigation section draws up a plan for the investigation of his case. The plan describes why the man is suspected, who are his suspected associates, what evidence is needed to arrest him, how he shall be placed under surveillance, how the evidence shall be gathered, and how he shall be arrested. This plan is submitted to his superiors for comment, criticism, and approval, and is then put into action. The investigating officer accumulates "evidence" by showing that the victim had a reason to be a criminal (i.e., that he was a member of a suspect group) and by accumulating the statements of spies and informers with regard to him. If this "evidence" is not sufficient to satisfy the officer, he places the suspect and the suspect's friends and associates under surveillance. These friends and associates may be held for interrogation in order to supply evidence against the suspect, the reason for their seizure being that they are associates of a suspect, and therefore suspect themselves.

Covert surveillance and the arrest of associates are carried out carefully, but they cannot always be concealed from the suspect. He may become aware of it, or his friends may tell him. As he comes a marked man in the eyes of his friends, they begin to avoid him. Their demeanor sometimes indicates to him that he is under suspicion. The knowledge that he will be arrested, without knowledge of when this will occur, obviously creates anxiety in the intended victim. Although KGB officers know about the psychological effect which surveillance has upon suspects, and make use of it, they do not use it with the calculated cunning that the victim sometimes supposes. Poorly concealed surveillance, and the arrest of friends and associates, followed after an indefinite period by the arrest of the main suspect, are not necessarily stage maneuvers to frighten the victim. Often they are simply evidence of rather slow and clumsy police activities.

The investigating officer in charge of the "case" is usually not above the rank of major. His standing in the eyes of his superiors and his future career in the organization are dependent upon his ability to achieve arrest and convictions. His superiors themselves have a similar relation to their superiors. Thus it often happens, especially in times of internal tension, that members of the organization compete with one another in trying to turn up suspects and secure their conviction. To a certain extent, officers are judged by the number of arrests which they obtain. Since Communist legal principles demand that no person be arrested except when it is clear that he is a criminal, officers who arrest men who must later be released are subject to censure. They have made a mistake because they have arrested a man who is not a criminal.

The consequences are important from the point of view of the victim. In effect, any man who is arrested is automatically in the position of being "guilty".†

If the "evidence" should be insufficient to substantiate his guilt, those in charge of his case are subject to censure. In theory, those making the arrest should have accumulated beforehand sufficient evidence of guilt to satisfy both their superior officers and the state prosecutor. It is usually not difficult to satisfy these officials. Nevertheless, this requirement for sufficient evidence of guilt puts pressure upon the junior officers of the KGB, who are anxious

† A discussion of the Communist concept of "guilt" and the meaning of this term to the KGB is presented in Part II, Section 16.

to establish a reputation for themselves, and sometimes they may falsify the "evidence" which they present to the prosecutor. This is a forbidden practice, for which the offending officer could be punished if he were "officially" found out. The officers who took part in staging the famous "doctor's plot" of 1952 were punished later for "falsifying the evidence." But when the KGB is under pressure to secure convictions, and when this pressure comes from high in the Party, "falsification of evidence," like the use of physical brutality in obtaining confessions, may be a widespread procedure. It is never "officially" condoned.

Anyone arrested by the KGB must know that in the eyes of the Soviet state, and in the eyes of those who have arrested him, he is a "criminal." The only question to be settled after his arrest is the extent of his criminal activity and the precise nature of his crimes. The officers in charge of his case, both those who have made the arrest and those who will carry out the interrogation, have a personal interest in seeing that the arrested man makes a prompt and extensive confession, for their own reputations are at stake. These officers work on a "time table": They are expected to "settle the case" within six weeks to three months after their victim has been seized by producing a satisfactory protocol, upon which a "trial" can be based.

5. The Arrest Procedure

It is a Communist principle that men should be arrested in a manner which will not cause them embarrassment and that the police should carry out arrests in a manner which will not unduly disturb the population.

In the United States, it is said that a man is "arrested" when the police seize him, detain him, or otherwise deprive him of his freedom; and United States law requires that the police obtain a "warrant" or comply with certain other legal procedures before carrying out an arrest. In the Soviet Union the KGB may obtain a "warrant" from the state prosecutor before seizing a man, but it is not required to do so. It may "detain" a man on suspicion and interrogate him "to see if he is a criminal." What would be called "arrest" in the United States may be carried out in the Soviet Union with or without a warrant. The process of seizure is the same in either case.

For more than 20 years it has been the practice of the Russian State Police to seize their suspects in the middle of the night. The "midnight knock on the door" has become a standard episode in fiction about Russia. The police are well aware of the fact that the intended victim, forewarned by his previous surveillance and the changing attitude of his friends, is further terrified by the thought that he may be awakened from his sleep almost any night and taken away. The official explanation for the nighttime arrests is that such a procedure avoids the embarrassment and alarm which would be created if the victim were seized in the daytime. It is customary for the arresting officer to be accompanied by several other men. He usually reads to the prisoner the arrest warrant, if there is one. It does not, of course, specify the details of the crimes committed. The prisoner is then taken promptly to a detention prison.

An alternate method of arrest, for which the same official explanation is given, is to carry out the procedure in a city not the home of the suspect. In order to accomplish this, men under suspicion are ordered by their superiors to travel on some pretext or other. Before the victim reaches his destination, he is arrested and taken from the train. A third method, said to be preferred

when there is no warrant, is to seize the victim suddenly as he walks down the street. All of these procedures create intense anxiety in the victim, and in the population at large they create all of the alarm which may be generated by the sudden and unexplained disappearance of a person from the midst of his family and friends.

6. The Detention Prison

According to Soviet administrative principle, a man who is arrested by the state police is not "imprisoned." He is merely "detained." In theory, he is detained in a quiet, healthy atmosphere, where he has an opportunity to meditate upon his crimes, and a chance to talk them over freely and at length with police officers, without being prejudiced by friends, associates, or lawyers, who might induce him to distort the truth.

In most of the large cities of the Soviet Union the KGB operates detention prisons. These prisons contain only persons under "investigation," whose cases have not yet been "settled." The most modern of these prisons are separate institutions, well built and spotlessly clean. In addition to the cells for the prisoners, they contain offices for the KGB units, rooms in which interrogations are carried out, and other rooms, usually in the basement, in which prisoners are executed when such punishment is decided upon. There are attached medical facilities and rooms for the care of the sick detainees. An exercise yard is a standard facility. In outlying areas or undeveloped regions, the KGB may occupy a separate wing of a general prison and use this as a detention prison. Facilities in these areas may be ancient or inadequate, depending upon what is available; but the detention wing itself is administered separately from that of the rest of the prison, and prisoners under detention are segregated from general prisoners.

Most of the cells in Soviet detention prisons are designed for one occupant. The typical cell is a small cubicle, about 10 ft. long by 6 ft. wide, containing a single bunk and a slop jar. It usually has no other furnishings. Its walls are barren, and it is lighted by a single electric lamp in the ceiling. One wall usually contains a small window above eye level, from which the prisoner can see nothing of his outside environment. The door contains a peephole, through which the guard in the corridor outside may observe the prisoner at will without the prisoner's knowledge.

There also may be cells which are large enough to hold two or more prisoners. Except for size, such cells are not different from the others. In general, prisoners whose cases are relatively unimportant, those against whom the evidence is "complete," and those who have indicated a willingness to talk freely are placed in cells with other prisoners, some of whom are usually informers. Those whose cases are important or "incomplete," those from whom information is desired, and those for whom public trials or propaganda confessions are planned are put in solitary confinement.

Such typical cells will not, of course, be found in all prisons, and especially not in those which are old or improvised; but the general aspect of barrenness and complete lack of access to the outside world is characteristic.

7. The Regimen Within the Detention Prison

The arresting officers usually do not give the prisoner any reason for his arrest beyond that in the warrant which they read to him. They usually search

him, and also search the place in which he lives. They then take him directly to the prison. Here he is asked a few questions about his identity, and his personal valuables and outer clothing are taken from him. These are carefully catalogued and put away.† He may or may not be given a prison uniform. He is usually examined by a prison physician shortly after his incarceration.

The entire introduction to the detention prison is brief and is carried on without explanation. Within a few hours after his arrest the prisoner finds himself locked up within a cell.

An almost invariable feature of the management of any important suspect under detention is a period of total isolation in a detention cell. The prisoner is placed within his cell; the door is shut, and for an indefinite period he is totally isolated from human contact except by the specific direction of the officer in charge of his case. He is not allowed to talk to the guards or to communicate with other prisoners in any manner. When he is taken from his cell for any reason, he is accompanied by a guard. If another prisoner approaches through the corridor, he turns his face to the wall until the other prisoner has passed.

The hours and routine of the prisoner are rigidly organized. He is awakened early in the morning and given a short period in which to wash himself. His food is brought to him. He has a short and fixed time in which to eat it; the standard diet is just adequate to maintain nutrition. He must clean himself and police his own cell; but he is not allowed enough time to keep it spotlessly clean. At some time in the morning he usually has an exercise period. Typically, his exercise consists of walking alone in the exercise yard. If he is in rigid isolation, he may not be allowed to exercise at all. He is usually allowed a slop jar in his cell which he can utilize for defecation and urination, but sometimes this is taken away. Then he must call the guard and perhaps wait for hours to be taken to the latrine.

At all times except when he is eating, sleeping, exercising, or being interrogated, the prisoner is left strictly alone in his cell. He has nothing to do, nothing to read, and no one to talk to. Under the strictest regimen, he may have to sit or stand in his cell in a fixed position all day. He may sleep only at hours prescribed for sleep. Then he must go to bed promptly when told, and must lie in a fixed position upon his back with his hands outside the blanket. If he deviates from this position, the guard outside will awaken him and make him resume it. The light in his cell burns constantly. He must sleep with his face constantly toward it.

If the prisoner becomes ill, he is taken to a prison physician, by whom he is treated with the best medical care available, according to the practices common to Soviet medicine. If necessary, he may be placed under hospital care; but as soon as he has recovered, the regimen will be resumed.

Prisoners who attempt to commit suicide are thwarted and carefully nursed until they recover; then the regimen is resumed.

Deviations from the prescribed regimen are promptly noticed by the guards and are punished. Disturbed behavior is punished also. If this behavior persists

† It is an interesting comment on the "legalistic" behavior of the KGB that prisoners who have been detained, interrogated, tortured, imprisoned at length, and ultimately released after many years may then receive all of their original clothing and personal valuables, which have been scrupulously cared for during their imprisonment.

and the officer in charge of the case is convinced that the prisoner has become mentally ill, the man may be placed under medical care until his health has returned; then the regimen is resumed.

8. Effects of the Regimen in the Isolation Cell

The effects upon prisoners of the regimen in the isolation cell are striking. § It has been mentioned that the man who has been arrested by the KGB is usually intensely apprehensive. Often he has known for weeks that he would be arrested, but has had no clear knowledge of when, or for what reason. He has been seized in the middle of the night and taken without explanation to a formidable prison. He knows that no friend can help him, and that the KGB may do with him what they please.

A major aspect of his prison experience is isolation. Man is a social animal; he does not live alone. From birth to death he lives in the company of his fellow men. When he is totally isolated, he is removed from all of the interpersonal relations which are so important to him, and taken out of the social role which sustains him. His internal as well as his external life is disrupted. Exposed for the first time to total isolation in a KGB prison, he develops a predictable group of symptoms, which might almost be called a "disease syndrome." The guards and KGB officers are quite familiar with this syndrome. They watch each new prisoner with technical interest as his symptoms develop.

The initial appearance of an arrested prisoner is one of bewilderment. For a few hours he may sit quietly in his cell looking confused and dejected. But within a short time most prisoners become alert and begin to take an interest in their environment. They react with expectancy when anyone approaches the door to the cell. They show interest and anxiety as they are exposed to each new feature of the prison routine. They may ask questions or begin conversations. Some make demands: They demand to know why they are being held and protest that they are innocent. If they are foreign nationals, they may insist upon seeing their consular officers. Some take a "You can't do this to me" attitude. Some pass through a brief period of shouting, threatening, and demanding. All of this is always sternly repressed. If need be, the officer in charge of the case will see the prisoner, remind him of the routine, threaten him with punishment, and punish him if he does not subside. || During this period the prisoner has not yet appreciated the full import of his situation. He tries to fraternize with the guards. He leaves part of his food if he does not like it. He tries to speak to prisoners whom he passes in the corridors and reaches back to close the door behind him when he is taken to the latrine. The guards refer to this as the period of getting "acclimatized" to the prison routine.

After a few days it becomes apparent to the prisoner that his activity avails

§ The reaction to be described in this and in the following sections is that of a "typical" man, previously untrained, who has never been imprisoned or isolated before, and who has been arrested for a serious, but not specified, crime against the state of which he could be "guilty." Even among such men, there are wide differences in the capacity to tolerate the isolation regimen. Some become demoralized within a few days, while others are able to retain a high degree of self-control for months. In addition to this, most men possess the capacity to adapt to isolation, and those who experience the isolation regimen a second time almost always tolerate it better, and longer. Previous training and the circumstances of seizure are important also.

|| The punishments used are described in Sections 10 and 13.

him nothing, and that he will be punished or reprimanded for even the smallest breaches of the routine. He wonders when he will be released or questioned. His requests have been listened to but never acted upon. He becomes increasingly anxious and restless, and his sleep is disturbed. He begins to look up alertly when anyone passes in the corridor. He jumps when the guard comes to the door. He becomes "adjusted" to the routine in his cell and goes through it punctiliously; but he still leaves some of his food, and occasionally he reveals by small gestures his lack of complete submission to his environment.

The period of anxiety, hyperactivity, and apparent adjustment to the isolation routine usually continues from one to three weeks. As it continues, the prisoner becomes increasingly dejected and dependent. He gradually gives up all spontaneous activity within his cell and ceases to care about his personal appearance and actions. Finally, he sits and stares with a vacant expression, perhaps endlessly twisting a button on his coat. He allows himself to become dirty and disheveled. When food is presented to him, he eats it all, but he no longer bothers with the niceties of eating. He may mix it into a mush and stuff it into his mouth like an animal. He goes through the motions of his prison routine automatically, as if he were in a daze. The slop jar is no longer offensive to him. Ultimately he seems to lose many of the restraints of ordinary behavior. He may soil himself. He weeps; he mutters, and he prays aloud in his cell. He follows the orders of the guard with the docility of a trained animal. It usually takes from four to six weeks to produce this phenomenon in a newly imprisoned man.

9. The Feelings and Attitudes of the Prisoner During the Isolation Regimen

The man who for the first time experiences isolation in prison is, of course, experiencing far more than simple isolation. He usually feels profoundly anxious, helpless, frustrated, dejected, and entirely uncertain about his future. His initial reaction to the isolation procedure is indeed one of bewilderment and some numbness at the calamity which has befallen him. This is followed by a period of interest and apprehension about every detail of the prison regimen, accompanied by hope that he can explain everything as soon as he gets a chance, or an expectation that he will be released when the proper authorities hear about his plight. Such hopes last but a few days, but they keep him alert and interested during that time.

As hope disappears, a reaction of anxious waiting supervenes. In this period, the profound boredom and complete loneliness of his situation gradually overwhelm the prisoner. There is literally nothing for him to do except ruminate, and because he has so much to worry about, his ruminations are seldom pleasant. Frequently, they take the form of going over and over all the possible causes for his arrest. His mood becomes one of dejection. His sleep is disturbed by nightmares. Ultimately he may reach a state of depression in which he ceases to care about his personal appearance and behavior and pays little attention to his surroundings. In this state the prisoner may have illusory experiences. A distant sound in the corridor sounds like someone calling his name. The rattle of a footstep may be interpreted as a key in the lock opening the cell.

Some prisoners may become delirious and have visual hallucinations. God may seem to appear to such a prisoner and tell him to cooperate with his

interrogator. He may see his wife standing beside him, or a servant bringing him a large meal. In nearly all cases the prisoner's need for human companionship and his desire to talk to anyone about anything becomes a gnawing appetite, which may be as insistent as the hunger of a starving man. If he is given an opportunity to talk, he may say anything which seems to be appropriate, or to be desired by his listener, for in his confused and befuddled state he may be unable to tell what is "actually true" from what "might be" or "should be" true. He may be highly suggestible, and he may "confabulate" the details of any story suggested to him.

Not all men who first experience total isolation react in precisely this manner. In some, these symptoms are less conspicuous. In others, dejection and utter despondence set in earlier, or later. Still others, and especially those with pre-existing personality disturbances, may become frankly psychotic. However, frank psychotic manifestations, other than those of the "prison psychosis" described above, are not usual, primarily because those having charge of the prisoners usually break the routine of total isolation when they see that disorganization of the prisoner's personality is imminent.

10. Other Pressures of the Isolation Regimen

Not all of the reaction to this imprisonment experience can be attributed to isolation alone. Other potent forces are acting upon the newly imprisoned man. The prisoner's *anxiety* about himself is compounded by worry about what may happen to his friends and associates, and, in the case of those who possess information which they wish to hide, apprehension about how much the KGB knows or will find out. Even in the absence of isolation, profound and uncontrolled anxiety is disorganizing. *Uncertainty* compounds his anxiety also. The newly arrested prisoner does not know how long he will be confined, how he will be punished, or with what he will be charged. He does know that his punishment may be anything up to death or permanent imprisonment. Many prisoners say that uncertainty is the most unbearable aspect of the whole experience. *Sleep disturbances* and nightmares lead to further fear and fatigue.

The effects of isolation, uncertainty, and anxiety are usually sufficient to make the prisoner eager to talk to his interrogator and to seek some method of escape from a situation which has become intolerable. But, if these alone are not enough to produce the desired effect, the officer in charge has other simple and highly effective ways of applying pressure. Two of the most effective of these are *fatigue* and *lack of sleep*. The constant light in the cell and the necessity of maintaining a rigid position in bed compound the effects of anxiety and nightmares in producing sleep disturbances. If these are not enough, it is easy to have the guards awaken the prisoner at intervals. This is especially effective if the prisoner is always awakened as soon as he drops off to sleep. The guards can also shorten the hours available for sleep, or deny sleep altogether. Continued loss of sleep produces clouding of consciousness and a loss of alertness(both of which impair the victim's ability to sustain isolation. It also produces profound fatigue.

Another simple and effective type of pressure is that of maintaining the *temperature of the cell* at a level which is either too hot or too cold for comfort. Continuous heat, at a level at which constant sweating is necessary in order to maintain body temperature, is enervating and fatigue-producing. Sustained cold

is uncomfortable and poorly tolerated. Yet another method of creating pressure is to reduce the food ration to the point at which the prisoner is constantly hungry. This usually involves loss of weight, which is often associated with weakness and asthenia. Furthermore, *deprivation of food* produces lassitude, loss of general interest, and some breakdown of courage. Some people become profoundly depressed when deprived of food. Chronically hungry people can sometimes be induced to overcome a surprising number of their inhibitions in order to relieve their hunger.

The effects of isolation, anxiety, fatigue, lack of sleep, uncomfortable temperatures, and chronic hunger produce disturbances of mood, attitudes, and behavior in nearly all prisoners. The living organism cannot entirely withstand such assaults. The Communists do not look upon these assaults as "torture." Undoubtedly, they use the methods which they do in order to conform, in a typical legalistic manner, to overt Communist principles, which demand that "no force or torture be used in extracting information from prisoners." But all of them produce great discomfort, and lead to serious disturbances of many bodily processes; there is no reason to differentiate them from any other form of torture.

11. The Interrogator

The KGB officer who has charge of a case during the period of suspicion, surveillance, and arrest is now supplanted by another officer who is charged with the interrogation of the prisoner and the preparation of the deposition. (Prisoners commonly refer to this document as the "confession"). The officers who specialize in interrogation are relatively junior also; they come from a generation which has grown up under the Communist regime and are selected for the KGB in part because of their evident devotion to the Party and its program. The majority are first recruited from the ranks of the armed services, or the Komsomol. They are usually chosen on the basis of demonstrated Party loyalty and a "horseback opinion" of their aptitude for KGB work. Nearly all of them have had the equivalent of a secondary school education, and some have had more schooling. Many of them are ardent Party members, with an almost religious dedication to the organization.

Within the KGB, assignments to interrogation are not highly regarded. Most KGB officers prefer to go into offensive espionage or join paramilitary units. Relatively few of them wish to become involved in political counterespionage, investigation, and interrogation. Such work is not looked upon as glamorous or exciting. Very often it involves assignment to outlying and relatively dull regions of the Soviet Union, and usually is hard and thankless. The interrogation of prisoners is a tiring and an emotionally trying procedure. Thus, there is often a deficiency of applicants for work in this section of the secret police, and local district officers of the KGB must assign men to fill the necessary quota at the state police school. The assignment is often given to the least desirable men in the organization. It can be assumed that a majority of those involved in the investigation and interrogation of unimportant prisoners are men of average ability with no great enthusiasm for their job. However, the KGB does also possess highly skilled, well-educated, extremely knowledgeable, experienced, and able interrogators who are devoted to their profession and proud of their abilities. The interrogator assigned to an important prisoner can be expected to be a man of such high caliber.

Some of those who go into secret police activity receive only a sort of "on-the-job" training under the guidance of more senior and experienced men, but a fair proportion of these police officers are especially trained at a KGB school. The course in the conduct of interrogations includes a description of the various interrogation methods that will be discussed shortly. Trainees are allowed to observe a demonstration interrogation, but do not actually conduct interrogations themselves. No formal training in psychology, psychiatry, pharmacology, or physiology is included in the curriculum. There are no representatives of any of these sciences on the faculty and, as far as we have been able to ascertain, there never have been. Trainees do receive information from experienced police officers on how to prepare a dossier, how to "size up" a man, and how to estimate what sort of methods to use in "breaking" him; but the instructors draw entirely upon police experience. They have a contempt for theoretical psychiatry and psychology, and for instruments such as the polygraph, which most of them regard as a useless gadget.

12. Interrogation

When the prisoner has been arrested and incarcerated in his cell, the officer in charge of his case submits to his superiors a plan for the interrogation of the prisoner. This plan is drawn up on the basis of what is already known about the prisoner. It describes the methods to be used upon him, the attitudes to be taken toward him, the type of crimes which he is believed to have committed, and the assumed motivation for them. His superiors may criticize or comment upon this plan and offer added suggestions, based upon their own experience. The purpose of this plan appears to be primarily that of making the interrogator approach the prisoner with a definite conception of what he wants to do and how he is going to proceed in doing it. The plan need not be adhered to rigidly if the development of the case indicates that changes should be made. In some prisons the interrogator reviews the plan with his superiors after each session and describes to them how he intends to conduct the next session.

If a prisoner indicates at the time he is seized that he is aware of his guilt and is prepared to describe his crimes, the interrogator may begin to question him very soon after his imprisonment. This is true especially when the police already possess a great deal of "evidence" and the prisoner readily confesses to the "crimes" which the interrogator wishes to establish.

Likewise, if the prisoner is seized without a warrant, the interrogator is likely to begin the questioning early. Soviet law specifies that if a man is "detained on suspicion" the first protocol of his interrogation must be given to the state prosecutor within 10 days, so that an arrest warrant may be issued or the man may be released. In general, interrogators are constrained to comply with this regulation, and they try to produce enough evidence to obtain an arrest within 10 days. In many such cases, because they have little except suspicion to guide their questioning, they are necessarily vague in describing the prisoner's crimes to him. They must be cautious lest the prisoner get wind of what they want him to say and refuse to say it. It is probably this, more than any calculated cunning, which causes them to make to the prisoner such enigmatic statements as, "It is not up to me to tell you what your crimes are; it is up to you to tell me"—statements which lead the perplexed prisoner to rack his brain for an answer. The prosecutor is not hard to satisfy, and the interrogator nearly always obtains enough evidence to make an "arrest." If not, he can apply for an extension of

the detention period. The law provides no real protection for the prisoner.

Interrogations, once begun, are continued until "the case is complete," but in some circumstances they are intentionally delayed in their onset. It appears that his delay is imposed when the prisoner is defiant, when he is thought to be withholding information, when the KGB is seeking a confession to crimes other than those for which it has "evidence," and especially when it wants to use the prisoner for a public trial or to obtain a propaganda confession from him. In such cases, the interrogation begins when the officer in charge feels that the prisoner is ripe for it. This is usually when he observes that the prisoner has become docile and compliant and shows evidence of deterioration in his mood and personal appearance.

Interrogations are almost uniformly carried out at night. It is said that this practice of night interrogation originated not from any preconceived idea of its effectiveness, but because the early Chekists were so overburdened with police duties during the day that they could find time for interrogations only at night. For one reason or another, it has become standard procedure, possibly because the physical and psychological effects of night interrogations produce added pressure upon the prisoner. He is deprived of sleep, and placed in a state of added uncertainty by never knowing when he will be awakened and questioned. Typically, he will be awakened suddenly by the guard shortly after he has dropped off to sleep. Without explanation, he is taken from his cell and down several corridors to a small and barren interrogation room, equipped with a desk and chair for the interrogator and a stool for the prisoner. The lighting is arranged so that the prisoner can be placed in a bright light, while the interrogator sits in relative darkness. Sometimes a stenographer is present in one corner of the room to take notes. More frequently the interrogator makes his own notes, writing as the prisoner speaks. Usually only one interrogator is present, but occasionally other officers are introduced. Sometimes interrogators alternate, for psychological reasons, one being "friendly" and the other "hostile." If his work is successful, the original interrogator may carry the case through to a conclusion; but if he does not achieve the desired goal, he may be removed, and a new officer takes over the interrogation.

The atmosphere of the interrogation room generally has some degree of formality about it. The interrogator may be dressed in full uniform. If he wishes to impress the prisoner, he may take out a pistol, cock it, and lay it on the desk before him; but this psychological gambit does not seem to be a required part of the protocol. The interrogator adjusts his attitude toward the prisoner according to his estimate of the kind of man he is facing. If the dossier indicates that the prisoner is a timid and fearful man, the interrogator may adopt a fierce and threatening demeanor. If the prisoner is thought to be proud and sensitive, the interrogator may be insulting and degrading. If the prisoner has been a man of prestige and importance in private life, the interrogator may call him by his first name, treat him as an inferior, and remind him that he has lost all rank and privilege. If the prisoner is thought to be suggestible, the interrogator will try to influence him by suggestion. If the prisoner is known as venal and self-seeking, the interrogator may try to bribe him with promises of reward for cooperation. If the prisoner has a tendency to blame others, the interrogator may try to let him place the blame upon others, while describing his own activities as harmless. If the prisoner is known to have a wife and children for whom he

cares deeply, the interrogator may threaten harm to them if the prisoner does not cooperate, and promise to protect and help them if he does. If it is known that the prisoner has been unfaithful to his wife or has committed some crime, such as embezzlement, the interrogator may blackmail him by threatening exposure or punishment unless he cooperates. All these, and many other tricks, may be employed. They are not based upon a scientific theory of human behavior; they are tricks of the trade, so to speak, developed out of police experience and applied on a "rule-of-thumb," "common-sense" basis.

Almost invariably the interrogator takes the attitude that the prisoner is guilty and acts as though all of his crimes were known. Almost invariably he points out to the prisoner that he is completely helpless and that there is no hope for him unless he cooperates fully and confesses his crimes completely. Almost never does the interrogator state specifically what the prisoner's crimes actually are. This is left up to the prisoner, who is told, in effect, that he knows the extent of his own crimes and need only make a complete statement of them.

Almost invariably the interrogator does not accept the early statement of the prisoner. No matter what crimes he confesses, the interrogator forces the prisoner to repeat his statements again and again, and to elaborate on them endlessly. Almost always he uses any discrepancies as indications of lying and questions the prisoner at length about them.

The first interrogation sessions are nearly always concerned with a complete review of the entire life experience of the prisoner. The interrogator wishes to know about the prisoner's background; his class origin; his parents, brothers, and sisters; his friends and associates, and everything that he has done throughout his life. If the case is of any importance, no detail is overlooked, and every period of the prisoner's life must be accounted for.

This review of the prisoner's life may occupy several interrogation sessions. It has several purposes. The primary one is to complete the prisoner's dossier. It gives the interrogator a thorough picture of the type of man he is dealing with and further guides him to the man's weaknesses, which can be exploited. Furthermore, requiring a man to account for every detail of his life produces a voluminous and involved story, and the prisoner can scarcely avoid being trapped into inconsistencies if he is concealing anything. The information obtained from the life history can be compared with that already in the police files, which are usually extensive. It enables the police to know the associates of the prisoner—information which is important, because these may be his "accomplices in crime," who can be made suspects also, and interrogated for further information. Perhaps its most important purpose is that it reveals many "criminal" features of the prisoner, such as "reactionary class origin," "membership in reactionary organizations," and "association with enemies of the state," which are, by Communist definition, "crimes" no matter how long ago they were "committed."

The prisoner, taken from his cell after a long period of isolation, anxiety, and despair, usually looks upon the first interrogation as a welcome break. The mere opportunity to talk to someone is intensely gratifying. Many prisoners have reported that after long periods of isolation they eagerly anticipate interrogation sessions and try to prolong them simply for the companionship which they afford. Not infrequently the prisoner also regards interrogation as an opportunity to justify himself, and feels a false assurance that he can "explain everything" as soon as he is given a chance.

Usually he is much taken aback by the fact that his crimes are not specified and that his guilt is assured. He is further distressed when his protestations of innocence are greeted as lies. But the opportunity to talk about his life experiences is generally looked upon, especially by a person from Western society, as an opportunity to justify his behavior. Many men willingly divulge all that they can remember about themselves, because they feel quite sure that they have done nothing which may be regarded as criminal. They are unaware that, from the point of view of Communist theory and of the KGB, much of their past behavior undoubtedly will be construed as "criminal" and held against them. If the interrogator offers them the opportunity to have paper and pencil in their cells and to write out their biographies, they seize upon this avidly as a means of relieving the boredom of the tedious, lonely routine to which they are exposed.

13. Pressures Applied by the Interrogator

As the interrogation proceeds, the interrogator changes his behavior according to his previous plan and the development of the case. If the prisoner is cooperating and talking freely, the interrogator continues to show a relatively friendly attitude. But sooner or later he invariably expresses dissatisfaction with the information which the prisoner has given, no matter how complete it may be. He demands new details, and usually shows an especially great interest in the "accomplices" of the prisoner and the "organization" to which he is supposed to have been attached. When the prisoner protests that he has told all, and denies any other crimes or accomplices, the interrogator becomes hostile and begins to apply pressure.

Some of the pressures which can be applied simply by altering the routine within the cell have been described. The interrogator has many others at his command. Continuous and repetitive interrogation is an effective and very common form of pressure. Another which is widely used is that of requiring the prisoner to stand throughout the interrogation session or to maintain some other physical position which becomes painful. This, like other features of the KGB procedure, is a form of physical torture, in spite of the fact that the prisoners and KGB officers alike do not ordinarily perceive it as such. Any fixed position which is maintained over a long period of time ultimately produces excruciating pain. Certain positions, of which the standing position is one, also produce impairment of the circulation. Many men can withstand the pain of long standing, but sooner or later all men succumb to the circulatory failure it produces. After 18 to 24 hours of continuous standing, there is an accumulation of fluid in the tissues of the legs. This dependent edema is produced by the extravasation of fluid from the blood vessels. The ankles and feet of the prisoner swell to twice their normal circumference. The edema may rise up the legs as high as the middle of the thighs. The skin becomes tense and intensely painful. Large blisters develop, which break and exude watery serum. The accumulation of the body fluid in the legs produces impairment of the circulation. The heart rate increases, and fainting may occur. Eventually, there is a renal shutdown, and urine production ceases. Urea and other metabolites accumulate in the blood. The prisoner becomes thirsty and may drink a good deal of water, which is not excreted but adds to the edema of his legs. Men have been known to remain standing for periods as long as several days. Ultimately they usually develop a delirious state, characterized by disorientation, fear, delusions, and visual hallu-

cinations. This psychosis is produced by a combination of circulatory impairment, lack of sleep, and uremia.

Periods of long standing are usually interrupted from time to time by interrogation periods, during which the interrogator demands and threatens, while pointing out to the prisoner that it would be easy for him to end his misery merely by cooperating.

The KGB hardly ever uses manacles or chains, and rarely resorts to physical beatings. The actual physical beating is, of course, repugnant to overt Communist principles, and is contrary to KGB regulations also. The ostensible reason for these regulations is that they are contrary to Communist principles. The practical reason for them is the fact that the KGB looks upon direct physical brutality as an ineffective method of obtaining the compliance of the prisoner. Its opinion in this regard is shared by police in other parts of the world. In general, direct physical brutality creates only resentment, hostility, further defiance, and unreliable statements.

It is a general policy that the interrogator must obtain the written permission of his superiors before using extreme coercive measures of any sort upon prisoners. In actual practice such permission is sought only if the officer in charge of a case feels that there is a need for a direct brutal assault. The KGB recognizes that some men who are intensely afraid of physical assault may break down if beaten once or twice, and it does use this procedure deliberately, though uncommonly. Generally speaking, when an interrogator strikes a prisoner in anger, he does so "unofficially." The act may be a true expression of his exasperation, and evidence that he, himself, is under emotional strain.

The use of brutality in the Russian secret police waxes and wanes in cycles that recur throughout the years. When feelings of insecurity develop within those holding power, they become increasingly suspicious and put great pressures upon the secret police to obtain arrests and confessions. At such times police officials are inclined to condone anything which produces a speedy "confession," and brutality may become widespread. Later, when the Party leadership again feels secure, its suspiciousness subsides. Meanwhile, demands arise for "reform," and the cessation of "irregular practices" by the secret police. Soon stern orders are issued that prisoners shall not be subjected to brutality, and some unfortunate police officers are punished for their past behavior. After this, brutality will be scrupulously avoided until the next wave of suspicion arises.

Regardless of brutality, it can be taken for granted that some period of intense pressure and coercion will be applied to every prisoner, no matter how cooperative he tries to be at first. This period of pressure will be accompanied by expressions of displeasure and hostility from the interrogator, and sometimes from the guards also. It appears to be a working principle of the KGB that no man ever reveals everything voluntarily. It has been a universal experience of prisoners of Communist state police that no matter how much a man tells, he is always pressed to tell more—in fact, those who talk are often the ones who are hounded the longest. Men who immediately, and without pressure, volunteer all that they know do not thus allay the suspicions of their interrogator. Eventually, when their flow of information runs out, and persuasion yields no more, they find themselves put through the same routine of repetitive torture which more recalcitrant prisoners encounter.

14. The "Friendly Approach"

The interrogator will continue this pressure until he feels that the prisoner is nearly at the end of his rope. At this point he introduces a psychological gambit which is probably the most successful of any of the tricks at his command. He suddenly changes his demeanor. The prisoner, returned once again to an interrogation session that he expects will be a repetition of torture and villification, suddenly finds that the entire scene has changed. The interrogation room is brightly lighted. The interrogator is seated behind his desk, relaxed and smiling. Tea and cigarettes are waiting on the table. He is ushered to a comfortable chair. The guard is sent away, and sometimes the secretary also. The interrogator remarks about his appearance. He is sympathetic about the discomfort which he has been suffering. He is sorry that the prisoner has had such a difficult time. The interrogator himself would not have wished to do this to the prisoner—it is only that the prison regulations require this treatment, because of the prisoner's own stubbornness. "But let us relax and be friends. Let us not talk any more about crimes. Tell me about your family"—and so on. The usual line is to the effect that, "After all, I am a reasonable man. I want to get this business over as much as you do. This is as tiresome to me as it is to you. We already know about your crimes; it is a mere formality for you to write out your confession. Why don't we get it over with so that everything can be settled and you can be released?"

Prisoners find this sudden friendship and release of pressure almost irresistible. Nearly all of them avidly seize the opportunity to talk about themselves and their feelings, and then go on to talk about their families. Most of them proceed from this almost automatically to giving the information which the interrogator seeks. Even if they do not provide everything the interrogator wants at this time, he may continue his friendly demeanor and the relaxation of pressure for several more sessions before resuming the old regimen of torture. But if the prisoner does reveal significant information and cooperates fully, the rewards are prompt and gratifying. The interrogator smiles and congratulates him. Cigarettes are forthcoming. There is a large meal, often excellently prepared and served; and after this the prisoner returns to his cell and sleeps as long as he likes, in any position that he chooses.

15. The Course of the Interrogation

Such friendly and rewarding behavior will continue for several days—usually as long as the interrogator feels that a significant amount of new information is being produced. At this point the prisoner may conclude that his ordeal is over; but invariably he is disappointed. For as soon as the interrogator decides that no new information is being yielded, the regimen of constant pressure and hostile interrogation is resumed. Again it is carried to the point at which the prisoner is near breakdown. Again it is relaxed, and again the prisoner is rewarded if he cooperates. In this manner, proceeding with regular steps, alternating punishment with reward, the interrogator constantly presses the prisoner to revise and rewrite the protocol until it contains all the statements which he desires, and is in a final form which meets with his approval. When it has at last been agreed upon and signed, the pressure is relaxed "for good"; but the prisoner continues to live in his cell, and remains under the threat of renewed pressure, until such

the prisoner and the interrogator. In many respects this is like the relationship that grows up between a psychiatrist and his patient. The prisoner, for all the pressure that he has been under, eventually finds in the interrogator the one human being in his environment to whom he can relate. The interrogator, on his part, has no personal hostility to his victim. He may actually like him. Especially when dealing with a Communist, he may feel that but for chance he would be in the prisoner's place. Interrogator and prisoner spend many hours of many days together. A certain comradeship and understanding grows up between them.

Many of these KGB officers impress the prisoner by the sincerity of their dedication to Communism and its ostensible ideals. The interrogator often displays a patient sympathy which becomes apparent to the prisoner. His attitude that "this is something we must go through with, and neither you nor I can stop until you have cooperated and signed a proper confession" is to some extent a genuine attitude. The KGB system allows of no other solution from the interrogator's point of view. It is in fact true that the interrogation will have to go on until a proper deposition has been signed. The prisoner often comes to recognize this sincerity. Many see that indeed the interrogator must follow the system, and there is nothing which he can do about it. Thus, the prisoner, in his need for companionship, may displace his hostility from the interrogator to the "system." Many interrogators genuinely plead with the prisoner to learn to "see the truth," to "think correctly," and to "cooperate."

There are instances of prisoners who signed depositions largely out of sympathy for their interrogators, because they felt that these men would be punished if a proper deposition were not forthcoming. In other words, the warm and friendly feelings which develop between the prisoner and the interrogator may have a powerful influence on the prisoner's behavior. Not infrequently, the prisoner develops a feeling that the interrogator is the only warm and sympathetic person in the hostile and threatening world in which he exists. His need for human companionship and acceptance is such that he overlooks the pressures which the interrogator puts upon him and ascribes them to the necessities of the system rather than to the willful activity of his "friend." If the interrogator rejects the prisoner or implies that he disapproves of him, the prisoner may feel bereft. He may blame himself for having let the interrogator down or for not having cooperated with the man who was trying to help him. His efforts to maintain his good standing in the eyes of his "friend" become an important motive for him to seek a rationalization which will allow him to produce a protocol of the type his "friend" needs. This same desire "not to go back on a friend" also becomes one of the reasons why he does not repudiate the protocol later when it is presented in court.

17. The Reaction of the Prisoner to the Interrogation

The way in which a prisoner reacts to the whole process of interrogation is to a great extent dependent upon the manner of man he is, his preexisting attitudes and beliefs, and the circumstances surrounding his arrest and imprisonment. All prisoners have this in common: They have been isolated and have been under unrelenting pressure in an atmosphere of hostility and uncertainty. They all find themselves in a dilemma at the time that the interrogation begins. The regimen of pressure and isolation has created an over-all discomfort which is well nigh intolerable. The prisoner invariably feels that "something must be done to end

this." He must find a way out. Death is denied to him. Ultimately, he finds himself faced with the choice of continuing interminably under the intolerable pressures of his captors or of accepting the "way out" which the interrogator offers. The "way out" is a rationalization. It allows the prisoner to meet the demands of his interrogator by degrees, at the same time retaining within himself some shred of belief that by his own standards he has not capitulated. With rare exceptions prisoners always accept this "way out," provided the pressures are sufficiently prolonged and intense and the interrogator can adjust his persuasiveness in a proper manner.

Various categories of prisoners respond to different types of persuasion. Persons who have been lifelong members of the Communist Party are familiar with the Communist concept of "crime" and the functions of the KGB. Furthermore, they have all been trained in the ritual of self-criticism, confession, punishment, and rehabilitation, which has been part of Communist procedure since before the Revolution. Many Communists can rationalize a belief that they are actually criminals, as specified by the KGB, and come to see their punishment as necessary for the good of the State and the Party. To the true Party member, martyrdom for such a reason carries with it an air of triumph.

Those who have studied the purge trials of the old Bolsheviks are convinced that this form of reasoning was behind their apparently peculiar behavior at the trials. These men held nothing sacred but the Party. They had dedicated their lives to the principle that the Party could do no wrong. They themselves looked upon deviationists as criminals worthy of the ultimate punishment. Zinoviev, Kammenev, and their followers knew themselves to be chronic oppositionists. Lenin had expelled them from the Party during the 1917 revolution and had reinstated them after they had confessed and recanted. In 1927 they had again been expelled by the Party and temporarily exiled; they had made abject recantations and had again been reinstated. But these men were chronic nonconformists. In some way, by their attitudes rather than by any deed, they had continued to be in partial disagreement with Stalin and other members of the party leadership. When they were arrested in 1936, it is said that the NKVD did not have very great difficulty in convincing them that they were criminals. They readily agreed to it. There was more difficulty in convincing them that the good of the Party demanded that they be publicly tried and executed; but after much tortuous logic they accepted this also. It is said that the interrogators and prisoners broke down and wept together when the final agreement was reached. Their "confessions" before the court contained an exposition of their crimes of which they were guilty "according to Communist theory," expressed as if these crimes had "actually been committed" in the Western, or popular, use of the word, whereas they were actually only "objective" or "consequential" crimes as defined by the Communist theory.

Non-Communist prisoners of idealistic beliefs or Socialist sympathies apparently make ready targets for the logic of the interrogator. Such persons are usually compelled to agree that the ostensible and idealistic motives of the Communist Party are "good," and that those who oppose these ideals are "bad." The rationalization in this case takes the form of getting the prisoner to say that the Communist Party has the same value system that he does. Something which the prisoner has done is "bad" by his own definition. From this point the prisoner proceeds through the usual steps to the ultimate signing of the deposition.

Persons who carry with them strong feelings of guilt associated with highly organized systems of moral values likewise become ready targets for the persuasion of the interrogator. Very few people are entirely free of guilt feelings, but often such feelings are found in the highest degree in those in whom they are least appropriate. For example, many strongly religious people have a profound sense of sin. They feel guilty of shortcomings of their own, which are much smaller than those found in most of their fellow men. They constantly see themselves as transgressing their own moral code, and in the need of forgiveness for doing so. Skilled interrogators make use of this. They point out that many of the ostensible ideals of Communism are the same as the ideals to which the prisoner himself subscribes. Since he has transgressed his own code, he is a criminal in Communist eyes also. Thus, Chinese interrogators who are experienced in the interrogation of priests develop an extensive knowledge of the Bible and Christian theology. They can draw parallels between Christianity and Communism, and, in fact, often identify the two as being different aspects of the same philosophical system. It is not hard to show the prisoner many points at which he has failed to live up to the Christian code. It is usually not very difficult to create within him a feeling of guilt about this. From here, it is also not difficult to get him to agree that, because of his un-Christian acts, he has injured "the people," whom Christ loved. The Communist Party is also interested in the welfare of "the people"; therefore, all the prisoner needs to do is confess that he has sinned against "the people" and has committed crimes against them. A confession of "crime against the people" is a satisfactory confession in a Communist court.

An additional vulnerability of highly moral people is that they find it difficult to tell a lie under any circumstances. Priests, for example, often give aid and comfort to those oppressed by Communist states. It is not too difficult for the police to find out about this, and it sometimes is very difficult for the priest to lie about it when presented with the evidence. From this point, it is not difficult to persuade the priest to confess that he has indeed given comfort to the enemies of the regime.

On the other hand, persons with so-called sociopathic or psychopathic personalities, who have few or no moral scruples, may also be vulnerable. Such persons have very little attachment to friends and to moral principles. They may be readily accessible to bribes and to various promises of reward. Under pressure they quite readily reveal all of the information they possess and freely implicate their associates. They readily rationalize the necessity for finding a "way out" of their situations and have little or no conflict about deserting any principles which they were supposed to possess. They need only to see what the KGB wants in the form of a "confession" in order to fabricate one without compunction. KGB officers are not entirely taken in by this lying. They do not hesitate to use the "confession," but they edit out the more fantastic parts from the final deposition.

Persons who are "caught with the goods" in actual crimes are equally vulnerable. This includes persons who have "actually" in the Western sense of the word committed espionage or treason. If the KGB has uncovered real evidence of this, it is quite likely that sooner or later, with constant pressure and interrogation, they will get the prisoner to admit it also. In this instance, the facts of the case are agreed upon by all concerned, and it remains only to determine the punishment.

The maze in which any prisoner finds himself has so many ramifications that it is almost impossible for him to escape from it without signing a protocol and being convicted. Anything he has done may be a crime. He has been adjudged guilty before his arrest. He is put in a situation of intolerable pressure. It is made clear to him that his only way out of this situation is to cooperate with the interrogator. He is offered a reasonable rationalization for doing so. Sooner or later under these circumstances, the prisoner and the interrogator almost inevitably come to an agreement upon a deposition which satisfies the interrogator. But not inevitably: There are reported instances of prisoners who have refused to sign any form of deposition and have remained in detention indefinitely, with their cases still unresolved, or have been tried summarily by an administrative court of the state police. Gomulka resisted the Polish UB. Elizabeth Lermolo, a woman who was implicated in the Kirov murder, resisted the NKVD and later escaped. It is alleged that she remained in detention, with periodic interrogation from 1936 until 1941, when the Germans overran her prison and she was released. It is said that she never signed a deposition. Whether this is a true story or not is not known. But it is known that of all the millions who passed through the hands of NKVD during the time of the purges, and who have fallen into the hands of its successors since then, few have escaped without signing a deposition which amounted to a confession of crime, as crimes are defined in Communist Russia.

18. The "Trial"

When the prisoner has finally reached the point of admitting his "crimes," and he and the interrogator have agreed upon a protocol satisfactory to both of them, he experiences a profound feeling of relief, which is sometimes shared by the man who has been questioning him. Even though his crimes may be serious and the punishment for them severe and of unknown degree, he welcomes a surcease from the unrelenting pressures and miseries of the interrogation procedure. Whatever the future may hold for him, he has for the moment found a way out of an intolerable situation.

When a satisfactory deposition has been prepared and signed, the pressures upon the prisoner are customarily relaxed. He is allowed to sleep as long as he wishes; he may have reading and writing material in his room. Sometimes he can join with other prisoners in periods of exercise. His meals improve and his guards become friendly, or even solicitous. This easy treatment is continued until he is thoroughly rested and his health has been restored. Then, in most cases, he is taken before a "court." The state prosecutor presents the court with the signed protocol and questions the prisoner about his crimes. Sometimes a "defense attorney" is assigned; this man invariably limits himself to requesting leniency from the court. The whole procedure is usually brief and formal. There are no verdicts of "not guilty." The function of the "judge" is solely that of presiding over the trial and passing upon the prisoner a sentence which has usually been agreed upon beforehand by the prosecutor and the KGB officer in charge of the case.

It is this aspect of the proceedings which is most bewildering to Western observers. It is easy to understand how prisoners can be tortured into signing confessions of crimes which they did not commit, but it is difficult to understand why the prisoners do not renounce these confessions later at the public trials.

Beginning with the purge trials of the 1930's, the NKVD and its successors

and offspring in Russia, the Eastern European nations, and China have presented the world with a series of public trials at which the prisoners calmly and seemingly without coercion make outrageous "confessions" of unbelievable crimes, praise their captors, and ask for the severest punishment for themselves. These prisoners have included important Communist officials, former NKVD officers, non-Communist citizens of various categories, and foreigners of the most diverse backgrounds. All of these prisoners were apparently "innocent"; some faced certain death, and many were profoundly anti-Communist. Men of the highest caliber and integrity, such as Cardinal Mindszenty, William Oatis, and Robert Vogeler, seemed to have the strongest possible motivations to resist; but none of them stood up in court and denounced the confession and his captors. This phenomenon demands an explanation.

The explanation is available, but it is not simple. It is necessary to examine the proposition in detail in order to view it in its proper light.

First, it is by no means true that "all prisoners confess freely at a public trial." Only a very small minority of prisoners of the Communist state police ever appear at a public trial. The KGB will not expose a prisoner to a public trial unless it is convinced that he will go through with his confession as planned. If there is any doubt about this, no public trial is held. But even with this precaution the KGB is not infallible. At the purge trials several of the prisoners tried to recant parts of their confessions. When a prisoner tried to recant, the prosecutor halted the examination of that person. Usually, when the man returned from his cell several days later, he was again docile and cooperative. In the Bulgarian trials, Traicho Kostov repudiated his entire protocol on two occasions. Some of these so-called "public trials" have not actually been public. They have been carried out in the presence of a select audience while movies and recordings are made of the prisoner's words, which are later transmitted to the public.

The majority of prisoners do "come to trial," but these trials are not public. They are held *in camera*. The state police are concerned only with political crimes and espionage. Their prisoners are tried before "military tribunals," which are not public courts. Those present are only the interrogator, the state prosecutor, the prisoner, the judges, a few stenographers, and perhaps a few officers of the court. At such a trial there is no opportunity for "public protest," and any protest which is made can be readily expunged from the record. So far as the prisoner is concerned, this so-called trial appears as nothing more than the next step in his process of imprisonment. He has been imprisoned, tortured, and interrogated and has signed a "confession." Following that, he has experienced more lenient treatment and has had a period of rest and rehabilitation. But he has not been out of the prison. He has not seen any of his friends or family or anyone interested in defending him. He has remained entirely in the hands of his interrogators and guards, with access to no one else. When he finally comes before the "court," he sees no one except the state prosecutor, the judge, and the court officials. The defense attorney, if one is assigned, shows not the slightest interest in refuting any of the "evidence" in the confession or in establishing a plea of "not guilty." He never questions the fact that the prisoner is guilty as charged. Sometimes he asks the judge for leniency; but not infrequently he informs the court that he is convinced the prisoner is just as big a monster as the prosecution says he is, and that he cannot bring himself to ask the court for leniency. The judge likewise shows no interest in the question of guilt or innocence. He limits

himself to maintaining order in the court and passing sentence. If the prisoner has any illusions that the prosecutor, the judge, and the defense attorney are going to allow him any opportunity to dispute the "facts in the case," these are soon dispelled.

By no means do all prisoners receive a "trial" of any sort. Those who are stubborn or repeatedly recant their confessions during the interrogation procedure will not be trusted, even at private trials. Uncooperative and stubborn prisoners, and those who might make embarrassing statements are "dealt with administratively." For many years the state police have had the right to carry out "administrative" trials for any prisoners whom they do not wish to expose to the usual trial procedure. These administrative trials consist of simply presenting the prisoner to a group of three senior police officers (the Troika), who pass sentence immediately and have it carried out forthwith. These administrative trials took place within the detention prison. Sometimes the prisoner was not even present at them; sentence was passed by the Troika merely upon the basis of the signed protocol. Sometimes the alleged records of these trials were made public, but generally the fact that such a trial had taken place was never revealed. For every Soviet citizen who has appeared at a public trial, there have been thousands who have been tried only at private trials by military tribunals, and hundreds who were dealt with administratively by the police themselves. Thus, a great number of high Communist officials, captured German officers, and similar prisoners who fell into the hands of the Russian secret police were not tried at all. So far as the public was concerned, they merely disappeared.

During the last few months there have been press reports that the right of administrative trial has been withdrawn from the KGB. It remains to be seen whether or not this is true.

19. Public Confessions

If we exclude from consideration all those prisoners who are dealt with administratively, two questions remain: 1. Why do all of those prisoners who are tried in private confess almost without exception? 2. Why do some prisoners confess at public trials, where there is actually some opportunity to make an open denial of guilt?

In response to the question of why prisoners at private trials confess almost without exception, the following answers can be given:

1. The setting of the private trial, as we have just described it, makes it apparent to the prisoner that any attempt at recantation is useless.

2. The prisoner at a private trial is always under actual threat by the KGB. The officer in charge of his case has clearly indicated to him that any attempt to alter or recant any part of his confession will lead to an immediate resumption of the interrogation-torture regimen. This threat is as poignant as a cocked pistol. The prisoner has just finished being carried through torture and interrogation over and over again to the point at which it is absolutely intolerable to him. He has already decided that, whatever his sentence may be, he prefers to receive his punishment rather than to return to the horrible ordeal through which he has just passed. In the opinion of KGB officers, this is the most potent reason why no prisoner changes his story.

3. Warm and positive feelings between prisoners and their interrogating officers often develop during the interrogation process, and many prisoners come to trial with the feeling that if they attempt to alter their testimony they will be

dishonoring an agreement with their interrogators (see Section 16).

4. Finally, it is to be emphasized that, in spite of all these detriments, some prisoners do recant at their private trials. The court then decides that these prisoners have not yet reached a full awareness of their crimes. They are sent back to the detention prison and once again put through the torture-interrogation regimen. Sooner or later, they learn that pleas of "not guilty" are not acceptable in Soviet courts, and that they must behave themselves at their trials. Otherwise, they are indefinitely detained or executed.

In answering the question of why some prisoners confess publicly when there is some opportunity for them to renounce their confessions and thereby embarrass their captors, one must consider the various categories of those who have been tried in public. Widely publicized trials are staged by the Communists only under exceptional circumstances and always for propaganda purposes. They are carefully managed "set pieces" in which every performer must play his role exactly as prescribed. The KGB and other Communist police organizations select the prisoners for these shows with great care.

The first category of those who have made public confessions are prominent Bolsheviks who have fallen from grace: Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, Bukharin, Radek and their associates, at the time of the great purges; more recently, Laslo Rajk, in Hungary; Traicho Kostov, in Bulgaria, and Slansky, Clementis, and others, in Czechoslovakia. The list is extensive, but not nearly so extensive as the list of prominent Communist officials who were liquidated administratively.

But why did those confess; who did so? The old Bolsheviks "confessed" primarily because they were lifelong, dedicated Communists. They had committed their lives to the belief that nothing is sacred but the Party, and the Party is always right. If there be a central point in the Communist creed, it is this. These men all subscribed to the belief that opposition to the Party line, as expressed by the Party leaders, is a crime. Whatever else they were, they were "chronic oppositionists," and knew themselves to be so. They all subscribed to the Communist ritual of public self-criticism and punishment. Nearly all of them had at one time or another publicly criticized themselves and had been punished. Several had been expelled from the Party, not once but several times. They all knew themselves to be in opposition to the Party leadership, and they all felt guilty about this. In spite of this, they still considered themselves to be Bolsheviks, and were prepared in principle to accept any demand which the Party might make upon them, even to the point of death.

All of the evidence points to the fact that the NKVD, using the interrogation-pressure process which we have described, persuaded these men to accept the concept that because they were opposed to Stalin, the leader of the party, they were wrecking the Party. As good Bolsheviks, the Party called upon them to make the ultimate sacrifice by denouncing themselves and giving up their lives so that the world could know that opposition to the Party leadership was both criminal and futile. The "crimes" to which they confessed publicly were not "actual" crimes in the Western sense of the term, but were "objective" or "consequential" crimes, which must result from their opposition according to Communist theory. Ultimately they made their confessions almost with an air of triumph, and went to their deaths seeing themselves as martyrs to the cause to which they had devoted their lives. Some of them—Krestinsky, for example—had difficulty, recanted a bit, and defied the prosecutor briefly; but after a few

days of persuasion they resumed their roles and carried the trial through to its end.

This behavior on the part of the highly disciplined and religiously dedicated "old Bolsheviks" is not unusual in the annals of human behavior. It is not inexplicable that these men who hated Stalin nevertheless played their roles and went to their deaths for the sake of the Party. The reader has but to consider how many soldiers, in wars throughout the course of history, have proceeded to certain death in response to what they knew to be stupid and disastrous orders, given by incompetent officers whom they hated; and how many wives have spent a lifetime in supporting and defending drunken and brutal husbands, whom they detested. People dedicated to a cause will destroy both their lives and their reputations for it. That Communists will do this we know well from our experiences in this country. The Rosenbergs could have escaped death had they been willing to confess to their espionage and reveal their contacts, but they refused to do so.

The information available to us about the trials of the Communist leaders in the Eastern European satellites indicates that their behavior can be explained on the same basis as that of the old Bolsheviks. These trials were not the success that one might assume from their awesome popular reputation. Rajk confessed obediently and went to his death like a proper Bolshevik; but Kostov denounced his accusers and proclaimed his innocence. The Polish police never dared to expose Gomulka to a trial of any sort. Tito defected and purged his would-be purgers. There have been no truly public trials since those times. The trials of Slansky and his colleagues were recorded in private, and selected excerpts of the transcripts were broadcast. Beria and Abakumov were tried entirely *in camera* by a military tribunal.

Another category of those who have confessed publicly is that group of intellectually or idealistically motivated people who were thought to be opposed to Communism, or at least to be non-Communist, prior to their arrest. Most prominent in this group is Cardinal Mindszenty; also included in this are other Roman Catholic priests from the satellite countries.

The Mindszenty case is the best known. In the public mind Mindszenty is the prototype of "Communist brain washing." Among the known facts of his case are these:

Cardinal Mindszenty came from an old and aristocratic Hungarian family; he had many friends among the Hungarian aristocracy and the nobility. He had always supported the monarchical form of government. During the period between the wars, when Hungary was a regency, he had been in favor of the restoration of the Hapsburgs to the Hungarian throne. He was a man of strong religious convictions, who held himself, as well as others, to a high code of moral conduct. Governmental administrators sometimes found him a difficult man to deal with because he was inflexible in upholding his moral principles.

During the Second World War he came into open conflict with the Nazis, and with the members of the Hungarian Fascist Arrow-Cross organization; but these organizations did not dare arrest him because of his position in the church and because of the respect and admiration in which the Roman Catholic population of Hungary held him. It was partly because he had become such a symbol of the integrity and independence of the church that he was elevated to the position of Cardinal in 1945.

Cardinal Mindszenty did not hesitate to make known his opposition to the Communist regime. He made no attempt to conceal his sympathy for many of

those oppressed by it. He maintained his association with his friends among the former aristocracy. He gave support and encouragement to those, both inside and outside the country, who, he thought, might end the Communist dictatorship and restore a legal government. He was arrested in December, 1948, after a propaganda campaign had been carried on against him for several years. Approximately six weeks later, he "confessed" at a public trial. All of the evidence indicates that the treatment which Cardinal Mindszenty received during his period of interrogation did not differ in any important detail from that which is used by the KGB, which we have described above. The only drugs which the Cardinal received were stimulants to keep him awake during the long hours of interrogation, and possibly sedatives to allow him to sleep when he was exhausted. There is no reason to believe that any new, esoteric, or unknown method was used in handling him and no need to assume that there was.

Cardinal Mindszenty's confession is published in the "Hungarian Yellow Book." In his published depositions, he acknowledges that he is a royalist, that he had favored the restoration of the monarchy, and that he had hoped that the international situation would develop in a way which would cause the United States to intervene and allow the monarchy to be restored. He agrees that he had continued to communicate with his monarchist friends, both in Hungary and abroad, and with various American authorities. He agrees that he was hostile to the Communist regime. "It was in the interests of this that I did everything to support American politics in Hungary, partly by my activity against the Hungarian Republic, and partly by constantly urging their interference, by a regular service of facts, and by espionage." This sentence, translated by Hungarian Communists, is typical of those found in Communist depositions; it can equally well be interpreted to mean that Mindszenty had committed espionage (in the Communist sense of the word) or that he had urged the Americans to make known the facts and to commit espionage. The "facts" in the "Yellow Book," even if accepted at face value, reveal the Cardinal to have been a Hungarian patriot and a vigorous anti-Communist, but not a spy.

Cardinal Mindszenty's trial was "public," but not all of his statements were broadcast. The broadcast portions were cut, evidently at points where he made significant reservations. But, even so, his widely publicized confession was no declaration of profound guilt. At his trial Cardinal Mindszenty stated that he recognized that some of his activities had been contrary to the laws of the Communist state. He stated that he was sorry he had violated the laws. If his actions had in any way harmed the people of Hungary or the Roman Catholic Church, he asked forgiveness for this. He agreed that he would be willing to step aside as leader of the Hungarian Church if this would be in the best interest of the people and the Church.

On the basis of this confession the Communists convicted him of being a "reactionary criminal" and of taking part in a "treasonable monarchist plot" to secure United States intervention and to overthrow the government of Hungary. He was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Still a third category of those who have confessed publicly are various foreign businessmen, newspapermen, and military men who were arrested or captured in the course of their routine duties, of whom Robert Vogeler, in Hungary, and William Oatis, in Czechoslovakia, are examples. In all these cases the following factors are evident:

1. The confessions made by the prisoners were "actually true" in the sense that some of the specific acts described in the confessions actually occurred, although not necessarily in the way in which they were described.

2. The interpretation put upon these acts was the Communist interpretation.

3. The prisoner had been brought to agree that in the country in which he was arrested the Communist laws applied and, therefore, these acts constituted a crime. The prisoner, therefore, pleaded guilty to "crimes" which were "crimes" by Communist definition, but which he had not intended as crimes, or considered to be crimes at the time that he carried them out. This qualification, however, was missing from the statements made by the prisoners at the trials.

4. All of these prisoners were under the threat of renewed interrogation-torture if they recanted or changed their confessions.

5. Many of them had the actual or implied promise, as well as the firm belief, that they would be released if they cooperated with the police.

6. Furthermore, all of them were able to rationalize that their confessions would not be believed by Americans in any case. This rationalization was essentially a correct one—their confessions were widely disbelieved in the United States, but in some other areas of the world their confessions are accepted as factual.

20. Punishment

The period of interrogation and detention, no matter how long and terrible it may be, is not considered imprisonment. The "punishment" begins only after the sentence has been passed. Sometimes a "lenient" judge will allow the prisoner to count his period of detention as a part of a prison sentence, but often this period is discounted altogether. According to Communist theory, the purpose of prison systems is to rehabilitate criminals through wholesome work, productive activity, and education. For this "purpose" prisoners are transported to Siberia or the Arctic, where most of them spend their terms working in mines and construction projects under brutal and primitive conditions. Those who are fortunate enough to receive any education during this procedure are "educated" by further indoctrination with Communist ideas.

III. Practices in Communist China

1. A Comparison of Chinese Methods with Those of the KGB

The methods used by the state police in China are basically similar to those used by the KGB, but they are not "carbon copies," like those of the Communist-dominated countries of Eastern Europe. They are different in several important details.

1. The goal of the KGB detention and interrogation procedure is the preparation of a protocol upon which a suitable punishment can be based, so that the KGB can then deal with the prisoner according to its preconceived idea of what must be done for the good of the Party and the Soviet State. In a minority of cases, this includes a public trial for propaganda purposes. The KGB does not appear to be greatly concerned about the future attitudes and behavior of the prisoner, so long as he behaves properly during the period of trial and sentencing.

The goal of the Chinese detention and interrogation procedure, on the other hand, is primarily that of ensuring that the prisoner will develop a relatively long-lasting change in his attitudes and overt behavior, which will be sustained after his release, so that he will not again constitute a danger to the Communist

state.¶ The securing of information by interrogation, the preparation of proper protocols and "confessions," and the participation of the prisoners in public propaganda trials are secondary to this primary goal.

2. Unlike the KGB, the Chinese make extensive use of group interaction among prisoners, in obtaining information, applying pressures, and carrying out indoctrination.

3. Whereas in the Soviet Union and Eastern European states the ritual of public self-criticism, confession, self-degradation, punishment, and rehabilitation is a Party procedure confined to Communists, the Chinese have extended this practice to the non-Party population, and to the prison population in particular, and have made it an important feature of their indoctrination procedure.

4. In China, at the moment at least, the period of detention is greatly prolonged. Whereas in the Soviet Union trial and sentencing take place fairly soon after the completion of the interrogation and the preparation of a suitable protocol, in China the preparation of a first confession is only a prelude to a long period of indoctrination and reeducation, which may go on for years, and is not terminated until those in charge of the prisoner believe that he has finally adopted a "correct" attitude and behavior. It is only then that the "trial," the "sentencing" and the formal term of imprisonment or other punishment begins.

Procedures in China are much less standardized than those in Russia, and many variations upon them can be expected. This is in part the result of the newness of the Chinese Communist regime and the lack of homogeneity of its personnel and facilities. The procedure outlined below is carried out in the large prisons in major cities. In outlying areas there may be differences in detail, but the general principles and practices are the same.

2. Background and Organization of the Chinese State Police

The Chinese Communist Party was formed in 1919; from that time forward a steady flow of young Chinese Communists were trained in Russian Party schools. Nevertheless, Chinese Communism developed along lines which were in many ways different from those of Western Communist parties. Communism was able to sustain itself only in rural China, where it fed upon poverty and discontent of the Chinese peasants. Mao's army lived off the countryside and of necessity became closely identified with the value systems of the peasant group, from which most of its numbers originated.

In the years from 1936 to 1946, while these Chinese Communists were busy expanding and recruiting new members from the general Chinese population, they gradually developed a highly organized and vigorous indoctrination program. It was aimed at all potential recruits who happened to fall into their hands. Uneducated peasants, city workers, and captured KMT troops, as well as interested students from the universities, were subjects for this indoctrination.

In order to create in this heterogeneous group a feeling of comradeship and identification with the peasant Communists, it was necessary to make them "cut their ties to the past." Therefore, the training program included a deliberate as-

¶ The official regulations for Chinese detention prisons include the following statement: "In dealing with the criminals, there shall be regularly adopted measures of collective study classes, individual interviews, study of assigned documents, and organized discussion, to educate them in the admission of guilt and obedience to law, political and current events, labor production, and culture, so as to expose the nature of the crime committed, thoroughly wipe out criminal thoughts, and establish a new moral code."

sault upon all of the traditional "bourgeois," "reactionary," "upper-class" attitudes, beliefs, and practices the recruits brought with them. Trainees were forced to abandon their refinements of speech, manner, and behavior, their reverence for family ties and worldly goods, and to adopt the crude and earthy attitudes and behavior of the new "people's army." This questioning and discussion of behavior and value systems was accompanied by the inculcation of a fanatical enthusiasm for the Communist movement, built around the ideal of the rejuvenation of China and its reestablishment of a dynamic, modern society (an ideal which had been shared by the majority of Chinese intellectuals and reformers since the days of Sun Yat Sen). The combination of Communist practices, such as public confession and self-criticism, with traditional Chinese methods of learning by rote and repetition resulted in a highly effective method of persuasion. These methods, as applied to the general population following the success of the revolution in 1949, have been referred to as methods of "thought reform" or "ideological reform" #; and, as we have seen, these phrases were finally transferred into English under the generic term of "brain washing."

The Chinese have shown great skill in the development of these methods and their application, but, like the Russians, they developed their methods by trial and error, through practice, and through the application of known principles. There is no evidence that psychologists, neurophysiologists, or other scientists participated in their development.

After the Communist triumph in 1949 a large number of "special advisers" were sent from Russia to help set up the Chinese state police and espionage systems, and to train the Chinese in Soviet methods.

The Chinese state police are organized on the same lines as the KGB. The central direction is at Peking and resides in the "Ministry of Public Safety," which is similar to the MVD. This Ministry has diverse functions, such as the control of frontiers, the uncovering of economic and political offenses, the management of traffic on waterways, and even the administration of certain public health measures. Those under its control include 2,000,000 members of the "Public Safety Corps" (similar to the paramilitary units of the KGB) and 10,000,000 "militia," or local police. Both the rural and the city police are responsible to it. The secret police organization, itself, is only one part of the over-all structure of this Ministry.

There are administrative divisions of the state police in each of the administrative areas into which China was divided after the Communist take-over. In each village and hamlet, in addition to the militia and rural police, the Communists set up what they call "Public Safety Subcommittees." These have three to five members selected from the local citizenry on the basis of their loyalty and enthusiasm for the new regime. Their job is essentially that of carrying out "census" investigations. The "census" is an all-embracing record of everything that goes on in the village. It covers the name, sex, age, nativity, occupation, education, family status, political affiliation, social relations, economic condition, and activities of every resident. Everyone who wishes to change his residence, change his occupation, or visit a friend is supposed to report this fact to the Public Safety Subcommittee. Those who wish to travel from one locality to another must obtain a travel pass in order to do so.

The term "brain washing" is not used by the Chinese, and should be avoided, for it has no precise meaning. The Chinese phrase is "Szu hsing K'ei Tsao," which means "ideological reform." It is sometimes shortened to "K'ai Tsao," or "reform."

Undoubtedly, the records maintained by these rural subcommittees are not so voluminous or detailed as they are alleged to be, and it is quite probable that the peasants have developed various means of circumventing their surveillance. Nevertheless, the men who make up these committees know their villages, and all that goes on within them. They are urged to increase their knowledge by frequent and unexpected visits among their neighbors, and evidently they do so. The result is that the committee is able to extend to the individual Chinese the direct control of the administrative apparatus of the central government to a degree to which this control has not been felt for many centuries. The "census" and the "Public Safety Subcommittee" have been among the most important means by which the Communists have fastened their control upon the vast Chinese population. They are, in effect, an all-pervading arm of the state police.

The local prison is usually at the "hsien," or county, headquarters. This headquarters, like its Soviet counterpart, is divided into an "inquiry and detection" section, a "detention" section, and other sections dealing with staff and administrative work and open police activities. Also, like their Russian counterparts, the Chinese police exercise both police and judicial powers. They not only "investigate" and "arrest"; they also "try" and "sentence." This is one reason why Western prisoners of the Chinese often refer to their interrogations by the police as their "trials." The Chinese state police make no clear distinction between the "trials" and the "interrogations," in spite of the fact that they often carry out a *pro forma* trial and sentencing at the end of the detention period.

The original members of the Chinese Communist police system were drawn from the guerrilla training schools. After 1949 the Communists established large police-training academies. Each of these has a student body of several hundred, who receive a training similar to that of KGB officers. Many former Nationalist police have been retrained and absorbed directly into the Communist apparatus.

3. The Suspects

In China, as in the Soviet Union, those whom the Party decides are a threat to its program automatically fall into the category of suspects. Because China is still in the midst of its revolution, there are large groups of people of "bourgeois" or "reactionary" class background, all of whom are automatically suspect. This includes all members of the "official" class, all of the rural gentry, all of the business and commercial classes of the cities, and property owners in general. All of those who were in any way connected with the Nationalist government are suspect. Unlike the Russians, the Chinese apparently have not yet decided that any national minority groups indigenous to China are automatically suspect. However, all foreigners, and especially all those of Western European or American background, are automatically suspect. All Christians, and especially Roman Catholics, are suspect.

As in Russia, there are "specific" suspects, as well as general categories of suspects. Such specific suspects include persons who are the associates and relatives of other suspects, persons about whom police spies and informers have reported derogatory information, and persons who have been accused of acts or attitudes which threaten the Party or any of its programs. That those who are actual enemies of the regime are all potential suspects goes without saying. In China, as in Russia, nearly anyone in the population may become a suspect; and when he is arrested, the police always have some reason for making the arrest, whether or not this is apparent to the victim.

4. Investigation and Arrest

Observations of the investigation methods of the Chinese state police indicate that they are similar to those used by the KGB. When local security officers decide that a person is a threat to the Party or its program, they satisfy themselves that he should be arrested and then arrest him. From the point of view of the victim, it is important that the Chinese investigating procedures sometimes are not as prolonged and comprehensive as those of the KGB and the prospective victim may have much less opportunity to get wind of what is afoot. Apparently, the Chinese occasionally make quick and arbitrary decisions to carry out arrests, basing these upon the report of a single informer; thus the police may swoop down suddenly upon an unsuspecting victim, who is utterly unaware that they might have any interest in him. There are, however, other occasions on which friends, relatives, and associates have gradually disappeared, or have been questioned by the police over a period of weeks before the final arrest of the central victim, who becomes all too aware of what is in store for him.

As in Russia, the arrest procedure is usually carried out suddenly, and often at night; but the Chinese make no pretense at carrying out their arrests covertly. Often they make a large show of force. The arresting authorities may drive up in a truck with a squad of heavily armed soldiers, surround the home of the victim, and cart him off with much military ceremony. If there is a desire to impress the populace, the arrest may be staged in broad daylight under humiliating circumstances. The arresting officers do sometimes read a "warrant" to the victim. As in Russia, this warrant does not name specific crimes, but names only general ones. The victim is given only a few moments to gather together the barest of his personal essentials before being taken away.

5. Chinese Prison Routine

Usually the prisoner is taken first to a police station, where he is immediately interrogated by several police officers. This initial interrogation is relatively brief, and takes the form of an accusation. Usually, it is carried out by three officers, in full uniform. Their demeanor is invariably arrogant and hostile. As in Russia, they never state specific crimes, but they tell the prisoner that he is accused of "crimes against the people," "treason," "espionage," or some similar broad category of malefaction. Sometimes they simply state to him that he knows why he is there, and what has he to say for himself?

Usually this initial shouting and accusatory interrogation is a brief one, and the prisoner is promptly placed in a cell. However, for psychological reasons, and because of lack of prison facilities, some prisoners are put under "house arrest" immediately after their initial arrest. A single room in the prisoner's home is fixed up as a cell, and guards are assigned. The prisoner stays in this room for a indefinite period of time and is transported back and forth to the prison for further interrogations (which the prisoners often call "trials"). Under standard conditions, however, the prisoner is confined immediately to a prison cell and usually goes through an initial period of solitary confinement.

Chinese prison facilities are much more primitive than many of those in Russia and are utterly inadequate to the prison population which they must at present sustain. Crude, improvised, and extremely primitive prison conditions are often encountered.

The Chinese prisons, like the Soviet prisons, are separated into "detention

prisons" (often called "detention houses"), where prisoners are kept during the period of "investigation" up to the time the cases are "settled," and "punishment prisons" and labor camps, in which sentences are served. The "detention prisons" in large cities are modeled along the lines of the Soviet detention prisons.

In important cases, when there is a need to elicit a good deal of accurate information from the prisoner, the Chinese utilize a routine of isolation, pressure, and interrogation, which is almost identical with that used by the KGB and is described in Part II. The prisoner is placed in a small and barren cell in total isolation. His food, his sleep, his exercise, his position, his activities, and even his eliminative functions are rigidly controlled. After a suitable initial period he is interrogated nightly with increasing pressure until he capitulates. Usually his cell is dirtier and less well heated than those in Russia, and his regimen is different in details—some minor and some major. In China, for example, prisoners in isolation may be required to sleep with their hands inside the blankets rather than outside. The Chinese have a predilection for severely restricting the activities of their prisoners. It seems to be much commoner for them to require men in total isolation to sit rigidly on their bunks at all times when they are not eating, sleeping, or exercising. This adds greatly to their discomfort.

An aspect of their isolation regimen which is especially onerous to Western prisoners is the arrangement for the elimination of urine and feces. The "slop jar" that is usually present in Russian cells is often absent in China. It is a Chinese custom to allow defecation and urination only at one or two specified times each day—usually in the morning after breakfast. The prisoner is hustled from his cell by a guard, double-timed down a long corridor, and given approximately two minutes to squat over an open Chinese latrine and attend to all of his wants. The haste and the public scrutiny are especially difficult for women to tolerate. If the prisoners cannot complete their action in about two minutes, they are abruptly dragged away and back to their cells. The guards customarily allow only this one opportunity for defecation, but they may allow one or more other opportunities to urinate during the day.

All Western prisoners experience extreme discomfort and marked disturbances of bowel function when first exposed to this regimen. Many of them think of it as one of the most fiendish tortures devised by the Chinese Communists, but the practice may simply be an old routine which has been customary in China for many years. It seems to be common to all Chinese prisons, even those in the provinces. Open latrines and public defecation are the custom in rural China, and they do not seem to be regarded as unpleasant by most Chinese.

Similarly, the diet in Chinese prisons is often regarded by Western prisoners as a device for creating discomfort. Rice, millet, and bean soup are the staples. As in Soviet prisons, these are presented to the prisoner in an amount just sufficient to maintain his nutrition if he eats all that he is given. Some Western prisoners regard Chinese prison food as nauseating or distasteful and suffer accordingly. However, there is reason to believe that the Chinese Communists intend to provide in their prisons a diet equivalent to that of an average Chinese peasant or soldier.

The chief features of the isolation regimen in China are the same as those of the Soviet Union: total isolation, utter boredom, anxiety, uncertainty, fatigue, and lack of sleep; rejection, hostile treatment, and intolerable pressure; and reward and approval for compliance.

6. The Interrogator

The interrogation in Chinese prisons is sometimes carried out by two or three officers; but usually one of these is in charge of the case, and it is he who acts as the "friendly" interrogator at times when pressure is released. As in Russia, there may be only one interrogator, and sometimes two interrogators alternate. These men are relatively junior officers. Like their KGB counterparts, many of them are dedicated Communists. They may approach the prisoner with a set of preformed ideas, which are impervious to logic. Some Chinese interrogators are university graduates, and some of them have studied abroad; but many others are men whose limited education has been entirely in Communist Party schools. Such men have an ignorance of the outside world and of Western ideas which makes it even more difficult for Western prisoners to cope with them.

On the whole, Western prisoners have reported that one of the most persuasive features of Communist Chinese interrogators is their evident devotion to their cause and the enthusiastic idealism with which they subscribe to the ostensible goals of Communism. Their patient attempts to teach prisoners "the right attitude" and to get them to understand the Chinese Communist viewpoint has a potent effect upon unsophisticated or idealistic people. At the same time, the relative ignorance of some of these police officers and their dogmatic adherence to Communist beliefs in the face of obviously contrary facts may be profoundly exasperating. Under the pressures of interrogation, prisoners are usually prepared to admit to acts which actually occurred and in time to accept the Communist definition of the nature of these acts; but they have great difficulty in bringing themselves to make confessions which are wildly contrary to fact. The interrogator may insist upon such confessions because of his erroneous beliefs about the nature of Western institutions and Western motives. This may in part explain why protocols are rewritten so many times in Communist prisons, and why the confession is so often rejected as unsatisfactory after the prisoner thinks that he has finally written it in an acceptable form.

7. The Interrogation Procedure

The interrogation procedure is much the same as that used by the KGB. It is usually carried out at night and in a special room; it proceeds stepwise, with a gradual building up of pressure upon the prisoner to an intolerable point, sudden release of pressure, friendly interrogation, rewards for cooperation, and then a repetition of the whole process until a presumably satisfactory first protocol is signed. As in the Soviet Union, the Chinese interrogators adjust their attitudes to the type of man with whom they think they are dealing. They are more likely to shout, revile, and humiliate. Possibly they take this attitude more toward Western prisoners than toward members of their own populace. Their procedures seem to be less formalized, and their pressures are more apt to be primitive and brutal. Important or recalcitrant prisoners are usually interrogated during a period of isolation in a detention cell, under a routine similar to that used in Russia. Less important prisoners may be interrogated while incarcerated in "group cells." In this case the members of the cell group alter their behavior to fit the needs

of the interrogators. Prisoners in group cells may be isolated if their "confessions" are not developing in a satisfactory manner.

In addition to the procedure of long-continued standing, which is frequently employed, the Chinese also use manacles and leg chains, devices which are no longer used by the KGB. Leg chains are hobbling and uncomfortable, but the most excruciating discomfort is produced by the manacles. These are commonly in the form of iron bracelets, several inches in width, and joined rigidly together. The prisoner's hands are placed behind his back, and his wrists are locked within the manacles. The rigid joint of the manacles holds his forearms together side by side, tightly behind his back. This position is a painful one to assume for even a few moments. When a man's arms are held in this position for many hours, he develops almost unbearable pain, primarily in his shoulders and hands. The circulation to his hands is interfered with also. They become swollen and exceedingly tender. The manacles may cut into his wrists and produce wounds which become infected. The Chinese may manacle a prisoner for days or weeks at a time. Such a prisoner is helpless and degraded. In order to eat, he must lie on the floor and lap up his food. He cannot urinate or defecate without help, and frequently he soils himself. He cannot find a comfortable position for sleep. Lying on either side causes pain in the shoulders, and lying on his back is impossible because of tenderness of his hands.

Chinese interrogators and prison guards are more likely to resort to direct physical brutality than their Russian counterparts. When asked to explain the difference between Chinese methods and those of the KGB, one Russian said simply, "The Chinese use torture." This is the exception rather than the rule in their behavior, but nevertheless it occurs. Angry interrogators may slap or beat prisoners and kick them in the shins. Guards may do likewise. Among their most sadistic practices are milking the fingers of manacled prisoners and binding the ankles of those who are forced to stand. Milking pressure on the swollen fingers of a manacled hand is excruciatingly painful. Whenever loose gauze bandages are applied around the ankles of a man who is forced to stand, they seriously constrict his legs as they begin to swell. This also produces intense pain.

As in Russian prisons, medical attention is given prisoners. This is not intended to be inadequate, but it is usually grossly so by Western standards. Some Chinese physicians, like their Russian counterparts, are skilled in estimating the capacity of prisoners to withstand punishment, and usually call a halt to tortures before death or irreparable physical damage occurs.

The content of the interrogation procedure is not merely the tortures which are applied. As in Russia, the persuasion and discussion of the interrogator, which seems to provide a "way out" for the prisoner, is an essential tool in producing the desired confession.

The Chinese more frequently ask the prisoner to write out, rather than relate, his own biography, and often require him to revise it in detail. The interrogation sessions themselves can be taken up with the discussion of this biographic material, but only rarely is the biography itself obtained by direct questioning. All of the psychological devices used by the KGB interrogators are also used by the Chinese interrogators. Night interrogation, with repetitive questioning, undefined crimes, changing attitudes, and increasing pressures alternate with periods of relaxed pressure, "friendship," and reward. Cigarettes, tea, and a friendly

attitude may be the sum total of a reward for cooperation; but even this provides profound relief from the usual interrogation procedures.

The KGB rarely requires a prisoner to fabricate a completely untrue act which is logically absurd. They concentrate more upon persuading him that his actual acts constitute crimes. Chinese interrogators, on the other hand, when they are intent upon establishing charges, such as bacteriological warfare or espionage, may insist that the prisoner include in his confession detailed statements which are not only untrue but logically absurd. One has the impression that this insistence is based upon a combination of ignorance and ineptitude. Prisoners usually balk at making such statements and tend to retract them even after they have been made.* This seems to produce a profound exasperation in many interrogators. It is in such settings that much brutality occurs. Men have been kicked, beaten, starved, locked up in small boxes, hung up by their thumbs or legs, or subjected to other primitive tortures under these circumstances. This has happened especially in POW interrogations.

Persuasion and friendly discussion nevertheless play a major part in the preparation of the original confession. The same types of rationalization are used by the Chinese as are used by the KGB, and the peculiar forms of Communist logic are common to both.

8. The Indoctrination Procedure in the Group Cell

At the time the first protocol or "confession" is signed, the prisoner is usually sullen and only half-convinced, if at all. It is at this point that the Chinese procedure diverges radically from that of the other Communist countries. The Chinese are less interested in immediate trial and punishment; they are more concerned with reforming the prisoner's thoughts and acts.

At some stage in his imprisonment the prisoner can expect to find himself placed in a cell with about eight other prisoners. If he was initially isolated and interrogated, this may be shortly after his first "confession" is accepted; but many prisoners are placed in group cells from the outset of their imprisonment. The cell is usually barren, and scarcely large enough to hold the group it contains. There may be a sleeping platform, but all of the prisoners sleep on the floor; and when all lie down, every inch of floor space may be taken up. The atmosphere is extremely intimate. Privacy is entirely nonexistent. Poor food and all of the other hardships of the prison routine are present, and a new and extraordinary hardship is added as well—the psychological atmosphere.

In societies which require a rigid conformity of belief and provide severe punishment for deviation, periods of great fear may be accompanied by widespread hysterical accusations and brutal punishments. This has been an outstanding feature of the present Communist Revolution in China. Under the pressures of the Communist demands for conformity and the fear of relentless punishment, men have turned against men and children against their parents. People compete with each other to demonstrate their loyalty to the new regime and freely accuse their neighbors of deviations or suspected crimes. The Chinese Communists have intentionally fostered this fear among the general population and use it for their own ends. Certainly, they do so in the prisons. One of their most ingenious

* A person who has finally been forced into making an absurd confession will sometimes accept the confession after the most absurd parts have been deleted, even though the remaining protocol is patently untrue.

prison devices is that of turning prisoner against prisoner, and requiring the enemies of the regime to beat each other into conformity.

During his original interrogation, as he is urged to confess his crimes, the prisoner is told repeatedly that only when he has completely confessed his crimes and has come to realize the error of his ways can his case be settled. After he is transferred to a cell with other prisoners, it becomes clear to him what this entails. It is necessary for him to compete with other prisoners in studying, in thoughts, and in behavior until he has demonstrated to them, as well as to his jailers, that he is thoroughly "reformed" and a true adherent of Communism.

The regimen in the new cell is completely organized. The prisoners arise at a fixed hour, have a brief period for cleaning themselves, eat a frugal breakfast, and have the usual march to the latrine. Thereafter, they spend the morning in lectures, discussion sessions, and brief exercise periods. They spend the afternoon in the same sort of routine—more lectures, more discussions and self-criticism sessions. In the evenings, the discussions and self-criticism go on continuously until bedtime.

The lectures are relatively formal study sessions given by an instructor, who is either a member of the prison staff or a prisoner who is further along in his indoctrination. The textbooks are the standard books of Marxist theory.[†] The lecturer assigns topics for reading in these books. These are later taken up in "discussion sessions." Such group discussions of general topics are designed to ensure that everyone understands what he is being taught. On each point it is necessary for everyone in the group to come to precisely the same understanding, which is the one that meets with the approval of the teacher and the more thoroughly indoctrinated students. These sessions are held in the cell. Everyone is forced to participate. Attempts at nonparticipation are noticed immediately by the other prisoners, who then insist upon an expression of an opinion from the recalcitrant member and a thorough discussion and dissection of his views. Prisoners and instructors are equally assiduous at ferreting out other standard devices for avoiding commitment, such as platitudinous statements, or the mere parroting of the words of the instructors and the group without conviction. Prisoners who attempt to escape by the use of such maneuvers find themselves set upon by the other students and sharply criticized for their insincerity.

The exercise period is like that in Soviet prisons. During the earlier phase of indoctrination it usually consists of walking in the prison yard or doing calisthenics. At later stages, more advanced prisoners are permitted to play games, such as volley ball or baseball.

Further lectures and more group discussions take place in the afternoon. In addition, there are the "self-criticism" sessions, during which each prisoner is supposed to criticize his behavior in the light of proper Communist behavior and to admit all his faults. Not only one's present failures but all of one's past actions are subject to review. The biographical material from each prisoner's life history is available, and sooner or later he must review most of the items. Furthermore, all prisoners must take part in vigorous criticism of other prisoners. One is not allowed to criticize vaguely or lightly. One must criticize specific points and criticize them forcefully. The result of this is an intense outpouring of hostile accusations upon the prisoner who is the recipient of the criticism. The hostility

[†] For example, "The Communist Manifesto"; "Socialism-Utopian and Scientific"; "Imperialism—the Highest Stage of Capitalism"; "Foundations of Leninism"; "The History of Social Development"; "The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik)."

of the group grows in intensity and continues until the uncommitted prisoner shows a genuine emotional reaction that indicates a satisfying willingness to reform.

A special aspect of the group criticism is what prisoners call "the struggle." This takes place when prisoners are undergoing interrogations while being confined to group cells. The cell group is made aware of the progress of the interrogation, apparently by direct instructions from the jailers to the group leader. When the prisoner returns fatigued after an interrogating session, the group surrounds him and "struggles" to help him with his confession. They stand around him in a group, shouting at him, reviling him, and accusing him for hours at a time, constantly telling him that he must confess all in order to be treated better. Such "struggles" are often initiated when a prisoner returns from an interrogation session wearing manacles and leg chains as a sign of his unsatisfactory performance. When the prisoner finally produces a satisfactory confession and the interrogator changes his attitude, the cell group is made aware of this also, and changes its attitude toward the prisoner to a milder one.

Another technique used is that of stopping all interrogations and instructions for a period of days and ordering the prisoner to concentrate upon writing his confession and self-criticism. During this time, he is not allowed to speak to anyone in his cell, and his cell mates do not speak to him. The effect of this is to produce anxiety and doubts in the prisoner, who continues to expand his writing in the hope that he will finally produce something which will satisfy his interrogators.

This routine of lectures, discussions, self-criticism, and group criticism goes on from morning until evening throughout the week. The formal lectures alone may occupy as much as 56 hours a week. Literally no part of the prisoner's waking life is left free.

9. The Reaction of the Prisoner to the Procedure in the Group Cell

Whether by design or by accident, the psychological atmosphere within one of these group prison cells is such that ultimately the prisoner comes to see that the only hope for a "solution to his case" lies in his complete conformity in speech and behavior to the doctrine outlined by his jailers. He also learns that he must demonstrate his zeal not merely by his own behavior but also by vigorously tearing down the defenses of many other prisoners. Fear and tension in the group are thus maintained at a high pitch, and the cell mates vie with one another in accusing, criticizing, degrading, and brutally punishing their fellow prisoners.

A prisoner newly introduced into one of these cells finds himself faced with an almost irresistible assault upon the integrity of his personality. Often he is already tired, discouraged, and psychologically whipped by the previous extraction of a "confession." Furthermore, he is usually somewhat confused about his value systems, and at least partly convinced that, by Communist standards, he is a criminal. He enters the cell as a newcomer and an unregenerate. He finds that his cell mates are all people who have "changed their attitudes." Regardless of their status prior to arrest, they all seem to regard themselves as criminals; some take pride in the fact that they were the worst criminals in the lot. He may be surprised to find that the cell leader who has charge of the discussion and criticism sessions is a former Nationalist officer, or possibly a priest, or a former high Communist official.

The new prisoner's protestations of innocence are not accepted by his fellow prisoners. They derisively tell him that he will soon change. They all tell him that resistance is useless, that the Communist party is all-powerful, and that no one who is innocent is ever imprisoned. They promptly turn upon him and begin to "help him" in his reform. They criticize him vigorously and brutally. They point out every error in his thinking. They detect his every attempt to evade commitment and destroy it.† They do not allow protestation of innocence. Thenceforth he has no moment of peace and no shred of privacy.

The brutalities of prisoners to other prisoners are far more frequent than those of the guards. This is another interesting example of Communist legalism. The Chinese, like the KGB, have a regulation that prisoners shall not be tortured, beaten, or otherwise maltreated. Usually the interrogator and guards follow this rule. They leave physical brutality to the prisoners themselves. Amid the tensions of the group cell, prisoners can revile and degrade their fellow prisoners to an unbelievable degree. When the group decides that a prisoner is recalcitrant or reactionary, they may turn upon him and beat him mercilessly. They may deprive him of sleep, take his food away from him, spit upon him, make him stand all day, and insist that he be manacled. It is said that prisoners have even killed or seriously injured other prisoners. Occasionally the guards even intervene to protect prisoners from their cell mates. Such pressure of prisoners upon other prisoners is intentionally permitted and is interrupted only when danger to the life of the prisoner, or the policy of the prison officials, indicates that it should be stopped.

Hence, in addition to the physical discomforts inherent in this situation, the prisoner is placed under profound psychological pressure. To reiterate: Man is a social animal. His health is as much dependent upon the maintenance of satisfactory relationships with his associates as it is upon his food and drink. Even if nothing else at all were done to a prisoner, he would find it almost intolerable to be confined so intimately with seven other people who revile him and openly despise him. Some sort of psychological *modus vivendi* leading to a degree of acceptance is necessary for any man who exists in a group of other men. Absence of such an adaptation is profoundly disturbing. Added to this burden is the fact that the prisoner is a bewildered, anxious, and beaten man from the start. Furthermore, he has no privacy whatever. Every moment of his life is spent within a few inches of his fellow prisoners. There is nothing that he can do or say that escapes them. Not even his past and private life is sacred to him. Everything he has ever done or said may be held up before him. On top of this, he is physically abused, fatigued, and degraded to the point of complete collapse; but, as in the interrogation situation, he is never allowed to die and is always snatched back just before the final breaking point.

Here, again, is an intolerable situation in which no man can exist indefinitely. The prisoner must conform to the demands of the group sooner or later. Indeed, one is amazed not so much at the fact that prisoners ultimately conform as at the remarkable amount of punishment which some prisoners absorb before they do so. One would think that no man would actively resist these pressures for more than a few months; but even men who were predisposed toward conforming in the first place have been known to put up some degree of resistance for years

† Various names have been given to the tricks commonly used by prisoners to avoid commitment, such as "finding a loophole," "assuming an appearance," "spreading a smoke screen," "window dressing," etc. Each of these can become a subject for special criticism.

before finally conforming in all minor details to the demands put upon them. Even those who have a wholehearted desire to embrace Communism find themselves faced with some demands which they cannot accept, and seem to find it necessary to exhaust themselves in resisting these points before they finally "give in." It is as if the prisoner cannot accept total conformity as a solution until he has convinced himself that it is indeed inevitable.

Prisoners who enter into the cell groups may be defiant for a while but they soon learn that this brings punishment upon them, and they try some trick of ostensible compliance. This is detected, with further punishment, and rejection. Other ruses fail also. Finally, many reach a point of emotional breakdown. The mood common to this is profound depression, with crying, whimpering, and the loss of all care about personal appearance. Some prisoners become disoriented. Evidently a few have delusory experiences, but this is less common. Sometimes these emotional disturbances go on for several months, and they may recur.

In this new situation of intolerable pressure, the prisoner is again offered an attractive "way out." This attractive way out lies in the adoption of the ostensible ideals of Communism. At the expense of belaboring the point, it must be said again that the "exoteric" or "open" doctrine of Communism purports to be an espousal of the ideals of self-sacrifice, equality, peace, freedom from want, and freedom from fear, which are common to most of the major ethical systems of mankind. The prisoner is told, in effect, that the reason he is being punished is that he has failed to live up to this set of ideals. When he realizes his errors, has cleansed his thoughts, and has become a wholehearted believer, his ordeal will end. All the rationalizations of Communist logic are brought into play to make his conversion easier. From morning until night he has this drummed into him in teaching sessions from which he cannot escape.

Not only do prisoners revile and criticize each other; some of them show a sincere desire to help the new prisoner to "reform" himself. The behavior of prisoners to other prisoners cannot be seen as simply the free acting out of hostility and aggression. Intermingled with this there is a truly sincere desire on the part of some to make the new prisoner see that only by conforming and adopting the proper attitudes and beliefs can he ameliorate his situation. Some of them have sincerely adopted Communism and see themselves as actually trying to make the prisoner into a better person; others see themselves as only trying to get him to do what he must do in order to survive. In all cases this rationalization enables the prisoners to take the attitude that they are "only punishing the new prisoner for his own good." This attitude causes no difficulty for those who are Communists, or who truly regard the new prisoner as a criminal; but it is a source of great conflict for some, including some priests and missionaries, who realize that their efforts to convert the new prisoner may stem from some selfish motives on their own part, and that they have the effect of causing him to deny principles to which they themselves are dedicated. In any case, the new prisoner does become aware of the fact that there are members of the cell group who have partly concealed sympathy for him and are sincerely trying to help him. He responds to this offer of help as much as he succumbs to the constant rejection and brutality.

From time to time, he is taken out of the cell to see his interrogator for private discussions and further opportunity to confess. Private persuasion is thus added to group persuasion. The attractiveness of the "way out" is as effective in producing conversion as is the necessity of escaping torture.

The duration of the period of imprisonment in the group cell does not appear to bear any direct relation to the progress made by the prisoner in adopting Communist views. The prisoner may assume that he has been converted, but his mentors are hard to satisfy. The interrogator and the other prisoners make conversion difficult to attain. It is common practice for them to ask for a new deposition and a new "confession" from a prisoner as soon as he appears to have achieved a certain amount of "progress." This new "confession" usually goes so far beyond the previous one that the prisoner has great difficulty in accepting it. This initiates a new period of conflict and resistance on his part and starts the cycle over again. Western prisoners find it especially difficult when the interrogators ask them to confess to belonging to nonexistent espionage rings or to make other grossly invalid "confessions."

10. The Conversion

The prisoner faced with a KGB interrogation in preparation for a trial is placed in a position in which he must rationalize only a portion of his beliefs and actions in order to reach a tolerable *modus vivendi*, but the prisoner in a Chinese prison has a much more difficult adaptation; he must rationalize all of his beliefs and actions. It gradually becomes apparent to him that his ordeal may be of indefinite duration, and that there is no escape from it short of complete compliance with the demands of his captors. Sooner or later most prisoners make the necessary adaptation. They come to the point of being able to say and do the things required of them. They are able to change their thinking enough to begin to identify themselves with the values held by the prisoner group.

Here, again, the rewards of rationalization help the prisoner, just as they helped him to confess. For example, most people are not without some sense of guilt about parts of their past behavior. Such guilt, possessed by prisoners, is greatly enhanced by the criticism and accusations of their fellow prisoners. Confession, even if it is entered into with some reservations, gives a sense of relief. The feeling of "joining," "belonging," and "being accepted" by the prisoner group provides a most intense satisfaction to one who has been rejected and reviled. Nor is it always very difficult for him to accept the ostensible ideals for which the group is working. Prisoners make rationalizations such as "after all, Communism and Christianity are essentially the same thing," or others, such as "I did not think of myself as a spy, but, after all, I am a foreigner, and foreigners have done great harm to China." All evidences of "reform" and "conversion" are fostered by the patient help and teaching which the prisoner receives from some of his associates and by the approval of the interrogator.

When he finally submits, the prisoner receives a substantial reward from a feeling of acceptance and belonging. Suddenly, he has "friends." He may even be a "hero." He unites himself with the others and is buoyed up by a sense of dedication to the "mission" that they are carrying out. At this stage, he may be transferred to a "free and easy cell" where conditions are less harsh. Here he has an opportunity for reading, and he may be allowed to teach other prisoners and to take part in games. His new-found enthusiasm is abetted by recurrent "drives" that take place within the prison—drives against "hypocrisy," "waste," "graft," "corruption," and the like—all of which are fostered with enthusiastic fervor by competitions among the cell groups.

Those who have been through the Communist prison procedure often come out with the feeling that no matter how difficult it was, it was worth while. They

may even feel grateful to their mentors. They feel as if they had been destroyed, and then had been reintegrated. Some feel as if they were more "mature" than they had ever been before. This is especially true of those who had previously felt at loss for a goal in life, or who had not been committed to a set of beliefs, friendships, or an occupation. It is also true of those who have carried a heavy load of guilt about earlier behavior. In this last group, something akin to a religious "conversion" is recognizable. Such prisoners have experienced a period of degradation and intense punishment, which they find not entirely unacceptable because of their preexisting feelings of guilt and unworthiness; following this, they experience an "acceptance" and "group identification" which is more valuable to them than ever before because of the fact that they have already "confessed" and "atoned" for their sins. The previously uncommitted, and those who felt rejected by their society, may develop an exhilarating feeling of "purpose" and "belonging" which they never had before.

Even those prisoners who were previously well integrated and on good terms with their fellow men, and who were committed to certain goals and beliefs, experience a profound feeling of relief when they are finally able to make the necessary rationalizations and to join with the prisoner group. This feeling of relief probably stems from the release of tensions and restorations of body processes that occur in a man when he is finally able to make an adaptation to a very difficult environment.

Long after the prisoner has developed a willingness to conform, he continues to be exposed to an unrelenting course of Communist studies. During all of his imprisonment he is denied access to any information which might contradict what he is being told. Over a period of years this combination of misinformation and absence of contrary evidence produces some areas of distorted belief in even the most skeptical.

11. The Trial

The period of indoctrination within Chinese detention prisons has been known to continue for as long as four years. A prisoner's release from the detention prison often appears to be decided upon on the basis of general policies rather than any specific aspects of his case. The release of foreign nationals is usually determined upon the basis of propaganda needs or the requirements of international agreements. Often release comes upon a prisoner quite unexpectedly. He is suddenly told that he will be freed. Within a few days he is taken before a "court," which is much like a Soviet military tribunal. There is a "judge," a "prosecutor," perhaps a few stenographers, and sometimes a "defense attorney." The prisoner repeats his confession in what he has long since learned is the proper manner. The defense attorney asks for lenience. (There are no pleas of "not guilty.") The "judge" then "passes sentence." If it has been decided to free the prisoner entirely, he is usually sentenced to a term in "prison" equal to the amount of time he has spent in the "detention prison," and then (if he is a foreigner) to deportation. The "lenient" judge then allows the prisoner to count his time in the "detention prison" as if it were "real imprisonment," and he is forthwith released. But if he is "to be punished," he will be sent to a labor camp or to some other punishment institution to begin his sentence.

12. The "Brain-Washed"

The people who have been described in the public press as "brain-washed"

have been prisoners suddenly released after periods as long as four years in Chinese detention prisons. Such persons have appeared at the border at Hong Kong, looking calm, fit, and sane. They praise their captors, praise Communism, and damn "American imperialism." It is said that their old acquaintances are amazed, and that their political attitudes seem to have "changed completely." The fact that they praise their captors is regarded as the most amazing of all, for it is known that they have been through many horrible experiences in the course of their imprisonment. It is from this pattern of behavior that the impression has arisen that the Chinese possess esoteric and devilish methods of "thought control" which no man can resist.

A number of people called "successfully brain-washed" have been studied intensively. A great deal is known about these people and what was done to them. The study of these people reveals that they possessed certain characteristics in common before they were imprisoned. These can be enumerated.

1. They were people who, long before their imprisonment, were in rebellion against their parents and the way of life of the segment of society to which their parents belonged, including many of its standards, beliefs, and practices.

2. They were people who had few friends within their homeland, and no place, organization, or occupation there with which they were firmly identified. So far as their native country was concerned, they were emotionally rootless.

3. They were people who had previously identified themselves with the "under-dog." They felt a strong sympathy for all people whom they regarded as "oppressed" or "exploited," and especially for minority groups of different racial or cultural origin.

4. They all spoke Chinese fluently, and for many years had had a strong interest in China and all things Chinese.

5. Most of them were previously familiar with the exoteric concepts of Marxist socialism, and most of them had been intellectually sympathetic to socialist ideas for many years before their imprisonment. Several of them had been members of Communist and fellow-traveler groups, and at least one of them is known to have been a Party member.

6. These people had been offered repatriation after the Communist Revolution, but they had elected to remain in China, most of them primarily because they were both sympathetic to the Chinese Communist Revolution and curious to see how it would work out. They were anxious to help develop the new China, if they were allowed to do so. For months prior to the time of their imprisonment, several of them were engaged in studying Chinese Communist literature and translating it into other languages.

Most of these people were not actually Communist Party members before their arrest and imprisonment. Most of them were sympathetic to Communist ideas and to the new China, but they had not committed themselves to Communism. They had toyed with their beliefs and found them intellectually attractive, but they were content to let their identification remain at this level. They had studied Chinese, and some went to Chinese schools; but they continued to associate with the members of the Western colony, and the forms of their lives were those common to expatriate Americans and Europeans living in Chinese cities. At the time of their arrests they were still rootless, uncommitted people.

7. Nearly all of these people were arrested on charges which included "espionage." The treatment which they received in prison was that which has been described above. These people confessed to "espionage," and after their release

some of them continued for a while to state that they had been "spies." None of them had actually committed espionage, and none were actually associated with American intelligence organizations. But all of them had, with innocent intent, done various things, such as describing economic conditions in letters or discussing the morale of Communist troops with their consular officials, which were "ostensibly" espionage by Communist definition and which were forbidden by Chinese Communist law. By Communist definition, all of them were of "reactionary background" and "the agents of an Imperialist power," and they had all "committed espionage." During the course of their imprisonment, they "admitted" their acts and accepted the Communist definition of them. The rationalizations which they utilized in making their confessions were like those which have been described above.

8. To a certain extent, they were also "converted" to the acceptance of Communist doctrine. That is to say, after much soul searching and profound emotional turmoil, they committed themselves to have faith in, and to work for, some of the overt Communist ideals which they had previously accepted only on an intellectual basis. Some of them emerged from prison with a sense of purpose and worthiness which they had not felt before. They remained overtly and actively pro-Communist for periods up to several months. After that time most of them appear to have reverted to their former positions of intellectual acceptance of some Communist beliefs, while outwardly conforming to a proper middle-class life.

In summary, the study of these "successfully brain-washed" people revealed them to be persons who had previously lost their identification with the society in which they originated, and who under years of intense pressure were temporarily persuaded to "commit" themselves to beliefs which most of them already found intellectually attractive.

13. The Effectiveness of Chinese Communist Indoctrination Procedures

Just how effective are these procedures? How long-lasting are their effects? Do they actually affect brain function? Are they "irresistible"? The answer to these questions, like the answer to those about Russian "public confession" trials, is not simple, but it is available.

The Chinese prison indoctrination procedure is never more than partly effective, but it always has some effect. No human can live through months or years of this experience without suffering emotional turmoil. In order to survive and not suffer an emotional breakdown, he must make some rationalization which allows him to identify with the prison group and to relieve some of the pressures upon himself. The extent of this rationalization need not be greater than a belief that his present situation justifies his present behavior and statements. Usually, it goes further than this. He usually finds some aspects of Communist doctrine which he can admire and which he can identify with his own value systems. Also, because of his long period (sometimes years) of incarceration and exposure to propaganda, with a total absence of accurate information from the outside world, he may unwittingly adopt some Communist beliefs about current events. On some other questions, he may have at least a tentative acceptance of Communist attitudes because he has been presented with a great deal of plausible propaganda "evidence."

Thus, a man who spends a long period in a Chinese civil prison and survives

can be expected to have experienced anxiety, despair, and doubt; he must have complied with the prison rules; he must have "confessed" to something, and he must have taken part in the various aspects of the indoctrination procedure. If the procedure was as vigorous and thoroughgoing as that described above, he must have shown enough evidence of conversion to satisfy his cell mates and jailers, and this usually means that he must have found at least some part of the Chinese Communist value system which he can identify with his own and can tentatively accept.

On the other hand, even though some of his attitudes and beliefs may have changed, his capacity to think is not altered. So-called "brain washing" produces no permanent changes in the function of the brain. Any form of imprisonment may induce a prison psychosis, and inhuman treatment may produce physical damage to the nervous system; but these effects are not peculiar to "brain washing."

Nor is there any unexplainable deficiency in the memory of former prisoners. Prisoners do not remember things which happened when they were delirious or otherwise psychotic. They may forget minor details of their experiences with the passage of time. Many of them do not wish to discuss some points of their treatment, because the memories of these are painful and the discussion of them is disturbing. But even the "most brain-washed" are capable of a vivid recollection of what occurred during their imprisonment.

Furthermore, the majority of those released carry with them an intense bitterness about some part of their imprisonment. Usually this is directed at certain other prisoners or jailers, but it may be directed at the whole Communist system. All prisoners come out with a realization that they have been cut off from the Western world for a long time, and with a suspicion that not everything in the outside world will turn out to be as it was presented to them in prison. All of them have a tentative orientation toward whatever new beliefs they may have, and most of them have reservations about their entire experience.

Upon their release, former prisoners set about a process of "reality testing." Without committing himself, each newly released man characteristically begins to talk to friends, and to listen to accounts of what has happened while he was away in prison. He begins to read back copies of books and magazines. He begins to compare what was told him with the facts as observed and reported in the American press. The available evidence suggests that within a period of months he readjusts himself to the outside world and resumes a set of beliefs roughly similar to those he held prior to his imprisonment.

Thus, it is quite erroneous to think that those who have experienced prison indoctrination in Communist China emerge as thoroughly indoctrinated Communists who express praise and admiration for their captors. Such people are as unusual as the public confessors in Russian purge trials. The vast majority of released prisoners say little or nothing. What pro-Communist beliefs they have they keep to themselves and express only in private. Many are bitterly anti-Communist. Although they are willing to admit that there are good aspects about the regime and agree that they cooperated and "confessed" while in prison, they do not have any genuine identification with Communism.

IV. Relation of State Police Procedures, Military Interrogation, and Indocrination of Civilians and Prisoners of War in Communist Countries

In Western states the custody of prisoners of war is in the hands of the armed

forces. In the Soviet Union during the latter part of the Second World War this was not the case. In 1942 an arrangement was arrived at between the Red Army and the NKVD which gave to the army custody of prisoners shortly after their capture and during the period of field interrogation, but turned over to the NKVD the problem of their ultimate custody and utilization. The fact that the NKVD was primarily a police organization was probably responsible for the methods and attitudes which it adopted in handling the war prisoners. In the extraction of information from prisoners, it simply applied the standard secret police techniques which had found to be so effective in handling civilian prisoners during the previous 25 years. The NKVD training program rapidly produced a large body of interrogators who were proficient in speaking German. A dossier was prepared on each German prisoner of war, which included a long biographical statement from him, as well as information gathered from the interrogation of other prisoners and from captured records. This was used in his interrogation. When prisoners gave information voluntarily, no additional pressure was put upon them; but when the interrogators felt that the prisoner was withholding information, they put him through the standard isolation pressures—repetitive interrogation techniques of the NKVD.

In typical Communist legalistic fashion, the NKVD rationalized its use of torture and pressures in the interrogation of prisoners of war. When it desired to use such methods against a prisoner or to obtain from him a propaganda statement or "confession," it simply declared the prisoner a "war-crimes suspect" and informed him that, therefore, he was not subject to international rules governing the treatment of prisoners of war. This legalism later had great importance for the United States, because it was also used against American military personnel in the Korean War. We can expect that it will be used against us in any future conflict. When it signed the Geneva agreements in 1949, the Soviet Union made specific exceptions to the effect that prisoners accused of war crimes would not be protected by the code, but would be subject to the laws of the nation against whom the crimes were committed.

Thus, German prisoners of war found themselves the subjects for criminal interrogation by secret police interrogators at the will of their Soviet captors. Similarly, they found themselves exposed to the same type of treatment that the Soviets provide for civilian political prisoners. The officers were separated from the enlisted men, and the enlisted men were utilized as a source of labor. Those prisoners who lived together in camps were also exposed to the type of indoctrination which the NKVD had developed for civilian prisoners according to the Communist philosophy of "rehabilitating" prisoners by "education and healthful work." This indoctrination consisted of lectures on Communism and group-discussion sessions, using the standard Marxist texts. The prison camps were infiltrated by large numbers of informers, who created internal dissension among the prison group and prevented the development of any organized resistance. In spite of this, the indoctrination program does not seem to have been outstandingly successful. It is estimated that only some 10% of German prisoners of war developed any sympathy for Communism, although many more cooperated with the Russians in order to secure better treatment. This proportion of successful converts is not especially high when one considers the fact that Germany had a large and vigorous Communist party before the advent of Hitler. The German army must have contained a fairly large number of men of underlying Communist sympathies.

Against the Japanese, the Russians used methods which were essentially the same as those which they used against the Germans, and with perhaps equal success. It is noteworthy that during the period 1945-1946 the deliberately increased the hardships and neglect within their prison camps, and thereby caused the death of a large number of prisoners they then held. Their policy was as much one of extermination as of conversion, but a higher proportion of those who were cooperative or converted survived because of the better treatment which they received.

The conversion of POW's always played a much greater role in the Chinese Communist military program than in that of the Soviet. It has been said that the Chinese Communists looked upon the entire Chinese nation as potential converts. They made their conversion and indoctrination program one of the most important aspects of their revolutionary effort. In 1943 this program was placed in the hands of Liu Shao-Ch'i, who was responsible for the form which it took thereafter. The conversion program within the Chinese prisons, which we have previously described, was developed out of the program which Liu Shao-Ch'i developed for use against the population in general.

Every prisoner or potential convert who fell into the hands of the Chinese Communists was evaluated on the basis of his life history, class background, education, and abilities. Those with revolutionary sympathies who possessed the proper background and abilities (especially students, intellectuals, and some proletarians and peasants) were trained to become Communist activists. These are the people whom the Communists commonly refer to as "cadres," both individually and in groups. For the purpose of the cadres' training, schools were set up offering a course of one year's duration. Students who entered these schools were isolated from the rest of society. They were put through an intensive and unrelenting program of study and physical work, which occupied every moment of their waking hours and left them no time for reflection. The first phase of this program consisted of "tail cutting," or the devaluation of old methods of thought and behavior and old value systems. This was accompanied by the use of the self-criticism and group-criticism techniques and by exhaustive lectures on Communism. As in the prisons, the emotional fervor of the group was maintained at a high pitch by the stimulation of intense competitiveness and the organization of "moves" and "drives" of one sort or another with "voluntary participation," from which no student could shrink because of group pressure. An atmosphere of fear was created by the occasional disappearance of students who were doing poorly, accompanied by rumors about their imprisonment or transfer to labor battalions.

In many respects the atmosphere within these training schools paralleled that within the prisons. Under the relentless pressure of hard work, fatigue, increasing demands, group pressures, criticism, doubts, and ridicule, the majority of students ultimately reached the point at which they went through an emotional crisis associated with tears and depression. At this point some dropped out, but most found themselves able to make the necessary adaptation by reorienting their value systems and identifying themselves with the Communist group. A religious fervor and a feeling of "conversion" frequently accompanied this emotional breakdown and recovery. His new Communist fervor and group identification continued as long as the student remained an active member of the class group and often later in his party group, but it is said that a fair proportion of students

suffered from one or more relapses of tears and doubts. It is known that some defected later when the opportunity presented itself.

In the population at large, the Chinese Communists have not been able to carry out indoctrination in nearly so tightly organized a fashion, but their approach has been essentially the same as their approach to the cadres. They aim their indoctrination primarily at the younger groups and carry out their programs with a special vigor in the schools and universities. Villages have been exposed to propaganda and a certain amount of lectures and teaching. Group-discussion and self-criticism sessions have been held. These are accompanied by an attempt to devalue the old practices and substitute the Communist value system. An atmosphere of fear produced by liquidations, arrests, and accusations is exploited. All of this has had the effect of producing superficial conformity and acquiescence.

Americans have had firsthand experience with the Chinese methods of indoctrination of prisoners of war. These methods have been made the subject of exhaustive studies by the Army and Air Force and by the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War. We shall not attempt to add to their voluminous documentation. However, we may consider briefly the experiences of our prisoners in the light of what we know about Russian and Chinese practices in general.

It is evident that the North Koreans were ill prepared to cope with American prisoners from any point of view. They possessed very few English-speaking interrogators and had no prepared facilities for the semipermanent custody of prisoners of war. Much of what appeared to be calculated brutality and deliberate extermination on the part of the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists in the winter of 1950-1951 was probably the result of lack of facilities, the breakdown of supply and communication, and callousness of Oriental peasant soldiers. The initial demoralization of American prisoners by the physical hardships of their captivity was probably not intentionally designed. Attempts to indoctrinate American prisoners were poorly organized and ineptly carried out when compared with the procedures used by the Chinese on their own populace. All too often the lecturers were absurdly ignorant of American conditions. The preparation of dossiers on individual prisoners was not nearly so thoroughgoing as that employed by the Soviets or by the Chinese in their own prisons. But the use of informers among the prisoner group and the isolation and removal of natural leaders were relatively successful in demoralizing the prisoners and in preventing the organization of active resistance groups.

The Chinese used the technique of accusing American prisoners of "war crimes" when they wished to expose them to a "criminal interrogation" with the aim of obtaining a propaganda confession, or when they wished to mete out some "appropriate" punishment to a marked man. This device was primarily used in obtaining bacteriological-warfare confessions from the aviators captured during the period of 1952-1953. All told, 78 aviators are known to have been exposed to such interrogation within North Korea. Of these, 38 "confessed," and 40 did not. The methods used in obtaining these confessions were similar to those used in the Chinese-Soviet prisons. They were characterized by a striking, and often extreme, degree of physical brutality. These officers were isolated, sometimes in unheated huts or water-soaked holes in the ground. They were deprived of sleep, food, warmth, and exercise. They were insulted, threatened, beaten, and repeatedly interrogated, and they were intermittently offered kind treatment if they assented to the demands of their captors. One gains the im-

pression that a good deal of this brutality, which included such things as mock firing squads, dousing prisoners with water in subzero weather, and the incarceration of men in small boxes, was simply a result of lack of sophistication and callousness on the part of the North Korean interrogators. Also, brutality was precipitated by the exasperating resistance of many of the prisoners. These men were being asked to confess to something which they knew to be palpably untrue, and there was no way of looking upon it in any other fashion. It is notoriously difficult to get men to make such confessions.

The resistance of these prisoners appeared to bear no direct relation to the amount of physical pressure put upon them by their Communist captors. Some men were brutalized for months without giving in; others succumbed almost immediately, sometimes with scarcely as much as a threat. Statistical correlations made by research groups of the U. S. Air Force indicate that resistance did not correlate with rank, education, religion, geographical area of origin, length of service, or regular or reserve status. The information from our own studies suggests very strongly that resistance or nonresistance is related to highly personal factors involving motivations, value systems, character structure, and the circumstances of imprisonment.

The available information all points to a readily understandable explanation for the defection of those few Americans who elected to remain in Communist lands. Nearly all of these men were of limited schooling and experience. It appears that few of them had any real interest in Communism. They defected primarily because they were afraid to be repatriated. Most of them had been regarded by their fellow prisoners as informers and collaborators, and they all had good reason to expect charges to be preferred against them if they returned to the jurisdiction of the United States. They were lured into defection by what amounted to rosy promises of further education and economic betterment if they went to China. When it turned out that their situation in China was far less rosy than they expected it to be, some were sorely disappointed and returned to the United States.

It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the behavior of our prisoners of war. This has been dealt with ably in publications of the U. S. Army and U. S. Air Force, and in the report of the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War. Suffice it to say that in every case that has been investigated, the statements and behavior of the men have been found to have a readily understandable basis.

V. Some Theoretical Considerations

A central theme of this paper has been the proposition that there is no need to assume that the Communists utilize occult methods in managing their prisoners. The results obtained are readily understandable on the basis of the methods known to be used. Theory has been avoided, because many present-day concepts of human behavior are still in a formulative state. Notwithstanding this, there is a sufficient body of evidence to allow us to state that we understand why the results obtained flow from the methods used.

It is helpful to consider the individual man as a living system entirely dependent upon maintaining a satisfactory relationship with his total environment. A man's life is dependent upon his ability to maintain a satisfactory body temperature; a satisfactory intake of food, fluids and air; a satisfactory elimination of waste products, and a satisfactory amount of rest and activity. It is equally necessary for him to maintain a satisfactory relationship with the other human beings in his

environment, and especially with those humans who by kinship or long association have acquired a special meaning for him.

When any of these necessary relationships between a man and his environment are disturbed, there develop within him feelings which are unpleasant, and which stimulate him to take whatever action is necessary to bring them to an end. Among these unpleasant sensations are hunger, thirst, fatigue, sleeplessness, excessive warmth or coldness, and all sorts of pain. These sensations originate within the human body as a result of disturbances of bodily processes. There are other unpleasant feelings, such as anxiety, fear, anger, loneliness, sadness, and dejection, which arise out of disturbed relations to the total environment and the people in it. When beset by these feelings, man is strongly motivated to make whatever adjustments in his relation to his environment are necessary.

The Communist arrest-imprisonment procedure has the effect of seriously disturbing man's total relation to his environment. It produces many disturbing and unpleasant sensations within him. In the description of the procedures of arrest, isolation, interrogation, and torture, it was mentioned that these produce anxiety, fear, tension, resentment, uncertainty, loneliness, boredom, fatigue, sleeplessness, hunger, coldness, and pain.

When men are put into situations which produce pressures similar to those produced by the Communist imprisonment situation, many follow a similar pattern of reaction. The first part of this reaction is a period of patient and purposeful exploratory activity. The man carefully tries every possible solution to the situation which may relieve him of the pressures upon him. If one arranges the experimental situation so that the man cannot find a satisfactory solution by his exploratory activities, his next reaction is an increasing and random exploration, with a general increase of motor activity and an overflow of this activity into other behavior, of a nonpurposive nature. He appears to "become excited" and shows evidences of anxiety, hyperactivity, and sometimes panic. If the pressures of the experimental situation are continued, the hyperactivity of the subject will gradually subside, with the exception of isolated repetitive acts. He may settle upon one form of response, which he repeats endlessly and automatically, even though this endlessly repeated action can never produce a solution. If the pressures are continued long enough, his ultimate response is one of total inactivity. He becomes first exasperated, and finally dejected and dependent upon anyone who offers to help him. He becomes unusually receptive to approval or human support.

For want of a better term, the experimental situation just described has been called a "situation of frustration." Situations of frustration are the common denominator of many of the Communist prison experiences. The reaction of the prisoner to the isolation routine closely reproduces that which occurs in an artificially frustrating situation. It is a more all-embracing reaction, slower in its development and more devastating in its effects, but it is basically similar. Situations of frustration also occur in the interrogation situation, where the prisoner must prepare a satisfactory confession and finds that no matter what he does or says he cannot satisfy the interrogator. Likewise, situations of frustration occur again and again in a group cell in the Chinese prison. Here also the prisoner finds that no matter how much he attempts to comply with the demands of the interrogator and the other prisoners, his confession is never satisfactory, and his ordeal is renewed. Much the same situation occurs in the training schools for Communist cadres, where there are increasing demands for more thorough study, more work, more en-

thusiasm, and more self-criticism, until the student ultimately breaks down, showing emotional reactions, such as crying and behavior of hopelessness and despair.

Thus, all of the Communist interrogation and indoctrination programs have much in common. In all of them the subject is faced with pressure upon pressure and discomfort upon discomfort, and none of his attempts to deal with his situation lead to amelioration of his lot. Psychiatrists may refer to a man in such a situation as "emotionally bankrupt." Some of the patients who seek the help of psychiatrists are in a similar state. The pressures and convolutions of their lives have reached a point at which they can no longer deal with them, and they must have help. It is recognized that such a state of "emotional bankruptcy" provides a good opportunity for the therapist. Indeed, there are therapists who are of the opinion that successful psychotherapy is rare unless a patient has reached such a state of readiness. This appears to be a recognition of the fact that a man will not turn to a therapist for help as long as he feels that there are other means of deliverance.

When a man is at the "end of his rope," he accepts avidly any help that is offered. In the experimental situation of frustration, the subject who has reached this stage will readily accept suggestions for solving the experimental problem, however absurd. His response to words of encouragement is striking. His own intense needs have prepared him to accept suggestions which he previously would have rejected. Similarly, the patient who has reached a point of desperation may abjectly put himself into the hands of a psychiatrist toward whom he has previously displayed contempt and hostility, and he will enter into a course of treatment, however painful it may be.

A characteristic of those who are "bankrupt" and need help is their need to talk. They obtain deep satisfaction simply from unburdening themselves to another human being. In Communist prisons this need to talk is greatly fortified by the regimen of total isolation. This is an important reason why the Communist interrogator, being the only man to whom the prisoner talks, is in such an advantageous position for obtaining information from him. The interrogator is dealing with a man who might be looked upon as an intentionally created patient; the interrogator has all of the advantages and opportunities which accrue to a therapist dealing with a patient in desperate need of help.

Although the Communist management of prisoners was not designed by psychiatrists or neurophysiologists, and those who carry out this management do not have formal psychological training, nevertheless the interrogator does deal with the prisoner by using many of the same methods which the physician uses in the management of his patients. He allows the prisoner to talk at length about his family and his life. This produces in the prisoner a warm and dependent relationship toward him. The interrogator approves and rewards proper attitudes and behavior, and disapproves and punishes improper attitudes and behavior. Because of his dependence upon the interrogator, the prisoner develops an intense desire to please him. The prisoner glows when he is rewarded, and is deeply disturbed when he is rejected.

The interrogator has in his hands knowledge of most of the life history of his victim. He does not hesitate to pick out from this history the disturbing and unpleasant episodes. He uses them as a lever to humiliate the prisoner and to increase his feelings of guilt and unworthiness. The potent effect which this procedure can have upon man has been demonstrated many times in the laboratory. It has been observed that when threatening episodes from a patient's life are introduced by the

physician and discussed intensively with indications of disapproval, the patient may be greatly disturbed. Not only are his mood and behavior disturbed, but profound and potentially dangerous alterations in his bodily processes occur also. Thus, the power which the interrogator possesses in dealing with the prisoner is great; his ability to manipulate both the physical and the interpersonal aspects of the prisoner's environment place his victim in a highly vulnerable position.

It is readily understandable that the prisoner ultimately adopts the suggestions of the interrogator with regard to the protocol. It is not at all incomprehensible that some prisoners can be carried to the point of confessing to crimes for which death is the certain punishment. Since the intimate interpersonal relation between prisoner and interrogator continues through the period of the trial, it is also understandable that prisoners may continue to play their prescribed roles before the judge and the state prosecutor.

The situation within the group prison cell in the Chinese prison is akin to that of the interrogator and prisoner. Here, the important relationship is between the prisoner and the group, with the prisoner striving to gain the acceptance of the group and to identify himself with them. In this setting the pressures are more prolonged and the situation of frustration may be repeated many times, because the prisoner is called upon not only to accept a protocol or confession but to adopt a whole new attitude. It may take a long time before such a state of utter defeat is achieved; but when it is, the prisoner's reaction has many of the features of a religious conversion.

Those who have experienced a true religious conversion maintain their new attitudes and behavior for an unpredictable length of time. It has been a general experience that most of the religious conversions experienced at camp meetings or revivals are of evanescent nature. The experience is a powerful one, but the convert usually reverts to his former patterns within a short time. But this is not necessarily so. Some religious conversions have long-lasting, or even permanent, effects. So it appears to be with the conversion which takes place in Communist prisons or indoctrination schools. Those who go through the experience often feel that it was unpleasant but worth while. Its effects upon their attitudes and behavior are usually evanescent. They disappear within a few weeks after the convert is removed from his Communist environment. But a small proportion of converts appear to experience long-lasting, or even permanent, changes in their attitudes and behavior, especially if they are among the "most susceptible group."

VI. Epitome

The methods used in Communist countries for the interrogation and indoctrination of persons regarded as enemies of the state have their roots in secret police practices which go back for many years. These methods have been refined and systematized by much use and experience. Data about these procedures have been collected and analyzed. The general dynamic features which underlie them are understandable.

Those who live in Communist states recognize that at times the state police are almost unlimited in their power and their action may be swift and arbitrary. When residents of such communities become aware that they are suspected by the police, their feelings of impotence and uncertainty are greatly augmented. As they are increasingly avoided by their friends and associates, they feel isolated

and rejected, and develop intense anxiety, often colored by feelings of guilt. Their sudden seizure under dramatic circumstances is additionally traumatizing. They usually enter upon their prison experience feeling fearful, vaguely guilty, helpless, and completely uncertain of their fate.

When the initial period of imprisonment is one of total isolation, such as that used by the KGB, the complete separation of the prisoner from the companionship and support of others, his utter loneliness, and his prolonged uncertainty have a further disorganizing effect upon him. Fatigue, sleep loss, pain, cold, hunger, and the like augment the injury induced by isolation. The cumulative effects of the entire experience may be almost intolerable. With the passage of time, the prisoner usually develops an intense need to be relieved of the pressures put upon him and to have some human companionship. He may have a very strong urge to talk to any human and be utterly dependent upon anyone who will help him or befriend him. At about this time he also becomes mentally dull and loses his capacity for discrimination. He becomes malleable and suggestible, and in some instances he may confabulate.

The interrogator exploits the prisoner's need for companionship. He uses items from the prisoner's biography derived from police files, from the prisoner's associates, and from hours of interrogation to arouse further guilt, conflict, and anxiety. He makes use of the dependence of the prisoner, which is strengthened by the intimate sharing of information about his life. He frustrates and further disorganizes the prisoner by rejecting his statements. He scolds, punishes, and threatens him when he does not cooperate, and approves and rewards him when he does. Then, by suggesting that the prisoner accept half-truths and plausible distortions of the truth, he makes it possible for the prisoner to rationalize and thus accept the interrogator's viewpoint as the only way out of an intolerable situation.

The methods of interrogation and indoctrination used in Communist China are in many respects similar to those of the Russian state police, from which they were in part derived; but in some respects they are quite different because of the special needs and traditions of the Chinese. In the Chinese prison, the individual interrogator is still important, and in occasional cases the management of the prisoner may quite closely duplicate that of the KGB. But in most instances the efforts of the interrogator are supplemented by the effects of the interaction between the prisoner and six or eight of his fellow prisoners with whom he is incarcerated in a crowded cell. Here the group replaces the interrogator as the focus of the prisoner's relationships. In this setting of complete lack of privacy, there is an unrelenting routine of self-criticism sessions, group-discussion sessions, rote learning, constant repetition of Communist viewpoints, and the repeated rewriting and rejection of autobiographical essays. The group exploits the feeling of emotional nakedness and unworthiness which the self-criticism sessions engender, dwelling upon items obtained from the prisoner's life history during these sessions which arouse in him guilt, conflict, and anxiety. These feelings are greatly potentiated when the group rejects, isolates, and reviles him because of his "improper" attitudes and past behavior. The prisoner is thus placed in a situation in which he cannot avoid having his past life reviewed and questioned and cannot avoid hearing an exposition of the Communist position. Moreover, for a period, sometimes of years' duration, he has access to nothing but Communist-oriented history and Communist inter-

pretation of current events. Like the KGB interrogator, the group rewards and approves the prisoner when he cooperates and behaves in accordance with their aims, and thus indicates to him that the only possible solution to an intolerable situation is the acceptance of the "proper" point of view.

Under pressures such as these, prisoners usually rationalize a change in attitude and hold it for an indefinite time. In general, this change in attitude is only so great as the prisoner feels it must be to enable him to relieve himself of the intolerable pressures under which he labors. In the KGB pre-trial interrogation, the achievement of a successful rationalization and a satisfactory protocol is usually accompanied by a profound feeling of relief, and an unspoken agreement with the interrogator that may even have overtones of warmth and friendliness. In the Chinese group cell, where the pressures are much more prolonged and the demands upon the prisoner are correspondingly more intense, the ultimate achievement of a proper rationalization and group acceptance is associated with feelings of relief that are occasionally exhilarating, and sometimes show some of the features of a religious "conversion."

Men under the complete control of Communist police have been made to say and do many things which their captors desire. Some people have proved to be much more malleable than others; but even under the most strenuous circumstances some men are remarkably refractory and refuse to cooperate with their captors up to the point at which they develop confusional states and delirium. The most effective features of the Communist procedures are those which would operate even in the absence of control. Prisoners who were not excessively abused and who encountered men who appeared to be dedicated, selfless, and even "idealistic" in their attachment to the ostensible goals of Communism have acknowledged these features of their captors; and those who were presented with plausible evidence have accepted it tentatively. When they have discovered that they would be rejected, reviled, and punished for non-cooperative behavior, they have refrained from doing or saying anything which would bring such abuse upon them when they were in Communist control. Those whose past lives have been colored by feelings of much guilt, by lack of purpose or commitment, and those who were previously sympathetic to Communist views have been more amenable to the Communist methods.

Prisoners who have been released from Communist control and have been able to assure themselves that they will no longer be punished for "improper" opinions have gradually readjusted their attitudes to their new environment. Their memories of the punishments and brutalities which they have endured have been lively. For most prisoners these memories override all others. When they have felt safe to acknowledge their resentment, they have expressed extreme hostility toward those responsible for their bad prison experiences, and they have nearly always rejected Communism and all those connected with it.

SPECIAL CENTER NOTICE
NO. 6-64

SECURITY
16 January 1964

CLASSIFICATION OF TALENT AND KEYHOLE INFORMATION

GENERAL

1. The purpose of this notice is to provide guidance for the classification in the Special Center of documents containing photographic and SIGINT products from sensitive manned overflight reconnaissance and from satellite reconnaissance. (The classification of information concerning collection operations is a separate matter not covered by this instruction.)

DEFINITIONS

2. TALENT material is the product obtained from U. S. reconnaissance operations from sensitive manned aircraft overflights.

3. KEYHOLE material is the product obtained from U. S. reconnaissance operations from satellites.

CODEWORDS

25X1A2g

25X1A2a

4. Code Words currently in use include [REDACTED] for TALENT material, RUFF for KEYHOLE photographic interpretation material and [REDACTED] for KEYHOLE SIGINT material.

HOW TO CLASSIFY

5. KEYHOLE associated material may vary in classification from TOP SECRET Codeword to SECRET. To assist in such determination, classification guidance is provided below:

a. TOP SECRET RUFF-HANDLE VIA TALENT-KEYHOLE CONTROL CHANNELS - is the classification given to KEYHOLE photographs intended for interpretation and to intelligence derived from, or based on, those photographs. Examples are:

(1) KEYHOLE photographs and analyses of the photographs.

(2) KEYHOLE Target Lists and KEYHOLE Requirements Lists.

HANDLE VIA TALENT-
KEYHOLE CHANNELS
ONLY

TCS-3154-64-KH
Copy 40 of 200 Copies

25X1A2g

25X1A2a

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] RUFF [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

RUFF [REDACTED]

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SPECIAL CENTER NOTICE

SECURITY

NO. 6-64

16 January 1964

(3) Listings of KEYHOLE documents which include full titles (e. g. , [REDACTED] TCS 0000-64-KH).

25X1D3a

(4) Mention of the value of KEYHOLE material in any intelligence field or concerning a specific country in terms whereby the resolution of the photography may be estimated

25X1D3a

[REDACTED]

25X1A2a

b. TOP SECRET [REDACTED]-HANDLE VIA TALENT-KEYHOLE CONTROL CHANNELS - is the classification given to KEYHOLE SIGINT material (COMINT Codewords and the control channel caveat "HANDLE VIA COMINT-TALENT-KEYHOLE CONTROL CHANNELS JOINTLY" are included when appropriate). Examples are:

(1) KEYHOLE SIGINT intercept material.

(2) KEYHOLE SIGINT Target Lists and KEYHOLE SIGINT Requirements Lists.

(3) Listing of KEYHOLE SIGINT documents which include full titles.

(4) Mention of the value of KEYHOLE SIGINT material, in any intelligence field or concerning a specific country, in terms whereby the usefulness of the material is revealed.

c. TOP SECRET-HANDLE VIA TALENT-KEYHOLE CONTROL CHANNELS - is the classification given to documents which refer in some detail to KEYHOLE materials, but include no substantive information from KEYHOLE. An example is:

25X1C8a

[REDACTED]

-2-

25X1A2g

TCS-3154-64-KH

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

RUFF [REDACTED]

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~~TOP SECRET~~

RUFF

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SPECIAL CENTER NOTICE

SECURITY

NO. 6-64

16 January 1964

d. SECRET-HANDLE VIA TALENT-KEYHOLE CONTROL CHANNELS - is the classification given to administrative papers which refer to KEYHOLE materials, but do not reveal the nature of the intelligence source or the geographic area from which the material was obtained. Examples are:

- (1) A request for a KEYHOLE clearance.
- (2) A listing of KEYHOLE document control numbers.

e. SECRET-HANDLE VIA SPECIAL CENTER CHANNELS - is the classification given to internal DDI Special Center administrative documents which pertain to KEYHOLE intelligence, but do not reveal the nature of the intelligence source or the geographic area from which the material was obtained. The term "KH Material" will be used in place of the word "KEYHOLE."

f. Receipts for KEYHOLE materials must be returned via TALENT-KEYHOLE channels, but may be unclassified if no descriptive information is included other than the TCS-KH control number.

HOW TO CLASSIFY TALENT MATERIAL

25X1A2g

6. Paragraph 4. a. - e. apply generally to TALENT material when "TALENT" is substituted for "KEYHOLE" and [REDACTED] is substituted for "RUFF" or [REDACTED]. " 25X1A2a

7. CAUTION - This notice is intended to serve only as a general guide. Assistance in classifying a document may be obtained from Office TALENT Control Officers and from the Special Center TALENT Control Officer. It is suggested that individuals engaged in classifying documents err on the side of caution and check on a case-by-case basis until experience has been gained.

25X1A9a

[REDACTED]
Chief, Special Intelligence Staff, DD/I

25X1A2g

-3-

TCS-3154-64-KH

~~TOP SECRET~~

RUFF

25X1A2a

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NSE BRIEFING

10 FEB

BACKGROUND

THE UNHAPPY SPARROW

A Sparrow was appointed Eagle.

But no sooner was the appointment made than doubts began to arise.

'Devil knows what made us choose this particular Sparrow—and for Eagle's work too!'

But it was too late. A nest had already been fixed up for him on Eagle Crag. And already a Cuckoo had become his bride—and away.

Our Sparrow sits on Eagle Crag, in an eagle's nest, terrified and very far from home. Not cosy at all.

Some Eagles fly up, beating their great wings. 'We are birds of freedom', they say. 'It's time, brother, time to take flight.'

'Where to?' asks the astonished Sparrow.

The Eagles explain: 'Beyond the far cloud, where the mountain gleams white.'

'Citizens, what do you mean?'

It's alright for Eagles: they just raise their great wings and soar, but he has to thresh and thrash his little wings. What is he getting his keep for? For being there, one might say, by the very peak. It's ^{all} alright for Eagles, they just raise their great wings and soar. But he has to thresh and thrash his little wings. He can scarcely draw breath from one pay-day to another.

Time goes by.

The Eagles are amazed:

'What's this, little brothers? Is this particular Eagle something, as it were, of other than eagle breed?'

One of them tried to work it out: 'This is not an eagle but an embryo eagle. In due course he should grow into an eagle.'

DOCUMENT NO. 10
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐
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DATE 2 Jan 82 REVIEWER:

-2-

They wait a month, half a year, a year. It is plain to everybody: no eagle is going to come out of this particular Sparrow. Well, after all, in a big place all sorts are to be found. If one doesn't turn out right, another may.

Our Sparrow ought to be restored to sparrow rank. There would not be a more useful bird anywhere.

But no, it's awkward. He has held acting rank as eagle for a year.

So the poor chap is still doing all he can--amongst the woodpeckers.

COMMENT: This fable is taken from a collection of eight by L. Lagin published in Znamya, May 1954. Znamya is one of the four principal Soviet literary magazines, with a circulation of 130,000.

An understanding of all the overtones and allusions in this fable is not, of course, accessible to the outside student of the USSR, but even so, it can be said with confidence that it expresses keen and widespread feeling on large matters. The Sparrow is a document of special political interest, for it is difficult to see how Russian readers can fail to savour the possibility of a connection between this bird and Malenkov. Kaganovich, in his speech to the railwaymen made on May 8 as published in Pravda on May 24, went out of his way to put Khrushchev before Malenkov, and since then the old 'precedence lists' of the top ten or dozen political leaders have been replaced by recourse to alphabetical sequence. What the Eagles say to the Sparrow is simply a quotation of two lines from a famous poem by Pushkin.

TOP SECRET

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9 April 1958

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DATE: 3/25/86 REVIEWER:

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State Dept. review completed

TOP SECRET

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

9 April 1958

25X1

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

No

USSR - West German nuclear armament: The foreign ministers of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia are meeting in Prague this week, probably in connection with the Soviet campaign now shaping up to combat the 25 March Bundestag decision to equip the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons. The three foreign ministers will probably first address themselves to the Rapacki plan for a nuclear-free zone in central Europe and urge its acceptance by West Germany. A public statement banning missiles and nuclear weapons from the three countries is a strong possibility--hedged on this occasion with the condition that Bonn not implement the Bundestag resolution. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1A

25X1A
[REDACTED]

yes

Communist China: Peiping's leaders appear well satisfied with their success in suppressing "bourgeois rightists" and tightening discipline among government and party cadres. There are indications that for the time being the purge of rightist officials from their posts in the central government is over and that the current rectification campaign will probably end next month without resort to mass terror. [REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1

II. ASIA-AFRICA

no

Israel-UAR: Israeli drainage operations in the Hula area apparently have resumed with minor adjustments in the operation to conform to the findings of the UN survey. The UN report found the UAR's complaints justified, but allowed the Israelis to proceed. Even if tension over this particular problem has relaxed temporarily, new friction in this and other Israeli-Arab border areas appears inevitable. [REDACTED]

25X1A

no

Turkey-Iran-Pakistan: Iran is informally exploring with Pakistan and Turkey the advisability of forming in the Middle East a non-Arab federation--which might also include Afghanistan--to counter Egypt's growing influence. While the creation of a new alliance in the near future is unlikely, the discussion of such a possibility reflects a growing concern in the area over the future of the Baghdad Pact. Iran apparently fears that Iraq will eventually withdraw from the pact; Pakistan feels the pact is becoming less effective than before; and Turkey favors strengthening the pact rather than forming any new alliance. [REDACTED]

25X1A

(Page 3)

25X1A

yes

Nasir and the Suez Canal: IBRD President Black believes Nasir has a "real desire" to settle soon with the old Suez Canal Company's shareholders, although the positions

9 Apr 58

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1A

OK of the shareholders and Nasir's representatives are still far apart. Black and his American adviser, General Wheeler, believe the canal is being well run and that the Egyptians intend to proceed with canal improvement plans. [REDACTED]

25X1A

III. THE WEST

OK NO Cuba: Batista and Dominican dictator Trujillo have renewed their allegations that Castro's movement is an instrument of international Communism. The outlawed Cuban Communist party has offered Castro unsolicited support for a general strike. Although a few individual Castro supporters probably have Communist sympathies, the sweeping charges are unsubstantiated. [REDACTED]

25X1A

OK NO West Germany - USSR: The West German - Soviet trade, repatriation, and consular agreement appears to represent a substantial abandonment by Bonn of its original demands on repatriation. Moscow has apparently obtained a large increase in trade targets and an agreement on consular rights in West Germany. The Adenauer government may be able to capitalize politically on the fact that Moscow is willing to deal with Bonn despite Moscow's recently stepped-up anti-German propaganda campaign.

25X1A

yes Italian Communist party: Luigi Longo's alleged replacement of the ailing Palmiro Togliatti as leader of the Italian Communist party (PCI) follows the recent PCI "purification" under which 48 of 191 outgoing Communist members of Parliament were dropped from the electoral lists. The change in leadership would probably not affect Communist chances in the 25 May national elections, but the purge of Communist parliamentarians may cause some Communist "protest voters" to support the Nenni Socialists.

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9 Apr 58

DAILY BRIEF

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Chinese Communist Purge of Party and Government
Nears End

The Chinese Communist campaign to tighten party discipline, reduce bureaucracy, and suppress "rightist" activity is now drawing to a close, and Peiping appears well pleased with the success it has achieved. Throughout this campaign the regime has in general avoided the use of terror, but three non-Communist cabinet ministers and scores of lesser officials have been fired from their posts. More than 1,300,000 government and party cadres have been sent to the "basic level" on farms or in factories where they are "correcting their style of work" by associating with the "masses."

There are indications that for the time being the purge of rightist officials from central government organs is over. The secretary general of the State Council recently announced that all party rightists at this level have been "expelled." Final results may be revealed at the national party congress which is expected to convene soon after the rectification campaign is finished at the end of May. [REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1A
[REDACTED]

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Non-Arab Near Eastern Federations Being Explored

The expanding influence of Egyptian President Nasir and the United Arab Republic has led non-Arab nations of the Near East to explore the advisability of creating a counterfederation. According to a Pakistani official, the Shah of Iran, prior to the Baghdad Pact meeting in Ankara last January, informally suggested a union of Iran and Pakistan. Unions of Iran and Pakistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, a new Turkish-Pakistani-Iranian arrangement, and a revival of the 1937 Saadabad Pact which included Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan have recently been mentioned at diplomatic levels. The Shah of Iran recently indicated that "secret talks" on the subject of an Iranian-Pakistan union or federation have been in progress for a year.

While none of these arrangements seems likely to come about in the immediate future, it is clear that non-Arab Moslem countries are considering new approaches to Near Eastern problems. Turkish ambassadors to the Near East recently met in Ankara to discuss what should be done; but Turkey favors strengthening the Baghdad Pact rather than forming a new alignment. Pakistan has held an ambassadorial conference in Karachi to discuss ways to reduce Nasir's prestige and possibilities for remedying the "lessening effectiveness" of the Baghdad Pact. Iranian ambassadors in the Near East are reported to be returning to Tehran for similar talks in late April. []

25X1A []

25X1A

25X1

25X1A []

Nasir and the Suez Canal

IBRD President Black has advised the American ambassador in Cairo that Nasir has a "real desire" to reach a quick settlement with the British and French shareholders of the old Suez Canal Company.

25X1C

[redacted] Nasir was "very pleased" with the outcome of his talks with Black.

25X1C

[redacted] Nasir told Black he would raise his previous compensation offer. It would still be considerably lower than the amount demanded by the shareholders, however, and Nasir indicated that he was prepared to let the shareholders break off negotiations if they would not accept.

Black's announced offer to advise Egypt in its plans for improvement of the canal is apparently based both on his impression of Nasir's attitude and on satisfaction with Egypt's operation of the waterway since its reopening in the spring of 1957. Daily transits now average higher than under the old company, and progress on programs for adding to the canal's capacity appears to be adequate. The canal management is alleged to have completed study of a "Nasir plan" which would include the expansion of the canal to receive ships of 52,000 tons, expansion of Port Said harbor, the construction of new docks, and the building of a port in Ismailia.

The use of newly purchased dredging equipment, combined with an all-out effort on the part of canal authority personnel, has increased the allowable draft from 33 to nearly 35 feet since the reopening. The Egyptians, however, have requested through the IBRD's technical adviser, General Wheeler, the loan of a US army dredge for use in improving the entrance and harbor of Port Said. [redacted]

25X1A

[redacted] 25X1A

[redacted] 25X1

25X1A
[redacted]

III. THE WEST

Alleged Communist Influence in the Cuban Rebellion

Renewed allegations by both Cuban President Batista and Dominican dictator Trujillo that rebel leader Fidel Castro's movement is an instrument of international Communism are intended to justify Dominican arms shipments to Cuba, and on Batista's part, to induce the US to resume arms shipments to Cuba.

Batista has long branded opposition to his regime as Communist inspired. He has produced no evidence, but several of Castro's followers--including his brother, who is known to have traveled behind the iron curtain--have been suspected of Communist sympathies. Castro himself recently refused apparently unsolicited offers of support for a general strike from the outlawed Cuban Communist party, which at present is estimated to have from 8,000 to 12,000 members. In spite of this refusal, the Communists have recently jumped on the rebel bandwagon to voice "solidarity" with the Cuban people in their "fight against the dictatorship."

25X1A

25X1

25X1A

Bonn Compromises on Trade Agreement With Moscow

The West German - Soviet trade, repatriation, and consular agreement initialed in Moscow on 8 April appears to represent a concession by Bonn on the question of repatriation of German nationals. It merely provides that the Soviet Union will give "benevolent consideration" to those Germans who wish to return. During the election campaign Bonn had demanded the return of more than 100,000 ethnic Germans, but after the elections in September it reduced this number to less than 16,000.

Bonn has also conceded the large increases in trade targets which Moscow sought when it initiated the negotiations in July 1957. New goals set for 1960 are double the present trade level of \$160,000,000, thus satisfying West German business interests eager to expand contact with the Soviet bloc.

Chancellor Adenauer will probably capitalize politically on the fact that Moscow is willing to deal with his government despite the recently stepped-up anti-German propaganda campaign. A week ago the German Foreign Ministry told American officials that Soviet negotiators had said the Bundestag decision on nuclear weapons made an agreement virtually impossible. [REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1

25X1A
[REDACTED]

Shifts in the Italian Communist Party

The reported replacement of Palmiro Togliatti by Luigi Longo as chief of the Italian Communist party (PCI) "for an indefinite period" would appear to be the logical outcome of Togliatti's declining health and weakened hold on the party. Opposition to Togliatti's policies has increased among PCI hard-line members and Soviet leaders during the past two years because of his independent reaction to the Khrushchev de-Stalinization speech, his continued advocacy of "poly-centric" relations between Communist parties, and his recent reported opposition to the re-establishment of a Cominform-type journal.

The Soviet delegation which visited the PCI in February was said to have criticized Togliatti sharply for his "revisionist" policies and to have shown respect only for Longo. In March, the PCI dropped 48 of the 191 Communist members of the outgoing Parliament from its lists for the 25 May national elections, presumably for "revisionism" and criticism of Soviet policies. Togliatti's departure may have been hastened by these developments.

Longo, 58, has been a member of the party since its founding in 1921 and number-two man since the end of the war. He was once known as a hard-line Communist and his relations with Moscow are now considered excellent, but he has apparently become more moderate in recent months and may be an acceptable leader to all party factions.

Togliatti would probably not oppose his own removal, however, and is likely eventually to get an honorary party post. A smooth transition to Longo would minimize unfavorable repercussions on the PCI's electoral chances, but anti-Communist exploitation of these shifts might cause some Communist "protest voters" to vote for Nenni Socialists. [REDACTED]

25X1A [REDACTED]

25X1A

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

9 April 1958

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR - West German nuclear armament: The foreign ministers of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia are meeting in Prague this week, probably in connection with the Soviet campaign now shaping up to combat the 25 March Bundestag decision to equip the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons. The three foreign ministers will probably first address themselves to the Rapacki plan for a nuclear-free zone in central Europe and urge its acceptance by West Germany. A public statement banning missiles and nuclear weapons from the three countries is a strong possibility--hedged on this occasion with the condition that Bonn not implement the Bundestag resolution. [REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1D

satisfied with their success in suppressing "bourgeois rightists" and tightening discipline among government and party cadres. There are indications that for the time being the purge of rightist officials from their posts in the central government is over and that the current rectification campaign will probably end next month without resort to mass terror. [REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Israel-UAR: Israeli drainage operations in the Hula area apparently have resumed with minor adjustments in the operation to conform to the findings of the UN survey. The UN report found the UAR's complaints justified, but allowed the Israelis to proceed. Even if tension over this particular problem has relaxed temporarily, new friction in this and other Israeli-Arab border areas appears inevitable. [REDACTED]

25X1A

III. THE WEST

Cuba: Batista and Dominican dictator Trujillo have renewed their allegations that Castro's movement is an instrument of international Communism. The outlawed Cuban Communist party has offered Castro unsolicited support for a general strike. Although a few individual Castro supporters probably have Communist sympathies, the sweeping charges are unsubstantiated. [REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1

West Germany - USSR: The West German - Soviet trade, repatriation, and consular agreement appears to represent a substantial abandonment by Bonn of its original demands on repatriation. Moscow has apparently obtained a large increase in trade targets and an agreement on consular rights in West Germany. The Adenauer government may be able to capitalize politically on the fact that Moscow is willing to deal with Bonn despite Moscow's recently stepped-up anti-German propaganda campaign. [REDACTED]

25X1A

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New Man for CIA

Only a few insiders have much basis for judging the work of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and they rarely talk. But there are a few hints along the way about the meaning of President Nixon's decision to name James R. Schlesinger CIA director and make the present director, Richard Helms, ambassador to Iran.

President Nixon has not been satisfied with the performance of the U.S. "intelligence community." In late 1969 he cut CIA personnel abroad by 10 to 12 per cent. He ordered a study of the CIA and intelligence generally by James Schlesinger, then a military and international specialist in the White House Office of Management and Budget, and by K. W. Smith, a National Security Council aide.

Their report came out in May, 1971. It recommended pulling intelligence together either by giving CIA Director Helms more authority over the five other U.S. agencies beside the CIA that gather intelligence, or by setting up a new cabinet-level Department of Intelligence.

In November, 1971, the White House ordered a reorganization of intelligence activities to give Helms more leadership over the rival intelligence agencies in the State and Defense Departments, the

Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Now the President pulls Helms out and puts in one of the authors of the report — Schlesinger.

One complaint that the President is said to have against the CIA under Helms is that the CIA often has been realistic about Vietnam. For example, the CIA didn't think bombing North Vietnam would be effective, or that it was effective after it started.

Ousting Helms for being right is wrong.

On the other hand, Senator J. William Fulbright's Foreign Relations Committee has been hassling the CIA for its private wars in Laos and Cambodia, which either violate U.S. law or come close to it. Ousting Helms for making war against the will of Congress would be proper — but it is clear Helms was only carrying out Nixon's policy there.


James Schlesinger is an economist who spent 12 years in the RAND Corporation, an Air Force think tank, then three years as a Nixon appointee in the Bureau of the Budget and the White House Office of Management and Budget, then a year as Nixon's choice as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. His record in government is good, but he is a weapons man and a hardliner.

Helms, the Shah and the CIA

THERE IS A CERTAIN irony in the fact that Richard Helms will go to Iran as the American ambassador 20 years after the agency he now heads organized and directed the overthrow of the regime then in power in Teheran. The tale is worth recounting if only because of the changes in two decades which have affected the Central Intelligence Agency as well as American foreign policy.

Helms first went to work at the CIA in 1947 and he came up to his present post as director through what is generally called the "department of dirty tricks." However, there is nothing on the public record to show that he personally had a hand in the overthrow of the Communist backed and/or oriented regime of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953, an action that returned the Shah to his throne. One can only guess at the wry smile that must have come to the Shah's face when he first heard that President Nixon was proposing to send the CIA's top man to be the American envoy.

The Iranian affair, and a similar CIA action in Guatemala the following year, are looked upon by old hands at



1953: Teheran rioting that overthrew the government left the United States Point Four office with gaping holes for windows and doors.

the agency as high points of a sort in the Cold War years. David Wise and Thomas B. Ross have told the Iranian story in their book, "The Invisible Government," and the CIA boss at the time, Allen Dulles, conceded in public after he left the government that the United States had had a hand in what occurred.

IRAN IS NEXT DOOR to the Soviet Union. In 1951 Mossadegh, who confused Westerners with his habits of weeping in public and running government business from his bed, nationalized the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. and seized the Abadan refinery. The West boycotted Iranian oil

and the country was thrown into crisis. Mossadegh "connived," as Wise and Ross put it, with Tudeh, Iran's Communist party, to bolster his hand. The British and Americans decided he had to go and picked Gen. Fazollah Zareh to replace him. The man who stage-managed the job on the spot was Kermit "Kim" Roosevelt (who also had a hand in some fancy goings-on in Egypt), grandson of T.R. and seventh cousin of F.D.R., and now a Washingtonian in private business.

Roosevelt managed to get to Teheran and set up underground headquarters. A chief aide was Brig. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who, as head of the New Jersey state police, had become famous during the Lindbergh baby kidnapping case. Schwarzkopf had reorganized the Shah's police force and he and Roosevelt joined in the 1953 operation. The Shah dismissed Mossadegh and named Zahedi as Premier but Mossadegh arrested the officer who brought the bad news. The Teheran streets filled with rioters and a scared Shah fled first to Baghdad and then to Rome. Dulles flew to Rome to confer with him. Roosevelt ordered the Shah's backers into the streets, the leftists were arrested by the army and the Shah returned in triumph. Mossadegh went to jail. In time a new international oil consortium took over Anglo-Iranian which operates to this day, though the Shah has squeezed more and more revenue from the Westerners.

In his 1963 book, "The Craft of Intelligence," published after he left CIA, Dulles wrote that, when in both Iran and Guatemala it "became clear" that a Communist state was in the making, "support from outside was given to loyal anti-Communist elements." In a 1965 NBC television documentary on "The Science of Spying" Dulles said: "The government of Mossadegh, if you recall history, was overthrown by the action of the Shah. Now, that we encouraged the Shah to take that action I will not deny." Miles Copeland, an ex-CIA operative in the Middle East, wrote in his book, "The Game of Nations," that the Iranian derring-do was called "Operation Ajax." He credited Roosevelt with "almost single-handedly" calling the "pro-Shah forces on to the streets of Teheran" and supervising "their riots so as to oust" Mossadegh.

TODAY THE IRAN to which Helms will go after he leaves the CIA is a stable, well armed and well oil-financed regime under the Shah's command which has mended its fences with Moscow without hurting its close relationship with Washington. The Shah has taken full advantage of the changes in East-West relations from the Cold War

While Iran and Guatemala were the high points of covert CIA Cold War ac-

tivity, there were plenty of other successful enterprises that fell short of changing government regimes. Today the CIA, humiliated by the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco it planned and ran, has withdrawn from such large scale affairs as Iran, save for its continuing major role in the no longer "secret war in Laos." The climate of today would not permit the United States to repeat the Iranian operation, or so one assumes with the reservation that President Nixon (who was Vice President at the time of Iran) loves surprises.

The climate of 1953, however, was very different and must be taken into account in any judgment. Moscow then was fishing in a great many troubled waters and among them was Iran. It was probably true, as Allen Dulles said on that 1965 TV show, that "at no time has the CIA engaged in any political activity or any intelligence that was not approved at the highest level." It was all part of a deadly "game of nations." Richard Bissell, who ran the U-2 program and the Bay of Pigs, was asked on that TV show about the morality of CIA activities. "I think," he replied, that "the morality of . . . shall we call it for short, cold war . . . is so infinitely easier than the morality of almost any kind of hot war that I never encountered this as a serious problem."

PERHAPS the philosophy of the Cold War years and the CIA role were best put by Dulles in a letter that he wrote me in 1961. Excerpts from his then forthcoming book had appeared in Harper's and I had suggested to him some further revelations he might include in the book. He wrote about additions he was making: "This includes more on Iran and Guatemala and the problems of policy in action when there begins to be evidence that a country is slipping and Communist take-over is threatened. We can't wait for an engraved invitation to come and give aid."

There is a story, too, that Winston Churchill was so pleased by the operation in Iran that he proffered the George Cross to Kim Roosevelt. But the CIA wouldn't let him accept the decoration. So Churchill commented to Roosevelt: "I would be proud to have served under you" in such an operation. That remark, Roosevelt is said to have replied, was better than the decoration.

Helms doubtless would be the last to say so out loud but I can imagine his reflecting that, if it hadn't been for what Dulles, Kim Roosevelt and the others did in 1953, he would not have the chance to present his credentials to a Shah still on the peacock throne in 1973.

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U.S. Civilians Dying Unheralded in Laos

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Star-News Special Correspondent

VIENTIANE — Some Americans killed in Indochina combat do not appear in the U.S. Indochina death toll which stands at latest count at 45,915.

These unacknowledged combat deaths are of American civilians performing military duties normally carried out by U.S. Air Force or Army personnel.

As they are civilians the U.S. military does not include them in the death toll when they are killed in action.

For example, U.S. officials this weekend announced two American military deaths. They said U.S. Air Force Capt. Harold L. (Skip) Mischler of Osborne, Kan., was killed Saturday when his light observation plane was shot down by small arms over the embattled South Laos town of Saravane. U.S. officials said a second American was lost over the plain of Jars area but were unable to identify him until next of kin were notified.

On Friday, Dec. 15, however, at a town on the South Laos' Bolovens Plateau called Paksong another kind of death occurred. John Kearns of Alvarado, Tex., was listed as killed by North Vietnamese mortar shells which hit the command post of the Lao irregular unit he was advising.

Killed at Saravane

An embassy spokesman described Kearns as "American contract personnel attached to an irregular Lao unit." Irregular Lao units are handled by the Central Intelligence agency. Kearns was the third American adviser to irregulars killed in action since September.

Another American was killed when Lao irregular units launched a helicopter attack on Saravane on Oct. 19.

He was aboard one of eight U.S. Air Force helicopters which carried Lao irregulars into the Saravane airstrip under intense enemy fire. The American was hit just before the helicopter touched down. Six of the U.S. helicopters

engaged were hit by Communist fire but none crashed. A third American adviser to the irregulars was killed during an operation which failed to retake the Plain of Jars in North Laos in September.

Air America officials say about twenty of their American crew members have been killed in Laos since March 1970.

Air America is a private contractor to the Central Intelligence Agency and other U.S. government agencies and as air crew personnel are civilians.

They are not carried on the military death toll.

Air America engages in resupply drops to irregulars often under intense enemy anti-aircraft fire and in infiltration and exfiltration of irregular intelligence and commando teams behind enemy lines. Another company, Continental Airlines, has lost some American personnel in similar operations in Laos.

American officials say roughly 800 Americans were killed or are missing in Laos since May 1964 when the United States first shouldered a greater burden of the Laos war. This figure includes all categories and is mostly military.

The unheralded paramilitary deaths in Laos indicate a trend which may start to show in South Vietnam as American military wind down the war there and various private American civilian companies are poised to move in to take over paramilitary chores.

Deaths Unreported

Increasing use of disguised paramilitary organizations will allow the U.S. military to put out figures of zero American casualties on the ground as they do now in Laos, as it will be "civilians" who are being killed, not U.S. military personnel.

As in Laos most of these civilians will be former members of U.S. Special Forces and similar units contracted to the Central Intelligence Agency

or other U.S. government agencies.

The U.S. failure to announce a list of paramilitary deaths in Laos, however, is one of the few faults which mar these operations.

In Laos, instead of having thousands of Americans as the Pentagon has poured into South Vietnam, the war is run just as effective if not more so by 500 to 600 Americans.

Small Group Functions

While Hanoi fields four, and in the dry season, five weak divisions of some 40,000 combat troops in Laos, the United States has only between 30 and 40 men on the ground at the most in combat areas throughout the country.

In the past eight years an estimated 31 of these Americans been killed. This figure includes some technicians caught flatfooted on the ground in 1968 at Phou Pathi, a supersecret installation in North Laos which the North Vietnamese overran.

About 60 Air America crewmen of American nationality are believed to have been killed in the same time period.

The small number of Americans with the irregulars are essential to insure good Lao leadership and lack of corruption. Poor leadership and non-payment of troops severely weakened Royal Lao regular forces throughout the war.

It has been suggested, however, that U.S. Embassy officials should admit it when such Americans are killed in action instead of trying to pretend they are "American personnel in management" as happened initially in the Kearns' case and these American deaths should be included in military casualty figures released weekly in Saigon.

STATINTL

U.S. plans prolonged role in Vietnam

By Richard E. Ward

Despite press speculation a peace agreement for Vietnam may soon be concluded, there is concrete evidence indicating the U.S. is planning to prolong the conflict and will attempt to subvert any peace accords.

U.S. procrastination in Paris, intensified bombing and the huge shipments of arms to Saigon, among other developments, are all indicators that the White House has no desire for true peace and has not abandoned its neo-colonial designs in Indochina.

An even more ominous proof of U.S. intentions of maintaining its puppet regimes in Indochina, was the apparent effort by presidential envoy Henry Kissinger to press Saigon's "demands" in Paris at the end of November, which would have virtually scrapped the agreement reached in October by Kissinger and Le Duc Tho of the DRV.

There have been various hypotheses put forward in the Western press concerning Kissinger's seeming about-face on behalf of Saigon, after proclaiming in October before the world that "peace is at hand." Nearly every possible explanation has been proposed by the pundits except the most plausible one. The U.S. stalling in Paris does not represent any deference to its Saigon puppets, but rather it is for the purposes of U.S. policy and the Saigon regime is merely an instrument. U.S. expressions of "support" for Saigon's policies, now as in the past, to the extent they are not fictions for deceiving American opinion, are fundamentally expressions of the aims and designs of the U.S.

Gain time

In essence, American procrastination in Paris has been an effort to gain time for augmenting Saigon's war machine and setting up a huge clandestine network of "civilian advisors" which will attempt to prolong the struggle in Vietnam, as well as in the rest of Indochina. No peace agreements have been reached.

"Even as the U.S. military is packing up for its expected exit from Vietnam, American officials here are secretly planning a major postwar presence of U.S. civilians in Vietnam, with many of them doing jobs formerly done by the military," wrote Fox Butterfield in a report from Saigon in the Nov. 27 New York Times.

Without alluding to the delay in Paris, Butterfield noted that the U.S. is in the process of augmenting its "civilian advisory" force in Vietnam, from 5000 to 10,000, its peak level at the stage of maximum U.S. military presence in Vietnam. But it should be apparent that this "advisory" apparatus could not be assembled overnight, any more than the enormous flow of U.S. arms could be brought to Saigon in a day. Saigon's air force was increased two-fold, from approximately 1000 to 2000 aircraft during the past two months, to give only one item of U.S. supply effort.

To place recent developments in their proper perspective, it must be noted that there has been a major shift in U.S. strategy set in motion last spring in the wake of the long-sustained offensive by the Liberation Armed Forces in South Vietnam.

Despite administration efforts to play down the strength of the offensive, it is evident that once again the whole U.S. strategy for victory in Vietnam was smashed. Only the most drastic U.S. measures of the war prevented the complete collapse of the Saigon regime and its armed forces: the blockade of the DRV, the greatest aerial escalation against the DRV and liberated areas of South Vietnam (while heavy bombing of Laos and Cambodia was sustained), and unprecedented aerial tactical and logistics support for the Saigon forces.

The augmentation of the U.S. air logistics support for Saigon's forces during the offensive surged from a monthly average of about nine million pounds of cargo before the offensive to 60 million pounds in May. Augmented U.S. "support" for Saigon after the offensive began, raised total U.S. expenditures on the war by an annual rate of approximately \$10 billion or nearly double the rate prior to the offensive.

The Nixon administration concealed this augmentation by requesting additional war funding only for the period ending Sept. 30. At about the same time the administration presented Congress with a request for these funds in June, Air America and Continental Air Services, the CIA contractual "civilian" airlines, began stepping up recruiting among Air Force personnel in Indochina, according to a Dec. 1 report of Dispatch News Service, by John Burgess. He quoted from a confidential recruiting brochure which, among other points, stated:

Clandestine warfare

"The thing is non-military; in other words, it's not flying. You are flying for the government, that is government agencies

such as USOM, USAID, USIS, etc. While these agencies may be under CIA direction, you don't know and you don't care. The government agencies direct the routings and schedulings, your company provides the technical know-how and you fly the airplane."

The brochure makes it clear that "civilian flying" is merely a cover for clandestine military activity: "Although flights mainly serve U.S. official personnel movement and native officials and civilians, you sometimes engage in the movement of friendly troops, or of enemy captives; or in the transport of cargo more potent than rice and beans! There's a war going on. Use your imagination!"

In what Burgess describes as a "hastily" added postscript, the brochure states: "Foreign aid situation unclear pending outcome military situation in RVN (Republic of Vietnam), but it looks as if we'll finish the war (and peace terms favorable for our side); if so, it is expected that a boom among contract operators will result. . . ."

In other words, here we have the first concrete indication that the White House was implicitly admitting defeat of its "Vietnamization" program and reverting to a less costly program of clandestine warfare. The U.S. strategy shift was probably equally dictated by a desire to further diminish the political impact of the war on American opinion and finally by a desire to diminish the blow to U.S. prestige in the event of ultimate failure, that is the collapse of the puppet regimes.

The U.S. is clearly trying to stave off this development as long as possible, but it also

wants to avoid the impression of being engaged in direct and large-scale U.S. intervention at the time, which sooner or later Nixon and Kissinger must know is inevitable.

Even if they cannot face this reality, they are now in deadly earnest about maintaining support for the puppet regimes, regardless of any peace agreement. If the U.S. honestly adhered to a peace agreement, Saigon's political collapse would quickly follow. That is why the U.S. is stepping up clandestine support for the Saigon regime, military aid disguised as civilian "contractual" aid, provided mainly by U.S. private military contractors.

There is a relationship between the U.S. arms build-up Indochina and the program for secret contractual aid. Before the October peace agreement, the U.S. made little effort to keep the program secret. In testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee on Sept. 13, Air Force Maj. Gen. Joseph R. DeLuca explained in detail U.S. plans for contracting for personnel to train Saigon Air Force members. In the area of maintenance alone, the U.S. was planning to make contracts for \$54 million of one to three years to train Saigon personnel, according to DeLuca.

Thailand Approves U.S. Headquarters

BANGKOK, Dec. 16 (UPI)—Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn said today that he has given the United States approval to move its military headquarters from Saigon to a remote base in Thailand only 60 miles from North Vietnam when a cease-fire goes into effect in Vietnam.

Thanom confirmed the planned move to isolated Nakorn Phanom Airbase, 380 miles northeast of Bangkok. The base, which formerly served as a major center for close air support of government and CIA-sponsored troops in Laos, was the jumping-off point for the unsuccessful commando raid on North Vietnam's Son-tay POW camp in 1970.

It is the closest base to both Laos and North Vietnam, lying about 60 miles from North Vietnam at the closest point.

Reds Shell CIA's HQ at Long Cheng

VIENTIANE (UPI) — The headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency in Laos at Long Cheng has come under Communist artillery fire for the first time since early September, American officials said Thursday.

The North Vietnamese shelling took place Tuesday night, the officials said. They said about 30 rounds of long-range 130-mm. artillery and 10 rounds of shorter-range 85-mm. artillery hit the western end of the airstrip and damaged several houses at the mountain base.

No casualties were reported.

Long Cheng, about 80 miles north of Vientiane, is headquarters for the CIA-sponsored "secret army" led by the Meo hill tribesmen's Maj. Gen. Vang Pao. In addition to Vang Pao and his soldiers, a number of CIA advisers stay overnight at the base.

Air America: Flying for U.S. and Profit in Asia

By JOHN BURGESS
Special to The Star-News

BANGKOK — "The flying is non-military; in other words, civilian flying. You are flying for the U.S. government, that is government agencies such as USOM, USAID, USIS, etc. While these agencies may be under CIA direction, you don't know and you don't care. The government agencies direct the routings and schedulings, your company provides the technical know-how and you fly the airplane."

Thus an unnamed American pilot describes "civilian flying" in Southeast Asia for Air America and the lesser known Continental Air Services — both private companies on contract to the U.S. government. The pilot's comments are part of a confidential, 16-page brochure available at certain Air Force personnel offices. It is shown to Air Force pilots interested in flying for one of the companies upon completing their military service.

The brochure lists no author or publisher, but it offers an illuminating view into the internal operations of Air America, which has played a crucial role in the Indochina war theater since the 1950s. Air America, along with the other companies, has airlifted troops, refugees, CIA agents, American politicians, war material, food and occasionally prisoners all over Southeast Asia.

Extravagant Salaries

The brochure, dated June 29, 1972, boasts that Air America ranked as one of the most profitable corporation in the United States in 1969, a year when most of the world's airlines lost heavily. Air America's customer is the U.S. government.

It employs about 436 pilots, according to the pamphlet, of which 384 are working in Southeast Asia. The center of Air America's operation is Laos, where the presence of military or military-related personnel is prohibited by the much-abused Geneva Conference of 1962.

Air America's profits are high despite the somewhat extravagant salaries it pays for flying personnel. According to the report, a pilot with 11 years experience flying UH-34D helicopter based at Udorn air base in Thailand an

average of 100 hours monthly, will take home \$51,525. All salaries are tax free.

A newly hired pilot flying a C-7 Caribou transport based in Vientiane, averaging 100 hours flying time monthly, would earn a minimum \$29,442. The U.S. commercial pilot average is \$24,000.

Also available to Air America personnel, in addition to a liberal expense account, is life and medical insurance, two-weeks leave, tickets on other airlines at 20 percent normal cost, PX and government mailing privileges and educational allowances for dependents. Many Air America pilots are retired military men receiving military pensions.

'Good' Investment

Americans can also become "air freight specialists", commonly called kickers. Their job is to push cargo out over drop zones. Salary is \$1,600-\$1,800 per month. Qualifications: American citizenship, air borne training, experience with the U.S. Air Force preferred.

Air America, Inc., is owned by a private aviation investment concern called the Pacific Corp. Dunn and Bradstreet's investment directory places its assets in the \$10-\$50 million category, and rates it "good" as an investment risk. Air America itself employs altogether about 8,000 persons, ranking in size just below National Airlines and above most of the smaller U.S. domestic airlines.

Formerly called Civil Air Transport (CAT), Air America was organized after World War II by General Claire Chennault, commander of the American fighter squadrons in Burma and China known as the Flying Tigers. CAT played a major role in post-war China supplying Nationalist troops. CAT also supplied the French during their phase of the war in Indochina.

Air America is commonly considered an arm of the CIA. In Laos, the CIA for the past 10 years or more has maintained an army of hill tribesmen, mainly Thai and Lao mercenaries. Most of the air supply and transport needs for this army have been handled by Air America.

Military Assistance
Though the brochure does not mention opium explicitly,

it hints at the subject of contraband:

"Although flights mainly serve U.S. official personnel movement and native officials and civilians, you sometimes engage in the movement of friendly troops, or of enemy captives; or in the transport of cargo much more potent than rice and beans! There's a war going on. Use your imagination!"

Air America works hand-in-hand with the U.S. Air Force. At Udorn air base in Thailand, Air Force mechanics repair the airline's transports and helicopters, many of them unmarked. The Air Force has reportedly leased giant C130 transports when the planes were needed for opera-

tions in Laos. In the section on Air America's benefits, the brochure lists in addition to normal home and sick leave: "Military leave will be granted appropriately" — an apparent acknowledgement that there are military people working directly with Air America.

One should not conclude, however, that the salaries, excitement and tax advantages mean that Air America pilots hope the war will continue. As the brochure's author notes in a typed postscript:

"Foreign aid situation unclear pending outcome military situation in RVN (Republic of Vietnam), but it looks as if we'll finish the war (and peace terms favorable for our side); if so, it is expected that a boom among contract operators will result when implemented, due to inevitable rehabilitation and reconstruction aid in wartorn areas. . . . Job market highly competitive and you'll need all the help you can get."

According to Pacific News Service, the following men sit on the Air America board of directors:

Samuel Randolph Walker — chairman of the board of Wm. C. Walker's Son, New York; director of Equitable Life Assurance Society; member of Federal City Council, Washington, D.C.; member of Action Council for Better Cities, Urban America, Inc., and life trustee, Columbia University.

William A. Reed — chairman of the board of Simpson Timber Co.; chairman of the Co.; director of Crown Simpson Timber Co.; director of

Seattle First National Bank; director of General Insurance Co.; director of Boeing Co.;

director of Pacific Car Foundry Co.; director of Northern Pacific Railroad; director of Stanford Research Institute.

Arthur Berry Richardson — foreign service officer in Russia, China and England from 1914 to 1936; chairman of the board of Cheeseborough Ponds, Inc. from 1955 to 1961; director of United Hospital Fund, New York; trustee of Lenox Hill Hospital.

James Barr Ames — law partner in Ropes & Gray, Boston; director of Air Asia Co., Ltd., director of International Student Association; member, Cambridge Civic Association and trustee of Mt. Auburn Hospital.

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
ENEMY HITS HARD AT LAOS POSITIONS

Start of Drive on Key Base
Near Plain Is Indicated

By MALCOLM W. BROWNE
Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, Dec. 11— Communist forces mounted heavy attacks on Laotian Government positions near the forward base supporting operations on the Plaine des Jarres over the weekend in what may be the start of a new drive to overrun the base.

The attacks, which were believed to have overrun two Government positions, increased pressure on Long



The New York Times/Dec. 12, 1972

Heavy Communist attacks were reported near Long Tieng (1). Laotians were driving eastward in the Dong Hene area (2).

Tieng, the Government's forward base in the mountains southwest of the Plaine des Jarres.

The plain itself is occupied by strong North Vietnamese forces, and Long Tieng serves as a base for air operations and Government guerrilla attacks against the plain. The base, which lies in a rugged valley, is the headquarters of Gen. Vang Pao and the irregular Meo troops he commands.

Laotian forces in the area are supplied, advised and in some cases commanded by officials of the United States Central Intelligence Agency.

Two of the positions believed to have been overrun by shelling and ground attacks Friday and Saturday were close to the southern tip of the plain.

A third position attacked and believed overrun was only five miles east southeast of Long Tieng, military informants here said. Contact with the Government unit there was lost and many of the defenders are believed to be missing.

Long a Focus of Fighting

In another action near the plain, Communist commandos reportedly attempted to set off explosive charges against defenses at the eastern end of the Long Tieng valley, but were repulsed.

The Long Tieng base, which is supplied by air, is surrounded by mountains in which strong Communist forces frequently operate. Military officials here say the Communists could probably take the base any time they choose, provided they were willing to pay a high cost in casualties.

But a military source said today that the situation there was not regarded as "any worse than usual" and that the several thousand military dependents living at Long Tieng were apparently not seeking to leave.

The Plaine des Jarres, a plateau surrounded by mountains, has been fought over for more than a decade by Communist, neutralist and rightist forces, changing hand frequently.

In official dispatches it is frequently referred to as "strategic," but there are increasing doubts among military observers here as to its real strategic value.

"Obviously we would like to get it back if only because the refugees who left there when the Communists took over would like to go home," an American officer said. "It is important to the Meo tribesmen whose home is there. But in terms of deciding the war in Laos the plain has long been overrated."

In recent months General Vang Pao and his Meo troops have made several attempts to regain a foothold on the plain, but have been driven off each time.

Drive in South Continues

In southern Laos, Government forces were reported today to be continuing their drive to recapture their recently captured market town of Dong Hene past, Muong

Phalane and toward the Ho Chi Minh Trail network bordering South Vietnam.

The Vientiane troops were said to have recaptured a large cache of Communist mortar and rocket shells in a clash seven miles southeast of Muong Phalane. Street fighting was reported continuing in Muong Phalane against North Vietnamese bunkers.

Elsewhere in southern Laos, 10 clashes or shelling attacks were reported around Saravane, which has changed hands a number of times during the last month. Government troops have a precarious hold on the abandoned and shattered town, but Communist pressure remains intense, and a North Vietnamese counterthrust is expected.

STATINTL

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Lao Irregulars Get More Aid Than Regulars

By JOHN EVERINGHAM

Special to The Bulletin

Phou Dum, Laos — The twin antennae of a small U.S. communications transmitter sticks up from a lonely mountain top 10 miles northwest of the village of Luang Prabang in northern Laos.

According to a Thai civilian employed by Air America (under contract to the CIA) to maintain the installation, it provides the U.S. military with communications between northern Laos and the U.S. air base at Udorn, Thailand.

Pro-Communist Pathet Lao forces control everything north and west of the mountain, beginning just a few hundred meters from the transmitter.

Not 'Irregular'

The 400 Lao Teung (mountain Lao) "irregulars" at the installation are among the 30,000 mountain villagers who form the backbone of the CIA's no longer secret army in Laos, an army that is virtually independent of Laotian control.

Officials refer to them as "irregulars," but they are fulltime, highly trained troops. The Special Guerilla Units (SGU) are given credit for the Vientiane government's not having lost control of the whole country. Communist forces occupy three-fourths of Laos.

How did these mountain soldiers wind up in an American army?

"Money," I was told over and over again on a recent overnight visit to the mountain. (Chances of a journalist being given a lift aboard the American helicopter that serves the mountain are about nil. The hike through the mountains took 10 hours.)

They Want Out

They said the only way of getting more than to escape the SGU and the war, return to their villages and families, and grow rice.

The deterrent to escape was the Royal Lao Army — 26 years in the Royal Lao Army. Military service is compulsory for all males of 15, though if a 13-year-old is big enough to hold a gun he will be drafted. And once a soldier, the only way out is bribery or serving until you're 40. Twenty-six years in the Royal Lao Army is risky at the very best odds.

Army recruiting teams reach even remote villages, getting in by helicopter where trucks won't go.

It isn't hard to see why those who had the chance opted for being an "American soldier" instead. "American Army" pay begins at 12,500 kip per month (\$15); Lao army at 4,500 per month (\$5).

Food too, I was assured, was far better and more plentiful, chiefly because the Americans deliver it themselves. Even big jars of local firewater whisky are occasionally given out.

In battle, SGU troops have access to superior weapons and a more reliable flow of ammunition than their brothers in the Lao army. Air support comes faster and their wounded are evacuated more swiftly, said Lieutenant Ohn See, the company commander.

More Respect

The Lao Teung speak of the "American bosses" with more respect than do the Meo SGUs with whom they share these highlands.

Before CIA militarization of the two mountain tribes, the Meo had a firmly established social-political structure which the CIA brushed aside. But the Lao Teung were disorganized and scattered, and the CIA had no need to interfere with their traditional leadership.

The Lao Teung's economic position has always been well below that of the Meo. Their crops were less carefully tended and their livestock fewer.

Now CIA militarization has

the Lao Teung. But the once prosperous Meo have been decimated by the CIA's military programs.

The tens of thousands of unwilling and unknowing tribesmen helicoptered up to the Plain of Jars each dry season since 1968 have been cut to pieces by communist guns and shelling.

Barely 10 percent of the Meos survive in their traditional mountain-top homes. As their villages fell behind Communist lines, they were bombed by the Americans.

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U.S. aid is still pouring into Laos

STATINTL

By ARNOLD R. ISAACS
Sun-Staff Correspondent

Vientiane, Laos—The United States role in the Indochina war may have diminished—but not in Laos.

No longer top secret but still partly concealed from public view, the American war effort in support of the Lao government remains as large as ever. Without it, U.S. and Lao officials agree, the war against the Pathet Lao and its North Vietnamese allies would collapse not in months but possibly in days.

"They might last a couple of weeks without us," said an American officer with long experience in Laos. He grinned, but he wasn't joking. A Lao colonel, asked how long it would take with continued outside aid for the Lao Army to be able to defend itself, said seriously: "Eight or 10 years."

In support of the government's war effort, the U.S. is providing direct military aid of \$350 million a year. This is about 10 times the whole Lao national budget, and almost twice the country's gross national product.

The aid totals do not include the cost of American bombing, which is mounted from outside Laos. Although the present extent of bombing in Laos is not known, fighter-bombers and B-52's have at times in the past reached sortie rates over Laos exceeding the highest ever reached over North Vietnam.

U.S. aid to Laos began in the 1950's. During the confused warfare preceding the Geneva Conference of 1962, the Americans supplied nearly half a billion dollars for military, salaries and equipment, administering the military assistance through a mission misleadingly called the Program Evaluation Office and manned by military officers in civilian clothes under the guise of "technicians"—an operation that foreshadowed later clandestine efforts.

When the Geneva Accords banned foreign military aid, the Americans conscientiously withdrew 666 military advisers. Only 40 of the 10,000 North Vietnamese advisers remained in Laos withdrew under International Control Commission supervision, though others may have faded across the border. The war quickly resumed, and so did American support.

In 1964-1965, when the Americans launched full-scale air war in Indochina and the North Vietnamese increased their commitment of men and arms to the battles in South Vietnam, the Laos war took on a pattern that has remained essentially unchanged ever since.

The U.S., seeking to impede the flow of Communist troops and supplies down the Ho Chi Minh trail complex in eastern Laos, stepped up its support of Lao government troops in return for diplomatic silence on U.S. bombing of the trail. The North Vietnamese in turn increased their aid to the Lao Communist forces in northern Laos, committing thousands of their own men to keep Lao government troops pinned down safely away from the approaches to the trail and North Vietnam's border.

In the ensuing years, both Washington and Hanoi attempted to hide the degree of their involvement in Laos. The North Vietnamese have never acknowledged the presence of their troops in the country—now estimated to number about 20,000. The Americans, though feeling their aid was justified by North Vietnam's violation of the Geneva agreement, apparently felt it would be embarrassing to intervene openly while Hanoi continued to deny its role.

Though an effort as large as the U.S. war in Laos could not really be kept hidden, official secrecy was maintained for a long time. It was not until March, 1970, that President Nixon publicly acknowledged American aircraft were bombing Laos, though the facts had been known long before.

Few details

Though the bombing is now officially admitted, few details are made available. The number of missions each day, for example, is not disclosed, nor are weekly, monthly or even yearly totals. Presumably this is not for security reasons, since the Americans have for years released fairly precise figures on the number of air attacks each day in North and South Vietnam.

It is known, though, that the bombing has been very heavy. In 1969-1970, a period in which most bombing of North Vietnam was suspended, the sortie rate over Laos was reported to have been 400 a day—a higher rate than has ever been reached over North Vietnam.

In the ground war, American Embassy officials, military attaches and Central Intelligence Agency personnel are deeply involved in war planning. The U.S. Embassy spokesman in Vientiane, gives a military briefing for correspondents at 11.30 every morning.

The briefings are quite detailed except on U.S. operations. Though the spokesman will often refer to air strikes, for example, he will not say whose planes were flying them.

All supplies

On the ground, the U.S. furnishes all the weapons, ammunition and supplies for the 55,000-man Royal Lao Army—which, despite the U.S. aid, still is regarded as poorly trained, badly led and largely ineffective except for defensive garrison duty.

The main American effort has been with the irregular units, originally organized, trained, paid and in many cases directed by the CIA. The irregular forces have grown to about 30,000 men, and many of them are only very loosely controlled by the Lao military command—a fact which is now giving some concern to the government and to U.S. officials looking ahead to a possible cease-fire.

The origins of the irregular forces are still shrouded in secrecy, but the information available suggests that the Americans did not intend, in the beginning, to create what has become a parallel army. The first units apparently were formed by the CIA to wage guerrilla warfare against the

Ho Chi Minh trail—an activity that might have embarrassed the Lao government, which has always regarded the war in Eastern Laos as the affair of the Americans and North Vietnamese.

An American official said, the irregular units "just grew"—

partly because many Americans felt the Royal Lao Army was simply too inept to be made into a capable fighting force.

"Has evolved"

"The situation has evolved," said an American officer, speaking of the formation of the irregular units, "and I'm not sure our policy has evolved along with it as it should have."

Along with the irregular units, the U.S. pays and equips battalions of "volunteers" from Thailand. Almost everything about the Thai units is classified, because both the Lao and Thai governments are sensitive on the subject. There are said to be about 12,000 Thai troops in the country now, almost double the number present a year ago.

Working with the Lao forces, according to the U.S. Embassy, are 320 U.S. advisers, which does not seem a large number but actually represents a far higher ratio of American advisers to local troops than has existed for years in South Vietnam.

It is not known how many Americans working for "the annex"—local slang for the CIA—are directly involved with military or paramilitary units.

Between 300 and 400 Americans provide logistical support for Lao forces, mostly through Air America, the CIA-financed charter airline that flies troops and supplies throughout the country. Air America's helicopters and transport planes, some of them with the company's insignia but most unmarked, can be seen at virtually every airstrip in Laos.

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War & Heroin—an Expensive Habit

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Alfred W. McCoy, with Cathleen B. Read and Leonard P. Adams II. Harper & Row. 464 pp. \$10.95.

BRUCE M. RUSSETT

Mr. Russett teaches political science at Yale University.

Most Americans used to think that the costs of an interventionist foreign policy were low. For relatively small expenditures of foreign aid money, arms, or occasionally the presence of American troops, one could build bastions of the Free World all around the globe. Anti-Communist governments in the underdeveloped countries could be supported or created, and anti-Communist politicians subsidized. Indeed, as in the Shan states of Burma or the Indonesian islands, separatist forces could be encouraged—if the ruling government could not be overthrown, or at least persuaded to move in desired directions. Some of these efforts might also bring enlightened governments and policies to the countries in question. Others would succeed at the cost of strengthening or imposing corrupt, oligarchic, reactionary governments. Many others would fail, at the cost of death and misery for the peoples who lived in those distant countries. But the costs to the United States would be minimal, easily tolerated by the world's richest power. And those small costs to us seemed far preferable to living in a world of Communist or neutralist-nationalist states.

Our innocence about the costs of an interventionist foreign policy has been lost in the wake of Indochina. Even if we could (as many still would) ignore the costs of our war to the wretched peoples of that area, we now have felt some substantial costs to ourselves. Fifty-six thousand young Americans dead, \$200 billion spent, an economy and foreign trade balance badly out of kilter, intense strains on our domestic, social and political system—these we now recognize as part of the price we pay. In this new book Alfred McCoy and his associates show us another cost, very possibly the grimmest of all, resulting from our addiction to interventionism: the heroin plague.

Drug addiction has of course been a curse of men for many centuries, and the United States has had thousands of heroin addicts since about sixty years ago. Neither the CIA nor Dean Rusk nor Henry Kissinger invented heroin addiction. But every designer, executor, or enthusiast for an interventionist foreign policy (and that includes me and prob-

ably you in our less-enlightened days) contributed by failing to know or to care much about the more subtle consequences of that policy.

As McCoy points out, there were around 20,000 addicts in the United States in 1946; the best estimates are that the figures then grew to about

57,000 in 1965, 315,000 in 1969, and 560,000 in 1971. The avalanche of addiction was made possible by an evil combination of supply and demand. Demand means the ability of American drug consumers to pay high prices, social conditions feeding the desire for an escape, and the enthusiasm of pushers prepared to distribute free samples generously. Under such circumstances the market will grow as fast as supply will permit. The supply comes from abroad: formerly from Turkey and Iran, now largely from Southeast Asia—60 to 70 per cent of the world's illicit opium from the "Golden Triangle" of Burma, Laos and Thailand. It is grown by peasants, shipped to the United States and distributed by Corsican and Mafia underworld gangs, and moved from the peasants to the gangs with the assistance of such friendly Freedom Fighters as Gen. Phoumi Nosavan of Laos, and Ngo Dinh Diem and Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky of South Vietnam. After enormous and carefully documented exposition McCoy finds that the United States:

... has acquired enormous power in the region. And it has used this power to create new nations where none existed, handpick prime ministers, topple governments, and crush revolutions. But U.S. officials in Southeast Asia have always tended to consider the opium traffic a quaint local custom and have generally turned a blind eye to official involvement. . . . However, American involvement has gone far beyond coincidental complicity; embassies have covered up involvement by client governments, CIA contract airlines have carried opium, and individual CIA agents have winked at the opium traffic.

This important book should not be interpreted as a piece of yellow journalism or as an exposé of scandals in the CIA. It details none of the classic sort of corruption for personal enrichment on the part of CIA men or of any other U.S. Government officials (though there is plenty on the part of the locals). The corruption is of a more subtle sort, stemming from the enthusiasm of "good" men for doing a good job. The job was defined as halting communism; the choice of means or of allies was not so important. One worked with the tools available. If this meant Corsican gangs in Marseilles, the Mafia in Sicily, or

opium runners and their accomplices in Southeast Asia, that was just the way it had to be. In any case, it usually seemed to be the citizens of the countries far away, not Americans, who paid the price of such alliances. Until 1970, for instance, opium grown in the Golden Triangle stayed almost entirely in Southeast Asia for Southeast Asians. Only in that spring did the great flood of heroin

to GIs in Vietnam begin, and only later still did it start to flow directly to the United States. And it was not until that time that senior officials in the U.S. Government decided that the Southeast Asian heroin trade should be suppressed.

McCoy and his colleagues show us, convincingly, that the heroin trade grew with the acquiescence and sometimes with the assistance of men in our government. Without our government's history of single-minded anti-communism, and of meddling in the politics of foreign lands, our government and our people would now have a heroin problem of much smaller proportions: Official American complicity in the drug trade has to stop. No matter how much some cold-warrior leaders may like the foreign policy of a particular foreign government, if that government is condoning heroin traffic, American military and economic aid should be withdrawn. The

continued

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THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: TIME FOR REVIEW?

The intelligence community, and its budget, pose many problems of traditional concern to the Federation of American Scientists: governmental reform, morality, proper use of high technology, and defense expenditures. In the last quarter century, intelligence agencies have proliferated. The United States has established an agency which goes beyond intelligence collection and, periodically, interferes in the internal affairs of other nations. Technology suited to the invasion of national and personal privacy has been developed apace. And the \$4 to \$6 billion being spent for intelligence might well be termed the largest "unreviewed" part of the defense budget.

Twenty-five years after the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, it seems a good time to consider the problems posed by these developments.

Of least concern in terms of its budget but of over-riding significance in its international political impact, is the Directorate of Plans of CIA, within which clandestine political operations are mounted. This is the issue discussed in this newsletter. More and more, informed observers question whether clandestine political operations ought to be continued on a "business as usual" basis. In the absence of an investigation, a "secret bureaucracy"—which started in the Office of Strategic Services during a hot war and which grew in the CIA during a cold war—may simply continue to practice a questionable trade.

Clandestine "dirty tricks" have their costs not only abroad but at home, where they are encouraged only too easily. And is not interference in the affairs of other nations wrong?

Two decades ago, as the cold war gained momentum, one of America's greatest political scientists, Harold D. Lasswell, wrote a comprehensive and prophetic book, "National Security and Individual Freedom." He warned of the "insidious menace" that a continuing crisis might "undermine and eventually destroy free institutions." We would see, he predicted: pressure for defense expenditures, expansion and centralization of Government, withholding of information, general suspicion, an undermining of press and public opinion, a weakening of political parties, a decline of the Congress, and of the courts.

Today, with the Cold War waning, it seems in order to reexamine our institutions, goals and standards. Which responses to the emergency of yesterday can we justify today? ☐

The National Security Act of 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency and gave it overall responsibility for coordinating the intelligence activities of the several relevant government departments and agencies interested in such matters. Today, a quarter century later, CIA is reported to have a budget of about \$700-million to \$1-billion and a staff of perhaps 18,000 people, or about 8,000 more than the Department of State! (This advantage in size gives CIA an edge in interdepartmental meetings for which, for example, others may be too rushed to fully prepare or not be able to assign a suitable person.)

The National Security Act authorized CIA to:

"perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence

agencies such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more effectively accomplished centrally;

"perform such other functions and duties *related to intelligence* affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." (italics added)

These clauses clearly authorize clandestine intelligence collection but they are also used to justify clandestine political operations. However, overthrowing governments, secret wars, assassination, and fixing elections are certainly not done "for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies" nor are they duties "related to intelligence." Someday a court may rule that political activities are not authorized.

In any case, at the urging of Allen Dulles, the National Security Council issued a secret directive (NSC 10/2) in 1948, authorizing such special operations of all kinds—provided they were secret and small enough to be pausable and deniable by the Government.

Even this authority has been exceeded since several impossible-to-deny operations have been undertaken: the U-2 flight, the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Iranian Coup, the Laotian War, and so on.

The National Security Act gave the CIA no "police subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions..." But another secret Executive Branch document evidently did give the CIA authority to engage in domestic operations related to its job. It was under this authority that such organizations as foundations, educational organizations, and private voluntary groups were involved with the CIA at the time of the National Student Association revelations (1966).

The "white" part of CIA is, in a sense, a cover for the "black" side. CIA supporters and officials invariably emphasize the intelligence, rather than the manipulation function of CIA, ignoring the latter or using phrases that gloss over it quietly. The public can easily accept the desirability of *knowing* as much as possible. But its instincts oppose doing abroad what it would not tolerate at home. And it rightly fears that injustices committed abroad may begin to be tolerated at home: how many elections can be fixed abroad before we begin to try it here? The last election showed such a degeneration of traditional American standards.

The present Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, is working hard and effectively at presenting an image of CIA that will not offend. In a recent speech, he said:

"The same objectivity which makes us useful to our government and our country leaves us uncomfortably aware of our ambiguous place in it. . . . We propose to adapt intelligence to American society, not vice versa."

Even construed narrowly, this is no easy job, and adapting clandestine political operations to American ideals may well be quite impossible.

At the time of the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy gave serious consideration to breaking CIA into two pieces: one piece would conduct operations and the other would just collect intelligence. The dangers were only too evident

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STATINTL

Laos: New facts on secret war

By Richard E. Ward
Second of a series

Clandestine sabotage, combat and espionage missions have been conducted in Laos and Cambodia by U.S. military personnel, despite White House denials and contrary to congressional prohibition.

Such missions are top-secret actions directed by the Studies and Observations Group of the U.S. Army Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, located in Saigon and generally known by its initials, MAC-V SOG. The most comprehensive picture of these activities available, based on testimony of former participants in these missions, known as Command and Control operations, is contained in a series of three articles by Gerald Meyer, published in the Nov. 5, 10 and 12 issues of the St. Louis Post Dispatch.

Unless otherwise indicated all material in this article is based on the articles by Meyer, a regular staff member of the Post Dispatch, who interviewed former Special Forces members, helicopter pilots and others who took part in the Command and Control operations during the 1960s and into 1972.

The Post Dispatch's informants, whose names were not revealed to protect them from possible prosecution, stated that the clandestine commando raids were still in progress as of August. One informant said that in August when he left Bien Hoa, one of the Command and Control bases, more than 100 Army Special Forces were stationed there and reinforcements were being sent from Okinawa.

The commando raids in recent years, utilizing Army personnel who generally command teams composed of mercenaries from Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam, were also sent into North Vietnam and liberated areas of South Vietnam. There is evidence that the Air Force has operational jurisdiction over a similar program based at Nakon Phanom, Thailand, just across the Laotian border.

Commando raids were ordered by

Washington against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the early 1960's, as documented in the Pentagon Papers, but which provided few details. The present program, apparently undergoing a partial "Vietnamization," is an outgrowth of the original escalation of CIA-Special Forces missions in Indochina ordered by the Kennedy administration.

Although the Post Dispatch does not mention the CIA, it is clear that Studies and Observations Group is a CIA operation. The informant most knowledgeable about SOG, a Special Forces officer, was described by correspondent Meyer as fearful of being jailed or fined, saying: "If I talked to you and got caught, I could get 10 years in prison and a \$10,000 fine."

The Special Forces officer said that the connections between Command and Control and the 'MAC-V SOG' organization in Saigon were so highly classified that we would not risk commenting on them," wrote Meyer.

Despite his reluctance to talk the officer explained that the Command and Control operations were "formally" under the direction of the Fifth Special Forces Group until January 1971, when the Fifth Special Forces officially was described as having been withdrawn from Vietnam. Actually, according to Meyer, "numerous Fifth Special Forces were left behind at Command and Control bases throughout South Vietnam" and various efforts were employed to conceal their continued presence. They were forbidden to wear the green beret and Special Forces insignia while they remained in Indochina.

Symbolic of the Command and Control operations, was a gestapo-like insignia, used by one of the units, a green-bereted skull with blood dripping from its teeth. This was the emblem of Command and Control Central. There were at least two other main units, Command and Control North and Command and Control South. The North, Central and South referred to the base areas of the commando teams.

Apparently most of the operations under the Command and Control program, at least in recent years, took place in southern Laos. However, after the U.S.-Saigon invasion of Cambodia and subsequent Congressional prohibition against use of U.S. ground troops in Cambodia, it is safe to assume that the secret U.S. missions were increased in the latter country.

Airborne bandits

Typically, Command and Control missions comprised several U.S. officers or NCO's commanding a mercenary team which would land in Laos or Cambodia, and "aimed at taking prisoners, gathering information and disrupting communist activities." The commandos would be transported in four helicopters, while four helicopter gunships would provide air cover, at least initially. Two other aircraft, one serving as a command post and a second as the forward air controller, were also involved in missions.

One Special Forces Veteran, who participated in Command and Control raids from Danang, said he had taken part in missions in North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. "He said they were for the purpose of gathering intelligence, rescuing other American missions threatened by North Vietnamese forces, destroying supplies and disrupting enemy communications facilities."

Command and Control Central, operating out of Dakto and Kontum, near the tri-border area of South Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia, was used for raids deep within the two latter countries.

"A Special Forces soldier formerly assigned to Command and Control Central said that the group's missions were handled by about 150 Americans and from 300 to 400

Montagnard tribesmen. Men participating in missions first were transported to Dakto and then sent by helicopter across the borders, he said.

"The missions were rotated among the men and casualties were severe, the man said. . . . Such teams usually included two or three American leaders and about half a dozen Montagnards.

"Dakto was the starting point also for large 'hatchet forces,' with larger numbers of Americans and Montagnards. . . .

"Less frequently—apparently only about once every six months—very large groups of Americans were sent across the borders on so-called Slam (Search, locate and annihilate) missions. More than 100 men sometimes participated in such missions. . . .

"Some penetrations into Laos apparently were quite deep. Both the Special Forces (two of Meyer's informants) said the U.S. operated a radio relay station on a mountain top about 30 miles inside Laos.

"This station, called the 'Eagle's Nest,' was used to transmit messages between South Vietnam and Command and Control teams operating beyond the mountain top in the Laotian countryside."

The radio station, whose exact location was not specified, could have been located near the Bolovens plateau, in Southern Laos, where the Pathet Lao told this correspondent in 1970 there was a secret U.S. base. The Pathet Lao liberation forces captured

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Is the Government a Partner in Red China's Death Trade?

*For some mysterious reason, the Nixon Administration
is lying to the people about imports of opium and
heroin from Red China*

BY KENNETH JOHNS

HOW MUCH of President Nixon's re-election was engendered by "blood money" from the Red Chinese narcotics "death trade?" This is the question that many observers are asking as they speculate about the sources of the large sums of money contributed to Nixon's campaign committee whose donors were not publicly identified.

The informed guess is that these sums were payoffs from those who control the traffic in opium. Several Washington correspondents pointed out that the "missing item" not discussed by President Nixon and Chinese Communist leaders during the meetings earlier this year was the question of stopping the deadly shipments of heroin and its source material, opium, from the China mainland.

The rapidly growing number of dope addicts is considered by experts to be the number one danger to this country's health and internal security.

Extremely suspicious also is the repetition of statements about stopping the flow of opium from Turkey. This country grows only a small part of total world production, about 400 tons, compared to 1,000 tons in Southeast Asia and an estimated 10,000 tons in Red China.

A substantial part of world produc-

tion ends up in the United States to supply its estimated 600,000 heroin addicts. Yet, the Nixon Administration and its spokesmen constantly play down or deny the existence of large imports, especially from China.

Noteworthy also is the fact that while official pronouncements are made deploring the "evil" from President Nixon down, the Nixon Administration has assigned *only ten agents to all of Asia* to intercept shipments. As one expert put it, "If he's [Nixon] really interested in stopping the flow he would see that the CIA, FBI and other agencies assign 500 to Hong Kong, 500 to Bangkok and 500 to Saigon. These are the major trans-shipment points to the U.S. This would make a dent in the supplies reaching the U.S."

See No Evil, Hear No Evil . . .

Preposterous as it may sound, the Administration's *official policy is that no heroin or opium comes from Red China*. Why this outright lie in the face of what all experts and foreign government officials know is not so?

Red China's involvement in the opium traffic has been known to informed people, both in and out of government, for years. One of the first government experts to point out the existence of the "death trade" was Harry J. Anslinger, director of the Bureau of Narcotics from 1949 to 1962. In 1955 he told the Senate Judiciary Committee

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N.J. Ex-Green Beret Admits Killing Triple Spy

(Former Green Beret Capt. Robert F. Marasco and seven other Special Forces members were involved in one of the major controversies of the Vietnam War in 1969 when accused of murdering a triple agent. Now a civilian in Bloomfield, he spent many hours being interviewed by Daily Journal reporter Thomas Michalski, recalling events surrounding the assassination that he says never were made public).

By THOMAS MICHALSKI
Journal Staff Writer

Former Green Beret Capt. Robert F. Marasco said he and other Special Forces personnel were involved in clandestine cross border intelligence operations in Cambodia as far back as 1963.

That fact is actually irrelevant, however, in that small units of U.S. military and the Central Intelligence Agency have been operating "unwritten about" sorties into both Cambodia and Laos for several years previous to 1963.

But Marasco and seven other Green Berets were accused by the Army with the June 1969 "elimination" of Thai Khac Chuyen, a triple agent who jointly served the U.S., North Vietnam and South Vietnam governments as a spy. This came directly as a result of "out-of-country" operations.

Chuyen, Marasco told The Daily Journal was not "properly checked out" by American intelligence officials

Cambodia and Laos during 1963-69.

The case blossomed into an emotion-laden controversy that touched Congress, the secretaries of the Army and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and President Nixon himself.

Marasco was charged with pumping two bullets into Chuyen's head before his body was dumped into the shark-infested South China Sea. It was an act which Marasco has since freely admitted.

The case, however, was dropped after a public outcry and CIA refusal to provide witnesses for a proposed Army court marshal of the seven.

That announcement came in September 1969 from then-Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor and, according to White House Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler, the decision was "approved" by President Nixon.

Marasco said he "no longer feels constrained from making disclosures which will clear the facts and show that all of us involved acted with honor and in the best interests of our country."

With the war in Southeast Asia now apparently coming to an end, Marasco disclosed in detail several incidents leading up to Chuyen's assassination.

He spoke of the highly secret "Project Gamma," how and why the Berets were charged with murder and conspiracy, the reasons why they were eventually set free, and of an incredible escape plan.

To begin this story one must understand Marasco himself. Now 30, a mod dresser, and a partner in his father's Bloomfield insurance agency, Marasco is quiet, intelligent, cool and calculating.

"I am not and never was a

killer," he says. "What I did in Vietnam was a job . . . for the best interests of my country."

Marasco's first wife was a college professor, "a staunch antiwar, but not necessarily anti-Vietnam war type. She was a pacifist. And a leader of the anti-war movement at her university at the time. To be married to a Green Beret, it just didn't go together.

"Of course," he said, "just having been in the service alone didn't go. Being a Green Beret compounded it and then, of course, the 'incident' compounded it more."

After his graduation from Bloomfield High School, Marasco went on to Fairleigh-Dickinson University where, in 1962, he earned a business administration degree.

Marasco went into the insurance field to get background in underwriting, claims adjusting and sales.

"I ultimately wanted to work for my father," he said. "But I wanted to be able to offer something to his agency, not just being the boss' son."

In 1966 Marasco, at 24, received his Army draft notice.

"I went to the recruiter and had him convince me why it would be worth my while to enlist and give him an extra year," he explained. "We came to an agreement that I would go into the counter-intelligence corps as an enlisted man."

Marasco admits today that he enlisted "because I wanted to stay out of the infantry."

He went to Fort Dix in March 1966 where he was called "Pappy" because of his age. "I was older than my drill sergeant," he recalled.

The next stop was Fort Holabird in Baltimore for counter-intelligence training. Marasco then volunteered for

Officer's Candidate School and went to Fort Benning, Ga.

"After six months at OCS I didn't want to go back to intelligence," he said. "I felt the Army was taking the best officer candidates and putting them in the soft branches like intelligence, transportation and the quartermaster corps.

"The best men were going to all other fields, and it seemed like they were putting the worst officers in the infantry," he said. "This should not have been because the infantry is the most important branch in the Army."

Despite his feelings voiced only moments earlier about serving in the infantry, Marasco said at this point, "I thought I could be a good infantry officer . . . I just wanted to stay in the infantry . . . they (the Army) wouldn't let me because of my central intelligence training."

In April 1967 Marasco was commissioned a second lieutenant and went back to Fort Holabird for additional training. He then was assigned to an intelligence unit in Washington.

"I met the assignment captain there," Marasco recalled. "I prevailed upon him to send me to Vietnam because that was the only way you could get out of any unit at the time."

Before going to Southeast Asia, Marasco went to parachute school and other schools required by the Special Forces.

"My assignment was to Fifth Special Forces Group (Green Berets) in South Vietnam," Marasco said. "But I was diverted to the 101st Airborne Division where I stayed for six or seven months."

STATINTL

First of 3 articles


before his assignment as a principal agent for the Fifth Special Forces Group in

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HEROÏNE: LES POURVOYEURS

Michel R. Lamberti et Catherine Lamour ont fait le tour du monde pour remonter toutes les filières qui mènent aux vrais patrons de la drogue

 « Si nous ne venons pas à bout de ce fléau, c'est lui qui viendra à bout de nous », s'exclamait, le 17 juin 1971, le président Nixon devant des dizaines de millions de téléspectateurs. Les Etats-Unis ont, en effet, le triste privilège de compter le plus grand nombre d'héroïnomanes du monde : plus d'un demi-million actuellement, dont trois cent mille pour la seule ville de New York. Plus de 50 % des crimes perpétrés dans les grandes villes sont directement liés à la drogue : on tue pour se procurer l'argent nécessaire à l'achat d'une dose d'héroïne.

Le phénomène n'est pas seulement américain : tous les pays européens voient croître à une vitesse vertigineuse le nombre de leurs héroïnomanes. En France, où la pénétration de la drogue n'a été sensible qu'à partir de 1968, on en compte déjà vingt mille. Et le ministère de la Santé estime que le pays pourrait compter cent mille héroïnomanes en 1976.

Couper la source

La drogue n'est plus un simple problème de police. Partant du principe évident, exposé dernièrement à un journaliste américain de « U.S. News and World Report » par l'ancien directeur des Douanes américaines, Myles J. Ambrose, et selon lequel « on ne peut pas devenir toxicomane si l'on ne trouve pas de stupéfiants », Washington a décidé de remonter à la source, c'est-à-dire à la production même de l'opium, dont l'héroïne est un dérivé.

Couper la source d'approvisionnement des trafiquants, c'est intervenir dans les affaires des pays producteurs : de politique, la lutte contre la toxicomanie est devenue politique. Se posant une fois de plus en « gendarmes du monde » mais, cette fois, pour une cause dont personne ne songe à discuter le bien-fondé, les Etats-Unis se sont lancés dans une croisade que d'aucuns jugent d'avance vouée à l'échec.

On produit, en effet, chaque année, dans le monde, assez d'opium pour approvisionner les cinq cent mille héroïnomanes américains pendant cinquante ans : deux à trois mille tonnes, dont la moitié seulement est destinée à l'industrie pharmaceu-

tique. Le reste passe sur le marché entre les mains des trafiquants qui approvisionnent les fumeurs d'opium et les héroïnomanes.

Les trafiquants peuvent se fournir à deux sources différentes :

• 1) Les pays dans lesquels la culture du pavot est légale et contrôlée par l'Etat, mais où une partie de la récolte échappe aux autorités administratives.

• 2) Les pays dans lesquels la culture du pavot est en principe interdite, mais qui n'ont pas les moyens matériels et politiques — ou le désir — de faire respecter cette loi.

La Turquie, troisième producteur mondial, entrait dans la première catégorie. Jusqu'à ce que le gouvernement d'Ankara décide de proscrire la culture du pavot sur tout le territoire turc à partir de 1972, 25 % de la production d'opium était détournée vers le marché clandestin, alors qu'elle aurait dû, en principe, être entièrement achetée par l'Etat. Ce pays n'est pas le seul à connaître pareil problème, une enquête effectuée par le service stratégique des renseignements du Bureau des Narcotiques américain (B.N.D.D.) donnait, pour 1971, les chiffres suivants :

	Production (1) écoulee sur le marché licite	Production écoulee sur le marché clandestin
Turquie	150	35 à 50
Inde	1 200	250
Pakistan	6	175-200
Iran	150	?
U.R.S.S.	115	?
République popu- laire de Chine	100	?
Yougoslavie . . .	0,83	1,7
Japon	5	—
Triangle d'or (Thaïlande - Bir- manie - Laos)		750
Afghanistan . . .		100-150
Mexique		5-15

(1) En tonnes.

Contrairement à ce que l'on pourrait penser, les « fuites » ne sont pas proportionnelles à l'importance de la production licite ni à celle des superficies cultivées

en pavot. Elles dépendent du plus ou moins grand sous-développement administratif du pays concerné et de la capacité des autorités locales à exercer un contrôle effectif sur les paysans, au moment des récoltes.

Pourtant, même des contrôles rigoureux ne suffisent pas à éviter les détournements, compte tenu de la différence de prix pratiqués sur le marché officiel et sur le marché clandestin. L'exemple de l'Inde le prouve, où, en dépit d'un système de contrôle gouvernemental cité en exemple par toutes les instances internationales, les fuites s'élèvent à 18 % de la production totale. La Yougoslavie laisserait échapper près de 70 % de sa production. Le Pakistan, enfin, qui produit légalement six tonnes d'opium, contribuerait pour près de deux cents tonnes à l'approvisionnement des trafiquants.

Le pavot partout

Dans une deuxième catégorie de pays, la production de l'opium est illégale. Il n'existe évidemment aucun organisme d'Etat chargé de contrôler une production qui, en principe, n'existe pas. Clandestine, la récolte d'opium est entièrement écoulée sur le marché parallèle. Selon le B.N.D.D., ces pays contribueraient pour huit cent cinquante à mille tonnes à l'approvisionnement du trafic.

D'autres régions, sur lesquelles on ne possède absolument aucune information, produisent de l'opium en quantité appréciable : le Népal et, probablement, la Syrie et le Kurdistan irakien. On signale aussi l'apparition de champs de pavots en Amérique du Sud. Contrairement à ce que l'on a souvent affirmé, la culture du pavot ne requiert pas de conditions géographiques ou climatiques exceptionnelles. Elle réclame seulement une main-d'œuvre abondante et un bon marché car la récolte demande beaucoup de soins et de minutie.

Nombre de pays qui ne sont pas producteurs traditionnels d'opium pourraient, s'ils le voulaient, se mettre à cultiver le pavot. C'est le cas tout récent du Japon. La production d'opium a, de ce fait, tendance à croître en fonction de la demande et pourrait encore augmenter considérablement. Des indices nombreux m

Enemy Military Leaders, to Show 'Respect,'

STATINTL

By MALCOLM W. BROWNE

Special to the New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, Nov. 25

— There were ferris wheels and Charlie Chaplin movies and horse races and cancan dancers and a one-legged American stunt pilot to entertain both royalty and revolutionaries at the That Luang Fair.

The annual fair, which ended today, is a two-week festival just outside Vientiane, in which this little country's citizens gather to reaffirm their faith in Buddhism and fealty to the King.

It is also an occasion for spectacular displays of the kind of fraternizing between enemies that has led some outsiders over the years to conclude that the war in Laos is not to be taken seriously.

It was taken for granted this year that the Communist-led Pathet Lao delegation currently in Vientiane would join enemy military leaders of the Vientiane Government in prostrating themselves before King Savang

Vatthana, and the public was not disappointed.

Asked why the Pathet Lao had participated in the annual profession of loyalty to the King, their spokesman, Set Petrasy, replied:

"We participate in religious festivals because of our wish to show respect for the customs and religion of our country."

Nine nations contributed small pavilions to the fair this year, mainly to show photographs of life in those countries.

Bow to a King at a Fair in Laos

The French pavillion offered a juggling act and dancing the Soviet pavillion showed movies of World War II on an outdoor screen and the South Vietnamese displayed lacquerware, nuoc fish sauce and other products.

But as King Savang Vatthana and the royal entourage, accompanied by the Premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, made the rounds of the pavilions, the first stop was at the relatively elaborate American pavilion.

Inside, there were movies of astronauts, recorded music and a model of Niagara Falls. The King paused politely before each exhibit as it was explained by Ambassador G. McMurtie Godley. The diplomatic corps that followed the King into the pavilion did not include the Russians or Chinese; they waited outside.

As the King emerged, the Americans treated him to a show that captured the attention of most of the tens of thousands of people on the fair grounds.

Roaring out of the sultry low overcast was a tiny white biplane that pulled up just over the King in a spectacular display of aerobatics.

The King, the crown prince and the Premier seemed to be enjoying the show, but for some of the spectators, the show was not without embarrassment.

Word was spread that the pilot of the plane was James H. Rhyne, a pilot of Air America, the quasi-military airline operated by the Central Intelligence Agency.

B52 Raids Called 'A Signal to Hanoi'

By EDITH M. LEDERER
Associated Press

SAIGON — U.S. B52 bombers continued their heaviest raids of the war over North Vietnam yesterday.

The North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry issued another statement condemning the bombing attacks, and American military sources indicated the raids were a signal to Hanoi that the United States will not stop its bombing below the 20th Parallel until a peace agreement is reached. The peace talks have gone into recess until Dec. 4.

U.S. officials disclosed that a second B52 was damaged in a surface-to-air missile attack last week that claimed the first B52 combat loss of the Vietnam war. None of the six crewmen on the damaged plane was injured but two of the six crewmen on the downed aircraft were hurt.

U.S. officials in Vientiane, Laos, also disclosed that an Air America C7 Caribou cargo plane flying in support of Laotian irregular forces, was shot down by enemy anti-aircraft fire Thursday, killing two Americans, a Thai and a Lao. Air America is backed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

10th Lost in 5 Days

The Air America plane was the 10th American aircraft lost in Indochina in five days, one of the heaviest tolls in several months. Six Americans were killed, 11 rescued and three are missing in the crashes.

As reports circulate in Paris of serious differences between U.S. and Hanoi negotiators, the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry said the B52 attacks "laid bare the deceitfulness of the Nixon administration's professed desire to end its military involvement and restore peace."

In South Vietnam, tens of thousands of marchers demonstrated along a 50-mile stretch of Highway 4 in an anti-Communist protest to show that the government is in control of the main road through the Mekong Delta.

The marchers carried flags and banners demanding that North Vietnamese troops get out of South Vietnam and declaring that "coalition with the Communists is suicide."

During the 24-hour period ending at noon yesterday, the U.S. command reported 14 more B52 missions against North Vietnamese targets below the 20th Parallel. Sources said that brought to more than 200 the number of missions against the North in the last

five days, the heaviest B52 raids of the war in the North.

The U.S. command said the attacks were centered on supply caches awaiting shipment to Laos and South Vietnam. But the North Vietnamese claim the Stratofortresses are bombing populated areas and causing heavy civilian casualties and damage.

President Nixon halted bombing above the 20th Parallel Oct. 23 in a move administration officials described as a good-will gesture following announcement of the draft cease-fire agreement.

Less than three weeks later, air strikes were intensified below the 20th Parallel to counter what American officials described as an intensive North Vietnamese supply buildup.

Heavy Ground Fighting

Since monsoon rains have sharply curtailed strikes by smaller fighter-bombers, the B52s have undertaken the burden of the bombing mission in North Vietnam's southern panhandle.

On the ground, heavy fighting continued in the central highlands 15 to 20 miles southwest of Pleiku City. Shellings were reported at Dalat in the highlands and at Cu Chi base camp 18 miles northwest of Saigon. No casualties were reported.

The Air Force credited the pilot of the downed B52 with saving top-secret electronics equipment from falling into North Vietnamese hands.

The Air Force praised Capt. Norbert J. Ostrozny, 30, of Lackawanna, N.Y., for guiding the crippled bomber from North Vietnam into friendly territory before it crashed.

U.S. officials said a SAM missile exploded 150 feet off the right wing of Ostrozny's aircraft near the North Vietnamese port of Vinh. Fragments of the Soviet-built missile set two outboard engines afire. They fell off and the two inboard engines then failed, dooming the big aircraft.

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CIA & drug traffic in South-East Asia

By BOMAN H. MEHTA

FORTY YEARS AGO, the students in Berlin shrieked: "We spit on freedom". That attitude of mind of the German nation enabled Adolf Hitler to bamboozle the electorate and seize power.

In 1972, another facet of the diseased human mind led Mrs. Patricia Nixon and her hen-witted daughter, Julie Eisenhower, to proclaim in defence of Richard Nixon's Vietnam policy that they were willing to immolate themselves on behalf of the Saigon stooge, Thieu.

THAT EXPLAINS TO A CERTAIN EXTENT WHY THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE BROUGHT ABOUT A LANDSLIDE VICTORY FOR RICHARD NIXON, THE MOST CONTEMPTIBLE, THE MOST UNLOVED FIGURE IN AMERICAN POLITICS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY.

BLACK RECORD

Richard Nixon's re-election as President of the US proves complete erosion of moral values in American society. What has been the record of this man as President of the US in the last four years?

Notwithstanding the pantomime mimicry of Dr. Kissinger's secret negotiations with Hanoi, Nixon has intensified the Vietnam War. He has devastated North and South Vietnam with fifteen million tons of bombs and a million Asians dead. And one is inclined to agree with I.F. Stone, the celebrated American columnist, that the Vietnam War may go on until 1976.

Richard Nixon has lowered the respect for the United States Supreme Court by appointing non-entities ready to carry out their master's will.

He has bullied the national press into subservience and with his secret electoral funds of £45 million, provided by the military-industrial complex, bought television to portray him every night as a man of peace hijacking his way to Peking and Moscow.

He has employed electronic devices to spy on his political opponents. The list can go on.

Two tons of opium and morphine were seized aboard a junk in Hong Kong harbour. This was the second biggest seizure. The two-million-dollar worth of contraband narcotics is part of the CIA-masterminded drug traffic to South-East Asian countries to lull them into submission to the American will.

One would have thought that this repulsive record was enough for any decent man to renounce Nixon in disgust. However, the American ballot box turned out to be another idiot box. And the most affluent society in the world showed itself as the most sick society. Consequently one must say farewell not only to the American Dream but to freedom at large.

SICK SOCIETY

To advance my thesis I must turn to The New York Review of Books of 21 September, 1972, the sea-mail copy which has just arrived in Bombay. Before doing so I may be permitted a pertinent aside.

In the midst of all this, the "White Russians" of Indian society are up in arms as their originals were trying to attack and dislodge Lenin. The Indira Government is subjected to the most vicious attacks from the desh "White Russians." They seem to forget that drought is not an Indian phenomenon only. It prevails in the Soviet Union and in Maoist China as well as in India. It has compelled Russia and China to buy American wheat worth billions of dollars in hard cash.

Drought is not the only Indian calamity. Corruption at all levels in our society has brought about a state of affairs which can only end in chaos. We are a corrupt and degraded lot. There is no doubt about it. But who is there in our country today to replace Indira Gandhi?

The alternative to her seems to be chaos and not revolution. For revolution we require character and integrity. Alas, we cannot boast of these characteristics and we witness the dismal spectacle of politicians who blatantly defend the CIA activities in our country.

POLITICS OF HEROIN

It is in this connection I give below a summary of the account which has appeared in The New York Review of Books of 21 September 1972. A book entitled The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia by Alfred W. McCoy was to be published by the well-known publishers, Harper & Row.

On June 1, 1972, Cord Meyer, a CIA official, visited the New York office of Harper & Row and requested the management to provide him with a copy of the galley-proofs of McCoy's forthcoming book.

THE REASON WAS THAT IN THIS BOOK MR. MCCOY WAS SHOWING THE COMPLICITY OF THE CIA AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN ORGANISING SOUTHEAST ASIAN DRUG TRAFFIC SINCE 1950.

At this very time the author, Alfred McCoy, was testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee his findings into the Southeast Asian drug traffic. McCoy's researches included during 18 months of study more than 250 interviews with heroin dealers, police officials and intelligence agents in Europe and Asia.

It was Cord Meyer's contention that Mr. McCoy's book would be full of inaccuracies. It would embarrass the United States government and perhaps involve the publishers in libel suits. (As a CIA official, Cord Meyer had been in the past in charge of providing financial subsidies to organisations such as the National Students' Association, Encounter magazine, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom.)

CIA CENSORSHIP

The publishers got in touch with the author and informed him that they had decided to let the CIA examine the galley-proofs. The reasons given by the publishers were two:

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continued

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Intrigue: Eastern Shore creep?

By John Schumadeke
Dover Bureau Chief

These haven't been easy weeks, Durall recalled. You were tested for leadership and ingenuity in dozens of grueling days.

There were no rules of fair play at The Farm. Every dirty trick in the book was against you. You trusted no one—not your fellow candidates, not a would-be confidant, nor the instructor, who could use a good attitude to suddenly turn on you and slice a knife at your throat.

This description of The Farm is from a spy thriller by Edward S. Aarons—"Assignment: Madeline."

The protagonist is one Sam Durall, the best spy in the summer of 1957, K Section of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Farm, according to Aarons' long series of books on Durall, is located somewhere on the Eastern Shore of Maryland. It's a place where the CIA trains its best agents.

A rain rain was falling, and the CIA's a p e a k e. Durall, beyond the village of Prince John (delicious) in Maryland, into a dimpled place of silver gray steel.

Durall had driven over from Washington for breakfast with the CIA's President, with a long winter's weekend ahead of him. "Come here, just the two of them," Aarons writes in "Assignment: Budapest."

The Farm is also supposed to be a place where over-land K Section agents go for rest and recuperation.

But does it really exist?

In 1962, the Soviet government released Francis Gary Powers, the American U-2 pilot shot down in 1960. It was reported that the CIA had been looking for a place to train Powers in Talbot County, Maryland.

During that time, it took a long time for the American public to know that the CIA was looking for a place to train Powers. It would seem unlikely

that The Farm would be listed in Maryland tourist guidebooks.

BUT if it exists, it's a 68.24 acre piece of land nestled along the Choptank River about 15 miles southwest of Easton.

It's on a spit of land known as Denon Point. A red brick mansion, a pier and a few out-buildings can be seen from the air. Nothing but a mailbox with no name on it and a "no trespassing" sign can be seen from the road.

The land lies along a dirt road which has no name and is not included on official Maryland highway maps. It forks to the right off the road leading to the Bellevue-Oxford Ferry.

From the air, one can see small boats pulled up along the tree-lined shore. There are trees all around the place; nothing but trees all around the place; nothing but trees can be seen from ground level.

If Aarons is to be believed and if K Section ("an agency so secret that even the government doesn't know about it") has a hand in the place, cautious reporters aren't likely to get the red-carpet welcome.

FIRST things first, however. If one is on a mission looking for a secret hideaway, one must be careful how one handles oneself.

"I'm looking for a list of all federal land in Talbot County," one begins by saying to the clerk in the county courthouse.

"We don't have too much," she says pulling open a drawer stuffed with tax maps.

She talks about a Navy laboratory and a historic monument of some sort.

Then, just as the reporters are about to leave, the clerk remembers something. Is true spy novel fiction, she finds a dusty map at the bottom of the drawer.

"The government owns some land here, but they won't let you in," she says. One

feels that in the best interests of national security, one should refrain from mentioning the name also.

After a few more minutes of laying out a route, the newsmen are off.

DRIVING down the unmarked road, one sees farmers (agents in disguise?) working in fields. There are signs everywhere in the area that say "No Trespassing. Survivors will be prosecuted."

Using the highly trained reasoning powers a reporter must have, one figures out that the place with no name on the mailbox and the simple "no trespassing" sign must be the government land.

The lane into the place also has that well-policed appearance characteristic of military-type land.

Next-door-neighbor George Lewis Jr. (another agent? one wonders) is pleasant when asked about the place.

"I've been over there," he says, noting that he knows the "carlatter."

"They've got some big dogs over there," his wife says pointedly.

BELIEVING the old saw about discretion being the better part of valor, one decides it might be safer to get a look from the air.

"You government men?" the pilot asks.

We finally confess that we're reporters. He says everyone in the area assumes the place is a CIA rest camp.

Perhaps a phone call to the CIA might answer some questions.

"31-1102," the receptionist answers in a complacent voice. Even though the number is listed under the Central Intelligence Agency in the Washington, D.C., phone book, no one every mentions the name.

ONE feels that in the best interests of national security, one should refrain from mentioning the name also.

"I'm calling about some land in Maryland you, er, your agency, I guess, owns."

At first they say they don't know anything about the land but promise to check. A while later, a call from a "spokesman" comes back.

It turns out the CIA does own the land. "It's used for management seminars it's training, but on the management side, the "spokesman" says.

"It's not a spooky place at all," he says reassuringly. "It's not used for guerrilla warfare."

Then how about a look at the place?

The CIA has a standing policy of no tours through any of its establishments, the spokesman says cordially.

STATINTL

Continued

Cambodia, Laos — a different problem

By Richard E. Ward

First of a series

Will a truce in Vietnam bring an end to the fighting in Laos and Cambodia as well?

And if there is a truce throughout Indochina within the near future, will that bring genuine peace to any of the three countries?

These are crucial questions of the day in Indochina. But as long as the U.S. refuses to conclude a peace agreement for Vietnam, where the escalation of the U.S. airwar has reached an all-time high, the prospects for truces in either Laos or Cambodia will remain very slender. The U.S. is continuing its aggressive military operations against these two countries and it is still using them as bases for U.S. operations against Vietnam.

Peace in Laos or Cambodia, as in Vietnam, depends in the first instance on whether the U.S. is willing to cease its military intervention and aggression. A lasting peace will also hinge on whether the U.S. will cease its overt and clandestine efforts to maintain its puppets and mercenaries in these countries.

For Laos and Cambodia, equally victims of unprovoked U.S. aggression, the question of a peace settlement must be resolved separately in accordance with the sovereign rights of the two countries, their respective military and political situations and the programs of the patriotic and liberation forces, now in control of about four-fifths of their national territories.

The present Laos peace talks began Oct. 17 between representatives of the U.S.-supported Vientiane regime and a joint delegation of the Lao Patriotic Front—Pathet Lao and the Patriotic Neutralist forces. The discussions are proceeding on the basis of the five-point political solution for Laos proposed by the Pathet Lao in March 1970 (which will be outlined in detail below).

These talks represent the latest effort by the Pathet Lao to resolve the struggle in Laos by political means, a goal which the U.S. has consistently sabotaged since the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina. Since that period the U.S. has taken increasing control of the Vientiane government, financed mercenary and foreign forces in Laos and subjected the country to increasingly savage air attacks—all in an effort to crush the revolutionary movement and resistance forces and to prevent their integration in a free and democratic political system.

Growth of Pathet Lao

Despite the massive U.S. military operations, the Pathet Lao has grown from a relatively small force controlling two provinces in 1954 to the present when, together with the Patriotic Neutralist forces, it has liberated no less than four-fifths of the country. Because of U.S. bombings of the liberated zone, however, a large portion of its population has been forced to flee to the Vientiane zone, where these persons are maintained in "refugee" camps which for all practical purposes are camps of detainment.

In the early 1960s the deterioration of the pro-U.S. forces was proceeding so rapidly that the U.S. had to agree to a settlement in which the Laotian parties established a tripartite government. This settlement was followed by an international conference on Laos, an agreement signed in Geneva in 1962, to which the U.S. was a signatory, guaranteeing Laotian neutrality and prohibiting foreign military intervention.

But when the U.S. refused to agree to respect Laotian neutrality and to cease all military intervention, clandestine CIA programs were underway in Laos attempting to sabotage the

It was at this period that the U.S. established a mercenary army, headed by Gen. Vang Pao, a former soldier in the French colonial forces. Vang Pao's army operated virtually independently of the Vientiane regime and in reality was directly under the supervision of the CIA, which financed the entire force, numbering approximately 30,000 at its peak.

At the same time, the U.S. also literally bought out neutralist elements of the Vientiane government including its head, Prince Souvanna Phouma, who sanctioned the clandestine U.S. operations. Some prominent Patriotic Neutralists who resisted the lure of huge U.S. bribes, including Foreign Minister Quinin Pholsena, were assassinated by CIA hirelings. Realizing their turn was next, the Pathet Lao and Patriotic Neutralists then moved into the liberated zone, already under attack by the U.S.-financed military forces, including those of the Royal government.

In April 1964 there was an extreme rightist coup in Vientiane which brought the government under full control of a group of squabbling reactionary cliques, united primarily by their dependence upon U.S. support. Souvanna Phouma remained as head of this regime, thus publicly indicating his abandonment of neutralism that he had previously abdicated behind the scenes.

The succeeding years witnessed intense fighting, as the U.S. tried to encroach on the liberated zone and actually succeeded in establishing secret bases at a number of isolated points within the liberated areas. By early 1970, despite the greatly intensified U.S. bombing of Laos following the 1968 bombing halt in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the tide had definitely turned and the Pathet Lao defeated the largest offensive mounted by the pro-U.S. forces whose depleted ranks were already being filled by Thai mercenaries. During the following year, the Lao liberation forces faced their greatest test and routed the U.S.-supported invasion by Saigon troops.

U.S. recourse to Saigon troops and increasing numbers of Thai mercenaries, the latter under CIA control, signified the U.S. was reaching the end of the road in Laos, but it has been unwilling to cease its genocidal air war or its support of mercenary elements and refused to allow the Vientiane regime to participate in meaningful discussions with the Pathet Lao.

The liberation forces, having no choice but to continue the resistance war in Laos, set siege to Long Cheng, the main CIA base and headquarters of Gen. Vang Pao, in December 1971. Both the CIA and Vang Pao, whose forces have been reduced to ineffectuality, have been retreating since.

The CIA headquarters is in its second location since retreating from Long Cheng. It is now located at Vang Vieng, about midway between Vientiane and Luang Prabang, the administrative and royal capitals. Route 13 between the two cities is already partially in Pathet Lao hands. And according to the latest report, Pathet Lao rocket shells were fired into the Luang Prabang airport on Nov. 1, damaging at least five military planes.

At the same time, Thakhet, further south along route 13, came under attack by liberation forces. Thakhet is just across the Mekong river from the secret U.S. air base in Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, one of the most important U.S. installations for guiding U.S. bombers in Indochina.

Route 13 which goes from Luang Prabang, Vang Vieng, Vientiane, and Thakhet to the border is considered the "heartland" of the area under the control

M - 463,503
S - 867,810

NOV 19 1972

Civilian Advisory Corps Recruited in Saigon To Replace GIs Who Are Being Pulled Out

By JAMES MCCARTNEY

From Our Washington Bureau

SAIGON. — An ad in the English-language Saigon Post Saturday read:

"NHA Inc. has an immediate requirement for 200 additional aircraft technicians ... due to contract expansion; and skills are needed NOW."

At the bottom were the words: "U. S. citizens only."

The ad was one of the first open indications here of plans for an American civilian advisory corps to remain in South Vietnam after a ceasefire.

NHA INC. — one of the larger American contractors here — is seeking maintenance men for South Vietnamese aircraft, both fighter planes and helicopters.

The ad represented only a portion of the advisory corps' iceberg.

The United States is developing plans in many fields for advisers to maintain sophisticated equipment, run computers, supervise economic assistance — and a good deal more.

The force could easily surpass 10,000 — and that figure could be an underestimate.

"YOU CAN BET that the Joint Chiefs of Staff can do more for South Vietnam than just help out technically. They'll want 10,000 snake-eaters in here for sure," one source said.

A "snake-eater" in Saigon

military jargon is a member of the Green Berets, Army specialists in secret warfare.

The draft peace agreement negotiated by Henry Kissinger and the North Vietnamese in Paris calls for withdrawal of all U. S. military forces from Vietnam within 60 days, but says nothing about civilian advisers.

It does say that the United States will not "intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam."

AS NEARLY as can be discerned from various sources here, all of whom would prefer to talk of the advisory corps in whispers, the civilians would fall into at least three major categories:

—U. S. CONTRACT personnel, working for companies that sign up to do specific jobs, such as NHA's aircraft maintenance work.

—ADVISERS to the Saigon government in each of South Vietnam's 44 provinces, from the Mekong Delta to the demilitarized zone.

—MEN TO KEEP an eye on the hundreds of millions of dollars worth of economic assistance that is expected to pour in here to help rebuild South Vietnam.

What all this adds up to is perhaps 5,000 to 6,000 contract people; 500 to 1,000 advisers, most of them outside Saigon; and a few thousand overseeing the spending of huge sums in American money.

COVERT MILITARY operations — perhaps in the pattern of Laos, where the CIA has been running the Laotian war for years — would be another possibility.

No one is willing to talk about that, and decisions may not yet have been made in Washington on a covert ballgame. Such decisions may be held back until U. S. officials determine whether Hanoi violates a ceasefire.

In Laos, plainclothes CIA military advisers have been attached to the U. S. Embassy in Vientiane as military attaches.

One big civilian contractor in Vietnam is Air America — a CIA-controlled airline which has played a key role in the Laotian War.

"THE BIGGEST contracts are going to fall in the area of maintenance and logistics," said one official.

"The South Vietnamese are going to need help in keeping our sophisticated equipment going. They do a pretty good job, overall, but there are just some things they can't yet do — at least do well enough."

In logistics, they'll need help primarily in running U. S. computers, to keep track of maintains of equipment and of military units. And they are used in intelligence work.

GOVERNMENT advisers will be organized along the lines of the present "CORDS," the U. S. "pacification" effort. (The initials stand for "Civil Operations and Rural Development Support.")

A U. S. officer said it will probably operate largely out of USIAD (U. S. Agency for International Development).


AID, headed by former Michigan State University president John A. Hannah, has been used as a cover for covert military operations in Laos — much to Hannah's distress.

CORDS has maintained advisers to South Vietnam's 44 province chiefs and to its 272 districts. If a ceasefire agreement is signed, plans call for continuing U. S. advisers at only the province level. Still, they would travel extensively.

CORDS has about 1,500 advisers in Vietnam. That number will probably be cut.

PRIMARY NEEDS in Vietnam, according to experts, will be in agricultural advice, public health and engineering.

18 NOV 1972

Our readers say--
EDITOR
THE DAILY WORLD
205 WEST 19th ST.
NEW YORK 10011**PREMATURE OBITUARY**

Newsweek and Time this week prematurely buried the war in Vietnam as over. The theme was that it is all over except for final details. Of course, that is Nixon's pre-election propaganda line. Whether they fell victim to that propaganda line or consciously joined in the deception is still to be discovered. The main fact at this point is that they did it.

As for Nixon, his strategy is obvious. In addition to all that the Daily World has already written exposing that strategy, there needs to be added that not only is Nixon not winding down the war, he is once again shifting the basis of operations to continue it at a new level.

Not only is he beefing up the Thieu mercenary regime, but U.S. advisers will continue to "guide" Thieu and pull other strings from behind the scenes as the CIA has been doing in Laos for years. Tricky Dick has lost none of his adeptness in deception of the people. ✓

—ROSS MALCOLM, Queens, N.Y.

INTENSIVE ATTACK MADE BY U.S. JETS ON SUPPLY ROUTE

300 Fighter-Bomber Strikes and 11 B-52 Raids Focus on Panhandle Region

By JAMES P. STERBA

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Thursday, Nov. 16—The United States command reported yesterday that American bombers had staged one of the heaviest days of raids of the war on the southern panhandle of North Vietnam.

More than 300 tactical strikes by fighter-bombers were reported concentrated Tuesday in an area from about 20 miles south of Thanhhoa down to the demilitarized zone that straddles the border between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. This total, a substantial increase from the 220 reported Monday, was higher than the average number that formerly was flown over all North Vietnam.

Biggest Raids in 3 Weeks

In addition, 11 three-plane missions by B-52 heavy bombers were flown over the panhandle.

The raids, aimed at blocking the North Vietnamese supplies being rushed to Communist troops in South Vietnam before any ceasefire, were the heaviest since President Nixon restricted bombing of the North to the area south of the 20th Parallel on Oct. 23.

Ground fighting, meanwhile, continued to be below average levels, with 45 North Vietnamese shelling attacks and only 20 ground actions reported in the 24 hours ended at dawn yesterday.

Ground Fighting Light

Fighting in the northernmost province of South Vietnam, Quangtri, also tapered off, according to Saigon military spokesmen.

A total of about 90 rounds of mortar hit positions held by South Vietnamese marines and airborne rangers about one mile north of Quangtri city. This compares with about 1,000 enemy mortar artillery and rocket shells that fell in the area earlier this week.

Only light ground fighting was reported elsewhere. Military officials said they would have to study the pattern of fighting a few more days before concluding whether it was related to reports from high level American military sources Tuesday that some North Vietnamese units had pulled back away from the fighting.

In a delayed report, the South Vietnamese command said the bodies of 50 people that it described as the "enemy" were discovered in Quantin Province south of Danang. They were killed by an American B-52 raid, the command said.

The UUnited States command said that "preliminary bomb damage assessment reports" on the results of the bombing of North Vietnam on Tuesday indicated two transshipment points, two airfields two fuel dumps, 38 trucks, 11 warehouses, an antiaircraft gun, four supply caches, six supply storage areas, seven boats, 15 bridges, 20 railroad cars, nine artillery guns and a railroad spur were damaged or destroyed.

American pilots, meanwhile, continued raids on Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. Twenty-two B-52 missions and 217 tactical airstrikes by fighter-bombers were flown over South Vietnam, mostly in Quangtri Province, the command's news release said.

Cambodians Report Road Open

PNOMPENH, Cambodia, Nov. 15 (AP)—The Cambodian high command said today that its troops had recaptured the district capital of Trapeang Kraleng and had reopened a 37-mile stretch of the road connecting Pnompenh with the sea.

The road, Route 4, from Cambodia's sole deep water port of Kompong Som, was cut two weeks ago when the enemy seized Trapeang Kraleng.

The command spokesman, Col. Am Rong, said the 13th Brigade met no resistance today upon entering the town. He said, however, that two to three miles of the road from Trapeang Kraleng to the sea was still held by the enemy.

Meo Said to Retreat


VIENTIANE, Laos, Nov. 15 (AP)—A United States military spokesman reported today that Gen. Vang Pao's army of Meo tribesmen, which the American Central Intelligence Agency finances, had been pushed off the southern edge of the Plaine des Jarres. He said North Vietnamese forces shelled a force of several battalions for six hours Monday night and then made a ground attack Tuesday. The Meos retreated after suffering "moderate" casualties and were trying to regroup to the south, the spokesman said.

Saigon Desertions Reported

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Nov. 15—The Vietcong delegation to the peace talks here asserted today that there had been substantial desertions from South Vietnamese forces last month, and Vietcong battlefield victories.

A statement issued by the delegation said 1,640 South Vietnamese soldiers, including "hundreds of the Saigon Seventh Division" deserted in the Mekong delta province of Mytho in October. It said this was the result of an organized campaign of 50,000 people who "marched on enemy posts to call on their sons, husbands and brothers to return home."



The New York Times/Nov. 16, 1972

U.S. stepped up bombing of southern panhandle of North Vietnam (1). Fighting waned near Quangtri (2). Cambodians retook Laos, enemy gained on Plaine des Jarres (4).

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Agreement May Be Nearing in Laotian Peace Talks

By Michael Morrow

Dispatch News Service International

Peace negotiations in Laos seem to have reached a higher plateau since the recent talks in Vientiane between Phoumi Vongvachit of the Communist Pathet Lao and Prince Souvanna Phouma, the Laotian prime minister.

Phoumi and Prince Souphanouong, Prince Souvanna's half-brother who is titular leader of the Pathet Lao, served in the first Laotian coalition government in 1957.

Negotiations had shown steady improvement since Souvanna's acceptance earlier this year of a five-point Pathet Lao plan as a basis for negotiations. The talks between Phoumi, the real power in the Pathet Lao, and Souvanna may indicate that the Communists now are willing to compromise on these five points instead of insisting on them as the final settlement.

If substantive discussions should move forward, stumbling blocks still exist. Only the second of Souphanouong's five points poses no problem. This calls for Laos to observe the principles of peaceful coexistence in the 1962 Geneva agreement—principles to which nearly everyone in Laotian politics pays at least lip service.

The other four points are less simple. The first proposes that the United States must totally withdraw from Laos and halt all bombing of Laotian territory. The United States has agreed—in presidential adviser Henry Kissinger's nine-point peace plan—to withdraw its

forces when North Vietnam withdraws its troops. That pact is still unsigned. Since the Pathet Lao lists this point first, it may insist that this be a condition for further negotiations.

The third point calls for establishment of a democratic coalition government. Vientiane and the Pathet Lao, however, disagree on what happened to the coalition government established by the Geneva agreement of 1962.

The Pathet Lao claims that it was dissolved by a military putsch in 1964. Souvanna and the United States maintain that the putsch was unsuccessful, and that the government of 1962 remains in power in Vientiane. Pathet Lao cabinet seats, says Souvanna, are still empty for them to re-occupy.

This difference pits the

concept of a new, reconstituted coalition government against the idea that the old tripartite (leftist, neutralist, rightist) coalition can be restored. Souvanna's legitimacy is thus called into question—the Pathet Lao no longer refers to him as the prime minister—as well as the rightists' privilege of participation in the coalition.

The Pathet Lao has long regarded the rightists as unacceptable in a new coalition. The rightists are, in general, members of the military and of the rich and powerful Champassak and Sananikone families.

Although the Pathet Lao does not question Souvanna's participation in a new coalition, it probably would not accept him as a neutral leader of a tripartite agreement, since the current government is heavily dominated by rightists.

The fourth Pathet Lao point proposes a provisional coalition government pending elections. The Pathet Lao is likely to oppose participation of the rightists and press for representation for the Patriotic Neutralist Faction, a splinter neutralist group which is considered friendly to the Pathet Lao.

The fifth point calls for pro-American forces—for

example, the CIA-backed mercenaries and Thai troops—to withdraw from illegally occupied territory. It also demands that refugees be compensated and returned to their native areas pending unification through consultations.

Redrawing the old Geneva cease-fire lines will be easy, but deciding who is to control what territory and what population will be a knotty problem. The Pathet

Lao, with North Vietnamese help, has taken considerable territory, and U.S. bombing has forced large numbers of refugees into camps that are under Vientiane's control.

The speed with which negotiations in Laos are begun in earnest will be influenced by military developments there and by agreements reached between Washington and Hanoi.

Laos is still a sovereign state—but barely so.

NEW YORK TIMES

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51 Rockets Hit Laotian Capital's Airport

By MALCOLM W. BROWNE

Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, Nov. 13 — Communist forces fired 51 large rockets into the airport of the royal Laotian capital of Luang Prabang today, damaging at least five military planes.

The rocket attack was the first directed at the airport in nearly a year and reflected the increasing intensity of North Vietnamese pressure in the area.

A military spokesman said Soviet-made 122-mm. rockets damaged two T-28 propeller-driven fighter-bombers of the Laotian air force and three light observation planes. An ammunition dump was reported demolished and a military compound damaged.

Two Laotian soldiers were said to have been wounded.

Attack Before Dawn

The attack occurred before dawn today, which is the 65th birthday of the Laotian King, Savang Vatthana.

Laos is governed from its administrative capital at Vientiane, but the home of the King and the traditional royal capital is Luang Prabang to the north. The two cities are connected by a road that is subject to frequent enemy ambushes.

Political experts felt that an infantry attack on Luang Prabang is unlikely because the Communist-led Pathet Lao nominally accept the King as chief of state. However, Communist forces seem intent on ringing Luang Prabang and eliminating nearby Government strongpoints.

Yesterday, the Government troops were forced to abandon a position eight miles southeast of Luang Prabang in the face of heavy shelling.

Elsewhere, a North Vietnamese force of about 500 men reportedly launched a heavy

attack on Thakhek, a Laotian town on the Mekong River bordering Thailand. Just across the river is Nakhon Phanom, a Thai base operated by the United States Air Force as its main surveillance headquarters for activity along the Ho Chi Minh Trail network.

The attack on Thakhek was reported mounted from three sides. An American plane was called in to strafe the attackers. The North Vietnamese reportedly withdrew from Thakhek after some fighting in the town. Military sources said the enemy attack may have been reconnaissance as a rehearsal for a future large-scale attack.

Town Reported Taken

In another part of southern Laos, Government troops reported having completed the capture of Dong Hene Saturday after nearly a week of fighting. The town, 30 miles east south-

east of Savannakhet, had been in Communist hands since last year.

Military sources said that when Government forces entered the village of Bung Kha, one mile from Dong Hene, Saturday, they found the bodies of 42 North Vietnamese soldiers.

Heavy fighting was reported over the weekend in a wide arc in the mountainous region surrounding the Communist-controlled Plaine des Jarres.


Clashes were reported near Khang Khay, east of the plain, in which at least 18 Communist soldiers were reported killed. But south of the plain, Government troops were forced to abandon a position nine miles east of Long Tieng, forward headquarters of a force created and equipped by the American Central Intelligence Agency for operations on the Plaine des Jarres.

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
E - 31,388

NOV 1 0 1972



THE 'SECRET' ARMY' — The CIA sponsors a small air force in Laos, waiting at Long Cheng to drop these 250-pound bombs. Beyond are con-

verted T-28 planes flown by Meo pilots against the North Vietnamese in northern Laos. (NEA Photo)



Fight drugs by creating jobs

By DONNA RISTORUCCI

Use of drugs—marijuana, "soft drugs" and heroin—is rampant in New York City's secondary schools, according to the Fleishmann Commission, a special commission formed to make an overall evaluation of the NYC school system.

The commission's report, recently released, estimates that nearly half of NYC high school students and approximately one-fifth of the junior high school students use drugs of some sort.

Will Riggan, the commission's associate director of research, said the students' use of drugs is generally more than "occasional."

Fifty percent of "inner city" crime in the United States is said to be heroin-connected.

Recent reports have estimated that the number of drug addicts in the nation has reached 600,000, arguing that previous surveys underestimated the extent of drug addiction.

The National Industrial Conference Board of New York said last year that a survey of 222 companies showed 53 percent reported some drug abuse among employees.

Despite claims by President Nixon last month that Federal anti-drug funds increased elevenfold since 1969, that arrests doubled in the same period and that a recent sharp increase in heroin prices on the East Coast suggests that the "supply is drying up," drug usage and addiction have dramatically increased, particularly among youth.

John Finlator, who retired last January as deputy director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, charged that "we are in worse shape in the war against drug abuse today than on the day the present Administration took office."

Jarvis Tyner, national chairman of the Young Workers Liberation League and candidate for Vice President on the Communist Party ticket, has commented often on the apparent inability (or unwillingness) of the FBI, the CIA, local police departments and the entire National Government to crush organized crime and put

a halt to the billion-dollar drug trade, while they seem to have no trouble harassing and arresting thousands of Black, Chicano and Puerto Rican youth for no reason and disrupting and intimidating movement organizations and leaders.

The role of the CIA and the military in the drug smuggling trade, particularly from Thailand, Laos

and Burma has been established, as has police cooperation in drug pushing in cities like New York. This must be stopped.

Equally important, however, is the need to get rid of the causes of drug usage among youth.

A basic cause, Tyner has pointed out, particularly among Black youth, is unemployment. The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs says the majority of young drug addicts are without steady employment.

"Lack of jobs turns large numbers of ghetto youth towards drug addiction," Tyner says. "People's spirit can take but so much without working for long periods of time. Some youth have come out of school and have never had a job. You can understand how drugs seem like a way out."

He added, "We believe this is a conscious policy on the part of the Administration."

Yet, jobs programs and guaranteeing that youth and young addicts are given jobs with meaning and a decent salary, are not a major part of a drug rehabilitation or drug prevention programs.

It was recently revealed in a survey commissioned by the Labor Department that the question of jobs in relation to drug rehabilitation has been largely ignored by the drug treatment programs and employers.

"Employers are actively excluding people with a history of drug problems from the labor force in the belief that these people constitute bad business risks and endanger the productivity of the company," the report said, and added that "drug programs do not see vocation training or job placement as playing an important role in the rehabilitative process."

The program of the YWLL and the election platform of the CP advocate, in addition to establishing a massive drug-abuse education program in the schools, getting to the root of the drug problem. The program calls for a massive construction of decent low-cost housing, medical centers, schools, recreation and cultural centers which would create millions of jobs for youth and at the same time meet their basic social needs. The funds for this would come from ending the Vietnam war, dismantling U.S. military bases all over the world and generally drastically reducing the military budget. Along with education and drug rehabilitation programs, this would greatly contribute to ending drug addiction and the widespread drug usage that is plaguing youth.

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IN THE WORLD

He Likes the French

Paris, Nov. 6 (AP)—Prince Souvanna Phouma, the premier of Laos, said today would



like to see the French military mission bolstered when peace returns to Indochina and regain the importance given it by the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina. Souvanna Phouma discussed the matter

Messmer with Premier Pierre Messmer. The French mission was authorized under the Geneva agreement on Laos. Its importance gradually diminished as United States military aid and Central Intelligence Agency operations took over more and more of the military functions in Laos.

SAN DIEGO, CAL.
UNION

M - 139,739

S - 246,007

NOV 5 1972

Heroin Traffic Examined

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By
Alfred W. McCoy, Harper &
Row, \$10.95).

Heroin didn't always have a bad name. Around the turn of the century it was hailed as a "miracle drug" and approved by the AMA for general use. In fact, it didn't even have a name until Germany's Bayer chemical combine invented "heroin" as a brand name and put it on the market as a cough medicine.

But this fascinating bit of drug lore is only incidental to the central theme of this devastating book; that because of its commitment to contain communism in Southeast Asia, the U.S. government helped create a generation of junkies.

Southeast Asia's "golden triangle" — where Laos, Thailand and Burma meet — has been an opium-growing area for centuries. But what McCoy and his fellow authors are concerned about is how within the last 20 years the "triangle" has expanded its production until today it accounts for 70 per cent of the world's illicit supply of heroin.

For this the authors hold the United States responsible. They specifically charge that in their clandestine war against the Communists, U.S. agencies, notably the CIA, allied themselves with elements known to be engaged in the drug traffic; ignored and even promoted the ac-

tivities of known drug traffickers, and allowed American military aircraft to be used to transport drugs

The charges are difficult to refute because, in the main, they happen to be true, McCoy has done his homework. Critics may quarrel with some of his facts and dispute many of his judgments, but he convincingly demonstrates, for example, that the G.I. heroin epidemic in South Vietnam could not have happened without the active participation of greedy generals and government officials who owed their jobs to the United States.

U.S. involvement in the drug traffic was, as the authors contend, an "inevitable consequence" of our involvement in Southeast Asia, where opium was a way of life. But it did not become an "American problem" until it touched American lives.

The book is not quite the scholarly work that it pretends to be. It is as much an indictment of the Vietnam war as it is a documentation of the drug traffic. The authors suggest that all will be well if President Nixon is defeated and the United States pulls out of Southeast Asia lock, stock and barrel.

Maybe so. But the sad thing is that the book's chief victims are a handful of dedicated CIA men who went to Southeast Asia to do a job. That job was to fight communism, not reform a society.

—Chicago Daily News

DENVER, COLO.
ROCKY MT. NEWS

Approved For Release

M - 192,279

S - 209,887

NOV 5 1972

RDP80-01601R000600120001-5

New book delves into problem

Airline accused of shipping opium

By JIM MORRELL
For Pacific News Service

A doctoral candidate in Chinese History at Harvard University, Jim Morrell has previously written for scholarly journals in the Asian Studies field.

WASHINGTON, D.C. — "It's a damned lie. You can say THAT!" We were asking Arthur Berry Richardson of New York, about reports that his airline, Air America, was one of the biggest opium shippers in the world. "We've discussed them at our board meeting, these scurrilous articles. There's no substance to them."

Last month Harper & Row published Alfred McCoy's long-awaited book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia." The heavily documented book is based on some 240 interviews with CIA agents, Bureau of Narcotics officials, top Laotian military commandes, and opium-growing Meo tribesmen. And it presented striking evidence that Air America has been flying Meo-grown opium out of north- and northeast Laos ever since 1965.

When asked specifically about McCoy's interviews with the Meo opium farmers whose harvest was flown out on Air America, all Arthur Richardson would say was: "Some guy thinks he's clever. Just take my word for it. Goodbye!"

Interviews with the publicity-shy directors of Air America tend to be brief but emotional affairs. For years Air America, the CIA's "private" charter airline in Southeast Asia, has indignantly denied any involvement in the Southeast Asian heroin traffic. This year, though, fewer people than ever seem inclined to take their word for it.

MOTTO IS NO IDLE BOAST

Air America's motto is "Anything, Anytime, Anywhere — Professionally" and it is no idle boast. From dusty airstrips in the Meo hill country they have been airlifting the raw opium to laboratories in Long Chieng or Vietnam where it is refined into No. 4 heroin (90 to 99 per cent pure), then smuggled abroad by Corsican gangsters or Laotian diplomats for ultimate disposal in U.S. markets.

The Opium Trail leads from the poppy fields of the Southeast Asian "Fertile Triangle" (of Burma, Thailand, and Laos which now produce over 70 per cent of the world's opium supply) to Saigon, Hong Kong, or Marseilles, and then right to the waiting arms of America's estimated one million heroin users.

In separate interviews, Laotian Gens. Ouane Rattikone and Thao Ma both told McCoy that Air America began flying opium to markets in Long Chieng

Rattikone was until last year owner of the largest heroin refinery in Southeast Asia. Gen. Thao Ma is former commander of the Laotian Air Force.

After several more interviews in Vientiane, McCoy told us he took a bus out of Luang Prabang, hitched a ride in a government truck and, when the road gave out, started hiking over the mountains. By nightfall he reached a small village, spending a sleepless night under a thin thatched roof.

"There was always the sound of a plane somewhere," he said. "Sometimes it was far away and sometimes it seemed right overhead. And every so often you would hear the sound of its mini-guns going off—600 rounds a minute at who knows what, anything that sets off its infrared detectors, anything that moves or breathes or gives off warmth."

The next morning McCoy and an interpreter walked down from the mist-enveloped mountains into the village of Long Pot, 10 miles west of the Plain of Jars. There, under the shadow of 6,200-foot Mt. Phou Phachau, which dominates the entire district, McCoy had reached the head of the Opium Trail.

TRADITION OF POLITICAL POWER

The village of Long Pot is a Meo community of 47 wooden dirt-floored houses. It is one of 12 Meo and Lao Theung villages that make up Long Pot District. One of the oldest Meo villages in Northeast Laos, it has a tradition of political power and is the home of District Officer Ger Su Yang. According to Ger Su Yang, the village households produce 15 kilos (33 pounds) of opium apiece. They are guaranteed an adequate food supply by Air America rice drops.

In return, officers of the CIA's "clandestine army" (led by the Meo Chieftain Vang Pao) pay them a high price for the opium. The source of Vang Pao's money, of course, is the CIA.

Long Pot is one of the few remaining areas in Northeast Laos where opium history can still be observed: close enough to Long Chieng still to be controlled by Vang Pao but far enough to escape the fighting. The Meo tribesmen's only cash crop is opium, and the CIA's deal with Vang Pao, badly put, comes to this: you send us soldiers and we'll buy your opium.

The 47 households' harvest of 700 kilos of opium will yield 70 kilos of pure morphine base after it has been boiled, processed and pressed into bricks. Then further processed in one of the region's seven heroin labs, the Long Pot harvest will yield 70 kilos of No. 4 heroin. Worth \$500 to the villagers of Long Pot, it will bring \$225,000 on the streets of New York or San Francisco.

Formerly Long Pot's opium harvest was bought up by merchant caravans, but these

and 1965. They were replaced by pony caravans and 1969, 1970 and 1971 opium harvests were flown out in Air America UH-1H "Huey" helicopters.

RENDEZVOUS IS DESCRIBED

District Officer Ger Su Yang described the rendezvous with Air America: "Meo officers with three or four stripes (captain or major) came from Long Chieng to buy our opium. They came in American helicopters, perhaps two or three men at a time. The helicopter leaves them here for a few days and they wait to villages over there (swinging his arm in a semi-circle in the direction of Gier Goot, Long Makhay and Nam Pac), then come back here and radio Long Chieng to send another helicopter for them. They take the opium back to Long Chieng." The pilots were always Americans and the Meo army traders did the buying.

The head man of Nam Ou, a Lao Theung village four miles north of Long Pot, confirmed the district officer's account. In 1969 and 1970 Meo officers helicoptered into Tan Son village, hiked to Nam Ou, and purchased the opium harvest, then continued on their way to Nam Suk and Long Pot.

The harvest of 1971 may well have been Long Pot's last. In return for the rice drops and opium purchases, Vang Pao and the CIA kept demanding soldiers. USAID (United States Agency for International Development) built a school in the village, and "Mr. Pop" (Edgar Buell, then the CIA's chief operative in Laos) had high hopes for the place, but in 1970 Vang Pao demanded that all the young men in the village including 15 year-olds join his army fighting the Pathet Lao. Ger Su Yang complied and they were flown away by Air America helicopters in late 1970.

But reports of heavy casualties came in and the village refused to send more. Ger Su Yang described what happened next: "The Americans in Long Chieng said I must send all the rest of our men. But I refused. So they stopped dropping rice to us. The last rice drop was in February this year."

ANSWER TO THE VILLAGERS

Fight or starve — this was the CIA's answer to the villagers of Long Pot. Air America flew the village's young men away to fight and returned their corpses to the village — professionally wrapped in sanitary plastic bags.

For the CIA the Meos offered a convenient instrument for keeping alive their war in Laos but for the Meos their alliance with the CIA and Air America has only brought disaster. They have been decimated and the survivors have fled the hills for the refugee camps around Long Chieng.

Long Pot's 1972 opium harvest was destroyed when "allied" fighters napalmed the village and three nearby Lao Theung villages. And Vietnam's National Liberation Front reported that on Jan. 10, 1972, units of the Lao People's Liberation Army took Long Pot.

Because of the fighting, in fact, Laos will only account for a fraction of Southeast Asia's estimated 1,000-ton 1972 harvest, and Air America may be shipping more dead bodies than opium this year.

Revelations like these in McCoy's book made the CIA so nervous that they contacted the publisher and insisted on a prior review, a unprecedented move. After considerable arm-twisting, Harper & Row reluctantly agreed, but found the CIA's critique of the book unimpressive and went ahead with publication anyway.

Since the CIA is Air America's major contractor, the trail of responsibility leads directly to the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government. It neatly undercuts all the "law and order" statements flowing from the White

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NO SECRET WAR

An Associated Press report yesterday from Saigon that the United States is planning to keep a military advisory group of American civilians in South Vietnam after regular military forces are withdrawn is disturbing.

The report quoted military sources as saying that the advisers would be employed by civilian firms under contract either to the Defense or State Departments.

Whether such activities would be covered by a Vietnam peace agreement or excluded from them remains conjectural. There is as yet no signed peace agreement. The U.S. is insisting upon reaching certain mutual understandings concerning the basic accord that is being worked out.

The implication of this report is quite clear — the continuation of American clandestine operations in Vietnam after the uniformed regulars are withdrawn, the kind of operations being conducted in

the "secret wars" in Laos and Cambodia.

Nobody in the U.S. government, of course, is going to confirm that CIA or other agents will remain behind to do what they can secretly to prevent Communist takeovers in Indochina. Obviously a number of American civilian officials will stay in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam in various capacities.

The New York Times reported this week, for example, "In conversations in recent days with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma of Laos and others, Nixon has stressed that he would seek to continue American economic and other assistance to Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam because he believed it was important to maintain non-Communist governments in Southeast Asia."

It would be all too tempting to use "civilian" aid officials, for example, for covert operations. It would be naive to suggest that the United States have no intelligence agents in Indochina after a peace agreement. But the U.S. should not shift its involvement in Vietnam from an open war to an underground war waged by agents under cover.

Nixon adopts Thieu stand

Daily World Combined Services

The U.S. has assured Saigon puppet President Nguyen Van Thieu it will not sign any agreement allowing South Vietnam's patriotic forces any participation in governing the country, United Press International said yesterday.

The Nixon Administration move was the latest in maneuvers to back out of the agreement reached Oct. 8 with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), and in effect was the equivalent of Thieu's rejection of a coalition government.

Reports from the Pentagon yesterday stated that the U.S. is rushing hundreds of new warplanes to Thieu's forces, while UPI newsmen Walter Logan quoted a high-ranking U.S. Army officer in New York as revealing that U.S. advisers would remain in South Vietnam even if all U.S. troops are withdrawn.

Logan's story follows:

By WALTER LOGAN

NEW YORK, Nov. 3 (UPI) — A cease-fire in Vietnam will not end the American presence there, even if all U.S. troops are withdrawn, a high ranking U.S. Army officer told UPI today.

The officer, himself a veteran of the Vietnamese army training program, said a large group of civilian advisers would remain after the cease-fire to aid the South Vietnamese armed forces but that the advisory group would consist largely of a brain trust of young West Point graduates working as an unofficial joint chiefs of staff.

The officer said the first of

these civilian advisers already had arrived in Saigon and were consulting with U.S. officers and South Vietnamese military officials on the future program.

The program would amount to a continuation of the Vietnamization program but with the American civilians advising the South Vietnamese command not only on warfare techniques but on training programs for the South Vietnamese armed forces, the officer said.

The program would, in effect, put the United States back where it started in South Vietnam. In the early days of American involvement in Vietnam in 1950 there was only a handful of military advisers.

The advisory group in South Vietnam would to a large extent resemble the program carried out in the "secret war" in Laos and to a lesser extent in Cambodia, the officer said. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) trained and equipped the army of Maj. Gen. Yang Pao, Meo hill tribesmen who operated out of a once secret base at Long Tieng.

The CIA-financed group in Laos even has its own airline, Air

America, and such an arrangement presumably could be used in South Vietnam and Cambodia.

In recent years West Point graduates expert in training programs and still in the U.S. military service, carried out widespread officer training programs in South Vietnam in hopes the South Vietnamese eventually would be able to handle their own training programs on warfare geared to American weapons.

U.S. military advisers also accompanied South Vietnamese Units in the field and worked directly with the troops, a practice that tapered off. Some advisers are still working with the South Vietnamese, the Army officer said.

The officer was mainly concerned with the South Vietnamese Army but said there presumably would be similar programs of advising the South Vietnamese Air Force and Navy. None of the training programs were mentioned in the cease-fire agreement worked out by Presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger and the North Vietnamese.



Betraying peace

The White House has worked out an immediate program for stalling and sabotaging peace in Vietnam; and a long-range program of neo-colonialism in Indochina, to take up where direct U.S. military action leaves off.

Henry Kissinger's promise of peace within days has vanished. Now, White House officials point, vaguely, a month or more hence. Kissinger said that one more meeting with the representatives of Democratic Republic of Vietnam would seal the pact. Now the White House says that any agreement with the DRV would have to be approved by Nguyen Van Thieu, Nixon's puppet.

Under the short-term program, stalling of the treaty signing is being used, even now, for a massive buildup of the U.S. air fleet and of war materiel in South Vietnam, with the ownership papers made out in Thieu's name.

For the longer range, the White House is now programming the "sale" of arms to Laos and Cambodia, and the shipment of "economic" aid to U.S. puppets in Indochina. For the long haul, too, the White House is planning the continued presence of U.S. "advisers" in Indochina — of para-military forces in mufti, of CIA agents, and of assorted mercenaries. ✓

Last week the White House "leaked" the demand that, in violation of the agreement, the DRV should remove some 35,000 of its troops. Now, days later, the number has been escalated to unspecified dimensions.

Violation of the still-unsigned Vietnam treaty is paralleled by violation of U.S. undertakings in other areas. Thus, the White House has decided to continue the use of the island of Culebra, off of Puerto Rico, as a U.S. Navy gunnery range, in direct violation of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's pledge to end such use. The press reveals also that, contrary to Nixon's personal pledges, the U.S. is continuing at the Fort Detrick, Md., infectious diseases laboratories, preparations for biological warfare.

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U.S. Civilians Likley To Train Viet Forces

By HENRY S. BRADSHER
Star-News Staff Writer

SAIGON — The thin end of a wedge has appeared here which could lead to a continuing U.S. military advisory program for South Vietnam after a cease-fire.

It consists of plans to use American civilians for military training and maintenance as a continuation of the Vietnamization program after U.S. troops leave Vietnam.

According to the peace plan worked out between Washington and Hanoi, but now bogged down in dispute, all U.S. and allied military personnel must leave South Vietnam within 60 days of a cease-fire agreement.

The terms of the plan made public by Hanoi last week say neither the Saigon government nor the Viet Cong will "be allowed to accept the sending of forces, military advisers, personnel, weapons, ammunition and war material into South Vietnam."

Laos Pact Ignored

The full text of the tentative agreement is still secret, but the published summary is not so tight on advisers or other personnel as the 1962 Laos agreement.

The unsuccessful effort to neutralize that neighboring country contained wording which theoretically would prohibit the kind of plans now being made here.

The Laos agreement was quickly ignored. An American "secret war" under Central Intelligence Agency auspices developed against North Vietnamese violations of the agreement. Whether the seeds of a similar development here exist in the plans for civilian training and maintenance of South Vietnamese weaponry might now depend on how well a cease-fire is observed, once agreed upon.

The United States has been rushing military equipment to South Vietnam against the possibility that agreement might come quickly and further weapons be cut off.

Transports Rushed

Equipment being sent includes items such as F5 jet fighter planes to defend the South against Hanoi's Soviet-made MIG21s and Chinese-made MIG19s. This is simply a speedup of an existing program.

But in at least one case a new item has been added to the Vietnamization program.

This is the C130 turboprop transport plane. Some 30 of them are being rushed here even though South Vietnamese pilots and maintenance men are not trained for them.

According to military sources, they will be trained by American civilians on contract to the U.S. government.

Neither the U.S. Military

Command nor the embassy here would comment on this report from well-qualified military sources.

A far broader program than C130 training has been signaled by advertisements in Saigon's only English-language newspaper, the Saigon Post.

One Ad for an unidentified employer is seeking "personnel familiar with U.S. Army methods and procedures" with specialties in armaments, communications and electronics, and other fields. "Positions to be filled no later than 1 January 1973" are available for Americans or third-country nationals, the ad says.

"Third-country nationals" usually refers in this context to Filipinos or South Koreans who followed the U.S. war effort to South Vietnam.

Some Veterans Stay On

Another ad, by Lear Siegler, Inc., seeks U.S. citizens for immediate positions that include helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft mechanics, jet and piston engine mechanics, and related specialties.

In the past, American contractors here have hired U.S. servicemen who take discharges in Saigon and stay on doing work similar to their military jobs.

The CIA staffed much of its Laos operations by hiring

American servicemen in Vietnam.

North Vietnam had originally sought in peace negotiations to have the United States take all its military equipment home, when it left — taking away from South Vietnamese units the weapons which America had supplied.

Hanoi retreated from this position by agreeing to let existing equipment stay.

As that equipment wears out, the draft agreement says. It can "be replaced on a one-for-one basis by weapons of the same characteristics and similar characteristics and properties," Dr. Henry A. Kissinger explained last week.

Kissinger said nothing about civilians staying behind to advise on that equipment.

Sweeping Prohibition

The 1962 Laos agreement required the withdrawal of all foreign troops and military personnel, with none to be reintroduced. Foreseeing problems, the countries that sought to neutralize Laos added a protocol which said:

"The term 'foreign military personnel' shall include members of foreign military missions, foreign military advisers, experts, instructors, consultants, technicians, observers, and any other foreign military persons, including those serving in any armed forces in Laos, and foreign civilians connected with the supply, maintenance, storing and utilization of war materials."

Applied to South Vietnam, such wording would seem to prohibit the kind of civilian program which the U. S. government is now organizing here.

But the hasty dispatch of C130s to South Vietnam indicates confidence in Washington that it will not be applied.

The Central Intelligence Agency:

A Short History to JAN 1963 — Part 1

James Hepburn

"I never had any thought . . . when I set up the CIA, that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations. Some of the complications and embarrassment that I think we have experienced are in a part attributable to the fact that this quiet Intelligence arm of the President has been so removed from its intended role . . ."

— Harry Truman, President of the U.S.
quoted at the start of the chapter

Introductory Note by the Editor

The book "Farewell America", by James Hepburn, was published in 1968 in English by Frontiers Co. in Vaduz, Liechtenstein; 418 pages long, including 14 pages of index. James Hepburn is a pseudonym; the book is reputed to have been written by the French Intelligence, in order to report to Americans what actually happened in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Copies of the book may be purchased readily in Canada, and at one or two addresses in the United States. No bookstore in the United States that I know of will order and sell copies of the book. (Inquire of the National Committee to Investigate Assassinations, 927 15th St. NW, Washington, D.C. 20005, for ways to purchase the book.) The twenty chapters are absorbingly interesting.

Information about secret intelligence services and the way they operate is of course not in the open literature. In the two and a half years since I read the book, I have seen no demonstration that any of the information contained in the book is false — and the information does tie in with much else that is known. Perhaps more than 90% of what is in the book is true.

The following article is based on Chapter 15, "Spies", of "Farewell America".

Everywhere — and the United States is no exception — there are criminals who will do anything for money. But it is one thing to murder a creditor, a Senator or a jealous husband, and quite another to assassinate the President of the United States.

Hired Killers

Hired killers are rarely employed by a parapolitical or paramilitary group. They are much too dangerous. Their connections, their morals, and their insatiable avarice pose too many problems for a responsible organization. On the other hand, a number of individuals active in groups like the John Birch Society, the Patrick Henry Association, and the Christian Crusaders would be only too happy to volunteer for an ideological crime. But, although successful assassinations have on occasion been the work of fanatics, serious-minded conspirators would prefer not to rely on idealists. History tells us why.

Fanatic Assassins

The Tsar's Prime Minister, Stolypin, was shot to death in 1911 during a performance of Rimsky-Korsakov's "Tsar Saltan" at the Kiev Opera.¹ The assassin, a lawyer named Dimitri Bogrov, was convinced he had acted in the cause of freedom, and many others before him had sacrificed themselves in the struggle against the Tsars. But fanatics like Bogrov who are prepared to die for a cause are few indeed, and the nihilists lost more men than the imperial families.

Professional Soldier Assassins

Today, professional soldiers and guerilla warriors have taken up where the nihilists left off. They are just as courageous, but often less successful. In Germany, in 12 years of Nazism and 5 years of war, despite the Kreisau Circle and the numerous groups that claimed in 1946 to have belonged to the underground, despite the work of the Allied intelligence services and the plots hatched by several high-ranking officers of the Wehrmacht and the OKW, Hitler was never assassinated. Two officers, however, tried.

The first planted a bomb on one of Hitler's desks, claiming it was a bottle of cognac. The bomb was due to go off in the plane carrying the Fuehrer to the eastern front, but it failed to explode. The assassination attempt was never discovered. It was publicized later by its author, who meanwhile had recovered his "bottle of cognac".

Colonel Von Stauffenberg Against Hitler

The second, more serious attempt was the work of Colonel Klaus Von Stauffenberg. His failure dealt a deathblow to the plot of July 20, 1944. Stauffenberg either didn't dare or didn't care to shoot Hitler.² Instead, he placed his briefcase, containing the equivalent of a pound of TNT³, under the conference table where Hitler was sitting and left the room, claiming he had to make a phone call. The TNT was set off by a detonator a few minutes later.

But Colonel Von Stauffenberg, while a brilliant cavalryman, was a poor saboteur. His bomb would have killed Hitler, and probably most of the other officers present, if the conference had been held, as was usually the case at Rastenburg, in the basement of a cement blockhouse. The closed quarters would have magnified the compression, and the explosion would have proved fatal. On that hot July day, however, the conference was held instead in a wooden barracks with the windows open. Hitler was only knocked to the floor and slightly wounded by the explosion.

Colonel Von Stauffenberg was mistaken in his choice of an explosive. TNT is excellent for blowing up railroad lines and bridges, but for this type of operation, the Germans would have used a defensive grenade of the type used by the German

continued

LIFE & LETTERS

HEROIN AND THE CIA

by Flora Lewis

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

by Alfred W. McCoy
Harper & Row, \$10.95

One fact is beyond dispute: heroin is flooding into the United States in sufficient quantities to support an ever growing number of addicts. Estimates about the drug traffic are unreliable, but trends are painfully clear in mounting deaths, young zombies stumbling through city streets, crime to the point of civic terror. There are said to be some 560,000 addicts in America now, twice the number estimated two years ago and ten times the level of 1960.

Another fact goes unchallenged: suddenly, in 1970, high-grade pure white heroin, which Americans prefer to the less refined drug more normally consumed by Asians, appeared in plentiful and cheap supply wherever there were GI's in Vietnam. The epidemic was a vast eruption. It took the withdrawal of the troops to douse it, for the fearful flow could not be staunched.

Beyond those facts, the sordid story of drug trafficking has been a shadowy, elusive mixture of controversial elements. It was obvious that there must be corruption involved. It was obvious that there must be politics involved, if only because the traffic continues to flourish on such a scale despite the energetic pronouncements of powerful governments. It takes a map of the whole world to trace the drug net.

Since the United States suddenly

became aware of the sinister dimensions of the plague and President Nixon bravely declared war on drugs (unlike the persistently undeclared war in Indochina), it has been customary for U.S. officials to pinpoint the poppy fields of Turkey and the clandestine laboratories of Marseille as the source of most of the American curse. Nobody denied that the bulk of the world's illicit opium (some say 70 percent, some say 50 to 60 percent) is grown in Southeast Asia and particularly in the "golden triangle" of mountains where Burma, Thailand, and Laos meet. But the U.S. government insisted, and continues to insist in the 111-page report on the world opium trade published in August, that this supplies natives and seldom enters American veins.

Not so, says Alfred W. McCoy, who spent some two years studying the trade. And further, it is certain to become less and less so as measures which the United States demanded in Turkey and France take effect in blocking the old production and smuggling patterns. This is of crucial importance for two reasons. One is that firm establishment of an Asian pattern to America means that the crackdown in Turkey and France will be next to futile so far as availability of heroin in the United States is concerned. The second is that focusing attention on Southeast Asia would bring Americans to understand that the "war on drugs" is inextricably involved with the Indochina war, and has to be fought on the same battleground from which President Nixon

assured us he was disengaging "with honor."

McCoy, a twenty-seven-year-old Yale graduate student, worked with immense diligence and considerable courage—for the opium trade is dangerous business and the combination of opium, politics, and war can be murderous—to document the facts of the Asian pattern.

A good deal of it has been common gossip in tawdry bars of Saigon, Vientiane, and Bangkok for years. But the gossip mills of Indochina are a long way from the streets of Harlem and the high schools of Westchester County. The general knowledge that the rumors reflected is a long way from precise, confirmed detail. So the Asian pattern had never come through clearly in the United States.

Now, in his book *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, McCoy has set it down. To show how it developed, he had to backtrack. The use of opiates in the United States has a long history. It wasn't until after World War I that widespread opprobrium, added to growing understanding of the dangers, turned the trade into an underworld monopoly. But World War II disrupted the supply routes. Unable to get drugs, American addicts were forced to quit the hard way. The market diminished, and, with a modicum of enforcement effort and international cooperation, might have been wiped out.

A single U.S. official act, McCoy believes, turned that chance around and enabled the creation of a worldwide octopus of evil almost beyond

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An American who once picked the targets tells How we ran the secret air war in Laos

By Seymour M. Hersh

Seymour M. Hersh is a member of The Times's Washington bureau. His latest book is "Cover-Up: The Army's Secret Investigation of the Massacre at My Lai 4."

Jerome J. Brown could easily be mistaken for a typical American businessman living abroad. He's 30 years old, slightly beefy, profane and constantly wears oversized sunglasses. He's now a partner in a management consulting firm headquartered in Malaysia, where he lives with his Indonesian wife and their young son.

Brown has been in Southeast Asia less than seven years, but he knows it extremely well. He should. He was once in charge of bombing parts of it.

For 18 months, beginning in early 1967, Capt. Jerry Brown operated covertly as the chief Air Force targeting official for the secret air war in Laos. He was assigned to Project 404, a still-classified bombing operation personally controlled by the American Ambassador to Laos. And for more than a year before his assignment to Laos, Brown — then a lieutenant — worked as a highly trained photo-intelligence specialist for the Seventh Air Force in Saigon. Later in his career, he was assigned the key job of writing intelligence manuals for Southeast Asia reconnaissance operations.

Because of the secrecy, Captain Brown never wore his uniform in Vientiane, Laos's capital. He dressed instead in another uniform: business suit, white shirt and tie, and he carried papers identifying him as an employee of the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.). He worked in an unmarked building in the center of the city, along with more than 100 other Air Force and Army attachés who were also clandestinely assigned. His job was a remarkable one for a junior Air Force officer—picking targets for a secret bombing war carried out under the direction of the American Ambassador.

Captain Brown left the Air Force in late 1968 and began his business consulting career in Malaysia, but he kept in touch with former colleagues and with the air war. On a recent business trip to the United States—only his second visit since 1968—the former officer agreed to a wide-ranging interview, in violation of his agreement not to disclose classified information.

that an insider has publicly discussed the "secret war."

That war has evolved into a steady procession of rainy-season offensives by the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese. The other side has gained steadily and now controls at least two-thirds of the territory and about half of the three million population of Laos. In essence, the United States' mission in Laos is still the same as it was five years ago, when Captain Brown first reported for duty in Vientiane. Bombing wasn't working militarily in Laos or in North Vietnam then, and—according to recently published United States intelligence estimates—it still has failed to slow down the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese operations, despite causing widespread damage and many deaths in both North Vietnam and Laos.

There was little in Brown's background to suggest he would become a maverick. A number of his former colleagues and superiors, while reluctant to discuss specifics, had high praise for him. "He's a very respectable guy in our business," one high-ranking Air Force intelligence officer said at the Pentagon. Another officer said simply, "He's credible." And another privately confirmed many of Brown's facts and specific recollections.

Brown was born in Newark and attended the College of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minn., earning a bachelor's degree in 1964. His family, moderately wealthy, now lives in Wilmette, Ill., a high-income suburb of Chicago. Brown's biggest passions, before Vietnam, were golf, baseball and a sports car his father bought him for his 17th birthday.

"When I first came back to the States in 1970," he said, "I wasn't ready to sit down and talk. I don't care now. I think the country's ready for it. Something has to be done."

Brown is convinced that what was wrong with the air war in the nineteen-sixties is still wrong. "The bombing can't work and the senior air officers would never totally present the picture as it really was. The politicians and the ambassadors and the Presidents are continually being lied to," Brown said during the interview, which took place at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York.

He described what he said were the two most important "myths" about the air war: "One, that bombing is accurate" and two, "that when it's accurate it totally destroys targets, which it doesn't."

He cited a number of examples that demonstrated, he said, that the North Vietnamese—despite the heavier bombing and improved reconnaissance technology of the nineteen-seventies—were capable of coping. Among them: their ability to move scores of Russian-built tanks without detection down the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the months before the North Vietnamese offensive this April. The tanks were deployed around the province capital of Anloc, which was later besieged.

"Even the laser bomb can't make a difference," Brown said. "It's an agrarian society. We can knock out a bridge at Thanhhoa [in North Vietnam] and they'll go down river 10 miles and ford it there. We can knock out all the electricity and they'll burn wood. We can mine Haiphong Harbor and they'll load up and sail out. We can't destroy the POL [petroleum, oil and lubricants]

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continued

October 25, 1972

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks

THE DRUG PROBLEM STILL GROWS

HON. CHARLES B. RANGEL

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, October 13, 1972

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, the failure of this country to stop or even slow the soaring rate of drug addiction has left it at the mercy of this cancerous habit which knows no mercy.

Heroin addiction is the greatest single cause of crime, and that problem too is worsening—up 33 percent in recent years. Heroin addicts spend more than \$5 billion a year on their habit, making criminal narcotics traffic one of America's largest industries. That \$5 billion is paid by the victims of the millions of burglaries, robberies and thefts committed by heroin addicts each year. It amounts to a "heroin tax" of \$160 a year for every American family of four.

Heroin addiction is no longer isolated in the urban ghetto. It has spread to all parts of society. Nor is heroin addiction an isolated problem of the addicts. It is a serious problem that affects everyone who is a victim of their crime.

Heroin addiction has spread to epidemic proportions. In late 1969, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs estimated the number of heroin users in the United States to be 315,000. At the end of 1971, the estimate was 560,000.

A year ago the BNDD estimated that 5 to 6 tons of heroin were being smuggled into the United States each year. Today their estimate is 6½ to 10 tons.

A major reason for the failure of the war on drugs has been the Nation's failure to prevent Southeast Asia from emerging as a major source of heroin. One quarter to one third of the heroin entering the United States comes from Southeast Asia. If present trends continue, Southeast Asia will replace Turkey as the major source for heroin entering this country.

The reason that this Nation has been unable to prevent this is that our allies in Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam are involved in the narcotics trade. The United States does not crack down on them because officials have placed the need for airbases in Thailand, Lao mercenaries and Vietnamese soldiers over the safety of this Nation's population from the drug invasion.

While a law that I authored enables aid to be cut off to countries that refuse to stop contributing to our drug problem, columnist Jack Anderson, in a column which appeared in the New York Post on Friday, October 13, points out that classified CIA documents give evidence that Southeast Asian leaders are either protecting drug smugglers, or are, themselves, participating in the traffic in illegal drugs to America.

More than \$200 million in military aid annually goes to the Savanna Phouma government in Laos. Yet one CIA document quoted by Anderson said:

A broad spectrum of Lao society is involved in the narcotics business, including generals, princes, high-level bureaucrats and province governors.

Laotian generals, it seems, are providing the transportation for drug smugglers. Ironically, according to the reports in Anderson's possession, the planes and trucks to transport the America-bound narcotics are paid for by the U.S. military programs which Congress has said should be cut off in just this kind of situation.

This secret report goes on to say, according to Anderson, that the difficulty of cutting off aid is great since "the risk of jeopardizing some part of the military is high."

Our \$240 million aid to Cambodia goes to help support one of the major shipment points for Southeast Asian heroin and the unstable corrupt government that protects this operation.

Anderson goes on to quote from the report:

If U.S. aid were withdrawn, the government's ability to withstand Communist aggression would be weakened to the point of collapse.

Are we to believe that the prospect of the collapse of a tiny corrupt government on the other side of the world is more important than the deaths of hundreds of our young people, black and white, because of heroin?

The story is no better in South Vietnam. While the Thieu regime has mouthed promises to stem the flow of heroin from its mountainous areas, Anderson quotes this report as saying, "the corruption among government, civilian, military and police officials, some of whom have been participating in the narcotics traffic themselves" makes the prospects of stopping South Vietnamese heroin traffic without drastic action very dim.

As for these drastic actions, the report is further quoted to say:

It is not in the U.S. interests to implement an air cut-off, even to punish Vietnam for failure to control drugs.

Thailand and much of South America repeat this same depressing story. Obviously, the war on drugs has become the victim of the war in Southeast Asia.

Up to 100,000 American GI's sent to fight in Vietnam since 1959 became addicted to heroin produced and marketed by our Southeast Asian allies. This same heroin is now taking its toll in our own country.

Claims of impressive seizures, important arrests, and international cooperation can simply not hide the failures. Ridding America of the heroin plague should be a seriously pursued national goal. When we spend \$60 billion to fight North Vietnam and less than \$1 billion to fight drug addiction, the priorities are anything but correct.

In September 1970, a leading Federal narcotics officer said:

Every time one addict is cured, more take his place because of the ever-increasing amounts of heroin available.

A year ago, the American people were told that opium production was being phased out in Turkey—which had in the past accounted for 80 percent of the heroin being smuggled into the United States.

For Americans today, this elicits several questions which should be asked.

If opium production in Turkey is being phased out, how can heroin importation—and addiction—be increasing?

And why is the overall problem worse than ever after all the calls for special action?

The answer, again, lies in the region known as the Golden Triangle where the borders of Thailand, Burma, and Laos converge. One year's crop of 750 to 1,000 tons can be refined into enough heroin to supply America's addicts for 10 years. More and more of this heroin is reaching the American market.

Southeast Asia has been a major producer of opium and has had opium addiction problems of its own for some time. But only in 1969 did the white pure No. 4 heroin prized by American addicts begin to be produced in Southeast Asia.

When it appeared, it appeared in earnest. John Ingersoll, Director of BNDD, said:

Our first indication of the presence of (No. 4) heroin in Southeast Asia came in December of 1969. In 1970, the trickle turned into a stream, and in 1971, the stream turned into a torrent of heroin pouring out of the "Golden Triangle."

Since there was no indigenous demand for No. 4 heroin anywhere in Southeast Asia, its appearance signified an intention to supply the U.S. market. The first victims were our soldiers in Vietnam.

Now that many of our GI's have come home and the market for No. 4 has diminished in Southeast Asia, Southeast Asian heroin is being marketed in America.

The United States has always tolerated corruption on the part of our allies in the war in Southeast Asia as long as they fight at least part of the war and follow at least some of our policies. Black marketeering, stealing U.S. aid, currency manipulation and smuggling are tolerated and all are rampant. Narcotics trafficking has not been treated any differently.

A vast military and political apparatus was built up in Indochina by the United States. We ignored the fact that virtually every link in that apparatus was simultaneously becoming part of a vast opium producing, refining, and smuggling apparatus which today is well on the way to replacing Turkey as the major source of heroin entering the United States.

The basics of the development of the Southeast Asian opium and heroin trade are these:

In Laos, opium is grown by the Miao tribesmen we organized into General Vang Pao's "secret army." In fact, once the United States began providing them with liberal food supplies to assure their allegiance, many of them were able to switch to opium as virtually their only crop.

In Burma, opium is grown by the Shan rebels, the biggest opium growers in the world. They are armed with American weapons provided by the CIA or which were acquired by trading opium with government officials in Laos and Thailand for guns supplied by—and stolen from—the U.S. military aid program.

Opium is also grown by hill tribesmen in Thailand.

Opium from Burma is transported into Thailand by remnants of the Nationalist

Meo Tribesman Is Veteran Pilot at 22

United Press International

LONG TIENG, Laos—Lt. Vang Bee Caikuevang recently chalked up his 500th combat mission as a fighter-bomber pilot. As a veteran of the North Laos air war, this means he has been flying all of eight months.

Vang Bee, 22, is one of seven Meo hill tribe pilots who fly in the mini-air force of converted T28 trainers attached to the CIA-sponsored army of Maj. Gen. Vang Pao, which fights against the North Vietnamese in northern Laos.

It used to be a rule in the U.S. Air Force that pilots earned a ticket home after 100 combat missions in high risk areas in Indochina, and it took most American pilots close to a year to pile up that many.

The Meos average eight to nine missions a day in their little propeller-driven planes when the weather permits, and it does not take long to pile up an impressive total of missions—if the pilot lives long enough.

Between 20 and 30 Meo pilots have been trained in the last four or five years, according to one count. That there are only seven now flying gives an idea of the odds they face when they climb into the cockpit.

"They tend to lead a short but happy life," says one American who knows them well.

The Meos have become the backbone of air support for Vang Pao's guerrillas because the fighting in South Vietnam since March 30 has kept most of the U.S. jets busy in North and South Vietnam.

T-28s carry four 250-pound

bombs each, plus .50-caliber machine guns, which are not always effective against dug-in targets. But they can go much lower and slower than the jets, which gives them almost pinpoint bombing accuracy in the hands of a skilled pilot.

That, however, also makes it a lot easier to get shot down. The T-28s were withdrawn from combat at the onset of a North Vietnamese offensive on the Plain of Jars north of Long Tieng last December when sophisticated Communist antiaircraft guns knocked three out of the sky in a few hours.

Like his army, Van Pao's air force is a U.S.-sponsored operation. Americans supervise maintenance of the T-28s and the loading of bombs. When a T-28 is lost, it is replaced from a stockpile at the Udorn air base across the Mekong River in Thailand.

The ranks of Meo pilots at Long Tieng are fleshed out with Lao airmen from the lowlands and, according to some sources, occasional reinforcements from Thailand's air force. Lowlanders are said to like flying at Long Tieng, despite the risks, since the CIA pays better than the Laotian air force.

For the Meos, the risks go beyond antiaircraft fire. They do not know how to fly on instruments so if they get into bad weather, they face the threat of falling victim to vertigo and losing control.

Vang Bee's immediate boss at Long Tieng is Capt. Vang Sue, one of the first Meo pilots to get his wings. At 27, Vang Sue has been

flying four years and beaten all the odds. He says he has flown about 3,150 combat missions.

There were six of the T-28s at Long Tieng as Vang Sue showed some visitors around, but he said only four of them were flyable. The tribesman pointed to the unserviceable aircraft.


"Broken," he said. What he meant in the case of one plane was that a bullet hole from a Communist machine gun had gone through the wing, slicing through a control cable so that it remained stretched taut by a single strand.

The plane had been damaged on a mission flown earlier that day by Vang Sue's wingman, a grinning tribesman in a yellow polo shirt and baseball cap with a pistol slung on his hip, cowboy style.

"If that cable breaks, he crash," said Vang Sue. "I guess maybe he lucky."

STATINTL

LIFE BOOK REVIEW



A packet of
high-quality heroin

The book the CIA couldn't put down

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
by ALFRED W. MCCOY (Harper & Row) \$10.95

One cool, clear January morning in 1970, I journeyed upward through the jungle-covered hills on the Thai-Burma border to interview a contingent of the Kokang Revolutionary Force, a band of Burmese guerrillas, about their revolt against the government in Rangoon. The talk around the campfire that day was not of revolutionary struggle, however, but of smuggling opium. And their chief worry was not the Burmese army but the remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Chinese whose gear-wheel flag could be seen floating over Thai territory on the next mountaintop.

Even as recently as 1970 the muddled politics of the opium-growing hill tribes and the American agents who operate among them like white gods seemed the stuff of Eric Ambler novels, a problem for Asians perhaps but not a big worry for Americans. But even then the pure heroin refined from Southeast Asian opium was finding its way into the bloodstreams of American GIs. The infection now shows every sign of following them home.

Alfred McCoy, a 27-year-old Yale Ph.D. candidate, has spent the last two years unraveling this complex situation. It is his thesis that Southeast Asia is rapidly replacing Turkey as the main source of heroin in the U.S. By supporting the very people who are most involved in the trade, moreover, our government has itself become involved in the passage of opium as "simply an inadvertent consequence of its Cold War tactics."

The CIA has given a boost to the book's sales by foolishly asking to read the manuscript before publication. The CIA's lawyers said the book "could create an accepted myth that the CIA has been involved in the drug traffic." Yet their written criticism of the manuscript seemed pathetically thin. For example, the CIA denied any "substantial" contact with the Nationalist Chinese forces in Southeast Asia after 1951. But McCoy puts his sources, including a former CIA operative, on the record to the contrary. The debate breaks down over the meaning of the word "substantial." Again, the CIA denies that Air

America, the CIA contract airline in Laos, carries opium. But Air America pilots are contract soldiers of fortune, and, in the bars of Vientiane, they often admitted to it.

One should remember, however, that opium-growing has long been a way of life to the hill tribes, and as such is neither illegal nor immoral. Once the political decision was made to arm the tribesmen in the anti-Communist cause it became inevitable that the agency would become at least tangentially involved in opium. Ironically, the CIA-based clandestine Meo army have been all but run out of the opium-growing areas of northeast Laos.

The book is much more than an exposé of CIA activities, however. McCoy lays out the whole history of the opium trade, going back to colonial and precolonial times, and explains in detail how the system works today. But though he paints a clear picture of governmental corruption in our client states and of the political vacuum in northern Burma, where most of the world's opium grows, it is still difficult to accept his conclusion—that the answer to the problem lies not in curing addiction at home or in smashing the syndicates, but in eradicating production in Southeast Asia. "The American people will have to choose between supporting doggedly anti-Communist governments in Southeast Asia or getting heroin out of their high schools," he concludes.

Unfortunately, the long history of our involvement in Southeast Asia has shown that we seldom have the leverage over our clients required to impose this kind of solution. It is questionable whether even the most intensive economic or diplomatic pressure could completely cut out the deeply ingrown opium business from that region. And if not Southeast Asia, are there not other fields in which poppies can grow? If we have found we cannot be the world's policeman, can we hope to become the world's narc?

by H.D.S. Greenway

Mr. Greenway is a former chief of Time's Bangkok bureau.

Laos Air War Leans Heavily on Meo Tribe

LONG CHENG, Laos (UPI) — Lt. Vang Bee Cai k u e v a n g recently chalked up his 500th combat mission as a fighter-bomber pilot. As a veteran of the north Laos air war, this means that he has been flying all of eight months.

Vang Bee, 22, is one of seven Meo hill-tribe pilots who fly in the mini air force of converted T-28 trainers attached to the Central Intelligence Agency-sponsored "secret army" of Maj. Gen. Vang Pao, which fights against the North Vietnamese in northern Laos.

It used to be a rule in the U.S. Air Force that pilots earned themselves a ticket home after 100 combat missions in high-risk areas in Indochina. It took most American pilots close to a year to pile up that many.

The Meos average eight to nine missions a day in their little propeller-driven planes when the weather permits. And it does not take long to pile up an impressive total of missions — if the pilot lives long enough.

Only 7 Still Flying

Between 20 and 30 Meo pilots have been trained in the last four or five years, according to one tally. That there are only seven now flying gives an idea of the odds they face when they climb into the cockpit.

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That, however, also makes it a lot easier to get shot down. The T-28s were withdrawn from combat at the onset of a North Vietnamese offensive on the Plain of Jars north of Long Cheng last December when sophisticated Communist antiaircraft guns knocked three out of the sky in a few hours.

U.S. Supervision

Like the "secret army," Vang Pao's air force is a U.S.-sponsored operation. Americans supervise maintenance of the T-28s and the loading of bombs. When a T-28 is lost, it is replaced from a stockpile kept at the air base at Udorn, across the Mekong River in Thailand.

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3,150 Missions

Vang Bee's immediate boss at Long Cheng is Capt. Vang Sue, one of the first Meo pilots to get his wings. At 27, Vang Sue has been flying four years and beaten all the odds. He says he has about 3,150 combat missions.

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October 17, 1972

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks

8799

HON. JOHN L. McMILLAN

SPEECH OF

HON. CARL ALBERT

OF OKLAHOMA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, October 13, 1972

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I join the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. DORN) and other colleagues in the words of tribute they have paid to my friend, JOHN McMILLAN. JOHN's departure is an occasion for personal regret so far as I am concerned. JOHN has had one of the longest records of public service in the history of this body or of the country. He has served as staff member and Congressman for a combined total of 44 years. He has served on two great committees of the House—the Committee on Agriculture and as chairman of the House District Committee. I doubt one could approximate two more difficult legislative problems than the problems of farmers and the problems of the District of Columbia. A softer man, a man with a lesser sense of responsibility, might have taken the easy way out and simply looked for another assignment.

I myself served on the Agriculture Committee for many years. I know that the problems of farmers have been harsh and difficult of solution. JOHN McMILLAN represented the PeeDee District, so called from the river that winds its way through the coastal lowlands of his State. Its No. 1 crop is tobacco and it has taken all of JOHN McMILLAN's power on the committee to represent the needs of his constituency in a time when tobacco growers have faced some of their toughest challenges. As the second-ranking member on the Agriculture Committee, I do not think anyone will dispute me when I say that JOHN McMILLAN has done an outstanding job of representing the interests which represent the main economic base in his district.

The chairmanship of the District Committee is demanding beyond question. It would be a hard job for any chairman, no matter what his political or philosophical bias happened to be. The economic and political status of the District has been in a state of flux many years. Complex problems have cropped up at every hand. It would have taken a Solomon to have produced solutions to all of them. JOHN McMILLAN has given the business of the District his best efforts for many years. Many have not agreed with his judgment, many have opposed him, but I do not think anyone doubts that he has acted in good conscience and taken his duties seriously.

As a representative of rural America and also the legislative overseer of a part of America which has had to bring many of its day-to-day administrative responsibilities to Congress, JOHN McMILLAN can conclude his career with the assurance that he has carried great burdens and has tried to act constructively in two most demanding legislative areas. He has been a devoted and conscientious Congressman. He is a great American and his service will long be remembered

in this House. As the Representative of a great State, the State if not the district in which my wife was born, both Mary and I join in wishing JOHN and his lovely wife, Margaret, a happy and fruitful future. The McMillans will always have a place in our regard and affection and in those of the Members of this body.

LET THEM EAT BOMBS

HON. PAUL N. McCLOSKEY, JR.

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, October 17, 1972

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Speaker, since June of 1970, there has been debate in this Chamber over whether or not it has been an American practice to bomb and destroy the villages of Laos.

Additional evidence on the subject was presented in an eyewitness account by John Everingham appearing in this month's issue of the Washington Monthly. The article follows:

LET THEM EAT BOMBS (By John Everingham)

(AUTHOR'S NOTE.—From March, 1968, to May, 1972, I made seven treks to the jungled villages of Long Pot District in north central Laos. The district is located approximately 32 miles to the northwest of Long Cheng, headquarters for General Vang Pao's American-trained army, and 30 air miles to the southwest of the now deserted Plain of Jars. In 1968, Long Pot was made up of slightly less than 2,000 people living in 11 separate villages. Five of these were populated by the Meo clan, five by the Hill Lao, and one by the people of the Mekong River lowlands. Long Pot is the name of the district and also the name of the Meo village serving as district headquarters.)

MARCH 1968

It was a three-day walk to Long Pot village from the nearest motor road. When I first arrived, I saw clusters of thatch and bamboo houses gripping the sides of a man-scraped ridge. The cries of small children scampering on the rust-colored clay mingled with the grunts and squeals of fat pigs rooting in the underbrush. It was a peaceful scene.

I was shown to the home of the district chief. He was a short, vigorous man in his late fifties, with a high forehead and the melancholy dignity of a senior statesman. Gair Su Yang wore loose black pants of traditional Meo cut and a U.S. military fatigue jacket; he wore no shoes.

According to Gair Su Yang, the first helicopter landed in Long Pot in 1960. The pilots were American, but a Meo officer climbed out to talk with him. The officer spoke of an alliance between the Americans and a Meo colonel of the Royal Lao Army named Yang Pao. He said that American officials had made a pact with Vang Pao, promising to build for the Meo their own army and independent state in the mountains. They guaranteed that the tribesman would not fall under the control of either faction of lowland Lao then girding for civil war. The officer painted a picture of future prosperity for the Meo. All they had to do was become anti-communist, helping the Americans to fight the Pathet Lao revolutionaries controlling sections of Laos' northern provinces.

One of the problems that the people of Long Pot had in accepting the deal was that they were not sure who Vang Pao was. But there was a more basic problem—though Gair Su Yang did not inform me of it until

sometime later: "If we joined the alliance, the Pathet Lao would have become our enemy and would have threatened our village. . . . I told him that Long Pot would not join Vang Pao and the Americans." According to Gair Su Yang, the officer then became angry and threatened that Vang Pao and the Americans considered those not friends to be enemies, and "enemy villages would be attacked and captured by Vang Pao's men."

"We couldn't do anything," Gair Su Yang later contended, pointing out that only fear of a helicopter-load of soldiers descending upon Long Pot forced him to accept involvement in the war venture.

By the end of 1960, every man in Long Pot village had received an M-1 rifle or carbine. Many had been flown to Long Cheng for three to four months' training by U.S. soldiers. (These were probably U.S. Special Forces, whom it was common to see in small up-country towns of Laos until 1968-69. Thereafter CIA "civilians" were used to train Vang Pao's army.) Long Pot's men were then given rank in irregular battalion 209.

Long Pot had been militarized in defense of "Meoland" nearly eight years when I first visited. It had not, however, gone to war. The M-1s were used for shooting squirrels and birds. Men, women, and children slashed, burned, and planted to reap harvests of rice, corn, and, of course, the opium poppy. Opium was the main cash crop, which from 1960 onwards had been bought by Meo soldiers and transported both by pony caravan and American-piloted Air America helicopters from Long Cheng.

OCTOBER 1970

During the summer of 1969, the Bureau of Public Roads, Laos Division (an arm of USAID), opened war-abandoned Route 13 linking the administrative capital of Vientiane with the royal capital at Luang Prabang. The new road put Long Pot only a half-day walk from motor transport. A companion and myself traveled up Route 13 by motorcycle and walked the rest of the way to Long Pot village. As we arrived, 20 teenage boys in U.S. army uniforms, dragging M-1 carbines and rifles often too big for them, paced through mock-military maneuvers, periodically driving to the ground in a half-hearted manner that would have gotten them killed if bullets had really been flying. A few days earlier, they had returned by helicopter from Long Cheng. There, they said, U.S. soldiers had put them through three months of military training. Another helicopter would arrive that afternoon, they said, and take them off to Moung Soui district, about 30 miles to the northeast, where the Pathet Lao were in the midst of attacking and taking the town.

The boys' eyes revealed their fear and demoralization as they talked about the coming helicopter ride and their destination. And as we all waited, bombs could be heard peppering the hills in the distance, in the direction of Moung Soui. The bomb blasts, though 15 to 20 miles away, shook the hill under our feet and shattered the young soldier's nerve. Several mothers were crying as they fussed over their soldier-boys; lucky charms were stuffed into baggy pockets. District Chief Gair Su Yang was at the center of the gathering handing out new U.S. army uniforms, pep-talking his recruits. But Gair Su Yang's voice was flecked with anger and did nothing to ease the funeral atmosphere.

No, said every boy I asked, they didn't want to go to fight the Pathet Lao. They said their village headmen had chosen them; they must go. And they went. Early next morning, I ran out from breakfast in Gair Su Yang's house as a helicopter finally whoop-whooped in to land. "Air America" was clearly printed down the side of the silver and blue craft. Boys clambered aboard. The helicopter rose

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NEWS

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OCT 13 1972

War on Laos opium evokes no hurrahs

By Keyes Beech
Daily News Foreign Service

VIENTIANE, Laos — To the Americans who came to Laos more than a decade ago to fight a clandestine war against the Communists, the poppy was a red paper flower you bought on Veterans Day.

Today, as the United States struggles to extricate itself from the Southeast Asian quagmire, the poppy has quite a different meaning. It is a sinister flower that, if not exactly the root of all evil, has corrupted governments, made heroin addicts of thousands of GIs, tarnished America's image and besmirched the reputation of dedicated public servants.

Now, after what one critic called a policy of "benign neglect" toward Laos' uninhibited opium trade, the U.S. mission here has declared war on all narcotics.

SINCE THE DRUG traffic in Laos was perfectly legal until a year ago, when U.S. officials forced an anti-narcotics law through the national assembly, the campaign has a long way to go.


Already some assemblymen are agitating for repeal of the law because, they say, it has worked a hardship on the opium-growing Meo mountain tribesmen who are America's chief allies in northern Laos in the long-running Central Intelligence Agency-backed war against the Communists.

One tribal leader has three tons of opium to sell and no takers because of the U.S. crackdown. Since opium is, or was, Laos' only cash crop, the tribesmen have a severe economic complaint.

WASHINGTON, it is under-



Beech



Asia's drug pipeline

Last in a series

live buying" of the Laos opium because it isn't altogether happy with the results of its purchases in Thailand and Turkey.

If the United States did buy up Laos' surplus stock, there is no assurance the primitive tribesmen wouldn't regard Uncle Sam as a steady customer and produce more, not less, opium.

Like other U.S. mission chiefs in Southeast Asia, Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley has felt the heat of President Nixon's global war on narcotics. Here, as in neighboring Thailand, the war on the drug traffic seems to have taken precedence over the war against communism.

"It is as if the United States were fighting two fires at once," said an old Southeast Asia hand, "communism and drugs — and the irony is that the drug problem is a direct result of the fight against communism."

GODLEY HAS come under attack by Alfred W. McCoy, a young scholar, for being "soft" on the drug traffic and allegedly attempting to cover up the role of the U.S. mission in Laos.

Godley has issued a vigorous eight-page single-spaced rebuttal to McCoy's charges as contained in a Harper's magazine article. McCoy is the author of a newly published book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," the product of 18 months' research.

The CIA is McCoy's chief target. It is his contention that the CIA, by working with corrupt local officials who were engaged in the drug traffic, has contributed to America's addiction problem.

THE EMBASSY'S position was not helped earlier this year when French police confiscated a suitcase containing 60 kilos of Laotian heroin. The suitcase belonged to Prince Sopsaisana, newly appointed ambassador to Paris.

The American Embassy was almost as embarrassed as the prince, who returned to Vientiane after the French government refused to accept his credentials. For, as McCoy states, Sopsaisana was widely regarded by the Americans as "an outstanding example of a new generation of honest, dynamic national leaders."

ONE LITTLE-KNOWN fact is that Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma was an opium tax collector in French colonial days. And, Gen. Ouan Rathikun, former commander of the Royal Laotian Army, will freely discuss his role in the drug traffic with almost anybody who takes the trouble to go around and see him.

After all, says the general, there was nothing unlawful about it, and opium has been a rich source of revenue for the gen-

eral, who seems amused by U.S. efforts to stamp out the traffic.

"If somebody wants to accuse us of being shortsighted," said a CIA official with unaccustomed passion, "that is one thing. But to say that we deliberately fostered the opium traffic as a matter of policy is an absolute lie."

BUT ONE FACT is inescapable. The CIA could not ask the Meos to fight on the American side and at the same time demand that they give up their opium-growing.

The handful of CIA men who have worked with the Meos over the years may have felt they were fighting for democracy. But the Meos were fighting for their land — and the right to grow opium on that land.

In their long war with the Communists the Meos have been driven from most of their mountain retreats by relentless Communist pressure. Since opium doesn't grow well below 3,000 feet, production has declined from an estimated 100 tons 10 years ago to 30 tons today.

"The more territory the Communists take, the less opium," said one cynical observer. "That may be the ultimate solution to the drug problem in Laos."

LIBERATION FORCES STRENGTHENED IN LAOS

By Richard E. Ward

In Laos the Nixon doctrine of using bombs and dollars to support reactionary forces is suffering serious setbacks.

The bombs which primarily kill and maim civilians have not been able to stop or blunt the liberation forces led by the Lao Patriotic Front (Pathet Lao). And sharply increased U.S. military aid to its mercenaries in Laos has not been able to raise the morale of these forces still experiencing heavy losses annually, especially in recent years.

Once the pro-U.S. mercenary force of 30,000, directed and financed by the CIA, consisted almost entirely of Lao minorities, mainly Meo, led by the Meo Gen. Vang Pao. Now after a decade of operations the Meos have been bled white in the service of the U.S. and no amount of money can replenish their ranks in Vang Pao's forces. The CIA has had to turn to other minorities and to "volunteers" from the military forces of Thailand to fight for the U.S. in Laos.

Thai troops now constitute the majority of Vang Pao's secret army which operates virtually independent of the Vientiane government. Their orders come from the U.S. embassy and in particular from ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley, who relishes informal titles like field marshal and procounsel given to him by the press.

Offensive bogged down

Vang Pao's mercenary troops are now engaged in their annual offensive. This drive, which began in mid-August, is reportedly bogged down and being turned back by the Pathet Lao earlier than ever before, even during the present rainy season when virtually all advantages are with the pro-U.S. forces.

The main CIA-backed operations customarily begin during the rainy season because during that period ground transportation, the only means available to liberation forces, is extremely difficult at best and in some regions even impossible. While the liberation forces must fight under this disadvantage, the CIA's mercenaries have U.S. aircraft providing transport and logistical support as well as tactical and strategic bombing support.

But despite these advantages, Vang Pao's troops are engaged in what is probably their weakest offensive ever. Starting from Long Cheng, the once top-secret CIA base, Vang Pao's troops have moved against the Plain of Jars. Detailed information has been entirely withheld from the press, an indication that the drive is failing, which is the conclusion of few assessments made by Western press sources.

In a report in the Sept. 23 Far Eastern Economic Review, D.E. Ronk, writing from Vientiane, noted the disparity between official U.S. claims that Vang Pao was making satisfactory progress and the reality "that (progress) if any . . . is being made at a snail's pace."

Ronk adds that Vang Pao's forces scattered around the edges of the Plain of Jars are being hit hard, while "progress toward the plain itself has been slow, to say the least; probably it has now stopped." As for the near future Ronk, an experienced observer in Laos, writes:

Precarious hold

"Most observers in Vientiane, including military men, are concerned for the safety of Long Cheng while Vang Pao's best troops are on the offensive. Long Cheng's defenses are being manned by Communist forces. . . . This year, Vang Pao's grip on the Long Cheng-Sam Thong defense line is precarious, at best, with most of the outer line two miles north and northeast of the base in Com-

munist hands. Few in Vientiane would be surprised if the Communists managed to sweep Long Cheng-Sam Thong into their control before the end of the current rains, then turned on Vang Pao's isolated forces around the plain 20 miles to the northeast."

Last winter, liberation forces mounted a three-month siege of Long Cheng during which the CIA-mercenary base was evacuated for a period. The siege was maintained in the face of unprecedented U.S. bombing and despite wide deployment of Thai troops who suffered heavy casualties. The heavy losses taken by the reactionary troops, including Vang Pao's Meo forces, has caused serious morale problems among all their elements.

For leading the Meo into disasters year after year, the CIA and

Vang Pao are meeting increasing resistance to recruiting among the relatively few able-bodied potential soldiers left among the Meo, who once readily took up arms for relatively high mercenary wages in impoverished Laos. Those still in uniforms are, according to the New York Times correspondent Fox Butterfield, "bedeviled by exhaustion after many years of war. . . ."

Butterfield, in a Sept. 27 dispatch, confirms the dismal outlook for the pro-U.S. forces in a report sent from the Long Cheng headquarters at Vang Pao. Although the general appeared "energetic," Butterfield states that his troops are "reportedly exhausted by last spring's fighting and afraid of the Communists' newly introduced 130-mm long-range guns."

One feature of the current fighting is that the liberation forces did not fall back during the rainy season, leaving many units in place. In past years, Vang Pao's advances and "victories" were generally achieved with virtually no opposing forces on the scene and his forces could entrench themselves before having to face the liberation troops.

Fill the breach

It is doubtful that Thai forces will be able to fill the breach of the depleted ranks of Vang Pao's troops. The U.S. is currently spending at least \$100 million to support Thai troops in Laos, but despite their mercenary wages of many times the pay of regular Thai troops, the heavy fighting has reportedly dampened their enthusiasm. One indicator of this is a 30 percent desertion rate among Thai troops in Laos.

Secrecy still enshrouds many aspects of U.S. operations in Laos, apparently in order to disguise violation of Congressional restrictions. Congress has prohibited the U.S. from financing mercenaries recruited outside Laos. The Nixon administration sidestepped that barrier by calling the Thai troops and airmen in Laos "volunteers." The Thai government denies any role although it allows recruiting from the regular armed services and supplies Thai officers to command the CIA units in Laos. The charade is maintained by giving the Thais Laotian names and Laotian military identification cards.

In a preface to a Senate Foreign relations committee report issued in May, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) observed that the administration was violating the Congressional ban on the use of Thai troops in Laos. He said that Congress had virtually no control over CIA programs, in part, because of Congressional abdication of responsibility as well as because of administration furtiveness.

"It is a fact," stated Symington, "that not only the American people, but even the proper committees of Congress, have not been given much detail of our use of Thai irregulars in Laos. . . . This is a fact. . . . Millions of dollars of appropriated monies are involved."

continued

Battered Laotian Tribe Fears U.S. Will Abandon It

By FOX BUTTERFIELD
Special to The New York Times

SITE 288, Laos, Oct. 5—Years ago, before the North Vietnamese first shelled this village with their big guns, Yong Dua Mua was a great chief among the Meo people. He had rich rice fields on the high mountains, pigs, chickens and a dozen water buffalo.

"Everything a man needs to live we had," he recalls.

Since then many of the chief's family and friends have died fighting in the Meo irregular army that is supported by the United States Central Intelligence Agency. A quarter of his own people have been lost, and the survivors, encamped in this place that does not even have a name, are refugees dependent on American aid dropped from the air.

Fatigue and Fear

It is a fate shared by nearly 200,000 Meos remnants of a proud race of mountain warriors, because since they took up arms—American arms—to fight the North Vietnamese, they have been driven out of their homeland in Northern Laos and into their series of crowded valleys and ridge tops around Ban Son, about 70 miles north of Vientiane.

The Meos are tired, and they are afraid that the United States will abandon them to their enemy—in Meo the word for "Vietnamese" and for "enemy" are one and the same. The Hanoi radio feeds their fear with daily broadcasts about antiwar feeling in the United States.

"If the Vietnamese attack us once more this year and the Americans do not help us, I will just have to stay here and die," said Mr. Yong, who has been a refugee from his home north of the Plaine des Jarres since 1960. "We cannot move again."

Between the North Vietnamese and the refugee settlements lies only the irregular army's redoubt at Long Tieng, which was partly breached last spring and is considered highly vulnerable.

South of Site 288 there are no more mountains into which to flee, only the hot and humid

Vientiane plain that the Meos, accustomed to living at heights above 3,000 feet, find uninhabitable.

Chief Yong and other Meo leaders interviewed in a tour of refugee villages near Ban Son this week believe that their plight is inevitable, as in a classical tragedy.

"When I was young my grandparents used to tell me that the Chinese and Vietnamese had oppressed us and taken our land for generations," said the chief, a tall, heavyset man much bigger than the average short, wiry Meo. "Even if I had known 10 years ago what I know now, I would have made the same decision to fight and not accept the Vietnamese. There was no choice."

As he spoke a flight of United States Air Force F-4 Phantom jet fighters flew over on their way to bomb North Vietnam. In the distance a small Continental Air Services transport, chartered to the Agency for International Development, circled lazily over a nearby village, dropping large burlap sacks of rice.

The agency is feeding most of the people in this area from the relief center at Ban Son, doling out rice, cornmeal, canned beef and cooking oil. Whenever the Meos can settle in one place long enough, they try to grow their own vegetables.

Although Site 288 and the hundred other settlements jammed together near Ban Son are still in the mountains, things do not look right to the Meos.

An Unfamiliar Environment

With all the crowding, there is little left of the luxuriant dark green rain forest on which they have always depended for fuel and building material. There is almost no land to slash and burn to plant upland rice. Traditionally they measured distances by the number of days it took to walk to the nearest village, but they now can hear their neighbors talking.

One of the few signs of progress at Site 288 is the six-year village school, but there are only half as many pupils as there were three years ago, before the last big North Vietnamese drive.

Each settlement also has a small dispensary supplied by A.I.D. Thousands of Meos have caught malaria during their migrations because they had lived at altitudes where the disease was unknown and had no immunity.

Chief Yong's village original-

ly lay in the rich mountain land halfway between the Plaine des Jarres and the North Vietnamese border. One night in December, 1960, he recalls, the Communists "fired their big guns into our homes" without warning.

"I could not tell you the reason why they did it. I do not know much," he added, holding certain words for emphasis in the beautiful, lilting Meo tonal language. "I cannot read or write."

Volunteers Without Pay

After that, the chief related, almost all the young men in his village went to join the army. "There was no pay in those days, they all just volunteered," he said.

The force he referred to was being put together by a young, tough and ambitious major in the regular Laotian Army, Vang Pao, himself a Meo. Now a major general, Vang Pao went into hiding south of the Plaine des Jarres early in 1961 and began recruiting the mountain tribesmen to battle the Vietnamese invaders.

As his force grew General Vang Pao also began receiving arms and training from a small group of Americans known as a "white star team," predecessors of the Special Forces, who landed clandestinely at his headquarters at Padong. Simultaneously, American planes started dropping food to Meo villagers who had been forced to flee.

Meo leaders interviewed this week and the Americans who helped organize General Vang Pao's force deny, as has sometimes been charged, that the United States made a secret deal to get the Meos to fight.


"There was no deal, the Meo wanted to fight and needed arms, we wanted to stop the Communists," said Edgar Buell, the A.I.D. officer who served as the Americans' first contact with General Vang Pao.

Policy Developed 'Gradually'

"At first no one thought the war would last more than six months," he explained. "It was only gradually as the fighting went on that we began to see the need to drop food to them and then to start paying the soldiers. The Meo aren't mercenaries, like people are always saying. If they were, I couldn't have worked with them all these years."

American officials here, many of whom have spent as much as 10 years in Laos, feel a deep sense of responsibility for the fate of the Meos. They know that the arming of the Meos may have helped provoke North Vietnamese assaults.

"Even though it was only a marriage of convenience and we made no promises," a high-ranking official who requested



The New York Times/Oct. 11, 1972
Meo refugees are camped in the Ban Son area.

anonymity said, "I personally feel in my heart a deep moral commitment. The problem is, these people are just too pure for the filthy world we so-called developed countries have created for them."

There are no accurate statistics on the number of Meos, civilian and military, who have lost their lives in the war. Estimates of the original number in this country, whose population is thought to be about three million, run from 200,000 to 350,000. Of these 80,000 to 100,000 are believed to be in areas under Communist control, according to Mr. Buell, who has spent more time working with the Meos than any other American.

Hospital Has Been Full

One of the few reliable estimates of military casualties is based on the relief rolls at Ban Son, which, informed sources say, list 4,500 widows of Meo soldiers and 5,000 to 6,000 disabled veterans.

This fall the 260-bed hospital at Ban Son has been full of

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OCT 19 1972

U.S. fights Asian tradition in its drug war

*Second in a series***By Keyes Beech**
Daily News Foreign Service

CHIENGMAI. Northern Thailand — Not long ago a visiting American congressman asked a U.S. narcotics agent in Bangkok if the hill tribesmen of Southeast Asia had any idea of the havoc their product, refined to heroin, was creating in the streets of New York.

For a moment the agent was speechless at the question. Then taking a deep breath, he replied: "Sir, they never heard of New York."

They never heard of Bangkok, either.

The question is indicative of the wall of ignorance that separates most Americans from the history and realities of the drug traffic in Southeast Asia.

FOR FOUR centuries, beginning with the aggressive prodding of greedy European colonialists, Asians have been cultivating the poppy that yields the opium that yields the morphine that yields the heroin that is now finding its way into the United States.

Up through World War II and beyond, every Southeast Asian government had its opium monopoly. Everywhere it was a major source of revenue, like other government monopolies including salt and tobacco.

In the middle of the last century the British fought a war to win the right to sell opium to the unwilling Chinese. Hong Kong had its own opium "farm." And not until 1946 did the British outlaw the drug traffic in Hong Kong.

FOR THE ASIANS opium was, and still is, an escape from the pang of reality just as alcohol is an escape for so many Americans. Some Asians become addicts — a growing number, in fact — just as some Americans become alcoholics.

more ways than one. An American woman may swallow a pill to ease the pain of her menstrual period. The hill tribe woman of Southeast Asia's golden triangle — the upper reaches of Burma, Thailand and Laos — will smoke a pipe or two of opium.

Opium also happens to be the only cash crop of the hill tribe people, their only means of acquiring some of the minor luxuries of the outside world. Their economy is as dependent on opium as the lowlanders are on rice.

DURING all those earlier years, to Americans opium was an Asian affair. But two years ago, when heroin addiction hit epidemic proportions among American GIs in South Vietnam, the Asian narcotics traffic suddenly became America's business.

Now the GI market almost has vanished with the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. But the drug problem lingers on — a legacy of the Vietnam War as the heroin traffickers seek new outlets in the United States to replace their lost GI market.

At the same time President Nixon has declared global war on the international drug traffic. As a result, stopping drugs has become almost as important as stopping communism among U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia.

IN AT LEAST three countries — Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam — all the resources of U.S. embassies have been thrown into the campaign to choke off the flow of heroin to the United States.

Embassy political officers, accustomed to routine diplomacy, have been diverted to full time narcotics assignments. "One way or another, we spend at least 50 per cent of our time on narcotics," said a senior embassy officer in Bangkok.

"Hell," said a young foreign service officer recently transferred to narcotics work. "I love it. It's a lot better than shuffling papers."

THE CIA, stung by charges that it has contributed to the drug traffic by collaborating with opium-growing hill tribesmen and corrupt Asian officials, has thrown all its intelligence-gathering resources into the antidrug campaign.

On top of all this, agents of the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs have made their appearance in Asian capitals from Tokyo to Hong Kong to Bangkok in increasing numbers.

For 10 years there was one U.S. narcotics agent in Bangkok. Today there are 12 operating in all Thailand, "making cases" in co-operation with Thai police.

SINCE Thailand is the natural conduit for drugs coming from the golden triangle, the

biggest effort has been centered there.

"When the heat is on from the White House," said one U.S. official, "you jump. No one questions the desirability of cutting off the drug traffic, although some of us wonder if there isn't an element of overkill in the current campaign."

If there is an element of "overkill" — and that is debatable — the reasons are understandable. Mr. Nixon is running for re-election and the "Asian drug connection" could easily become an explosive campaign issue.

Next: The drug traffic — romantic and deadly.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600120001-5

The CIA has moved to Vang Vieng—a pullback that reflects the fading fortunes of the US-backed Vientiane government's military position

Flight of the CIA

By Frances Starnes

Vang Vieng: While the monsoon rain came down in torrents, the combo flown in from Vientiane for the occasion — electronic amplifiers and all — played its way through a broad repertoire of Laotian and American dance music. On the circular concrete floor — colourfully if inadequately sheltered by a blue parachute — dancers shrugged off water as they celebrated into the early hours of the morning. Between numbers, as numerous speakers took note of the occasion, the guests huddled under tin roofs and parachutes set up around the spacious garden. The social and political élite of Vang Vieng — ranking officials, officers of the Vang Vieng FAN (neutralist) garrison, the Operation Brotherhood staff from the Vang Vieng Hospital and two or three American AID officials — were observing an anniversary little noted elsewhere. In August 1964, the neutralist general Kong Le had scored a fleeting victory here; although Kong Le has been long exiled in Paris, the FAN garrison here still finds the event worthy of commemoration.

Vang Vieng is a sleepy little town on Route 13, about half-way between Vientiane and Luang Prabang. Situated on the banks of the Nam Song River and surrounded by jagged mountains frequently wreathed in clouds, it offers some of the most spectacular scenery in Laos. Until recently, however, life was not particularly eventful. For one thing, despite claims several months ago that Route 13 had been secured from its point of origin in Luang Prabang all the way to the south, public traffic north from Vientiane stops here. The only ground traffic from here to Luang Prabang is the military convoy, with both the Muong Kasi and Sala Phu Khoun areas remaining under considerable Pathet Lao pressure. But here, even the war pressures have been scarcely felt.

Although the number of refugees being cared for out of Vang Vieng more than trebled in the first seven months of 1972, the 13,000 refugees housed in this area is insignificant compared with

the 136,000 Xieng Khouang refugees being supplied from Ban Xon (militarily, Lima Site 272) not many kilometres east of here. A member of the hospital staff comments that even the trickle of government soldiers coming here today is a new phenomenon. And even now, when the sun goes down, the streets are dark except for a large pool of light at the hospital and a much smaller one at the US AID compound.


But change is in the air and it is centred on the — until now — unsurfaced airstrip. The terse announcement from US official sources in Vientiane at the end of July said merely that "military logistic support" recently sited at Ban Xon was being transferred to Vang Vieng. The airstrip there was severely damaged by a flash flood on July 20-21, which also caused extensive damage in some of the refugee villages in the vicinity. It was implied that the "logistics" move to Vang Vieng stemmed from that incident.

In fact, the flood and the resulting damage to LS-272 seems only to have speeded a move already approved at upper levels. Ban Xon had become the temporary site of the secrecy-shrouded CIA operations formerly conducted at Long Cheng, and of the highly sophisticated electronics equipment used there, when that base was threatened


last December and January. In the ensuing months it became apparent that there would be no return to Long Cheng and that Ban Xon was ill adapted for the mission, for a variety of reasons.

There was the matter of the refugees. It is quite thoroughly established that intelligence collection and caring for refugees have been opposite sides of the Air America operation for as long as that line has been in existence. At Ban Xon, however, the two functions have been in each other's way. The air traffic involved in the refugee feeding programme, for example, has taxed the LS-272 facilities under the best of conditions; when the weather is bad — as it frequently is in the mountains around Ban Xon, the added military traffic has often strained them past breaking point. (Fatal accidents are common in the Ban Xon air operation.) Medical facilities have been similarly strained. Thus, in March, according to the Green Beret-trained medic directing it, the dispensary programme operating out of Ban Xon had to service more than 150,000 people, of whom some 130,000 were refugees.

The Long Cheng siege also placed a burden on the Na Suh hospital (at Ban Xon) that it was not designed to handle. Earlier, a new 40-bed facility had been put into operation at Na Moh, at



STATINTL



US AID's Houei Sai headquarters: Critical spot

continued

True picture of U.S. in Laos shows through in new book

STATINTL

THE END OF NOWHERE,
American Policy Toward Laos
since 1954, by Charles A. Stev-
enson. Beacon Press, Boston.
1972. \$8.95.

By JOHN PITTMAN

Current reports from Laos offer no indication of any moves by the Nixon government to wind down its aggression against the people of Laos. On the contrary, the signs speak of every intention of Nixon and his military and civilian bureaucrats to press the virtual extermination of the Meo minority and continue his program of nullifying the 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos to which a former U.S. government was signatory.

One such report published Oct. 1, 1972 from Fox Butterfield of the New York Times, speaks of the concern of "American officials" in Long Tieng, Laos, over the exhaustion of the mercenary troops under the Meo chief, Gen. Vang Pao. These 30,000 troops are no longer Meos, the dispatch says, because the Meos have either been killed or become disillusioned. Vang Pao's forces now are "other hill tribesmen" and Thai mercenaries "who are also paid and equipped by the United States."

The dispatch notes that although "foreign military aid to Laos and the presence of foreign troops or advisers is banned by the 1962 Geneva accord on Laos," there are still Americans in Long Tieng, the CIA base, and "several could be seen...some of them in jungle camouflage uniforms carrying M-16 rifles and boarding helicopters with the irregular troops."

Of course, the U.S. censors couldn't pass this dispatch without seeing that it attributed all opposition to the Vang Pao forces to "North Vietnamese." The reason for this "editing" of press dispatches from Laos is two-fold: on the one hand, it suppresses the native, Laotian resistance to U.S. plans conducted by the indigenous armed forces of the Neo Lao Hak Sat (Laotian Patriotic Front); on the other hand it sets up the false premise of North Vietnamese aggression, that is, the violation of the Geneva Agreements, which is used to justify U.S. inter-

ments to save "freedom" in Laos.

But the book under review debunks these and the myriad other alibis of U.S. bureaucrats and militarists for their aggression in Laos. The author is one of the few writers with sufficient backbone to question the right of Americans to be in Laos in the first place. As is becoming increasingly popular in hindsight reappraisals of U.S. policy during the past quarter of a century, the author attributes the decisions to move into Laos to the obsessive anti-communism of such champions of freedom and democracy for the masses as the late John Foster Dulles.

"The obsession with anti-com-

munist and the consequent opposition to a coalition government were deeply rooted in the minds of policy makers in the 1950s and 1960s. This continued fear of any loss of territory to Communist control, or even to substantially increased Communist influence, has been the driving force of American foreign policy for a quarter of a century."

A conspicuous flaw in the book is its insufficient and sometimes erroneous information concerning the liberated areas of Laos. Nevertheless, it can be recommended as a first-rate expose of U.S. imperialist policy, and specifically of the aggressive and barbarous policy which the Nixon government is continuing today.

2 Oct 1972

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STATINTL

Drugs and the CIA

incomplete
as received.

From a staff correspondent in New York

publication of a chapter from his then forthcoming book in "Harper's Magazine" and similar accusations made by Mr McCoy before a Congressional hearing.

The allegations attracted little national attention at that stage.

But, in July, the CIA made a formal request to the publishers, Harper and Row, to review the manuscript, stating that Mr McCoy's claims were "totally false and without foundation."


Although affirming their belief that Mr McCoy's "scholarship is beyond reproach" and refusing to promise to make any changes in the text, Harper and Row agreed to make the manuscript available to the CIA.

That decision caused controversy in publishing circles because of the precedent of allowing the CIA to review a book before publication.

However, Mr B. Brooks Thomas, vice-president and general counsel for the publishing house, explained: "We are not submitting to censorship or anything like that. We are taking a responsible middle position."

When the CIA's critique of the book was submitted at the end of July, Mr McCoy and his publishers regarded it as an anti-climax.

Mr Thomas stated that the publishers were "underwhelmed" with the CIA's reply. Harper and Row made



General NE WIN

a point-by-point refutation of the CIA's defence and announced that they would publish the book unchanged.

American reviewers have hailed the book as the first work of near-scholarship on the popular subject of heroin smuggling.

While the book adopts a New Left, anti-CIA and anti-American foreign policy stance, it is a fascinating history of the world's opium and heroin trade.

Mr Colby flatly denies the charge that the South-East Asian opium trade in any way "depends on the support (money, guns, aircraft, etc) of the CIA," as claimed by Mr McCoy.

He said that the US Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs had publicly stated that the CIA for some time had been its strongest partner in identifying foreign sources and illegal trade in narcotics.

The CIA, he said, had no evidence that General Vang



General VANG PAO

Pao was involved in the Laotian drug trade.

"Because his forces are the principal Laotian deterrent to North Vietnam aggression, many US Government personnel have been in constant contact with General Vang Pao for a number of years," he said. "No evidence has come to light connecting him with narcotics traffic."

Mr Colby said that Air America had long had an effective inspection system, and recently had introduced a more rigid system to bar even the inadvertent transport of narcotics.

Mr McCoy, in his determination to indict the Nixon Administration and the CIA, fails to give credit for strenuous efforts the American Government has made in recent times to combat the narcotics trade.

James A. Markham, a writer on the drug problem for "The New York Times," says that, in certain parts of the world,

"American diplomats give almost monomaniacal attention to persuading frequently indifferent or corrupt officials to do something about poppy cultivation, heroin refining and heroin trafficking."

Mr Nelson G. Gross, senior adviser on international narcotics to the US Department of State, said recently that the intensive drive mounted by the Government over the past year-and-a-half was beginning to have a noticeable impact on the trade.

"The availability of heroin on the streets is less than it was a year ago. The quality is not as good. The wholesale price is higher and the retail price is higher," he said.

The Government, he said, was moving fast to prevent a major new route of drug traffic developing from South-East Asia.

With the US Secretary of State, Mr William P. Rogers, he had met Chairman Ne Win of Burma to explore means of helping the Burmese Government combat heroin processing and transport.

The frightening extent of heroin addiction in American cities and the street crime it spawns make drug traffic an emotional subject in this country.

If Mr McCoy's book helps step up the campaign against drug trafficking it will serve a good purpose.

But the campaign will not be helped by his politically motivated and exaggerated accusations.

WASHINGTON POST

STATINTF

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VIENTIANE, Laos — Still savoring his cigar after a three-course luncheon washed down with French wines, G. McMurtrie Godley answered the telephone, postponed his tennis game, dashed to his sedan and was driven off at top speed.

"Wheatburner 50 to Wheatburner Base," he intoned into the car's radio-telephone, "heading for airport — ten-four." The rush mission of American Ambassador Godley on an otherwise sleepy recent afternoon in the Laotian capital turned out to be a false alarm of sorts. There was just a chance that three captured American pilots North Vietnam had agreed to release might be on board the regular weekly Aero-flot flight which was arriving from Hanoi ahead of schedule. And "Mac" Godley wanted to be on hand just in case the men accepted his personal suggestion they disembark and accept U.S. government transportation home rather than continue in the company of their antiwar chaperones.

While Russians in sports shirts and North Vietnamese in pith helmets and business suits streamed off the Ilyushin 18, Godley saw that the pilots were not among the passengers, got back into the car and headed home to change for tennis. "Forty-five minutes is about all the tennis I can take in this age anyway."

At 55, Godley has been going at this pace for more than three years in Laos and, for that matter, ever since he graduated from Yale, class of '39. Part proconsul, part traditional striped-pants diplomat and part general, Godley personally directs the no longer quite so secret American war in Laos — and loves every minute of it.

He has no doubts about his job or how to carry it out even though his critics suspect he is more Defense Secretary Melvin Laird's man in Vientiane than Secretary of State William Rogers. "Call me field marshal if it makes you feel better," he is inclined to say. "I don't care. But please note I've got no troops."

"Uncle Sugar"

INVOLVED in undercover work since World War II when he dealt with American prisoner of war problems while based in Switzerland, one of the first U.S. diplomats to work closely with the military, activist ambassador to the Congo during the "Simba" revolt in 1964, Godley believes in the American world mission in uncomplicated terms uncomfortable to more doubting Americans.

So big and burly that Congolese called him "The Bear that Walks Like a Man" when he was ambassador in Leopoldville, Godley says, "I don't think I've had the very best of the U.S. Foreign Service" and "if I end up being the fall guy I couldn't care less."

"They weren't ten deep for the Laos assignment, but I just pinch myself daily when I think I'm being paid for doing this."

—G. McMurtrie Godley

Our Man In Vientiane

By Jonathan C. Randal

Washington Post Foreign Service

Godley is given to pithy, direct language of a nature which an earlier age would not have found repeatable in mixed company. Pure product of the Cold War in warm climates, he invariably refers to the United States as "Uncle Sugar," a sobriquet reflecting the persuasiveness of American power in underdeveloped countries.

Even with a staff of 1,200 diplomatic, military and CIA men, as ambassador to this Oregon-sized country Godley has his hands full:

- Requesting and approving all American air strikes against North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troops—who numbered over 100,000 just before the Easter invasion of South Vietnam—in northern Laos and along the Ho Chi Minh supply trails leading south to Cambodia and South Vietnam.

- Directing CIA military operations and the activities of some 230 military attaches whose tasks include supplying arms and ammunition to the Royal Lao army, Meo tribesmen and Thai volunteers in the Plain of Jars north of Vientiane and in the southern Laos panchannel.

- Keeping able neutralist Premier Souvanna Phouma in office despite repeated right-wing efforts to dislodge him, to ensure that the tatty facade on the 1962 accords remains intact for another effort to neutralize Laos in the event of an Indochina-wide peace settlement, a task even the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao representatives here privately concede he performed brilliantly in the past month.

- Maintaining the precarious and artificial Laotian economy within the limits of a congressional aid ceiling of

\$350 million annually, a far from easy task since most of the money goes for military spending. Indeed, the annual threat of the fall of the CIA's base at Long Cheng on the Plain of Jars is feared less than the economic crisis reflected by the fall in value of the Laotian kip from 500 to 800 to the dollar in the past year.

Dropping the Veils

FOR MOST of Godley's first year as ambassador, and indeed since the 1962 Geneva accords were broken first by North Vietnam and then by the United States, American military involvement was kept as secret as possible. But in the past year or so, Washington has progressively dropped the principal fiction imposed by the Geneva accords which set up the tripartite right-wing, neutralist and left-wing government under big power auspices: a promise to avoid any foreign military establishment in Laos except for a small French training mission.

As early as 1964, the United States was deeply committed to the Souvanna Phouma government, providing aid, a stabilization fund for the kip and military help. In return, Souvanna Phouma allowed the United States to bomb North Vietnamese positions on the strength of a verbal understanding which even now remains the only basis for American military operations here.

In March, 1970, President Nixon started lifting the secrecy after a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee headed by Stuart Symington held hearings on Laos as part of its investigation of U.S. commitments abroad. Whatever major mystery was left disappeared last December when U.S. officials announced the discovery of Long Cheng, headquarters of Gen. Vang

continued

Tribesmen's Drive in Laos Slows and Fears for Base Rise

By FOX BUTTERFIELD
Special to The New York Times

LONGTIENG, Laos, Sept. 27

—Maj. Gen. Vang Pao's irregular army of hill tribesmen has opened its annual rainy-season offensive against the Communists around the Plaine des Jarres.

But despite some successful thrusts behind the enemy's lines, American officials here are concerned that the irregular's campaign has stalled, bedeviled by exhaustion after many years of war and unusually stiff North Vietnamese resistance.

As a result, these Americans fear that when the rains stop in another month, the North Vietnamese will still be in a good position to threaten the important base at Longtieng and the 132,000 refugees who live in valleys just to the south.

"Militarily the loss of Long Tieng wouldn't mean the end of the war," said one high-ranking American officer at this once-secret center for the irregular army, "but it would be a major catastrophe for the hill people who have been retreating for four or five years and would have to move on again."

Farther south lies only the hot, humid and already crowded Vientiane plain, which the hill people, mostly members of the Meo tribe, consider uninhabitable.

The chief hope of the Laotians and Americans is that when the roads become passable again in November, the North Vietnamese, preoccupied by their offensive in South Vietnam, will not send troops to reinforce the estimates 6,000 troops they have scattered around the Plaine des Jarres and just north of Long Tieng.

Last spring the Communists withdrew one of their two divisions—the 312th—from the fight for Long Tieng, transferring it across the border to Quangtri Province.

"If the North Vietnamese don't bring in a lot more

troops we can hold Long Tieng," said another American who has watched the Communists gradually push General Vang Pao's forces south over the past five years. "It all depends on Hanoi."

Long Tieng itself, nestled in a narrow mountain valley 83 miles northeast of Vientiane, has been largely rebuilt since the devastating three-month North Vietnamese siege last spring. General Vang Pao once again has his headquarters here and many dependants of the tribal soldiers have returned after being evacuated.

Planes belonging to Air America and Continental Air Services bring "supplies for the irregulars. A squadron of tiny T-28 fighter planes manned by Royal Lao Air Force pilots also use the paved airstrip, which ends abruptly in a series of jagged limestone cliffs that look like the scenery in a Chinese landscape painting.

Because of the Communists' offensive in South Vietnam, American air support for the fighting here in northern Laos has been drastically reduced, authoritative American sources say. It is down from an average of 200 sorties a day last year to only about 20 sorties a day.

There are still a number of Americans here, agents of the Central Intelligence Agency, which finances and helps train and direct General Vang Pao's forces. Several could be seen today during a visit sponsored by the American Embassy, some of them in jungle camouflage uniforms carrying M-16 rifles and boarding helicopters with the irregular troops.

Although much of the secrecy that once surrounded

Long Tieng has ended, Americans here still use only facious names and newsmen were not allowed to photograph them. Foreign military aid to Laos and the presence of foreign troops or advisers is banned by the 1962 Geneva accord on Laos.

The irregulars' offensive began in mid-August with four separate task forces totaling about 5,000 men being lifted by helicopter onto the heights around the plain des jarres, which lies 20 miles north of Long Tieng. Their objective was to cut in behind the entrenched North Vietnamese facing Long Tieng and force them to retreat.

But General Vang Pao's troops, reportedly exhausted by last spring's fighting and afraid of the Communists' newly introduced 130-mm. long-range guns, moved slowly.

In one of the columns, American officers say, almost 500 men had to be evacuated with trench foot after they had failed to dry their feet during the monsoon rains. Another column lost its commanding officer on the first day.

Even more disastrous, the North Vietnamese did not pull back this year as they have in the past to shorten their supply lines during the torrential rains. Instead they have clung to heavily fortified positions in the mountains and blasted the irregulars with their artillery.

General Vang Pao appears as energetic and determined as in the past. Despite years of bitter fighting and defeat, the

sturdily built 43-year-old Meo leader spends almost all his time these days at Long Tieng and gives his officers a tongue-lashing over lunch in his quarters. Americans who work with him report.

But the number of Meos among his 30,000 soldiers has steadily decreased as they have been killed or become disillusioned. They have been replaced by other hill tribesmen, particularly upland Laos, and by so-called volunteers from Thailand, who are also paid and equipped by the United States.

The number of Thais is a closely guarded secret, but one well-informed source estimates that there are "wellover" the 4,800 figure used in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee report last year.

3 Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601

Yale Graduate Student Causes a Stir with Book on Heroin and the C.I.A.

Every now and then the University community discovers that one of its members just happens to be the author of a best-selling book, or at least a book that is causing a lot of talk. It's happening again.


"The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia" (Harper & Row), by Alfred W. McCoy, a Yale graduate student in Southeast Asian history, may not rise to the top of best-seller lists but it has caused a considerable stir in government and publishing circles because it reveals, among other things, the complicity of the Central Intelligence Agency in the world heroin trade.

The book is the product of 18 months of research—four in Southeast Asia—and 275 interviews, many of them in the "Golden Triangle" region where Laos, Thailand and Burma meet and where 70 per cent of the world's illegal opium poppies are grown.

McCoy's book documents in exhaustive detail the route and manner in which refined heroin travels from the hillsides of northern Laos to the streets of America's cities. The opium trade generates the major financial resources for the U.S.-allied Meo guerrillas of northern Laos, McCoy charges. He further insists that C.I.A. personnel in the region not only tolerate the opium trade, but abet it and profit from it.

Back home, the C.I.A., aware of McCoy's research and familiar with his testimony on the matter before a Senate subcommittee, disagreed with his charges and demanded to see a pre-publication copy of the book. Harper & Row, while insisting that it was not submitting to censorship, gave the C.I.A. a set of galleys—a move which McCoy "totally opposed." The C.I.A. returned the galleys with a list of minor factual objections but failed to refute the author's main thesis, and on Aug. 17 Harper & Row published the book without a single change from its original version.

McCoy is taking the fall semester off from the Graduate School. He doesn't have time, he says, for school and all the business surrounding the publication of "The Politics of Heroin." He says he enjoys celebrity and has had quite a bit of media exposure lately, though he is still



\$1,000 in the red as a result of research and travel costs associated with writing the book.

McCoy, who co-edited another book about Laos in 1970, still hasn't completed a portion of his doctoral comprehensive exams at Yale and hasn't had time to work on a dissertation, although he has a topic. Meanwhile, Harper & Row has three more ideas for books it would like him to write.

Why not ask Yale to credit the work he has already done toward the requirements for a doctoral thesis?

"Aw, come on," he says, "you know Yale well enough to know it doesn't work that way."



DETROIT, MICH.
FREE PRESS

1972
M - 550,264
S - 578,254

The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia



The Vientiane Connection: Trading Drugs for Peace

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN, by Alfred McCoy (Harper and Row \$10.95).

"The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," is not an easy book to read, and not much fun really. Even with the old sure-fire spy-gangster-three spook elements it's not much fun, because there is something disturbing about the subject, or subjects.

There is nothing very charming about the heroin trade anymore, because it is hurting too many people, has pitted too many lives; and there is precious little enchantment left in the work of our foreign cryptoperatives because it can lead to some very dirty, very enduring situations.

But the subjects are very much with us, and need to be treated, and that gets done here pretty well.

THE BOOK GOT started by accident, author Alfred McCoy explains. A member of the Antiwar Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, in 1970 he coedited "Laos: War and Revolution" for Harper and Row, and included a section on the role opium traffic played in Southeast Asian politics.

Editor Elizabeth Jakab took a run up to New Haven where McCoy was (and is) working on his doctorate in Southeast Asian history and persuaded him to do a book on the junk trade and tradition. It's hard to say what she envisioned, but McCoy saw a quick-in-and-out. Perhaps 250 pages, paperback, to be finished by September 1971. He was off by one year, 159 pages and a cover.

He went to Europe, began talking around Paris with old French Indochina hands: Refugees from the Diem regime of Vietnam, exiles, former French colonial, army and intelligence officials.

One of the former French officials "sort of sat me down and ran down to me the history of the opium trade," McCoy says. "I was flabbergasted."

He talked with Col. Roger Trinquier, who was among the leaders and losers against the Viet Minh in 1954, who told him how the French sought to cement relations with the Meo tribesmen in the Indochinese uplands "To have the Meo, one must buy their opium."

"And he said he would expect the Americans were involved in the opium traffic the same way he was," McCoy recalls. "It was just an economic imperative for anybody who's going to treat with that tribe."

And at that point, history turned into journalism.

WHAT MCCOY found in Southeast Asia was not an American duplication of the French opium traffic role. He found evidence of opium moving on CIA airlines, found opium growing, moving through territory which was under CIA dominion: "They did carry the stuff. They were shipping it. They were selling it. It's a level of very, very extreme complicity that actually became involvement."

"It's not like the French military intelligence actually managing and directing traffic for profit and for a source of financing. But they did carry it, and they did sell it, and they did buy it because by providing facilities for their allies (the Meo, remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang, Laotian government officials, others) they are enforcing the political strength of their allies, providing them with a national base."

He says conversations with a former USAID (United States Agency for International Development) official indicated a heroin refinery was operating near the CIA's Long Cheng headquarters in Laos.

"It's as if you were allowing a heroin refinery to be operating in your garage in your back yard, not attached to your house. The fine line of involvement . . . I think you'd be put in for abetting."

The CIA must have thought it could get "put in" for something because early last summer, after McCoy testified in Senate narcotics hearings, the CIA asked for a look at the book before publication. This reaction from the normally invisible, unflappable agency was extraordinary.

After Harper and Row agreed, the CIA studied the document, specified objections, he publisher decided they were without merit, and publication came a month ahead of schedule.

American allies, or former allies, implicated by McCoy in the drug trade include former South Vietnamese Vice President Ky, the late Ngo Dinh Nhu. And Americans contributing to the growing complicity include more than the CIA shadow-men. Writes McCoy:

"Rather than sending U.S. combat troops into Laos, four successive American presidents and their foreign policy advisers worked through the CIA to build the Meo into the only effective army in Laos. The fundamental reason for American complicity in the Laotian opium traffic lies in these policy decisions . . ."

DEALING historically—opium, morphine and heroin trade has a position of long standing in Southeast Asian economies—and politically—the traffic has been fostered by a succession of governments, colonial and native—McCoy's major point becomes a matter of little dispute: American heroin users are getting more and more of their drug from the "golden triangle" area of Laos, Burma and Thailand. Official estimates of U.S. heroin sources used to attribute no more than five percent to Southeast Asia; now the figure is rising to 25 percent, McCoy says.

The book, says this historian-scholar, is primarily a heroin book: "What I hoped it would do is fill an informational function, and raise a debate."

"And I hope somewhere in the smoke the substance doesn't get lost—that people begin to understand that the old image—the Turkey-Marseille-New York route is something of interest to moviegoers and historians and that it is a part of the present, but not part of the future."

The Vientiane Connection? McCoy says he has already talked with one moviemaker about the possibilities.

JAMES HARPER, Free Press Staff Writer

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STATINTL

COMMENTARY

Interrupting its usual silence, the CIA has provided Harper's with a rare public document. It is an official letter of protest against our July cover story, "Flowers of Evil," an extremely compromising report by Alfred W. McCoy about the CIA's complicity in the heroin trade in Southeast Asia. "I trust," writes W. E. Colby, the Agency's executive director, "you will give this response the same prominence in your publication as was given to the McCoy article."

The letter appears below in full, together with Mr. McCoy's reply and the testimony of a former USAID representative who witnessed the CIA's participation in the Laotian drug traffic. This exchange, we hope, throws further needed light on a little-known stretch of the sewer that runs between Washington, Saigon, Vientiane, Phnompenh, and Bangkok.

Beyond all that, we are surprised by Mr. Colby's use of the word "trust." We may well be reading too much into it, but that word, and indeed the whole tone of the letter, suggests that Mr. Colby expected an immediate mea culpa from Harper's. Is the CIA that naïve? Mr. Colby, who once presided over the notorious Phoenix program in Vietnam,* is hardly an innocent. Still, his entire letter reflects a troubling simplicity, an unquestioning trust in the goodness of his own bureaucracy. He asks us to share that trust, whatever the stubborn facts may be. As conclusive evidence of the Agency's purity, for example, he even cites Director Richard Helms' public-relations argument that "as fathers, we are as concerned about the lives of our children and grandchildren as all of you."

Such curious expectations of trust apparently motivated the Agency to ask Harper & Row to hand over the galleys of Mr. McCoy's book, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, from which he drew his magazine article. The Agency declared that it simply wanted to check the book for factual inaccuracies, possible libel, or damage to national security. To deliver this unusual request, the Agency dispatched Cord Meyer, a man with the proper Establishment connections who, as the CIA's overseer of the since-transformed Congress for Cultural Freedom,** might be said to have once been in the publishing business himself. Although the galleys were duly sent to the Agency, the CIA's subsequent complaints about Mr. McCoy's research failed to impress Harper & Row, which has since confidently published the book, unchanged. Apparently there are limits to trust, even among gentlemen.

Although Mr. McCoy won't agree with us, our own reaction to this episode is to feel a certain sympathy for the beset bureaucrats of the CIA, who seem to be impaled on the defensive notion, "The Agency, right or wrong." By definition the CIA finds itself involved with a good many questionable people in Southeast Asia. That is a condition of its mission—a mission it did not invent but simply carries out on White House orders—and we suspect that the public would trust the Agency a good deal more if it either acknowledged the facts or remained silent. Alas, the CIA now seems determined to revamp its image into something like a cross between General Motors and the League of Women Voters. But so endeth our sermon. Let the reader draw his own conclusions.

THE AGENCY'S BRIEF:

Harper's July issue contains an article by Mr. Alfred W. McCoy alleging CIA involvement in the opium traffic in Laos. This allegation is false and unfounded, and it is particularly disappointing that a journal of Harper's reputation would see fit to publish it without any effort to check its accuracy or even to refer to the

public record to the contrary.

Normally we do not respond publicly to allegations made against CIA. Because of the serious nature of these charges, however, I am writing to you to place these accusations in proper perspective and so that the record will be clear.

The general charge made by Mr.

McCoy that "to a certain extent it [the opium trade in Laos] depends on the support (money, guns, aircraft, etc.) of the CIA" has no basis in fact. To the contrary, Mr. John E. Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, in a letter to Representative Charles S. Gubser of California on May 27, 1971

*Phoenix is a campaign of systematic counterterrorism designed to root out and destroy Vietcong sympathizers. As U.S. pacification chief from 1968 to mid-1971, Ambassador Colby headed CORDS (Civil Operations and Rural Development Support), which ran Phoenix in cooperation with the South Vietnamese police. Mr. Colby has testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that, in 1969 alone, Phoenix agents "neutralized" 19,534 suspected Vietcong, killing 6,187 of them in the process. Critics argue that Phoenix uses assassination methods and that Mr. Colby's figures are extremely conservative.

**The GCF, among other activities, at one time published a dozen or so serious anti-Communist magazines throughout the world. The best known is *Liberator*, which now has a direct CIA sponsor.

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continued

REPORTS & COMMENT

STATINTL

THAILAND

Though détente is Asia's order of the day, in Thailand there is tension and danger. Mr. Nixon's "era of peace" has not yet dawned over this enigmatic kingdom, which wants a placid life but is not permitted by geography to have one. Sabotaging tomorrow's hopes, the Vietnam War lingers on. Thailand's current troubles center upon two related issues: Can Thailand avoid paying a big price for its key role in the Indochina war? How can Thailand find a way to live with China? Beneath both issues lie U.S.-Thai relations, and some anxious questions for Americans.

In Thailand at present, one has a weird feeling of *déjà vu*, of anachronism. Is this really 1972, with prudent President Nixon trimming down open-ended American commitments in Asia, or is it still the mid-1960s, with President Johnson talking (and bombing) as if every second Asian land were mankind's linchpin?

It now seems macabre to read the worried remark of Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, last March, in his letter of transmittal of the staff report by the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee he heads: "In fact, in the not too distant future, there may be about *half as many* American military personnel in Thailand as there are in Vietnam." Though Washington has not pointed it out, today there are in fact *more* U.S. forces in Thailand (some 50,000) than in Vietnam (43,500). The seven U.S. air bases which punctuate the dusty kingdom buzz with new life. The one at Tahkli had been closed but now swings again with Phantoms, bars, and brothels. An expanded base

mushrooms at Nam Phong. Thailand has become the mainland headquarters for American bombing in Indochina. Faster than the weapons of war leave Vietnam, they pour into Thailand: Phantom fighter-bombers, EC-121's, C-130 transport planes, B-52's, KC-135 supertankers, U-2's, and SR-71's (the most up-to-date reconnaissance plane). According to the State Department, there are 550 to 600 fixed-wing attack aircraft in Thailand now, and Thai military sources tell me the total figure for U.S. warplanes of all sorts is 800.

Three years ago, withdrawals of troops began from Thailand as from other East Asian countries. But in 1971, when the total was down to 32,000, the process stopped. During 1972 the tide has been reversed. Today there are more U.S. troops here, and far more planes, than before the withdrawals began in 1969. Not only is Thailand the place of origin of almost all air sorties over Laos and North Vietnam, and of many over Cambodia; it also provides vital troops for the anti-Communist ground war in Laos. The innocent observer might feel that something funny has happened on the way to implementing the Nixon Doctrine in Thailand.

To be sure, the doctrine never said that reductions of forces in East Asia would go in a straight line downward; and there were pressing reasons for the 1972 buildup of air power in Thailand. As the U.S. troop level in Vietnam got down around 150,000, military planners told Nixon that if further reductions were to take place there must be a buildup in air capacity outside but near Vietnam's borders.

In this way Thailand started to be-

come ransom to Vietnamization. The process continued as even middle-level officials made hasty decisions to move the Seventh Airborne Command, the Army's 131st Aviation Battalion, and other units from Vietnam to Thai bases. With the Communist offensive of last spring in Vietnam, the buildup in Thailand became quite frank and feverish. Planes came into Thailand from Asia and the United States, to make possible the staggering pummeling that Vietnam has been dealt these past months.

Each year Mr. Nixon seems to find it necessary to effect a sharp zag of escalation in order to provide a zig of withdrawal. In 1970 it was the operation into Cambodia. In 1971 it was the invasion of southern Laos. In 1972 it is the revamping of Thailand as a base for air attacks. The trouble is that the zags were not quite as neat and surgical as hoped. In some ways Cambodia and Laos are in a mess no less intractable than Vietnam's, as the recent reports by James Lowenstein and Richard Moose for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee suggest. As for Thailand, if there is a Vietnam settlement soon, we (and the Thais) will avoid any comparable mess there; but if there is not a settlement soon . . . ?

Tie-up

Does the buildup matter much anyway? American activity in Thailand cost the taxpayer about \$250 million last year (this is total U.S. outlay, including surplus equipment, Peace Corps, agricultural aid, as well as military and economic assistance, but not including the \$100 million or so which the CIA spends to send Thai troops into Laos). But there is a sec-

STATINTL

PORTLAND, ORE
OREGONIAN

M - 245,132

S - 407,186

SEP 30 1972

Heroin airlift

To the Editor: In response to your Sept. 19 editorial denouncing the charges Sen. McGovern directed at the Nixon Administration's involvement in the Southeast Asian opium traffic, I feel it my duty to inform you that McGovern's charges are not "innuendoes without verified facts," as you stated.

There is undeniable evidence that American funds and equipment have been utilized to transport raw opium from field to refinery in Southeast Asia's golden triangle region.

Gen. Ovan Rathikun, former commander-in-chief of the Laotian army, has publicly admitted his own involvement in the opium business and has discussed the cooperation he has re-

ceived from the CIA. Ronald Rickenbach, a former USAID representative in Laos, has testified that he personally watched hundreds of pounds of raw opium being loaded onto a Laotian air force aircraft, which in reality is an American aircraft paid for by American taxpayers.

Alfred W. McCoy, in his forthcoming book "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," has interviewed scores of people directly involved in the drug traffic of Southeast Asia, and all evidence indicates that the CIA, the American embassies in Southeast Asian countries, and the Administration itself, are not as innocent and law-abiding as they would have us believe. And for our President to brag about rising heroin prices on the East Coast as an indication of increased government vigilance is pure hogwash. Is Mr. Nixon happy that the pushers are making more money now? Is he happy that addicts are suffering more and stealing more from our communities to pay for the higher priced heroin?

ANDRE ALLAERT,
4936 SE Brooklyn St.

STATINTL

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
INQUIRER

M - 463,503

S - 867,810

SEP 27 1972

Returning 'pawns of war' deserve to be left in peace

The people who make policy in Hanoi are not given to casual sentimental gestures. And whatever Bob Hope may say in his Christmastide monologues to the troops in the field, neither are the planners in the Pentagon.

So anyone who believes that the last three weeks of maneuvering three U. S. officers' release from North Vietnamese captivity is anything but political manipulation has abandoned reason.

In the recent public pronouncements on the subject, no one has emerged with much credit.

★ ★ ★

The only ones with a just claim for sympathy are the prisoners of war themselves: Navy Lts. Mark L. Gartley and Norris A. Charles and Air Force Major Edward Elias. The sympathy due them, in immediate terms, is because they have become, as James McCartney of our Washington Bureau points out, true "pawns of war."

But in larger measure, these men — pressured from all sides to take stands, clarify truths, make public judgments — will remain symbolic prisoners long after their return home. Few, if anyone, alive can be as acutely aware as they of the effect that anything they say or do will have on the lives and hopes of the 423 U. S. military personnel who they left behind in North Vietnamese prisons.

The three men were selectively released because Hanoi believed there would be practical political benefit in doing so. For the United States government or any of its significant officials to try to frustrate that intent could have no

imaginable effect except to make the plight of the remaining prisoners more uncomfortable.

Thus the proper U. S. position, from the time that the proposal came up, was to hold its tongues, beyond a dignified and restrained: "Welcome home; we're glad to have you back."

★ ★ ★

In the face of the conditions of release made clear through the antiwar intermediaries — who have a predictable role to play — the Defense and State Departments' move to meet the prisoners at the Vientianne airport was ill conceived. Perhaps the U. S. Ambassador to Laos, G. McMurtrie Godley, really intended simply to give the men a warm handshake, as perhaps did the naval and air attaches he took with him. But for years the attaches and others in the embassy in Laos have been managing a clandestine, CIA-managed war there; their credibility is low.

So there was some reason, but no temperance, in Sen. George McGovern's stump charge that "the Administration seems to be playing politics" with the prisoners. And there was less temperance yet in Defense Secretary Melvin Laird's outburst that "Sen. McGovern apparently is willing to act as an agent for Hanoi."

The men are now expected to reach U. S. soil tomorrow. The government and the campaigners would do best to leave them in peace.

There is little enough of that to be had these days.

RECORD

SEP 25 1972

STATINTL

E - 33,470

Statute Versus Treaty As Narcotics Control

On paper at least, September '18 looked like a great day for the good guys in their battle against international drug traffic.

There on Capitol Hill was the U. S. Senate ratifying by a vote of 69 to 0 a strengthening revision of a 90-nation treaty designed to clamp down on the narcotics trade.

Henceforth, the revision provides, the International Narcotics Control Board will see to it that the world production of dope is limited to the quantity needed for medical and scientific use. Production above that ceiling will be reported to the signatory nations and the United Nations General Assembly.

And there at the Department of State was President Nixon saying this country will suspend all American economic and military assistance to any government "whose leaders participate in or protect the activities of those who contribute to our drug problem."

Just which initiative will be the more productive is hard to say just now.

That of the Senate is dependent on devious channels and protocols, but it does have the advantage of being taken without benefit of George McGovern jaw-boning.

The route the president can take is a good deal more direct, if only he will follow it now that he has made a McGovern-nudged pitch for diligence.

But the chances for clamp-down would

be a great deal fatter, one suspects, if the president had been right when he said he is "required by statute" to cut off aid to governments contributing to our drug problem.

The statute is not quite so forceful.

The rule, written into last year's Foreign Assistance Act, is that aid shall be cut off only when the president himself decides that a government has "failed to take adequate steps" to suppress dangerous drugs. The president is the sole judge of which countries are being helpful and which are not. He is "required" to take no action that his personal verdict on the evidence does not support.

His evidence, clearly, is not the same as that which has disturbed Senator McGovern.

The president, says his challenger, has failed to "crack down on the narcotics trade in Laos, Thailand and South Vietnam" because the administration needs "air bases in Thailand, Laos" and "mercenaries and Vietnamese soldiers to fight its war."

There may be more partisan testimony than hard evidence in that accusation, of course. Even so, the McGovern statement is not barren of corroboration.

There have been charges that the CIA's Air America has helped transport heroin in Southeast Asia. In his book, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, Arthur W. McCoy raised the question of CIA agents knowingly engaging in such traffic to help maintain alliances. And Mr. McCoy qualified with no question his assertion that officials in Southeast Asian governments allied to the U. S. have profited from the drug traffic.

To accuse is not to prove. But if Mr. McCoy's questions and statements are rooted in nothing firmer than supposition, they suggest that the president, even if not derelict, will have a difficult time being diligent in application of that statute.

The helpfulness (or, for that matter, the helplessness) of allies like South Vietnam and Thailand in areas other than drug control cannot fail to influence Mr. Nixon's reading of the evidence.

Not, that is, so long as a keystone of this nation's foreign policy is to prop up such allies.

Presidential options running afoul of presidential commitments, it's just possible, the Senate has a right to question to narcotics control.

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.

EXAMINER

E - 204,749

EXAMINER & CHRONICLE

S - 640,004

SEP 24 1972

PAGE 38



The Politics Of Heroin Exposed

Reviewed by
Thomas Lask

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Alfred W. McCoy, with Cathleen B. Reed and Leonard P. Adams II. Harper & Row; 464 pp.; \$10.95.

ALTHOUGH "The Politics of Southeast Asia" is packed with information, some of it of considerable complexity, its charges (for that is what its conclusions are) are simple enough to be spelled out in a school primer.

Seventy per cent of the world's supply of heroin, the book asserts, has its origin in Southeast Asia in an area of northeast Burma, North Laos and North Thailand known as the "Golden Triangle."

It is transported in the planes, vehicles and other conveyances supplied by the United States. The profit from the trade has been going into the pockets of some of our best friends in Southeast Asia.

The charge concludes with the statement that the traffic is being carried on with the indifference if not the closed-eye compliance of some American officials and there is no likelihood of its being shut down in the foreseeable future.

Quick Controversy

These conclusions have been drawn by a

*'We have to continue to fight
the evil of Communism and to
fight... you must have money
In these mountains the only
money is opium'*

-A Taiwan general

young Ph.D. scholar from Yale who studied the subject for 18 months and who has already been embroiled with the Central Intelligence Agency over them.

Before publication, his book was attacked by the CIA for what it said were unjust accusations that the agency knew of but failed to stem that heroin traffic. After reading the galleys (which the publisher had made available) and sending off a critique to Harper's, the CIA took no further action.

It is difficult for anyone not close to the field to assess the accuracy of McCoy's material. But it must be said that his book is a serious, sober, headline-shunning study with 63 pages of supporting notes, referring to a large number of personal interviews, newspaper accounts, previously published books, Congressional committee hearings, government reports and United Nations documents. It is so filled with information that it will take a great deal more than mere dislike of its contents to demolish it.

Official Acknowledgement

Perhaps the greatest guarantee of its accuracy is a cabinet-level report prepared by officials of the CIA, the State Department and the Defense Department that confirms the main findings of the McCoy book. The report, dated Feb. 21, 1972, said that "there is no prospect" of stemming the smuggling of drugs by air and sea in Southeast Asia and cited as one reason the fact that "the governments in the region are unable, or in some cases unwilling" to make a truly effective effort to curb the traffic.

That drug smuggling is not a problem remote from us can be seen from the fact that a shipment of the Double U-O Globe brand, a bulk heroin manufactured in the Golden Triangle, was seized in an amount estimated by the police to be worth \$3.5 million in the Lexington hotel in New York City last November and another shipment worth by police estimates to be \$2.25 million was taken in Miami.

The politics of heroin — and in this book the emphasis is on the politics — is an artful one. McCoy cites the case of Ngo Dinh Nhu, brother of President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, later murdered by his colleagues.

During his brother's regime, Nhu was head of the secret police and had set up a close

STATINTL

THE C.I.A. AND THE HEROIN TRADE



STATINTL

By ALFRED W. McCOY
and KATHLEEN B. READ

"LADIES and gentlemen," announced the genteel British diplomat, raising his glass to offer a toast. "I give you Prince Sopsaisana, the uplifter of Laotian youth."

The toast brought an appreciative smile from the guest of honor, cheers and applause from the luminaries of Vientiane's diplomatic corps assembled at the farewell banquet for the Laotian ambassador-designate to France, Prince Sopsaisana. A member of the royal house of Xieng Khouang, the Plain of Jars region, the prince was vice-president of the National Assembly, chairman of the Lao Bar Association, president of the Lao Press Association, president of the *Alliance Francaise*, and a member in good standing of the Asian People's Anti-Communist League. After receiving his credentials from the king in a private audience at the Luang Prabang Royal Palace on April 8, 1971, he was treated to an unprecedented round of cocktail parties, dinners, and banquets. For Sopsai, as his friends call him, was not just any ambassador; the Americans considered him an outstanding example of a new generation of honest, dynamic leaders.

The final send-off party at Vientiane's Wattay Airport on April 23 was one of the gayest affairs of the season. Everybody was there; the champagne bubbled, the canapes were flawlessly French, and Ivan Bastouil, charge d'affaires at the French embassy, gave the nicest speech. Only after the plane had soared off into the clouds did anybody notice that Sopsai had forgotten to pay for his share of the reception.

His arrival at Paris's Orly Airport on

the morning of April 25 was the occasion for another reception. The French ambassador to Laos, home for a brief visit, and the entire staff of the Laotian embassy had turned out to welcome the new ambassador. There were warm embraces, kissing on both cheeks, and more effusive speeches. Curiously, the prince insisted on waiting for his luggage like any ordinary tourist, and when his many suitcases finally appeared after an unexplained delay, he immediately noticed that a particular one was missing. Sopsai angrily insisted that his suitcase be delivered at once, and French authorities promised, most apologetically, that it would be sent to the Laotian embassy as soon as it was found. Sopsai departed reluctantly for yet another reception at the embassy, and while he drank the ceremonial champagne with his newfound retinue of admirers, French customs officials were examining one of the biggest heroin seizures in French history.

The ambassador's suitcase contained 60 kilos of high-grade Laotian heroin — worth \$13.5 million on the streets of New York, its probable destination. A week later, a smiling French official presented himself at the embassy with the suitcase in hand. Although Sopsaisana had been bombarding the airport with outraged telephone calls for several days, he suddenly realized that accepting the suitcase was tantamount to an admission of guilt and so, contrary to his previous insistence, he flatly denied that it was his. Ignoring his declaration of innocence, the French

government refused to accept his diplomatic credentials, and Sopsai remained in Paris for no more than two months before he was recalled.

DESPITE its resemblance to comic opera, the Prince Sopsaisana affair offered a rare glimpse into the workings of the Laotian drug trade. That trade is the principal business of Laos, and to a certain extent it depends on the support (money, guns, aircraft etc) of the CIA. Unfortunately, the questions raised by the prince's disgrace were never asked, much less answered. The French government overlooked the embarrassment for diplomatic reasons, the international press ignored the story, and the United States embassy demonstrated a remarkable disinterest in the entire subject.

Over the past 50 years, Laos has become something of a free port for opium. The delicate opium poppy grows abundantly at high elevations in the northern mountains, and under a sequence of different regimes (French, American, Laotian), the hill tribesmen have been encouraged to cultivate the poppy as the principal cash crop. Opium dens can be found in every quarter of Vientiane, and the whereabouts of the opium refineries are a matter of common knowledge.

The Laotian indifference to Prince Sopsaisana's misfortune therefore becomes easily understandable. The reticence of the American embassy, however, requires a few words of explanation. Sopsai had allegedly received his 60 kilos of heroin through the kind offices of a particularly Pao. Vang Pao also happens to be the commander of the CIA secret army in

continued

STATINTL

CHICAGO, ILL.
NEWS

E - 434,849

SEP 23 1972

Fiction: An ex-CIA man's disputed thriller

COMPANY MAN by Joe Magglo (Putnam, \$6.95).

By George Harmon

THE late Allen Dulles, quarterback of our World War II spies and later chief of the CIA, scoffed at the notion of the American diplomat or spy being a closed-mind blunderer too cynical to play by any rules but his own. He criticized such novels as Graham Greene's "The Quiet American" and Burdick and Lederer's "The Ugly American" for promoting "mischief-creating prejudices."

Dulles wrote that he preferred "taking the raw material which we find in America — naive, home-grown, even homespun — and training such a man to be a good intelligence officer, however long the process lasts." Those homespun

boys, if we are to believe recent news accounts, are traveling much farther afield than Dulles seemed willing to send them.

THE BACKBONE of CIA activity apparently remains the clandestine listening posts and purloined letters which Dulles so loved. But now the charge is often made that the CIA tries to foment change rather than merely report it; in Uganda, for example; in Chile, in Laos.

So much is being written about the CIA, in fact, that its argot is creeping into American slang: a spy is a spook, to kill is to "terminate with extreme prejudice."

Now arrives Joe Magglo, a mercenary-turned-writer, who says he worked off and on for the CIA in places like Africa and Laos.

His novel tells of Nick Mar-

tin, a sort of comic book superhero and former Green Beret. A "home-grown" boy whom Dulles would have liked, he is recruited off a Florida campus by "the Company" (in-group slang for the CIA), and works part time, training Bay of Pigs invaders and shooting up Africa and the Tonkin Gulf. There is enough bad writing to fill three pulp magazines ("steel split the air overhead").

BUT MAGGIO'S book has an aura of authenticity about it, and few readers know enough about the CIA to dispute him — even though the question already has been raised: Is Joe Magglo the Clifford Irving of the barracks set?

W. E. Colby, executive director of the CIA, disputes the publisher's contention that "Company Man" is "a novel of facts," proclaiming it a "taw-

dry fabrication" filled with "lurid writing and innate contradictions." He denies that the CIA ever has carried out assassinations or has trafficked in drugs, as Magglo asserts.

Colby also says Magglo was "terminated for cause" during a six-month CIA training program and never went overseas for the CIA or undertook any of the "assignments" Magglo says he performed. But Magglo has obtained a government letter quoting the CIA as saying that he worked for the agency on contract.

In any event, Magglo writes enough like a soldier to convince the reader he has been one. He has produced an unprofessional but good example of thriller fiction.

George Harmon is a Daily News editor and writer.

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BROWNSVILLE, TEX.

HERALD

SEP 22 1972

E - 12,705

S - 12,809

Laotians Can Do Some Wonders With Figures

By LARRY MATTHEWS

Copley News Service

VIENTIANE, Laos -- American men killed in combat -- 99,200; wounded--230,400; listed as missing or captured in the first four months of 1972--32,000. The statistics are staggering and, of course, untire.

But in Laos where a jungle war has now raged for more than a decade, there is bitter significance in such casualty figures.

For the American casualties above are equivalent to the royal Lao government losses, according to figures compiled from the official Laotian news bulletin, Lao Presse.

Eight hundred forty-four Laotian soldiers died fighting during the first four months of this year, according to Lao Presse. In this tiny kingdom, where only 1.7 million of the total 3 million population are under government control, these deaths are equivalent to 99,200 American deaths.

In the same four-month period, 2,469 Laotians were wounded, equivalent to 230,400 Americans.

Two hundred seventy-two Laotians are listed as missing in action or captured. That is the same as 32,000 GIs, 20 times the actual number of Americans missing or captured in Indochina since 1961.

The Laotian figures show that seven men were killed and 27 were wounded every day, and moreover, the 1972 casualties are not high. In fact, the opposite is true. Laotian casualties are running lower this year than in the last four years.

A 1971 study done for the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee started that Laotian forces lost an average of ten men killed a day from 1963 through April, 1971. The wounded went uncounted.

Many of the casualties were suffered during North Vietnamese drives against the U.S.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) base at Long Cheng in the north and along Route 23 on the Bolovens Plateau in the South in January and March of this year.

In each case, intense communist artillery barrages and human wave frontal assaults sent hundreds of Laotian soldiers to hospital wards and morgues.

Even though the Pathet Lao-North Vietnamese Dry season offensive had ended, fighting continues. Within the next month, royal Lao army forces will take advantage of monsoonal rains to counterattack and retake ground lost during the wet season. More casualties are inevitable.

The majority of government casualties, however, are recorded not in large battles like those of January and March, but rather in small guerrilla encounters throughout the country.

Clashes involving no more than 20 men kill and wound several soldiers daily.

Few roads or trails in the country are safe from ambushers who always claim a victim or two before scurrying off.

Each day, mines and booby traps blow away lives and limbs. And because few Laotian units keep maps of the mine fields they lay, government as well as Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops repeatedly fall into their own traps and pay the human toll.

During an average day recently, the Laotian Ministry of Defense reported that eight government troops were killed, 26 wounded and two were missing in nine clashes, eleven shelling and one mine incident. The tally at the end of that week was 46 killed, 149 wounded and two missing.

As the war drags on, replacing the casualties becomes more difficult.

In Vientiane last March, army trucks waited outside a popular movie theater and hauled off young men caught without proper identification papers.

Army recruiters in southern Laos recently picked up healthy-looking bicyclists, threw them (and their bicycles) into trucks and hustled the lot off to the airport to be sent into battle.

To help the manpower-deficient Laotian government, the CIA began importing Thai troops a little over a year ago. They now number 5,000 and more are needed.

In spite of Laotian recruiting methods and the presence of Thai troops, the problem remains.

"Laos cannot go on this way much longer," says one American official. "There are just no more men to fill the places of the dead and wounded."

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REGISTER

M - 250,261

S - 515,710

SEP 22 1972

Cracking Down on Drug Trade

President Nixon said he would comply fully and promptly with the statute which requires him to suspend aid to "any government whose leaders participate in or protect the activities of those who contribute to our drug problem."

Taken literally, the statute would require him to suspend aid to South Vietnam, Laos and Thailand, all of which have leaders deeply involved in the drug trade.

Formerly nearly all the heroin for Americans came from Turkish poppy fields via French processors and smugglers. In recent years the United States has been paying Turkey to cut off opium production and catching the French smugglers. So the traditional Southeast Asia opium trade has greatly expanded, begun manufacture of heroin and gone after customers among American soldiers in South Vietnam and in the world market. Burma is part of the chain, too, but Burma scorns U.S. aid.

If the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency were a foreign power (sometimes it acts like one), the President would have to cut off support for it, too. For years the C.I.A. has tolerated the opium and her-

oin trade of Southeast Asia in its search for "freedom fighters." The opium-growing Meos of Laos are C.I.A. proteges, and so, earlier, were the opium-growing Chinese Nationalist exiled guerrillas in Burma. The chain of smugglers who brought the opium from the interior highlands to processing and distribution points as heroin included Laotian and South Vietnamese generals and officials.

Unfortunately, all this is hard to prove in any individual case, though the general outlines are well-known.

The C.I.A. denies everything, and the Thai, Laotian and South Vietnamese governments do the same -- and occasionally co-operate in crackdowns to keep the White House satisfied.

Still, the President would be wise to keep his pledge on file and consider actually carrying out the threat. America's "honor" and "face" have been hopelessly smirched by the long, cruel Indochina war, but he could still salvage a little honor by ending the whole war (not just for Americans on the ground) out of refusal any longer to co-operate with those who are corrupting American troops with heroin.

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CALIFORNIA VOICE

SEP 21 1972
WEEKLY - 12,500

Politics and History of Heroin

By Mark Henriquez

Almost universally acknowledged as something akin to the great plague itself, it is often surprising to learn that heroin was once proclaimed to be the wonder drug of the age. The time was shortly before the turn of the century and the place was imperial Germany where heroin had just been developed as a cure for a more sinister addiction, that of morphine. As use of the drug became more widespread and its disadvantages more obvious, heroin quickly lost its privileged position and the scientific institutions of the day renewed their search in other directions.

Quantities of heroin first appeared in this country around 1930. The principle importers of the drug were sailors and other global transients whose activities were confined primarily to the larger coastal cities. The ghettos for the most part remained untouched.

MORPHINE

With the coming of WW II the situation underwent a radical change and once more the use of morphine was involved. Standard procedure adopted by the U. S. armed forces for the treatment of wounds received in combat involved immediate massive injections of the drug to deaden the pain. So widespread was the use of morphine during the war that many G. I.'s were issued their own personal drug supply and hypodermic needle in the event that self treatment became necessary. Despite the fact that morphine was known to have been dangerously addictive some fifty years before the outbreak of the war, the drug had become an integral part of America's wartime medical machine.

It was with the release of many of these wounded veterans from service that the specter of widespread drug addiction first appeared. No one, it seems, had yet developed a cure for morphine addic-

tion but heroin was a good substitute. Sailors soon found that they could make a lot more money selling heroin than they could on any ship and the rush was on to secure the most lucrative markets and methods of production.

EFFECT

Nowhere was the effect of heroin felt more dramatically than in the Black community. Seemingly overnight scores of young men, whose only misfortune was to have served

Freedom Party and even a fledgling Black Panther Party (New York chapter) have all espoused this position at one time or another. Whether or not this change is valid in and of itself, there is a substantial body of evidence to suggest that the United States government has actively encouraged large scale heroin production to further its own political ends.

The genesis of this intrigue began shortly before the ac-

areas that border Laos and Cambodia. It just so happened that these Meo (pronounced Mao) and Montingyard tribesmen traditionally engaged in running guns and opium to the lucrative markets of Thailand and Viet Nam.


As they were already doing a booming business on their own, some incentive was needed to push them into the uncertainties of war. It seems that since these tribesmen had little or no contact with any government, political appeals were largely ineffective.

COMPROMISE

What evolved was a compromise. Montingyard and Meo tribes would fight and provide intelligence for American troops if the Americans would, in turn, help them move greater quantities of opium and heroin.

The details as to how this compromise has worked have been the subject of numerous articles appearing in publications ranging from Ramparts to THE NEW YORK TIMES. Air America aircraft, a charter owned and operated by the CIA, certain aircraft belonging to the USAF, and in one case documented by CBS, even the personal aircraft of the American ambassador to Saigon have all been involved in the trafficking of heroin.

That a new generation of American soldiers becomes addicted while serving in Viet Nam is seemingly a small price to pay for the opportunity of stopping the insidious red hoards.



their country, returned home with only their wits between them and what was most often a slow agonizing death.

Five years after the close of WW II the pusher was already established as the new king of the ghetto. The post war baby boom, the newfound affluence of the fifties, and the Korean conflict in which even more Americans were introduced to use of narcotics all played a role in the rise of smack. As a result countless millions of young men and women, most of them Black, found themselves involved with heroin before reaching the age of twenty.

Black power advocates were the first to allege that heroin addiction was actually encouraged by this country's federal government as a means to further subjugate the Black population, and thereby avoid full scale revolution in the face of increasing repression. Stokely Carmichael, Rap Brown, the now defunct SNCC, Peace and

tual introduction of American troops in South Vietnam. Before the American army could embark it was necessary to determine the amount of local support they could expect. Since the South Vietnamese army was barely on the edge of destruction and the civilian population almost solidly behind the Viet Cong, or just as solidly neutral, the search concentrated on certain jungle tribesmen who inhabit the remote mountain

18 SEP 1972

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STATINTL

Nixon Warns of Aid Cut To Drug-Dealer Nations

By GARNETT D. HORNER

Star-News Staff Writer

President Nixon today warned that he will not hesitate to cut off all American economic and military aid to any government whose leaders participate in or protect the drug traffic.

He also praised the Central Intelligence Agency for its role in fighting international drug traffic and said the agency has been "much maligned."

He said the CIA has "performed superbly" in fighting the international drug trade. "In the field of intelligence," he added, "we always find that the failures are those that are publicized. Its successes by definition must always be secret. In this area, there are many successes, and particularly ones of which this agency can be very proud."

Critics of the CIA have charged that the Agency has aided drug traffickers in Southeast Asia to help maintain alliances.

He spoke of "fine initial progress" in immobilizing and destroying sources of drugs coming into the United States.

He said, "France, Paraguay, Laos, Thailand and Turkey are just a few examples of the many countries where the work of American officials, from the ambassador down, in partnership with local officials, has produced important breakthroughs — huge heroin seizures, key arrests, or — in Turkey's case — the courageous decision to eradicate the opium poppy itself."

The President said he considers keeping dangerous drugs out of the United States "just as important as keeping armed enemy forces from landing in the United States" because the drugs can endanger the lives of young Americans just as much as would an invading army.

Speaking at an international conference on drug control at the State Department, he asked American officials from around the world to convey to foreign officials with whom they deal "this personal message" from me:

"Any government whose leaders participate in or protect the activities of those who contribute to our drug program should know that the President of the United States is required by statute to suspend all American economic and military assistance to such a regime."

"I shall not hesitate to comply fully and promptly with that statute."

Nixon said he has been "cracking the whip" over government agencies involved in dealing with dangerous drugs

to get them to "quit fighting each other and start fighting the problem."

Citing some results, he said the number of arrests of drug traffickers in the last fiscal year was double the number arrested in 1969, and the seizures of heroin and other illicit drugs are at an all-time high.

"Very sharp increases in the prices of heroin throughout the eastern United States indicate that the supply is drying up and that the pressure is on the criminal drug trade," he said.

Nixon's statements apparently were in response to a statement yesterday by Democratic presidential candidate Sen. George S. McGovern.

McGovern said the number of heroin addicts in the United States had doubled since 1968 and charged that Southeast Asia had become a major source of heroin because the administration would not crack down on the narcotics trade in Laos, Thailand and South Vietnam.

Nixon made no direct reference to McGovern's charges, but his comments appeared to be a sharp counterattack.

The President's praise of the CIA role follows claims and official denials that the agency's Air America has helped transport heroin in Southeast Asia.

In a book called "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," that was published recently, Arthur W. McCoy raised the question of whether CIA operatives knowingly engaged in such traffic to help maintain alliances.

More specifically, McCoy accused officials in governments of U.S. allies in Southeast Asia—particularly in Saigon—of profiting from the traffic.

STATINTL

The Poppies And the Pushers

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

By Alfred W. McCoy

With Cathleen B. Read and

Leonard P. Adams II

Harper & Row. 464 pp. \$10.95

By LAURENCE STERN

"ORDINARILY THIS AGENCY does not respond to public criticism," the CIA's general counsel wrote the general counsel of Harper & Row publishing company last July 5. "However in this case we are under the strongest directive to support the U.S. government's effort against the international narcotics traffic and are bending every effort to do so. We believe we cannot stand by and see baseless criticism designed to undermine confidence in that effort without trying to set the record straight. . . ."

The subject of this extraordinary letter was *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* by Alfred W. McCoy, a doctoral candidate at Yale University. Harper & Row provided the CIA with advance proofs of the book and after receiving a statement of rebuttal covering several of McCoy's allegations of Agency involvement in opium traffic, the book was published.

If the intervention had any effect, it has probably been to boost the sales of McCoy's book; certainly it turned its publication into something of a *cause célèbre*. Perhaps the Agency would have better served its own interests by following the time-honored intelligence precept of maintaining silence in times of adversity. Public accountability has never been its strongest attribute.

By its nature as one of the world's

most profitable illicit businesses, the opium and heroin trail is heavily canopied with underworld and official secrecy. In the Golden Triangle region of northeastern Burma, northern Thailand and northern Laos, the principal opium growing and processing area in Southeast Asia, the traffic is fed by highland tribes, minor warlords and paramilitary soldiers, and it is controlled by high-ranking officials of the three countries. This distribution system fed heroin into the veins of American soldiers in Vietnam and into the international heroin stream that sur-

LAURENCE STERN is the roving foreign correspondent of *The Washington Post*.

faces terminally in the ghettos and suburbs of the United States.

McCoy has done a sturdy and comprehensive reporting job. He has interviewed American and Southeast Asian sources who either played a direct role in the opium traffic or are highly competent to talk about it. It is his argument that when the United States embarked on the geopolitical objective of trying to contain Chinese and North Vietnamese power at their borders in Southeast Asia, it slipped inexorably into the narcotics traffic.

The international market had been created long before by the European colonial powers, chiefly Britain and France. Great Britain in the late 18th century took the first big step toward internationalization of the Asian drug traffic by establishing a government monopoly over India's opium harvest, helping finance the regime of the Raj by taxing the product, and beginning the massive export of Indian opium into China. When Chinese imperial authorities tried to stop it, Britain, with its gunships, blasted open the Chinese ports to European trade and Indian opium during the Opium War of 1839 to 1842.

Under the forced infusions of opium from British-ruled India the Chinese imports rose from a level of 340 tons in the first decade of the 19th century to 6,560 tons by 1880. It was in this period that the Chinese began a large-scale program of domestic opium production, much of it in the outlying provinces of Szechwan and Yunnan. By the beginning of the 20th century, China had an addict population of 15 million. The wave of Chinese migrations into Southeast Asia spread the scourge of addiction southward.

The French played a similar role in expanding and monopolizing opium production under colonial authority. Centuries before the French arrived the Meo people had used opium as a ceremonial intoxicant, but more as a ceremonial intoxicant than to achieve the stupefaction of "liv-

ing death" with which the Chinese coolies escaped their wretched life cycle of toil, poverty and disease. The French established their own monopoly and converted the Meo poppy harvests into an important cash crop which was taxed and sold to the growing addict population of Indochina. By the beginning of World War Two, according to McCoy's research, there were some 2,500 opium dens in Indochina serving about 100,000 addicts.

The Viet Minh war of independence eventually became a major challenge to French political rule and a drain on the colonial economy. In countering their guerrilla movement the French turned to the Meo tribal peoples in the Laotian highlands and to their poppy harvests. Meo opium became an important factor both in financing the war and in cementing the loyalties of the tribal guerrillas fighting on the French side. McCoy relates the case of the French Expeditionary Corps' "Operation X," a top-secret project for the collection and transport of Meo opium into the Saigon markets where it was turned over to the Binh Xuyen, an underworld secret society which the French occupation authorities permitted to take over civil authority in Saigon. By the time American influence replaced the French military presence, the poppy was the main cash crop in the Golden Triangle, the opium economy was fully developed, and there were well-rutted patterns for dealing with the tribal mountain guerrillas who had been enlisted by the French in the war against the Pathet Lao and Vietnamese Communist insurgents.

Here the argument begins. McCoy asserts that Central Intelligence operations became heavily involved in the opium-heroin traffic. He says that some of the Agency's chief Asian operatives and clients controlled it and that the CIA's contract airline, Air America, moved it toward the ultimate markets.

All this has long been a matter of conventional wisdom and surmise in the bars and embassies of Vientiane, where wags spoke of Air America as "Air Opium," but McCoy seeks to document the case with interviews (alas, some of the crucial ones anonymous) and hard evidence.

One of the most sensational allegations in the book is that Meo General Vang Pao, the most important field commander on the Royal Lao government side, arranged for the delivery of 60 kilos of high grade Laotian heroin (worth \$13.5 million in New York) to Prince Sopsaisana, the Laotian ambassador-designate to France in April 1971. Sopsaisana returned to Laos after French

continued

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Soviet Embassy employe

defects

By DONALD R. MORRIS
Post News Analyst

* Evgeniy Sorokine, 24, an employe of the GRU Rezydentura in the Soviet Embassy in Vientiane, Laos, has defected to the United States.

According to AP and UPI reports, Sorokine and his wife Tatiana were posted to Laos in 1971, where he was assigned duties as driver and French interpreter for Col. Vladimir P. Gretchanine.

Gretchanine was listed as a Soviet military attache. In the early 1960s, Gretchanine was posted to Washington, and was expelled in the course of a quid pro quo reprisal for several U.S. diplomats expelled from Moscow at the time.

ON SEPT. 10 Sorokine's car was found crashed into a tree halfway between the Soviet Embassy and Vientiane Airport. That evening he requested political asylum at

the U.S. Embassy, and the following day he was flown out of Laos, probably on a chartered Air America flight.

Sorokine is now reported to be in the United States. Tatiana Sorokine remains in Vientiane.

These are the bare outlines of a story that will not be expanded on by official U.S. sources, at least for some time to come. Several conclusions, however, may be drawn.

Sorokine was an employe of the Soviet military intelligence service, the GRU; he was not attached to the KGB. All personnel attached to the Soviet military attache office are employes or officers of the GRU, and never of the KGB. Gretchanine is, and always was, a GRU officer.

SOROKINE WAS, most likely, not an officer, but an employe whose duties were exactly as given: driver-interpreter to Col. Gretchanine, whose rank indicates he was

probably the GRU Resident — the officer in command of the GRU Rezydentura.

Although not an agent handler, Sorokine will be nonetheless valuable. He will be able to provide a complete breakdown of the GRU Rezydentura, including those offi-

Post analysis

cers under other covers outside of the Military Attache Office. He will undoubtedly be able to identify a goodly proportion of the KGB Rezydentura as well. His duties would also have enabled him to identify a number of GRU agents, developmental cases and spotting leads as well.

Several aspects of the story hint that Sorokine may be something of a handling problem. More than twenty officers of the Soviet intelligence services have defected to Western countries. It is the act of a deeply maladjusted man, a misfit in his own society who is, by cutting off his entire past life with no

Laotian Foreign Ministry the same day he was flown out of the country. They dropped their standard gambit in such cases, which was to charge that the defector had absconded with the embassy petty cash fund and should be treated as a common criminal. Either they placed little reliance in the Laotian police, or they knew he was out of the country when they reported his absence.

THE CIA is to be commended for the speed with which Sorokine was evacuated; even in Laos such operations pose administrative problems, especially with a sudden walk-in. Over the years, they have been able to count on such a defection every 18 months or so, to implement the knowledge gained from their independent penetrations of the Soviet services.

Sorokine, in fact, may be astonished to find that his hosts know more about the GRU than he does. It has happened before.

hope of return, in effect, taking what may be the only alternative to suicide open to him. For complex psychological reasons, defection almost never occurs before middle age, and Sorokine, at 24, is quite possibly the youngest GRU defector to reach the West.

THE CRASHED car indicates further agitation and a spur-of-the-moment decision. Under no circumstances would this be some form of window-dressing to mislead the Soviets; the CIA eschews such James Bondish dramatics.

Sorokine's desertion of his wife may be still further evidence of disturbance; had the defection been planned in advance with CIA assistance she could easily have been evacuated as well. (But several defections have been triggered by the urge to escape an impossible marital situation.)

The Soviets reported that Sorokine was missing to the

Soviet Embassy employee

STATINTL

defects

By DONALD R. MORRIS
Post News Analyst

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Although not an agent handler, Sorokine will be nonetheless valuable. He will be able to provide a complete breakdown of the GRU Rezidentura, including those offi-

Post analysis

cers under other covers outside of the Military Attache Office. He will undoubtedly be able to identify a goodly proportion of the KGB Rezidentura as well. His duties would also have enabled him to identify a number of GRU agents, developmental cases and spotting leads as well.

Several aspects of the story hint that Sorokine may be something of a handling problem. More than twenty officers of the Soviet intelligence services have defected to Western countries. It is the act of a deeply maladjusted man, a misfit in his own society who is, by cutting off his entire past life with no

hope of return, in effect, taking what may be the only alternative to suicide open to him. For complex psychological reasons, defection almost never occurs before middle age, and Sorokine, at 24, is quite possibly the youngest GRU defector to reach the West.

THE CRASHED car indicates further agitation and a spur-of-the-moment decision. Under no circumstances would this be some form of window-dressing to mislead the Soviets; the CIA eschews such James Bondish dramatics.

Sorokine's desertion of his wife may be still further evidence of disturbance; had the defection been planned in advance with CIA assistance she could easily have been evacuated as well. (But several defections have been triggered by the urge to escape an impossible marital situation.)

The Soviets reported that Sorokine was missing to the Laotian Foreign Ministry the same day he was flown out of the country. They dropped their standard gambit in such cases, which was to charge that the defector had absconded with the embassy petty cash fund and should be treated as a common criminal. Either they placed little reliance in the Laotian police, or they knew he was out of the country when they reported his absence.

THE CIA is to be commended for the speed with which Sorokine was evacuated; even in Laos such operations pose administrative problems, especially with a sudden walk-in. Over the years, they have been able to count on such a defection every 18 months or so, to implement the knowledge gained from their independent penetrations of the Soviet services.

Sorokine, in fact, may be astonished to find that his hosts know more about the GRU than he does. It has

14 SEP 1972

CIA "secret army" crumbles in Laos

VIENTIANE—Units of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's "secret army" of Meo tribesmen in northern Laos fled from the Plain of Jars Wednesday after coming under heavy attack by the Lao Patriotic Front forces. The four columns of "secret army" troops were reported about 12 miles north of the big CIA base at Long Cheng.

According to informed sources, the Meo tribesmen complained of a lack of U.S. air support and said that this justified their somewhat hasty withdrawal. But other observers said the Meos are being affected by the recent reports of CIA involvement in opium-smuggling in Southeast Asia. The entire Meo tribal economy is based on opium-smuggling, except for the CIA funds they receive.

September 19, 1972

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S 14755

selves with those on whom the Americans bombs are falling. But all of us could identify with the hostages of those terrorists in Munich, and feel the horror the Israeli athletes must have felt at the realization that those armed men, self-righteous in their own cause, were ready to kill them without a qualm.

Perhaps that glimpse of the ultimate evil of which humans are capable will steel us toward the harsh judgment we must, it seems, make as a nation in this election: Will we condone a continuation of the killing in the vain hopes of redeeming our blunder in Vietnam?

If the Munich tragedy does that for America and the world, there may be some measure of meaning in its madness. Otherwise, we must record it as just another mindless massacre in this darkened age.

CHICAGO COUNCIL OF LAWYERS ENDORSES CONSUMER PROTECTION AGENCY LEGISLATION

Mr. PERCY, Mr. President, I am exceedingly pleased to learn that so distinguished a group as the Board of Governors of the Chicago Council of Lawyers has endorsed legislation to create a governmental voice for the consumer, who for so long has gone unrepresented before Federal agencies and courts.

In view of the fact that both the Republican and Democratic Party platforms, just adopted, endorsed the concept of an independent consumer advocacy agency, and that the Senate Government Operations Committee recently voted 15 to 2 to report S. 3970 to the floor, I am hopeful that the leadership will act promptly to schedule this legislation for full consideration before the Senate.

The Consumer Protection Agency legislation is a precise and balanced measure which affords the authority and resources needed to assure effective advocacy for consumer interests. It is needed, because the regulatory agencies Congress has set up to protect the consumer have simply not been doing the job. The legislation also provides for a Council of Consumer Advisers which will advise the President on policy matters that critically affect the public and will guarantee that consumer interests are taken into account at the highest levels of Government.

Mr. President, the Chicago Council of Lawyers was founded in response to the need for a reform professional organization of lawyers in the Chicago area. Since its organization, council membership has grown to over 1,300 and it is now counted as a major general membership bar association in Chicago affiliated with the ABA.

I ask unanimous consent that the resolution adopted by the Chicago Council of Lawyers be printed in its entirety in the Record. The reference to S. 1177 in the resolution is a reference to the predecessor bill of S. 3970, which was modified somewhat in the course of 2 months consideration before the Government Operations Committee. The basic findings and conclusions of this resolution, however, continue to apply with the same force and effect as they did with respect to the original measure.

There being no objection, the state-

ment was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

STATEMENT OF THE CHICAGO COUNCIL OF LAWYERS

The Chicago Council of Lawyers' Board of Governors urges adoption of Senate Bill 1177 which authorizes creation of a Council of Consumer Advisers to the President and an Independent Consumer Protection Agency. In recent years, it has become apparent that the interests of the American consumer of goods and services have not always been considered either by industry in product design and delivery or by government in regulatory policy-making. At present, the consumer's view is advocated only by a few dedicated citizens whose resources do not permit broad representation and who often are forced to expend those limited resources and energies merely to establish their right to be heard. Essentially, S.B. 1177 provides an integrated framework for developing over the long-term national consumer programs and priorities through a Council of Consumer Advisers (the "CCA"), and for meeting the need for a consumer spokesperson, through a Consumer Protection Agency (the "CPA"), with financing and authority to represent consumer interests full time on specific questions.

The CCA, to become a part of the executive department, is directed to report annually to the President on consumer programs, priorities and legislative goals; thus progress in meeting consumer needs will receive the national attention and concern they deserve. The CPA will have standing to be heard in federal administrative adjudicatory and rule-making proceedings. Though it will have no authority to impinge on the jurisdiction of other agencies, an active and aggressive CPA will force sometimes ineffective and industry-wedded agencies to consider the interests of the consumer. Another important feature of the CPA's role is the direction to conduct industry-wide surveys and investigations to analyze industry and business practices of concern to consumers. Included in this authorization is the important power to require business and industry to answer interrogatories. Until now, only understaffed and inadequately financed citizen groups have undertaken such studies. Other important consumer interest functions the CPA will exercise are to receive consumer complaints and direct them to the appropriate agency for action, to act as a clearinghouse for information of interest to consumers, and to publish a Federal Consumer Register of information useful to consumers.

Besides establishing a potentially strong advocate for consumer interests, S.B. 1177 contains safeguards against unnecessary and irresponsible harassment of business by the CPA. Specifically, section 208 requires the CPA to take all reasonable measures to assure the accuracy of all public disclosures, to avoid "surprise" disclosures, and to announce product comparisons only under controlled conditions. Perhaps most important to business is the role the CPA will take as advocate for industries and businesses forced to act contrary to consumer's interest because of existing laws or agency policies. For example, only two years ago the television industry, alerted to a potential fire hazard in color TVs, sent representatives to a Chicago meeting to discuss upgrading flammability standards at the risk of Justice Department intervention on antitrust grounds. The CPA would act to urge government approval of industry cooperation in similar matters.

Recognizing, too, the critical role citizen groups have played in making government and industry increasingly responsive to consumer interests the drafters of S.B. 1177, notably Senators Charles Percy and Abraham Ribicoff, have assured further responsible citizen initiative by providing for a CPA administered system of grants to help sup-

port citizen research and action groups. To the same end, section 405 orders all federal agencies to clarify, and relax where appropriate, procedural requirements for citizen participation in public hearings.

In sum, the Chicago Council of Lawyers believes S.B. 1177 is legislation that all interests—consumer, industry and government—can and should support.

LAOS: THE FURTIVE WAR

Mr. EAGLETON, Mr. President, the concern that congressional power is being usurped by the executive branch has been voiced many times by this body. The 68-to-16 vote for passage of the War Powers Act is a clear indication that an overwhelming majority of Senators feel it is time to reassert the constitutional prerogatives of Congress.

In the forefront of this fight to bring awareness to the Congress and to the American people is my distinguished senior colleague from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON). As a member of the Committees on Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Joint Atomic Energy, Senator SYMINGTON has viewed with growing concern covert operations of the U.S. Government.

Senator SYMINGTON has now contributed a most perceptive article in World magazine entitled "Laos: The Furtive War," in which he expresses in a compelling manner his deep concern that the power of Congress to declare war has been eroded.

Senator SYMINGTON's strong feeling that the authority of Congress has been bypassed in the Laotian experience is reflected in the following passage from his article:

The Constitution has been bypassed by a small group of men in various Departments of the Executive Branch who, under the direction of four Presidents, initiated and carried out policies without any real Congressional knowledge and thus any true Congressional authorization. Needless to say, these policies were also carried out without the knowledge and approval of the American people, on whose consent our government is supposed to rest.

This theme is reinforced in Senator SYMINGTON's article as he looks at the history of our involvement in Laos since the Presidency of Dwight Eisenhower. Senator SYMINGTON's analysis is both compelling and shocking. I commend it highly to the Senate.

I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From World magazine, Aug. 29, 1972]

LAOS: THE FURTIVE WAR

(By U.S. Senator STUART SYMINGTON)

(NOTE.—Stuart Symington, a Democrat, is the senior senator from Missouri, and the only senator on the Armed Services, Foreign Relations and Joint Atomic Energy Committees. Born in Massachusetts, he has been in the Senate for twenty years.)

The United States has been involved for more than a decade in an undeclared and largely unnoticed war in northern Laos. From the beginning, and as of today, this war has been characterized by a degree of secrecy never before true of a major American involvement abroad in which many American

10 SEP 1972

Heroin Road In SE Asia

STATINTL

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE

Special to The Star-News

VIENTIANE—"I have the fastest boat on the river," boasted the Lao colonel as he swigged another glass of throat-burning rice whisky at a party in Ban Houei Sai, a Lao garrison town.

Nobody could dispute the colonel's claim, for the previous record-holder — a big Chrysler belonging to American Treasury and Customs officers — had a burned-out engine after someone had surreptitiously drained the oil from its crank case.

The prime suspect of U.S. officials is none other than the Colonel and his henchmen, who, they believe, are in the opium and heroin trade.

"The river" is the mighty Mekong, now swollen by monsoon rains. From Yunnan in China it plunges in a brown mass of whirlpools and forming eddies, over giant rock outcroppings that could dash a boat to pieces between the sloping green hills that make excellent land for poppy-growing.

If the river doesn't kill the unwary traveller he faces the peril of an arrow fired from a crossbow of Shan or Ekaw tribesmen or bullets from a Ho musket or a Kuomintang carbine.

The whole area—Burma on one bank and Laos on the other—is the battleground for American narcotics agents and heroin smugglers and refiners. The sabotaged boat is just a skirmish in the battle that started last November, when the United States persuaded the Lao government to pass anti-narcotics laws.

Stalemate

Agents of the Treasury and Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs say that, after initial successes, they have reached a stalemate in the fight against drug traffickers along the borders.

Earlier this year agents knocked out two heroin refineries in villages just north of Ban Houei Sai. At one of them, Lao military officials, who denied running the refinery, burned buildings as a sign of good faith to show their willingness to stop the trade after considerable American pressure.

Later American narcotics agents and Laos' tough new drug squad leader, Gen. Khammu Bou-sarrath, took away truck loads of equipment from the burned refinery, including ether in 10-gallon drums, acetone and acetic anhydride, all used in heroin manufacture.

But the all-important chemist was never caught.

In Vientiane Gen. Khammu raided the house of a national assembly member, Mou Mou Sen, and reported confiscating 27 pounds of heroin hidden under the house roof.

Mou Seu, claiming immunity as a legislator, has not yet been prosecuted. This immunity runs out when the Assembly closes Nov. 11, and many American officials take the view that if the Lao government fails to prosecute Mou Seu under the new law, cooperation in the drug fight will have failed.

Sixty-six pounds of boiled opium have been confiscated from passengers on aircraft chartered to U.S. government agencies by Air America and Continental Airlines.

Since this flurry of activity, agents and runners have been eyeing each other warily.

"Nobody is buying opium for the international market," an informed U.S. official said.

Americans say the 1972 opium crop harvested in January and February has not been sold internationally because of the crackdown. This judgment is based on a drop in opium prices indicating a glut on the market on the Burmese side of the border.

To date, opium and heroin have followed certain routes, and the Americans are concentrating first on closing off these routes. The flow of heroin follows the line of least resistance, one U.S. official said "We will stop it coming one way and it will flow around us. The traffickers will find new routes and we will close them off till it's no longer worthwhile. We can pinch the flow off across Thailand and Laos eventually, but the traffickers can always move through Burmese territory to Rangoon and the Bay of Bengal and there won't be much we can do about it. We have no political leverage in Burma."

American officials say about 450 tons of opium are produced annually in Burma's Shan and Wa states.

The opium flows out of the hills to the walled city of Kengtung. From Kengtung it follows the Burmese road system to Tachilek opposite the Thai town of Mai Sai. There are at least eight heroin refineries around Tachilek.

From Tachilek heroin moves in two directions, one across the border into Thailand and through Thailand's busy road net, the other east from Tachilek to a point just north of the area where Burma, Laos and Thailand come together.

The heroin crosses into Laos from Burma at Muong Hi village then continues down to the Yao tribes' headquarters at Nam Keun on the Mekong River.

In the Nam Keun area there are also heroin refineries which handle not only Burmese opium, but opium grown by the Lahy and Ekaw tribes in

LORAIN, OHIO
JOURNAL

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U.S. Planes Carry Dope

THE U.S. government has insisted for years that its unofficial CIA-run airline, Air America, has not been running opium in the mountain-bound Asian land of Laos.

But now, from the files of the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies, we have evidence that U.S. ground and air equipment—if not U.S. personnel—has formed the backbone of the Laos opium trade.

"SELECTED ROYAL Lao Army and Royal Lao Air Force units, utilizing air and ground equipment furnished by the U.S., provide the means for protecting, transporting and processing of narcotics," reports one intelligence summary on Laos.

"A broad spectrum of Lao society is involved in the narcotics business, including Generals, Princes, high-level bureaucrats

and Province Governors," says the report.

Another document, complete with a secret CIA map, reports unequivocally: 'Most of the refineries in Laos operate under the protection of the Royal Laotian Armed Forces...Some reports suggest that a senior Royal Laotian Armed Forces officer may hold an ownership interest in a few of these facilities.'

To end narcotics running by the highest echelons of Laotian society, the documents propose drastic action.

"An important target group will be the air force generals and other Royal Lao Air Force personnel who command and operate the transport aircraft involved in shipping narcotics."

9 SEP 1972

CIA Laos army disintegrates

VIENTIANE—United Press International quoted "American sources" on Friday as saying the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's "secret army" of Meo tribesmen and Thai mercenaries in northwest Laos "has virtually disintegrated." Numbers involved were estimated at 6-8,000. The "secret army" was under attack by forces of the Lao Patriotic Front.

9 SEP 1972

Laotian Irregulars***Abandon Offensive***

From News Dispatches

VIENTIANE, Sept. 8 — A 2,400-man task force of CIA-supported Laotian irregular forces was forced to withdraw from its positions northwest of the Plain of Jars under heavy fire on Tuesday, abandoning an offensive operation against the North Vietnamese-held Plain, American sources said today. ✓

The Washington Merry-Go-Round**U.S. Is Backbone of Laos Drug Trade****By Jack Anderson**

The U.S. government has insisted for years that its unofficial 'CIA-run' airline, Air America, has not been running opium in the mountainous Asian land of Laos.

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To end narcotics running by the highest echelons of Laotian society, the documents propose drastic action.

"An important target group will be the Air Force generals and other Royal Lao Air Force personnel who command and operate the transport aircraft involved in shipping narcotics.

"Officials high and low who are found to be involved in a substantial way will have to be removed from positions of influence," urges the memo. It recommends curtailment of some aid to Laos.

"This is aimed specifically at eliminating the use of all U.S.-owned aircraft operated by the Royal Laotian Air Force or U.S.-leased aircraft, including U.S. support items, in the transport of narcotics."

In recent months, America's spokesmen claim a new Laotian anti-heroin law is having some effect. But, in fact, only lowly opium hustlers are arrested; the generals and princes go untouched.

Jonah and the Whale

The Federal Reserve Board is supposed to supervise banks, not do their dirty work. But recently the Fed aided the banks in an attempt to take over an entire industry.

The victim of this power play was supposed to be the

armored car and courier industry, a collection of small companies all over the country.

The banks would like to swallow up the industry, and the Fed has been deliberating whether to grant permission.

Unwilling to play Jonah to the banks' whale, the armored car and courier companies are fighting back. As part of their counterattack, one courier firm hired Dun & Bradstreet to survey how good a job the courier companies do.

They decided to survey the Fed's own outlying banks, figuring that if the Fed's own branches liked the courier service, this would be convincing argument that the industry deserved to survive.

Dun & Bradstreet gathered 20 interviews with Fed banks before their bosses in Washington got wind of the survey.

Off went a peremptory telegram. "It appears inappropriate for officials of Federal Reserve banks and branches to express any opinions about courier services," wired Board Secretary Tynan Smith, noting that a Fed decision on the takeover was pending.

To make absolutely sure the courier survey was stymied, Smith added: "Please keep us informed if you are contacted for such information." This so

intimidated the regional Fed officials that two of them, who had already given interviews, tried to withdraw them. Other officials insisted their replies be totally anonymous.

Although the survey was aborted, the courier services did get some use out of it. Based on the incomplete returns, it showed the Fed banks were generally satisfied with the private courier services.

No Spanish Allowed

A top anti-poverty official has scolded subordinates for speaking Spanish at a recent meeting that included Spanish-speaking officials.

"I was appalled," wrote operations chief James Griffith, "to hear a meeting of in-house (anti-poverty) people closed with a statement in Spanish and answered in Spanish. This was absolutely uncalled for and taken as a direct insult by the persons in attendance."

Griffith's rebuke was directed at migrant staff official Pete Merilez. Asked for an explanation, Griffith told us: "We poor gringos who don't speak Spanish sometimes get embarrassed when we hear others speak it. We get the feeling they're speaking behind our backs."

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ground mining experience being permitted to work alone while installing temporary roof support in face areas;

4. *Management's failure* to enforce the company's approved roof control plan and other policies designed to eliminate substandard conditions and practices which result in roof-fall accidents.

5. *The failure of management* to establish a procedure by which trainees are readily identifiable and the lack of communication between the safety department, supervisory personnel, and employees relative to the type, extent, and control of training new employees before they are required to work alone, and

6. *Management's failure* to analyze and utilize the data logged in the accident record books in the prevention of injuries from roof-falls." (Italic supplied.)

If the miners of this Nation knew of this record and could vote on retaining or not retaining Consol's current management team, I feel certain that they would vote to throw that team out of office.

By failing to properly train and retrain employees, to instill in all their employees, a sense of safety consciousness, and, most importantly, to insure that all Federal and State safety rules are fully observed, Consol officials are clearly negligent and should be replaced. Consol needs management people who will devote greater personnel time and effort to health and safety than production. This means all Consol mine officials whatever their title—not just the Safety Directors. Until this is done, I predict that Consol will continue to lead or nearly lead the Nation in mine deaths.

I urge that you personally take charge of Consol's health and safety program and initiate steps to drastically reduce injury and fatality rates at all Consol mines for the remainder of this year and thereafter.

I would be interested in learning what actions you take or plan to take to achieve this.

Sincerely,

KEN HECHLER.

WORLD ORDER STRATEGY COMMITTEE, MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FOR PEACE THROUGH LAW

(Mr. DRINAN asked and, was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. DRINAN. Mr. Speaker, I have the honor to chair the World Order Strategy Committee of our bipartisan, bicameral organization, Members of Congress for Peace Through Law MCPL now has 134 members—32 Senators and 102 Representatives, from both parties and every region of the country.

The World Order Strategy Committee was created by MCPL several months ago for the purpose of examining the basic assumptions on which American foreign policy is based.

Our committee is very fortunate to have 13 exceedingly able and dedicated members—public servants who believe that a careful review of the fundamental questions of how to obtain peace through law is a necessary enterprise. They are Senators ALAN CRANSTON, of California; HAROLD HUGHES, of Iowa; and BOB PACKWOOD, of Oregon; and Representatives RICHARD BOLLING, of Missouri; PAUL FINDLEY, of Illinois; DONALD FRASER, of Minnesota; PAUL McCLOSKEY, of California; PATSY MINK, of Hawaii; HENRY REUSS, of Wisconsin; FRED SCHWENGLER, of Iowa; JOHN SEIBERLING, of Ohio; and

CHARLES WHALEN, of Ohio. We have six Republicans and eight Democrats in all.

Our committee has undertaken an inquiry into the following fundamental questions:

SEVEN FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS

First. What kind of international political order do you want your grandchildren to inherit?

Second. What is U.S. national security?

Third. Is the balance of power concept consistent with international peace and national security?

Fourth. Is the policy of deterrence an adequate response to our need for security?

Fifth. Does U.S. foreign policy contribute to the ability of peoples to select governments of their own choosing?

Sixth. How do existing disparities among nations in wealth and human well-being affect U.S. national security?

Seventh. What should be the fundamental principles of U.S. foreign policy?

These are obviously questions of exquisite difficulty. The process of arriving at even tentative answers will be long and arduous. However, we believe these questions must be asked and discussed very seriously if world order is ever to be more than an idle dream.

COMMITTEE HOLDS HEARINGS

To begin our inquiry, the committee held a series of six hearings. Each of the six distinguished citizens who testified reflected on the fundamental questions. The contributions of Prof. John Kenneth Galbraith, Hans Morganthau, and Robert W. Tucker, Dr. Richard J. Barnet, Norman Cousins and C. Maxwell Stanley to our work were so outstanding that I would like to bring their statements to the attention of all of our colleagues.

The hearings of the World Order Strategy Committee are open to the public and every Member of Congress is invited to attend and join us in discussion with the witnesses.

On behalf of the committee I welcome the assistance of all Congressmen and Senators as we continue to seek new, practical answers to the fundamental questions which the United States and mankind must answer if we are to survive.

A brief biographical sketch of each of our witnesses to date, and summaries of their statements follow:

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH

Professor John Kenneth Galbraith was born in Ontario, Canada and was educated at the University of Guelph, the University of California and Cambridge University in England. Assistant Professor of Economics at Princeton University, 1939-40, he also served as Economic Advisor to the National Defense Advisory Committee, 1940-41. Between 1941 and 1943, he was at the Office of Price Administration, first as Assistant Administrator in charge of the Price Division and then as Deputy Administrator.

He was a Member of the Board of Editors of *Fortune* magazine 1943-48 and was Director of the Office of Economic Security Policy, Department of State in 1946. He has served as Chairman of the Americans for Democratic Action and as U.S. Ambassador to India, 1961-63. A Visiting Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge University, 1970-71, he is currently Paul M. Warburg Professor

of Economics at Harvard University, where he taught from 1934-39 and from 1948 to the present.

His numerous publications include *A Contemporary Guide to Economics, Peace and Laughter* (1971), *Who Needs the Democrats and What It Takes To Be Needed* (1970), *How To Control The Military* (1969), *Ambassador's Journal* (1969), *How To Get Out of Vietnam* (1967), *The New Industrial State* (1967, second edition, 1971), *The Affluent Society* (second revised edition, 1969), *Economic Development in Perspective* (1962), *American Capitalism, the concept of countervailing power* (1952, second revised edition, 1955), and *Beyond the Marshall Plan* (1949).

STATEMENT BY PROF. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, BEFORE THE WORLD ORDER STRATEGY COMMITTEE OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FOR PEACE THROUGH LAW, JUNE 27, 1972

(1) There is advantage in being compelled to state the basic problem of our foreign policy in brief compass. This is a field where meaning is ordinarily disguised by words, the more words the better the disguise. It is one reason why discussion of foreign policy tends to be intellectually inferior even to the more suspect forms of sociology. Its reputation is saved principally by the circumstance that those who discuss foreign policy have a superior social position, more self assurance, a lesser awareness of what they do not know, and somewhat better tailoring.

(2) The effects of American foreign policy in the last quarter century have been regionally very diverse. Western Europe and Japan were the areas of failure and war in the first half of this century. Here, on the whole, the policy has been a success. Economics have been strong; nationalism has receded. We are now suffering competitively in relation to these parts of the world. That, however, has been the consequence of incompetent economic management here at home. In Singapore this week, former Secretary of the Treasury John Connally was generous enough to say that he thought that Britain had a sound economy. He was wise not to mention the state of the American economy from which he had just taken the precaution of detaching himself.

(3) In relation to the Communist states things have also improved in these last years. For this we must give credit to the recent initiatives of Mr. Nixon. They have moved us perceptibly away from the cold war terror which so effectively enthroned the military and so extensively destroyed civilian reason in the fifties and sixties. (It was unreasonable, it must be added, which Mr. Nixon had previously done much to enhance.) Our great need in relation to the Soviet Union is to avoid the risk of further confrontation. We cannot continue to depend on the insane assumption that the Russians will always back down. And the further need is to negotiate an effective arms limitation agreement. We cannot afford another arms limitation like last which (in the Administration view) is only acceptable if associated with a large increase in arms expenditure. Arms limitation of this kind could only be treated adequately by the late Lewis Carroll.

(4) The area of our misfortune in foreign policy in the last twenty-five years has been in the Third World. This—at the Bay of Pigs, in the Dominican Republic, in Bangladesh and above all in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam—has been the theatre of all our disasters. Here, repeatedly, we stumbled. It is obvious that something is very wrong with our policy toward this part of the planet—unless, of course, the disasters were really a succession of righteously conceived initiatives all misconstrued as mistakes by the American people. However popular in Washington at the time and still in the memoirs of those involved this is a proposition it would be unwise to accept.

(5) The source of our disasters was the

Reveal Disaster In Plain of Jars

By JOSEPH FRIED

Staff Correspondent of THE NEWS

Saigon, Sept. 4—Communist troops smashed the spearhead of a major allied drive to retake the strategic Plain of Jars in Laos by shattering two elite Lao mobile units, reliable sources disclosed today. Authorities so far have been able to account for only about 650 allied troops out of a total of 2,400 men.

The drive was launched recently to take advantage of the departure of a North Vietnamese division, possibly for redeployment to South Vietnam's battlefields.

Spearheading the push were two crack mobile units of Laos special forces consisting of Meo tribesmen under the command of Gen. Vang Pao. The Meos are recruited and financed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Sources said the Laotians were battered by a North Vietnamese regiment which had remained behind in the Plain of Jars, and suffered the severe casualties in two days of fighting late last month. Some of the missing allied troops were believed to be still attempting to slip through enemy lines, but most have been killed, wounded or captured.

The dimensions of the sharp setback had not been revealed by officials in Vientiane. The sources said it has had a crippling effect on the drive in the Plain of Jars which was reported to be proceeding half-heartedly.

Helicopter Downed

In today's fighting in South Vietnam, Communist troops drove South Vietnamese rangers from a highland base near the jungle Cambodian border after the enemy fired 200 mortar rounds into the position last night. A supporting U.S. helicopter was downed in the action at Le Minh, 10 miles from the border and 25 miles west of Pleiku city, but the aircraft's six wounded crewmen were rescued.

Typhoon Elsie cut deeply into U.S. air activity. Some Air Force jets based in Thailand and South Vietnam managed to raid the North yesterday, but their 60 strikes were the fewest since the U.S. resumed across-the-border missions in April. Elsie's 55-mile-per-hour winds also curtailed U.S. raids in South Vietnam, trimming the number to 204 during the last 24 hours. As Elsie was downgraded to a Tropical Storm, Navy and Air Force raids today

B-52s Fly High

The bad weather did not affect high-flying B-52 bombers, which struck twice in North Vietnam and three times inside the demilitarized zone overnight and today against enemy supply caches. The Stratoforts also logged 29 missions in South Vietnam, including seven in provinces around Saigon where a Communist build-up is under way.

Fighting picked up around battered An Loc, 60 miles north of Saigon, where 134 Communists were killed yesterday and early today. An Loc underwent a bitter three-month siege by the Communists last spring, and the upsurge in activity could herald a renewed Communist drive around the rubble-strewn capital of Binh Long Province. U.S. warplanes and artillery accounted for more than half of the enemy casualties. South Vietnamese losses were eight dead.

Around battle-scarred Quang Tri city, government forces killed 61 Communists while losing 10 dead. Another 19 enemy soldiers were killed in neighboring Thua Thien Province. There, Communist sappers attacked armored elements near Camp Eagle, the headquarters of the South Vietnamese 1st Army Division and barely four miles southwest of Hue. The raiders succeeded in destroying five armored personnel carriers. Two South Vietnamese soldiers were killed, while enemy losses were unknown.

3 September 1972

The Politics Of Heroin in Southeast Asia

By Alfred W. McCoy.
With Cathleen B. Read
and Leonard P. Adams II.

Illustrated. 464 pp.
New York: Harper & Row. \$10.95.

By JAMES M. MARKHAM

It looks as though *Papaver somniferum*, the rather beautiful opium poppy, is going to provide us with a new genre of film, fiction, journalism and, even, scholarship. This is understandable. Heroin addiction is savaging our cities. "Any nation that moves down the road to addiction, that nation has something taken out of its character," President Nixon observed last March shortly after his return from China, once the most addicted of nations. Mr. Nixon has declared "war" on heroin at home—and galvanized his emissaries abroad. In certain parts of the world, American diplomats now give almost monomaniacal attention to persuading frequently indifferent or corrupt officials to do something about poppy cultivation, heroin refining and heroin trafficking.

Moreover, from the perspective of a journalist or film-maker, the subject is a natural, replete with ignorant hill tribesmen hacking away at their poppy fields in remote corners of Asia, ragtag paramilitary smugglers leading vast mule caravans across cloud-shrouded mountains, shadowy Chinese middlemen bribing

James M. Markham, who was a correspondent for The Associated Press in South Asia and Africa, now reports frequently on drug problems for The Times.

1972, The New York Times Co. All

high-ranking officials to look the other way, cosmopolitan Corsican intrigueurs arranging for stewardesses to strap on "body packs" of No. 4 heroin and fly to New York, intrepid undercover agents trying to foil all of the aforementioned and—last, but by no means least important—the junkies on our streets, symptoms and carriers of disquieting diseases.

This book, the first work of near-scholarship in the new genre, comes to us redolent of controversy [see *The Last Word*]. Before it was even in galleys—on June 1—the Central Intelligence Agency dispatched an employee to Harper & Row in New York to warn the company that the book could well be inaccurate, libelous and "damaging to the interests of this country," according to the recollection of Executive Editor M. S. Wyeth. The next day Alfred McCoy testified before a Senate subcommittee about alleged involvement of high-ranking South Vietnamese officials, Air America and others in the opium business. Alarmed, the C.I.A.'s General Counsel, Lawrence R. Houston, stepped up the pressure, and on July 5 asked to "see the text prior to publication" in order to point out its inaccuracies.

In a display of post-Irving caution—and over the author's objections—Harper & Row agreed on July 19 to let the C.I.A. consider the galleys for a week and submit its criticisms, on the understanding that the publishers would be under no obligation to make any changes. The mountain at Langley, Va., labored and produced a mouse. The 1,500-word critique the Agency returned to Harper & Row on July 28 understandably "underwhelmed" the editors (who appeared to have been concerned mainly about libel suits) and they decided to proceed with the publication of the book.

The C.I.A.'s clumsy intervention—particularly when linked to its ongoing efforts to prevent a former agent, Victor L. Marchetti, from even writing a book about the Agency for Alfred A. Knopf—is seriously disturbing. So is Harper & Row's submission of the book for prepublication criticism; it sets a worrying

precedent even if the company maintains, as it does, that this was a special case. But the C.I.A. assaulted the McCoy book like a bull lunging at a matador's outstretched cape. For what the 27-year-old Yale graduate student has given us is not—as advertised—an expose of "C.I.A. involvement in the drug traffic" but rather a fascinating, often meticulous unraveling of the byzantine complexities of the Southeast Asian opium and heroin trade. To be sure, McCoy weaves a New Left anti-C.I.A. leitmotif throughout his pages, and at times lapses into the error (usually made by angry non-Americans) of crediting American espionage with history-bending powers. Thus, in the early (and weakest) chapters of the book we are led to believe that if the O.S.S. had not backed the Mafia in Sicily at the end of World War II and if the C.I.A. had not sponsored Corsican mobsters as anti-Communist strikebreakers on the Marseilles waterfront, these two underworld groups would have subsided into well-deserved oblivion and never gotten into heroin trafficking.

As a former C.I.A. agent told Seymour Hersh (who unearthed the pre-publication fiasco), McCoy's assertions are "10 per cent tendentious and 90 per cent of the most valuable contribution I can think of." "He's a very liberal kid," the ex-agent continued, "and he'd like to nail the establishment. But some leading intelligence officers inside the Government's program think that his research is great." Well they might. For McCoy has done his homework, and, unlike most authors of books about spooks and mobsters, he gives us a rich set of footnotes. It is too bad they are not at the bottom of the pages, because this is a book to be read in tandem with its footnotes. Some assertions in the text are stronger than the footnotes they rest on; many are not.

The book's strength does not lie in its finger-wagging approach to history, but in its astounding-but-true tales of exotic rivalries that make up the heroin trade. Have you ever heard, for example,

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WASHINGTON STAR
3 SEP 1972

Reds Enlarge Control Along Chinese Roads

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE

Special to The Star-News

NAM YU, Laos — Communist forces are enlarging their area of control along the west flank of the Communist Chinese road network which runs from China across northwest Laos, to within 25 miles of the Thai-Laos border and passes 30 miles southeast of this Lao irregular base.

Informed military sources say pro-Communist Pathet Lao forces have assaulted and captured 11 irregular hilltop positions in the past six months in a move which coincides with a rise in the number of incidents initiated by terrorists in that part of Thailand across the border from the road area.

The Pathet Lao have knocked irregulars from positions overlooking the river valley midway between here and the Chinese road and which parallels the road.

Motive Unclear

Communist motivation for the move against the irregulars may be only to keep them further from the road to stop the irregulars' teams from slipping through the road defenses to survey Chinese traffic. But it may also be aimed at stopping surveillance of some new activity on the road. The Chinese started road construction in the area Sept. 1, 1968, and now have roads linking China with North Vietnam and most of northwest Laos. The road points like an arrow at Thailand's heart and Thais have been increasingly nervous about it.

Xieng Lom lies inside Laos on the south bank of the Mekong opposite the Chinese road end at Pak Beng. The Thais asked Laos to agree to the Thai army's use of Xieng Lom in exchange for the Thais giving Lao troops help in defending Long Cheng in northeast Laos against a North Vietnam

Two Uses for Road

To date the Chinese road appears to have two uses. First, it serves as boundary to North Vietnamese influence in North Laos. No North Vietnamese troops have been spotted west of the Chinese road. Secondly, it serves as an infiltration route for Thai Communists going to Peking and Hanoi for training or returning from there. It is also a route for small arms, ammunition and mines destined for terrorists in northern Thailand's Nan and Chiangrai provinces. Thai troops and Lao troops around Xieng Lom have been plagued the last few months by mines on hill paths and numerous small sharp ambushes and clashes.

Like Long Cheng

The third possibility for a Pathet Lao attack is that the Chinese have decided to eliminate this base. Nam Yu is a smaller edition of the Central Intelligence Agency base at Long Cheng. It has a good runway sited among limestone escarpments and is a home base for irregular troops.

The irregulars are led by a handful of U.S. officials and it is possible Chinese or Pathet Lao may view Nam Yu as an American listening post because of its proximity to the Chinese road system in Laos and its relative closeness to Chinese and Burmese borders.

The Lu and Ekhaw and Kun or Ho tribesmen drift over each country's borders and pass through Nam Yu or the hilltop positions it controls, reaching all the way to just northwest of the Pathet Lao and Chinese garrisoned town in Laos, Muong Sing. Nam Yu therefore has intelligence potential.

When the Embarrassed Chuckling Stopped

Our Allies, Opium, and the CIA

By Michael T. Malloy

We were just about to take off from one of the many secret airstrips the Central Intelligence Agency had cut into the mountains of northern Laos, when a tribal soldier hurried up, spoke briefly to an American CIA agent, and threw a big, white canvas bag aboard. I already half knew the answer, but as we buckled our seat belts I asked the agent what was in the bag.

He looked embarrassed. "Opium," he said.

Embarrassment was the strongest emotion that American officialdom showed a decade ago if anyone mentioned the wide-open dope traffic conducted by our allies in Southeast Asia. Narcotics smuggling was more often viewed with amused tolerance as just another Asian peccadillo like corruption, gold smuggling, and night clubs that advertised "Twenty Fresh Girls Just Arrived From Bangkok With Medical Certificates."

White slavery and gold smuggling still rate little more than an embarrassed chuckle at some of our Southeast Asian embassies ("we're here to fight communism, not to play missionary"), but narcotics is something else.

The epidemic of opium-based heroin that struck our armies there in 1970 and the frightening inroads the drug has made among high-school students at home have turned that amusing peccadillo into a deadly menace to our own national well-being.


Free Publicity

So *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* couldn't have been published at a worse time for the men who direct our policies in that bloody and controversial corner of the world. Newspapers, magazines, and television reporters have described allied involvement with the narcotics trade in the past, without generating more than *pro forma* evasions and denials. But this book, published Aug. 17, is so thoroughly researched, so carefully annotated, and so specific in its accusations that even the Central Intelligence Agency has crawled out of its accustomed shell of secrecy to publicly issue 11 pages of denials.

The agency should have stayed in its shell. It guaranteed the book an enormous

Staff Writer Malloy spent several years in Southeast Asia as a correspondent for United Press International.

amount of free publicity by asking Harper & Row to suppress its publication. It trapped itself in a "put up or shut up" corner by telling the publishing company it could demonstrate that author Alfred McCoy's allegations were "totally false." It failed to demonstrate any such thing when Harper & Row broke publishing tradition by giving the agency an advance look at the book and a chance to explode



'The book is so thoroughly researched, so carefully annotated, and so specific in its accusations that even the Central Intelligence Agency has crawled out of its accustomed shell of secrecy to issue 11 pages of denials.'

its charges. Instead of preventing its publication, the president of the 155-year-old publishing house said the CIA's response merely "reaffirmed" his company's confidence in the book.

McCoy is a 27-year-old graduate student at Yale. His book is a monumental piece of scholarship in a field that sometimes resists investigation to the point of killing the investigators. He has interviewed spies, gun runners, opium farmers, mercenaries, policemen, and generals along a trail that ran from dusty European libraries to mountaintops in the no man's land of northern Laos. He produced a fascinating tale of mercenary armies, lost battalions, commando raids on Communist China, and wild mountain tribesmen led by hard-drinking American adventurers who sometimes pay cash bounties for enemy ears. It is right out of *Terry and the Pirates*, and it is all new.

McCoy's chief conclusion is that "American diplomats and secret agents have been involved in..."

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Let Them Eat Bombs

by John Everingham

Author's Note: From March, 1968, to May, 1972, I made seven treks to the jungled villages of Long Pot District in north central Laos. The district is located approximately 32 miles to the northwest of Long Cheng, headquarters for General Vang Pao's American-trained army, and 30 air miles to the southwest of the now deserted Plain of Jars.

In 1968, Long Pot was made up of slightly less than 2,000 people living in 11 separate villages. Five of these were populated by the Meo clan, five by the Hill Lao, and one by the people of the Mekong River lowlands. Long Pot is the name of the district and also the name of the Meo village serving as district headquarters.

It was a three-day walk to Long Pot village from the nearest motor road. When I first arrived, I saw clusters of thatch and bamboo houses gripping the sides of a man-scraped ridge. The cries of small children scampering on the rust-colored clay mingled with the grunts and squeals of fat pigs rooting in the underbrush. It was a peaceful scene.

I was shown to the home of the district chief. He was a short, vigorous man in his late fifties, with a high forehead and the melancholy dignity of a senior statesman. Gair Su Yang wore loose black pants of traditional Meo cut and a U.S. military fatigue jacket; he wore no shoes.

According to Gair Su Yang, the first helicopter landed in Long Pot in 1960. The pilots were American, but a Meo officer climbed out to talk with him. The officer spoke of an alliance between the Americans and a Meo colonel of the Royal Lao Army named Vang Pao. He said that American officials had made a pact with Vang Pao; promising to build for the Meo their own army and independent state in the mountains. They guaranteed that the tribesman would not fall under the control of either faction of lowland Lao then girding for civil war. The officer painted a picture of future prosperity for the Meo. All they had to do was become anti-communist, helping the Americans to fight the Pathet Lao revolutionaries controlling sections of Laos' northern provinces.

One of the problems that the people of Long Pot had in accepting the deal was that they were not sure who Vang Pao was. But there was a more basic problem—though Gair Su Yang did not inform me of it until sometime later: "If we joined the alliance,

the Pathet Lao would have become our enemy and would have threatened our village. . . . I told him that Long Pot would not join Vang Pao and the Americans." According to Gair Su Yang, the officer then became angry and threatened that Vang Pao and the Americans considered those not friends to be enemies, and "enemy villages would be attacked and captured by Vang Pao's men."

"We couldn't do anything," Gair Su Yang later contended, pointing out that only fear of a helicopter-load of soldiers descending upon Long Pot forced him to accept involvement in the war venture.

By the end of 1960, every man in Long Pot village had received an M-1 rifle or carbine. Many had been flown to Long Cheng for three to four months' training by U. S. soldiers. (These were probably U. S. Special Forces, whom it was common to see in small up-country towns of Laos until 1968-69. Thereafter CIA "civilians" were used to train Vang Pao's army.) Long Pot's men were then given rank in irregular battalion 209.

Long Pot had been militarized in defense of "Meoland" nearly eight years when I first visited. It had not, however, gone to war. The M-1s were used for shooting squirrels and birds. Men, women, and children slashed, burned, and planted to reap harvests of rice, corn, and, of course, the opium poppy. Opium was the main cash crop, which from 1960 onwards had been bought by Meo soldiers and transported both by pony caravan and American-piloted Air America helicopters from Long Cheng.

October, 1970

During the summer of 1969, the Bureau of Public Roads, Laos Division (an arm of USAID), opened war-abandoned Route 13 with the royal capital at Luang Prabang. The new road put Long Pot only a half-day walk

from motor transport. A companion and myself traveled up Route 13 by motorcycle and walked the rest of the way to Long Pot village. As we arrived, 20 teenage boys in U. S. army uniforms, dragging M-1 carbines and rifles often too big for them, paced through mock-military maneuvers, periodically diving to the ground in a half-hearted manner that would have gotten them killed if bullets had really been flying. A few days earlier, they had returned by helicopter from Long Cheng. There, they said, U. S. soldiers had put them through three months of military training. Another helicopter would arrive that afternoon, they said, and take them off to Moung Soui district, about 30 miles to the northeast, where the Pathet Lao were in the midst of attacking and taking the town.

The boys' eyes revealed their fear and demoralization as they talked about the coming helicopter ride and their destination. And as we all waited, bombs could be heard peppering the hills in the distance, in the direction of Moung Soui. The bomb blasts,

though 15 to 20 miles away, shook the hill under our feet and shattered the young soldiers' nerve. Several mothers were crying as they fussed over their soldier-boys; lucky charms were stuffed into baggy pockets. District Chief Gair Su Yang was at the center of the gathering handing out new U. S. army uniforms, pep-talking his recruits. But Gair Su Yang's voice was flecked with anger and did nothing to ease the funereal atmosphere.

No, said every boy I asked, they didn't want to go to fight the Pathet Lao. They said their village headmen had chosen them; they must go. And they went. Early next morning, I ran out from breakfast in Gair Su Yang's house as a helicopter finally whooped-whooped in to land. "Air America" was clearly printed down the side of the silver and blue craft. Boys clambered aboard. The helicopter rose and swept away toward Moung Soui. In three swift trips, 20 village boys were gone. None ever saw home again—except for one. His body was returned for burial 12 months later.

Tong Ouie is a village of Hill Lao people about an hour's walk from Long Pot village. The Hill Lao are a less prosperous, less colorful race who share the mountains with the Meo. But such distinctions are obscured in khaki. Early in 1970, Long Cheng demanded men from Tong Ouie to boost the failing Meo forces. The headman recounted the story bitterly: he had first refused to send a single man up to Long Pot village to fill out the district's quota. "The Americans are crazy. So is Vang Pao. They send more and more men against the Pathet Lao each year and they all get killed. Why should our people fight and die for the Meo or the Americans?"

John Everingham is a reporter for Dispatch News Service, reporting from Laos, where he has been for the past three years.

Books

Bombs (Quietly, Please) Away!

BY NOAM CHOMSKY

VOICES FROM THE PLAIN OF JARS:

Life Under an Air War

compiled by Fred Bransman

Harper-Colophon, 160 pp., paperback \$1.95

On March 31, 1968, Lyndon Johnson ordered a partial bombing halt over North Vietnam. On the same day a cable to U.S. ambassadors stated that "air power now used north of 20th [parallel] can probably be used in Laos (where no policy change planned) and in SVN [South Vietnam]." One of the targets was the Plain of Jars, in northeastern Laos, which had been bombed intermittently since 1964 when it fell into the hands of the Pathet Lao.

In November 1968 negotiations began in Paris. The bombing of North Vietnam was temporarily halted, and again the bombers were shifted to South Vietnam and to Laos. Sixteen months later T. D. Allman, a correspondent for the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, reported that, in the judgment of observers, the "five-fold escalation of the U.S. bombing in Laos" was "the most significant development in the recent history of the Laotian war," and that it "convinced the North Vietnamese that they had to meet force with counter-force." The bombing was now primarily directed against settled areas. Villagers fled to forests and hills.

In mid-1969 infiltration fell off sharply along the trails. As air power was again released, strikes against Northern Laos were sharply accelerated. After massive bombardment the CIA mercenary army swept over the

Plain of Jars, murdering and pillaging. The remnants of the population were removed to the Vientiane Plain.

"In September 1969, after a recorded history of seven hundred years, the Plain of Jars disappeared." With these words Fred Bransman opens this searing account of the destruction of a peaceful society of 50,000 by a secret air war that was "aimed at the systematic destruction of the material basis of the civilian society," in the accurate phrase of a Belgian United Nations adviser.

Why? Speaking for the administration, former Ambassador William Sullivan has conceded in Senate testimony that the war in Northern Laos "has nothing to do with operations in South Vietnam or Cambodia." In earlier Senate testimony he had hinted at the primary motivation: Laos is being used as a buffer to protect the interests of the Thai elite, long the main support for American programs in Southeast Asia. The Pentagon Papers reveal that as early as 1954 Thailand had been designated by the National Security Council as the "focal point of U.S. covert and psychological operations in Southeast Asia." George Ball, then Undersecretary of State, in a memorandum of July 1, 1965, observed that "Securing the Mekong Valley will be critical in any long-run solution, whether by the partition of Laos with Thai-U.S. forces occupying the western half" or by some other arrangement. This remark foreshadows later developments: the economic integration of U.S.-domin-



ated areas of Laos with Thailand, and the introduction of Thai mercenaries, contrary to explicit Congressional directives. The destruction of the civilian society of Northern Laos was one element in these long-range plans.

There were, no doubt, other reasons for the air war against Northern Laos. Modern history attests, amply, the consequences of overwhelming power at the service of a fanatic ideology. American planners operated on the assumption that the U.S. position throughout the world might collapse if the forces of revolutionary nationalism in Indochina attained victory. In the Pentagon Papers there is no instance of any hesitation with regard to any military policy except in terms of the potential costs to the American planners and interests they represent, - one of these costs being popular revulsion. In Northern Laos the war was a carefully guarded secret, and the costs were minute. Correspondingly, the destruction was total. Flying over the Plain of Jars in 1971, T. D. Allman describes it as a deserted wasteland, "empty and ravaged, a striking example of what less than three years of intensive U.S. bombing can do to a rural area." The plain may be uninhabitable for decades because of the vast quantities of unexploded ordnance.

Furthermore, U.S. planners have always been concerned over the "ideological threat" of Asian communism—the threat, very simply, that it might work. The slow and patient steps of



Noam Chomsky is professor of linguistics at MIT. He has written extensively on American foreign policy and the Indochina war.

Seoul's Hired Guns

by James Otis

THE AMERICAN SOLDIERS who work with them in Vietnam speak respectfully of the "ROK Marines." Technically, ROK indicates their place of origin—the Republic of Korea (South Korea). But the Americans utter the term as if it were "Rock," and as though it referred to their physical conditioning and the state of their sensibilities: as soldiers they are brutal, licentious and they get results. Militarily, they are trusted by the American high command, which—in the current fighting—has assigned them the responsibility of keeping the vital An Khe Pass open and preventing South Vietnam from being split in half.

Some 37,000 of these troops are presently engaged in South Vietnam. Referred to pretentiously as "allies," their involvement is said to arise from ideological commitment to the cause of freedom, national self-interest, or some other self-serving platitude. In fact, they are latter-day Samurai, hired guns of the Orient, who have sold their services to Washington for the duration.

To be specific, the normal salary of a ROK army private is \$1.60 a month. But if that private elects to serve in Vietnam, he can earn 23 times that amount, or \$37.50 a month. In one day, he earns almost as much as he would have made in a whole month had he remained in his homeland—courtesy, to be sure, of the American taxpayer. The middleman of this operation is the government of South Korea, which receives a kickback of well over \$300 million per year for the service.

Such "allies" are to mercenaries what a "protective reaction raid" is to an unprovoked strike and what an "incursion" is to an invasion—namely, the same thing.

For some time now, persistent reports have linked these mercenary Koreans to brutalities in Vietnam which would make Rusty Calley blush. In June, the *Alternative Feature Service* (AFS), of Berkeley, California released a heretofore secret study by the RAND Corporation—enough—"Mention of Korean Troop

Activities in RAND Interviews," and thereby made public what the American government has known for at least six years. The 1966 document is replete with these stories of barbarity which Americans have learned how to take in and ignore:

• "When they came to the VC-controlled areas . . . they raped the women in those areas. There were times they killed the women after they had raped them. I heard just recently women were raped and killed. The people were so frightened of the Korean troops, they didn't dare to stay in their homes but moved away." (from a National Liberation Front deserter)

• "... only 50 villagers still lagged behind. Most of them were women, children and elderly people. The Korean soldiers rounded them up in one place. The people thought that they were to be evacuated to the GVN-controlled areas by helicopters. . . . The Koreans suddenly pointed their guns at the crowd and opened fire. Only two babies of two and three survived. They crawled on their mothers' bellies." (from a refugee)

• "... when the Korean troops came, they called all the old women and children down in the trenches to come up. Then these people were told to sit in circles. Afterward, the Korean troops machine-gunned them." (from an NLF prisoner)

• "Everybody agreed that the Koreans were barbarous. They went on operations without interpreters going along. They killed at random without distinguishing between the rights and wrongs. Some people said it was because the VC mixed themselves with the villagers, and thus the Koreans couldn't help making a mistake. I don't think their reasoning was right. I don't

see why the Koreans should kill the children. Kids of two, three, or even five or seven years weren't VC. They also burned the paddy and the people's houses. They burned the cow pens and the animals inside too. Cows are certainly not VC!" (from a refugee)

The introduction to the document notes that "no effort has been made to ascertain the veracity of the statements made by the interviewees." And AFS quotes former RAND analyst Melvin Gurtov as saying that the report was "a draft circulated for comments . . . as opposed to a published study." It would be a mistake to surmise, however, that this report outlines the full extent of the U.S. government's information about South Korean murders in Vietnam. On the contrary, American officials have received at least three other major reports on the subject.

On January 10, 1970, A. Terry Rambo, a graduate student at the University of Hawaii, told the *New York Times* that he had reported the extensive killing of civilians by South Korean troops to U.S. Army officers in Vietnam in 1966, but the information had been suppressed. Rambo and two colleagues, Jerry M. Tinker and John D. Lenoir, were researchers for Human Sciences Research (HSR), Inc., McLean, Virginia, on a refugee interview project for the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency.

Rambo took the atrocity information to American officials in Vietnam. He briefed a "group of ranking American officers in Saigon about the report." The result: Rambo was "ordered by a general officer of the MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] staff to cease investigating the Koreans—and no mention of it was to be made in our reports."

The Rambo team prepared two reports, one without atrocity information, one with it. This was done, according to Tinker, because they "knew that if our report contained anything about murders it would be classified

by TOM SCHUSTER

THE CIA'S WAR WITH RED CHINA AND OTHER ASIAN LANDS

THE OLD WORLD WAR TWO C-46 bounced and yawed in the violent turbulence as its twin engines strained to maintain 160 knots. Its American pilot gripped the controls with every ounce of strength he could muster, and his eyes ached from the strain of searching the darkness to avoid the towering Himalayan mountains on each side.

They'd taken off from a secret base over three hours ago and were threading their way east of the Tibetan capital of Lhasa, long occupied by the forces of Red China. Their mission: drop agents and supplies to a band of Tibetan guerrillas who were still fighting the Communists.

The copilot, sweating over the air chart in his lap, tried to guide them to the drop zone that a mysterious American "civilian" at their base had earlier described. "Hold your course," he yelled. "Another two minutes should put us right on."

The pilot reached up, flicking on the "get-ready" light to alert the Tibetan agents who'd be jumping, and the plane crew who would kick the supplies out. "Go!" he yelled and switched on the buzzer.

Just as the last chute opened, the old plane was suddenly rocked by deadly Communist 37mm antiaircraft fire and the pilot cursed to himself, "Goddam—

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bastards were waiting for us."

But he managed to drop down and contour fly the valley floors, below the Red radar, and just after dawn they landed back at their base. They climbed from the plane, their gray uniforms soaked through with sweat, and the pilot

muttered for the thousandth time, "There's gotta be an easier way to make a buck." The C-46 was ancient, but its skin had been polished to shine like a mirror. Back toward the tail were small blue letters that spelled out "Air America." The only other identifying marks were the fresh 37mm holes in the left wing panels.

Throughout Asia, people have come to recognize these strange aircraft and their even stranger American pilots. Especially the pilots. You learn to spot them wherever you are. They're the guys in the gray Air Force-type uniforms, crushed caps, cowboy boots, with pistols hanging at their sides. They can be found raising hell in the Suzy Wong section of Hong Kong or racing motor bikes along Tu Do Street in Saigon or joking with the girls at the Vieng Rattay Club in Vientiane.

They're the pilots of the cloak and dagger Air America, one of the world's least known airlines. Many are "old China hands" who first began flying for the "outfit" back when mainland China belonged to Chiang Kai-shek. They're the last of that breed known as soldiers of fortune, and these devil-may-care mercenaries will

continued

Laos: The Furtive War

by U.S. Senator
Stuart Symington

*The strange history
of a war—undeclared,
undisclosed, and largely
undiscussed—a war in which
U.S. involvement
continues to grow.*

The United States has been involved for more than a decade, in an undeclared and largely unnoticed war in northern Laos. From the beginning, and as of today, this war has been characterized by a degree of secrecy never before true of a major American involvement abroad in which many American lives have been lost and billions of American tax dollars spent.

A perversion of the processes of government has been going on, a perversion inimical to our democratic system and to the nation's future.

Who is responsible? The Constitution has been bypassed by a small group of men in various departments of the Executive Branch who, under the direction of four Presidents, initiated and carried out policies without any real Congressional knowledge and thus any true Congressional authorization. Needless to say, these policies were also carried out without the knowledge and approval of the American people, on whose consent our government is supposed to rest.

The war in northern Laos, in which the United States has been a principal party, has been pursued without a declaration of war by the Congress. Moreover, in the past few years, the U.S. government has financed Thai troops fighting in northern Laos despite a clear legislative prohibition against such activity.

It has been possible for successive administrations to ignore the normal processes of government because, until recently, the Executive Branch has succeeded in concealing from the people and the Congress the true facts of our involvement in this little country. As long as Congress and the people did not know what the United States was doing, as long as there was no public debate on the issues involved, Executive Branch policy-makers were free to do as they pleased without having to explain or justify their actions. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State under President Eisenhower and an arch proponent of the Domino Theory, considered Laos a key domino that then stood between China and North Vietnam on the Communist side and Thailand, Cambodia, and South Vietnam on the free world side.

By an exchange of diplomatic notes in July 1955, the U.S. and the Royal Government of Laos called for economic cooperation and the defense of the Kingdom of Laos. During the late Fifties, U.S. aid to Laos was running \$40-million a year, and 80 per cent of that went to

the support of the Royal Laotian Army.

To guide the Lao Army, the State Department organized an incognito American military mission with headquarters in Vientiane. This group was attached to the U.S. Operations Mission, or more popularly, the PEO. Its members were called technicians and wore civilian clothes. At its head was an equally disguised American general. When the general assumed command of this force his name was erased from the list of active American army officers.

Thus for many years this war was a well-kept secret. When John F. Kennedy became President in 1961, there were 700 American military personnel in Laos as well as 500 Soviet operatives whose mission was to provide logistic support to local Communist forces. These forces included at least 10,000 North Vietnamese.

Soon thereafter, the military position of Royal Lao government forces began to deteriorate whereupon President Kennedy and the Soviet and Chinese leaders entered into negotiations that led to a conference in Geneva. The Geneva Convention recessed when President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev met in Vienna and produced a joint statement on Laos in which both parties assured the neutrality and independence of Laos and "recognized the importance of an effective cease fire." In July, what became known as the Geneva agreements of 1962 were signed.

THE GENEVA Agreements prohibited Laos from joining any military alliances, including SEATO, banned the introduction of foreign military personnel and civilians performing quasi-military functions (with the exception of a small French training mission), and forbade the establishment of any foreign military installation in Laos.

After these agreements were signed, the United States and the Soviet Union withdrew their military personnel. The North Vietnamese, however, failed to withdraw most of their forces and advisers.

In the fall of 1962, because of the continuous presence of the North Vietnamese in Laos, the United States agreed to provide Souvanna Phouma, the Prime Minister and leader of the Neutralist faction in the tripartite government, with limited amounts of military equipment as permitted by the Geneva Agreements.

In 1962 the United States began, through the CIA, to support a force of Lao irregulars on the theory that it would be possible to deny officially that the Geneva Agreements were being violated.

In the instrument for waging what became a full-scale war was, in my view, a clear perversion

Stuart Symington, a Democrat, is the senior senator from Missouri, and the only senator on the Armed Services, Foreign Relations
in Massachusetts, he has been in the Senate for twenty years.

3
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Soldiers of Fortune— A Vanishing Breed

The trade of a mercenary—a hired soldier—isn't what it used to be, according to Joe Maggio.

Mr. Maggio, who's been out of the business more than seven years (ever since the war in the Congo between Joseph Mobuto and Moise Tshombe), says pessimistically that there doesn't seem to be much call nowadays for soldiers of fortune.

"Back in the Congo days you could walk into the Memling Hotel or the Purple Cow Bar in Leopoldville and wind up with a well-paying fighting job," says Joe with a trace of nostalgia. "Today it's gotten much tougher."

Maggio says he has done most of his own free-lance fighting on behalf of the CIA which, he claims, has freely employed mercenaries in the past. Working on contract as a CIA "adviser," he has seen service in the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, in Laos, Thailand and elsewhere. He has just written a novel based on his experiences called *Company Man*, published by Putnam. The title alludes to the CIA which, Maggio says, is known among mercenaries as "The Company."

Maggio got his credentials for mercenary work by serving a three-year

hitch in the Marines after dropping out of military college.

"People become mercenaries for two reasons," he explains. "Either they're attracted by the romance of the idea, or they're trying to get away from something. With me it was the romance. I thought the most adventurous life possible was that of a soldier of fortune."




Photo of a soldier of fortune: Maggio ready for jump into Vietnam in 1963.

Maggio claims that he doesn't share the feeling of many mercenaries that it doesn't matter whom you're fighting for as long as the pay is good. "Some mercenaries have a mentality that says: 'For \$500 I'll kill this guy.' I never felt like that. My idea was to be on the right side. Like in the Bay of Pigs, we thought we were right. We also never doubted that we'd win, with the whole weight of the U.S. supposedly behind us."

Maggio, a 34-year-old native of Atlantic City, N.J., who now makes his home on a schooner in Nassau, says that the best mercenary force in the world still is the fabled French Foreign Legion, which numbers around 8000 men and is stationed mostly in Southern France. Belgians and Scotsmen, he claims, make particularly good mercenaries.

Pay is good

For most mercenaries, he admits, the big attraction still is the money. "A free-lance infantryman makes up to \$1200 a month," he says, "and a pilot as much as \$2600. That's tax-free, of course—you don't get W-2 forms when you're a mercenary. And you also keep all you can steal."

Maggio says that the quality of mercenaries isn't as high as it used to be.

"There were about 3000 soldiers and 500 officers in the Congo," he recalls. "The officers were pretty good material but there were plenty of alcoholics, deviates and bums among the troops. I saw some guys there that were in the Bay of Pigs operation, too."

Maggio ascribes the current lack of mercenary opportunities to a UN crack-down on hired armies following events in the Congo. But despite the present lack of openings, Maggio says there still are plenty of would-be mercenaries ready for action. However, he can't recommend it as a likely career, especially for youngsters ready to run away from home in search of adventure.

Experience necessary

"You really have to have a good background as a soldier and the papers to prove it," he says. "There's an office in Paris that keeps a kind of register of available mercenaries. I don't know just where it's located right now, but if I went over there to the neighborhood of the Boulevard St.-Michel and the Rue St.-Jacques I could find it in no time. You can go there and apply, but they want credentials on your military record—they're interested only in true professionals. If they do get you a job, they keep 30 percent of your pay for six months."

"But there just doesn't seem to be any market for mercenaries any more. The profession is dying out. I can see why, but it's too bad for a lot of guys who were men left behind by time and could only find themselves in this kind of life. I know that there are lots of people who'll say 'good riddance,' but for me there's a kind of sadness in it, too."

H.K.

PARADE • AUGUST 27, 1972

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
OUR MAN IN WASHINGTON

A joint report recently released by the CIA, the State Department, and the Defense Department has admitted that "there is no prospect" of halting the smuggling of narcotics by air and sea from Southeast Asia into the United States "under any conditions that can realistically be projected."

This shocking admission contradicts the Nixon Administration's optimism with respect to its war against the illicit entry of opiates into the United States. In appalling frankness, this high-level report revealed the futility of stemming the influx of narcotics until the "allied" nations of Southeast Asia restrict the growth transportation, and refining of the opium plant. While the governments of South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand are openly stating their willingness to continue to cooperate with American officials in stamping out the opium traffic, the fact is that opium traffic has become ingrained in the economic fabric of these countries to such an extent that the Asian authorities approach the enforcement of their anti-smuggling laws with a grin and a wink.

Yet the U.S. taxpayer, in his commitment to subsidize the governments of these impoverished nations, is indirectly supporting authorities in countries where the smuggling is widespread. Eighty to ninety percent of the opium traffic from the Orient is estimated to travel through Thailand, yet known refineries, says the report, dot the shore of this nation around the Gulf of Siam providing easy access to the trawlers which transport the refined opiates to Hong Kong and then point east, or to European ports.

While much is said about Turkey as a farmland for opium, the Asian nations of Thailand, Laos, and South Vietnam provide a substantial share of the plant which infects the lives



Mr. Anderson

of so many Americans. Furthermore, American money has much more to say about what happens in these Asian nations which are so economically dependent upon American support. Nevertheless, although the CIA knows about the location of the opium fields, and although the CIA knows about the paramilitary Nationalist Chinese units which transport the opium through Thailand, and although the CIA constantly monitors the shipment of heroin out of the Thai ports, these governments ironically seem totally unable to stem the flow.

Needless to say, there must be many an American on the payroll of these smuggling organizations. Needless to say, there are dazzling profits to be reaped in this illegal business where the demand is incessant and where there are no taxes to pay. Needless to say, this admission by such a high level of American federal agencies is an alarming revelation of the weakness of a free nation which prides itself on the glories of entrepreneurship. Certainly, this is not the type of unbridled capitalism which is urging these Asian nations to maintain.

25 AUG 1972

STATINTL

Lao Unit Bids To Take, Hold Plain of Jars

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Aug. 24—American-supported commando forces have parachuted deep behind enemy lines in Northern Laos in an effort to recapture and hold the Plain of Jars, field reports said today.

About 100 commandos were dropped into an area 40 miles northeast of Long Cheng Monday night in an attempt to cut the supply route from North Vietnam to the Communist forces in Northern Laos.

This was the first use of parachutists in Laos in recent memory and appears to underscore the determination of Gen. Vang Pao, commander of the Lao irregular forces, and his CIA advisers to recapture and this year hold the Plain of Jars, about 100 miles North of Vientiane.

Almost exactly one year ago, Gen. Vang Pao's forces advanced from Long Cheng onto the Plain of Jars, but they failed to capture and occupy its northeast corner and the mountains to the east before the end of the rainy season.

As a result, North Vietnamese forces were able to mass virtually unopposed within easy range of the plain. And when communist forces hit at the beginning of the dry season last December, they swept Gen. Vang Pao's forces off the plain in less than three days.

By the time the communist offensive had run its course,

the North Vietnamese were in Long Cheng Valley, 40 miles to the southwest off the opposite side of the Plain of Jars, and for the next three months, communist artillery laid siege to Long Cheng with devastating effect.

This year, however, Gen. Vang Pao has augmented his rainy season offensive with airborne troops.

Communist successes during the last dry season, however, changed the strategic picture radically in Northern Laos. No longer are North Vietnamese troops forced to wade through a powerful defensive ring around Long Cheng to get at the heart of Northern Laos' defenses. They are still within easy striking distance of Long Cheng.

It is that presence that alters the strategic picture.

With his best troops now 20 to 40 miles outside Long Cheng, Gen. Vang Pao has a lot riding on this bid to relieve Communist pressure on Long Cheng and the entire northern front.

If the gamble pays off and his forces can recapture and hold the Plain of Jars through the coming dry season and hold Long Cheng, it could hearten the entire Lao army and have an effect on peace talks now in their preliminary stages.

If the gamble fails, the entire defenses of Northern Laos will have to be reestablished elsewhere.

CIA Awakens Sleepy Laotian Village

VANG VIENG, Laos — (AP) — Until late July, Vang Vieng was a sleepy mountain village in North-Central Laos. But now the Americans have arrived and have established it as a major logistics center for the Central Intelligence Agency.

The military organization here will be supporting Lao-Lian irregulars including Gen. Vang Pao's Mee army, officials here said.

Vang Vieng is on Highway 13, 67 miles north of Vientiane, and has about 2,000 residents.

The move to Vang Vieng culminates a series of responses to intense and continued North Vietnamese pressure on the former logistics and operations base at Long Cheng, the CIA base 70 miles northeast of Vientiane.

Long Cheng had come under a heavy North Vietnamese attack in January. For the first time, the North Vietnamese breached ridge-line defenses that protected the Long Cheng Valley and a vital air strip.

Because of the situation around Long Cheng, a base

at Ban Xon was maintained until early July, when heavy flooding destroyed most of the logistics center.

Vang Vieng airport, next to the village's main street, is now undergoing radical changes with the arrival of the Americans. The dirt air strip is receiving an all-weather surface, and office buildings and warehouses

are being built besides the airstrip. The entire area is

being enclosed with a chain-link fence.

AUG 21 1972

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Misdirections in War on Drugs

There have been only a few brave individuals in Congress willing to take on the whole of the Nixon Administration's war on international drug trafficking.

The reasons are obvious. No one in his right mind wants to be placed in the category of being pro-heroin, and on the surface, the opposition of Rep. Robert Steele, R-Conn., and a few others would appear to be a misjudgment. In addition, the complexities of the traffic are so great that one has to know his facts before venturing any opinion; those who couldn't even follow the plot line of "The French Connection" would be totally lost after one pass at the real world of drug trade.

But the opposition has some good points, and it turns out that Rep. Steele and the others are not, after all, suggesting that addiction can be fun. What they are suggesting is that the administration's 18-month-old drug trade abatement program may be both self-defeating and aimed in the wrong direction, toward European labs and Turkish sources.

It is self-defeating, some of the critics say, because if the flow of heroin into this country is appreciably slowed, it will only guarantee that the price for the commodity will rise and that a price rise, in turn, will cause more drug-related crimes.

There is no answer to this objection except the British system of drug-maintenance for addicts. A law professor at Stanford, Herbert Packer, maintains that decriminalization of heroin and related activities would dry up the tremendous profits in drugs overnight. That may be an exaggeration; but the British solution would make such trade and sales less profitable. However, the strain of Puritanism

in America, which would equate such a drug maintenance program as trafficking with the Devil, runs strong enough to make prospects for such a program dim for the foreseeable future.

The second charge—that the U.S. program is misdirected, is based on the contention that the Nixon efforts are largely overlooking the tremendous role of Southeast Asia in the international heroin picture. Alfred McCoy, a student of Southeast Asian history at Yale, makes the case (in a book excerpted in Harper's magazine) that the greatest potential source of heroin is the "Golden Triangle" of Burma, Thailand and Laos. He claims, also, that the CIA, in its long struggle to organize the tribesmen of Laos in a counter-insurgency war, has provided the logistics for vastly increased heroin traffic and has refused to admit the terrible implications of that traffic because some of its most important "clients" are making profit from that traffic.

The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has admitted, belatedly, that there is some truth in the McCoy argument. In a recent secret report that leaked out, the agency says that the Southeast Asian heroin sources are larger than previously thought and that there is evidence that the potential of the "Golden Triangle" is not being lost on organized crime. That area has produced as much as 70 per cent of the annual production of opium, the source of heroin; and if the CIA continues to build airfields and prop up corrupt local generals, production might even increase.

The administration should be listening to the voices of dissent. Drug trafficking, like prostitution, is not so much rooted out as temporarily inconvenienced. If the demand continues, the administration had better face up to some of the real problems of pinched supply.

A Correspondence with

Alfred W. McCoy

I

On June 1 of this year an official of the US Central Intelligence Agency paid a visit to the New York offices of my publisher, Harper and Row, Inc. This CIA official was Mr. Cord Meyer, Jr. (now the CIA's Assistant Deputy Director of Plans; formerly the CIA official in charge of providing covert financial subsidies for organizations such as the National Student Association, *Encounter* Magazine, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom).¹ Mr. Meyer urged several of his old friends among Harper and Row's senior management to provide him with a copy of the galley proofs of my history of the international narcotics traffic, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*. In this book I show the complicity of various US agencies—particularly the CIA and the State Department—in organizing the Southeast Asian drug traffic since the early 1950s.

Mr. Meyer presented one of Harper and Row's senior editors with some documents giving the CIA's view on the Southeast Asian drug traffic. His manner was grave. He said, "You wouldn't want to publish a book that would be full of inaccuracies, embarrass the United States government, or get you involved in libel suits, would you?"

Harper and Row's management promised to consider Mr. Meyer's request and summoned me from Washington, DC, where I was then testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee on my findings after eighteen months of research into the Southeast Asian drug traffic. This research included more than 250 interviews with heroin dealers, police officials, and intelligence agents in Europe and Asia.

At a meeting in New York on the afternoon of June 8, Harper and Row's president, Mr. Winthrop Knowlton, and its senior vice president, Mr. B. Brooks Thomas, told me that they had decided to provide the CIA with a copy of the galley proofs prior to publication for the following reasons:

First, the CIA would be less likely to seek a temporary court injunction barring publication of the book if the Agency were given a chance to persuade itself that national security was in no way endangered by portions of my book; and secondly, Harper and Row felt that a responsible publisher should have enough confidence in the veracity of any of its particularly controversial books to show them to any reputable critic for comment prior to publication.

At first I disagreed strongly with Harper and Row's decision, arguing that submitting

the galley proofs to the CIA could set a dangerous precedent and ultimately weaken First Amendment guarantees concerning freedom of the press. Moreover, in view of what I had learned of the CIA's operating methods in Southeast Asia I was convinced that the Agency was capable of using unethical means—such as coercing my sources into retracting statements they had made to me about US complicity in the international narcotics traffic—in order to induce Harper and Row to withdraw the book from publication.

After a week of negotiations, however, Harper and Row told me that they would not be willing to publish the book unless I agreed to submit the manuscript to the CIA. Faced with what I believed would be lengthy delays if I took the book to another publisher and the prospect of losing my Harper and Row editor, Elisabeth Jakob, with whom I had worked

closely, I capitulated. Thus began more than two months of lengthy negotiations between the CIA, Harper and Row, and myself. Most of what happened during these elaborate negotiations is in the correspondence reprinted below. I have added introductory notes to explain some of the attending circumstances.

Considered collectively, this exchange of letters provides us with another important reminder—perhaps the first since the National Student Association scandals of 1967—of the contempt this most clandestine of our governmental agencies has for the integrity of the press and publishing industry. As the CIA's letter of July 28, 1972, shows, it was unable to rebut effectively my analysis of its role in the international heroin traffic during the last quarter century. Since the CIA simply had no plausible defense against this charge, it tried to impose prior censorship in order to avoid public scrutiny of its record. If it was not already clear, it now should be obvious to publishers that the Agency cannot be regarded as a responsible critic when its public image is seriously threatened by what is written about it.

II

1 In this letter, written after Cord Meyer, Jr.'s visit, Harper and Row asked the CIA for official confirmation of their interest in seeing the book. Since the CIA had never before been quite so willing to defend itself publicly, neither Harper and Row nor

and Row by stating categorically that it could rebut all my charges about its complicity in the international narcotics traffic. We were surprised, however, that the CIA made no reference to "national security" as one of its concerns in requesting to review the manuscript. Rather, the Agency made its request purely on grounds of government privilege.

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

5 July 1972

Mr. B. Brooks Thomas
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.

Dear Mr. Thomas:

Mr. Cord Meyer has asked me to respond to your letter to him of June 30th in connection with the book, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, by Alfred W. McCoy.

As you are no doubt aware, Mr. McCoy testified on 2 June 1972 before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee. His testimony included allegations concerning support of the international opium traffic by U. S. agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, and numerous other allegations concerning participation in the opium traffic by both Americans and local personnel in Southeast Asia.

In the light of the pernicious nature of the drug traffic, allegations concerning involvement of the U. S. Government therein or the participation of American citizens should be based only on hard evidence. It is our belief that no reputable

Continued.

21 AUG. 1972

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Sparks or Sputters?

A Washington drawing room was the scene last year of an unlikely encounter between poet Allen Ginsberg and Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The subject of the post-poetry-reading confrontation was opium—and Ginsberg insisted that the CIA was deeply involved in shipping it around Southeast Asia. So totally false did Helms consider the accusation that he agreed to a fascinating bet with the poet: Helms promised that he would sit down for an hour of meditation each day for the rest of his life if the charges were proved correct.

The same accusations—true or not—boiled again last week. This time, the


from guerrillas to government officials, are so deeply involved—the CIA not only overlooks their dealings, but sometimes even helps them transport opium and heroin. Soon afterward, the CIA's general counsel, Lawrence Houston, wrote to Harper & Row: "We believe we cannot stand by and see baseless criticism . . . without trying to set the record straight."

After considerable deliberation, Harper & Row sent the agency a set of galleys. Seven days later, the CIA weighed in with a lengthy critique—which Harper & Row editors judged rather light. B. Brooks Thomas, vice president and general counsel of the publishing house, then replied to Houston: "We believe the best service we can render the author, the CIA and the general public is to

up their own minds. "I had hoped that my work would be interesting enough to spark a public debate," he says. "Now the CIA, by attempting to suppress the book, has itself sparked the debate." Still, there is no indication that CIA director Helms has been convinced by the book's charges; he has not disclosed any plans to begin daily meditations.



John Everingham—DNSI



Robert R. McCoy—Newsweek

McCoy interviewing Laotians, and his provocative book

CIA, which almost never takes a public stand on any issue, clashed with the respected publishing firm of Harper & Row. At issue is a book—"The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia"—in which author Alfred W. McCoy presents a heavily documented argument that the CIA has assisted in the flow of opium and its by-product, heroin. The CIA challenged the book before publication, and Harper & Row reluctantly allowed the agency to peruse the galleys. Then, despite a list of objections specified by the CIA, Harper & Row announced that it was satisfied that the book was sound and would publish it this week—a month ahead of schedule.

McCoy, a 26-year-old Yale graduate student, first made his accusations during Congressional testimony in June. McCoy charged that because drug traffic is such a local custom in Asia—and U.S. allies,

publish the book as expeditiously as possible, and that is what we intend to do." Privately, the Harper & Row lawyer commented, "We were underwhelmed by their criticism."

Why did the CIA—usually the most silent of government agencies—take on Harper & Row so publicly? One agency insider observed that McCoy's charges had been made before—mostly in underground or fringe publications. "But what I think has got the backs up around here," he suggested, "is that the charges are now showing up in Harper's magazine and in a Harper & Row book. That is hitting where these people live," he said, gesturing around him at CIA headquarters. "These are people with vast contacts in the academic community and government. They can't let this ridiculous falsehood be accepted as fact."

McCoy is content to let readers make

STATINTL

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Smuggling? Yes; collusion? No

Despite its full commitment to the fight against the narcotics trade, the CIA runs into continual accusations of engaging in the traffic itself.

The accusations center around Air America, an airline operating in Vietnam and Laos and into the "Golden Triangle" where 70 per cent of the world's illicit opium is produced.

It is an open secret that Air America was covertly established by the U.S. government to provide safe and adequate air services in a part of the world where commercial carriers provided neither.

The capital to start it was funneled through the CIA, which still serves as a funding mechanism for operating costs, but it is a semi-autonomous organization whose employees are all civilians under contract to the airline and not to the CIA or the U.S. government.

AIR AMERICA RUNS scheduled flights throughout Vietnam and Laos, and it is used by all manner of passengers with official travel orders.

In Laos, it is also used on a charter basis to support the irregular war effort against the North Vietnamese, transporting supplies, equipment and food as well as advisers and the Meo tribesmen and their families from hilltop airstrip to hilltop airstrip.

Throughout the "Golden Triangle" — which is beyond all formal administration, no matter what the lines on the map say — no currency has much value, and raw opium serves as the basis of what passes for an economy.

The CIA does not and never has paid its assets in it and does not and never has dealt in it. The tribesmen with whom the CIA works, however, do deal in it, and raw opium in small amounts has undoubtedly moved on Air America flights in the bundles of Meo personal possessions.

AIR AMERICA WILL stop this when it can, but it isn't easy. No U.S. airline, for example, has yet discovered how to prevent even shotguns from being smuggled aboard their flights. The problem is in any event inconsequential, since the amounts are small and des-

tinued for use only as currency in Meo village barter.

Far more serious is the problem of ranking Laotian diplomats and military notables who smuggle large quantities of opium and heroin out of Laos and into the world market.

The diplomats are immune to search when they travel, and an Air America employee — a resident alien in Laos — would be on a sticky wicket if he tried to search the luggage of a senior Laotian official in Laos itself.

The responsibility, moreover, is not that of the airline but of the customs service in the country of arrival. Here again, diplomatic luggage is immune to search, as are certain official aircraft used by the military, and a country that insists on an illegal search had better find what it is looking for.

THE JULY HARPER'S magazine features an extract from the forthcoming book "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," by Yale Ph.D. student Alfred McCoy. The extract starts with a detailed description of the arrival at Orly Airport in Paris on 25 April 1971 of Prince Sopsaisana, the new Laotian ambassador to France.

Despite the presence of a large reception party, the prince insisted on waiting for his numerous official suitcases like an ordinary tourist, and when they arrived he at once noticed one was missing. He angrily demanded that it be produced, but was forced to depart with the promise that it would be delivered to the Laotian embassy as soon as it was found.

The suitcase contained 132 pounds of pure heroin. France refused to accept Sopsaisana's credentials, and he had to return to Laos.

The gist of McCoy's article is that the drug trade in the "Golden Triangle" flourishes with CIA support. His argument runs:

- All the leading figures in Laos are deeply involved in the drug trade.

- The CIA works closely with many of these figures.

- Ergo, the CIA is supporting the drug trade.

While the first two statements are correct, the conclusion is not valid and is not borne out by any evidence.

McCoy might, for example, have asked who tipped the French government off to this particular shipment. Customs officials do not take it upon themselves to search an ambassador's luggage. Authority for that can only come from the highest levels, and takes days to arrange.

The Orly officials, moreover, knew precisely which suitcase to sequester. They removed the right piece of luggage and let the rest go in a matter of minutes, obviously before there had been any chance to search all of them. In short they had heard from Vietnamese exactly what to look for, and this tip did not come from the Laotian government.

The U.S. government, through the State Department and the CIA, is doing all it can to scotch the trade. The government of South Vietnam has had impressed on it that collusion between its customs officials and arriving smugglers is a serious matter, and it has arrested both its own citizens and halted and searched ranking foreigners.

In short, neither the CIA nor any other U.S. agency has ever deliberately engaged in, fostered or cast a deliberately blind eye on narcotics smuggling, although it has worked in other fields with officials who have been privately active in that one.

Raw opium has undoubtedly been transported on Air America flights in the past, but only as a private venture of a foreign passenger, and never with the connivance of an Air America employee. And the CIA has done what it can to prevent the use of Air America for such purposes.

The stories will no doubt continue, as long as there is a need for air services in Indochina, and as long as opium holds the peculiar place it does in the economy of that part of the world. But the stories must be seen in perspective, and in no way will they support the contention that the U.S. government, through the activities of the CIA, has deliberately furthered the international narcotics trade.

Miamian's Novel Is Blood, Guts In Pulp Manner

COMPANY MAN, by Joe Maggio; G.P. Putnam; \$5.95.

Reviewed by LAWRENCE MAHONEY

About the most accurate appraisal of this first novel is to call it an expanded version of the men's blood and guts fiction that appears in stag-

pulp magazines. That essentially is what Miamian Joe Maggio has done.

The publisher touts it as a powerful novel of modern warfare, a rival to Robin Moore's "The Green Berets" of a few years back. Heady adventure stuff, but it doesn't measure up.

MUCH of the book is set in Miami, Coconut Grove to be exact. Maggio has long played the soldier-of-fortune there and the book's Nick Martin doubtlessly is based on himself.

The paragraphs of this book are stuffed to overflowing with military abbreviations. This doesn't help Maggio's chopped style either and he has a lot to learn about dialogue.

It is quite easy to write such fiction about the Central Intelligence Agency because the truth about that superspy "company" is so hard to come by.

MAGGIO'S story line centers on Nick Martin, a Hemingway-type hero, a maverick who finds himself in the contract employment of the CIA in Miami and Guatemala during the buildup for the Bay of Pigs episode.

Specifically, he is employed by something called SOD (Special Operating Division), a paramilitary group used to do the CIA's dirtiest work. After the abortive Cuba invasion, Martin finds himself in a variety of other difficult spots.

It is in the cockpit of Indochina that Martin finds himself disillusioned with the "Company" because of a series of gory missions, including one which devastated the fishing villages of North Vietnam and triggered the Tonkin Gulf incident and ultimately the Tonkin Resolution which plunged the U.S. headlong into the Vietnamese Civil War.

IT IS IN Laos near the North Viet border that Martin crosses up his superiors and finds himself arrested for crossing the border to rescue tribesmen he had trained and sent over.

The book ends with a totally disillusioned hero leaving "the Company" for a local mercenary force in the Congo, where he becomes a true mercenary, risking his life in combat only for money, with no concern for cause.

If Maggio's book is based on fact, which the publisher claims it is, then the CIA training and operations are even more weird and unchecked than Americans have had reason to believe before.

Lawrence Mahoney is a Herald staff writer.

STATINTL

QUINCY, MASS.
PATRIOT LEDGER

AUG 19 1972
E - 65,785

GLOBAL CONNECTION

Two U.S. government reports released this week show the size and complexity of the drug problem and point to some gloomy conclusions about the effectiveness of attempts to control it.

A "World Opium Survey, 1972," put together by the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, Bureau of Narcotics, Customs Bureau and Treasury, found that the international heroin market, controlled by international criminal "cartels," continued to have enough heroin to supply the world's users despite increasing crackdowns and seizures. A minimum of 200 tons of opium (from which heroin is refined) were estimated on the world market in 1971; in the same year, about one-tenth of that amount was seized by law-enforcement agencies world wide. This year, seizures are running somewhat higher than last year.

The report estimated that 100 kilograms of heroin, representing an investment of less than \$300,000 to the French Corsicans who control the European trade, would ultimately sell for \$22 million on the streets of New York.

Although efforts are under way to control the growing of the opium poppy, notably in Turkey, the report said those efforts are unlikely to be successful in various areas unless accompanied by "serious changes in a number of long-standing social and economic traditions."

An illustration of the complexities involved in the opium trade is the case of the Meo hill tribes-

men of Laos. The Meo tribesmen have been an important force in the U.S. effort to support the Laotian government in its war with the Communists. On the other hand, the principal cash crop of the Meo is the opium poppy.

The other report this week was on an investigation by the Government Accounting Office of drug abuse control programs in the U.S. military services. The report found that although the Defense Department has actively cooperated in the enforcement of laws against drug trafficking, there is no way of telling whether its drug education programs are effective.

The study suggested that enforcement crackdowns may have contributed to the replacement in the drug trade of marijuana, which is bulky and easily detected by smell, by more dangerous drugs such as heroin.

And, said the report, military programs offering exemptions from prosecution for drug users who voluntarily turned themselves in for treatment had resulted largely in confusion, distrust and resentment among both troops and their immediate superiors. Further, said the accounting office, rehabilitation programs for drug users have met with very limited success.

The conclusions to be drawn are as familiar as they are cheerless: the drug problem is a reflection of deep and complex problems in the modern world, and most of our attempts to deal with it to date have been hasty, shallow and insufficient.

Free (drug) enterprise

Perusal of news dispatches about the Federal "World Opium Survey 1972" discloses several deficiencies in the report.

It does not deal with the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in conspiring in the opium traffic in the "golden triangle" in Burma, Thailand, and Laos. That CIA role is dealt with in detail in Alfred W. McCoy's "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," published yesterday by Harper & Row.

The Survey is, thus, a coverup for the CIA's drug operations.

The Survey does not deal with the drug traffic in Saigon where several of President Thieu's generals are major operators. That traffic has been protected by the U.S. command. One consequence has been the massive drug addiction among GIs, addiction which has returned to the U.S. with them.

The Survey reveals one useful consequence of President Nixon's visit to Peking. For years the U.S. Narcotics Bureau, and Harry Anslinger, its chief, carried on a slanderous war against the Peoples Republic of China as the main source of the world's opium traffic. The present report admits, in effect, that that was a lie. There is "no reliable evidence that China has either engaged in or sanctioned the illicit export of opium or its derivatives," it says.

The Survey concedes that, world-wide, government "seizures... represent only a small fraction of the illicit flow."

The obvious conclusion is that the flow of opium through the capitalist world is made possible by massive corruption of government officials, police agents, etc.

The inspiration for the massive business in opium is the same one that inspires other business — profit. In this respect, it is a shining example of "free enterprise."

14 Aug 1972

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Out in the shadow of the american embassy in Saigon

Editor's note. — *The Nixon administration has been striving to foster the Nguyen Van Thieu regime as a tool for the "Vietnamization" of the war. But no glossy veneer can hide the latter's nature as a traitorous clique, a gang of robbers trading in prostitutes, drugs and war means, a band of political speculators, black-marketeers and embezzlers who have been plundering "aid" funds and the salaries and wages of their own civil servants and soldiers — all this under American protection. The following inquiry by Thanh Nam exposes part of this corrupt and rotten US-puppet regime.*

STATINTL

SAIAGON, in early 1972.

Tens of thousands of Honda and Suzuki motorbikes and Mercedes and Datsun sedans of every colour and hue rush along, belching clouds of exhaust fumes which ruin the foliage and flowers of the trees lining the streets.

The 3.6 million people of Saigon live crowded in eleven districts. High-rise US-style buildings of nine, ten, eleven storeys tower insolently in Dong Khanh and Nguyen Hue avenues while along muddy and refuse-strewn alleys in workers' quarters at Chuong Duong, Binh Dong and Cholon whole families are crammed into shanties of thatch, tin and card-board.

The number of Americans in military uniform has decreased a great deal. More and more snack-bars, Turkish-bath establishments and massage parlors catering to the American soldiery are closing down. American military police continue to stalk about, but in dwindling numbers.

And yet, while the war is being "Vietnamized," the American presence remains intact, overwhelming, in this city. It seems to have grown even heavier, more stifling. The scream of American jets keeps coming from the Tan Son Nhut airfield. Crowds of American civilians and air force officers continue to throng Tu Do boulevard. The American hand, the tricks of old Bunker, the desperate moves of President Nixon to avoid checkmate, as well as the histrionics of Thieu, Huong, Kieu and Co. are still daily topics of discussion for the Saigonese. People talk about the fiasco staring Nixon in the face, the inevitable departure of Nguyen Van Thieu, the collapse of "Vietnamization." For the last seven or eight years, the Saigonese people have had their ears full of the "lofty mission of the Americans" in this country and the "stability" of the "Second Republic." More and more clearly, the truth is appearing to them.

The fortress in the city

Everyone in Saigon knows about the new American fortress embassy, Bunker's residence. The old embassy at the corner of Ham Nghi and Vo Di Nguy streets now serves only for the reception of ordinary visitors and the delivery of passports and visas. The new embassy is white-painted and six storeys high, with a helicopter landing strip on its terrace roof; where a chopper and its pilot are standing by at all hours of the day and night. The box-shaped building is set back some distance from the street, surrounded by a solid ferro-concrete wall, equipped with air-conditioners, electronic computers and a hot telephone line linking it to the White House in Washington,

and defended by machinegun nests. It is served by a power-house in the backyard. Military police stand guard day and night. The Americans boast that all building materials came from the United States and that plans were drawn and construction supervised by a renowned American military engineer, at the cost of 2.25 million dollars. In early 1971, in an interview with a French journalist, Bunker bragged about the solidity of this "White House" on the eastern shore of the Pacific. The unimpressed Frenchman replied with a wry smile: "Mr Ambassador, in my opinion, the fortress style of the embassy building suits your name rather than ambassadorial functions." Bunker's face showed that he was not amused by the play on word. In fact, Bunker was no ordinary ambassador and the unusual style of his residence indeed fits his unusual assignment.

Bunker has been in Saigon for six consecutive years. His is the most difficult and dangerous job ever held by an American diplomat in any period of American history. Political circles in Saigon are rife with stories and rumours about the man and the policies he has been pursuing. In spite of his 75 years, Bunker is very fastidious about his clothes, and the expensive *eau de Cologne* he uses vary according to the season and the occasion. He has been, before his appointment to Saigon, ambassador to Argentina, Italy, India and Nepal.

The American press considers him as a skilful trouble-shooter who shows cold toughness not only to his adversaries but also to his allies. Saigon politicians nickname him The Old Fridge, while the Saigon press has dubbed him the Proconsul. His business is to pull the strings on which Nguyen Van Thieu dances, and he seems to perform it well. Even when the going is hard, he knows how to smooth away the obstacles. For instance he would lower his voice and call Thieu by his name (instead of Mr President) and tell him: "The United States is a great country, but one of her foibles is to lack patience. So you should realize that there are limits to American forbearance." Or he would say bluntly: "This has been decided in Washington. Once our President has taken a decision, there is no turning back." Then the only thing Thieu can do is to shut his mouth and stay quiet. If he doesn't, Bunker will have this clincher: "You know, Mr Thieu, Congress has become rather restive. They might reduce or even cancel some of the aid appropriations..." And that settles it.

The above are part of what the world press calls the tactics of pressure and blackmail, the main-spring of American diplomacy.

In fact, "Fridge" Bunker still has one more trick reserved for when Thieu is really intractable. He would smile and give the latter a gentle tap on the shoulder and say softly: "Mr Thieu, we happen to know that you and Mrs Thieu have some personal financial affairs to settle. We should be glad to

13 August 1972

'Cease-Fire' Lines Taking Form in Laos

BY JACK FOJISIE

Times Staff Writer

VIENTIANE, Laos — The "yo-yo" no longer seems a part of the Laotian war.

For the first time in the decade since it became part of the Indochina insurgency conflict, combat in this landlocked Asian buffer state has ceased to be a series of seasonal advances and retreats by both sides. The lines are virtually stationary.

The North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao forces, which formerly utilized the dry season for attack and then retreated when the rains came, are not doing so this summer. Despite having to commit some of its Laos-based troops to the NVA three-front offensive in South Vietnam, those troops remaining have dug in at their forward-most positions.

This is generally true all along the loosely contested 800-mile front. There is speculation that Hanoi's stay-put order is predicated on possible negotiations to end the Indochina war. The present front would presumably then become the cease-fire line.

Little Pressure

Although the political gain for the NVA by standing fast is apparent, Gen. Nguyen Giap's army in Laos has been under little pressure from the American-backed Royal Lao Army so far. With the wet season almost half over, the Lao generals have made no effort yet to stage their annual thrusts at critical points along the long front.

Gen. Vang Pao, regarded as the Laotians' most aggressive commander, has made no move to recapture the lost Plain of Jars in the north, or even sortie out to the embattled headquar-

ter. The first time the enemy has been for each regional warlord family to hold onto its troops and wait for the enemy to invade the fiefdom before giving battle.

Gen. Vang Pao's Meo mountain tribal army, now being supported logistically by the American Army as well as the Central Intelligence Agency, also is undergoing recruiting and training.

Perhaps all this is necessary, for the Royal Lao Army—regular and irregular—is said to be outnumbered by the combined NVA and Pathet Lao (Communist) force. According to American estimates, in mid-July the enemy totaled 97,600 men. They included 63,200 NVA, with the others being NVA-led Pathet Lao units, PL irregulars and a handful of Communist-leaning ("neutralists") Laotians.

Various reasons are advanced for the inability, or reluctance, of the Lao generals to do what normally comes naturally at this time of year in Laos—advance on the heels of the NVA and Pathet Lao units falling back to rainy season quarters.

Rebuilding Operation

Putting the best face on the no-go status, American advisers say, the Lao generals are reluctant to attack without customary U.S. close air support—and that all American air power is preoccupied with bombing North Vietnam. Air officers deny that its Thailand-based 400-plane bomber armada is stretched thin and say "we are ready to support ground operations in Laos anytime."

A more plausible explanation is that the Royal Lao Army is using this wet season to rebuild and "will be stronger than ever before" when it takes the field again.

Thanks to the political wizardry of U.S. Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley, the warlord-controlled Lao forces are being forged into American army divisional format. One-third of the 45,000-man Lao regular army will be prepared under the plan, at least in theory, to

live with ex-Lao veterans in Missoula, Mont. As a man from the tropics, Gen. Vang Pao was able to touch snow for the first time when he hunted in the Montana mountains—and he frolicked in the cold white stuff barefooted.

CIA Relocates

What promises of new support he obtained in Washington is not apparent, but "it's not his nature to stand still," an American friend explained. If he intends to push back the foe from around Long Cheng, the NVA is not backing off. They periodically shell his base and his CIA support team has recently relocated in Vang Vieng, closer to Vientiane.

Even while "wintering," the NVA command has ventured, for the first time in the war, into the Mekong Valley. An enemy force captured Khong Se-done, a town in south Laos on the main north-south highway adjacent to the Mekong River. In its one forceful retaliation of the present wet season, Lao troops claim to have recaptured the town, killing 225 enemy. By Lao war standards that's a big battle.

Throughout Laos since Jan. 1, the Royal Lao army admits to having lost 400 men in battle.

Thai Volunteers

The equalizer for the Royal Lao Army has been the Royal Thai Army "volunteers," who for better-than-Thai army pay provided by the Americans, cross the Mekong river to fight in critical areas.

During the past November-May dry season, about 10,000 Thai infantry and artillerymen were fighting in Laos under American sponsorship, authoritative sources revealed. But Thai units trying to stem the NVA offensive on the Plain of Jars last December were decimated. So the urge to reenlist for short-time high-paid duty in Laos has lost some of its appeal.

Gen. Vang Pao's inactivity may be explained by his only recent return from a five-week sojourn in the United States. The colorful tribal leader and ex-French army sergeant is the top soldier of the war in CIA opinion. With two wives he visited Washington, chatted with fellow soldier Gen. William C. Westmoreland and saw Disneyland. He spent

STATINTL

Laos Claims U.S. Gunships Are Being Used by Assassins

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star-News

VIENTIANE — Is the United States using its giant C130 Spectre gunships for nighttime assassinations of Communist officials, Communist sympathizers and Communist suspects in their homes?

This charge is being leveled at the U.S. by Lao officials, authoritative diplomatic sources say, after an incident at Khong Island on the Lao-Cambodian border Friday night July 21.

Diplomats quote Lao sources as saying a Spectre gunship circled the house of Khong island's chief information officer then opened fire blasting it five times and reducing it to a shambles. The officer and his family escaped unharmed after the first firing pass.

The sources say weather was clear and point out that Khong Island which is 3,000 yards long by 5,000 yards wide and located in the middle of the broad Mekong, is clearly distinguishable. Therefore, they say, the Spectre cannot have mistaken its target.

Afraid to Go Home

Diplomats quoted Khong's province chief as saying the Central Intelligence Agency was out to get him and he is afraid to go home each night.

Well informed sources, however, gave another version of the incident. They say the Spectre was about 12,000 yards off target. The Spectre zeroed in using a starscope, an instrument which turns nighttime into daylight but colored green and shows the target almost as clearly as in daylight.

These sources said the target was a house near Khompong Srilao, a Cambodian

town on the Mekong bank west of Khong.

These sources said the information officer will be compensated with new furniture by the U.S. embassy.

Why should a high ranking official of the friendly Lao government and a Lao information officer also a Lao government employee make such accusations against the United States?

Deals in Contraband?

The answer may be a guilty conscience.

Informed U.S. sources have consistently asserted Lao officials in Pakse working with Lao officials in Khong have been dealing in contraband with North Vietnamese forces and Pathet Lao whose forces surround the island. This traffic in fuel, other petroleum products, batteries, rice and cloth has been going on with the connivance of high-ranking Lao army officers, Americans charge.

On June 5 a Royal Thai Air Force OHF 10 Bronco fired on and sank a boat traveling from the Mekong town of Pakse to Khong island reportedly filled with contraband cloth for Communist uniforms. The boat's owner was believed to be Col. Samran Rajphakdy, brother of the Laos army chief of staff, Gen. Phasouk Rajphakdy. In another earlier inci-

dent U.S. aircraft strafed what was claimed to be a boat full of students at a known Communist crossing point near Moulahamok between Khong and Pakse. How effective is the gunship if it is used in such a way?

Pinpointed House

There is no doubt it successfully pinpointed a single house and shot it apart but its inhabitants escaped because the first firing pass was used to zero in on the target, informed sources said.

One drawback to use of the Spectre for assassination of Khong officials is that it would be rather obvious to the Lao public who did the killing as North Vietnam hasn't got around to flying Spectres yet. The incident has left a bad taste in the mouth of Lao officials even in Vientiane and defense minister Sisouk Na Champassac has given stern orders not to discuss the incident with the press, the Lao say.

If the U.S. Air Force is carrying out assassinations with Spectre gunships in Communist-held areas off South-east Asia, a bit more care on targeting seems necessary. Diplomats say a high-ranking group of U.S. officers is presently in Vientiane to investigate the incident but the embassy has not confirmed the report.

ST. LOUIS, MO.
POST-DISPATCH

E - 326,376

S - 541,868

AUG 1 2 1972

Dope And The CIA

The publishing firm of Harper & Row is to be commended for its rejection of Central Intelligence Agency criticism of a book on the heroin traffic in Southeast Asia which it plans to release this month. The author, Alfred W. McCoy, alleges that some American officials and CIA agents have allied themselves with groups engaged in the drug traffic, have abetted the traffic by covering up for drug runners and have been involved "in the transport of opium and heroin."

The CIA, which has undertaken an unusual publicity campaign to throw down the charges (some of which have been published previously), asked Harper's for permission to examine the advance text. The firm complied, and received a long CIA criticism of the book. Harper & Row editors went over the comments with Mr. McCoy, examined his substantiating documents, and then informed the agency it saw no reason to make any changes in the book.

B. Brook Thomas, Harper & Row vice president and general counsel, said the publishers were "underwhelmed" by the CIA critique. He added that the CIA had been very courteous and correct—"We haven't got any pressure."

We would consider the very request by the CIA to be a form of pressure, however, and Harper & Row was well-advised to resist it.

Mr. McCoy makes a strong case for the charge that CIA policies have in fact aided the heroin traffic in Southeast Asia. This has come about through the agency's free-wheeling clandestine efforts to control events in remote areas of Indochina. If the CIA would stick to intelligence gathering it would not be subject to such charges as Mr. McCoy has leveled, and would not have to defend itself.

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10 AUG 1972

5

By: Dan Siegel

By the way, Young also happens to be chairman of the Asia Society!

His Introduction rambles on about "professional advisors" a while longer and then finally mentions "specific subjects". SEADAG will study: Development Administration, Education and Manpower, Mekong Development, Political Development, Regional Development, Rural Development, Urban Development and -- nota bene -- the Problems of Development Under Conditions of Insurgency, which means how to foist a capitalistic game plan on people who hate capitalism.

"Clearly," the Penn students wrote, "one of the imperatives behind the formation of SEADAG was that money would be available from the Federal Government," thus enabling Penn scholars to go ahead with their research without having to worry about the rent. "It is noteworthy," the students point out, that Young chairs both SEADAG and the Council on Foreign Relations which helps Nixon formulate foreign policy. Obviously, the Penn scientists' thoughts are fathered by the wishes of Washington, not the needs of future Vietnamese.

One more anagram is relevant here, although the ubiquitous Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) ties to USAID are almost common knowledge by now. In an interview with Dan Blackburn of Metro-media News, Dr. John Hannah, director of USAID, was asked: "Doctor, how do you respond to complaints that the AID Program is being used as a cover for CIA operations in Laos?"

"Well," said Dr. Hannah, "I just have to admit that that is true. This was a decision that was made back in 1962 and by administration from now until then (sic), and it is the only place in the world that we are."

Hannah was lying through his teeth about Laos being the only country in the

world where USAID fronts for the CIA, but his admission suffices to prove that Penn counts the CIA as one of its patrons of higher learning.

Moreover, Young's Introduction states flatly that USAID has "the final veto power on every SEADAG grant," exercising the following criteria:

- "Projects should be related to areas of AID geographic concern. Priority will be given to projects involving or relevant to the Philippines, Thailand, Laos, Indonesia, Vietnam and Korea...

- "Priority will be given to projects which are relevant to AID programs, activities and planning.

- "Projects will be considered as to their sensitivity to local political situations." (My emphasis -- D.S.)

STATINTL

Publisher Bars Changes in Book On SE Asia Drugs Hit by CIA

By Tim O'Brien

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency has sent Harper and Row, Inc., a detailed critique of a book the firm is about to release, saying the work will do a "disservice" to the fight against narcotics traffic in Southeast Asia.

The New York publishing house, however, has decided to go ahead with publication of "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia" by Alfred W. McCoy. The firm informed the CIA that "it is our sincere opinion that Mr. McCoy's scholarship remains unshaken and we do not see any reason for making changes in the text."

The book is highly critical of the CIA's efforts to suppress opium production and smuggling in Southeast Asia.

On July 5, CIA General Counsel Lawrence R. Houston wrote to Harper and Row, asking "to see the text" of the book. "In the light of the pernicious nature of the drug traffic, allegations concerning involvement of the U.S. government therein or the participation of American citizens should be made only if based on hard evidence," Houston wrote. "It is our belief that no reputable publishing house would wish to publish such allegations without being assured that the support evidence was valid."

"This, of course, in no way affects the right of a publisher to decide what to publish. I find it difficult to believe, however, that a responsible publisher would wish to be associated with an attack on our government involving the vicious international drug traffic without at least trying to ascertain the facts," he wrote.

Author McCoy, when told that Harper and Row planned to release galley proofs to the CIA, protested. He argued in a letter to B. Brook Thomas, the firm's vice president and general counsel, that "submitting the manuscript to the CIA for prior review is to agree to take the CIA's criticism as a condition of publication, thus abandoning the First Amend-

ment protection against prior censorship."

McCoy cited "extralegal actions" taken by the CIA to obstruct the book's publications. He said, "Visits by the CIA to Harper and Row, the telephone calls, and the letters are extralegal attempts by the CIA to harass and intimidate me and my publisher."

Thomas replied in a July 18

letter, however: "We want very much to publish (the book). But we want even more to live up to the traditions and responsibilities of a great publishing house as we see them. If we are forced to make a choice between the two, there can be no doubt what that choice must be."

McCoy, under "strong protest," agreed to give the CIA an advance copy of his book. He did so, he said yesterday, "for pragmatic reasons," partly because of the firm's decision not to publish the work if it were not first reviewed by the CIA.

Acknowledging receipt of the manuscript, CIA counsel Houston wrote Harper and Row on July 21: "It is not our intention to ask you to make changes in Mr. McCoy's book even if we believe some of the statements might be harmful to the government. It is possible that we might find some statement which is currently and properly classified in the interest of national security. If so, we will consult with you, but we believe this is highly unlikely. Our primary interest is in the validity of the evidence with which Mr. McCoy supports his allegations."

A CIA agent hand-delivered the agency's formal critique of the book in a letter dated July 28.

"Mr. McCoy supports his theme by citing a large number of allegations, assertions and interpretations," the 11-page criticism said. "From an examination of these, it is plain that Mr. McCoy has limited his citations to those supporting his position. He appears to have ignored available information which might

contradict it."

"Mr. McCoy's charges against the CIA, both directly and by innuendo, have been repeated by editorial writers throughout the nation and could create an accepted myth that the CIA has been involved in the drug traffic. The truth is that CIA has never been involved in the drug traffic and is actively engaged in fighting against it. We believe that the effect of Mr. McCoy's book is to do a disservice to this fight and to dishearten the many sincere people in CIA who are at least as concerned about this menace as Mr. McCoy."

In his book, McCoy argues that "American diplomats and secret agents have been involved in the narcotics traffic

at three levels"—coincidental complicity by allying with groups engaged in drug trafficking; abetting trafficking by covering up for Southeast Asian traffickers; and active engagement "in the transport of opium and heroin."

The CIA critique covered several, although not all, of the illustrations used by McCoy to substantiate his three charges. For example,

McCoy said that Air America—"which is really a CIA charter airline"—has been actively involved in the transport of opium products out of Laos. His sources, he said, include former Laotian chief of staff Ouane Rattikone (himself a suspected drug smuggler), Laotian air force commander Gen. Thao Ma, a USAID officer in Laos, and McCoy's own interviews with officials in Laotian villages.

The CIA critique said: "We believe the statement Mr. Paul Velte, Managing Director of Air America, made on 2 June 1972 in response to these allegations, labeling them as 'utterly and absolutely false,' clearly expresses the company and CIA views on this matter."

"General Ouane categorically denied that Air America was in any way involved in such traffic."

McCoy said yesterday that "there are over 200 pages of material on American operations in the Golden Triangle area. Out of all that, this is all they (the CIA) could come up with. They're only criticizing about 2 per cent of my total information."

"The most remarkable thing about the CIA's critique is that the agency actually admitted that one of its own mercenary army commanders, Laotian Gen. Chao La, was running a heroin lab in northwestern Thailand. Although the CIA said it destroyed his laboratory in mid-1971, it had been operating since 1965 and the agency's full knowledge," he said.

Elisabeth Jakob, the editor handling the manuscript, said yesterday that "the industry has been very cautious on things like this ever since the Clifford Irving story broke."

A source at Harper and Row said the CIA wrote the publishing firm that it could "prove beyond doubt" that McCoy's facts were wrong. "They just didn't do it," the source said.

On Friday, the firm wrote the CIA, responding to each of the agency's criticisms. The "best service we can render the author, the CIA and the general public is to publish the book as expeditiously as possible, and that is what we intend to do." The book is scheduled for release on Aug.

STATINTL

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6 AUG 1972

American Involvement Still Growing in Laos

U.S. Military Takes More Far-Ranging Role, Including Remolding Royal Army

BY JACK POISIE

Times Staff Writer

VIENTIANE, Laos — American involvement in South Vietnam may be winding down, but in Laos it continues to grow.

The significance is not yet in increased numbers, but in more far-ranging roles. The newest one is remolding of the Royal Lao Army in the U.S. format. An Indochina peace settlement would end all such ambitious undertakings, but with the American-backed Laotian government in poor shape militarily, the shoring-up process is proceeding as if the war remains unending.

As noted, the numbers of official Americans reported in Laos is up only slightly — from 1,041 in 1970 to 1,190 last year. Now it totals 1,250. But that does not count daily commuters from Udorn, Thailand, a 30-minute flight away. There the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Army and Air Force, and the chartered U.S. airlines Air America and Continental have their Laos-operation headquarters, their logistical base, and many of their aircraft.

French Supplanted

Americans have supplanted the French as trainers of the Royal Lao Army. With the usual "take-charge" desire, American military officers are settling into their role as revampers of the motley Lao units into American-style division.

The American organizers of these radical changes insist the Laotians will conduct all their own operations. "two or three" Americans

to oversee the process at each of four training camps. But if this endeavor follows the American experience in revamping the South Vietnam and Cambodian armies, the U.S. presence in the camps will become plentiful.

The enlargement of the American role expands in other directions. The U.S. Embassy, having recently added a second large building, is now constructing a third. Such diplomats as narcotics agents are housed inside.

The AID mission, besides its own legitimate civilian air program, continues to harbor CIA field agents, despite a Washington announcement a year ago that this practice would end.

The AID mission's role here as "paymaster" for other agencies including the CIA is considered defensible. As one AID official explained: "When you've got irregular soldiers on the embattled hill, that's CIA. When you've got civilians on the same hill, that's AID. But it's better to make one rice drop than two—and AID is in the rice-dropping business.

The candor with which officials discuss American activities here is due to a "fess-all" decision by Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley early this year. He decided, it was explained, "that just about all the secret activity in Laos has leaked out."

Patton-Like Phrases

Thus, Laos is now relatively open coverage for reporters. Thailand is the American coverup still exists.

With Godley's see-for-yourself policy, one might assume his image would have improved in the press. But he is still regarded in most profiles as a diplomat-turned-warrior. He uses such Patton-like expressions as "giving them the steel" in referring to a larger import of artillery to be used against the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces in Laos.

And while there is still some denial, many previous restrictions on American military activities in Laos have been relaxed during Godley's regime. As a foreign diplomat observed: "The 1962 Geneva big-power agreement (to keep Laos non-involved in the Indochina war) is the most violated document in recent history — by both sides."

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NEW HAVEN, CONN.

REGISTER

AUG 4 1972

E - 104,849

S - 122,459

Book Coming Out Despite CIA

A Yale student's book linking the Central Intelligence Agency to Southeast Asian heroin traffic will be published this month despite the CIA's objections to it.

Harper & Row will publish "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia" by Alfred W. McCoy, a Yale graduate student, on Aug. 17, according to the author.

The book charges that the CIA was aware of, and at times a participant in, heroin business conducted by government officials in Laos, South Vietnam and Thailand.

The CIA asked to review the book prior to publication, saying that it could disprove a number of McCoy's claims. The publishing company told McCoy it would not print the book if he refused this review.

The CIA sent Harper & Row a letter listing its objections Thursday, but McCoy said most of them were simply "flat denials."

McCoy said this morning he felt the agency was trying to squash the book but that extensive coverage of the CIA review in the news media caused it to pull back.

McCoy said many of his charges — substantiated in the book — were supported by news stories as well following the CIA request to review the book.

August 2, 1973

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600120001-5

S 12475

REFERRAL OF MESSAGE FROM
THE PRESIDENT

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD subsequently said: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a message from the President of the United States on Tropical Storm Agnes received today be referred jointly to the same committees to which a previous message on the same subject was referred; namely, the Committee on Public Works; the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs; and the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HUGHES). Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session, the Presiding Officer (Mr. GRAVEL) laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(The nominations received today are printed at the end of Senate proceedings.)

MILITARY PROCUREMENT
AUTHORIZATIONS, 1973

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 15495) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1973 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to authorize construction at certain installations in connection with the Safeguard antiballistic missile system, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I yield such time as may be needed to the distinguished Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), whom I will replace in the chair.

(Mr. CRANSTON assumed the chair as Presiding Officer.)

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask unanimous consent that the time be equally divided between both sides.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CRANSTON). Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the amendment of the Senator from California. I rise again, as I have so many times before in the last 3½ years that I have been a Member of this body, in support of a move constitutionally based on the Senate's power and right to declare war and to supply the funds to support armies at war or during peacetime, almost unbelieving

that so much time has passed since this debate began.

Some of us have been deeply torn by the fact that within our own party many years ago we had to part courses from a President that we dearly loved, a President with legislative prowess and with expressed concerns for peace for this country, who espoused great programs which were jointly brought into being through Congress, who has all but been forgotten because of one failure—a failure to bring an end to a conflict that not only has torn Southeast Asia apart, but also has torn apart this country.

I find myself today in a position of having agreed to time limitations on an amendment, when everything from the very center of my being cries out that we should have filibustered against the passage of this bill until a determination was made once and for all to end this war.

I find myself again listening to the rafters ring as men whom I honor and respect cry out for the blood of our enemies, and say that the only way for justice to prevail is through death, destruction, bombing, and destroying. They seem to believe that little children and civilians, peaceful people, the dying and the aged, are of no concern and of no consequence to the people of this country. I cannot believe that nor can I much longer tolerate it.

The expressed will of these people time and time again has cried out in agony from the very center of their being, saying, "Bring it to an end; do not let it go on."

Yet we fail and we say the same things over and over again: Give the President a little more time; let him negotiate; let him bomb; let him destroy; let him bring them to their knees.

Ten years have passed. Our President has long since gone of his own volition, and we have a new President who 4 years ago said to the American people:

I have a plan to bring this war to an end. The people of America deserve a new President to make new decisions.

Since that time 22,000 American men have died in combat and other thousands have died for other reasons. There have been hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties, deaths on both sides of the borders, an invasion of Cambodia, an invasion of Laos, incessant bombing of the north, armies fighting without our knowledge or authorization, paid by the CIA.

How much longer can our consciences cry out, not for truth from our enemies, but for truth from our leadership in our country? How much longer must we consent to time agreements of 4 hours to debate an issue that has brought death to hundreds of thousands of people on the face of this earth?

How much longer must we be asked, in the interest of ending a session of Congress, to sacrifice our right, as Senators, to continue to try to bring this war to an end, if we feel it right to do so, or at least to exhaust every means we have?

We have coaxed, we have tried, and we have appealed. I do not speak in anger toward any Member of this body

because of his personal feelings. I speak in anguish from the bottom of my heart, and from the bottom of my soul at what this country has done in the name of justice and continues to perpetrate in the name of peace. How long can it go on and how long will the people tolerate it? It seems almost forever.

Since President Nixon came into office more days have passed than from the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the beginning of the buildup of our forces, the conquest of the Continent of Europe, the devastation of Hitler and to the day when peace was signed with those countries involved. Yet we are still at war with a little nation in Southeast Asia. And we were promised a settlement and justice.

Now, they say, "Give us time." They say, "You are aiding and abetting the enemy. You dare to cry out for the right to exercise your constitutional right as a Member of the Senate representing the people of your State."

I say that unless I dare to cry out in that regard, then I have ceased to represent the people of my State and the people of this country. I have not only the right but also the will to use whatever means and devices the forefathers of this country gave in the separation of powers in the constitutional structure of this country to see that civilian control of our military force to exercise justice in the world is derived from the feelings of the hearts and the consciences of the people and not from the heart of the military superpowers who know nothing but to be trained to fight wars.

I do not fault them. They have their purpose in being able to fight, to win, to conquer. But they are the servants of the will of the people of this country, not the rulers of it. Too long has it been the other way around.

The fact is, however, that a real blood-bath has been going on while we have been debating a hypothetical one. By the President's own admission, there have been 600,000 civilian casualties in South Vietnam since 1965. Official statistics now show more than 1 million combat deaths on all sides. In the past 3 months alone, there have been 45,000 additional civilian casualties, according to the President.

With this evidence and with the evidence of our environmental warfare, there can be no doubt now that we have been destroying Vietnam allegedly in order to save it.

How much longer can this continue? We cannot end this war by ourselves. Of course; but we can end our contribution to the slaughter. We can halt our massive bombing, and we can bring all of our troops and prisoners home safely.

We have been preaching to the American people about changing the face of this war, and we have been moving forces into Thailand and into the South China Sea and wreaking destruction in the process. Is that bringing the war to an end? It is not bringing the war to an end.

The debate over what kind of government there is in South Vietnam as opposed to what kind of government there is in North Vietnam is interesting. It is interesting to see that Members of this body have no reluctance at all to vote

2 AUG 1972

Report Pessimistic On Screening Out Indochina Drugs

By Tim O'Brien

Washington Post Staff Writer

A White House report circulated among congressmen early last month gives a gloomy forecast for U.S. efforts to stem illicit narcotics trafficking in Southeast Asia, particularly Burma and South Vietnam.

The little noticed report shows that a total of only 29 tons of illegal opium or its derivatives were seized in Southeast Asia between August 1971 and June 1972. This represents about four per cent of the annual illicit production in the region, which according to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs is approximately 700 tons.

The report—a chronology of “narcotics action” in Thailand, Laos, Burma and South Vietnam—shows that 26 of 29 tons were destroyed at Chiang Mai, Thailand, last March.

The action has frequently been cited as an indication of a crackdown in Thailand.

But columnist Jack Anderson says that “the CIA and other federal agencies have quietly informed Washington that something besides opium went up in that bonfire.” He said that all but five of the 26 tons was nothing but fodder, plant material and chemicals.

The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs refuted those charges, claiming that on-the-spot U.S. inspectors examined the material under microscopes and found it to be “genuine opium.”

Andrew C. Tartaglino, Deputy Director for Operations in the BNDD, said “our chemist tested it before it was burned. There is no question—it was opium.”

Anderson's colleague, reporter Les Whitten, was present at a BNDD press conference, challenging Tartaglino to make available a weekly intelligence summary compiled by the bureau from CIA and State Department reports. The summary, Whitten said, contained “a lot of extraneous matter

was mixed with only five tons of opium.”

Tartaglino said the summary was based on “raw intelligence” and had been “discounted as unreliable.” He said the summary is classified and cannot be released without going through “established procedures.”

The United States paid \$1 million for the 26 tons of material that was voluntarily turned over by bands of Nationalist Chinese living in northern Thailand according to Tartaglino.

The White House study, signed by Richard Harkness, information director for the President's Narcotics Control Program, said there would be difficulties in any long-term effort to stem the flow of illegal drugs in South Vietnam.

“Smuggling is endemic in the country and real control is unlikely,” the report said.

According to the study, South Vietnam President Thieu was handed a memorandum on May 3, 1971, “which notes relationship between narcotics problems and future U.S. role in Vietnam.” The memo urged him to greatly improve “intelligence and enforcement activities to identify and arrest narcotics ring-leaders and pushers.”

The following day, the head of the Vietnamese national police's narcotics bureau was replaced, and its personnel expanded from 26 to 52.

But the unpublicized White House report summarized: “Encouraging as Vietnam's recognition of the problem and (its) dynamic response may be, real progress of a long-term nature is questionable.”

This conclusion stands in contrast to the administration's public optimism, reiterated only a week ago by presidential assistant, Egil Krogh Jr.

The study was compiled for the White House by those State Department desks responsible for the four countries. It contained a narcotics action chronology.

The report listed no specific seizures or arrests in Burma

the largest opium producing country in Southeast Asia.

The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs estimates that Burma's illicit opium production is about 400 tons a year.

According to the report, “the Burmese government's policy of non-alignment and sensitivity to foreign influence is a limiting factor in its involvement with the U.S. or the United Nations in the narcotics field.”

“There are no BNDD (Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs) or U.S. Customs programs in Burma such as exist in neighboring countries with which the U.S. is allied or has common security interests and programs,” the study said.

The White House said “very little opium is now grown in Laos; less than 30 tons a year.” However, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs estimated last Tuesday that Laos produces more than three times that amount — about 100 tons a year.

“Nearly all of (the Laotian opium) still being grown is consumed by the growers,” the report said. “There is no evidence that significant amounts of Lao-grown opium are entering the international traffic. Laos is a conduit for Burmese opium and opium derivatives, including heroin, however.”

Of the 30 or 100 tons of opium products grown each year in Laos, less than one ton was confiscated between August 1971 and June 1972, according to the report's chronology of narcotics actions.

Although the report said that Laos is a “conduit” for Burmese opium and although only one ton was confiscated there in the 10-month period, the report concludes that “the flow of opium and heroin through Laos has been seriously disrupted.”

Alfred W. McCoy, author of a soon to be published book “The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia,” testified before a Senate subcommittee early last month that “all U.S.

officials in Indochina know that the vast majority of the high grade heroin sold to GIs fighting in South Vietnam is manufactured in Laotian laboratories.”

“In northern Laos,” he said, “Air America aircraft and helicopters chartered by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and USAID have been transporting opium harvested by the agency's tribal mercenaries on a regular basis.”

Publication of the book by Harper and Row, Inc., has been held up by a CIA request to review it. McCoy, under “strong protest,” agreed to give the CIA an advance copy.

Last Friday, a CIA agent delivered “written comments and criticisms” to the New York publisher, but the company has not yet announced whether the CIA asked for revisions or a halt to publication. It is believed the firm will not agree to alter the manuscript, a source close to McCoy said.

BOOKS

James Bonds of Yesteryear

By ROGER JELLINEK
New York Times News Service

In 1941 a British naval intelligence officer named Ian Fleming recommended to Gen. William (Wild Bill) Donovan that he recruit as American intelligence officers men of "absolute discretion, sobriety, devotion to duty, languages, and wide experience." Donovan, a World War I hero and successful Wall Street lawyer, understood the fantasies of writers and presidents, and in a memo to President Roosevelt promised an international secret service staffed by young officers who were "calculatingly reckless," with "disciplined daring" and trained for "aggressive action."

The Office of Strategic Services came to include such James Bonds as John Birch, Norman O. Brown, David K. E. Bruce, Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, William Bundy, Michael Burke, Julia Child, Clark Clifford, John Kenneth Galbraith, John W. Gardner and Arthur J. Goldberg. There were others — Sterling Hayden, August Heckscher, Roger O. Hillsman, Philip Horton, H. Stuart Hughes, Clark M. MacGregor, Herbert Marcuse, Henry Ringling North. And still others: John Oakes, Walt W. Rostow, Elmo Roper, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., Ralph de Toledano — to name just a few of the hundreds in this book by R. Harris Smith.

SMITH, WHO WAS in the trade himself, resigning in 1968 after a "very brief, uneventful, and undistinguished association with the most misunderstood bureaucracy of the American government," the Central Intelligence Agency, now lectures in political science at the University of California's Extension Division. "This history of America's first central intelligence agency" is "secret" because Smith was denied access to OSS archives, and so had to rely on the existing literature supplemented by some 200 written and verbal recollections of OSS alumni.

The book is densely packed with the bewildering variety of OSS exploits in World War II: Spying, sabotage, propaganda, military training missions, politicking and coordinating resistance groups against the Germans.

OSS agents had to compete as much with their allies as with their enemies.

OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency. By R. Harris Smith. Univ. of California Press. 458 pages. Illustrated. \$10.95.

In France and Switzerland, where Allen Dulles operated, the British SOE (Special Operations Executive) was especially grudging. In Germany itself, the OSS lost out to more orthodox American military intelligence, though paradoxically they were strongly represented at Nuremberg, where Gen. Donovan was himself a deputy prosecutor — at the same time that the head of the Nazi secret service, Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, was under OSS protection in exchange for his intelligence network in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.


From present perspective the most (literally) intriguing story is that of the OSS in China and Indochina. There were

both pro-Communists and anti-Communists in the OSS, and most agents sympathized with Asian nationalists, so that the OSS aided Thai partisans against the British and, of course, more famously, the Vietminh against the French in Laos and Vietnam (an OSS medic saved Ho Chi Minh's life). Smith's retelling of the tragicomedy of Indochina after the Japanese surrender in 1945, with Vichy and Gaullist French, British, Chinese and the Vietminh jockeying for control, makes a fascinating setpiece.

The book ends with an account of the transformation of the OSS into its "mirror image," the CIA. Smith's admiration for the OSS's wartime pragmatism, its "tradition of dissent" and its anticolonialism suggests his thesis: That the OSS/CIA has been made the straw man of the radical and liberal left. In fact, he asserts, the CIA has been the principal guardian of liberal values in the "intelligence community."

HE REMINDS US that the CIA fought Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy, and he argues that the CIA's campaign to fund anti-Communist liberals successfully undermined international Communist organizations and disarmed the paranoid anti-Communism of the FBI and others at home. He notes that CIA liberals worked against Batista for Castro, who betrayed them, allowing the CIA conservatives to plan the Bay of Pigs action. Finally, he points to the evidence in the Pentagon Papers that the CIA has been a critic of the Vietnam War from the beginning.

But the question remains whether the OSS "tradition of dissent" is meaningful, whether it doesn't compromise liberals as much as aid them. Smith's book is full of cryptic references to former OSS agents now prominent in international business and finance. CIA liberalism has not prevented a number of CIA-fomented coups d'état in favor of military regimes. Even CIA liberal criticism of the war in Vietnam seems to have had little effect on policy. All might be fair in time of war, but Smith ought to have scouted the need for a permanent bureaucracy part of whose function is officially devoted to clandestine political manipulations abroad in time of "peace."



A Protest By The CIA

Intelligence Agency Denies Links With Drug Trade In Laos

STATINTL

(The following letter to the editor of the Post-Dispatch takes issue with statements made in an editorial printed on this page. The statements, although reflecting charges publicized over a period of several years, were based in this instance mainly on an article in the July 1972 issue of Harper's Magazine, titled "Flowers Of Evil, The CIA and the Heroin Trade," by Alfred W. McCoy. The article was adapted from a chapter in The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, a book by Mr. McCoy, a PhD student in Southeast Asian history at Yale University, to be published in September by Harper & Row, Inc.)

In your editorial of June 27, you state: "The connection of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency with the dope traffic in Laos has long been notorious." I write you to state that this allegation is false and unfounded. It is disappointing to see a journal of the Post-Dispatch's reputation repeating such an unfounded assertion without a check of its accuracy, any reference to the public record to the contrary, or any apparent effort to specify its sources.

Normally CIA does not respond publicly to allegations made against it. Because of the serious nature of the drug problem in this country, I am writing to you to make the record clear, although the sweeping phraseology of your comment is difficult to counter in detail.

CIA's real "connection" with the "dope traffic in Laos" has been to work against it. John E. Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, in a letter to Representative Charles S. Gubser of California on May 27, 1971 (reproduced in the Congressional Record of June 2, 1971), stated:

"Actually, CIA has for sometime been this bureau's strongest partner in identifying foreign sources and routes of illegal trade in narcotics. Their help has included both direct support in intelligence collection, as well as in intelligence analysis and production. Liaison between our two agencies is close and constant in matters of mutual interest. Much of the progress we are now making in identifying overseas narcotics traffic can, in fact, be attributed to CIA co-operation."

Roland Paul, investigator for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, reported in the April 1971 issue of Foreign Affairs "that due to the long association with the CIA, the Meo tribesmen in Laos were shifting from opium to rice and other crops."

You also allege that "The big shot of the Laotian trade is Gen. Vang Pao, an unsavory character who for the last decade has been commander of the CIA's secret army in northeastern Laos. American diplomatic officials in Laos seem to look the other way; they have confined their recent efforts to promoting Laotian laws against opium addicts."

In truth, Gen. Vang Pao is not engaged in the drug trade in Laos. On the contrary, he has, as a leader of the Meo, conducted an energetic program over the years to bring this tribal group to abandon their traditional growth of the opium poppy

and develop substitute crops and new forms of livestock to provide daily sustenance and income. He has done this in the course of fighting off a North Vietnamese invasion of the Meo territories in Laos. He has received American assistance in both of these efforts.

While vague assertions such as your editorial have been made about him in the past, the U.S. Government personnel in constant contact with him for many years have never found evidence connecting him with trafficking in narcotics.


More than one year ago, in an address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Richard Helms, director of Central Intelligence, stated the following:

"There is the arrant nonsense, for example, that the Central Intelligence Agency is somehow involved in the world drug traffic. We are not. As fathers, we are as concerned about the lives of our children and grandchildren as are all of you. As an agency, in fact, we are heavily engaged in tracing the foreign roots of the drug traffic for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. We hope we are helping with a solution; we know we are not contributing to the problem."

This statement remains valid today.

W. E. Colby
Executive Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C.




—Post-Dispatch, July 25, 1971
"... And I Thought It Was An Escape!"


STATINTL

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STATINTL



A Report on Scholars' Access to Government Documents
By Carol M. Barker and Matthew H. Fox



The Twentieth Century Fund/New York/1972

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continued

AUG 1972

U.S. Electronic Espionage: A Memoir

STATINTL

ABOUT THIRTY MILES NORTHEAST of CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, right off the Baltimore-Washington expressway overlooking the flat Maryland countryside, stands a large three story building known informally as the "cookie factory." It's officially known as Ft. George G. Meade, headquarters of the National Security Agency.

Three fences surround the headquarters. The inner and outer barriers are topped with barbed wire, the middle one is a five-strand electrified wire. Four gatehouses spanning the complex at regular intervals house specially-trained marine guards. Those allowed access all wear iridescent I.D. badges — green for "top secret crypto," red for "secret crypto." Even the janitors are cleared for secret codeword material. Once inside, you enter the world's longest "corridor"—980 feet long by 560 feet wide. And all along the corridor are more marine guards, protecting

the doors of key NSA offices. At 1,400,000 square feet, it is larger than CIA headquarters, 1,135,000 square feet. Only the State Department and the Pentagon and the new headquarters planned for the FBI are more spacious. But the DIRNSA building (Director, National Security Agency) can be further distinguished from the headquarters buildings of these other giant bureaucracies—it has no windows. Another palace of paranoia? No. For DIRNSA is the command center for the largest, most sensitive and far-flung intelligence gathering apparatus in the world's history. Here, and in the nine-story Operations Building Annex, upwards of 15,000 employees work to break the military, diplomatic and commercial codes of every nation in the world, analyze the de-crypted messages, and send on the results to the rest of the U.S. intelligence community.

Far less widely known than the CIA, whose Director

STATINTL

CIA Moving Base In Northern Laos

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, July 30—The headquarters for CIA-backed Laotian irregular forces in northern Laos is moving from the Long Cheng area to a new location 17 miles west, according to highly reliable U.S. sources here.

Vang Vieng, a town on Route 13 85 miles north of Vientiane and 34 miles southwest of Long Cheng Valley, has been chosen as the new operations and logistics center for Gen. Vang Pao's guerrilla force.

The move to Vang Vieng became necessary as a result of setbacks suffered by Gen. Vang Pao's forces, according to the U.S. sources.

Arms, ammunition, petroleum and all other war material supplied by the United States to Gen. Vang Pao's irregular army of Meo tribesmen are expected to be stockpiled at Vang Vieng for greater safety, sources said.

Both CIA and Meo planners, coordinators and advisors also will be based at the new center, where they will be in less danger than they currently are in at Long Cheng and Ban Song.

U.S. sources in Long Cheng recently reported Vang Pao's forces are having considerable difficulty recapturing positions strategically important to the defense of Long Cheng Valley.

U.S. advisers to Vang Pao are said to be increasingly worried about the vulnerability of the Ban Song base.

Ban Song replaced Long Cheng as headquarters for Vang Pao's irregular army early this year when North Vietnamese forces launched heavy attacks on Long Cheng after capturing the Plain of Jars.

JUL 31 1972
M - 239,949
S - 350,303

U.S. aid for the drug traffickers?


AS PART OF the effort to combat drug abuse—which, according to President Nixon last summer, has “assumed the dimensions of a national emergency”—the administration is committed to an all-out attack on the international narcotics trade. This involves not just the breaking up of the syndicates that process and import the heroin to the United States, but persuading other governments, particularly in Southeast Asia where most of the world's heroin now originates, to come down hard on the growers and marketeers. But is the Nixon administration trying as hard as it could to cut off this profitable trade at its source?

Disturbing evidence is accumulating that it may not be. There is *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, to be published this fall but excerpted in the July issue of *Harper's* by a young Yale graduate student specializing in Southeast Asian history and politics. This documents the involvement of high government and military officials in Laos and Thailand in the narcotics trade; it even charges complicity by the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA has challenged all the author's allegations, asserting that most of them are without foundation.

'Lever' is hard to use

But there is also the study made last winter by top-level officials of the CIA, the State Department and the Pentagon, and just now disclosed. This report concludes that there is no prospect of cutting off the smuggling of narcotics from Southeast Asia because of “the corruption, collusion and indifference at some places in some governments, particularly Thailand and South Vietnam.” This conclusion, too, is being discounted by administration officials, who argue that it is out of date and that “substantial progress” has been made in the past four months.

Yet it would be naive to assume that a situation that was so bad could have improved as significantly and as swiftly as all that. Certainly the success it scored last year when it was able to persuade the Turkish government to ban completely the growing of opium poppy



Dowling In The Kansas City Star

“The place to start is the other end.”

of the opium poppy. In Turkey's case the United States is to help in compensating the thousands of peasant farmers for whom poppy-growing has been an innocent livelihood for centuries and who now must switch to other cash crops. Whether the Turkish government or anyone else is compensating the many middlemen who have grown fat off the opium trade is not discussed publicly.

But the United States has another way of persuading reluctant governments to join the anti-drug campaign. Congress tacked on a provision to last year's foreign aid bill permitting the President to suspend aid to any country that doesn't take action against the drug traffic. The only problem is that suspending aid to the governments of Southeast Asia would virtually end the Vietnam war overnight.

It's a dilemma, to be sure. But it's worth recalling that last winter, when President Nixon was vehemently reiterating this country's commitment to keeping President Thieu in power in Saigon, even though this was the main obstacle to serious negotiations in Paris, the same regime was one of the major factors being blamed by U.S. officials for the continuation of our own “national emergency” in drugs. And that's why we ask: Is the administration trying as hard as it can in the war on drugs, or must that effort still rank way below a certain view of a solution for

STATE JOURNAL

JUL 30 1972

E - 15,301

S - 15,679

Wanted: Answers on Laos

Last week Americans learned through the press that the Central Intelligence Agency is experimenting with rainmaking techniques in Laos to retard the flow of enemy supplies down the Ho Chi Minh trail into South Vietnam. The report came from "military sources," not from the Nixon administration. Sec. of Defense Melvin Laird refused to comment on the subject.

THAT IS HOW the American people have learned over the years the extent of their country's involvement in Laos, an involvement that does not seem likely to diminish as a result of "Vietnamization" of the war or any other scheme that focuses primarily on Vietnam.

Reports started appearing several years ago that U.S. bombers were ranging far beyond the Ho Chi Minh trail to drop their deadly cargo on the Plain of Jars in central Laos. There have been persistent rumors that the CIA has been training mercenaries to fight against the Communist Pathet-Lao, which is engaged in a civil war with the Lao government (admittedly with the help of the North Vietnamese). There is also considerable evidence that Americans in the Army's elite Special Forces have been fighting on the ground in Laos.

Only recently has the Nixon administration acknowledged that U.S. bombers have operated over Laos, generally giving the impression that American air strikes there have been directed only against North Vietnamese supply routes. The other reports have either been denied or, as in this instance, dismissed with a highhanded "no comment."

YET REPORTS from U.S. military and civilian personnel returning home from Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam indicate that the number of bombs dropped in Laos since 1965 probably amounts to hundreds of times the destruction rained on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese. That attack was rightfully considered an act of war by the American people. But when the tables are turned, when the U.S. unleashes literally thousands of air attacks on a small Asian country, both Democratic and Republican administrations have refused to so much as comment on what is going on, let alone ask Congress for a declaration of war or for its token approval with another Tonkin Resolution.

Although the U.S. Constitution stipulates Congress is the only power that can legitimately commit American fighting men to combat, reports coming out of Laos show the extent to which Congress has lost control over the U.S. war machine.

This newspaper recently ran a two-part condensation of a report to Congress by Rep. Paul McCloskey, R-California, which presented evidence that U.S. ambassadors in Laos have been able to order Air Force strikes against virtually any village in the country with little interference from Congress or the White House. McCloskey's report, based on interviews with dozens of U.S. servicemen and Laotian refugees, suggests that lower echelon policy makers have used bombs to "herd" the Laotian civilian population out of Communist territory and into government controlled areas, the loss of a few thousand lives notwithstanding. There was even some evidence that biological warfare materials have been used in Laos on a selective basis.

THIS INFORMATION is hard to believe, if only because it seems unlikely that the U.S. military and diplomatic corps would dare to so flaunt the powers the Congress seems to have lost by default. But the reports continue to come in, despite government silence on the war in Laos. If true, they provide a sad commentary on the extent to which American diplomacy has been brutalized during a decade of military free rein in Indochina.

It has been said that thanks to the clever posturing of Richard Nixon during his trips to Red China and Moscow and with the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam, the war in Indochina will not be an issue in this election year. Americans may be able to write off the tragedy of Vietnam, once our troops are back home and the prisoners of war have been released. But there will remain the tragedy of Laos, of which most Americans are hardly aware, thanks to the deliberate efforts of the executive branch.

According to the present Vietnamization schedule, a substantial number of U.S. bombers will remain in Thailand, the source of most of the air strikes into Laos. The Vietnamization idea does not represent a significant change from the kind of thinking that got his country involved in the quagmire of Southeast Asia in the first place. The U.S. Air Force will remain to literally fly to the rescue of political regimes in Laos or who knows where else.

THIS IS A good year for Americans to ask the politicians where they stand on continuing this presence in Southeast Asia, and, for those who favor it, whether they would make it accountable to Congressional authority.

Yes, the reports coming out of Laos are hard to believe. But impossible? As, yourself. And then ask the candidates. — G.L.

Denounces AID Link With CIA

By WILLIAM K. WYANT JR.
A Washington Correspondent
of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, July 29—Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, denounced Saturday the Agency for International Development's involvement in Laos with the Central Intelligence Agency.

"The activities and funds of these two agencies in Laos are now so mixed," he said, "that it must be impossible for Lao officials to know whether they are dealing with AID or with the CIA."

Symington, chairman of the Senate foreign relations subcommittee on security agreements and commitments abroad, made the statement in a preface he wrote for a declassified version of hearings over which he presided last April 13.

He criticized the Executive Branch of the government for making extensive deletions in the hearing record, made public Saturday. He said the deletions were made "on alleged grounds of security."

The hearing transcript was scissored so severely, Symington said, that his panel was at first reluctant to make public what remained. However, it was decided that the report would add to information available about Laos.

Roderic L. O'Connor, co-ordinator of AID's bureau for supporting assistance, appeared before the subcommittee in response to a letter Symington wrote March 21 to John A. Hannah, administrator of the Agency for International Development.

Symington's letter had asked Hannah a series of questions about the relationship in Laos between AID, which administers foreign assistance, and the CIA, which finances irregular troops fighting Communists.

In a separate statement issued Saturday with the censored but now declassified hearing record, the Missouri Senator said the facts now coming out "raise serious questions about the legality of some United States expenditures in Laos . . ."

The facts also disclose, Symington said, "a pattern of deviousness, if not actual deception, which has characterized the conduct of our policy in Laos for the last decade."

O'Connor told the subcommittee that AID was not now financing, and never had financed, military or intelligence operations in Laos, as such. He conceded that AID's assistance had helped the royal Lao government carry its defense burden.

In fiscal 1972, the witness said, the CIA is reimbursing AID in the amount of \$2,500,000 for medical services and supplies for paramilitary forces or their dependents in Laos.

O'Connor said AID supplied certain services in the health and humanitarian fields for "anybody" in Laos who is ill, sick, or wounded.

EXAMINER

E - 204,749

EXAMINER & CHRONICLE

S - 640,004

JUL 30 1972

STATINTL

southeast asia

'The Politics of Heroin'

IT WAS the harvest land for raw opium, the infamous "golden triangle." In the corner embracing north-eastern Burma, northern Thailand and northern Laos about 1000 tons of raw opium was produced, about 70 per cent of the world's supply.

From there it eventually found its way to the American market, but that source of heroin, according to Administration officials, had been turned off.

"We think all the countries are cooperating with us and we are quite satisfied with that cooperation," said Secretary of State William P. Rogers to a Senate subcommittee last May.

On the Defensive

How much cooperation, however, was subject to dispute, with the Central Intelligence Agency and eventually the Administration on the defensive last week.

Part of the official worry originated with the soon-to-be-published book by Alfred W. McCoy, a 26-year-old Yale graduate student who spent 18 months investigating narcotics operations in Indochina.

In "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," McCoy charged that the CIA knew of the narcotics trade but failed to take action and that both CIA and State Department officials had provided political and military support for America's Indochinese allies actively engaged in drug traffic, had covered up evidence of such involvement and had been

actively involved themselves in the trade.

The CIA launched a big effort to refute the charges, calling them unwarranted, unproven and fallacious, and managed to persuade the publishers of the expose, Harper & Row, to permit the CIA to review the manuscript prior to publication.

The book has been based on more than 250 interviews, some of them, McCoy said, with past and present officials of the CIA.

He said that top-level South Vietnamese officials,

The CIA was accused of drug trafficking

including President Nguyen Van Thieu and Premier Tran Van Khiem, were involved.

The CIA began an unusual public defense by sending two letters for publication to the Washington Post, which had printed some of McCoy's allegations.

The Approach

The CIA began its approach to Harper & Row in learning of McCoy's appearance before a Senate subcommittee.

Harper & Row decided that although "we don't have any doubts about the book at all . . . as one of the oldest publishing houses in

America, Harper & Row has an obligation to itself and what it stands for."

A Harper & Row spokesman added that if McCoy did not agree to the CIA review, it would not publish the book.

Cabinet Report

Then came a Cabinet level report, released last Sunday. Contrary to administration assurances of success in halting drug traffic, it said, there was "no prospect" of slowing the traffic "under any conditions that can realistically be projected."

The report was prepared by officials of the CIA, State Department and Defense Department and noted that "the most basic problem and that one that unfortunately appears least likely of any early solution, is the corruption, collusion and indifference at some places in some governments, particularly Thailand and South Vietnam . . ."

The report also stated that "it should surely be possible to convey to the right Thai or Vietnamese officials the mood of the Congress and the Administration on the subject of drugs."

To which, Lester L. Wolff, a New York Democratic critic of government's handling of Southeast Asia drug traffic, said, "We think the trade has got so much protection in high places in Thailand that the Administration is afraid they'll tell us to take our air bases out if we put too much pressure on them."

TORRINGTON; CONN.
REGISTER

JUL 29 1972
E - 11,792

Editorials

Uncle Sam - drug pusher

Acting FBI Director Patrick Gray declared the other day that a shortage of heroin on the street market has developed as a result of the government's crackdown on the drug traffic, "the most intensive drive this nation has ever directed against narcotics racketeers." This might be encouraging news were it not for the fact that while the FBI is trying to crack down on the drug merchants another federal agency has been aiding and abetting them.

A detailed report linking the CIA to the enormously profitable traffic in heroin is presented in the July issue of Harper's magazine. It was written by Alfred W. McCoy, a PhD student in Southeast Asian history at Yale, not as a journalistic expose but as a chapter in a Harper & Row book scheduled for September publication under the title "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia."

It is a shocking indictment that McCoy presents in reciting how, as a result of direct and indirect American involvement, opium production in Southeast Asia is increasing and the export of high-grade heroin is flourishing. Most of the heroin used by American GIs in Vietnam has come from Laotian areas where the CIA is active, McCoy writes, and increasing amounts are being sent to the United States and Europe.

As part of the U. S. effort to bolster Southeast Asia against Communist inroads, the CIA has been working since 1959 with the Meo tribesmen of hilly northern Laos. In forging an effective guerrilla

army, the CIA built up the power of tribal commanders both militarily and economically. But by Laos tradition, economics is opium, starting with poppy farmers like the Meos and extending into the royal Laotian government.

One of the commanders of the CIA secret army, McCoy reports, is General Vang Pao, a major entrepreneur in the opium business since 1961. CIA operatives guided the building of airstrips to link his villages via Air America planes — which, naturally, soon were flying Meo opium to market. CIA and the U. S. Agency for International Development later helped finance a private airline for Vang Pao, who went on to open a heroin processing plant near CIA headquarters.

A year ago, President Nixon declared war on the international heroin traffic, and — under U. S. pressure — opium dens in Laos were shut by the hundreds. But, according to McCoy's report, neither U. S. nor Laotian officials are going after the drug traffickers. He notes that, according to a United Nations report, 70 per cent of the world's illicit opium has been coming from the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia — northeast Burma, northern Thailand and northern Laos — "capable of supplying the U. S. with unlimited quantities of heroin for generations."

McCoy's conclusion: "Unless something is done to change America's policies and priorities in Southeast Asia, the drug crisis will deepen and the heroin plague will continue to spread."

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STATINTL

Book World

Looking at Laos

THE END OF NOWHERE: American Policy Toward Laos Since 1954. By Charles A. Stevenson.

(Beacon, 367 pp. \$8.95)

VOICES FROM THE PLAIN OF JARS: Life Under an Air War. Compiled with an Introduction and Preface by Fred Branfman.

(Harper Colophon, 160 pp. \$1.95)

Reviewed by
Walt Haney

The reviewer taught in Laos for three years and is the author of "A Survey of Civilian Casualties Among Refugees from the Plain of Jars," published by the Kennedy Subcommittee on Refugees.

Millions upon millions of words have been written about America's involvement in Vietnam but remarkably little about United States actions in Laos—despite the fact that we have spent some \$5-\$8 billion on that small country in the last four years. These two books, though strikingly different in many respects, represent valuable contributions to a long-needed public discussion of the American role there (or as one U.S. official interviewed by Charles A. Stevenson calls that kingdom, and whence the title of his book, "The End of Nowhere").

Stevenson and Fred Branfman differ as much as their books. Stevenson is the pedant; footnotes and bibliography span almost 50 of his book's 300 pages. An earlier version of "The End of Nowhere" served as his doctoral dissertation at Harvard. In writing it, Stevenson interviewed 86 past and present government officials—from AID bureaucrats to CIA operatives, from ambassadors to congressional staff members. At first one thinks:

How remarkably thorough, this man must have traced down nearly every American official who ever had anything to do with Laos. But he did not interview a single Laotian.

Whether this omission represents the arrogance of American academia or whether it reflects a de facto acknowledgement that Laotians have never had much say about what the U.S. did in their country is not made clear. I suspect it represents a mixture of both. For as Stevenson writes:

"The basic fact is that Americans control most of what happens in areas allegiant to the Vientiane government. The United States provides essential advice, coordination and supplies for the war. Outside of a few cities, Americans or their agents perform most of the functions of the central government. U.S. funds support the economy and the government."

He also notes: "At \$350 million per year, direct American aid is about 10 times the size of the Laotian budget and about 75 per cent larger than the gross national product of \$202 million."

Though Stevenson traces the numerous blunders, deceptions and missed opportunities of American involvement in Laos, it is "Voices from the Plain of Jars" that brings home the tragedy. The book's editor, Fred Branfman, is an activist, deeply opposed to United States policy in Indochina, who lived and worked in Laos for four years—first as a volunteer with Interna-

and then as a free-lance journalist.

Like Stevenson, he interviewed dozens of people about U.S. policy in Laos. But unlike Stevenson he talked with people on the receiving end, with hundreds of Laotian refugees, which led him to the remarkable idea (and like many innovative ideas, quite obvious once it was put forward) that is the basis for this book. He simply asked the refugees to write of their lives and the war they experienced—as they called it, the war of the airplanes. The result, among all the hundreds of books on Indochina, is truly unique.

Its greatest weakness is Branfman's introduction. A history of Laos as abbreviated as his must inevitably contain some partial truths and consequent distortions. Yet the introduction to "Voices from the Plain of Jars" contains too many. For example, Branfman speaks of the present condition of the refugees from the Plain of Jars in almost unrelievedly bleak terms. He quotes one observer to the effect that the refugees are dying in refugee camps on the Vientiane Plain. He reports that they have been given "some of the poorest land in (Vientiane) province . . . most (of it) uncleared."

In fact the refugees have by now been completely resettled on land cleared for them by the Royal Lao government and the U.S. aid mission. Indeed, judged by conditions in neighboring Vietnam or Cambodia or even by conditions in previous years in Laos, the refugees from the Plain of Jars have been treated extremely well since soon after their evacuation from the Plain. Yet to be given shelter and medical aid and to be resettled was surely the least they were owed. And besides, their treatment after becoming refugees is not the main issue raised by this volume of essays.

The real issue, simply put, is why was the Plain of Jars destroyed, completely leveled by bombs? Again and again the essays and drawings by the refugees call out this plaint: Why did the planes bomb?

Stevenson almost completely ignores the issue of why the Plain of Jars was bombed. His book does more to explain why the once verdant

land now does Branfman's. (Branfman speaks of a secret decision to wage an air war against the Plain, as if there was some sort of huge conspiracy in the U.S. government when even the Pentagon Papers afford little evidence to support such a theory.) First, Stevenson shows the cavalier indifference of U.S. officials. For example, Dean Rusk told Stevenson, "After 1963, Laos was only the wart on the hog of Vietnam." And Chester Cooper, a member of the National Security Council from 1961 to 1967 commented, "Laos was not all that goddamned important."

Second, by the example of his own analysis, Stevenson helps to explain why the Plain was destroyed. For like the policymakers he studies, Stevenson carefully avoids moral judgments of who escalated the conflict in Laos, of why the U.S. did what it did in Laos and whether our actions can possibly be justified by the ends we seek. Matter-of-factly he writes:

"What could have been done differently in the past? What can and should be done in the future? These questions have not been addressed directly because the main purpose of this book is to explain and understand the policymaking process rather than to evaluate or criticize the results of that process."

Stevenson does not ask the vital question of why the bombs were dropped on so many innocent Laotians. For all his research, he never comes to grips with the question of why. Why is the United States spending \$1 billion annually to bomb a country whose gross national product is only \$200 million? Why are we spending 23 times more to bomb Laos than we are on economic assistance to that country? Why have the Laotian provincial capitals of Xieng Khouang and Sam Neua been completely destroyed by bombing? Why? Perhaps because not enough people in responsible positions ever stopped to ask why.

Branfman, though his answers are not always completely credible, at least has the insight and the courage to ask the important ques-

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STATINTL

U.S. Terms Damage to Dikes Minor and Accidental

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 26 — The Administration said today that any damage done to North Vietnam's dike system by American bombing was accidental and had only "the most incidental and minor impact" on the system.

Repeating what has become an almost daily denial that American aircraft are deliberately bombing the irrigation system, the State Department said that any damage to the dikes was a result of legitimate attacks on military installations such as anti-aircraft sites.

Charles W. Bray 3d, the department spokesman, said that the United States had evidence to bear out his contention that "there has been no new indication of anything but the most incidental and minor impact on the system of levees as the result of strikes against military installations."

"This is a fact," he said.

Administration Annoyed

In recent days, the Administration has made no secret of its annoyance and frustration over the growing world concern that the American bombing of North Vietnam might lead to catastrophic results during the current rainy season if the dike system breaks down.

North Vietnam has repeatedly charged the United States with systematic bombing of the dikes and has invited various observers to inspect the dikes.

Expressions of concern have

come from such sources as the Rev. Dr. Eugene Carson Blake, secretary general of the World Council of Churches and Secretary General Waldheim of the United Nations.

President Nixon, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, and Secretary of State William P. Rogers have denied that American aircraft have been authorized to bomb the dike system.

But for a month, State and Defense Department officials

have acknowledged — as Mr. Bray did today — that some bombs may have fallen on or near the earthen levees along the Red River, either by inadvertence or because a military target was there.

The Administration made plans to hold a special briefing for newsmen yesterday to present photographs to buttress its arguments but at the last moment the briefing was not held. Informed sources said that the Administration recognized that Hanoi could also produce photographs.

"We could show an undamaged dike and they could show one with a crater in it. Or if they didn't have one, they could drop a mortar in it and make one," one State Department official said.

So far, despite the start of the heavy rainy season, there have been no reports of any flooding. The Hanoi press has printed several articles exhorting the population to take part in the regular summer dike building program to prevent a repetition of last year's flooding, the worst since 1944.

In another matter, Administration witnesses opposed to

day the adoption of a Senate resolution that would outlaw the use of weather modification as a means of war.

Witnesses from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Defense Department refused to discuss the military uses of weather modification, asserting that such information was classified. They testified before a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on oceans and international environment.

Senator Claiborne Pell, Democrat of Rhode Island, the subcommittee chairman, said there was "no doubt in my mind that the United States has indeed been conducting weather modification operations in Southeast Asia."

The New York Times reported on July 3 that the United States Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency had conducted cloud-seeding operations over Laos since 1967, and over South and North Vietnam since 1968. The Pentagon has denied that any of its aircraft were involved in seeding over North Vietnam but has refused to discuss operations elsewhere.

July 24, 1972

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

in line with the changes already voted by the Senate in this bill?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator repeat his parliamentary inquiry?

Mr. HUGHES. Is the section 15 mentioned in this amendment now a properly numbered section, in view of the changes already made in the proposed legislation before the Senate today?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator ask unanimous consent that the amendment be properly numbered?

The Parliamentarian informs the Presiding Officer that that will take care of the problem of the Senator from Iowa.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be properly numbered to conform with the changes already made in the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

FOOD FOR PEACE VERSUS FOOD FOR WAR

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I was startled to read an article in this morning's paper citing the latest report on the food-for-peace program and noting that in some instances about 80 percent of the payment received for agricultural commodities is funneled back to the local governments for military equipment and facilities.

On further investigation, I discovered that this activity is perfectly legal under section 104(c) of Public Law 480, which permits agreements to use these repayments "To procure equipment, materials, facilities, and services for the common defense including internal security."

Perhaps, Mr. President, I am singularly naive in supposing that this fine program—which I have long supported and which has done so much to help share America's abundance with the hungry and undernourished people of the world—would be used only for peaceful activities.

After all, the declaration of policy at the start of this law declares a major purpose:

To use the abundant agricultural productivity of the United States to combat hunger and malnutrition and to encourage economic development in the developing countries, with particular emphasis on assistance to those countries that are determined to improve their own agricultural production.

But there is another declared purpose, one which has apparently become a blank check for many activities abroad:

To promote in other ways the foreign policy of the United States.

This catch-all clause has permitted the U.S. Government to return nearly three-quarters of a billion dollars to the government of South Vietnam in the form of military aid, nearly \$600 million to the government of South Korea, and now we are doing the same in Cambodia. Over the years since 1954 we have returned over \$1.7 billion in defense-related aid.

Although this amounts to only 13 percent of total Public Law 480 assistance, the figure is about 80 percent for Vietnam and Korea.

Perhaps Congress would approve such provisions if given the opportunity. But I believe that we should be given that opportunity.

Otherwise, we may again be drawn into military arrangements without our full knowledge and consent.

Personally, I consider the use of food for peace as food for war to be a perversion of the basic intent of Congress. I also believe that it does our credibility no good at home or abroad to have these funds rechanneled for war under the label of food for peace.

For too long we have learned, after the fact, of unauthorized funds going for foreign aid—the under-valued excess defense articles, the CIA money for Laos which has been channeled through the AID budget, and the quiet reprogramming which leads to mushrooming commitments without the prior consent of Congress.

This is merely another example of such concealed aid.

In order that Congress can advise and consent to such agreements, I am today offering an amendment to the pending bill which would provide simply that no agreement for common defense purposes under Public Law 480 shall be entered into unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by Congress.

Since the hour is late and the time on this bill is short, I believe that this provision would give Congress the opportunity to step back and look at these disguised military aid programs—and then accept or reject them as we choose.

Mr. President, as I have stated, this amendment, very simply, would give Congress and the proper committees the right from this point on, after the passage and signing into law of this bill, to review these matters if our Government wants to rechannel the food for peace funds into military channels.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUGHES. I yield to the distinguished Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me 3 minutes?

Mr. HUGHES. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I am very pleased to join the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES) in offering this amendment.

I was very much disturbed this morning to read reports indicating that the United States had funneled \$78 million into South Vietnam's war budget from the surplus agriculture commodities under the terms of Public Law 480. The report was brought to our attention this morning in the press. I ask unanimous consent that the AP story on the White House report, entitled "Food for Peace Funds Arm Saigon" on food-for-peace operations in Indochina last year, be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

"FOOD FOR PEACE" FUNDS ARM SAIGON

A White House report shows the United States funneled \$78 million last year into South Vietnam's war budget under the Food for Peace foreign-aid program.

The disclosure came in a report to Congress on Food for Peace operations last year. It was signed by President Nixon on June 29.

According to the report, South Vietnam

through 1971 received \$919.8 million worth of U.S. farm commodities under Food for Peace. Of that, \$712.7 million was kicked back to the Saigon government to use for "common defense" purposes.

Authority for the expenditures is provided in Section 104-C of the Food for Peace law.

Further, the report shows, Korea last year received \$20 million Food for Peace aid to help pay military bills, and Cambodia got \$7.4 million.

Through 1971, Korea had received \$593.1 million in "common defense" funds under Food for Peace out of a total aid under the program of \$752.2 million. Cambodia began receiving the aid last year.

Under a typical arrangement, the United States agrees to provide South Vietnam with farm commodities, to be paid for with local currencies. About 80 per cent is then kicked back for "common defense" purposes.

The report says: "The major uses . . . are for personnel equipment, mostly clothing, construction and construction materials, and local services provided for the United States Military Assistance Command—Vietnam."

Over-all supervision of the "common defense" money is handled by the U.S. Department of Defense and the Agency for International Development, the report says.

In the case of Korea, the study says the money is used "to help offset the increasing defense costs" which are being transferred from U.S. military aid mission to the Korean defense budget.

The money in Cambodia is used "for military pay and allowances," the report says.

"Although 1971 was the last year local currency arrangements will be signed, it is anticipated that 104-C grants will continue to be made to Vietnam and Cambodia out of funds generated under credit agreements," the report says.

Since Food for Peace was enacted in 1954, more than \$1.7 billion has been spent on "common defense" arrangements. The report shows that about \$12.9 billion in total aid, the military kickbacks have amounted to 13 per cent.

Although Vietnam, Korea and Cambodia are the only current recipients, many countries over the years have shared in the "common defense" benefits.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, last year, you may recall, the Presiding Officer now in the chair (Mr. PROXMIER) I am sure will, introduced an amendment sponsored by the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIER), the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN), and myself to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, designed to repeal the wording in Public Law 480 which in practice had become a means for the U.S. Government to provide additional military assistance beyond the amounts authorized or appropriated by Congress. The amendment was designed to restore the original purpose of Public Law 480 of which I was one of the earlier sponsors.

Public Law 480 is the Food for Peace Act. Its purpose is to promote international trade in agricultural commodities, to combat hunger and malnutrition, and to further economic development.

Putting \$78 million into South Vietnam's defense budget hardly fulfills the spirit of the Food for Peace Act. It is hardly in keeping with the amendment introduced last year, the Proxmire-Humphrey-Mansfield-McGovern amendment, written into law as Public Law 93-226. This amendment attempted to close a loophole and to prohibit any use of Public Law 480 funds for military purposes. That was its intent, and that was the

STATINTL

NEW HAVEN, CONN.
JOURNAL-COURIER
JUL 24 1972
M - 32,217

CIA Said Eyeing Student's Book

A Yale University graduate student's forthcoming book on heroin traffic in Southeast Asia is reportedly being reviewed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Alfred W. McCoy, 26, of 29 Lake Place, a Ph.D. student in Southeast Asian studies, spent 18 months in Asia investigating narcotics operations and recently testified before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Aid.

He testified at the time that aircraft chartered by the CIA and the Agency for International Development "have been transporting opium harvested by the agency's tribal mercenaries on a regular basis."

The CIA, with the permission of Harper & Row, the book's publishers, is reviewing the manuscript of McCoy's book with the intention of demonstrating that some of the book's claims are "totally false and without foundation," according to a recent article in The New York Times.

McCoy testified in two Congressional appearances in June that the material in the forthcoming book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia", was based on more than 250 interviews, some with CIA officials.

In a chapter of the book printed in the current issue of Harper's Magazine, McCoy charged that "American involvement has gone beyond coincidental complicity; embassies have consciously covered up involvement by client governments, CIA contract airlines have reportedly carried opium and individual CIA men have abetted the opium traffic."

At the time of his Congressional testimony, McCoy was described as a "very thorough scholar and not the antiwar type" by a senate staff member.

In the magazine article, McCoy wrote that during the last several months of 1970, more American soldiers were evacuated "mas casualties from South Vietnam for drug-related reasons than for reasons having to do with war wounds."

He also wrote that farmers in

the Golden Triangle—northeastern Burma, northern Thailand and northern Laos—produce 70 per cent of the world's supply of raw opium and that much of it is being funneled to addicts on New York streets.

"After pouring billions of dollars into Southeast Asia for over 20 years, the United States has acquired enormous power in the region. And it has used this power to create new na-

tions were non-existent, to hand pick prime ministers, to topple governments and to crush revolutions.

"Unless something is done to change America's policies and priorities in Southeast Asia, the drug crisis will deepen and the heroin plague will continue to spread," McCoy wrote.

McCoy could not be reached Sunday night for comment.

KATHRYN KOLKHORST

24 JUL 1972

STATINTL

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Report to U.S. Sees No Hope of Halting Asian Drug Traffic

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 23—A Cabinet-level report has concluded that, contrary to the Nixon Administration's public optimism, "there is no prospect" of stemming the smuggling of narcotics by air and sea in Southeast Asia "under any conditions that can realistically be projected."

"This is so," the report, dated Feb. 21, 1972, said, "because the governments in the region are unable and, in some cases, unwilling to do those things that would have to be done by them if a truly effective effort were to be made."

The report, prepared by officials of the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department and the Defense Department, noted that "the most basic problem, and the one that unfortunately appears least likely of any early solution, is the corruption, collusion and indifference at some places in some governments, particularly Thailand and South Vietnam, that precludes more effective suppression of traffic by the governments on whose territory it takes place."

The report sharply contradicts the official Administration position and Government intelligence sources say its conclusions are still valid today. In May, Secretary of State William P. Rogers told a Senate subcommittee that "we think all the countries are cooperating with us and we are quite satisfied with that cooperation."

Similarly, Nelson G. Gross, Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters, testified before Congress in June on the subject of narcotics smuggling that "the governments of Thailand, Laos and Vietnam have already joined us in the fight and, while we have a long way to go, we feel that during the past year some real progress has been achieved."

All officials concerned with the drug problem acknowledge that the United States agencies, under personal prodding from President Nixon, have begun an intensive effort to stem international narcotics traffic.

But the report says that effort is far less effective today than Administration officials say it is.

Critics' Charges Backed

Two leading critics of what they allege to be the Government's laxness in stopping the flow of narcotics are Representative Robert H. Steele, Republican of Connecticut, and Alfred W. McCoy, a 26-year-old Yale graduate student who has written a book on narcotics in Southeast Asia. The New York Times reported Saturday that Mr. McCoy's allegations concerning the C.I.A. and the drug traffic had been the subject of an intense and unusually public rebuttal by the agency.

The Cabinet-level report, made available to The Times, buttressed many of the charges made by the two critics, particularly about the pivotal importance of Thailand to the international drug smugglers. Thailand is also a major Air Force staging area for the United States.

In a report on the world heroin problem last year, Mr. Steele wrote that "from the American viewpoint, Thailand is as important to the control of the illegal international traffic in narcotics as Turkey. While all of the opium produced in Southeast Asia is not grown in Thailand, most of it is smuggled through that country."

Mr. Steele's report, filed with the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, noted that many American citizens had established residence in Bangkok, and had moved into the narcotics trade. The report added that the inability of the United States to have a few notorious smugglers deported had led some intelligence officials to conclude that the men were paying Thai officials for protection.

Mr. McCoy said in testimony before Congressional committees last month that hundreds of tons of Burmese opium passed through Thailand every year to international markets in Europe and the United States and that 80 to 90 per cent of the opium was carried by Chinese Nationalist paramilitary teams that were at one time paid by the C.I.A.

There are a number of opium refineries along the northern Thai border, he said, and much of the processed high-quality heroin is shipped by trawler to Hong Kong.

"Even though they are heavily involved in the narcotics traffic," Mr. McCoy testified, "these Nationalist Chinese irregular units are closely allied with the Thai Government." He said that Thai Government police and paramilitary units in the northern border area and collect an "import duty" of about \$2.50 a

pound of heroin. In this activity, he said, is monitored by United States intelligence agencies.

Thai-U.S. Agreements Cited

Mr. Gross, the State Department's adviser on international narcotics, said in his Congressional testimony that "during the past year the Thais have increased their efforts in the drug field with United States and United Nations assistance." He cited two agreements, signed in late 1971, calling for more cooperation and more long-range planning between Thai and United States officials to stamp out the trade.

"Based on all intelligence information available," Mr. Gross testified, "the leaders of the Thai Government are not engaged in the opium or heroin traffic, nor are they extending protection to traffickers." He added that the top police official in Thailand had publicly stated that he would punish any corrupt official.

The cabinet-level report, submitted to the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, asked "highest priority" for suppression of the traffic by Thai trawlers, noting that each trawler "would represent something like 6 per cent of annual United States consumption of heroin."

The report said that the trawler traffic should have priority because "it is possible to attack the Thai trawler traffic without seeking the cooperation of Thai authorities and running the attendant risks of leaks, tip-offs and betrayals."


After such a seizure, the report said, the United States Embassy in Bangkok could "repeat with still greater force and insistence the representations it has already often made to the Government of Thailand" for more effective efforts "to interdict traffic from the north of Thailand to Bangkok and also the loading of narcotics on ships in Thai harbors."

At another point in the report, a general complaint was voiced. "It should surely be possible to convey to the right Thai or Vietnamese officials the mood of the Congress and the Administration on the subject of drugs," the report said. "No real progress can be made on the problem of illicit traffic until and unless the local governments concerned make it a matter of highest priority."

Representatives Steele, Lester L. Wolff, Democrat of Nassau County, and Morgan F. Murphy, Democrat of Illinois, have sponsored legislation that would cut off more than \$100-million in foreign aid to Thailand unless she took more action against the heroin traffic. Their measure cleared the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 21


and is included in the Foreign Assistance Act, now pending.

During a Congressional hearing into drug traffic last month, Representative Wolff disputed the Administration's contention that it was making "real progress" in stemming the narcotics flow and said, "we think the trade has got so much protection in high places in Thailand that the Administration is afraid they'll tell us to take our air bases out if we put too much pressure on them."



The New York Times

Nelson G. Gross asserted that there has been progress against smuggling.



United Press International

Robert H. Steele charged the Government is lax in halting flow of drugs.

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C.I.A. AIDES ASSAIL ASIA DRUG CHARGE

Agency Fights Reports That It Ignored Heroin Traffic Among Allies of U.S.

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 21 —

The Central Intelligence Agency has begun a public battle against accusations that it knew of but failed to stem the heroin traffic of United States allies in Southeast Asia.

In recent weeks, high-ranking officials of the C.I.A. have signed letters for publication to a newspaper and magazine, granted a rare on-the-record interview at the agency's headquarters in McLean, Va., and — most significantly — persuaded the publishers of a forthcoming expose on the C.I.A. and the drug traffic to permit it to review the manuscript prior to publication.

The target of all these measures has been the recent writings and Congressional testimony of Alfred W. McCoy, a 26-year-old Yale graduate student who spent 18 months investigating the narcotics operations in Southeast Asia. His book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," is scheduled to be published by Harper & Row in mid-September—barring delays caused by the intelligence agency's review.

In his book, Mr. McCoy alleged that both C.I.A. and State Department officials have provided political and military support for America's Indo-Chinese allies actively engaged in the drug traffic, have consciously covered up evidence of such involvement, and have been actively involved themselves in narcotic trade.

C.I.A. officials said they had reason to believe that Mr. McCoy's book contained many unwarranted, unproven and fallacious accusations. They acknowledged that the public stance in opposition to such allegations was a departure from the usual "low profile" of the agency, but they insisted that there was no evidence linking the agency to drug traffic in Southeast Asia. One well-informed Government official directly responsible for

monitoring the illegal flow of narcotics complained in an interview that many of Mr. McCoy's charges "are out of date." "Go back three or four years," he said, "and no one was concerned about this. It wasn't until our own troops started to get addicted, until 1968 or '69, that anyone was aware" of the narcotics problems in Southeast Asia.

This official said that in the eyes of the C.I.A., the charges were "unfair." He said of the C.I.A., "they think they're taking the heat for being unaware and not doing anything about something that was going on two or three years ago."

Based on 250 Interviews

During two Congressional appearances last month, Mr. McCoy testified that his accusations were based on more than 250 interviews, some of them with past and present officials of the C.I.A. He said that top-level South Vietnamese officials, including President Nguyen Van Thieu and Premier Tran Van Kiem, were specifically involved.

In July, 1971, Representative Robert H. Steele, Republican of Connecticut, said during a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee hearing that the United States Government possessed "hard intelligence" linking a number of high-ranking Southeast Asian officials, including Maj. Gen. Ngo Dzu, then commander of the South Vietnamese II Corps, with involvement in the narcotics trade. Mr. Steele's accusations were denied and mostly ignored.

Mr. McCoy also alleged that Corsican and American syndicate gangsters had become involved in the narcotics trade. He said that such information was known to the C.I.A. In a chapter of his book published in this month's Harper's Magazine, Mr. McCoy further charged that in 1967 the infamous "Golden Triangle"—an opium-producing area embracing parts of northeastern Burma, northern Thailand and northern Laos—was producing about 1,000 tons of raw opium annually, then about 70 per cent of the world's supply.

The bulk of Mr. McCoy's accusations—both in the magazine and during the Congressional hearings—failed to gain much national attention. Nonetheless, the C.I.A. began its unusual public defense after a Washington Star reporter cited some of Mr. McCoy's allegations in a column.

Letter Sent to Paper

Two letters were sent to the newspaper for publication. Colby, the executive director of the C.I.A., and the other by Paul C. Velte Jr., a Wash-

ington-based official with Air America, a charter airline that flies missions for the C.I.A. in Southeast Asia. Both categorically denied the allegations linking C.I.A. personnel to any knowledge of or activity in the drug traffic.

A similar letter of disavowal, signed by Mr. Colby, was sent for publication to the publisher of Harper's Magazine within the last week. Robert Schnayer, the magazine's editor, said that the letter would be published as soon as possible.

The C.I.A. began its approach to Harper & Row in early June, apparently after learning of Mr. McCoy's appearance before the Senate subcommittee. Cord Meyer Jr., described as a senior agency official, met with officials of the publishing concern and informally asked for a copy of the manuscript for review prior to publication.

On July 5, a formal letter making the request, signed by Lawrence R. Houston, general counsel of the C.I.A. was sent to Harper & Row.

Mr. Houston's request was not based on national security, but on the thesis that "allegations concerning involvement of the U.S. Government [in drug traffic] or the participation of American citizens should be made only if based on hard evidence."

The letter continued: "It is our belief that no reputable publishing house would wish to publish such allegations without being assured that the supporting evidence was valid." If the manuscript were handed over, the letter said, "we believe we could demonstrate to you that a considerable number of Mr. McCoy's claims about this agency's alleged involvement are totally false and without foundation, a number are distorted beyond recognition, and none is based on convincing evidence." A copy of the letter was made available to The New York Times.

Mr. McCoy, in an interview, said that the book had been commissioned by Harper & Row and carefully and totally reviewed by its attorneys with no complaint until the C.I.A. request was made.

B. Brooks Thomas, vice president and general counsel of the publishing house, said in an interview in New York, "We don't have any doubts about the book at all. We've had it reviewed by others and we're persuaded that the work is amply documented and scholarly."

"We're not submitting to censorship or anything like that," Mr. Thomas said. "We're taking a responsible middle position. We should have the chance to review it." If Mr. McCoy

did not agree, he added, Harper & Row would not publish the book.

In a subsequent interview, Robert L. Bernstein, president of Random House and president of the Association of American Publishers, Inc., said that his concern had twice refused official C.I.A. requests for permission to revise manuscripts.

"In general," Mr. Bernstein said, "our opinion would be that we would not publish a book endangering the life of anybody working for the C.I.A. or an other Government agency. Short of that, we would publish any valid criticism."

In a series of interviews with The New York Times, a number of present and former officials of the C.I.A. acknowledged that smuggling and "looking the other way" was common throughout Southeast Asia during the nineteen-sixties. But many noted that the agency had since taken strong steps to curb such practices.

One official, who spent many years in Southeast Asia, said, "I don't believe that agency staff personnel were dealing in opium. But if you're talking about Air America hauling the stuff around, then I'll bet my bottom dollar that they were in it."

Another former C.I.A. agent described Mr. McCoy's published writings as "1 per cent tendentious and 90 per cent of the most valuable contribution I can think of."

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MILTON VIORST

The Switch to Automated Warfare

Just in case you've forgotten how all that fuss down in Miami Beach (and since) got started, may I remind you that it was a war in Indochina—which, in the absence of large American casualties, has dropped off the front pages again.

For myself, I'm grateful for a little book by Fred Branfman, who spent four years in Laos, called "Voices From the Plain of Jars." It's an account, largely in the words of the victims, of what living beneath an American air campaign is like. It's worth \$1.95 for this grim reminder of Orwellian struggle.

The Plain of Jars, Branfman tells us, is a small and beautiful plateau, whose 150,000 inhabitants lived in virtual isolation from the outside world in tiny farming villages. For centuries, the Plain was fought over by different tribal groups, none of which seemed to hold it for very long.

In 1964, the Plain was taken rather effortlessly from the right-wing Laotian heirs of the French colonial regime by a local Communist group called the Pathet Lao. To rescue it from this fate, the United States decided to bomb the Plain of Jars, as we say, back into the Stone Age.

The entire operation was conceived by the CIA—and, of course, the American people were told nothing about it. Over the ensuing years, U.S. bombers literally destroyed the ancient society there, killing tens of thousands of people and driving the others into the forests and the cities.

It was a stirring American victory or, as Tacitus put it, "where they make a desert, they call it peace." It is hard to know what strategic purpose was served—but the Plain of Jars victory has been amply confirmed by outside sources.

At first, I was disposed to think that Branfman exaggerated when he wrote: "Although few people realize it as yet, the disappearance of the Plain of Jars is one of the signal events of our time, as significant in its own way . . . as the atomic bombing of Hiroshima."

He went on to explain that the Plain of Jars marked the historical advent of "automated" warfare.

The armies of our allies, he pointed out, were so much weaker than their adversaries that conventional air support was inadequate. "So," he wrote, "the traditional roles of air and ground forces were reversed." Air power became the principal arm of conquest, with ground forces supplementing the bombs.

To a superpower, he said, the advantages of automated war are that it is "relatively inexpensive and . . . its own citizens are barely or not at all aware of it, and their leaders are free to wage war at their pleasure."

But, even more frighteningly, he adds: "The basic psychology of war is altered as well. Heretofore, hatred of the enemy and love of country or faith—real or manufactured—has been a necessary prerequisite for sending men off to war."

"However, when tens of thousands of technicians are called upon to wage war against a country and a people they will never see, then the need for such motivation disappears. When even the relatively few who do enter enemy territory remain 5,000 feet in the air and wage battle by pushing buttons and pulling levers to release ordnance on unseen persons below, even the tenuous human bonds which once existed between enemies are dissolved."

"War becomes a technical exercise, bereft of malice or rancor, freeing combatants

from pangs of conscience and the moral constraints."

Branfman finished his book before the full implications of President Nixon's Indochina strategy became apparent—but it is clear that the lessons we learned over the Plain of Jars have been incorporated into the fighting in South Vietnam.

We no longer fight on the ground. We send our bombers in from our sanctuaries in Thailand, Guam and the carriers in the Tonkin Gulf. After releasing their destruction, the technicians who fly them return home to martinis and a hot supper.

Not even the Pentagon claims that the South Vietnamese army is more than a minor auxiliary of American air power.

As Secretary Laird said recently, we will "be continuing air and sea power in Asia for a good time. The idea that somehow or other the Nixon Doctrine means that we will not have air or sea power in Asia is a great mistake."

So the next time someone tells you how swell it is that President Nixon has wound down the war in Vietnam, you can answer that he hasn't wound down anything. He's just shifted from the obsolete kind of war to the new, invigorating automated war.

STATINTL

Laos War Being Run on a Personal Basis

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE

Special to The Star-News

VIENTIANE — Considerable rivalry exists between the U.S. State and Defense departments on who should run the Laos war and how the Laos war should be run, well-informed U.S. official sources say.

This rivalry is so great that sometimes one group of U.S. officials is not totally aware of what other another department is doing, sources said. Right now the Laos war is run by the State Department through its man on the scene, U.S. Ambassador G. McMurtre Godley.

Personal Direction

Godley orchestrates the war very personally, deciding for example whether and where B52 strikes should be made. To help and advise him from the field the ambassador has the Central Intelligence Agency. The agency acts as the State Department's executive assistant in Laos with its employees coordinating and directing the activities of the Laos irregular army, which takes the brunt of the Laos fighting.

Representing the defense Department is the 127-man army of the attaches' office. It, too, advises the ambassador, but its men in the field are found only with units of the Royal Lao Army, which does not do very much fighting in Laos.

Senior army attaches are present at most policy meetings, but a senior U.S. official said this does not mean they are always up to date on a fast-moving military situation because the CIA doesn't always tell them. A source said one Army attache was "just about in tears when he left Laos because he couldn't keep up with it (the situation)."

During the military crisis in north Laos the first three months of this year, Godley was conferring with Central Intelligence Agency officials as soon as they returned from the field. The sessions were in private, U.S. owned buildings at the Vientiane airport, not at full dress embassy team meetings with army attaches present.

Reports Conflicted

During the battle for the provincial capital of Khong Se-done the U.S. Army was saying the mountain overlooking the town was in friendly hands when in fact it wasn't, according to irregular commanders on the scene. This preeminence of the State Department in a war has not caused the top-ranking U.S. military to love Godley.

A high-ranking visitor here from Cincpac (Commander in Chief Pacific) headquarters in Hawaii snapped "Get rid of that man (Godley) and we would be all right."

The Defense Department has assigned an officer to oversee what Godley does in a roundabout way.

The officer is Brig. Gen. John W. Vessey, deputy chief of the U.S. military mission to Thailand. Vessey is based at Udorn in northeast Thailand, and is in charge of logistics for the Laos war, which is paid through Defense Department funds. "Vessey's very sharp, a kind of watchdog on Mac," is how one U.S. source described him. Most of the Defense Department's animus seems directed at the State Department rather than the Central Intelligence Agency. "That's because they know the CIA wants to get out of this business," an informed American source said. "The Army would like to be doing what the CIA is doing — outrunning the irregulars," one source said. And, in fact, the Defense Department is getting more and more into the act in Laos through control of funds for the war.

Except for \$7.1 million from the Defense Department, the CIA has been funding the Lao irregulars to the tune of close to \$100 million. All costs of Lao irregulars, however, will come out of Defense Department

funds in fiscal 1973, according to a report this year for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The Defense Department is also taking over the \$44 million cost of air supply contracts with the U.S. Military Air Services and Laos

Air Development, contractors who handle the delivery of war supplies and other chores for the U.S. government in Laos.

Hidden by State

These costs were previously hidden in U.S. aid funds under State Department control. Unfortunately, one shudders at the thought the U.S. Army and Defense Department are running the Laos war. For under their aegis, most U.S. officials believe, U.S. involvement would become greater and more costly.

As ambassador, Godley is abreast of political developments and therefore better able to orchestrate the war.

The CIA has set up a separate Laos army relatively free from the corruption and intrigue which plagues the Royal army. Irregular officers are promoted or demoted on merit, the soldiers are paid on time, they are fighting on a voluntary basis and they fight pretty well.

Guerrilla Instruction

The agency has introduced some guerrilla warfare concepts (though not enough) such as mobility, keeping away from static defense and using small teams to find the enemy. Each individual weapon is accountable and frequent on-the-scene inspection by Americans insures against material wastage.

The State Department, CIA and Army have all sent their best officials to Laos, and it is easy to sympathize with U.S. Army frustrations here with a war nobody will let them get into. But given the Army's

record in South Vietnam, U.S. officials here prefer to see the war remain in the competent hands of the State Department's Godley and the CIA.

Generals, Staffs, Cooks

They say there has only been a rise of 219 in the number of Americans involved in the Laos war with 1,259 Americans involved in early 1972 compared to 1,040 in March 1971.

"The Army would have generals, an appropriate staff, then cooks for the staff and so on. We'd never get out of here if they were running it," an American official said.

Sources said the Army had shown itself not to be geared for guerrilla warfare in Vietnam just from the point of view of infantry tactics alone. "They'd probably get the Lao going on these big fancy operations with no results," sources scoffed. All U.S. officials here, however, admit to

one major problem looming which concerns State, Defense and CIA.

Downgrade or Upgrade?

The problem is that at some point Lao irregulars and the Royal army will have to be integrated. How does one do it? U.S. officials ask.

Obviously the latter is more desirable and if it is going to be done, who is going to do it? The CIA tends to shy away from further involvement here and that leaves the job to the Defense Department, informed U.S. sources say. This plus increased participation in funding by the Defense Department indicates the Pentagon is likely to play an increased role in Laos. Some Americans believe that is the situation if Laos and Laos conglomerate military forces survive long enough against the continuing North Vietnamese pressure — currently a very questionable factor indeed.

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A Visit to a Secret American Base in Thailand

By Peter Smith

Pacific News Service

PHITSANULOK, Thailand—In a U-shaped bend of a small river about 15 miles east of this northern district capital lies a secret U.S. military training base known as Camp Saritsana.

Near the point where I had been told to turn off the road to find the camp, a Thai waitress in a small restaurant said that there were usually about 1,000 Thai soldiers at the site, but that most had just left. She also told me that 10 or 15 Americans were stationed there, and that planes landed on an average of five times a day.

As I walked along the river away from the highway, the whine of diesel generators guided me until I saw several concrete and wooden buildings, a 100-foot-high water tower, and a generator shed. Further up, a steel suspension bridge carried truck traffic across the river. The scene reminded me of places where I had served in Vietnam and Thailand.

At Saritsana, U.S. Army Special Forces train Thai soldiers for combat in neighboring Laos. Since the early '60s, CIA-financed Meo mercenary armies, led by their most powerful chieftain Vang Pao, have been fighting in Laos, and estimates of the number of Meo men killed run as high as 50 per cent. To replace these losses, the United States has been training Thais for the last three years. But the training and the fact that Thailand has been sending troops to Laos have not been acknowledged by U.S. or Thai officials.

Senate Report

But a U.S. Senate subcommittee on security agreements and commitments abroad reported last year:

"The Thai irregular program . . . was designed by the CIA specifically along the lines of the irregular program in Laos. The CIA

supervises and pays for the tag, a frequent tip-off that training of these irregulars people are engaged in activity which might not be their salary, allowances (including death benefits), and operational costs in Laos."

These Northern Thai speak a dialect similar to Meo dialect, and they are easily integrated into Vang Pao's forces.

At the camp, I was stopped at the main gate by three Thai guards, who called their commanding officer, a Thai special forces sergeant major, on the phone. When I told him I had once served with the U.S. Special Forces in Thailand and just wanted to talk with some Americans on the base, he said, "Sure, come on." One of the guards got on the back of my motorcycle and we drove to headquarters.

The 50-acre site is divided roughly in the middle by an airstrip. Heavy woods surround the base. Ten barracks for Thai soldiers were on the left side of the entrance road. Elsewhere on the grounds were a Thai special forces headquarters, a jump tower and cable rig for parachute training, a drying loft for the parachutes, and several maintenance buildings.

'Air America' Sign

After checking with the Thai sergeant major, the guard took me across the runway to a building marked "Air America," the name of the charter line which flies secret missions for the CIA throughout Asia. My Thai escort ushered me into a U.S. Special Forces team room, where five men were having their morning beer. All wore civilian clothes or jungle fatigues without insignia or name

Scattered among the usual pin-ups and memorabilia of home were other signs. One said: "No war was ever won with moderation and civility. KILL!" Another said: "Make war, not peace. War is the final answer."

The men were polite, almost painfully so. They did not mention their mission, and when I expressed interest they changed the subject.

Finally one of the men offered to escort me to the gate, and I followed his truck out and waved to the Thai guards as I left.

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Letters to the Editor

SIR: I refer to the letter of W. E. Colby, executive director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who rebutted the charges made by some American newspapermen that the CIA was involved in opium trafficking. I do not question Colby's good faith, neither do I say that the CIA, as an entity, traffics in opium; but, I am sorry to say that there is more to these charges than mere "gossip, conjecture and old history."

I also know what I am talking about because I was involved in security matters for the South Vietnamese government under President Ngo Dinh Diem. In effect, one day, the President told me to investigate into the activities of our chief of secret police, chief of our own "CIA" and chief of military security, and to report directly to him, because, as he put it: "I cannot ask my own chiefs of police, 'CIA,' and military security to investigate into themselves."

I found out the corruption of two chiefs, and the President took very drastic measures against them. I have kept the contact with my security agents ever since. They firmly confirm that a few CIA agents in Indochina are involved in opium trafficking. But above all, a line must be drawn between Indochina and the rest of the world, because, due to the fact of the counter-insurgency warfare, the operations of the American CIA in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are extremely important when they are compared to operations of the same agency in other countries. In Indochina, the CIA is a real army with his own aerial fleet. A number of CIA operatives deal directly with Vietnamese, Lao, or Meo warlords or officials at the highest level, with whom they share the proceeds of the opium traffic. For good American citizens in the United States, it is very difficult to imagine the influence and power of these operatives in Indochina. Their power, in fact, is unlimited—they are the true rulers of Indochina; their desires are orders—no Vietnamese, Laotian or Cambodian official would dare resist their orders. Corruption growing from a de facto power affects some of these CIA operatives.

The traffic of opium involves a relatively large number of persons. Outside a few Americans, there are Vietnamese, Laotians and Meo who are involved. Since these persons have their clans, families and friends who live from this traffic, the total number of persons concerned become so great that it is impossible to keep secret the operations.

I also do not question the good faith of CIA Director Richard Helms when he said that "as an agency, in fact, we are heavily engaged in tracing the foreign roots of the drug traffic for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. We hope we are helping with a solution; we know we are not contributing to the problem . . ." However, as I said previously, a line must be drawn and a distinction must be made; for circumstances are not the same—there is not the vaguest resemblance between CIA operatives in Indochina and their colleagues operating in other countries.

In conclusion, CIA Director Helms and Colby, Miss Randal, and McCoy said the truth and did not contradict one another; they perhaps did not talk about the same country.

Tran Van Khiem,
Attorney, Former Deputy,
Vietnamese National Assembly.

Chevy Chase, Md.

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Letters to the Editor

Reply on CIA Drug Charges

SIR: On July 5, W. E. Colby, executive director of the Central Intelligence Agency, responded to a June 29 column by Judith Randal in a letter. He stated that charges of CIA involvement in the narcotics traffic from Southeast Asia were "unsubstantiated." Since I am one of the persons who have made such charges, I would like to give the basis for my findings.

The specific charge is that Air America aircraft chartered by the CIA have been transporting opium harvested by the CIA-supported Meo tribesmen in Laos. I have three sources for this information:

(1) This was told to me by Gen. Ouane Rattikone, former chief of staff of the Royal Laotian Army, who also admitted to me that he had controlled the opium traffic in northwestern Laos since 1962.

(2) Air America's involvement was confirmed by Gen. Thao Ma, former commander of the Laotian Air Force, who refused to carry opium for Gen. Ouane.

(3) I spent six days in August 1971 in the opium-growing Meo village of Long Pot, Laos. (The writer assures us that that is, in fact its name--Ed.) Ger Su Yang, the district officer, told me:

"Meo officers with three or four stripes (captain or more) came from Long Tieng to buy our opium. They came in American helicopters, perhaps two or three men at one time. The helicopter leaves them here for a few days and they walk to villages over there, then come back here and radioed Long Tieng to send another helicopter for them. They take the opium back to Long Tieng."

Verified by Others

This account was verified by other officials, farmers and soldiers in Long Pot. Ger Su Yang also reported that the helicopter pilots were always Americans. Long Pot harvests weighed approximately 700 kilos (1,543 pounds) and could not have been carried without the pilot's knowledge.

In my June 2 testimony before the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee, I charged that "by ignoring, covering up and failing to counteract the massive drug traffic from Southeast Asia, our government is aiding and abetting the influx of heroin into our nation." I stand by this charge. The U.S. has put top priority on its military and political goals in fighting the war in Indochina. As long as our Asian allies have fought the war, U.S. officials have tolerated governmental corruption. Narcotics trafficking has not been treated differently from stealing U.S. aid, currency manipulation or black marketeering, all of which are rampant.

The CIA has organized a mercenary army of mostly Meo tribesmen in Laos under Gen. Vang Pao. The Meos' cash crop has been opium, and the CIA merely followed their French colonial predecessors' dictum: "In order to have the Meo, one must buy their opium." The CIA may not have bought their opium, but did ship it to market.

Ignored Involvement

More importantly, the CIA, the U.S. Embassy and the whole U.S. apparatus in Laos ignored Gen. Ouane Rattikone's involvement in the narcotics traffic, even while American troops in Vietnam were being decimated by Laotian heroin. His involvement, as well as the location of the heroin laboratories, was common knowledge among even the most junior U.S. officials. As late as June 9, 1972, Nelson Gross, the State Department's drug coordinator, called my charges of Gen. Ouane's involvement "unsubstantiated allegations." However, John Warner of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in a June 19 interview in The Star admitted for the first time that Gen. Ouane controlled and protected the Laotian narcotics traffic for years. Colby quoted Warner in his letter to try to discredit my charges, but conveniently omitted mention that the former chief of staff of the Royal Laotian Army was also the chief narcotics trafficker.

Southeast Asia is fast becoming the major source of heroin for the U.S. market, and high government officials in Laos and South Vietnam are involved in the narcotics traffic. The U.S. government knows this but ignores and covers it up.

The time has come when we have to decide which is more important to our country--propping up corrupt governments in Southeast Asia or getting heroin out of our high schools.

Alfred W. McCoy.

New Haven, Conn.

Editor's Note: McCoy is the author of the Harper's Magazine article, "Flowers of Evil," appearing in its July, 1972, issue, quoted by Miss Randal.

STATINTL

M - 239,949
S - 350,303

America's new morality: 'What's worse, bombs or rain?'

FROM THE SAME people who gave the world the Gatling gun, the A-bomb and plastic shrapnel we now have, once again, a new, improved way of making war.

The U.S. Air Force and the CIA can now make it rain on your parade, whether that parade is a military convoy on the Ho Chi Minh Trail or a political demonstration in Saigon (or Louisville?).

We understand the Nixon administration's unwillingness to brag about the cloud-seeding operations that the United States has been conducting in Indochina. Any bragging, now—or even any admission that such operations have, indeed, taken place—would make it appear that Defense Secretary Laird lied to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last month when he was asked about Air Force rainmaking activities. The Secretary said, "We have not engaged in any over North Vietnam."

Now at least a dozen present and former military and civilian officials tell *The New York Times* that our planes have seeded clouds over North Vietnam at least as late as 1971—and over Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam as well.

In addition to damaging Secretary Laird's impeccable credibility, premature admissions to rainmaking might also lose Mr. Nixon the votes of those environmentalists, if any, who still take him seriously when he puts on his Smokey the Bear hat and proclaims himself hard to beat at admiring and protecting Mother Nature.

For it appears that Mr. Nixon, who rarely hesitates to rush in where angels and Democrats fear to tread, has outrained—as well as outbombed—the previous administration. State Department protests that our tinkering with Indochina's rainfall was taking environmental risks of unknown proportions apparently persuaded former Defense Secretary McNamara to call off cloud-seeding operations in 1967.

But, in the words of one pro-rainmaking official, "What's worse, dropping bombs or rain?"

Added ingredient possible

If we overlook the fact that Mr. Nixon and his generals (or perhaps, as seems to be common, the generals without Mr. Nixon's consent) are dropping both, it's a fascinating question.

The residents of our drought-stricken Southwest probably would reply that bombs are worse than rain. However, the citizens of Rapid City, S.D., or our eastern seaboard might not agree. And the tightly closed mouths of the people of Rapid City

tempt the people of Rapid City to ask a few more questions about that cloud-seeding experiment that was conducted in the Black Hills on the day their city was flooded and scores of their friends and relatives were killed.

The anonymous official's question also prompts a second question: Is the destruction wrought by our bombing in Indochina as indiscriminate as that wrought by the forces of nature? If it is, then we've been lied to again about the pinpoint accuracy of our attacks on war-supporting industries and supplies in North Vietnam, in which our "smart" bombs always seem to demolish our targets but leave the civilians unharmed. If it isn't, then the rain could be far worse than the bombing—especially during the two monsoon seasons when, as an official explained, the cloud-seeding amounts to "just trying to add on to something that you already got." One thing the Indochinese peoples have got during those seasons is the strong danger that they'll be wiped out by floods. And it's a safe bet that the soldiers in that American Special Forces camp that received seven inches of rain in two hours, courtesy of a CIA blunder, didn't laugh.

In addition to sizable quantities, the Americans, never content to let nature go unimproved-upon, can now deliver two kinds of rain—either the plain, old-fashioned variety or a new, improved rain with an extra secret ingredient. This new rain, according to one source, has "an acidic quality to it and it would foul up mechanical equipment—like radars, trucks and tanks."

We're left to wonder whether it damages other mechanisms, such as humans and trees. But even if it doesn't, we hope the White House reserves the fancy rain for export only. If our government begins using rain to break up political demonstrations, as the CIA did in Saigon when the Diem regime was tottering, we hope the protestors will be spared the additional indignity of having to hitch-hike home.

Richard Jordan Gatling, the inventor of that primitive machine gun that we see used with such effectiveness against the Indians in Western movies from time to time, hoped that by developing such a terrible weapon he would make men more reluctant to resort to arms. If meteorological warfare fulfills its potential, Mr. Gatling's dream might yet come true. Our future disputes may be settled by a few wizards—heads of state, maybe—at control panels, instructing Mother Nature where to send her floods, winds, earthquakes and hail.

There'll be no need of arms then, and "World War" will have a new meaning.

Pentagon:

Weather
As a
Weapon
Of War

WASHINGTON—Dr. Gordon J. F. MacDonald, a prominent geophysicist who had just completed a tour as vice president of the Defense Department's Institute of Defense Analysis, published in 1968 a little-noted but chilling study on the military potential of meteorological warfare. He listed a number of options available to those who would choose to tamper with nature. Among them:

- Altering the world's temperature by rocketing materials into the earth's upper atmosphere to either absorb light (thereby cooling the surface below) or absorb outgoing heat (thereby heating the surface below). This technique could be targeted at a specific area.

- Triggering tidal waves by setting off a series of underground explosions along the edge of the Continental Shelf, or by producing a natural earthquake. A guided tidal wave could be achieved by correctly shaping the energy-release sources.

- Changing the physical makeup of the atmosphere by creating, with a rocket or similar weapon, a "hole" in the important ozone layer between 10 and 30 miles up that is responsible for absorbing much of the ultra-violet light cast from the sun. Without the protective layer of ozone, a molecular form of oxygen, the radiation would be fatal to all human, plant and animal life that could not take shelter in the affected area below.

Dr. MacDonald (who is now a member of the White House Council on Environmental Quality) made it clear that his essay was based only on speculation. Last week, however, it became known that at least part of his macabre weather arsenal had been secretly in use by the United States since the 1960's.

Air Force planes, supported by the Central Intelligence Agency, have been

waging a systematic war of rain on the infiltration trails of Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam and South Vietnam. The intent: suppress enemy anti-missile fire, provide cover for South Vietnamese commando teams penetrating the North and hinder the movement of men and matériel from North Vietnam into the South.

The first experimental rain-making mission was flown by the C.I.A. in South Vietnam in 1963, but it was not until 1965 that a group of Air Force scientists officially was ordered to start thinking of ways to turn nature into a military tool.

"We all sat down in a big brainstorming session," said one of the scientists who participated at the Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories at Hanscomb Field near Bedford, Mass. "The idea was to increase the rain and reduce the trafficability in all of Southeast Asia."

Within a year, the Air Force and C.I.A. began a highly secret rain-making project over the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, known as "Operation Pop-Eye." There were heated protests from the State Department, and eventually a directive from the Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara ordering a halt to the project. Instead, well-qualified sources said last week, "it went underground—into the dark."

From 1969, through at least early this year, weather warfare was a covert operation being directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with White House acquiescence.

The fact that the program existed at all came to light only last week in The New York Times. But, despite an extensive investigation, it could not be learned how successful the program had been, how many missions were conducted or whether it was still being used in connection with the heavy bombing of North Vietnam that followed the enemy offensive last April.

Making rain has long been technically feasible. Scientists have learned that rain fall can be increased by as much as 40 per cent after seeding clouds by aircraft with silver-iodide particles. Other chemicals, including dry ice, also have been used with success, both in the United States and in Southeast Asia.

Military and Government specialists acknowledge that there is little precise scientific knowledge of the short-range impact of cloud seeding and practically none of the long-range ecological effect of changing the amount of natural rainfall. Some scientists have

published data suggesting that weather modification, in combination with other ecological stresses such as air pollution and pesticides, may have a synergistic effect—that is, result in collective changes far greater than either abuse would have caused by itself.

In Indochina, where heavy bombing already has robbed much of the landscape of its natural water-holding capability by destroying foliage and trees, artificially induced rains may result in far greater flooding than expected, along with heavier soil erosion.

Technically, there are no interna-

tional agreements outlawing such warfare. But Government officials made clear last week that the weather-making activity of the Air Force was shielded from public view because of White House sensitivity to what could be regarded as the impropriety of the action. The issue, one well-informed official said, was one in which Henry A. Kissinger, the President's national-security adviser, took a personal hand. "This kind of thing was a bomb," the official said, "and Henry restricted information about it to those who had to know."

—SEYMOUR M. HERSH

7 JUL 1972

STATINT

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War in Air Decentralized by Nixon, But the Controls Are Termed Strict

By NEIL SHEEHAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 6 --

President Nixon is waging the air war against North Vietnam with a decentralized system of command and control that differs significantly from the highly centralized system employed by his predecessor, Lyndon B. Johnson, during the 1965-68 air campaign. In the view of a number of civilian and military officials with experience in Indochina, the decentralization does

News

Analysis

not imply the unraveling of civilian control over the military or the loosening of the chain of military command.

In effect they reject suggestions of such a deterioration made in the wake of the acknowledgment by Gen. John D. Lavelle that forces under his command made at least 28 unauthorized air raids on the North between last Nov. 8 and March 8. He was dismissed as commander of the Seventh Air Force in Saigon after a secret inquiry that was completed there March 23.

In the 1965-68 air war, lists of proposed targets were forwarded from the war zone through subordinate commands to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, who modified or approved them and sent them to the White House.

At Tuesday luncheon meetings, President Johnson and his senior Vietnam policy aides decided that certain targets could be attacked by a given date. If the attacks were not carried out by then, the authorization lapsed.

Robert S. McNamara, who favored this highly centralized system when he was Secretary of Defense because he felt that it resulted in calculated doses of force carefully applied, informed the Joint Chiefs, who in turn informed the subordinate commands what targets could be attacked by what dates.

List of Authorized Targets

Under the Nixon Administration's system, according to the officials, who were interviewed by The New York Times, a list of authorized targets in the North was transmitted to the subordinate commands by the White House and the Joint Chiefs in the latter part of April.

Targets are then selected by the field commands from those on the authorized list. The field commands tell the Joint Chiefs in advance what they intend to strike and by what date, thus giving the White House prior notice.

Mr. Nixon resumed full-scale air attacks on the southern panhandle of North Vietnam in the first part of April after the North Vietnamese had launched their offensive across the demilitarized zone. The new air war moved into high gear in the latter half of the month, with raids throughout the North.

The civilian and military officials, explaining their view that decentralization has not weakened command and control, say, first, that the President still decides how military force will be applied and to what extent he will delegate authority to apply it.

Second, they asserted, the decentralized system, in the light of the failure of the Johnson Administration's policy to bring the war to a halt, is a better method of applying air power in a coordinated campaign aimed at depriving North Vietnam of imports, both economic and military, through mining and bombing. If air power is to be effective, the officials added, the commander on the scene must be free to select his targets and to time his attacks.

In the end, regardless of what guidance is issued by the civilian leadership and the Joint Chiefs, the sources asserted, Washington and the various intermediate headquarters have to rely on what they are told by the field commands.

'Slave of Reporting System'

"On the way back you are the slave of the reporting system," an official said. "It would be very difficult to tell whether the report was falsified if it met the required format, especially when you are handling dozens of messages a day. It is highly improbable that you would smell a rat unless somebody tipped you off."

The deciding factor in the system, the officials maintained, is the honesty and discipline of the commanders close enough to the scene to know what is actually happening. They noted that there were no checks — sometimes referred to as fail-safe devices

— that would automatically prevent the kind of insubordination and falsification that General Lavelle acknowledged in testimony before the House June 12.

The officials interviewed contended that there was no way to build checks into the structure to automatically forestall insubordination and falsification without so thoroughly eroding the responsibility and initiative of subordinate commanders as to make the cure worse than even the possibility of the disease.

In the view of the officials interviewed, a case similar to the Lavelle affair could have occurred — although there is no evidence that it did — under the highly centralized system used by the Johnson Administration. They also believe that it could occur under the present system.

Conforming to the Format

It was pointed out that General Lavelle met the format of the reporting system by describing the unauthorized strikes as "protective reaction."

Similarly, when Air Force jets accidentally strafed a Soviet freighter in the North Vietnamese port of Campha in 1967 while Mr. McNamara's highly centralized system was in force, the pilots and the acting wing commander, in an unsuccessful attempt to cover up the mistake, filed a false report and burned the gun-camera film that had recorded the incident.

In the case of the My Lai massacre in 1968, again while the Johnson Administration was in power, the original report forwarded to headquarters in Saigon said that 128 Vietcong had been killed and three weapons captured. Because the guerrillas are often able to recover most of the weapons from their dead and because dozens of similar reports were received all the time, the senior officer who saw this one ordered the routine message of congratulations from Gen. William C. Westmoreland, then American military commander, sent to the unit that had committed the massacre. General Westmoreland may not even have read the report.

The circumstances of the famous Green Beret murder case the following year indicate that Col. Robert B. Rheault,

Special Forces commander in Vietnam at the time, may have inadvertently misled Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, General Westmoreland's successor, about the killing of a Vietnamese agent suspected of spying for the other side because the colonel had in turn been misled by his subordinates.

Subterfuge Proposed

Before President Nixon's decision to launch ground attacks on Communist bases in Cambodia in the spring of 1970, Generals Westmoreland and Abrams were repeatedly frustrated in their pleas for permission to assault those sanctuaries.

Staff officers, it is now known, proposed using the so-called rules of engagement — in the way General Lavelle used the rules of "protective reaction" — as a subterfuge to get around the prohibition. The rules of engagement permitted American troops to return fire across the border or to conduct hot pursuit into Cambodia in the midst of battle.

"People suggested getting lost, or saying we were getting shot at and shooting back, but Westmoreland and Abrams refused to chisel," an officer related.

Some officials say that, specific cases aside, actions by recent Administrations in the conduct of foreign policy and war-making have encouraged an atmosphere of deception. They assert, for example, that when the civilian leadership subverts the Congressional prohibition against employing a third country's troops in Laos by having the Central Intelligence Agency secretly hire Thai mercenaries, this has an impact on the willingness of subordinate officials to abide by restrictive orders that they dislike.

The Possibility of Error

It is also noted that even the most carefully devised system of civilian control can prove ineffective because of human error.

Mr. McNamara's rigidly centralized target selection did not prevent the bombing of schools, churches, hospitals and homes in North Vietnam because individual pilots mistook them for designated military targets or dropped their bombs prematurely.

Vets return from Paris to spread peace message

By LENORE WEISS

NEW YORK, July 4 — Returning from a three-day meeting last week in Paris with veterans of the Southeast Asia liberation forces, 15 delegates of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW), announced plans here to report their findings to their local areas.

This includes, said William del Rosario, a national coordinator of the VVAW, "speaking tours, articles, testimony to Congressmen and appearances on radio and TV."

The interview took place at VVAW headquarters on West 26 street.

They had to do their own publicity, the veterans said, because their trip had been ignored by the commercial press.

The veterans brought back photos documenting the effects of U.S. bombing raids on North Vietnam.

In their three-day talks in Par-

is last week, they had met with veterans of the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front, the Army of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Pathet Lao and the Cambodian United Front to find "a common basis for ending the war."

The talks had been organized by French peace groups and representatives of the War Crimes Commission, a citizens' group established several years ago by Bertrand Russell, the late British philosopher.

"We achieved more in three days than our government has achieved in three years, said John Boychuck, an active-duty GI who was due to return to Mt. Home Air Force Base in Idaho. "We didn't have to decide if we wanted round ashtrays, square ashtrays or who was going to sit where."

Precious minutes

Toby Hollander, of East St. Louis, Ill., an Annapolis graduate, said the PRG spokesman in Paris, Ly Van Sau, expressed the purpose of the meeting when he said, "If our efforts cause the war to end one minute earlier, this equals four tons of bombs."

Veterans learned in Paris of specifications by the U.S. military for 40,000 new "tiger cages," which are cells 8 by 10 feet on Con Son Island, for the prisoners of the Saigon regime.

Laotian and Cambodian representatives in Paris told the veterans, said Paul Richard, Seattle, that the war, contrary to U.S. State Department reports, is not limited to Vietnam. They cited the presence of U.S. advisers and helicopters along Routes 4 and 5, as well as a training camp in Cambodia conducted by the CIA. ✓

The Paris meeting, said Richards, demonstrated the solidarity of liberation forces in Southeast

JUL 1972

Letters to the Editor

The CIA Responds

SIR: As you are aware, the Central Intelligence Agency seldom responds to criticism of any sort. It cannot remain silent, however, when a newspaper with The Star's reputation prints an article alleging that this agency supports the heroin traffic in Southeast Asia. I refer to the column by Judith Randal in The Star of 29 June.

So serious a charge should be made only on the basis of the most convincing evidence. Miss Randal states only that "reporters have been hearing for more than a year" and then refers to an article in Harper's magazine by a graduate student, Alfred W. McCoy.

Charges of this nature have been made previously and each time have been most carefully investigated and found to be unsubstantiated. The public record on this subject is clear. There is, for instance, a report by Roland Paul, investigator for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in the April 1971 issue of Foreign Affairs, which states: "... due to the long association with the CIA, the Meo tribesmen in Laos were shifting from opium to rice and other crops."

The Congressional Record of June 2, 1971, printed a letter from John E. Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, to Representative Charles S. Gubser of California, which states: "Actually, CIA has for some time been this bureau's strongest partner in identifying foreign sources and routes of illegal trade in narcotics. Their help has included both direct support in intelligence collection, as well as in intelligence analysis and production. Liaison between our two agencies is close and constant in matters of mutual interest. Much of the progress we are now making in identifying overseas narcotics traffic can, in fact, be attributed to CIA cooperation."

Miss Randal's article is also in contrast to the two articles by your staff writer, Miriam Ottenberg, on June 18 and 19, 1972, in which she pointed out: "U.S. narcotics agents are making a sizable dent in the Southeast Asian dope traffic and—despite reports to the contrary — America's Asian allies and the CIA are helping them do it." And she quoted John Warner of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs as saying, "he had seen nothing of an evidentiary nature from Mr. McCoy 'other than gossip, conjecture and old history'."

Narcotics addiction is one of this country's most serious social problems. The Central Intelligence Agency is dedicated to eradicating this menace and, specifically, to interdicting the flow of narcotics entering this country.

It is difficult to understand why a writer would publish material tending to undermine confidence in this effort without the most convincing proof. More than one year ago, in an address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Richard Helms, director of Central Intelligence, stated: "There is the arrant nonsense, for example, that the Central Intelligence Agency is somehow involved in the world drug traffic. We are not. As fathers, we are as concerned about the lives of our children and grandchildren as are all of you. As an agency, in fact, we are heavily engaged in tracing the foreign roots of the drug traffic for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. We hope we are helping with a solution; we know we are not contributing to the problem."

This statement remains valid today.

W. E. Colby,
Executive Director,
Central Intelligence Agency

STATINTL

3 JUL 1972

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Rainmaking Is Used As Weapon by U.S.

Cloud Seeding in Indochina Confirmed— Chemical Also Employed to Foil Radar

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 2—The United States has been secretly seeding clouds over North Vietnam, Laos and South Vietnam to increase and control the rainfall for military purposes.

Government sources, both civilian and military, said during an extensive series of interviews that the Air Force cloud-seeding program has been aimed most recently at hindering movement of North Vietnamese troops and equipment and suppressing enemy anti-aircraft missile fire.

The disclosure confirmed growing speculation in Congressional and scientific circles about the use of weather modification in Southeast Asia. Despite years of experiments with rainmaking in the United States and elsewhere, scientists are not sure they understand its long-term effect on the ecology of a region.

Some Opposed Program

The weather manipulation in Indochina, which was first tried in South Vietnam in 1963, is the first confirmed use of meteorological warfare. Although it is not prohibited by any international conventions on warfare, artificial rainmaking has been strenuously opposed by some State Department officials.

It could not be determined whether the operations were being conducted in connection with the current North Vietnamese offensive or the renewed American bombing of the North.

Effectiveness Doubted

Beginning in 1967, some State Department officials protested that the United States, by deliberately altering the natural rainfall in parts of Indochina, was taking environmental risks of unknown proportions. But many advocates of the operation have found little wrong with using weather modification as a military weapon.

"What's worse," one official asked, "dropping bombs or rain?"

All of the officials interviewed said that the United States did not have the capability to cause heavy flooding during the summer in the northern parts of North Vietnam, where serious flooding occurred last year.

Officially, the White House and State Department declined comment on the use of meteorological warfare. "This is one of those things where no one is going to say anything," one official said.

Most officials interviewed agreed that the seeding had accomplished one of its main objectives — muddying roads and flooding lines of communication. But there were also many military and Government officials who expressed doubt that the project had caused any dramatic results.

The sources, without providing details, also said that a method had been developed for treating clouds with a chemical that eventually produced an acidic rainfall capable of fouling the operation of North Vietnamese radar equipment used for directing surface-to-air missiles.

In addition to hampering SAM missiles and delaying North Vietnamese infiltration, the rainmaking program had the following purposes:

• Providing rain and cloud cover for infiltration of South Vietnamese commando and intelligence teams into North Vietnam.

• Serving as a "spoiler" for North Vietnamese attacks and raids in South Vietnam.

• Altering or tailoring the rain patterns over North Vietnam and Laos to aid United States bombing missions.

• Diverting North Vietnamese men and material from military operations to keep muddied roads and other lines of communication in operation.

Keyed To Monsoon

The sources said that the operations necessarily were keyed to the

two main monsoon seasons that affect Laos and Vietnam. "It was just trying to add on to something that you already got," one officer said.

Military sources said that one main goal was to increase the duration of the southwest monsoon, which spawns high-rising cumulus clouds — those most susceptible to cloud seeding — over the panhandle areas of Laos and North Vietnam from May to early October. The longer rainy season thus would give the Air Force more opportunity to trigger rainstorms.

"We were trying to arrange the weather pattern to suit our convenience," said one former Government official who had detailed knowledge of the operation.

According to interviews, the Central Intelligence Agency initiated the use of cloud-seeding over Hue, in the northern part of South Vietnam. "We first used that stuff in about August of 1963," one former C.I.A. agent said, "when the Diem regime was having all that trouble with the Buddhists." "They would just stand around during demonstrations when the police threw tear gas at them, but we noticed that when the rains came they wouldn't stay on," the former agent said.

"The agency got an Air America Beechcraft and had it rigged up with silver iodide," he said. "There was another demonstration and we seeded the area. It rained."

A similar cloud-seeding was carried out by C.I.A. aircraft in Saigon at least once during the summer of 1964, the former agent said.

Expanded to Trail

The Intelligence Agency expanded its cloud-seeding activities to the Ho Chi Minh supply trail in Laos sometime in the middle nineteen-sixties, a number of Government sources said. By 1967, the Air Force had become involved although, as one former Government official said, "the agency was calling all the shots."

"I always assumed the agency had a mandate from the White House to do it," he added.

A number of former CIA, and high-ranking Johnson Administration officials depicted the operations along the trail as experimental.

The state of the art had not yet advanced to the point where it was possible to predict the results of a seeding operation with any degree of confidence, one Government official said.

"We used to go out flying around and looking for a certain cloud formation," the official said. "And we made a lot of

seven inches of rain in two hours on one of our Special Forces camps."

Despite the professed skepticism on the part of some members of the Johnson Administration, military men apparently took the weather modification program much more seriously.

According to a document contained in the Pentagon papers, the Defense Department's secret history of the war, weather modification was one of seven basic options for stepping up the war that were presented on request by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the White House in late February, 1967.

The document described the weather program over Laos — officially known as Operation Pop-Eye — as an attempt "to reduce trafficability along infiltration routes."

Authorization Needed

It said that Presidential authorization was "required to implement operational phase of weather modification process previously successfully tested and evaluated in same area." The brief summary concluded by stating that "risk of compromise is minimal."

A similar option was cited in another 1967 working document published in the Pentagon papers. Neither attracted any immediate public attention.

The Laos cloud-seeding operations did provoke, however, a lengthy and bitter, albeit secret, dispute inside the Johnson Administration in 1967. A team of State Department attorneys and officials protested that the use of cloud-seeding was a dangerous precedent for the United States.

"I felt that the military and agency hadn't analyzed it to determine if it was in our interest," one official who was involved in the dispute said. He also was concerned over the rigid secrecy of the project, he said, "although it might have been all right to keep it secret if you did it once and didn't want the precedent to become known."

The general feeling was summarized by one former State Department official who said he was concerned that the rainmaking "might violate what we considered the general rule of the thumb for an illegal weapon of war—something that would cause unusual suffering or disproportionate damage."

There also was concern, he added, because of the unknown ecological risks.

A Nixon Administration official said that he believed the first use of weather modification over North Vietnam was in 1969 when rain was increased

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July 1972

The Use of Force in Foreign Policy by the People's Republic of China

By ALLEN S. WHITING

ABSTRACT: President Nixon's "journey for peace" to Peking has implicitly modified the image of a Chinese Communist aggressive threat delineated by all previous administrations. However, it has not explicitly redefined the administration's assumptions on the Chinese use of force. This has left considerable confusion and unease among Asian and American audiences who accept the concept of massive Chinese military force being deterred from aggression primarily by American security commitments, bases, and force postures extending from Korea and Japan to India. The nine instances wherein the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has crossed customary borders in hostile array during the past twenty-two years provide prima facie evidence for the conventional image of a potentially expansionist regime contained by American commitments and force. However, closer examination of the use of military force by the People's Republic reveals an entirely different situation whereby the government in Peking, in most cases, deployed the PLA in defensive reaction against a perceived threat. The Chinese use of force primarily for defensive deterrence has remained remarkably consistent over twenty-one years, and considerable continuity may be anticipated for at least the next five years.

ACCORDING to a Gallup poll, in September 1971 more than half the American public saw China as the greatest threat to world peace in the next few years.¹ Nothing has eventuated from President Nixon's self-styled "journey for peace" to Peking to change this perception, nor has the administration given any systematic assurances to the contrary. Instead the Pentagon continues to demand new, complex, and costly weapons systems for the West Pacific, ostensibly to deter potential Chinese aggression. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warns we must prepare to fight two nuclear wars at once, with the Soviet Union and with China.² Our Asian allies from Korea to Thailand worry aloud about the credibility of America's deterrence in the aftermath of stalemate and withdrawal from Vietnam, against a rising weariness of military burdens in Asia, manifested by congressional pressures for cuts in military assistance.

American and Asian anxiety over the future use of force by the People's Republic is rooted in recent history. On nine occasions in the past twenty-two years, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has projected China's military power across its borders.³ In Korea (1950) and India (1962) major war resulted. In Laos (1964) and Vietnam (1965) PLA deployments risked Sino-American conflict. Two crises in the Taiwan Strait (1954-55 and 1958) ostensibly fell within the category of civil war, but nonetheless confronted the United States as protector of the Chiang Kai-shek regime. In March 1969 bel-

Allan S. Whiting, Ph.D., Ann Arbor, Michigan, has been Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan since 1968. He previously taught at Michigan State, 1955-57, and Northwestern, 1951-53. He was a staff member of the Rand Corporation in the Social Science Division, 1957-61; Director, Office of Research and Analysis for the Far East, U.S. Department of State, 1961-66; and Deputy Principal Officer, American Consulate General, Hong Kong, 1966-68. Educated at Cornell and Columbia universities and the recipient of several fellowships, he is the author of Soviet Policies in China, 1917-24 and coauthor of Dynamics of International Relations; Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?; and China Crosses the Yalu.

continued

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A NOVEL
ABOUT THE
CIA'S MERCENARIES
**COMPANY
MAN**
BY JOE MAGGIO

Not since Robin Moore's *The Green Beret* has such a powerful novel about modern warfare appeared—a book so shocking that it promises to generate excitement, alarm, and controversy. Startling in its authenticity, *COMPANY MAN* is the painfully vivid story of a CIA mercenary—an insider's account of intrigues that are all too often borne out by sensational news breaks.

In this brutal novel, Joe Maggio exposes the shadow world of the CIA ("the Company") and the mercenaries paid to die for their country. The story centers on Niel Martin, contract employee of the CIA's Special Operating Division (SOD), who finds himself stranded in the Congolese jungle. Used and abandoned by the Company, he now believes that he has been set up for an ambush.


An arm of the Company that runs virtually unreigned, the SOD employs outcasts, criminals, and ex-military men in the "world defense against Communism." Once a Green Beret and later a graduate of the Farm—the SOD's "secret" training base in Langley, Virginia—Martin had already been dispatched by

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(Continued on back flap)

Alfred W. McCoy

FLOWERS OF EVIL



STATIN

The CIA and the heroin trade

Ladies and gentlemen," announced the genteel British diplomat, raising his glass to offer a toast, "I give you Prince Sopsaisana, the uplifter of Laotian youth."

The toast brought an appreciative smile from the guest of honor, cheers and applause from the luminaries of Vientiane's diplomatic corps, assembled at the farewell banquet for the Laotian ambassador-designate to France, Prince Sopsaisana. A member of the royal house of Xieng Khouang, the Plain of Jars region, the Prince was vice-president of the National Assembly, chairman of the Lao Bar Association, president of the Lao Press Association, president of the *Alliance Française*, and a member in good standing of the Asian People's Anti-Communist League. After receiving his credentials from the King in a private audience at the Luang Prabang Royal Palace on April 8, 1971, he was treated to an unprecedented round of cocktail parties, dinners, and banquets. For Sopsai, as his friends call him, was not just any ambassador; the Americans considered him an outstanding example of a new generation of honest, dynamic national leaders, and it was widely rumored in Vientiane that Sopsai was destined for high office some day.

The final send-off party at Vientiane's Wattay Airport on April 23 was one of the gayest affairs of the season. Everybody was there; the champagne bubbled, the canapés were flawlessly French, and Mr. Ivan Bastouil, chargé d'affaires at the French Embassy, gave the nicest speech. Only after the plane had soared off into the clouds did anybody notice that Sopsai had forgotten to pay for his share of the reception.

His arrival at Paris's Orly Airport on the morning of April 25 was the occasion for another reception. The French ambassador to Laos, home for a brief visit, and the entire staff of

the Laotian Embassy had turned out to welcome the new ambassador. There were warm embraces, kissing on both cheeks, and more effusive speeches. Curiously, the Prince insisted on waiting for his luggage like any ordinary tourist, and when his many suitcases finally appeared after an unexplained delay, he immediately noticed that a particular one was missing. Sopsai angrily insisted that his suitcase be delivered at once, and French authorities promised, most apologetically, that it would be sent to the Laotian Embassy as soon as it was found. Sopsai departed reluctantly for yet another reception at the Embassy, and while he drank the ceremonial champagne with his newfound retinue of admirers, French customs officials were examining one of the biggest heroin seizures in French history.

The Ambassador's suitcase contained sixty kilos of high-grade Laotian heroin — worth \$13.5 million on the streets of New York, its probable destination. A week later, a smiling French official presented himself at the Embassy with the suitcase in hand. Although Sopsaisana had been bombarding the airport with outraged telephone calls for several days, he suddenly realized that accepting the suitcase was tantamount to an admission of guilt and so, contrary to his righteous indignation, he flatly denied that it was his. Ignoring his declaration of innocence, the French government refused to accept his diplomatic credentials, and Sopsai remained in Paris for no more than two months before he was recalled to Vientiane.

Fragile flower, cash crop


Alfred W. McCoy, a Ph.D. student in Southeast Asian history at Yale University, has written numerous articles on Southeast Asia and has edited a political history of Laos.

Adapted from a chapter in *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, by Alfred W. McCoy with Cathleen B. Read, to be published by Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., in September. Copyright © 1972 by Alfred W. McCoy.

Despite its resemblance to comic opera, the Prince Sopsaisana affair offered a rare glimpse into the workings of the Laotian drug trade. That trade is the principal business of Laos, and to a certain extent it depends on the support (money, guns, aircraft, etc.) of the CIA. Unfortunately, the questions raised by the Prince's disgrace were never asked, much less answered. The French government overlooked the em-

July 1972

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The Story of My Overthrow and Resistance

[MOSCOW - PEKING]

YOU MUST NOT GO, SAMDECH SIHANOUK. It's Friday, the thirteenth." These words were spoken to me, half in jest, by one of my aides on the way to Orly Airport for the plane which was to take me from Paris to Moscow. It was the morning of March 13, 1970. Unlike many of my countrymen, I am not superstitious, so I laughed, and flew off to meet the Russian leaders. Five days later, while still in Moscow, I was deposed as Cambodia's Head of State so it was an unlucky day after all.

President Podgorny met my flight, but there were no elaborate welcoming ceremonies, because mine was a political and not a state visit. After greeting me he said there was a plane waiting to take me straight home to Phnom Penh.

"Take an overnight rest in Moscow, if you like," he said, "but fly on to Phnom Penh in the morning. We have confidence in you, Sihanouk. You are really the indispensable leader of your people. But you must go back and take charge of Cambodia's affairs. See that they don't fall into the hands of Lon Nol and Sirik Matak. You must ensure that Cambodia doesn't drift into an American takeover, prevent Lon Nol and Sirik Matak from creating difficulties for the South Vietnamese people who are waging a heroic struggle for the liberation of their country." I replied that I'd have to think things over very carefully.

There was much to think about. On March 18,

had been anti-Vietnamese demonstrations in Svay Rieng Province—the reports reaching me showed that Lon Nol was behind them. On March 11, a mob—ostensibly of students and school children—attacked the embassy of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (the NLF) and, a few hours later, that of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Hanoi). My reports showed it to be the work of the Army—specifically Lon Nol. The nucleus of the attackers was, in both cases, some fifty military men in civilian clothes, commanded by Lon Nol's younger brother, Colonel Lon Non. This was a far cry from the "spontaneous demonstrations" naively reported in the European press and on American television. Signs had been prepared in English, a language rarely used in public display in my country. Photographers and TV crews had been alerted. Everything pointed to a scenario drawn up well in advance.

As soon as I heard of the attacks on the embassies, I sent a cablegram to my mother, the Queen, condemning the violence as "acts of personalities attaching greater importance to their personal and clan interests than to the country's future and to the fate of the people." I warned of the possibility of a rightist coup and said that I would return for a confrontation with those responsible, but added that, if the people chose to follow them "along a path that will turn Cambodia into a second Laos, they will compel me to resign."

The answer to my message to the Queen came in the form of a cablegram from the Queen on March 15, 1970, attacks

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WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP

Homage to CIA Drug Fight Ironic

By JUDITH RANDAL

The American Medical Association, which predictably offers few surprises at its annual meeting, achieved the unexpected this year.

As one entered the convention's exhibition hall in San Francisco's Civic Center, one's nostrils were assailed by an odor more appropriate to that city's Haight-Ashbury district — an aroma strongly suggestive of the burning leaves and blossoms of the female *Cannabis sativa* plant.

The scent fired the curiosity of all in the hall who had ever sampled marijuana and drew from the wife of one physician attending the meeting the remark that she had smelled that odor many times in the back of the school bus she drives.

That was only the beginning of the surprise. Following one's nose, one soon came upon a booth housing an exhibit on drug abuse which featured a display about many drugs, including pot, and a device that generated a synthetic smoke that was close to, if not identical with the real thing.

★

There was still more surprise to come in this display, which — it turned out — had won the gold medal in the AMA's coveted Billings Prize competition as one of the outstanding scientific exhibits of the meeting. The exhibitor was no mere doctor or pharmaceutical firm, or even your average, run-of-the-mill science-oriented government bureau. It was that most unlikely of contenders for an AMA award: The Central Intelligence Agency.

Dr. Donald Borcharding of the CIA was on hand to explain the exhibit's origins. Like most agencies, he said, the CIA has an occupational health division whose job it is to promote the well-being of its personnel. When CIA officials at the agency's Langley,

Va., headquarters became worried about pot, LSD, speed, heroin and the like, Borcharding and his colleagues assembled the display.

According to the CIA medic, it was an immediate hit, not only at the Langley "Spook Farm" but also among groups in the community, such as Knights of Columbus lodges and parent-teacher associations. The CIA is thinking about putting together "how-to-do-it" instructions so that other groups can build their own replicas.

★

Granted, the crusade against drug abuse needs all the help it can get. But the trouble with the CIA exhibit is that it does not tell things strictly as they are. For example, it implies that the use of marijuana sets the stage for later use of heroin. This issue is by no means settled and, as a matter of fact, there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that alcohol, rather than marijuana, is the first drug to be abused by most people who subsequently become heroin addicts.

In any case, many experts believe that if there is any connection whatever between pot and heroin, it is their illegal status and that if the former were "decriminalized," its link with the latter would tend to disappear.

More important to this discussion than an argument about the casual relationship of the two drugs is the point that the CIA does not come into the campaign with completely clean hands. Reporters have been hearing for more than a year that the agency has been supporting the heroin traffic in the Golden Triangle region of Laos, Thailand and Burma, and that this opium byproduct has been one of the more important cargoes carried by Air America, an airline operating in Southeast

Asia whose charter business is almost exclusively with the CIA. The Golden Triangle region, incidentally, is said to grow 70 percent of the world's illicit opium from which morphine base, morphine and eventually heroin are derived.

For more details on the CIA's complicity in the heroin mess, one might consult an article entitled "Flowers of Evil" by historian Alfred W. McCoy, in the July issue of Harper's magazine. Part of a forthcoming book called "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," the article spells out in detail how Vag Pao, long the leader of a CIA secret army in Laos, has become even more deeply involved in the drug traffic and what role this traffic has played in the importation of heroin into the United States and its use by our troops in South Vietnam.

★

Writes McCoy of the situation: "As a result of direct and indirect American involvement, opium production has steadily increased, high-grade heroin production is flourishing and the Golden Triangle's poppy fields have become linked to markets in Europe and the U.S."

The CIA went away from the San Francisco meeting with a gold medal and, no doubt, a good many doctors who saw the exhibit went away impressed. Some of them probably learned for the first time what pot smells like.

But for others there was a bitter incongruity in the government's super-secret spy arm winning a medal for an exhibit on the horrors of drug abuse. To some it was a little like the Mafia getting a top award for a display of the evils of extortion, prostitution and gambling — and a few of the more socially aware physicians present did not hesitate to say so.

A mass of legislation has been enacted by the Democratic Congress, but most of it does not carry the political sex appeal of these principle issues. The President is not likely to overlook the opportunity to expose these shortcomings.

Democrats have a particular talent for killing each other off. Party infighting does not help the Nation or the Democratic Party. The writing of a platform may expose more weaknesses than the party can overcome regardless of candidate, and George Wallace and others are attempting to produce a party platform which is more acceptable to the American public than the one now proposed. Yet, efforts to start pulling responsible party factions together may have come too late to be effective. One thing is certain, the Democratic Party has serious problems ahead for November. America wants responsible programs and responsible candidates which it can confidently support for a better tomorrow. Let us hope it is not too late to repair the damage within the Democratic Party. America needs a strong Democratic Party under sound leadership.

AN OLD-FASHIONED PATRIOT SPEAKS OUT

(Mr. HALL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, the Missouri National Guard Association, the non-military forum of over 1,700 active officers, retired officers, active and retired enlisted men of the Missouri National Guard recently held its silver anniversary conference in St. Louis, Mo. At that ceremony Col. Oliver M. Husmann, president of the association for 1971-72, and a prominent St. Louis businessman, gave his report to the members.

The conference warmly received this old-fashioned patriot who spoke out for his organization, to always defend the country. From one who has served his Nation, speaking before those who also shouldered the task of defense, Colonel Husmann eloquently and concisely stated his dedication to the United States, and its traditional spirit of patriotic maintenance of freedom, plus efforts for peace.

I recommend these words of Colonel Husmann to this Congress as an example of the strong devotion to our country that still persists today:

REMARKS BY COL. OLIVER M. HUSMANN

Webster defines a Patriot as "one who loves his country and zealously guards its welfare; especially a defender of popular liberty." This is the kind of patriot I was taught to admire and emulate. The kind who has fought for his country throughout its history. The kind who admits the imperfections of government, but loves his country even more in spite of them.

Today we have a new kind of patriot. The draft dodgers who skulks into Canada, Sweden, or any other country that will grant them asylum. Those who trample and spit upon the Flag. Those who bomb and burn our public buildings and academic institutions. Those who condemn our involvement in Viet Nam and publicly esteem our enemies. Those who question every word uttered by our leaders, but willingly accept as the whole truth any and all charges levied against us by our enemies.

There are many in this country who find favor with this new type of patriot. We find these 'sob sisters' amongst our clergy, among our so-called intellectuals and even amongst our leaders in the Congress and the Senate. They say we should not have become involved in Viet Nam and now because we are so involved, the new type of patriot must be permitted to vent his frustrations as he desires.

The National Guard is made up of men. Men from many walks of life. Men in different stages of maturity. Men of different social antecedents. Men of various religious beliefs. Men with different political convictions. These qualities and characteristics which each individual possesses, must be nurtured, moulded and fused with those of the next man until, as an entity, we can move forward in a concentrated effort toward a common goal. We must resolve to do everything in our power to again convince the people of our country that Webster's definition of a patriot is and always will be correct.

There are too many in this country who have forgotten that the two ideologies—Democracy and Communism—cannot live side by side except by artful truces and so-called cold wars, neither of which can nurture a real, lasting peace. The tentacles of Communism creep insidiously wherever they gain a foothold. Our land, our way of life, our freedom and our liberty, as we know them, are the prizes Communism strives to take from us. Guardsmen must be constantly prepared to fight this threat. We must not permit ourselves to become the weak link in the defense of this great nation.

There is a greater need for the existence of the Guard today than ever before. We must let our fellow citizens know that the enemy wants us to be careless, lazy and uninspired in the desire to defend our country. That he looks upon us with utter contempt when we say we are tired of war. We must make the public realize that America needs its men—soldiers and citizens alike—to work continuously to improve our defensive posture while there is still time. If we wish to maintain for our children the liberty, freedom and safety which we enjoy, we must be prepared to defend these truths to the death. Consider for a moment what life would be like without these privileges we accept so matter-of-factly.

One thing is certain; we have the organization to build such a defense. We have the know-how and the money in this country to develop such a defense. Most important of all, we have US, the National Guard. We can discourage aggression now. All we have to do is feel the urgency, to realize the practicability of being prepared, and to work—as men dedicated to the principle that the freedom we enjoy shall not perish.

Our silver anniversary is an opportune time to rededicate ourselves to the task at hand, to filling our ranks with true patriots, to teaching, to absorbing lessons learned, to building a defense capable of filling the needs of our people, our community and our country.

Guardsmen have taken such dedicated stands many times in history; always in the cause of freedom and liberty. Our citizen-soldiers, our National Guard, is older than the Nation itself. Dedicated men of the early colonies organized units and trained to defend their settlements long before the Declaration of Independence. Many of our present-day Guard units trace their history directly to these early groups of citizen-soldiers.

We need to review the heritage willed us by those who early stood in the defense of our country. We need to relive the struggles of the past, to see in our minds eye and feel in our hearts the valiant stand they took so this nation might be free. We need to think of those who stood with Washington at Brandywine and Germantown. We need to be

reminded of the Guardsmen, militiamen, minutemen, call them what you will, who bled at Bunker Hill. We need to trace their footprints that marked with blood the snows of Valley Forge. We must bend our backs and grasp with freezing fingers the frosted oars with Washington as he crosses the icy Delaware. We must lay siege with him to the heights of Yorktown. We must strive with those who followed Lee, Sherman and Grant. We must feel the fury of the charge at San Juan. We must share with them the blood and sweat of the Philippines and the Mexican Border. Let us follow "Black-Jack" Pershing through the holocaust of WWI. Eisenhower, MacArthur and Patton through the war to end all wars. Let us relive with them Argonne, Chateau Thierry, Corregidor, Normandy and MIG Alley. Finally Korea and Viet Nam. For the first time in history American fighting men find themselves in the unusual position of fighting a battle they cannot win, a war they are not supposed to win. A classic study in frustration.

Is Freedom, Democracy and the American way of life, which was bought at such a tremendous price to be lost to the most deadly enemy that has ever threatened free men? Has the sacrifice they made, been made in vain? Can we not continue the fight, can we not as citizen-soldiers bolster the defenses, man them effectively and surely, against any and all attacks of an enemy? Can we not show a love for our country? A love that surmounts all fears, all weaknesses and dedicates men to preserve with their lives the land they love?

I am not asking that we dedicate ourselves to becoming a nation of warmongers. No, I ask that we dedicate ourselves to work for peace. I firmly believe a strong aggressive, defensive posture is the best offense available to a country whose democratic ideals prevents it from initiating an attack against any enemy unless provoked beyond endurance.

Until we have made our country so impregnable, so invulnerable that an attack would be suicidal, will our enemies keep their distance. Until we have done this, the possibility of America becoming a major battlefield in a new world conflict becomes more apparent with each passing day.

Gentlemen. Now is the time for us to look to our defenses, time to follow the heritage which is ours. The time to demonstrate, once again, to all the world, that democracy is a living thing, transcending all other ways of life, and worth protecting at any cost.

(Mr. PRICE of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks in the body of the Record and to include an address by Mr. HOLFIELD.)

(Mr. PRICE of Illinois remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

(Mr. BUCHANAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. BUCHANAN'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

NARCOTICS AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

(Mr. WOLFF asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Speaker, at this point in the Record, I would like to insert the texts of several formal statements made before an informal hearing which the dis-

27 JUN 1972

Politics vs. economic needs

What should determine

U.S. foreign aid?

By Lucia Mouat
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Should politics rather than economic need govern the distribution of U.S. foreign aid?

Even politicians say "no" but only in theory. In practice, political motives can often be found.

Liberals become furious when aid is continued, sometimes over the objection of legislation they have helped to pass, to such authoritarian regimes as Greece, Pakistan, and Brazil. They like it no better when the administration steps in on its own to seal the flow as it did last December when the President ordered a cut in aid to India for its entry into what is now Bangladesh.

Conservatives are often more concerned with the political aftermath of aid. They deplore the fact that the United States cannot seem to accomplish more in the way of democratic reforms in other governments or at the very least to extract some degree of allegiance or appreciation.

Sensitive case in point was the United Nations vote on Taiwan's ouster in which 40 recipients of U.S. aid were among the 76 who voted against the U.S. position.

As just desserts for what it sees as such arbitrary actions, Congress has imposed more than 70 restrictions on who is eligible to receive U.S. aid. Factors which can land a country in the taboo category vary from failing to cooperate in narcotics control to seizure of U.S. fishing vessels in what the United States recognizes as international waters.

Warning from State

State Department experts warn that economic aid is simply not suited for short-term political goals. They say history offers no evidence that development dollars play much if any role at all in keeping down revolution and deterring communism or in encouraging democracy.

Communist Cuba and socialist Chile which together have taken in well over \$1 billion in U.S. aid, largely in loans, in the past years are cases in point.

Expecting recipients to follow U.S. leadership in making their foreign-policy decisions is part of the same mold.

"Political criteria aren't reasonable at all," says Maurice J. Williams, deputy administrator of AID, pointing out that many aided countries are newly independent, and bowing to U.S. pressures is not one of the attributes they need to succeed.

"In personal relations, if a country can't be bought and if it can, it's often not worth the effort. Though a mutuality of interests may de-

velop, our purpose is not to have satellites, not to create a new colonialism."

Long-range result

The only possible case for a political rub-off from an economic investment, experts say, is indirect and long range. Some suggest, for instance, that there may well be a correlation between the extensive U.S. aid given Korea's economy and educational system over the years, and the role of Korean intellectuals, thus exposed to the U.S. example, in forcing the resignation in 1960 of President Syngman Rhee whose government was considered by many to be both authoritarian and corrupt.

However, even when politics is laid aside in favor of strictly economic goals, problems persist.

One of the newer discoveries of development economists, which foreign aid critics have been quick to pick up, is the fact that the income gap between rich and poor in developing countries is widening rather than closing.

The result, as World Bank president Robert S. McNamara put it in a strong speech before the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Santiago this spring, is that while the national growth rates may be impressive, somehow the bottom half of the population is being left behind.

He said that the 10 percent in the lowest income category in India, for instance, is actually worse off, despite aid, than it was 20 years ago.

It is now generally agreed here that foreign aid in the past put too much emphasis on industrialization and economic growth and too little on the problems of income distribution and full employment in the labor-intensive developing countries.

Manufacturing has been growing at the rate of about 7 percent a year in these countries and industrial jobs at about half that rate. The international labor organization predicts that the combination unemployment and underemployment may reach an average of 30 percent in the developing countries by 1990.

The problem often is not so much a lack of food, for instance, as the lack of ability to buy it.

"People think because someone is hungry, all you need to do is get production up," says one AID staffer. "Hunger isn't a production problem — it's a poverty problem."

Sometimes it's more important that production technology be aimed at reducing costs than increasing yields."

In general AID officials are well aware of the problem and are shifting their thrust accordingly. Terms such as income redistribution and full employment crop up often in speeches given by Dr. John Hannah, AID administrator and one of the most enthusiastic aid proponents which the agency has ever had.

While the United States can exercise some direction in this area, often by its own example, the country in question must carefully choose the economic and social policies accompanying its growth for full effectiveness.

"There's always been disparity of income," says AID's Mr. Williams. "Every man can't step into the modern sector simultaneously. Every man didn't get a factory job at once in the days of the industrial revolution. It's what you do about it — your policies — that are important."

While virtually everyone agrees that the rich-poor gap must be narrowed, the division between critics is still sharp on another economic point: the degree to which the U.S. aid program helps or hurts the U.S. economy.

Paul Hoffman, long the head of the UN Development Program, is fond of saying that foreign aid is a misnomer. He argues that in view of the possibilities in creation of new jobs, adding to export earnings and national security, the term is more aptly mutual assistance.

Church raps aid program

In his lengthy, much quoted speech on the Senate floor last October, Sen. Frank Church (D) of Idaho called the U.S. foreign-aid program "patently self-serving" and charged it was a "spreading money tree under which the biggest American businesses find shelter."

He argues that U.S. interest in economic stability overseas is motivated primarily by Washington's wish to create a favorable climate for private investment and notes that with government insurance for such ventures, it is the American taxpayer who shoulders the burden.

AID officials find themselves somewhat torn on this point. To sell foreign aid to skeptical conservatives, they want to emphasize its potential in terms of new markets and trading partners. Yet the further they go, the more they draw fire on the same points from the Left. In compromise, they usually focus on such relatively innocuous points as the high payback rate and the 10 percent share of U.S. exports which al-

In our own country, we stand in greater need of what we call conscience. Order is Heaven's first law; the Universe, with the infinity of celestial bodies, is regulated by law and maintained in order. The human creature on our own planet—as well as those which may inhabit any like orbs—is endowed with the faculty of reason; with faith, that is to say, reasoned hope; with the belief of the pure in heart that the soul shall have immortal being.

"Hats off to the past, and coats off to the future," must yet be the homely slogan.

I believe that mirth and music are material gifts from Heaven to Man, in compensation for the tragedies of life. Good thought and conduct constitute good morals. Evil is the exact opposite. If we transgress, we are punished, in one way or another.

All the qualities of humanity that are possessed of hope, faith, courage, diligence, reason, love of home and country, vision and noble ideals, must be exercised as indispensable labors in humanity's forward march. Apropos, the spirit of reverence and the Church must perform their necessary roles.

These observations are indeed trite. The multiplication table is trite, but reliance on the mathematics of Newton took the Astronauts to the moon, and thru the voids of space.

Our Baronial Order—whose members are descendants of sureties of A.D. 1215, has great opportunity for noble and patriotic service. It has also great responsibility, and, I believe, is meeting its obligations with fine dispatch.

The Magna Charta is a lengthy instrument of 61 articles. On June 12, 1215, it was adopted to hold in restraint, a cruel, despotic King John of England. Twenty-five sureties were named from the roster of Barons, to require the arbitrary King to pay allegiance to the Great Charter, which relates to benefits and property and other rights to the Barons, as well as the people in general.

Under the benefits conferred by Magna Charta, England, and the course of civil and religious liberty made lasting progress.

The next great document of liberty was the Mayflower Compact, adopted in November 1620 by the Pilgrims in Cape Cod Harbor. It was brief, but of essential character. It provided, in simple words, a comprehensive, organic and formal instrument enabling the establishment of Plymouth Plantation—on the Plymouth Rock site, binding equally on all; and assuring total equality, and to make all needed laws. Under it, the Pilgrims lived and prospered, with complete civil and religious liberty.

This modest compact proved to be the acorn which rooted and grew to the great oak of our Constitutional government, which we must uphold and sustain.

In conclusion, let me say, as did Tiny Tim in the immortal Christmas Story of Dickens, "Lord bless us all, each and everyone!"

CIA SMUGGLES OPIUM

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Speaker, I am releasing today substantial new evidence that indicates U.S. pilots flying CIA operated helicopters have been smuggling opium inside Laos.

What this new evidence indicates is that U.S. pilots using U.S.-owned planes are illegally smuggling opium in Laos, some of which has almost certainly been sold to U.S. GI's in Southeast Asia and some of which has almost certainly been smuggled into illicit U.S. drug markets.

I am releasing today a letter which I have received from Alfred McCoy, au-

thor of a forthcoming book on heroin traffic in Southeast Asia, which details the allegation of United States and CIA complicity in drug traffic. If these allegations are true, then the CIA is implicated in fostering the drug traffic that ruins the lives of tens of thousands of Americans.

According to the information Mr. McCoy has given me, a Laotian district chief and other officials have told him that American helicopters flew Meo officers into Laotian villages where they purchased opium. The opium was also transported out by American pilots and planes to Long Tieng, the CIA headquarters in Northern Laos where it was allegedly refined into morphine and eventually heroin.

The Meo tribesmen, as many of my colleagues know, had been recruited by the CIA and form a mercenary army which fights the Pathet Lao Communist guerrillas. For the Meo, opium is considered an important cash crop.

Mr. Speaker, I have asked CIA Director Richard Helms to thoroughly investigate Mr. McCoy's allegations. Since Mr. McCoy obtained his information late last summer it is imperative to determine whether this kind of drug trafficking is still going on. A principal, unanswered question which the CIA must resolve is "At what level in the CIA were officials aware of this illicit drug traffic?"

It is also becoming increasingly clear, Mr. Speaker, that the Nixon administration is covering up and contradicting itself about the importance of heroin traffic in Southeast Asia. After Mr. McCoy testified before a Senate committee last month the State Department termed his charges about the involvement of Government officials in Southeast Asia as "unsubstantiated." However, the U.S. Army Provost Marshal reported in 1971 that high ranking members of the South Vietnamese Government were in the top "zone" of the four-tiered heroin traffic pyramid.

Mr. McCoy, quite rightly, also disputes the State Department's claim that "Southeast Asia is not a major source of heroin on our market." This statement by the State Department directly contradicts a General Accounting Office report which states that:

The Far East is the second principal source of heroin entering the U.S.

Mr. Speaker, it is imperative to determine whether the CIA is still involved in opium traffic and who was responsible for the alleged involvement of the CIA with the opium growers of Laos.

My letter to Mr. Helms follows:

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., June 27, 1972.

Mr. RICHARD HELMS,
Director, Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR Mr. HELMS: I am publicly releasing today substantial new evidence that indicates that U.S. pilots flying CIA-operated helicopters have been smuggling opium inside Laos. These allegations are contained in a letter and additional information that I have received from Mr. Alfred McCoy, author of a forthcoming book on heroin traffic in Southeast Asia. If these allegations are true, then the CIA is implicated in fostering the drug traffic that ruins the lives of tens of thousands of Americans.

I am writing to you today to request that

you thoroughly investigate Mr. McCoy's allegations. Since Mr. McCoy obtained his information last summer, it is imperative to determine whether this kind of drug trafficking is still going on. A principal unanswered question which the CIA must resolve is: "At what level in the CIA were officials aware of this illicit drug traffic?"

I hope that you will report to me in full the results of your investigation.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

LES ASPIN,
Member of Congress.

ROONEY REQUESTS HALF BILLION FOR RELIEF OF FLOOD RAVAGED STATES

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. ROONEY) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ROONEY of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, in the wake of probably the most destructive flood in America's history I have today announced that I will request an additional half billion dollars in Federal funds for relief in the five States which have been declared disaster areas by President Nixon.

The \$92.5 million now available to the States in the President's disaster relief fund will not begin to compensate the losses suffered by the five States. If Pennsylvania were to receive the entire \$92.5 million it would cover only about 10 percent of the cost of putting the State back together.

I have introduced legislation to provide relief funds in the amount of one-half billion dollars to the States which have been declared disaster areas by the President. This money would be disbursed by the Office of Emergency Preparedness whose primary function is the administration of the President's disaster relief fund. In past crises involving disaster areas in several States OEP has apportioned financial aid to the States according to the amount of damage sustained in the respective States. This is the only fair and realistic method of tackling the massive cleanup job ahead.

Pennsylvania, hardest hit by the flooding by a wide margin, would receive the lion's share of the supplemental appropriation, and Florida, having the least amount of damage of the five States, would receive the smallest portion. The remaining money would be distributed by OEP to Virginia, Maryland, and New York.

Other Members and I of the Pennsylvania delegation will meet with Governor Shapp today to discuss the crippling effects of the flood.

I hope to explore all avenues of Federal assistance with the Governor and arrive at some concrete goals with regard to the needs of the stricken Pennsylvania communities.

BEEF PRODUCERS GET SHORT END OF STICK

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. SKUBITZ) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. SKUBITZ. Mr. Speaker, in my opinion the action the President took on

editorials:

From Bangkok To The West

One of the persistent scandals of the demoralizing war in Indochina is the growth of the illicit Asian narcotics traffic of which Americans are the principal victims and for which the United States Government must assume all too much of the blame. The situation is so tragic, and so blatant, that the House Foreign Affairs Committee has voted to cut off all aid to Thailand until its government moves to curb the export of opium.

The measure on which the committee voted was offered by Representatives Wolff of New York and Steele of Connecticut who have visited Thailand and who think that, to put it mildly, the Thais are not doing enough to stop the trade in opium. The substance reaches the United States in the form of heroin; Mr. Wolff says that as much as five tons of heroin, enough to supply the entire addict population of the U.S., leaves Thailand annually.

Of course Thailand is supposed to be a United States "ally" and is increasingly the seat of United States air power as American forces are withdrawn from Vietnam, and that is part of the trouble. Mr. Wolff has said that high-ranking Thai officials are involved in the drug traffic, and he has noted that while opium also comes from Cambodia and Laos these two countries do not have the ability to control it as Thailand does.

The connection of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency with the dope traffic in Laos has long been notorious. The big shot of the Laotian trade is Gen. Vang Pao, an unsavory character who for the last decade has been commander of

the CIA's secret army in northeastern Laos. American diplomatic officials in Laos seem to look the other way; they have confined their recent efforts to promoting Laotian laws against opium addicts.

The United States has seven big air bases in Thailand. They have been absorbing units from Vietnam as efforts are made to comply with President Nixon's troop withdrawal schedules. One base, Nam Phong, is closer to Hanoi than the Da Nang airbase in South Vietnam which recently lost all its remaining fighter squadrons to bases in Thailand. The present announced total of U.S. military strength in South Vietnam, 54,000, does not include 42,000 men on naval ships in the Gulf of Tonkin and 50,000 airmen in Thailand and Guam.

So the U. S. presence in Thailand actually is growing and so is the opportunity for corrupt Thai officials to exploit the situation and develop the drug traffic. Bangkok has long been a center of activity in such international commodities as gold and jewels, and Mr. Wolff says that 11 trawlers now openly transport heroin and opium from Bangkok to Hong Kong. Presumably this comes from northeastern Burma, northern Thailand and northern Laos, the so-called Golden Triangle, and it could not be moved without official connivance.

We feel sure the Thais, who have an authoritarian government, could crack down on this dirty business if they had a mind to, and the United States ought to exert maximum pressure. The idea of cutting off military assistance can at least be clearly understood by the pragmatic Thais.

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White House linked to raid on Dem center

By CONRAD KOMOROWSKI

WASHINGTON, June 26—Participants in the June 17 raid on national Democratic party headquarters here had direct links with the White House, Republican National Committee, Central Intelligence Agency and fascistic organizations of Cubans living in the U.S.

Disclosures have linked an organization of veterans of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba with the White House and the raid on the Democratic headquarters.

The tentacles can be glimpsed of a long-term conspiracy to use terrorist gangs and individuals against "left-wing causes" in the U.S.

The raid on Democratic party headquarters—not at all a "left-wing" organization—shows how far this fascistic activity has gone.

Ties with the fascistic elements in the military reserve through the White House can be discerned.

Trail of CIA

The trail of the CIA is visible at all stages of the operations of these gangs. Members of the Ex-Combatientes Cubanos de Fort Jackson are reported to have met with "American friends" on "direct action to combat what they viewed as left-wing causes in the U.S.," according to Tad Szulc in the New York Times June 22.

The blundered attempt to bug Democratic party headquarters and to photograph files has revealed a festering cancer in the White House.

When Nixon moved into the White House he brought with him the baggage of the days when he introduced the first concentration camp bill in the history of Congress and helped create the period of McCarthyism.

McCord's links

James W. McCord, who was held on \$30,000 bond after his arrest last Saturday, was at that time under contract as security coordinator to the Committee for Reelection of President Nixon headed by former Attorney General John N. Mitchell and of the Republican National Committee.

McCord was also a member of a 15-man unit of the Office

of Preparedness, which is a part of the Executive Office of the President. Its job is witchhunting, the hunting out of dissenters and so-called "subversives" and planning of measures to deal with them.

The Cubans, who were recruited for subversive activities against Cuba, including the CIA-organized invasion, have been working with the United States Military Reserve unit, which operates under the Office of Emergency Plans and Preparedness in the White House.

Other direct links

These are not the only direct links. The name of E. Howard Hunt, Jr., was found in the address books of two of the participants in Saturday's raid. Hunt is a former CIA agent, who worked for it from 1949 to 1970. He was an associate of "Frank Bender" in the organization of the Bay of Pigs invasion, and has maintained his connections with former Cubans. Hunt was a consultant at the White House in 1971 and in 1972 until at least March.

Two of the participants in the raid are connected with Ameritas, which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the All-State Investment Fund, S.A., incorporated in Panama. Persons familiar with the revelations of CIA "fronts," through which funds are channeled and activity conducted, believe this setup has the same foul smell.

At his Thursday press conference, Nixon did not denounce the raid but confined his statement to: "This kind of activity ... has no place whatever in our electoral process or in our government process."

The fact is that the connections of the participants in the raid with the White House, etc., show that "this kind of activity" although it should not. The history of surreptitious activity by

governmental circles, both Democratic and Republican, as in the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the CIA activities in Laos and Cambodia, and the role of secret conspiracy in the Indochina war show that Nixon's statement is untrue.

Senate Increases Israel Arms Aid; Other Cuts Stand

By Spencer Rich
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate voted \$35 million in extra military aid for Israel yesterday but refused—on a 37 to 35 vote—to restore \$245 million slashed from the administration's request for worldwide military aid.

The White House won a partial victory, however, when Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) withdrew his provision barring the United States from financing CIA-directed Thai "volunteers" fighting Communists in Northern Laos.

The actions came in debate on the \$1.7 billion foreign military aid authorization bill. Both sides in the dispute openly sought to lure support by promises of larger aid to Israel.

Sen. Church Fights Move

Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R-Pa.), acting for the administration, opened the fight by proposing to restore \$245 million of the \$550 million that was cut by the Foreign Relations Committee.

Scott said the funds were needed to help provide modernization of the Korean army, equipment for other Asian nations, and assistance to countries like Jordan.

But Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), who led the successful fight to beat the Scott amendment, said much of the military aid money simply goes "to supply authoritarian, dictatorial regimes with weapons which they want only for the purpose of holding their own people in check."

Included in the Scott package was \$20 million for Israel, which was to be in addition to the \$50 million in security supporting assistance and \$300 million arms credits already earmarked for Israel in the committee bill.

Several senators said inclusion of the extra funds for Israel was an open attempt by the administration to push the

rest of the \$245 million through the Senate on the back of a popular increase in Israel aid.

An aide to Sen. Abraham A. Ribicoff (D-Conn.), who is Jewish and a supporter of aid for Israel, said the State Depart-

ment had approached the senator's office a week ago with a promise to add \$20 million for Israel if Ribicoff would help restore funds for the other countries—a deal which Ribicoff turned down.

Turns Tables on Scott

Church, also an ardent Israel supporter but a critic of aid to some other nations, turned the tables on Scott by outbidding him on the Israel issue. He offered a motion killing Scott's proposed \$245 million overall boost but providing \$35 million more for Israel than in the committee bill. In this way, pro-Israel senators could support more aid for Israel without taking the remainder of the \$245 million package.

In the first of two votes on the issue, Scott's \$245 million proposal was killed, 37 to 35, with both Virginia senators voting against Scott and both Maryland senators for him. Church's \$35 million extra for Israel was then approved, 54 to 21, with J. Glenn Beall (R-Md.) the only Maryland or Virginia senator opposing it.

On the Laos issue, Case was persuaded that he didn't have the votes, despite strong support from Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), who said the CIA is spending \$100 million this year and \$100 million next for its Northern Laos operations. So Case agreed to an amendment by Sen. Peter Dominick (R-Colo.) deleting Case's strong ban on U.S. financing of Thai volunteers in Laos.

However, another part of the same provision, prohibiting U.S. financing of troops

from other countries fighting in Thailand at some future time, was retained.

Existing law already bars financing of third country mercenaries fighting in Laos, but the administration has said this doesn't apply to the Thais fighting in Northern Laos because they are volunteers. Symington called this an utter fake yesterday, saying staff members he'd sent to Laos were told by the alleged volunteers, "I was ordered to come here."

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be done by the military attachés in the Embassy.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I am glad the Senator brought that up. As a matter of fact, I was going to bring it up.

Of course, the Senator knows that the managers on the part of the Senate do not file a report or a statement. The managers on the part of the House do.

I am certain that the Senator will agree with me that their statement does not necessarily constitute law. That just happens to be a unilateral interpretation that they have given to this, and we certainly had nothing of this in mind. In fact, I believe it was clearly stated in our discussions in the committee that this work would be handled by aides out of the Embassy.

Mr. JAVITS. That is the important point.

Mr. SPARKMAN. They have it, for one thing, in the latter part, where it refers to training Cambodians in South Vietnam. There is nothing in the measure that would point this up or that would dispute it. It is my understanding that we are doing that now. This measure, as I interpret it, does not affect that.

Mr. JAVITS. I should like to say to the Senator that I support the conference report, that I think they have rendered the country a great service in settling this matter.

I understand Senator Aiken's worries, and I agree with him. But I believe that, as we talked originally in an effort to settle this matter, when things lean on each other, they probably will work out. We have many other recourses if they do not.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Speaking of these reports, I think it is understandable that reports of different kinds and rumors get out. During the last several days, under the management of our coach and general manager, we have had many conferences—sometimes several conferences in the same day—and it is very easy for rumors or reports to get out which do not necessarily state the true conditions.

Mr. JAVITS. I think it is important for the Senate that Senator SPARKMAN and Senator MANSFIELD express it authoritatively, that this language does not indicate the existence of any understanding that there will be a MAG; but, on the contrary, that an understanding does exist that if any military personnel are required, it will be personnel operating out of the military section of the embassy.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Of course, the effect of a statement such as this, or a statement by one of us, if we made it, would affect the legislation only in the event that it is ambiguous. I do not think the proposed legislation is ambiguous. Certainly, we threshed it out thoroughly on the floor of the Senate when we were debating the measure. I think it is clear and can be understood easily.

Mr. JAVITS. I think the Senator has made a fine record on it, and I thank him very much.

Mr. President, the situation seems to have turned out quite differently from what we intended. In this regard, let me quote briefly from a recent report of the Foreign Relations Committee:

On January 31, 1971, a Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia (MEDTC) was formed to administer the program. The Chief of the MEDTC and his staff were located in Saigon, but 16 and later an additional 7 MEDTC officers were stationed in Phnom Penh. In July 1971, the MEDTC Chief, a Brigadier General, moved to Phnom Penh, and the MEDTC element in Cambodia was raised to its present strength. In Phnom Penh, there are now 43 MEDTC personnel (50 are authorized and up to 12 more have been approved by the Executive Branch). There are 63 other MEDTC personnel at MACV in

Saigon. Of the 12 new personnel, 4 will be used to monitor third-country national contracts (50 additional third-country nationals will be hired to train Cambodians in logistics), 4 to monitor training, 3 to be assigned to help advise on port operations at Kompong Som and 1 will be a fiscal specialist who will monitor the military uses portion of the Public Law 480 agreements (these agreements are discussed below).

Although American military personnel in the MEDTC seem to be acutely aware of the prohibition against their acting as advisors or participants in the planning and execution of tactical operations, they are nevertheless deeply involved as advisors or organizers in activities such as force planning, military budgeting, logistics and training. As noted above, 11 of the 12 new MEDTC personnel will be involved in logistics and training activities.

I have heard that the spirit of the law has been stretched even further in that U.S. military personnel who are training Cambodian troops in South Vietnam sometimes accompany those Cambodian forces back to Cambodia, and at the border these U.S. trainers become members of MEDTC. If this is so, I question whether it is not tantamount to a violation of the law.

I know we are at war, and I am in favor of supporting the South Vietnamese financially, assuming they can remain viable. I know that could include ARVN military actions in Cambodia. I have no objection per se to that, Mr. President; and I believe that is probably the general opinion of the Senate.

But that is a very different thing from backing into a war by getting involved ourselves in Cambodia, whether directly or indirectly through advisors or in some other way, so that we inevitably somehow acquire a "national commitment," and it is said the national "honor" is at stake, as the President has expressed it, or his honor as President is at stake, and the powers of his office. We get all involved in our own dialectic, and next thing you know you have had it, you are in another Vietnam fighting to honor another "commitment."

Mr. President, I make these remarks only by way of expressing the hope that provisions such as the ones addressed by Senator DOMINICK's amendment may be obviated by a much closer relation, between the appropriate committees of Congress, in this case, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I do not relish the idea of locking this into law, which does have a tendency to put U.S. policy in something of a bind—Senator DOMINICK and his associates are strongly calling our attention to that, and I understand it perfectly—but it is brought about by a long-standing and long proceeding series of events which erode a sense of feeling on the part of those who have responsibility to the Senate for foreign policy, insofar as we ourselves participate in it, that they really know what is going on.

As regards the Cambodia situation, I am considering whether there is an appropriate amendment to introduce to clear up the anomalies and ambiguities I have discussed.

Mr. President, I hope very much it is in this area that we can make the most progress, and can be instructed by what has here occurred, in showing how ur-

gently necessary it is that we be informed.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will someone yield me 3 or 4 minutes?

Mr. DOMINICK. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, first I wish to ask a question of the distinguished Senator from Colorado. Does the Senator's amendment strike subsection (b) on page 8 also?

Mr. DOMINICK. Yes, it does.

Mr. COOPER. I am glad it does, because even if we had to vote on the total section, I intended to ask that (a) and (b) be severed for a separate vote. I do not believe we have a constitutional right to require the President of the United States to provide the Congress to report, at least in advance, on detailed military operations.

But to go to the subject which the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) has just been ably discussing.

I should like to point out that we learned—I am sure that some Members of the Senate knew before—sometime in 1967 and 1968 about our operations in Laos. These operations began in 1962 or 1963 under the administration of President Kennedy, and have continued since that time.

I recall that on August 12, 1968, I offered an amendment to prohibit the use of any U.S. forces in support of Thailand or Laos, to prevent the expansion of the Vietnam war, excluding Cambodia, because at that time Cambodia was considered a neutral country. The amendment was adopted unanimously by the Senate, although we were told at that time by Senator SPARKMAN that Secretary Laird had reported that it was not of any effect. Later I discovered why it was not—because my use of the term "U.S. Forces" evidently did not include the use of CIA forces.

I support the modification of the Senator from Colorado, but I do want to point out a contradictory position. Evidently, we are supporting this amendment because we are at war and operations are going on in Laos which we are not willing to interrupt because we are at war, and evidently because we consider it would endanger our forces, whether CIA in Laos or regular U.S. forces in South Vietnam, are not willing to strike all funds for Laos and to stop this operation.

I simply point out that it is contradictory to adopt this kind of measure with respect to Laos, and to vote then for an amendment to take our troops out of Vietnam by August 31, 1972, where they are certainly at war and could be greatly endangered by a sudden evacuation. I have supported most of such proposals, with the exception of the Hatfield-McGovern amendments and then because of my opposition to a fixed date I have always believed that the flat and clear way is to adopt an amendment which says, "Take all our forces out. Stop the war and prohibit funds except for withdrawal." I have believed there would be a greater possibility of getting prisoners of war back and of having a peaceful settlement. The situation since the massive attack by North Vietnam has

CHICAGO, ILL.

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Secret U.S. air base in Thailand prepares for bombers

By Peter Smith

Special from Pacific News Service

NAM PHONG, Thailand — The new U.S. Air Force installation here at Nam Phong, in northeast Thailand, was secretly constructed during the last three years, but has been dormant for about 14 months.

That has changed now as a mass of Air Force and Navy seabee personnel arrived at the base to prepare it for the influx of fighter-bombers pulling out of South Vietnam.

(On Tuesday, the Marine Corps commandant said Marine A-6 Intruder planes began operating Tuesday from Nam Phong, where the corps is moving its air operations from Da Nang, South Vietnam. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr. said the shift was "part of the move to get out of Vietnam, to get a base that's more secure." Cushman's was the first official acknowledgment of how Nam Phong would be used.)

Unlike all other American air bases in Thailand, which are near population centers and in plain view, the base at Nam Phong is in a sparsely populated, heavily wooded area. A secondary road leading off the Ken Kaen-Udon Mitrapob (Friendship) Highway goes past the entrance road to the base, which is out of sight, about three miles to the south on the other side of a small hill.

View of base, facilities

Although newsmen are barred from the base, I was able to gain access to it and observe the activities. At present, aside from its massive 10,000-foot main runway, the air base includes only taxi strips, a small loading and unloading area, and perhaps a dozen or so barracks and office buildings. Already, however, all the communications and radar equipment necessary for putting the base on at least a temporary operational footing have been shipped in and set up in the woods around the main strip. Giant C-141 Air Force cargo jets bringing in this and other equipment have been seen landing as often as once an hour. Reminiscent of many air strips in Vietnam, temporary pumping stations, rows of earth embankments holding rubber bladders, have been constructed to fuel the many planes expected to arrive in the next few weeks.

Hundreds of marines and Navy seabees lounge in the barracks areas of the tent cities set up to house them or work in the new storage yards where the massive amount of incoming Air Force equipment in crates and seabee construction material was being sorted out and deposited, awaiting later use. Several Thai civilian contractors have already come up from Bangkok with earth-moving equipment. They intend to start clearing almost immediately to make way for the aircraft maintenance and parking areas and for the many administrative buildings that the base will require to become fully operational.

The base is divided into two parts. The first comprises the main air strip and related buildings and is entirely American-operated. Later, when the construction is completed, this part of the base will be turned over to the Royal Thai Air Force, according to Thai press sources. But this is only a convenient

Peter Smith served with the U.S. Special Forces as a sergeant in Vietnam. He trained for a year in Thailand.

formality that will allow Americans to give guard duty and responsibilities to the Thais, and let them fly the Thai flag, while leaving effective control in their own hands.

Big personnel increase

The second part of the base, separated from the first, is a secret camp used to support the classified ground war being conducted by the CIA-financed and controlled army of Gen. Vang Pao in northern Laos. At this camp, Thai "volunteers" who fight in Laos are trained and garrisoned.

The opening of the Nam Phong base, which brings to seven the number of U.S. Air Force installations in operation in Thailand, was necessitated by the Nixon administration's need to relocate Air Force and Marine fighter-bomber squadrons being pulled out of Vietnam. While troop strength in Vietnam has been reduced from 61,000 to 43,000 over the last three months in line with troop withdrawal policy, the number of Air Force personnel in Thailand has been increased from 32,000 to 46,000. Recently the air base at Takli was reopened and is now in full operation, with four wings of Phantom jets and 3,000 airmen. The giant air base at Uthapao, south of Bangkok, has received 50 or more additional B-52s since the beginning of the current air-war build-up.

Out by the gate, while one of their buddies was over buying soda from the Thai shopkeepers who have already opened small stores across from the main entrance, several U.S. marines were standing around. They stood just inside the gate, evidently observing a restriction that no Americans are allowed off post. I walked up and asked them if this was the new air base the Americans were building, and was greeted with the paranoia typical of soldiers well coached on saying nothing to anybody about anything. "Which base?" one asked back. I volunteered that I had been sitting across the street for a half-hour watching aircraft landing at the strip just down the road.

"Yes, this is the new base," offered another. "But who are you? Do you have any identification? The base is highly classified and we can't talk to anybody about it." Soon their buddy arrived in the truck with his load of soda, and all the marines piled on and drove off. Apparently they were part of an advance party that preceded the main group coming in from bases in Vietnam.

Asian Allies Help Cut Heroin Traffic

By MIRIAM OTTENBERG

Star Staff Writer

U.S. narcotics agents are making a sizable dent in the Southeast Asian dope traffic and—despite reports to the contrary—America's Asian allies and the CIA are helping them do it.

"We have seriously damaged the program of the narcotics traffickers," reported John Warner, chief of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs' strategic intelligence office. "It's becoming increasingly more difficult for them to operate, even though their profits are tremendous."

Warner countered testimony given recently by Alfred W. McCoy, a Ph.D. student, before a Senate Appropriations subcommittee to the effect that the governments of South Vietnam, Laos and Thailand are actively engaged in the heroin traffic and that the U.S. government has not moved to stop it.

"Corruption," Warner acknowledged, "is a way of life in Southeast Asia. It reaches to all levels. But the United States government has made it perfectly clear to all governments in the area that we will not compromise on the narcotics issue."

He cited as an example of increasing cooperation on instance earlier this year when 26 tons of opium were turned over to the government of Thailand by one of the insurgent forces along its border—presumably for reasons of its own.

Until recently, the opium would have found its way back into the traffic. But this

Second of 2 Articles

time, it was burned in the presence of American narcotics agents and samples were taken and analyzed by American chemists.

Even more significant are recent successes of Laos and Thai narcotics investigative units set up with U.S. aid.

Warner explained how they came into being and, in doing so, replied to the charges made by McCoy in his Congressional appearance.

McCoy had charged that the U.S. ambassador to Laos, G. McMurtrie Godley, "did his best to prevent the assignment" of U.S. narcotics agents to Laos.

Actually, Warner said, Godley has been one of the staunchest supporters of the anti-narcotics program in Laos, and requested U.S. narcotics agents as advisers long before they could be sent there. He was instrumental in persuading Laos to outlaw the opium traffic, Warner said.

Godley also persuaded the Laotian government to appoint an honest and competent general to head the new narcotics investigative unit which the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs established and trained, Warner added.

In the short time the unit has been operational, Warner reported, it has made tremendous progress in arresting traffickers and seizing laboratory equipment and the chemicals used to make heroin.

The unit's latest score came on June 7 when it arrested a Meo deputy of the Laotian parliament and seized 10 kilos of No. 4 heroin (the injectable kind), 26 kilos of opium and a number of U.S. Army carbines.

Another special investigative force, trained and equipped by BNDD agents, has just gotten under way at Chingmai in northern Thailand. Chingmai is a road junction in the network of roads leading south to Bangkok.

It's particularly important to U.S. narcotics agents because they hope there to halt the movement of heroin out of the "Golden Triangle," the opium growing area bordering Laos, Burma and Thailand.

The new Thai unit has just scored its first success. On June 10, a joint BNDD and Thai task force raided a compound and seized 1,600 kilos of raw opium and processing equipment, he said.

Warner also reported that the Royal Hong Kong police also have stepped up their anti-narcotics program, making large seizures of narcotics, arresting traffickers and seizing two laboratories this year. At the time, both labs had quantities of heroin, opium and morphine base.

Burma, the other government touched by the opium traffic, has expressed its willingness to cooperate, Warner reported, but Burmese officials frankly admit their control over the border areas are very tenuous. It would require an army to make any impact on the border areas where insurgent forces protect the opium traffickers, Warner said.

In Laos an acknowledged important trafficker has been knocked out of business not by an army but by American diplomacy, Warner said.

Gen. Ouane Rattikone, former chief of staff of the Royal Laotian Army, had consolidated several opium refineries into one, and with his army, controlled and protected the Laotian narcotics traffic for years, Warner said.

"He was forced to retire in July, 1971. We have political clout in the area and Ambassador Godley exerted it."

Warner said similar action would be taken against Vietnamese figures if charges of narcotics trafficking were proven.

"Politics means nothing to us in BNDD," he said. If we had the evidence . . . the President would be informed and I know something would be done about it.

McCoy had said in his congressional testimony that the political apparatus of Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky (the former

president of South Vietnam) "demonstrates the importance of official corruption in Southeast Asia's drug traffic." McCoy also said Ky's sister is tied in with heroin smuggling.

Warner, however, said there is no evidence that Ky is involved.

McCoy, in his Senate testimony, said he had briefed BNDD on his findings and they corroborated much of his evidence. Asked about that, Warner said he had seen nothing of an evidentiary nature from McCoy "other than gossip, rumors, conjecture and old history."

McCoy had accused the CIA of providing substantial military support to mercenaries, rebels and warlords actively engaged in the narcotics traffic and of letting aircraft it chartered be used to transport opium harvested by the mercenaries.

Of those charges, Warner said the American-chartered aircraft now have security forces guarding against the against the transport of any narcotics.

Since President Nixon asked the CIA to assist in dealing with the Southeast Asian narcotics problem, Warner said, the CIA has been one of the most cooperative government agencies working with BNDD to develop the information on which BNDD and its foreign counterparts can act to interdict the traffic and make cases.

The weeding out of Asian officials heavily involved in the dope traffic, as well as the strikes against the traffickers themselves, are all fairly recent. And so is the BNDD involvement in the Pacific.

It's only in the last two years that American narcotics agents have come into the Orient in force. Since BNDD Director John E. Ingersoll pushed for more agents to fight the Pacific traffic in drugs, regional offices have been set up in Bangkok, Saigon and Tokyo, and district offices in Chingmai, Vientiane, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Hong Kong, Okinawa and Manila.

PORTLAND, ME.
PRESS-HERALD
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S - 108,947

JUN 18 1972

Hathaway Asks CIA Watchdog

Congressman William D. Hathaway said Saturday he will introduce a bill Monday to give Congress the means to oversee operations of the Central Intelligence Agency.

In making the announcement from his Portland headquarters, the second district representative said, "It is essential that the elected representatives of the American people have the right and perform the duty of overseeing the activities and expenditures of the CIA ... as they do with all government agencies."

"In addition to running an extensive spy network worldwide, the agency gives money and technical assistance to secret military and political operations which often run counter to U.S. foreign policy."

Hathaway cited the war in Laos as an example which, he said, "the CIA was financing to the tune of several hundred million dollars a year long before it was public knowledge."

The Congressman, who is seeking the Democratic nomination for the Senate seat now held by Sen. Margaret Chase Smith, said his proposal would establish a joint committee on foreign information and intelligence for the House and Senate.

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CIA-Backed Commando Raids into N. Viet Told

BY WAYNE THOMIS

[Aviation Editor]

[Chicago Tribune Press Service]

SAIGON, Viet Nam, June 14 —Hanoi broadcasts infrequently mention "works of saboteurs" in North Viet Nam's panhandle, and Saigon's vernacular press occasionally report odd little aircraft accidents with nonmilitary planes in mountainous regions of Laos, Northwestern South Viet Nam, and sometimes in Northeastern Thailand.

These are mere peeks by the general public at a tremendous submerged "iceberg" of clandestine operations continuously and now increasingly carried out against the Communist North.

These actions probably never will be disclosed in full detail but it can be said responsibly that today they constitute an important phase of this Southeast Asia battle.

It is a silent war. It is carried out by special forces and by mercenaries. It is a hit-and-run war in which units are airlifted or sea borne deep into North Viet Nam for demolition missions, for seizure of prisoners, for probing forays, and—it now is understood—for accumulation of information on American prisoner of war camp locations.

This type of action has been taking place in the North Vietnamese panhandle from the Demilitarized Zone to well north of Vinh during the last 60 days.

An increasing series of such raids have come from the sea-coasts and from helicopter air-bridge links in Laos and Thailand to points where damage can be done or information obtained from the North Vietnamese, it was learned from reliable sources.

Communist broadcasts from Hanoi in the past have used "saboteur" in an ideological sense. Now they are referring to actual dynamitings by these raiders. They specialize in targets which are too difficult for bombers to identify from the air, or are too well hidden to be spotted by aerial photography. They also carry out a traffic in agents not otherwise possible under present conditions.

Size, Duration Vary

Reports filtering from Central Intelligence Agency and associates military establishments indicate such raids may vary from 20 to several hundred men. They may stay in North Viet Nam from a few minutes to 24 hours.

Mercenaries enlisted for such secret actions include Europeans, Chinese, Malays, Japanese and Americans. The operations are carefully planned and surrounded by the tight security.

The CIA now believes the large-scale American attempt to free prisoners from a camp near Hanoi a year ago failed because of a security leak

which resulted in a prisoner shift.

The raiders are heavily armed. Not one operation has failed, and none of the raiders have been trapped, according to informed sources.

Casualties among these special forces have been low. Pay scales are said to be "quite high" and morale among these specialists in demolition, electronics sabotage, and interrogation is very high. The men regard themselves as an elite corps.

Financed by CIA

The mysterious, CIA-financed Air America civil flying fleet seems to operate on a supernational basis across Cambodian, Thai, Laotian, and South Vietnamese borders. It has had a part in some of this work. However, much of the work is being done by military detachments, temporarily posted to the special forces.

The military establishment here generally attempts to suppress mention of this side of the war for a number of reasons, with security against enemy knowledge being the least important. The North Vietnamese are fully aware of the nature of the CIA-directed and financed special operations.

It is known that after each such raid all civilians and military personnel in the North who have had contact with the raiders are subjected to rigorous and lengthy questioning by Communist secret police and political commissars.

The U. S. forces seek to hide the clandestine side of the war to prevent embarrassment to Thai, Cambodian, and Laotian governmental departments.

It is recognized by American leaders that such concealment is merely "token" but is required in certain diplomatic tries fringing South Viet Nam maintain.

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Silent War Stepped Up In Vietnam

Saboteurs Harass North's Panhandle

By WAYNE THOMIS

Miami Herald-Chicago Tribune Wire

SAIGON — Hanoi infrequently broadcasts mention "works of saboteurs" in North Vietnam's panhandle.

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STATINTL



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STATINTL

U.S. Air-Drops Asian Guerrillas

Saboteurs Raid N. Vietnam

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Laos, June 14—Use of Laotian territory and specially recruited Asian mercenaries for CIA-sponsored espionage and sabotage missions in North Vietnam has been confirmed here by American sources close to the operation.

The missions are originating from a number of small mountaintop sites in northern Laos within 30 miles of the North Vietnamese border. The guerrilla troops are transported by unmarked Air America planes.

The existence of the guerrilla missions inside North Vietnam was first reported in Saigon earlier this week. Such missions were known to have been initiated in early 1960s, but were not regarded at the time as very effective and were apparently suspended after the 1968 bombing halt.

Highly trained mountain tribesmen from northern Laos and some Thai mercenaries with long experience in special operations are said here to make up the teams. Most of the guerrillas are said to speak Vietnamese, some fluently.

Officially, the Air America management in Vientiane is unaware that the company's pilots or planes are flying such missions. Air America is a quasi-private airline under contract with U.S. government agencies.

Pilots used on the espionage-sabotage mission flights are carefully selected and receive special pay for hazardous duty by a "white envelope system." This means that the money received is not accountable or traceable, even for tax purposes, sources say.

Official U.S. spokesmen in Vientiane decline to comment on the operation, but information pieced together from American and local sources here indicates that virtually

inaccessible CIA-maintained bases in Laos are used to train, house, and transport the guerrillas.

Nam Yu, the CIA's most secret base in Laos, situated in northwestern Laos near the town of Ban Houei Sai, is reported to be the primary training center.

Nam Yu was formerly a base for intelligence teams being sent into South China to report on telephone and road traffic, a program discontinued last year when President Nixon accepted an invitation to visit China.

From Nam Yu, the guerrillas are moved to the Long Cheng area 80 miles north of Vientiane where they continue to train, making forays into the surrounding mountains inside Laos on lower-level reconnaissance missions for seasoning and practical experience in avoiding capture and inflicting harm on Communist forces.

Many of the potential North Vietnamese infiltrators are "weeded out" during this training period, sources say.

Resident newsmen here have been unable to visit Long Cheng in recent months.

Jump-off points for the guerrillas are considerably east and northeast of Long Cheng, according to the sources, most being tiny hilltop positions hardly known to exist. A major point of departure is said to be at Bouam Long, sometimes called "the fortress in the sky," about 40 miles northeast of Long Cheng, a base the Communists have never been able to wrest from its Meo defenders.

Practical training exercises are also conducted at Bouam Long. Communist radio broadcasts frequently note the presence, capture or killing of commandos from Bouam Long in the Sam Neua area of northeast Laos. Caves in nearby mountains contain the headquarters of the Communist-supported Laotian rebels.

The highest priority, however, is given to missions that move into North Vietnam

where they conduct sabotage, espionage and propaganda missions in that country's least inhabited and defended areas. Precise information on targets and types of guerrilla action is not available here.

It is known, however, that the CIA is distrustful of many claims made by the guerrilla infiltrators and frequently equips the units with cameras so they can photograph themselves at targets. The photographs prove the missions were carried out, and provides intelligence data for CIA analysts.

Each mission uses at least one specially equipped twin-engine Otter plane, said to carry half a million dollars worth of radio and electronic gear for pinpoint navigation and locating of ground forces. Because of the twin Otter's virtual silent operation as it passes close over the ground, its short take-off and landing capability, and the load it can carry, its basic function has been the clandestine insertion, pickup and resupply of guerrilla missions.

There are also reports of guerrillas being snatched from enemy-occupied territory by a hook dangling from rescue aircraft. The guerrilla on the ground inflates a large balloon with lighter-than-air gas, attaches it to a thin line which is then attached to a harness he fastens to himself. The rescue craft passes over the balloon, hooks on and hauls him up.

Qualified sources here say, meantime, that they believe that such espionage missions will be increased in northern Laos, and may be resumed inside China itself, to sabotage war material that—because of the mining of Haiphong—is expected to flow increasingly through China's Yunnan Province and the Laotian Province of Phong Saly on its way into North Vietnam.

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Laos Finally Starts to Train Regular Army

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE

Special to The Star

PHOU KHOA KWAI, Laos — In this rough mountain valley, 40 miles northeast of Vientiane, Laos has finally begun training its regular army after 14 years of almost continuous warfare against North Vietnam and the pro-Communist Pathet Lao.

"If Laos is ever going to have an army it's going to have to train soldiers," an informed military man said as he explained the setting up of this Lao training school, the first of its kind in the nation.

Laos has never trained its royal army, the right-wing fighting force, before for two very sound reasons.

These are, first, nowhere in Laos is safe from Communist attack apart from the capital, Vientiane, which is politically protected by the presence of a Communist garrison. Vientiane, in the flat, heavily-populated plain, is unsuitable for training, however.

Dramatic Example

This Communist attack ability was dramatically demonstrated at the school May 19 when over 100 Neo-Communist troop overran Phou Khao Kwai. Fourteen Lao trainees were killed, 13 seriously wounded and 15 are missing. Communists threw satchel charges into buildings, blew up generators and ran through instructors' huts shooting them up.

No instructors were killed. Along with two American military advisors who handle the school's logistics, they lay in fields and ditches and fought back and the Communists pulled out.

The second point is that most of the fighting in Laos is done by Lao and Thai irregular forces trained in Thailand or in CIA-run camps in southern Laos. These irregulars, often recruited from the royal army, are paid directly by Americans and come under a different command system.

According to a report by Richard M. Moose and James G. Lowenstein, investigators

for U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, published in May, royal Lao army regulars kill fewer enemy troops in combat than the irregulars: 1,160 enemy in 1971 compared to 4,544 killed by irregulars in the same year. The royal Lao army had only 557 men killed in 1971 compared to the Lao irregular death toll of 2,259 in the same year, the report says. With low-level participation in war by regulars and a high level of corruption in the army, Americans tended to try to build a separate army rather than improve the existing one.

Now with the U.S. cutting back its role in Southeast Asia, American officials here feel regulars should be trained to irregular standards and the two forces merged eventually into one competent army.

Volunteers Dwindle

Also, the supply of Thai volunteers is dwindling as more of them are killed in Laos. Thais are political liability because of U.S. congressional distaste over their being funded by the United States while Thais are fighting for mostly mercenary motives.

The seriously deteriorating military situation in Thailand and a change in world political alignments are causing Thais to take a close look at their role as allies of United States.

The Lao military is happy with the school here. They say they were treated as second-class citizens while being trained in Thailand and they could not understand why they had Thai instructors anyway as Thais have done little fighting compared to Laotians. Military sources, however, point out the training here has "a long way to go" before regulars can reach irregular standards.

The school is set in a long, narrow valley overlooked by rocky bluffs.

There is a dirt airstrip capable of taking American medium-sized transports. Lao army engineers have constructed six barrack blocks,

two stories each, from teak trees in the valley. The damage wrought by the Communist satchel charges has already been repaired. U.S. funds have constructed a new concrete headquarters to replace one burnt by the Communists.

The school can train 600 men at one time, but presently has only 440, all recruits. The school is divided into three sections: infantry training, a 10-week course; artillery training, some courses long as six months; and commando training, a course which has not yet started.

Realistic Training

Instructors are young first lieutenants and captains, all of whom have had combat experience in Laos and trained in Thailand and the U.S. Two officers also have been to Australian jungle warfare school.

Infantry school training is realistic as recruits from the first have to patrol to protect their camp from real life Red Guerrillas. They are taught how to shoot at stationary and pop-up targets before assignment to a combat unit. They also learn small unit tactics.

More important, perhaps, recruits are given a literacy test at school. Those who can't write, usually 60 to 80 percent of the intake, are given six hours a week of classes to learn reading and writing which followed up by a "good citizenship" course to provide some sort of motivation and explain why the nation is at war with North Vietnam.

Artillery Exam

Today at Phou Khao Kwai is examination day for the artillerymen, before they are assigned to combat units. The exam takes place in a grass and bamboo classroom.

Young peasant boys aged 13 to 20 jostle each other shyly as the examining officer calls each candidate in turn to enter the classroom. Once in the doorway the recruit snaps to attention, gives his name, the number of the course, and such while his hand quiver in a salute.

"Do you know how to use this?" the examining officer says, showing a rangefinder.

"No sir," says the recruit. The officer sighs while sergeants taking down scores giggle. The officer works his way through three mechanical aids in fire control for artillery until the recruit shows he can use one and gives a demonstration of his ability.

Unusual Feature

Today at Phou Khao Kwai is feature. Its afternoon schedule starts at 1:30 p.m. while the royal army does not function until 3 p.m. in the rest of Laos.

The location of the school in this picturesque, cool valley has caused some hardship to local Meo tribesmen. Many of them have been shifted to the hot Vientiane Plain to cultivate paddy rice. Lao military men say that with firing ranges in the valley, particularly the artillery ranges, there would have been some danger to the local population. Also, training camp security had to be taken into account as some Meo support Communists operating as part time guerrillas. Laos admit there were Meo objections to the camp's installation, but their removal is called an "obligation" for country's needs. Meo tribesmen in Phou Khao Kwai long had a reputation for hostility to the Meo commander, Gen. Vang Pao and Laotians, who they accuse of trying to take over their valley.

*Foreign policy—peace through war, truth through lies***Roots of War**

By Richard J. Barnet.
350 pp. New York. Atheneum. \$10.

By RONALD STEEL

For the past three decades one President after another has been telling us that we must make the world safe for America. F.D.R. preached the Four Freedoms, Harry Truman dropped the atomic bomb, Ike and Dulles set up a global system of bases, J.F.K. told us we were the "watchmen on the walls" of freedom, L.B.J. warned us that others wanted what we have, and Nixon seeks respect for his office by B-52 raids on small Asian states. Security through terror, peace through war, truth through lies: this has been the model for United States foreign policy for nearly two generations.

Richard Barnet argues in this provocative and disturbing study of the Thirty Years' War waged in the name of peace that instead of trying to make the world safe for America we should be looking for a way to make America safe for the world. It is not our enemies, he maintains, but we ourselves who are the greatest threat to world peace, pursuing what we insist is our national interest by "spreading death, terror, and destruction," and behaving in a way that America is "surpassed by none in the fear and hatred it has inspired around the world."

Since 1940, Barnet argues, the external business of the United States has been war and preparation for war. We have the world's most powerful military force; maintain some 400 major overseas installations, have waged two land wars in Korea and Vietnam, and have intervened either through the C.I.A. or with our own troops from Guatemala and Cuba to Lebanon and Laos. Until Vietnam we assumed that the feeding of a permanent war machine was the price we had to pay for living in a threatening world.

"We are the Number One nation," Lyndon Johnson said as he was devastating Vietnam, "and we are going to stay the Number One nation." But the price of being the world's Num-

ber One military interventionist is getting to be more than the country can support. Inflation is rampant, unemployment is persistent, the balance of payments is disastrous, the vaults at Fort Knox are emptying, and the public mood is turning from disenchantment to confusion and even to an ugly search for authoritarian order. The world is not going the way we want it to, and—judging from President Nixon's kiss-and-make-up visits to Peking and Moscow—maybe the menace is not so terrible as we were told it was all these years. If not, what is the purpose of murder in Indochina and the most gargantuan war machine the world has ever seen?

This is the question that many are beginning to ask, but few have approached it with the incisiveness and originality shown by Richard Barnet. Drawing on his experience in government and his work at the Institute for Policy Studies, which he founded in Washington 10 years ago with Marcus Raskin and has helped transform into a brains trust of the radical left, he has looked at foreign policy from the inside. Instead of asking how we responded to external threats, he tries to find out what it is about our society that led us to create situations that would justify the wars of intervention, why for three decades we have been organized for war.

Barnet is not the first to view foreign policy as an outgrowth of domestic policy. But the special value of his book lies in his examination of the domestic political, economic, and social forces that determine that amorphous thing we call the national interest. For the élite who have evolved our foreign policy, that national interest demands war, the threat of war and the preparation for war. "War is primarily the product of domestic social and economic institutions," Barnet insists, and those who control these institutions decide which threats are important enough to justify war.

In Barnet's schema the roots of war are three-fold: the concentration of power in a national security bureaucracy that plays by rules of its own making and is largely self-perpetuating; the capitalist economy and the business creed that sustains it; and the vulnerability of the public to manipulation on national security issues. The first of these, he argues, means more than just a change of leaders or of policy. It means sweep-

ing institutional changes within the society: shrinking and controlling the bureaucracy, eschewing the growth mystique that feeds economic expansion and military interventions, and making the public aware of how it is directly affected by the decisions of the élite. Only in this way, he believes, can the United States "renounce militarism and war as primary instruments of policy and accommodate its fears and appetites to the postimperial world."

The centerpiece of Barnet's argument is his dissection of the national security bureaucracy, an organization that permits individuals to "get medals, promotions and honors by committing the same acts for the state for which they would be hanged or imprisoned in any other circumstance." These men are able to commit what he calls "bureaucratic homicide," "because their official roles insulate them from personal responsibility for their actions. They direct the "Green Machine," as the G.I.s call the war juggernaut in Vietnam, and decide from their desks and push buttons which governments shall be overthrown and which nations destroyed. They do so in the name of the national interest, which they are solemnly pledged to uphold and defend.

These men are not monsters, nor do they see themselves operating as oppressors and aggressors. They are, Barnet holds, deeply moral men who are convinced that what they are doing is best for the nation and, by extension, best for the world. They are always saying so, and there is no reason to believe that they do not mean it, however much those they are subverting and bombing may disagree. These men are talented and intelligent, the "brightest and the best" by every standard American society holds dear. They have been to the right schools, hold the right jobs in finance, law and business, belong to the proper clubs and organizations, and succeed one another in all the important governmental posts—regardless of which political party is in power.

Barnet shows how between 1940 and 1967 all the first- and second-level posts in the national security bureaucracy were held by fewer than 400 individuals. Of the 91 people who held the very top jobs—the Secretaries of Defense and State, and of the three services, the chairman of

Continued

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Commando raids on North Vietnam

*'Mercenaries' (CIA recruits?)
hit supply and transport lines*

By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Saigon

United States-hired commandos are making unannounced raids into North Vietnam, according to U.S. sources in Saigon.

The sources said the raids are being made against North Vietnam's supply and transport system, mainly in the country's southern panhandle, by "Asian mercenaries." Most of the commandos are believed to be recruits of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in Laos.

Many of the commandos are being inserted into North Vietnam by unmarked aircraft, the sources said. But according to one report, some have been slipped into North Vietnam on boats.

The sources said the raids are being staged from a "neighboring country," undoubtedly meaning Laos. But it was thought that bases in Thailand might also be involved.

Targets spotlighted

Truck parks and supply depots are among the targets, the sources said.

The CIA had organized sabotage and intelligence raids into North Vietnam in the early 1960's, but these were believed to have met with little success.

In early 1964, the raids were stepped up and came under the control of the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Saigon. Some of the details of those raids were disclosed in the "Pentagon papers" published last year.

The raids were apparently suspended after the bombing halt in 1968.

The renewed raids are no secret to the North Vietnamese. Hanoi publications such as Quan Doi Nhan Dan (People's Army) have made at least half-a-dozen references over the past few weeks to "puppet ranger groups" making raids in the north.

Publication warns

The armed forces publication recently warned that the United States is "attempting to conduct surprise attacks by infantry or commandos in vital areas to sever our transportation to the front line."

In another issue, Quan Doi Nhan Dan said that North Vietnam's local forces are "determined to annihilate U.S. puppet ranger groups."

"At present, along with using aircraft and warships to . . . attack us, the Nixon clique is maneuvering to continue to use rangers to carry out sabotage activities in the north," the paper said. "These activities are aimed at sabotaging our communications lines and military and economic installations.

"They use aircraft, boats, and rubber rafts to land these rangers or send them across the borders. Their basic plot is to land secretly, quickly carry out sabotage activities, and then withdraw quickly."

But it added that "sometimes they leave behind a small number of rangers to carry out activities for a long time."

Although the North Vietnamese publication called the raids "desperate," activities which "cannot escape being appropriately punished," there is no evidence so far that the Communists have had much success in stopping them.

Along with the bombing, mining, and commando raids, the United States has also resumed the dropping of propaganda leaflets over North Vietnam.

The Voice of America has increased its broadcasts to North Vietnam from a pre-offensive level of 6 hours a day to a current level of 13 hours a day.

10 June 1972

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GINSBERG-McGOVERN QUESTION

CIA SMACK SMUGGLING

By FLORA LEWIS

NEW YORK — A weird series of incidents is bringing into focus the question of the CIA's relation to the booming Indochina traffic in heroin and the opium from which it is made.

Ramparts magazine has published a study of the drug trade in Indochina, pulling together many details of the widely but only vaguely known story and making a series of specific charges against top South Vietnamese, Laotian and Thai officials. Further, Ramparts charged that it is CIA operations and subsidies in the area which have made possible the big increase in the supply of heroin from Indochina.

Sen. George McGovern (D.-N.D.) wrote a letter to CIA Director Richard Helms asking six questions about it. One inquired whether the opium production in Laos was conducted with the knowledge of CIA officials, particularly around the CIA's secret army base at Long Cheng in Laos, and if the effect of CIA operations is to "protect the supplies (of opium) and facilitate their movement."

CIA legislative counsel Jack Maury called on McGovern to give oral answers to the questions. He referred to a sheaf of legal-size papers for his information, indicating that the CIA has made a new investigation, but he didn't give McGovern the papers. He denied some of the charges, but said the CIA has been trying to convince the local people not to be in the drug traffic, which obviously implies that the CIA knows about it.

McGovern's query wasn't the first challenge to Helms on the subject. On March 4 Helms went with his wife to an evening event at the Corcoran Gallery in Washington. The star happened to be Allen Ginsberg, the tousle-haired mystic poet. They met at a reception before the poetry reading, and Ginsberg took after Helms for what he says is CIA support of the dope trade.

The poet has been investigating drug traffic for seven years, and he has on the tip of his tongue a lot of precise names and places and figures. For one thing, he said, Long Cheng is a central collecting market for the opium flowing from Zieng Quang Province of Laos down into Vietnam and Bangkok and out around the world back to the United States.

Helms said it wasn't true, so Ginsberg said, "I'll make you a wager." If he lost, Ginsberg promised to give the senator "a vajra" (sic) which he describes as "a Buddhist-Hindu ritual implement of

brass symbolizing the lightning-bolt doctrine of sudden illumination." Helms was to meditate one hour a day for the rest of his life if he lost.

Some time later, Ginsberg sent Helms a clipping from the Far East Economic Review saying that a number of correspondents who sneaked into Long Cheng over the years saw raw opium piled up for sale in the market there, in full view of CIA armed agents. He also sent a note offering Helms suggestions about how to keep a straight back while meditating, the best sitting position and proper breathing.

He has had no acknowledgement from the CIA chief, but says, "I have been tender toward him. It is terribly important to get him into an improved mind-consciousness. Anything that might help save the world situation would be sheer Hari Krishna magic, the hard-headed people have brought us to such an apocalyptic mess."

Helms says that he has received no note from Ginsberg, and only vaguely remembers the bet. He called the charges "vicious," "silly," "ridiculous." He told me, "There is no evidence over the years that any of these people were involved in any significant way. Almost all the opium grown there is in Communist-controlled areas, Pathet Lao areas."

I asked about Thailand, and he said, "I don't control northern Thailand. I don't control the Royal Laotian government; it's an independent country" (whose national budget and army are subsidized by the United States). "I don't know why you want to lay all this on the poor old CIA."

"We are not involved in the drug traffic in Laos or anywhere else. There is no evidence at all. To have evidence you'd have to get somebody in my office and have him say yes, I ran drugs with your approval."

At another point, he said, "Opium's been in that part of the world for centuries," and "most drugs in the United States come from Turkey." He said he didn't know anything about a U.N. report that 70%-80% of the world's supply comes from Southeast Asia.

And at another point he said "that part of the country (Laos) is loaded with opium. It's all over the area."

Maury, he said, had told McGovern that "it's all rot. It's not true." Later, Maury told me that he couldn't say anything about his talk with McGovern and that a written report which he has promised to give the senator "won't be available to you or anybody else for publication."

Meanwhile, the rate of heroin addiction among GIs in Vietnam is soaring dramatically, and drugs continue to pour into the United States.

Certainly, Helms is right when he says

that drug control is not the CIA's responsibility. But two facts are inescapable.

1.—Drugs are flowing into Vietnam and out of Indochina into the world underground network in dramatically increasing quantity. Not only is there a fearful growth in the amount of opium, from which heroin is refined, produced and exported from southeast Asia. Alongside the traditional opium trade, heroin is being produced there. This is new. The proof that it is true is the ready availability of heroin to GIs in Vietnam. Their powder doesn't come all the way from Turkey or France.

2.—The CIA provides virtually all the transportation, the arms, and much of the money on which the people engaged in growing and moving drugs depend on in order to keep going. The CIA isn't there because of the drug traffic. As Helms says, it does not officially condone the traffic. But official CIA operations have made it much easier for the trade to prosper in security.

While the standard American government position is that Turkey is the main source of the heroin reaching the

U.S., there is every reason to question whether this remains true. The United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs has said that 80% of the world's opium supply comes from southeast Asia. Dr. Alexander Messing, a UN narcotics expert, says that "if (the supply of opium from) Turkey were shut down overnight, there is still so much of the stuff around that it would hardly make a difference."

Partly, this is because the main producers of opium are the hill tribes in Laos and northeast Thailand. Many are the Meo people, on whom the CIA relies for its "clandestine army" in Laos. Opium is their one cash crop. The CIA needs the goodwill of the Meos. It does not go out of its way to offend them.

Partly, this is because the very nature of CIA operations in southeast Asia requires the cooperation of high local officials, daredevils, adventurers. Often those who are corrupt cooperate all the more willingly, since it facilitates their illicit enterprises. The CIA doesn't support what they do on the side, but it

NEW YORK, N.Y.
POSTEVENING - 623,245
WEEKEND - 354,797

JUN 9 1972

MEANWHILE IN THAILAND . . .**A 7th Airbase for New U.S. Stronghold**

NAM PHONG, Thailand, (Dispatch News Service International)—The U. S. has begun work on a seventh airbase in Thailand to be used for air-strikes in the Indochina war. The move feeds speculation that the U. S. plans to turn Thailand into a stronghold for anti-communist military activity in Southeast Asia.

At present, the site—in the Nam Phong district of Khon Kaen province in the northeast—is an isolated Royal Thai army post where Americans train Laotians and Thais for the clandestine war in Laos.

Its development as an airbase will place American strength in Thailand—now at an official 36,000-37,000—back up toward the 1969 high of 49,000. Military sources in Bangkok say the base will be the home of F4 Phantom fighter-bombers.

(A Defense Dept. spokesman in Washington says there are presently no U.S. troops at Nam Phong, though there is a possibility the base may be used as an airstrip in the future.)

May Prove Embarrassing

The U. S. Embassy here admits that construction has already begun, and it will no doubt prove embarrassing to the Thai government, which only six months ago signed in Kuala Lumpur a plea for a "Declaration of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality" for Southeast Asia. (Under the agreement, the major powers would consent to non-interference and be denied military facilities in the area.)

The base will thus throw into question again alleged U. S. intentions to wind down the air war and its presence in Southeast Asia.

In the wake of the North Vietnamese offensive in South Vietnam, American air power in Thailand was increased until five bases were operating at top capacity.

One month ago it was announced that Takli Airbase, closed since late 1970, would be reactivated by the U. S. Air Force. The Pentagon stressed that this was a

temporary move to counter the offensive.

But, according to GIs and civilians working at Takli, the base had been so thoroughly stripped that it was little more than runway and empty buildings. Reconstruction will take months.

The task at Nam Phong will be even larger. At present there is a 10,000-ft. runway and little else. Everything—including quarters for several thousand American troops, maintenance facilities, protective structures for the aircraft—will have to be built from scratch.

The base is located about 60 kilometers from the provincial capital of Khon Kaen. Little distinguishes its main gate as the entrance of a military installation. No barbed wire or buildings can be seen. Three guards lazily check vehicles as they enter and wave them on to disappear over a rise on the dirt road leading in.

Across the road from the guarded entrance is a row of shacks housing about 15 small commercial shops. The closest town is a dusty district capital, five kilometers up the road.

Before construction for the air facilities began, the base was a springboard for Thailand's role in the war in Laos. Part of the 12,000-man force of Thai troops that the CIA finances and directs in Laos is trained here.

According to qualified observers these Thai troops are playing an increasing role in Laos, as the role of Meo tribesmen in combat diminishes. Soldiers who sport custom-made "commando" uniforms at the camp, openly admit they have been in combat in Laos. **80 U. S. Advisers**

Outside the base one can hear the occasional boom of field guns. (An undisclosed number of the Thais in Laos are with artillery units.)

Approximately 80 Americans are stationed permanently at the post in an advisory and training capacity.

Until recently, most planes taking off from the Nam Phong airstrip were T28s

carrying Laotian student pilots and their instructors. Though American transports are now landing in force, the T28s can still be seen flying circles around the camp and practicing bombing runs.

The camp also has a 160-bed hospital caring for Thais wounded in Laos. Thai casualties in Laotian combat are a closely guarded secret, but this hospital is almost full. Most of the patients have relatively minor wounds. Those seriously injured are sent to a hospital at Udon Airbase, 100 kilometers to the North, where many of the

Many of the soldiers said they were wounded at Long Cheng, formerly a secret CIA base in central Laos, which has been under siege from Communist forces for the past several months. According to these men, Thais and Meo irregulars were the mainstay of the force defending Long Cheng and Royal Lao army units were hardly to be seen.

According to a heavily censored U. S. Senate report, the U. S. now spends over \$100 million yearly to finance the Thai forces in Laos. A private receives a monthly wage of \$76—at least three times his regular salary. The sum is transferred to Thai officers by CIA personnel at Udon base.

The Thai soldiers first appeared in 1970 and are officially called volunteers, as a result of the Fulbright Resolution which forbids direct U. S. financing of third national soldiers to fight in either Laos or Cambodia. It is maintained in official circles that the volunteers were all recruited in Northeast Thailand and were ethnically of Laotian stock.

But according to the soldiers themselves, neither of these claims are true. Many of the men are from provinces in the Central Plains, and cannot speak Laotian. Though most do volunteer—for financial reasons—enlisted men and officers with special skills are often ordered to Laos as part of their duties in the Royal Thai Army.

According to Laos Premier Souvanna himself acknowledged their uncertain status interview, 25 to 26 Thai battalions, each with about 400 men, were planned for deployment in Laos by June. Souvanna himself acknowledged their uncertain status by saying, "They can't be called Thai battalions. We must call them volunteer battalions."

As the Nam Phong Airbase takes shape, the nearby town of Khon Kaen undoubtedly will begin to show signs of the presence of American troops.

Unless the town is closed to the GIs and they are ordered to Udon instead, local business entrepreneurs probably will begin some commercial construction of their own. Kon Kaen is one of the few provincial Thai towns in the northeast to escape the shabby commercial effects of an American presence. As an untouched town its days appear numbered.

8 JUN 1972

U.S. REPORT SAYS PAKISTAN SPENT AID FOR DEFENSES

**Congress Panel Is Told of
Diversion of Relief Funds
to Border Fortification**

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 7—The General Accounting Office has reported to Congress that most of a grant of about \$10-million made to Pakistan last fall for humanitarian relief was diverted for the construction of military defenses on what was then the East Pakistani border with India.

This grant was part of the total American emergency aid commitment of \$109.1-million made last year during the civil war in Pakistan's eastern wing, which subsequently became the independent republic of Bangladesh.

42-Page Report Compiled

But the General Accounting Office, which is the investigative agency of Congress, said in a report prepared for the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees, headed by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, that "most of this assistance, even though authorized," had not been "provided or scheduled for shipment."

A copy of the 42-page report, signed by the Controller General of the United States, Elmer B. Staats, was obtained today by The New York Times.

The General Accounting Office also asserted that the Pakistani Army seized for military use last year about 50 United States Army assault boats that had been provided in 1970 for relief to victims of a cyclone and tidal wave that struck East Pakistan. The report added that trucks and jeeps belonging to United Nations aid agencies had also been taken by the Pakistanis for the same purpose.

Fund Transfer Reported

The Nixon Administration has said on several occasions in the last few months that the bulk of the over-\$1-billion commitment for 1971 had been fulfilled. But the General Account-

inquiries, said that, besides the \$10-million, only about \$20-million in food and coastal and river vessels had been provided.

Administration sources here said today that the funds authorized last year for East Pakistani relief but not yet expended had been transferred to the 1972 assistance programs for Bangladesh. The total commitment to Bangladesh for 1972 is \$217-million.

The \$10-million that the General Accounting Office said was diverted for military fortifications had been intended to create employment through public works last year in what was then East Pakistan. The employment, it was said, was to provide people there with money to buy food that the United States had sold to the Pakistani Government on credit.

The General Accounting Office said that the money had been used instead for fortifications on the border, between East Pakistan and India in anticipation of the Indian-Pakistani war that broke out in November.

The report said that the Agency for International Development, which was in charge of the public works assistance, had said the project, financed by rupees owed by the United States in Pakistan, was designed to create employment through "repairing roads and embankments and cutting water plants that clogged rivers."

But the General Accounting Office said it had learned that "in one sector of East Pakistan approximately 5,000 to 6,000 laborers were engaged in military defense works—constructing and digging entrenchments, constructing embankments and carving bamboo punja stakes and other military-oriented work projects."

Under United States law, humanitarian aid may not be diverted for other uses. After the Pakistani Army began its crackdown on March 25, 1971, against the autonomy movement then under way in East Pakistan, the United States banned all new sales of military equipment to Pakistan.

No Further Funds Given

The public works grant was made on Oct. 8, 1971, but the Government Accounting Office report said that "because most of the projects carried out under this grant included building defense works along the India-East Pakistan border, AID [the Agency for International Development] decided against considering further assistance."

Sources in the Accounting Office said today that the \$10-

the question of further such assistance became, in effect, academic less than two months after the original grant because of the outbreak of the Indian-Pakistani war.

They said that it had been possible to examine at the United States Embassy in Islamabad the Pakistani capital, document pertaining to the diversion of relief funds for military construction.

In the report, the Government Accounting Office complained that "our review efforts were impeded by Department of State and Agency for International Development officials."

Data Withheld, Report Says

The report said that these officials "withheld and summarized records prior to our access and thereby limited information needed for a complete and thorough report."

Senator Kennedy, recalling reports by the Government Accounting Office earlier this year on the Central Intelligence Agency's use for military activities of relief funds in Laos, said in a statement that the new findings "underscore the Administration's complicity in the repression of East Bengal, and its cosmetic concern for the millions who were unwilling pawns in our Government's policy of failure and shame."

STATINTL

E - 61,356
S - 62,391

JUN 8 1972

Saigon's Role in Drug Trade Demands Probe

Nothing less than a full scale investigation is demanded. With new and penetrating information which casts a shadow of corruption over the South Vietnamese government, we wonder again what it is that we have sent our soldiers off to fight for—and if what they are fighting for is really worth protecting. We have exported men to die and to kill fighting for a cause. The suggestion that the recipients of our largesse have and are exporting back drugs and drug addicts and are getting rich in the bargain is too much.

McCoy has laid it out for a Senate subcommittee. The question now is what does the Senate do about it? To do nothing would be to bury one more horror tale of this gruesome conflict.

If the testimony of a Yale University graduate student before a Senate panel is even less than 100 per cent factual, the American people have further proof that Vietnam has exported more than unhappiness and divisiveness to this country.

In any case, the story told by Alfred W. McCoy to the Senate Appropriations Committee's subcommittee on foreign operations is too big to be swept under the rug. It calls for full disclosure and the American people are entitled to have it.

What McCoy revealed for the committee is a picture so grim as to be almost beyond belief. It represents a glossary of total corruption tying highest ranking South Vietnamese, American and assorted other Southeast Asian officials to a mammoth international trade in heroin and opium. That isn't all. The Yale student links U.S. and Corsican organized crime syndicates with the whole operation.

There can be no dismissing McCoy as a publicity-seeking crackpot. The public has heard the same story before. The difference is that this time it is sweeping in context. No names have been spared. McCoy's statements are based on an 18-month study and interviews with officials in the U.S., Indochina and Europe.

What emerges is a damning finger pointed squarely at South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu, former Vice President

Nguyen Cao Ky, Prime Minister Tran Van Khiem and blood relatives in illicit drug trade up to their necks. The word from the Yale man, working on a Ph.D. in Southeast Asian history, is that South Vietnam is the organizational nerve center for international trade in these drugs—and splitting the action with Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and the international crime syndicates.

Dragged into the sordid story, actually a web of intrigue spun around smuggling across borders and buying in the open market, are generals of several nations as well as ranking civilian officials in the Saigon government.

All of this is incredible enough. But credulity is strained almost to the breaking point when McCoy says his investigation revealed (1)—that heroin has been marketed to American GIs and (2)—that equally high-ranking American officials including diplomats it and the CIA know about and have blinked at it for the sake of expediency.

The only thing we find more incredible is the response of one Senate panel member following McCoy's testimony: "He has told us nothing new that we haven't heard before." That response is no longer adequate. In the light of what McCoy has said, it is an insult to McCoy and to the intelligence of the public.

BALTIMORE, MD.

SUN

M - 164,621

E - 189,871

S - 323,624

JUN 3 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-0

Indochina called key to drug traffic

BY WALTER R. GORDON
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The author of a forthcoming book on heroin smuggling told a Senate committee yesterday that the focus of opium traffic has shifted to Southeast Asia, where it is controlled by high government officials and abetted, directly and indirectly, by the United States.

Alfred W. McCoy, a 26-year-old doctoral candidate who said he spent 18 months on research, travel and interviews, said heroin traffic in South Vietnam is "divided among the nation's three dominant military factions"—those controlled by the president, Nguyen Van Thieu, the former president, Nguyen Cao Ky, and the prime minister, Tran Thien Khiem.

He did not present any evidence, personally linking the three leaders to the heroin trade, however. After the hearing, he commented that Vietnamese leaders traditionally insulate themselves from the dealings of underlings and there was no way of knowing whether the three leaders were involved.

Evidence from research

He added, however, that he had evidence from research and interviews that their organizations played a key role in the smuggling.

"Most of the opium traffic in northeastern Laos," he told the committee, "is controlled by Vang Pao, the Laotian general who commands the CIA's mercenary army."

He said the American government had directly abetted the heroin traffic by allowing smugglers to use the CIA's Air America to transport opium and by employing Burmese heroin smugglers as intelligence agents operating across the Chinese border.

Border crossings had

He said in an interview that the China border crossings had

been halted under presidential directive but that the Air America operations are continuing.

Mr. McCoy was testifying before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee.

In response to a question from Senator William Proxmire (D., Wis), the chairman, Mr. McCoy said he believed the only way heroin smuggling could be halted would be for the U.S. to put pressure on Asian governments by cutting off aid.

Senator Gale W. McGee (D., Wyo.), the only other senator present, accused Mr. McCoy of using "the vernacular of Joe McCarthy" when he charged the U.S. was "abetting" the drug traffic merely because it supported and financed those who actually engaged in the smuggling.

Shifted from Turkey

Mr. McCoy insisted that that word was correct but said he had not meant to suggest that American officials were personally corrupt or that the U.S. government intended to encourage drug traffic.

Mr. McCoy said that since the late 1960's the principal area of opium growing had shifted from Turkey to the golden triangle of Southeast Asia, which he estimated now produces 70 per cent of the opium smuggled into the U.S.

The witness said he had spent four months in Southeast Asia last year and had had "hundreds" of interviews in the process of researching the book. He said no official whom he talked to disputed the main points of his Senate testimony.

Example given

The author gave this example of international heroin traffic: a Laotian chief of staff who was said to have admitted to con-

trolling opium in northwestern Laos, allegedly sold the drug to a Chinese racketeer who was "the silent partner in Pepsi Cola's Vientiane bottling plant."

Then, according to the witness, Mrs. Nguyen Thi Ly, the sister of General Ky, bought the heroin and arranged for Vietnamese Col. Phan Phung Tien to fly the drug to Saigon aboard planes of his 5th Air Division.

Mr. McCoy also identified Gen. Ngo Dzu, recently fired as head of the 2d Military Region after suffering defeats at the hands of the North Vietnamese, and Gen. Dang Van Quang, whom he called "Thieu's Kissinger," as major supporters of President Thieu who are involved in the drug traffic.

The principal international agents on the drug traffic, he said, are a group of Corsicans who first settled in Indochina in the Nineteenth Century and who maintain liason with heroin laboratories in France.

Mr. McCoy, a Ph.D. candidate in Southeast Asian history at Yale University, is the author of "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," which will be published by Harper and Row in July or August.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600120001-5

Charge CIA and Thieu push heroin to U.S. GIs

Daily World Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON, June 2—Alfred W. McCoy, a Yale student working on his doctorate, told a Senate Appropriations subcommittee today that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Saigon Dictator Nguyen Van Thieu are directly involved in the shipment of vast quantities of opium and heroin to the U.S.

McCoy, who has authored a book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," debunked President Nixon's campaign against heroin imported from Turkey.

He told the Foreign Operations subcommittee, headed by Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wisc), that the U.S. underworld has totally recouped the loss of the Turkish supply by turning to Southeast Asia sources.

In South Vietnam, McCoy said, the opium and heroin traffic is divided among the nation's three dominant military factions: Pres. Thieu's political apparatus, Prime Minister Kim's political organization, and Gen. Ky's political apparatus.

"Throughout the mountainous Golden Triangle region, the CIA has provided substantial military support for mercenaries, right-wing rebels, and tribal war lords who are actively engaged in the narcotics traffic and in Thailand the CIA has worked closely with nationalist Chinese paramilitary units which control 80 to 90 percent of northern Burma's vast opium export and manufacture high-grade heroin for export to the American market," McCoy testified.

"Some of President Thieu's closest supporters inside the South Vietnamese army control the distribution and sale of heroin to Americans GI's fighting in Indochina."

"Finally U.S. agencies have been actually involved in certain aspects of the region's drug traffic. In Northern Laos, Air America aircraft and helicopters chartered by the CIA have been transporting opium."

JUN 3 1972

Thieu Is Running Dope, Senate Told

Senator Gale W. McGee (Dem.-Wyo.) pressed McCoy on his lack of professional qualifications, implied his material was one dimensional and slanted and likened some of his charges to "McCarthyism."

"I resent your implication, Senator," McCoy replied, insisting his allegations are based on fact.

McCoy told newsmen he was financed in his investigations by the Fund for Investigative Journalism, the publishing firm of Harper and Row and from his own savings.

Associated Press

Washington

South Vietnam's president, former vice president and prime minister run organizations that split control of their nation's opium and heroin trade, a narcotics researcher charged in Senate testimony yesterday.

The witness, Alfred W. McCoy, said the South Vietnam narcotics ring has links with Corsican gangsters, with an organized crime family in Florida, and with scores of high-ranking military officers in South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand.

McCoy, a PhD candidate in Southeast Asian history at Yale University, testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee's subcommittee on foreign operations. He said he had spent 18 months interviewing officials in the United States, Indochina and Europe.

POLITICS

McCoy accused American officials of condoning and even cooperating with corrupt elements in Southeast Asia's illegal drug trade out of political and military consideration.

At the State Department, a spokesman said: "We are aware of these charges, but we have been unable to find any evidence to substantiate them, much less proof."

These are McCoy's major charges:

- Heroin and opium traffic in South Vietnam is divided among the political organizations of President Nguyen Van Thieu, former Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky and Prime Minister Tran Van Khiem.

- General Ky's sister, Nguyen Thi Ly, travels about once a month to Vientiane, the capital of Laos, to arrange for shipment of packaged heroin to Pakse or Phnom Penh in Cambodia.

- The heroin is then picked up by transport aircraft belonging to the South Vietnamese Fifth Air Division and flown to Saigon.

- Until recently Mrs. Ky's prime supplier was an "overseas Chinese racketeer" named Huu Tim Heng, who used his position as the silent partner in the Vientiane Pepsi Cola bottling plant as a cover to import a chemical necessary for the manufacture of heroin, McCoy testified.

- Heng bought raw opium and morphine from General Ouane Rattikone, former chief of staff of the Royal Laotian Army.

- General Rattikone admitted, McCoy said, that he controlled opium traffic in northwestern Laos since 1962 and controlled that country's largest heroin laboratory producing a high-grade drug for the GI market in South Vietnam.

- Most of the opium traffic in northeastern Laos is controlled by General Van Pao, commander of the CIA mercenary army, he said.

- The government of

Thailand allows Burmese rebels, Nationalist Chinese irregulars and mercenary armies to move "enormous hundreds of tons of Burmese mule caravans loaded with opium across Thailand's northern border."

- "Some of President Thieu's closest supporters inside the Vietnamese Army control the distribution and sale of heroin to American GIs fighting in Indochina."

Santo Trafficante Jr., whom he called the heir to a Florida based international crime syndicate, traveled to Saigon in 1968, contacted prominent members of Saigon's Corsican criminal syndicates and arranged increased imports of Asian heroin to the United States.

McCoy accused American embassies in London of trying repeatedly to cover up the involvement of local officials in the drug traffic.

CIA

"In northwestern Laos," McCoy said, "Air America aircraft and helicopters chartered by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency have been transporting opium harvested by the agency's tribal mercenaries on a regular basis."

He was asked by Senator William Proxmire (Dem.-Wis.), the subcommittee chairman, to produce documentation for several of his allegations and he promised to do so.

Viet Heroin Book Author Is Criticized

Sen. Gale W. McGee (D-Wyo.) accused author Alfred McCoy of "McCarthyism" for his testimony yesterday linking U.S. and Saigon government officials to heroin trafficking.

"It seems to me you do strain the truth a little bit," said McGee, who has a doctorate in history. "Just because the CIA or an embassy dealt with some of these people, it doesn't mean somehow they're aiding and abetting."

"I resent your implication, senator," McCoy responded during a hearing of the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee. He said his testimony and material in a forthcoming book were based on 18 months of research in Southeast Asia and on interviews with U.S. officials in this country.

Besides producing photographs of a U.S. Vietnam Military Assistance Command paper alleging that South Vietnam's Lt. Gen. Ngo Dzu and his father were linked with heroin trafficking, McCoy charged in his testimony that U.S. diplomats have tried to cover up illegal drug activities.

G. McMurtrie Godley, U.S. ambassador to Laos, "did his best to prevent the assignment of U.S. Bureau of Narcotics officials to Laos," McCoy testified.

Thieu, Ky Run Drug Trade, Yale Student Tells Senators

Associated Press

A narcotics researcher has testified top South Vietnamese leaders control their nation's illegal drug trade and are profiting handsomely from heroin sales to American GIs.

Alfred W. McCoy, 26, said control of heroin and opium traffic in South Vietnam is split among the political organizations of President Nguyen Van Thieu, former Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, and Prime Minister Tran Van Khieu.

McCoy, a doctoral student in Southeast Asian history at Yale University, testified yesterday before the Senate Appropriations Committee's subcommittee on foreign operations.

McCoy, son of a career Army officer, also said American officials have condoned and even cooperated with corrupt elements of Southeast Asia's illegal drug trade for political and military reasons.

State's Reply

In reply, a State Department spokesman said, "We are aware of these charges, but we have been unable to find any evidence to substantiate them, much less proof."

McCoy said the South Vietnamese narcotics ring has links with Corsican gangsters, with a Mafia family in Florida, and with scores of high-ranking military officers in South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand.

He said he interviewed officials for four months in Southeast Asia, for two months in Europe and for a year in the United States.

High-ranking military and

civilian officials in South Vietnam and other Indochinese countries have been directly involved in distributing heroin to GIs fighting in Vietnam and to addicts in the United States, McCoy said.

He said he confirmed independently an allegation by the National Broadcasting Co. that Gen. Dang Van Quang, a military adviser to President Thieu, is the "biggest pusher" or narcotics in South Vietnam.

Have Denied Charges

In Saigon, Thieu and Ky were not immediately available for comment on the charges involving them. Both have denied similar charges in the past.

McCoy said that Santo Trafficante Jr., whom he identified as the heir to a Florida-based international crime syndicate, traveled to Saigon in 1968, contacted prominent members of Saigon's Corsican criminal

syndicates and arranged increased imports of Asian heroin to the United States.

In Tampa, Fla., a friend of Trafficante confirmed that Trafficante visited the Far East in 1968, but added, "it was strictly for pleasure."

McCoy accused American embassies in Indochina of covering up involvement of local officials in drug traffic, a charge denied by the State Department.

"In northern Laos," McCoy said, "Air America aircraft chartered by the CIA have been transporting opium harvested by tribal mercenaries on a regular basis."

Paul Velte, the line's managing director and chief executive officer, said it is doing all it can in "a security program which effectively prevents the carriage of drugs on any of the airline's equipment."

STATINTL

NEWARK, N.J.
NEWS

E - 267,289
S - 423,331

JUN 2 1972
Other Congress
Developments

DRUG TRAFFIC: A Yale graduate student who has spent the last 18 months researching international drug traffic contended today that the CIA is involved in Southeast Asian heroin traffic.

In testimony prepared for the Senate Appropriations subcommittee on foreign aid, Alfred W. McCoy said that

aircraft chartered in Laos by the Central Intelligence Agency and Agency for International Development "have been transporting opium harvested by the agency's tribal mercenaries on a regular basis."

BEIRUT BOYCOTT: Rep. Bell Abzug D-N.Y., wants Congress to call upon the international airlines to boycott Beirut until the Lebanese government takes "strong and effective" measures to end

the activities of Arab-sponsored terrorist groups on its territories.

VA HOSPITAL: Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., D-N.J., announced today that the Senate Appropriations Committee has approved an increased appropriation to begin work on a new Veterans Administration hospital in southern New Jersey.

June 1972

STATINTL

Ask Them Yourself

Want to ask a famous person a question? Send the question on a postcard, to "Ask," Family Weekly, 641 Lexington Ave., New York, N. Y. 10022. We'll pay \$5 for published questions. Sorry, we can't answer others.

FOR REP. CHARLES B. RANGEL, N.Y.

You've accused the CIA of aiding and abetting heroin sellers in Asia. What grounds do you have for such a serious charge?—R. D., New York, N.Y.

Despite public disclaimers by the CIA, many of us in Congress have serious reason to believe that the agency is indeed complicit in the trafficking of deadly heroin to our servicemen in Southeast Asia. Newsmen clandestinely entering the secret CIA base at Long Cheng in Laos have reported raw opium openly piled up for sale in the market there. In addition, we know that the CIA regularly supplies arms, transportation and funds to drug-producing hill tribes in Laos and Thailand in exchange for their allegiance, knowing full well that these tribesmen are cornerstones of the drug trade. Most Congressmen have little idea how the CIA operates and how much money it spends. The CIA budget is carefully disguised and hidden. In fact, a recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, "Laos, April, 1971," reads like a jigsaw puzzle, with pieces "deleted at the request of the Department of State, Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency." Congress cannot prevent CIA involvement as long as we are deliberately kept in the dark about that agency's operations.

June 1972

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R

AMERICA'S SECRET WAR

FRED BRANFMAN

Since the mid-1950s, when the French were defeated in Laos, there has been a tug of war within that country between the Royal Lao Government (RLG), supported by a group of right-wing factions backed by the United States, and the Pathet Lao, a moderate and left-wing nationalist guerrilla movement backed by the Soviet Union and North Vietnam.

By 1964, after a series of military and political struggles, the RLG, with aid from the CIA, held the capital and the south of Laos, while the Pathet Lao held the Plain of Jars, a rich plateau of great beauty in the north. The United States was determined to defeat the Pathet Lao and bring all of Laos under the RLG. This is an account of how the U.S. military set out to achieve that end, and some first person stories of what happened to the Laotians who lived on the Plain.—THE EDITORS

In September, 1969, after a recorded history of seven hundred years, the Plain of Jars disappeared.

As the central part of this account, the reader will learn of this event from essays by the Laotian peasants who lived through it.

These peasant reports show how before 1964 the Plain, located in northeastern Laos, was a picturesque and prosperous rural society of some fifty thousand people; how the Pathet Lao guerrilla movement occupied it in May, 1964, and how airplanes then came from a distant, unseen land to bomb it; how the aircraft destroyed homes, storehouses, schools, temples, and bamboo huts built in the forest; how the people retreated, first into the forest and then underground, huddling together in dugout tunnels and holes; how ricefields, vegetable gardens, and fruit orchards were rendered barren by the bombs; how water buffalo,

cows, chickens, ducks, and pigs were lost to the bombs; how children, parents, grandparents, aunts and uncles and cousins alike were killed or wounded by the bombs.

These reports show, finally, how in September, 1969, the Plain of Jars was emptied of the survivors of the "war of the airplanes," as many had come to call it; how they were settled in the refugee camps where they wrote these essays, far from their ancestral homes; and how they remain there until today.

These chronicles of the disappearance of a homeland, however, represent far more than just another tale of death and destruction in this twenty-sixth year of the Indochina war.

For this "war of the airplanes" marks a new era in the history of military conflict: war which is not fought by men but machines, war which can erase distant and unseen societies clandestinely, unknown to and even unsuspected by the world outside.

More than 25,000 attack sorties were flown against the Plain of Jars from May, 1964, through September, 1969; more than 75,000 tons of bombs were dropped on it; more than 50,000 airmen at distant bases were involved; below, on the ground, thousands were killed and wounded, tens of thousands driven underground, and the entire above-ground society leveled.

And yet, for five and a half years, this massive war was unknown to the world beyond.

The ground battles raging elsewhere in Laos were reported on fairly regularly during these years. But one searches in vain through the newspapers and mag-

From "Voices from the Plain of Jars: Life under an Air War," compiled with an introduction and preface by Fred Branfman. © 1972 by Fred Branfman. Used by permission.

Fred Branfman worked in Laos from 1967 to 1971, first as an education adviser for International Volunteer Services and then as an independent researcher and writer. He interviewed thousands of Laotian refugees and dozens of American pilots. He is now working with Project Air War in Washington, D.C., an independent source of information on the continuing air war in Indochina. For a note on the book, please turn to the Office Memo, inside front cover.

continued

[Perspective]

Electoral Politics: The Candidates Reply

IN THE EDITORIAL ESSAY "Vietnam and the Elections" which opened the April issue of RAMPARTS we observed that the call for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, once dismissed as extremist or naive, had at last become politically respectable. Withdrawal had in fact become the dominant theme of Vietnam policy among this year's Presidential candidates. At the same time, we noted, the clear principle of this demand was being clouded and distorted in the turgid mainstream of American electoral debate. And we called upon the anti-war movement in the coming months "to sharpen the demand for withdrawal and establish the clearest possible mandate for it."

In an attempt to follow our own advice, RAMPARTS wrote to each of the Presidential candidates, presenting to them a list of seven questions on their plans for peace in Vietnam. We received replies from Rep. Chisholm, Sen. Humphrey, Sen. Jackson, Sen. McGovern and Sen. Muskie. The letters from Chisholm, Humphrey, McGovern and Muskie essentially consisted of the candidates' point-by-point responses to our questions over their signatures. In the following commentary we have taken these questions one or two at a time, and grouped together the answers of these four candidates for comparison and analysis. Sen. Jackson's letter did not direct itself to the specific questions in a parallel way, so we are printing it in its entirety in a box on page 10. Of the Democratic candidates who remained in the aftermath of the Wisconsin primary only Wallace and McCarthy did not respond to our questions. Since Rep. McClosky had dropped out of the race in March, and Richard Nixon did not answer our questions on the Republican hopefuls.

We posed seven questions; while the original numbering is maintained, the results are discussed here in a different order. This allows us to set out first the common thrust of the four candidates' policies and in a sense proceed from the easy questions to the hard, from the shared assumptions to the problematic implications.

1. *Shall the United States permanently withdraw all its armed forces (soldiers, sailors and airmen) from Vietnam on the sole condition of an agreement for the repatriation of prisoners of war, timed to coincide with our withdrawal?*

2. *Shall the U.S. similarly withdraw its armed forces from all of Indochina on the same single condition? What about U.S. bases in Thailand?*

CHISHOLM:

1. I firmly believe and stand for an immediate total withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Vietnam; with the sole condition being an agreement for the repatriation of prisoners of war.

2. I also believe that it is imperative that we withdraw our armed forces from all of Indochina. I must further support a withdrawal of U.S. influence on the lives of those who seek a preservation of their culture.

HUMPHREY:

1. Yes.

2. Yes, although in regard to Thailand the critical point is that these bases not be used for strikes in Indochina. The question of leaving these bases altogether is a longer term proposition, involving issues that go beyond the Vietnam war; this calls for further study at the Presidential level.

McGOVERN:

1. Yes. It is important to note, however, that leaving U.S. forces in South Vietnam to defend the Thieu regime is a circuitous method of achieving release of our prisoners. I am convinced that they will be returned within the framework of Article 118 of the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war, which provides that prisoners will be released without delay "after the cessation of hostilities." This requires a complete American disengagement from hostilities against all parties in Indochina. I want to point out, too, that I

do not regard this U.S. withdrawal as a negotiating position—it is instead a course of action which I fully intend to implement. The McGovern-Hatfield Amendment did not urge the President to negotiate our withdrawal; rather it required withdrawal by cutting off funds for the war.

2. Yes. The bases in Thailand have no justification other than to attempt to exert U.S. influence over the internal politics of Southeast Asian countries. The withdrawal must, of course, mean an end to all military operations, including bombing, anywhere in Indochina.

MUSKIE:

1. Yes. I have consistently supported this position in the last few years. On February 2, I urged that "We must set a date when we will withdraw every soldier, sailor, and air-man, and stop all bombing and other American military activity, dependent only on an agreement for the return of our prisoners and the safety of our troops as they leave." I do not believe that an agreement for the safety of our troops as they leave would be in any way a problem; the basic exchange would be a complete end to American military participation in the Indochina war for the return of our prisoners.

2. My proposal includes our military activity and personnel in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. I would therefore not make use of our bases in Thailand and elsewhere in Southeast Asia for activities related to the Indochina war. I would otherwise approach the issue of bases in Thailand and elsewhere in Southeast Asia in the context of efforts not only to promote detente between the U.S. and China but also with regard to the effect that either maintaining or removing our various bases would have on the possibilities for accommodation among Asian nations themselves. Clearly, we do not need to maintain anything like the number and size of bases we have now in Southeast Asia.

6. *Shall the U.S. set a date by which it will carry out its withdrawal (as specified in the preceding answers) on the same single condition of an agreement on repatriation of POWs?*

CHISHOLM:

6. Yes, it is most essential to any effective withdrawal that a time certain be set and announced.

7. As a date for total withdrawal of U.S. forces, I propose July 1, 1972.

HUMPHREY:

6. Yes.

7. I was co-sponsor last year of the Vietnam Disengagement Act which called for withdrawal of all our troops by December 31. I still support any subsequent deadline within six months. I endorsed this principle when I supported all the Mansfield amendments calling for a withdrawal date six months after the particular legislation was enacted.

McGOVERN:

6. Yes.

7. The single limitation should be a calculation of time required to accomplish the physical withdrawal. Last September an American general who has been responsible for transport of supplies in Vietnam told me that all equipment worth salvaging, along with all U.S. manpower, could be moved out within 90 days. That is the date I have been proposing but it is, of course, quite possible that withdrawals since then have considerably shortened the time needed.

MUSKIE:

6. Yes.

7. The earliest possible date.

The basic impression one gets from these responses is that all the candidates gave the right answers, namely: yes, yes, yes, and soon. The most striking difference is on the Thailand bases: McGovern's readiness to part with them and to define their objective without euphemism has a forthright ring in contrast to the geopolitical waffling of Muskie and Humphrey on that issue. Of course, how far McGovern would pursue the implications of this attitude for the American role in S.E. Asia, or for U.S. fleets and bases which "exert influence" elsewhere, remains an open and interesting question.

But, Thailand aside, in these four questions we have the basic elements which have come to be widely accepted as the Peace Alternative to Nixon's policy of war. It is a program

that took shape in the divisions and debates within the U.S. Senate. The periodic gathering of the Senate doves to fight for various amendments from the Hatfield-McGovern to the Cooper, Church and Mansfield, in the absence of an aroused and visible popular movement became the most dramatic center of political opposition to Nixon's war. Now these Senatorial initiatives, whether they won or lost, or were diluted in the House, or arrogantly flouted by Nixon himself, seem to have defined the content of Presidential peace politics. And one of the problems we find is that a Vietnam peace settlement, negotiated with a House/Senate conference committee, is treated as if it had already been negotiated with the Vietnamese.

McGovern distinguishes his plan for withdrawal from a negotiating position: it is not an offer coupled with a condition, but an intention coupled with an expectation. At first glance this seems an amiable but moot distinction; as if, instead of signing a peace treaty, we would say, "we all trust each other, let's skip the formalities." But it has other implications that will appear below. While Muskie's formulation sounds more businesslike, most people would accept his summary of the Peace Alternative, "the basic exchange would be a complete end to American military participation in the Indochina war for the return of our prisoners." A consideration of the remaining questions and answers make clear, however, that this "basic exchange" is not in fact a formula for peace or genuine American withdrawal, but a perilous negation of these aims.

BECAUSE THE SENATORIAL definition of the peace issue has been accepted, it is easy to think that, when we turn to questions 3 and 4 which deal with cutting off U.S. military and economic aid to the Saigon government, we are no longer dealing with the meat of anti-war demands, but with the gravy. There are a number of misconceptions involved in this. One is that, if the candidate at least answers Yes on those four questions, then even if he falls down on the others he is nonetheless committed to getting the troops out and ending the U.S. bombing. But a closer analysis

of questions 3 and 4 will show the opposite; such a candidate would be committed to maintaining the troops and bombing indefinitely.

3. *Shall the U.S. end all military aid to the Saigon regime (whether or not President Thieu should resign) on the same basis?*

4. *Shall the United States end all economic aid to the Saigon regime on the same basis (with any humanitarian exceptions such as an imported rice dole to be distributed through an agency agreed to by the PRG)?*

Question 4 as posed in this way might seem to ask the candidate in effect to recognize the PRG as the government of South Vietnam, and to endorse it at the cost of humanitarian aid. Therefore we sent a follow-up letter reformulating the question to make clearer the intended point, to distinguish granting aid to the country and people of South Vietnam, in a politically neutral way, from underwriting the government we have created in Saigon as the chosen instrument of American power.

The revised question 4 was in three parts:

A. *Pending an overall settlement of the war, should U.S. economic aid to Vietnam be of a form agreed to by all the major political forces there, including the Provisional Revolutionary Government (or NLF)?*

B. *Pending such a limited agreement on aid, should all other aid (that is aid worked out only with the Saigon side of the conflict) be suspended beginning from a "date certain"?*

C. *What date?*

McGovern and Chisholm answered first the original and then the revised question, both answers are included here. Humphrey and Muskie responded after the second letter and were able to take the revised question into account.

CHISHOLM:

3. There is no question in my mind that the U.S. government *must* initiate an immediate halt of all military assistance to Saigon.

4. (Original question) I believe that we can in good conscience leave the people a land which we have both politically and economically raped, with-

out some degree of economic assistance. However, this is an item which must be left to negotiation after total military withdrawal.

4. (Revised question) I believe that multilateral aid should be dispensed, but with the approval of all sides involved. An agreement on the specific mechanics of distribution should be worked out in consort with neutral nations.

I further propose that all military assistance to South Vietnam be ended by July 1, 1972. What sum of U.S.

economic assistance is granted to the Vietnamese by the United States should be taken directly from Pentagon funds, and so allocated in the military or Defense budget.

HUMPHREY:

3. Yes, I voted for a 250 million dollar ceiling for military assistance to Laos and 250 million to Cambodia. I am against any further military assistance to Vietnam.

4. With respect to your question on economic aid to Vietnam, I prefer to

reiterate what I have already said on this subject in the past. I view economic and humanitarian assistance as a matter which transcends governmental relationships since its primary purpose is to assist people in need and not prop up any particular government. Whereas I am clearly against any continuation of military assistance to South Vietnam, I do favor economic assistance for all of Indochina. I think that the same criteria for aid to South Vietnam should be applied as is applied to other countries. In other words, the need for American assistance and the programs where our money would be channeled would have to be rigorously justified before any approval would be given. Any massive reconstruction program in Indochina would only be undertaken after a settlement had been reached, but I do think that we should focus our attention on this possibility now.

It is likely that future aid programs to South Vietnam, assuming that the United States withdraws and the war continues, would be most acceptable if they had the approval of all major political forces in the country. This approach has been taken by the United Nations in Laos and Cambodia. The United States would do well to study this example and work closely with international organizations in any future aid program to South Vietnam.

Finally, I would say that I do not think aid should become a lever to force our will on other countries. This kind of quid pro quo arrangement defeats the central purpose of economic and humanitarian assistance and rarely achieves the goal it sets out to achieve. The Senate during the recent aid debate expressed a desire to move out of bilateral aid programs and into multilateral assistance where there would be fewer strings attached. I support this orientation.

McGOVERN:

3. Yes. Unless we do we will have no basis for claiming that hostilities between the United States and other parties in Southeast Asia have ended.

4. (Original question) No. The U.S. withdrawal could easily push Vietnam over the brink of economic disaster, and I have no wish to accelerate that process. It is a certainty that the removal of our forces and the end to

UNITED STATES SENATE
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, D.C. 20510

February 29, 1972

Dear Mr. Kolodney:

Thank you very much for your recent letter and for the advance copies of the pieces by you and by Professor Chomsky. I must say that both articles seem to have accepted, in a totally uncritical manner, the North Vietnamese position in regard to the Southeast Asian conflict. I doubt that such oneness can contribute very much to a just and equitable solution to the war, one that is fair to all the parties involved.

Nonetheless, I am happy to respond to the issues raised by the several questions you put forward in your letter. On September 1, 1970, in a letter to President Nixon initiated by Senator Scott and me and signed by 28 other Senators (a copy of which is enclosed), I proposed a multi-step program which would have required all parties to the conflict to take affirmative actions toward peace. I continue to believe that this sort of mutuality and reciprocity is an acceptable framework for ending the war.

The President's recent eight-point peace proposal embodies many of the same features of our earlier suggestions. I believe that the President's initiative is a basis for genuine negotiations; and that it is now incumbent upon the North Vietnamese to cease demanding the complete capitulation of the Republic of Vietnam as a condition for halting the killing. I do not believe that the cause of peace is furthered by irresponsible, politically-inspired, criticisms. Indeed, endorsement of the North Vietnamese position by well-known Americans only reinforces North Vietnamese intransigence, thereby prolonging the war.

The diplomatic deadlock should not, however, prevent us from reducing our military presence in South Vietnam. I have said that all of our ground combat troops could have been out of Vietnam by the end of 1971. In any event, it is clear that substantial reductions in American force levels have already been made. These can be, and should be, continued.

On the question of future outside aid to the parties involved in the Indochina conflict, I proposed on February 10, 1972, a mutual big-power freeze on military aid to North and South Vietnam (statement enclosed). It seems to me that this is one useful way of ending—or at least reducing—the role of outside powers in the Indochina situation.

The war in Indochina has proved difficult and painful for all concerned. On April 6, 1968, I said that "contrary to the notions of some critics, our basic problem in Vietnam has not been an arrogance of power. Rather, our basic problem has been to achieve a reasonable compromise with an adversary who has not wished to compromise." That, I am sorry to say, is still our basic problem almost four years later.

Sincerely yours,

/s/

Henry M. Jackson, U.S.S.

military assistance would result in President Thieu's resignation, and in the emergence of a government which would be capable of negotiating a political settlement. Under those conditions I think we have a responsibility to begin repairing the incredible damage we have done to the people and the terrain of Indochina.

4. (Revised question)

A. Yes. Economic aid should be supplied in forms which cannot be used by the South Vietnamese government as a method of solidifying its political position. An effort to achieve agreement of all parties on the form and distribution of such aid would be the best way to achieve that result; and I would strongly pursue such an effort.

B. Since his entire claim to power in Vietnam is based on our military guarantee, there is not the slightest reason to believe that President Thieu could continue to hold power in the context of our complete military disengagement. Both he and the North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front representatives in Paris have told me this directly. I have to say frankly, therefore, that I think the question is based on an impossible premise. In that light, and considering the potential problems involved in reaching agreement on the kinds of economic aid allowable, I would not favor a total economic aid cutoff in the absence of a multiparty agreement. Interruption of humanitarian aid programs going on now would intensify the suffering of a great many innocent people in South Vietnam, and many of those people are suffering at our hands.

C. As noted above, I would not set such a date, although I think an adjustment in our aid program designed to focus on humanitarian relief should coincide with our military withdrawal timetable.

MUSKIE:

3. With regard to the maintenance of military aid to the Saigon government after American withdrawal, I have said that "we must urge the government in Saigon to move toward a political accommodation with all the elements of their society. Without such an accommodation, the war cannot be ended. And it is clear that the American people will not support an indefinite war either by our presence or by

proxy." Thus, I would not use our aid to perpetuate a war that benefits only the dictatorial Thieu regime. I would condition our military aid on progress toward a political accommodation (and thus an end to all the fighting) in Vietnam.

4. I would treat the economic aid which serves to support the Saigon government in the same way that I would treat military aid. I would definitely make an exception for humanitarian aid which goes directly to serve the needs of people. (I believe this and the previous answer also cover your more recent questions on how I would handle aid to Saigon.)

It would be difficult not to note first of all what—given the vague Liberal-Moderate-Conservative spectrum that usually places Muskie to the left of Humphrey—would appear to be a surprising result: Humphrey is prepared to go further than Muskie on the aid issue, i.e., to oppose at least military aid.

Both Muskie and Humphrey discuss the question of aid as if the withdrawal of direct U.S. military participation by a certain date could proceed even if the aid issue were not satisfactorily settled. But their plans to withdraw "within six months" or "at the earliest possible time" are proposed as *offers* made on the condition of a POW agreement. They treat Vietnamese acceptance of this condition as a foregone conclusion. However, the North Vietnamese Nine Point Peace Plan has already made clear that they are unwilling to meet this condition of release of POWs unless withdrawal of U.S. forces (Point 1) is accompanied by an end to U.S. support to the Saigon regime (Point 3). (The Nine Points end with: "The above points form an integrated whole.")

This was underscored last January after Nixon made public his "generous offer" and denounced the enemy's intransigent rejection of it. The press spokesman of the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris countered: "In the private meetings we had the very clear impression that the Nixon Administration is clinging to its positions and has not budged an inch on our demands for total troop withdrawal and cessation of support for the Saigon regime." This casts a different light on the

Peace Alternative as formulated, for instance, in Muskie's response to question 1. "The basic exchange would be a complete end to American military participation in the Indochina war for the return of our prisoners." Muskie campaigns as if this "complete end" awaited only his election, but in fact it is merely an offer of a deal he already knows to be unacceptable. What would the new President Muskie do when he could not deliver the withdrawal and the POWs? Would he pretend surprise? Would he, like Nixon, denounce the enemy for rejecting his generous offer, and keep on pounding them with bombs to force them to submit.

Any candidate who raises hopes of such a POW-Withdrawal exchange, while balking at a critical ingredient on the question of aid, is playing a dangerous game at best. And McGovern, who proposes to go ahead with our part of a nonexistent deal, is setting the stage for vengeful public outrage if they "stab us in the back" by keeping our boys imprisoned. The effect of McGovern's plan—whether intended or not—would be that for the Vietnamese to act as they had clearly said they would, would be made to seem a terrible breach of faith (not to mention a violation of the Geneva Convention on prisoners as interpreted by McGovern in answer 1).

The question of aid to Saigon then is central, not peripheral, to the prospect of peace, and failure to confront it could end in an explosive resurgence of hawkish sentiment. What exactly is at issue?

For Muskie, with his backing of military as well as economic aid, a commitment to continued dominance for the Saigon regime (*sans* Thieu) is fairly explicit in his answers to 3 and 4. He proposes to use military aid to force Saigon "to move toward a political accommodation with all the elements of their society." He would "condition our military aid on progress toward a political accommodation (and thus an end to all the fighting)." Giving military aid to one side in a war to force it to accommodate its enemies is a novel idea; normally we give such aid to help force its enemies to submit. He does not want "an indefinite war" even "by proxy," but the political accommodation he wants to bring about seems to amount

to conciliatory terms for a Saigon victory.

Of the four candidates only Muskie proposes military assistance, and only he acknowledges support for a broadened Saigon regime as an *aim* of aid. The others restrict themselves to economic aid, and the aim projected is humanitarian, any benefits to the Saigon regime as the recipient and agent being purely incidental. Now this is really a pretty thin argument. A less likely model for humanitarian effort is difficult to conceive than the U.S. financing of the government in Saigon—a government legendary for corruption, preoccupied with maintaining an army of a million with which to prosecute an abhorrent war, which still manages to channel most of the foreign exchange we provide right back out of the country for the purchase of luxury goods by its pampered elite; an economic assistance program watched over by USAID which functions explicitly as a military adjunct and notoriously as a CIA conduit and cover in Indochina. Can there be any question that, pending a political settlement and a new government, humanitarian interests would be better served if all U.S. financial assistance to South Vietnam were funneled through the Swedish government or the United Nations and programmed and administered independent of Saigon's control or ours?

Rep. Chisholm seems to accept such a plan in her answer to revised question 4 (assuming her second paragraph merely refers to how the aid described in the first should be accounted in the U.S. Federal Budget). Humphrey's second paragraph is tentative and non-committal. McGovern's argument is curious: The denial of military aid by itself will unseat Thieu, leading to a political settlement. Since the military cutoff will suffice to bring on a settlement, the suffering that would be caused by withholding in the interim economic aid as well would be unnecessary, gratuitous. All the better, one would think, to bypass the Saigon government in the first place through Sweden or the UN. And that will hasten Saigon's downfall, cutting short the unnecessary suffering of continued war while we wait for the military cutoff alone to bring it down.

ALL THIS HAS LITTLE TO DO with the real issues at stake. Access to American money is the principle of cohesion that holds together the structure of the Saigon government's power, its military machine, administrative apparatus, all the greased palms and beholden elites that support it. It is not really even a question of economically starving this entity. Should it become known that the access to U.S. money was *going to be cut off*, this center of power which is the prime instrument of American influence in Vietnam would begin immediately to disintegrate. Humphrey and McGovern apparently accept the possibility of a coalition government in Vietnam, perhaps formed during the early days in office of the new U.S. President. But what a coalition government means depends on how the Saigon structure enters into it, to what extent it remains intact, how much control of its military and administrative resources it retains, what territory it effectively controls, what social elements gravitate to it. If it remains intact, if it can make good use of continued access to U.S. money and backing of American power, then, even though it were the weaker element of a coalition, all is not lost for U.S. strategy in Vietnam. Such a coalition, as we proved in Laos, leaves myriad openings for the U.S. to expand its influence. Compromises can be torpedoed, coups engineered, discord programmed—everything, secret armies, Air America, the CIA, a whole new beginning is possible. But, if a new government is formed in Vietnam on the basis of a disintegrating Saigon regime, the elements of its power dissolved and dispersed, that is a different story.

The weight and unity that our Saigon subsidiary would carry into a new government depends in great measure on the resolution of political and military forces at the moment the settlement is made. And that turns in large part on two things: whether the assurance of access to U.S. money holds it together and whether the bargaining power of the U.S. military threat stands behind it. The North Vietnamese Nine Points call for formation of a new government at a point when both these elements would be absent. The peace plans of Humphrey and McGovern

would in effect get around this.

It is worth considering what the offer of withdrawal tendered to the Vietnamese actually amounts to. Nixon is most likely going to offer some kind of dove-pleasing spectacular before election day. (Last January's did leave the opposition speechless, but it was too early to be his last word.) Whatever else it includes, the number of U.S. ground troops in South Vietnam by next January 20 is likely to be relatively small. At the same time Nixon will by then surely have given the Saigon government enough military supplies and reserves to make further military aid not critical for some time to come. Now the basic withdrawal plan proposed calls for withdrawing as fast as they can go, those GIs whom Nixon has left around, cutting off the military aid that Saigon hardly needs, and stopping the bombing (or promising to do so as soon as the date certain arrives and the GIs are out). The North Vietnamese are supposed to be rushing the U.S. POWs home at the same rate the GIs leave the South. The exchange: the North Vietnamese give up the most critical political leverage they hold on U.S. policy in Vietnam, the one thing that has kept the war a serious political liability at home, presses us toward a peace settlement, and limits our options of aggression.

In return, they get a few thousand non-combat GIs out of Vietnam and two American promises. The first they can add to their collection of U.S. bombing halts; the second, that military aid will not be resumed, they can file with the similar provision of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords. Presumably if we break these promises we have to return the POWs to them.

If there is to be a coalition government, the question is whether it will be formed with the Saigon dollar line intact, the POWs safe at home, and U.S. airpower, at best withdrawn anywhere from 6 to 48 hours away, standing behind it.

What it comes down to is that each side has one fairly irretrievable concession at stake. For them, release of the POWs. For us, allowing a coalition government to form in a context where the Saigon regime is not backed

by access to money and the U.S. bombing threat. **Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600120001-5**
First, by releasing the POWs before a coalition forms, our concession will never be made. But, once a coalition is formed, they would have to make their concession good because the POWs would then be a liability, a political basis for new U.S. attacks. The Nine Points call for this timetable: we stop supporting the Saigon regime, allowing it to collapse, at that point the process of coalition will begin along with a cease-fire, U.S. withdrawal and return of POWs.

That is the significance of their including a cessation of support for Saigon, as well as withdrawal of troops, as conditions for the POW release. So when the doves gloss over the question of economic aid as a purely humanitarian, politically incidental problem, they are placing a serious obstacle in the way of peace, and they are evading the demands of true withdrawal from Vietnam.

The one question of the seven not yet covered, question 5, though rather inconclusive is nevertheless illuminating on this point.

5. Shall withdrawal of U.S. forces include withdrawal of any or all of the military equipment bases, supplies, and reserves now being transferred to the Saigon regime, or are these to be looked on as Vietnamese and therefore immune to withdrawal? If any of this material is to be withdrawn, what? How much?

CHISHOLM:

5. I believe that total immediate withdrawal of all U.S. manpower to be the imperative priority. The usage of residual equipment bases, supplies, etc., should be left open to negotiation only after that first priority has been achieved.

HUMPHREY:

5. I have sponsored Senate Bill S2985 which would halt such giveaways of military materiel in Indochina not authorized by Congress.

McGOVERN:

5. We should withdraw that portion of military equipment which costs less to transport than to replace.

MUSKIE:

5. Although the United States would naturally withdraw much of the equipment its forces have been using in Vietnam, dismantling all bases built by the United States and withdrawing all American weapons and equipment from

ticable. Nor would a commitment to do so serve as a real purpose. It assumes that we and the North Vietnamese can settle all of the issues of the war between us. This issue would become academic in the context of a political settlement worked out by the Vietnamese themselves. As I have said, we should urge such a settlement.

All the answers missed the intended point. The candidates deal with the residue of equipment still in U.S. hands next January 20. The question meant to point to the fact that arms, which even now are still American, are being given and transferred to the Saigon army and will be magically transformed into indigenous Vietnamese resources by the time the candidates' promise of withdrawal comes due. Of course it was a question that could not really be confronted because how could they answer? How far back does one draw the line? It was *all* American once, and that reveals the key point about a true withdrawal: It still is, that government which we called into being to serve us. We gave it its constitution and its political police, its bureaucracy and its corruption. Its leaders are our viceroys, its armies our mercenaries. Even though the last GI may ship out and President Thieu may be discarded, it stands as the cornerstone of our intervention, the creature of our aggression, the fruit of genocide.

That is why we have a responsibility to cut off its support and undo its power. That is also why the most dovish candidates may balk at cutting off economic aid, because to do that is to deny its legitimacy, to renounce our control, to admit defeat.

At this writing the results of the offensive launched in early April are still undetermined. For radicals there is always a tendency, especially because they understand its illegitimacy, to dismiss the current government as weak, corrupt and doomed. Thus one

may speculate that the issue of cutting off economic aid will be swept aside by the liberation armies. But speculation is not politics, and the political point at least must be made. Moreover, to take the passive attitude of a football fan exhilarated by a winning team would be callous and destructive. These are costly victories and the price of every victory is increased by the torpor of the anti-war movement at home. And, finally, the measures of victory may be far from clear. Eventually a new government may well be forced into being, but it will represent a complex resolution of victories and defeats, military and political, in Vietnam and in the United States.

For the Presidential Peace Candidates the fundamental question in Vietnam is the same as it has been since the U.S. first subverted the Geneva Accords of 1954 (after paying 80 percent of the cost of the French war). Does the peace candidate propose now to make our intervention cheaper, cleaner, less direct, to salvage the instruments of our control, to leave an opening for a resurgence of our power? Or will he really turn his back on the savage 20-year attempt at American dominion? ■

AIR FORCE REGULATION }
NO. 200-2 }DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, 5 FEBRUARY 1958**INTELLIGENCE****Unidentified Flying Objects (UFO)**

SECTION A—GENERAL	Paragraph
Background Information	1
Definitions	2
Objectives	3
Responsibilities	4
Guidance	5
Zone of Interior Collection	6
 SECTION B—PUBLIC RELATIONS, INFORMATION, CONTACTS, AND RELEASES	
Maintaining Public Relations	7
Releasing Information	8
Exceptions	9
Release by Non-Air Force Sources	10
Contacts	11
 SECTION C—PREPARING AND SUBMITTING REPORTS	
General Information	12
Methods for Transmitting Reports	13
Where to Submit Reports	14
Basic Reporting Data and Format	15
Negative or Inapplicable Data	16
Comments of Preparing Officer	17
Classification	18
Reporting Physical Evidence	19

This regulation establishes the responsibility and procedure for reporting information and evidence on unidentified flying objects (UFO) and for releasing pertinent information to the general public.

SECTION A—GENERAL

1. Background Information. The Air Force investigation and analysis of UFO's over the United States are directly related to its responsibility for the defense of the United States. Prompt reporting and rapid identification are necessary to carry out the second of the four phases of air defense—detection, identification, interception, and destruction; therefore, the Air Force maintains the Unidentified Flying Object Program. To implement this program successfully requires strict compliance with this regulation by all commanders.

2. Definitions. To insure proper and uniform usage in UFO screenings, investigations, and reportings, the objects are defined as follows:

a. *Familiar or Known Objects*—Aircraft, birds, balloons, kites, searchlights, and astronomical bodies (meteors, planets, stars).

b. *Unknown Aircraft*:

(1) Flying objects determined to be air-

craft. These generally appear as a result of ADIZ violations and often prompt the UFO reports submitted by the general public. They are readily identifiable as, or known to be, aircraft, but their type, purpose, origin, and destination are unknown. Air Defense Command is responsible for reports of "unknown" aircraft and they should not be reported as UFO's under this regulation.

(2) Aircraft flares, jet exhausts, condensation trails, blinking or steady lights observed at night, lights circling or near airports and airways, and other similar phenomena resulting from, or indications of aircraft. These should not be reported under this regulation as they do not fall within the definition of a UFO.

(3) Pilotless aircraft and missiles.

c. *Unidentified Flying Objects*—Any airborne object which, by performance, aerody-

*This regulation supersedes AFR 200-2, 12 August 1954.
USAF Declass/Release Instructions On File

AFR 200-2

2-4

dynamic characteristics, or unusual features, does not conform to known aircraft or missiles, or which does not correspond to definitions in a and b above.

3. Objectives. Air Force interest in UFO's is three-fold: First, as a possible threat to the security of the United States and its forces; second, to determine the technical or scientific characteristics of any such UFO's; third, to explain or identify *all* UFO sightings as defined in paragraph 2c.

a. *Air Defense.* The great majority of flying objects reported have been found to be conventional, familiar things of no great threat to the security of the United States and its possessions. However, since the possibility cannot be ignored that UFO's reported may be hostile or new foreign air vehicles of unconventional design, it is imperative that sightings be reported rapidly, factually, and as completely as possible.

b. *Technical and Scientific.* The Air Force will continue to collect and analyze reports of UFO sightings until all can be scientifically or technically explained, bearing in mind that:

- (1) To measure scientific advances, the Air Force must have the latest experimental and developmental information on new or unique air vehicles or weapons.
- (2) The possibility exists that foreign air vehicles of revolutionary configuration or propulsion may be developed.
- (3) There is a need for further scientific knowledge in such fields as geophysics, astronomy, and the upper atmosphere which the study and analysis of UFO's and similar aerial phenomena may provide.
- (4) The reporting of all pertinent factors will have a direct bearing on scientific analyses and conclusions of UFO sightings.

c. *Reduction of Percentage of UFO "Unknowns."* Air Force activities must reduce the percentage of unknowns to the minimum. Analysis thus far has provided explanation for all but a few of the sightings reported. These unexplained sightings are carried statistically as unknowns. If more immediate, detailed objective data on the unknowns had been available, probably these too could have been explained. Due to the human factors involved, and the fact that analyses of UFO sightings are based primarily on the personal impressions and interpretations of the observers, rather than on accurate scientific data or facts obtained under controlled conditions, it is improbable that all of the unknowns can be eliminated.

4. Responsibilities:

a. *Reporting.* Commanders of Air Force bases will report all information and evidence of UFO sightings, including that received from other Services, Government agencies, and civilian sources. (See section C.)

b. *Investigation.* The commander of the Air Force base nearest to the location of the reported UFO sighting will be responsible for the conduct of all investigative action necessary to submit a complete initial report of a UFO sighting. Every effort will be made to resolve the sighting in the initial investigation. A UFO sighting reported to an Air Force base other than that closest to the scene of such sighting, immediately will be referred to the commander of the nearest Air Force base for appropriate action. (See paragraph 6.)

c. *Analysis.* The Air Technical Intelligence Center (ATIC), will analyze and evaluate:

- (1) Information and evidence reported within the zone of interior after the investigators of the responsible Air Force base nearest the sighting have exhausted their efforts to identify the UFO.
- (2) Information and evidence collected in overseas areas.

NOTE. *Exceptions:* The ATIC, independently or in participation with pertinent Air Force activities, may conduct any additional investigations necessary to further or conclude its analyses or findings.

d. *Public Relations and Information Services.* The Office of Information Services, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, will be responsible for releasing information on sightings, and, in coordination with ATIC, for answering correspondence from the public regarding UFO's. (See paragraphs 7 and 8.)

e. *Congressional Inquiries.* The Office of Legislative Liaison will:

- (1) In coordination with the ATIC and/or the Office of Information Services, when necessary, answer all congressional mail regarding UFO's addressed to the Secretary of the Air Force and the United States Air Force.
- (2) Forward those inquiries which are scientific and technical to the ATIC for information on which to base a reply. The ATIC will return this information to the Office of Legislative Liaison for reply to the inquiry.
- (3) Process requests from congressional sources in accordance with AFR 11-7.

f. *Cooperation.* All Air Force activities will cooperate with Air Force UFO investigators to insure the economical and prompt success of investigations and analyses. When feasible, this cooperation will include furnishing air or ground transportation and other assistance.

5. Guidance. The thoroughness and quality of a report or investigation of UFO's are limited only by the skill and resourcefulness of the person who receives the initial information and/or prepares the report. The usefulness and value of any report or investigation depend upon the accuracy and timeliness of its contents. Following are aids for screening, evaluating, and reporting sightings:

a. Logic, consistency, and coherence of the observer's report should be given careful study. An interview with the observer by personnel preparing the report is especially valuable in determining the source's reliability and the validity of the information given. Particular attention should be given to the observer's age, occupation, and education; whether his occupation involves observation reporting or technical knowledge.

b. Theodolite measurements of changes of azimuth, and elevation and angular size.

c. Interception, identification, or air search if appropriate and within the scope of air defense regulations.

d. When feasible, contact with local aircraft control and warning (ACW) units, ground observer corps (GOC) posts and filter centers, pilots and crews of aircraft aloft at the time and place of sighting. Also contact with any other persons or organizations that may have factual data on the UFO or can offer corroborating evidence—visual, electronic, or other.

e. Consultation with military or civilian weather forecasters for data on tracks of weather balloons released in the area and any unusual meteorological activity which may have a bearing on the UFO.

f. Consultation with navigators and astronomers in the area to determine whether any astronomical body or phenomenon would account for the sighting.

g. Contact with military and civilian tower operators, air operations units, and airlines to determine whether the sighting could have been an aircraft. Local units of the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) are often of assistance in this regard.

h. Contact with persons who may know of experimental aircraft of unusual configuration,

rocket and guided missile firings, or aerial tests in the area.

i. Contact with photographic units or laboratories. Usually, these installations have several cameras available for specialized intelligence or investigative work. Photography is an invaluable tool and, where possible, should be used in investigating and analyzing UFO sightings. (See paragraph 19.)

6. Zone of Interior Collection. Both the Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence, Headquarters USAF, and the Air Defense Command have a direct and immediate interest in the facts pertaining to UFO's reported within the zone of interior.

a. All Air Force activities will conduct UFO investigations to the extent necessary for their required reporting action (see paragraphs 15, 16, and 17); however, investigations should not be carried beyond this point, unless such action is directed by Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Headquarters USAF.

b. After initial reports are submitted, the ATIC may require additional data, such as narrative statements, sketches, marked maps and charts, and other required data, which can be supplied more quickly and economically by the Air Force activity that made the initial report. Therefore, ATIC is authorized to contact the appropriate Air Force activity.

c. Direct communication is authorized between ATIC and other Air Force activities in matters pertaining to UFO investigations. Specifically, the ATIC may call upon the 1006th Air Intelligence Service Squadron (AISS) to assist the base commander responsible for further field investigation if review of the initial report indicates such a requirement. (See paragraph 4b.)

SECTION B—PUBLIC RELATIONS, INFORMATION, CONTACTS, AND RELEASES

7. Maintaining Public Relations. The Office of Information Services is responsible for:

a. In coordination with the ATIC when necessary, maintaining contact with the public and the press on all aspects of the UFO program and its related activities.

b. Releasing information on UFO sightings and results of investigations.

c. Periodically releasing information on this subject to the general public.

d. Processing, answering, and taking action on correspondence received from the general

public, pertaining to the public relations, interest, and informational aspects of the subject. (See paragraph 9.) This office will forward correspondence and queries which are purely technical and scientific to ATIC for information on which to base a reply.

8. Releasing Information. All information or releases concerning UFO's, regardless of origin or nature, will be released to the public or unofficial persons or organizations by the Office of Information Services, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. This includes replies to correspondence (except congressional inquiries) submitted direct to ATIC, and other Air Force activities by private individuals requesting comments or results or analysis and investigations of sightings.

9. Exceptions. In response to local inquiries resulting from any UFO reported in the vicinity of an Air Force base, information regarding a sighting may be released to the press or the general public by the commander of the Air Force base concerned only if it has been *positively identified as a familiar or known object*. Care should be exercised not to reveal any classified aspects of the sighting or names of persons making reports. (See paragraph 18.) If the sighting is unexplainable or difficult to identify, because of insufficient information or inconsistencies, the only statement to be released is the fact that the sighting is being investigated and information regarding it will be released at a later date. If investigative action has been completed, the fact that the results of the investigation will be submitted to the ATIC for review and analysis may be released. Further inquiries should be referred to the local Office of Information Services.

10. Release by Non-Air Force Sources. If newsmen, writers, publishers, or private individuals desire to release unofficial information concerning a UFO sighting, every effort will be made to assure that the statements, theories, opinions, and allegations of these individuals or groups will not be associated with or represented as being official information.

11. Contacts. Private individuals or organizations requesting Air Force interviews, briefings, lectures, or private discussions on UFO's will be referred to the Office of Information Services, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. Air Force personnel, other than those of the Office of Information Services, will not contact private individuals on UFO cases nor will they discuss their operations and functions with unauthorized persons unless so directed, and then only on a "need-to-know" basis.

SECTION C—PREPARING AND SUBMITTING REPORTS

12. General Information:

a. Paragraphs 2 and 5 will be used as an aid and guidance to screenings, investigations, and reportings. The format will be as outlined in paragraph 15. Activities initially receiving reports of aerial objects and phenomena will screen the information to determine if the report concerns a valid UFO within the definition of paragraph 2c. Those reports not within that definition will not be considered for further action under the provisions of this regulation.

b. To assist activities and personnel responsible for handling, screening, and processing initial, incoming UFO information, the general sources and types of reports are given here:

(1) Generally, initial UFO reports are received from three sources:

- (a) Civilian (airline, private and professional pilots, tower operators, technical personnel, casual observers, and the public in general), by correspondence, telephone, or personal interview;
- (b) Military units and personnel (pilots, observers, radar operators, aircraft control and warning units, etc.), by telephone, electrical message, or personal interview;
- (c) Quasi-military units (Ground Observer Corps (GOC) posts, observers, and filter centers), usually by telephone.

(2) Generally, UFO reports received from civilian sources are of two types:

- (a) Those referring strictly to an observed UFO, containing either detailed or meager information;
- (b) Those referring only in part to an observed UFO, but primarily requesting information on some aspect of the UFO program.

c. Reports considered to fall primarily in a public relations or information service category (see paragraphs 4d, 7, 8, 9 and b(2) above) should be referred to the Office of Information Services. UFO data sufficient for investigation and/or analysis may be extracted before referral to that office.

13. Methods for Transmitting Reports. Coupled with any necessary screenings and investigations that must be performed preparatory to reporting, all information on UFO's will be reported promptly. Reports under 3 days from

date of sighting will be electrically transmitted with a "Priority" precedence. Electrically transmitted reports over 3 days old should carry a "Routine" precedence.

Written reports of sightings over 3 days old may be submitted on AF Form 112, Air Intelligence Information Report (AIIR) and AF Form 112a, supplement to AF Form 112 (see paragraphs 14 and 15); however, their use should be kept at a minimum in reporting initial sightings. The delays often involved in processing and transmitting AF Forms 112 through channels may make followup investigations difficult, producing only limited usable information. This factor must be considered in cases where an immediate investigation or study of a reported sighting is considered necessary. Reporting by electrical means will eliminate delays. A follow-up and/or complete report of all sighting initially reported electrically will be submitted on AF Form 112.

14. Where to Submit Reports:

a. *Electrical Reports.* Submit multiple addressed electrical reports to:

- (1) Commander, Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado
- (2) Nearest Air Division (Defense). (For zone of interior only.)
- (3) Commander, Air Technical Intelligence Center
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
Dayton, Ohio
- (4) Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D.C.
- (5) Office of Information Services
Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D.C.

b. *Written Reports:*

- (1) Within the zone of interior, submit all reports direct to ATIC. ATIC will reproduce each report and distribute it to interested zone of interior intelligence activities and to Office of Information Services, if such action is deemed necessary.
- (2) Outside the zone of interior, submit reports as prescribed in "Intelligence Collection Instruction" (ICI) June 1954, direct to:
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D.C.

c. *Reports from Civilians.* Where possible, civilian sources contemplating reporting UFO's should be advised to submit the report, for processing and transmission, to the nearest Air Force base, other than ATIC.

essing and transmission, to the nearest Air Force base, other than ATIC.

15. Basic Reporting Data and Format.

Show the abbreviation "UFO" at the beginning of the text of all electrical reports and in the subject of written reports. Include in all reports the data required, in the order shown below:

a. *Description of the Object(s):*

- (1) Shape.
- (2) Size compared to a known object (use one of the following terms: Head of a pin, pea, dime, nickel, quarter, half dollar, silver dollar, baseball, grapefruit, or basketball) held in the hand at about arm's length.
- (3) Color.
- (4) Number.
- (5) Formation, if more than one.
- (6) Any discernible features or details.
- (7) Tail, trail, or exhaust, including size of same compared to size of object(s).
- (8) Sound. If heard, describe sound.
- (9) Other pertinent or unusual features

b. *Description of Course of Object(s):*

- (1) What first called the attention of observer(s) to the object(s)?
- (2) Angle or elevation and azimuth of the object(s) when first observed.
- (3) Angle or elevation and azimuth of object(s) upon disappearance.
- (4) Description of flight path and maneuvers of object(s).
- (5) How did the object(s) disappear? (Instantaneously to the North etc.)
- (6) How long was the object(s) visible. (Be specific, 5 minutes, 1 hour, etc.)

c. *Manner of Observation:*

- (1) Use one or any combination of the following items:
Ground-visual, ground-electronic, air electronic. (If electronic, specify type of radar.)
- (2) Statement as to optical aids (telescopes, binoculars, and so forth) used and description thereof.
- (3) If the sighting is made while airborne, give type of aircraft, identification number, altitude, heading, speed, and home station.

d. *Time and Date of Sighting:*

- (1) Zulu time-date group of sighting.
- (2) Light conditions. (Use one of the following terms: Night, day, dawn, dusk).

e. Location of Observer(s). Exact latitude and longitude of each observer, and/or geographical position. A position with reference to a known landmark also should be given in electrical reports, such as "2mi N of Deeville;" "3mi SW of Blue Lake." Typographical errors or "garbling" often result in electrically transmitted messages, making location plots difficult or impossible.

Example: 89 45N, 192 71W for 39 45N, 102 21W.

f. *Identifying Information on Observer(s):*

- (1) Civilian—Name, age, mailing address, occupation.
- (2) Military—Name, grade, organization, duty, and estimate of reliability.

g. *Weather and Winds-Aloft Conditions at Time and Place of Sightings:*

- (1) Observer(s) account of weather conditions.
- (2) Report from nearest AWS or U.S. Weather Bureau Office of wind direction and velocity in degrees and knots at surface, 6,000', 10,000', 16,000', 20,000', 30,000', 50,000', and 80,000' if available.
- (3) Ceiling.
- (4) Visibility.
- (5) Amount of cloud cover.
- (6) Thunderstorms in area and quadrant in which located.

h. Any other unusual activity or condition, meteorological, astronomical, or otherwise, which might account for the sighting.

i. Interception or identification action taken (such action may be taken whenever feasible, complying with existing air defense directives).

j. Location, approximate altitude, and general direction of flight of any air traffic in the area at time of sighting.

k. Position title and comments of the preparing officer, including his preliminary analysis of the possible cause of the sighting(s).

l. Existence of physical evidence, such as materials and photographs.

16. Negative or Inapplicable Data. Even though the source does not provide or has not been asked for specific information by an interviewer, do not use the words "negative" or "unknown" until all logical leads to obtain the information outlined under paragraph 15 have been exhausted. For example, information on weather conditions in the area, as requested in paragraph 15g, may be obtained from the local military or civilian weather facility. Use the

phrase "not applicable" (N/A) only when the question does not apply to the particular sighting being investigated.

17. Comments of Preparing Officer. The preparing officer will make a preliminary analysis, and a comment on the possible cause or identity of the object being reported, together with a statement supporting his comment and analysis. Every effort will be made to obtain pertinent items of information and to test all possible leads, clues, and hypotheses concerning the identity or explanation of the sighting. (See paragraph 5.) The preparing officer receiving the report initially is in a much better position to conduct an "on-the-spot" survey or followup than subsequent investigative personnel and analysts who may be far removed from the area, and who may arrive too late to obtain vital data or the missing information necessary for firm conclusions.

18. Classification. Do not classify reports unless data requested in paragraph 15 require classification. Classify reports primarily to protect:

a. Names of sources reporting UFO's and other principals involved, if so requested by these persons or considered necessary;

b. Intelligence, investigative, intercept, or analytical methods or procedures;

c. Location of radar and other classified sites, units, and equipment;

d. Information on certain types, characteristics, and capabilities of classified aircraft, missiles, or devices that may be involved in the sighting.

19. Reporting Physical Evidence. Report promptly the existence of physical evidence (photographic or material):

a. *Photographic:*

- (1) *Still Photographs.* Forward the negative and two prints. Title the prints and the negatives, or indicate the place, time, and date of the incident.
- (2) *Motion Pictures.* Obtain the original film. Examine the film strip for apparent cuts, alterations, obliterations, or defects. Include in the report comment on any irregularities, particularly if received from other than official sources.
- (3) *Supplemental Photographic Information.* Negatives and prints, in themselves, often are insufficient to provide certain valid data or to permit firm conclusions. (See AFM 200-9—a

classified document receiving limited distribution.) Information that will aid in plotting or in estimating distances, apparent size and nature of object, probable velocity, and movements includes:

- (a) Type and make of camera,
 - (b) Type, focal length, and make of lens,
 - (c) Brand and type of film,
 - (d) Shutter speed used,
 - (e) Lens opening used, that is, "f" stop,
 - (f) Filters used,
 - (g) Was tripod or solid stand used,
 - (h) Was "panning" used,
 - (i) Exact direction camera was pointing with relation to true north, and its angle with respect to the ground.
- (4) *Other Camera Data.* If supplemental information cannot be obtained, the minimum camera data required are the type of camera, and the smallest and largest "f" stop and shutter-speed readings of the camera.

- (5) *Radar.* Forward two copies of each still-camera photographic print. Title radarscope photographic prints in accordance with AFR 95-7. Classify radarscope photographs in accordance with section XII, AFR 205-1, 3 January 1956.

NOTE: If possible, develop photographic film before forwarding. If undeveloped film is forwarded, mark it conspicuously to indicate this fact. Undeveloped film often has been destroyed by exposure during examinations made while en route through mail channels to final addressees.

b. *Material.* Each Air Force echelon receiving suspected or actual UFO material will safeguard it in a manner to prevent any defacing or alterations which might reduce its value for intelligence examination and analysis.

c. *Photographs, Motion Pictures, and Negatives Submitted by Individuals.* Photographic and motion picture material is often submitted by individuals as part of their UFO reports. All original material submitted, will be returned to the individual upon completion of necessary studies, analyses, and duplication by the Air Force.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:

OFFICIAL:

J. L. TARR
Colonel, USAF
Director of Administrative Services

THOMAS D. WHITE
Chief of Staff

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Agency-Level Planning in CIA

1964 to 1971



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O/PPB
29 December 1971



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Agency-Level Planning in CIA

The purpose of this paper is to present a brief, historical sketch of CIA's progress in planning at the agency level. The phrase "Agency Level" was selected after careful thought. It is meant to describe planning above the Directorate level; that is, planning at one central point that encompasses the full range of CIA's responsibilities and programs, and which transcends the traditional budgetary plan which all agencies prepare annually. Such phrases as "strategic planning," or "management planning," or "corporate planning" could probably have been used, but the author desired to avoid argument about the meaning of such words as strategic, management and corporate in this or any other context. Agency Level Planning, as will be seen later on, really involved all of these factors in one way or another, almost regardless of the definitions one would wish to use. A list of the persons involved in CIA's planning effort from 1964 to 1971 is shown in the attachment.

It is probably safe to say that continuing attention to Agency-Level Planning in CIA began in 1965. Prior to this, there had been sporadic attention to specific Agency problems by inter-directorate teams or task forces which in some cases produced forms of ad hoc

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planning. With one exception,* it was not until 1965, and the advent of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), that an Agency organization began continuing efforts in Agency-Level Planning.

There was, however, just prior to the establishment of PPBS, one major ad hoc planning effort which is worthy of mention. Admiral Rayborn, shortly after his appointment as DCI, commissioned a special study group under the direction of Lyman Kirkpatrick to prepare a long-range plan for CIA. The report which was produced in September 1965 by Mr. Kirkpatrick was an unusual document entitled Long Range Plan of the Central Intelligence Agency. Little would be accomplished by arguing whether or not, despite its title, this document constituted a plan. Several of those on the Kirkpatrick group spoke of the report as "a plan for a plan," and perhaps this interpretation is most accurate. However, the effort did have value. As Kirkpatrick points up in his covering letter to the Plan, it was most important that those involved in the effort believed that a permanent CIA planning staff was necessary and that the deliberations of his group developed an Agency viewpoint which had never before been apparent.

* O/PPB's predecessor organization, the Office of Budget, Program Analysis and Manpower (BPAM) included a Planning Staff. This staff, however, was very new and had little opportunity to develop planning methods before the advent of PPBS and the creation of O/PPB.

The Kirkpatrick Plan, as it has been called, included long-range assumptions concerning foreign developments and the impact of technology, a chapter on the present and future role of CIA, four chapters covering the long-range outlook for clandestine activities, intelligence production, reference services and support activities, and special papers dealing with thirteen significant subjects.

The Kirkpatrick Plan was not considered to be realistic when produced, and six years of history have proved this criticism to be accurate. The basic unrealism which was detected sprang largely from the Plan's conclusion that CIA would require, between 1965 and 1970, an additional 25X1A people to meet the dynamic expansion in requirements which were foreseen by the Clandestine Service, the Science and Technology Directorate, production functions and reference activities. The Plan did not foresee the domestic turmoil which the United States would experience, the economic conditions which have developed and the public's growing disinclination to enlarge the responsibilities of security elements of the Government. BUT IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT THIS PLAN WAS PREPARED IN THE VERY BRIEF PERIOD OF SIX WEEKS. Considering the pressure of time and the fact that this was the first planning effort undertaken by CIA, it produced an unusually good result.

Special note should be made that the Kirkpatrick Plan recommended the establishment of a central planning staff in CIA. This recommendation asked that the planning staff be situated at the top level of the Agency, close to, but not part of, the budgetary processes of the Agency. However, after consideration of all factors, the planning function was placed within the newly created Office of Planning, Programming and Budgeting (O/PPB), since it was the Executive Director-Comptroller's belief that planning must be intimately associated with day-to-day resource management and budgetary realities. The Office of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting had been created (shortly after the Kirkpatrick Plan was produced) as a result of the President's adoption of the PPBS as the dominant Government resource management system. Thus, the new O/PPB existed, the Budget Bureau's doctrine argued that planning should be an integral part of the PPBS, the Executive Director-Comptroller was faced with a decision as to where to place the planning function, and a natural course of events followed.

O/PPB's first crack at Agency Level Planning, then, began in the late Winter of 1965. It began, it was thought logically, by an attempt to determine CIA's objectives. The first Program Call issued to implement the new planning, programming and budgeting

system, therefore, asked each component of the Agency to submit its operational objectives. As a result, a large number of such objectives were received by O/PPB and an effort was undertaken to synthesize these objectives -- that is, to eliminate the duplication, redundancy and contradiction in and among the objectives which had been received and to array them in a way which would facilitate assessment of the manner in which Agency programs contributed to the objectives. After an initial screening, it was found that the objectives submitted to O/PPB had not been screened at any level within the Directorates. Each component responding to the Program Call had simply listed its version of its objectives and mailed them in to O/PPB. The result was that the contradictions found between objectives from the same Directorate made it impossible to integrate them without further review within the Directorates. Also, there was an astonishing number of objectives to deal with -- in total, hundreds were received covering an extremely wide variety of activities.

The second phase of this early endeavor was an attempt to organize the objectives in the most coherent fashion possible and to return them to the Directorates for review leading to the elimination of contradictions and duplication. There was little enthusiasm within

the Directorates to perform this job and the enthusiasm within O/PPB, it must be admitted, was fast waning. After several weeks of reviewing comments from the Directorates and further attempts to integrate the objectives, O/PPB discontinued its attempts to create for CIA a total picture of its objectives. The classic approach of presenting a "heirarchy of objectives" for CIA, to be used as a basis for program review and resource decisions, was thus ended, but not forgotten.

Despite O/PPB's inability to complete the job it had started out to do, it did use the knowledge it had accumulated to produce a document in January 1966, which was entitled CIA Planning Assump-tions Goals and Objectives. This document, the predecessor of today's Planning Guidance, was issued to furnish CIA components basic guidance in the formulation of their programs and resource requests. This early effort contained a section which briefly presented a look at future world events, a section presenting the Agency's broad goals (in fact, being closer to statements of mission) and a section presenting objectives related to major activities such as production, collection, and covert action.

Later, in 1966, the CIA Planning Assumptions Goals and Objectives were reconstituted. The document became a fairly comprehensive

presentation of probable future world conditions as extracted by O/PPB from various National Intelligence Estimates which had been produced. The goals and objectives sections were completely eliminated from the publication. In the Fall of 1966, this new version was published for the guidance of the Directorates in their program planning and was entitled CIA Planning Assumptions.

During 1966 O/PPB also developed the concept of a Target Oriented Display. That is, to relate the use of resources to end purposes, rather than simply to functions or organizations. This concept was explained to the Bureau of the Budget at the working level and in a memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Director, Bureau of the Budget in the Fall of 1966. From this early conceptual beginning grew the Consolidated Intelligence Resources Information System (CIRIS) which today is administered by the NIPE staff. This development is mentioned here as an aspect of planning, because the CIRIS system, or concept, has the potential for becoming a key element in reviewing past use of intelligence resources and to discern the planned use of resources in the future. As inaccurate as it still may be, CIRIS is the only means available to the DCI to determine how Intelligence Community resources are allocated by function (e.g., collection, production, etc.) and by target

(e.g., Soviet Union strategic offensive forces, ChiCom ground forces, etc.), and to discern the planned future allocation of Community resources.

During 1967 and 1968, O/PPB was perhaps more concerned with program review functions and budgeting than it was in nurturing the art of planning. Nevertheless, a few efforts were made which can clearly be placed under the label of planning and which are worthy of mention. The Planning Assumptions continued to be modified. The version published in the Fall of 1968 no longer was a brief extraction of published NIEs, but was a fairly comprehensive portrayal of anticipated developments in foreign affairs. The entire writing was done in O/PPB based upon the latest NIE on World Trends and other information available. Also, during 1968, considerable time was spent in O/PPB in assessing the planning techniques which would be most adaptable to CIA's peculiar problems and culture.

Beginning in 1967 and continuing through 1968, a member of the O/PPB Planning Staff became deeply interested in the possibility of establishing an over-all system for objectively determining the relative value of foreign countries as intelligence targets. Under this concept, the "threat" or "concern" to the US of each foreign


country would be expressed quantitatively by weighted scores. For example, under each country there would be uniform categorical breakdowns for such subjects as strategic weapons, conventional military forces, strategic base locations, economic factors, political influence, etc. A value would be assigned to each of these factors under each of the countries -- these values to be derived from a consensus of the intelligence experts in CIA or in the Community. Very simply stated, the country with the highest score would receive the highest national priority for intelligence, and so on down the line. Using this system as a base, intelligence managers could then review the existing commitment of intelligence resources against each country and against the sub-factors of each country to determine if budgeting was consistent with agreed upon priorities. This concept, of course, also provided for feedback and evaluation and for forecasting as integral parts of the system. A system this elaborate, this quantitative, this systematic, was not received with great enthusiasm within CIA at the time. Indeed, a proposal quite similar to this which was surfaced by NIPE in 1969 and again in 1971 has not caught the fancy of Agency management at the time of this writing. The original O/PPB paper was entitled The Economics of Intelligence.

At the time that the developments described above were taking place, CIA's planning effort was represented by the Planning Assumptions and the Program Memoranda which were prepared for submission to the Bureau of the Budget each Fall. The Planning Assumptions were improving in quality, but they were only for guidance -- they were not (and are not) directive in nature. The Program Memoranda were written independently to cover each of the seven CIA program categories, and thus, it was not possible to obtain a coherent view of where the Agency was headed, or according to what priorities. Furthermore, it was not easy, or perhaps even possible, to find a clear relationship between what was said in the Planning Assumptions, the Program Memoranda and the budget. In short, there were no visible connections between our assumptions regarding the future, the programs we proposed, and the budget we submitted.

The O/PPB planning group pondered this problem, once again evaluating the desirability of establishing a hierarchy of objectives which might become the connecting links which seemed so necessary. In the end, it was the consensus that the Agency's functions were so varied, and the organizations so unspecialized (i.e., each Directorate is involved in almost every program activity), that any expression of

total Agency objectives would be so large and complex as to offer little assistance to planning and management. It was at this point that the idea of "issue planning" became attractive. Issue planning is to some extent a compromise. The idea is that many areas of an organization are static and show little dynamic change with respect to their objectives and the programs which they follow. Therefore, there is little need for planning in these areas. Instead, management should look at those areas where there is anticipation of dynamic change and at specific problems and issues which may impact significantly on the organization's future -- in terms of mission, operations or resource requirements. In oversimplified terms, under this concept, the planning office disregards the bulk of the organization and concentrates on analysis of special problems and issues facing the total organization. This, as can be readily seen, greatly reduces the number of planning problems that must receive attention by the planning staff and management. The purpose of analyzing special problems and issues, for planning, is to assess the future impact of a particular development on the organization, to identify the effect such a development would have on functions and programs, to present alternative courses which could be adopted, and to present the effect each alternative would have on resource

requirements. Examples of this type of planning can be seen in



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At the same time that the O/PPB planning group began the identification of special problems and issues which should receive planning attention at the Agency level, other planning techniques were also under investigation. During late 1968 and 1969, two specific techniques were explored: a "Country Study" method of planning was investigated and work undertaken to prepare a model, and the DELPHI technique was examined and evaluated to determine its possible use in an intelligence organization.

The Country Study concept derived from earlier work done by the State Department's Management Staff under the Foreign Affairs Programming System (FAPS). The FAPS was perhaps the first attempt to systematize the review of foreign policy objectives and programs by the US Government. The system was developed prior to the establishment of PPBS and was tested in 1965 and 1966, principally in the Latin American area. The FAPS was designed to cover the foreign affairs programs of all Government agencies and involved the following processes:

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- The identification of US objectives in a particular country. These would be compiled by the Country Team, endorsed by the Ambassador and approved by the Department and the NSC regional groups. These studies of objectives (later called Country Analysis Strategy Papers -- CASPS) were also to include assessments of conditions in the countries and future prospects for achieving US goals.
- The alignment of US foreign affairs programs under each of the objectives.
- The identification of funds and manpower involved in each of these programs and those projected for the future.
- An analysis of the issues and problems resulting from the examinations above.

It is worth noting here that while FAPS did not make the grade at this time because of skepticism about the likelihood of applying systematic analysis to foreign affairs activities, and because of Defense Department's and CIA's disinclination to become involved in the program, it was resurrected in 1970 and has become the basic tool in State's new management system which resulted from the Macomber Task Force. It is also worth mention that David Osborne,

former Deputy Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, while Deputy Chief of Mission, Tokyo, conducted further experiments with FAPS. His particular contribution was to explore means of assessing the "probability" of achieving foreign policy objectives, which he was convinced should be considered along with any system developed to determine the priority of objectives.

At any rate, the O/PPB group studied FAPS materials, met with David Osborne and set about to see to what extent the FAPS concepts could be applied to intelligence programs. It was decided that it would be worthwhile to try to create a model using [REDACTED] 25X1A as a test case. [REDACTED] was selected because a current CASP 25X1A existed, which provided an approved set of US foreign policy objectives, because the Clandestine Service at that time had an exemplary array of programs against [REDACTED] (i.e., unilateral 25X1A and liaison collection projects, propaganda, labor and political covert action programs), and because O/PPB possessed a good description of [REDACTED] The 25X1A O/PPB model involved displaying the US objectives, aligning CS objectives and programs appropriately against these objectives, identifying consistencies and inconsistencies (i.e., objectives where CIA had no programs and CIA programs where there were no objectives)

and designing a system for relating the use of funds and manpower against the various programs and objectives. This model was never fully completed by the O/PPB planning group due to the departure of the analysts who were performing this task and interest that developed in following other planning approaches. Fortunately, however, the effort which had been spent to develop this model was not wasted.

In 1970, the Missions and Programs Staff of the DD/P became interested in improving the CS management and planning system and used the O/PPB [REDACTED] model as a basis for establishing the CS Country Programming System which is now in effect. Similarly,

25X1A

NIPE Staff, after discussions with O/PPB on FAPS and the [REDACTED] model, developed a proposed system for evaluating the priority of objectives and intelligence programs against foreign countries.

25X1A

DELPHI, the other planning technique explored at the same time, is a method developed by the RAND Corporation for achieving the consensus of experts on solutions to problems, to assess alternatives, to establish priorities, to forecast developments, and so forth, in areas where exact knowledge cannot be obtained. For example, the DELPHI method can be used to obtain the best judgment of a group of scientists to predict when a particular technological breakthrough may be expected. The DELPHI method is based upon obtaining the

views anonymously from a group of experts on a subject, such as the example, "playing back" to the group the results of the first attempt, the results of the second attempt, and so on until consensus is obtained. The O/PPB planning group tested the DELPHI with a small group of players in early 1969 and found the results encouraging for problem solving, forecasting, and for establishing objectives and priorities. Later on, the DD/P ran a DELPHI to elicit the views of an expert group of operations officer to determine the current objectives of the CS. Later, another DELPHI was carried out within the DD/P to assess its Country Programming System. Other DELPHIs have been run by the Office of Scientific Intelligence, the Office of Training, and other components. DELPHI seems to be a planning technique which will have many applications in intelligence planning, since many of our problems have no exact textbook answers and depend upon the considered judgments of experts.

In the Fall of 1968, the O/PPB Planning Staff formed a group to consider carefully all techniques which might be applied to the business of intelligence resource planning and to develop recommendations regarding the basic planning concepts which should be adopted. The results of the group's examination were submitted to the Director, PPB in January 1969. In essence, the group's conclusions were as follows:

- The Planning Assumptions constituted an adequate projection of external events and their likely impact on the Agency's objectives and programs.
- The CIA Budget and the Program Memoranda provided a generalized picture of the thrust and objectives of CIA and could be considered as parts of an Agency Level Planning system.
- The program review process by O/PPB and the Agency's top management in effect represented an effective, if incremental, planning process.
- It would be impracticable to establish a network or heirarchy of Agency objectives to guide program planning, or to install a formal planning system such as used in some business organizations.
- That "issue planning" (discussed earlier) seemed the most appropriate method to be emphasized by CIA in improving its planning processes.

The recommendations contained in this study were adopted in principle by the Director, PPB in early 1969 and the O/PPB planning group continued its efforts to identify issues which would effect CIA's future programs and to express them in a form which would enable the Agency's management to take the proper action.

Meanwhile, back at the Planning Assumptions, new developments were also taking place in 1969. Due to suggestions and feedback from the Agency's operating elements, it was decided to establish a more authoritative basis for the forecasting of world trends. With the Executive Director-Comptroller's approval, the Office of National Estimates was asked to prepare a world trends estimate expressly for use in the Planning Assumptions. ONE agreed to do this, and thus, the Assumptions began to represent a more substantively valid expression of likely developments in world events as they concern US security and policy interests. Also in 1969, the first "Implications" were added to the Assumptions. Beginning this year, the CIA Planning Assumptions contained sections which interpreted the impact of world developments on the programs and objectives of CIA. These interpretations, for simplicity, were, and still are, referred to as implications. In this first year, the implications were prepared by O/PPB, circulated to the Directorates, and then revised on the basis of the comments received. This process catalyzed planning at all levels. In subsequent years, the Directorates have been asked to prepare implications themselves and these have been revised or supplemented by O/PPB.

The work continued to identify and structure issues in a form which would assist the Agency's management planning processes.

By the end of 1969, several issues had been examined and prepared for top management attention. Those issued concerned such topics as the future deployment of technical collection sensors by human agents, future intelligence requirements with respect to Communist China, the impact on CIA programs and resources of a settlement in Indochina, the impact of non-official cover, and several other significant subjects. (For clarity, it is noted here that at this time in history, the planning issues became known as "Planning Objectives," in the event that some interested person decides to do some research in this area.)

Unfortunately, Agency management was apparently not sufficiently interested to pursue the Planning Objectives which had been suggested. Perhaps too many issues were presented at one time -- perhaps the issues themselves were believed to be too knotty, or perhaps management felt that the items proposed should be the normal concern of Directorate management. In any event, there was no action taken to pursue the planning which had been proposed. The work which had been done was used to a limited extent some months later in the background papers which were prepared for the Director's conference with his Deputies. It is likely that many of the Planning Objectives identified in late 1969 would still represent valid areas for Agency study and planning.

By the end of 1969, then, a wide variety of approaches to Agency Level Planning had been explored and some had been tested and adopted. But there was certainly not the feeling on the part of the O/PPB planning group that any significant changes had been wrought. The Agency's ability to look ahead and anticipate change, to estimate its future resource requirements past one or two years, or to forecast needed changes in its programs and objectives had not improved measurably. The fact remained that long-term planning remained very limited and ad hoc and that it still was not possible to discern a substantive connection between Planning Assumptions, program plans and the annual budget. Policy guidance with regard to objectives and priorities still did not exist.

Work continued into 1970 to refine and to determine means by which top management attention and action could be focused on Planning Objectives. Each issue (Planning Objective) selected was subjected to stringent review as to substantive importance, probability of solution and format. Format was considered to be of considerably more importance than might be thought, since it was the planning group's intention to make it clear that these objectives were not simply to bring management's attention to a problem, but to chart out the course for analysis of the problem, to identify the type of approach to be taken, the estimated time involved and the form of the resultant

recommendations -- that is, to present a solution to a problem in the form of an action plan. Each objective selected, of course, was considered to have some significant long-range resource implications. An example of one such Planning Objective can be seen in the one prepared for Propaganda Programs against the USSR. When forwarding this objective, the Planning Staff provided a brief substantive background which described changes in the world environment and the likely effect of these changes on propaganda activities and a section which described the planning factors which should be addressed. These planning factors involved identification of the present and future objectives of propaganda activities against the USSR, an examination of existing programs and the development of a comprehensive plan which would address:

- mid- and long-term objectives;
- preparation of a general strategy for action;
- description of present programs;
- analysis of risks and uncertainties;
- projection of resource requirements for future programs;
- description of future programs;
- establishment of a program coordinator; and
- provision for periodic evaluation and reporting to

Agency management.

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As the planning group pursued its work on the Planning Objectives, concern began to be registered once again about the lack of a comprehensive formulation of Agency objectives and priorities. (The reader is reminded that Planning Objectives would constitute only a description of selected issues and problems which were felt to be of significance to the Agency's future, and would not cover anywhere near the totality of Agency functions.) Pressures built up within the planning group for the development of a proposal for a formal planning system for CIA; that is, the creation of a formalized planning structure complete with objectives, priorities, planning responsibilities and procedures for a continuous, systematic planning operation.

In April 1970 a member of the planning group prepared a comprehensive evaluation of CIA's existing Agency Level Planning efforts, including a description of the major deficiencies in the system and steps which could be taken for improvement. Among the deficiencies noted were the following:

- Unclear policy guidance.
- Failure to clarify major objectives.
- Failure to clarify relative priorities.
- Inadequate responses to the programming system.

- Failure to integrate the seven program plans into an integrated Agency plan.
- Failure to anticipate short-term contingency situations.
- Inadequate attention to long-term developments and requirements.
- Insufficient coordination among Directorates.

Among the suggestions for improvement which were noted were the following:

- Definition of Agency major objectives and priorities, even if in a general way, endorsed by the Director.
- Use of these objectives to coordinate the substantive and operational programs of the Agency.
- The development of strategies for achieving major objectives which incorporated the programs and capabilities of every component of the Agency.
- The evaluation of policy options -- i.e., to determine CIA's legal basis, intention or desire to engage in certain programs.
- Separation of the planning function from the budgeting function, thereby removing the psychological and cultural barriers and the restraints imposed by primary concern on resources.

- Provide a separate "Call" for Agency plans -- that is, separate the call for plans from the call for budget preparation.
- Issuance of an annual Director's overview paper which presents policy guidance to Directorates.
- Increased attention to special analysis of special issues and increased use of planning techniques such as DELPHI to assist in the determination of objective and priorities and to identify options and alternatives.

During this same general period, in late 1969 and early 1970, the Planning Staff suggested that O/PPB present a proposal for improving the Agency's research and development planning. The Agency's R&D program at that time was the subject of considerable debate because of allegations concerning unclear objectives and priorities and of duplication and overlap of effort among Agency R&D elements. The Planning Staff undertook preparation of a formal Agency R&D planning system in early 1970 and after several weeks of review and analysis concluded that, while a suitable model could be developed for R&D, R&D was but one element of Agency activity and should not be approached separately from the other Agency programs which it supported. In short, the case was made that there should be

a design for a total Agency planning system with R&D becoming a subset of this total design.

After staff review and consideration of these findings, it was decided that the Planning Staff should prepare a proposal for a complete formal planning system for CIA and at the same time complete the work begun on the R&D problem. The R&D planning system would serve as a concrete model for planning in one area of activity under a total system concept.

In October 1970 the Planning Staff completed two papers: one entitled Agency Planning, and a second, Some Fundamental Aspects To Consider In Agency RD&E Program Planning. The Agency planning paper addressed a planning system comprised of three essential steps: premises, planning, and implementation and review. The premises would embody the basic missions of CIA, the impact of external and internal environmental factors, and forecasts of anticipated developments. The planning phase would involve the development of strategic plans, major objectives and policies at the Agency level. Implementation and review would involve operational planning, project-level planning, implementing programs and a review and evaluation activity. This paper also contained a proposed organization of the Agency-level planning function and a design for the procedures

needed to carry out the system concept. This paper was presented to the Director, PPB in October 1970 and to the O/PPB conference in [REDACTED] which took place that same month. No specific action resulted from presentation of the plan. It was not submitted to higher authority perhaps because it represented a formula for integrating the functions of the four CIA Directorates into a total planning system which then, and even now, runs counter to the desires of the Director and his Deputies.

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The subordinate paper concerning R&D planning was published and circulated separately but at about the same time as the paper discussed above. This paper described the basic elements to be incorporated in R&D planning and provided examples and actions which could be taken to improve R&D planning. The R&D paper was used to some extent in the policy deliberations which were then taking place with regard to CIA's R&D problems, and was distributed to key officials in the Agency's R&D activities. While it was not formally acted upon, its principles were adopted to some extent by the R&D Review Board.

In late 1970, the Planning Staff concluded that one important and potentially profitable area of planning had not yet been attempted. Up until this time, as described earlier in this paper, O/PPB had

considered a fairly wide range of planning concepts and devices (objectives, DELPHI, formal planning system, etc.), but had not explored the idea of developing intelligence "strategies" as vehicles for Agency-level planning.

A "strategy," in this context, is to select a significant area of intelligence concern, to explore it in depth, to forecast developments and contingencies, and to plan for likely future program needs. An adequate "strategy" would obviously require the collaboration of all Agency components concerned with the subject matter under consideration -- collection, covert action and production.

In early 1971, two members of the Planning Staff undertook preparation of "strategies" for intelligence problems related to the Soviet Union and Communist China. This involved the preparation of two papers, one for each country. The Soviet paper, which is used as the example, contained discussion of the following factors:

- US-Soviet power relationship
- Soviet policy
- US policy
- Indicators of changes in the relationship
- Agency programs targeting the Soviet Union
- Potential changes in program emphasis
- Planning implications

After approval of the Director, PPB, both papers were circulated to operating elements within CIA to acquire the reviews of specialists regarding the potential of such a planning approach, to validate the substantive portions of the papers and to stimulate the coordinated planning which was the end-purpose of strategy papers. Specifically, it was hoped that the Agency's "community" of Soviet specialists would, acting in concert, review historical factors in the US/Soviet relationship, forecast probable future developments, compare these future developments with current intelligence programs and describe programs which would be needed to meet future needs.

There was a very mixed reception given the two strategy papers which were issued. The Soviet paper became bogged down in controversy about the substantive interpretations contained in the O/PPB proposal, and there was no great enthusiasm, particularly within the Plans Directorate, for joining hands to create a unified Agency strategy. The Intelligence Directorate had no serious argument with the concept involved, but believed that the substantive interpretations should be modified. The DD/I Planning Staff agreed to prepare its own version of the substantive elements, but to date nothing has been received -- nor has the Planning Staff pushed the DD/I for its views.

The China paper met with a much better reception, principally because a China group, headed by a China coordinator, already existed within the Agency. The China coordinator responded affirmatively to the concept proposed, and it was noted that shortly thereafter the China group embarked on a program which was markedly similar to the proposals contained in the China strategy paper. The Planning Staff does not know if this was the result of the stimulus provided by the strategy paper, or if it was simply a matter of independent invention, which so often is the case in the intelligence business.

Thus, the idea of preparing strategy papers is another chapter in the history of Agency planning approaches. Some gain was achieved, but it cannot be said that the approach took hold within CIA. Perhaps a strategy paper, per se, is not a strong enough device for bringing together the capabilities and expertise which exist in CIA's four Directorates to focus on subjects of importance and mutual concern. On reflection, it appears that some means of achieving authoritative inter-Directorate coordination must exist before an Agency-wide approach to intelligence problems can be made. O/PPB's mission is not sufficiently clear in the substantive areas to bring about the coordinated effort which is necessary.

In the Fall of 1971, the Planning Staff proposed still another planning "system" for CIA. The essential purpose of this proposal was to support a more active role by the Executive Director-Comptroller in planning and resource allocation. Two mechanisms were proposed: an Executive Director-Comptroller's "operating plan" and an Executive Director-Comptroller's "annual report to the Director." These instruments would be designed to tie together the identification and resolution of intelligence consumer and policy issues and intelligence resource issues, to measure and guide the performance of the Agency as a whole, and to facilitate coordination of current and future programs involving two or more Directorates. .

As can be seen, an essential step of this package proposal was to energize the first element -- to identify substantive issues, since it was argued that resolution of such issues is the basic function of intelligence. The secondary step would be to translate unresolved substantive issues into resource issues. Four basic approaches were suggested to identify substantive issues:


- "Big Issue" Determination -- an approach in which major policy issues requiring an important intelligence input are identified through consultation with the NSC, the

President's Committee for International Economic Policy,
the State Department, the Defense Department, etc.

- Objectives and Priorities Determination -- a comprehensive approach to resource issues utilizing the objectives and priorities of DCID 1/2 as a starting point.
- Intelligence Gaps Determination -- use of reviews of national gaps as revealed during the estimative process.
- Feedback -- establishment of an identifiable feedback mechanism to determine the extent to which consumer needs remain unsatisfied after a response has been made.

At the same time, each of the four above approaches was considered to be a module, suitable for separate implementation by itself but promising more return when employed together with one or more of the other approaches.

The proposal just described was presented to the Director, PPB in mid-December 1971 for his review and determination of future action. Whatever decisions ensue can become part of the next chapter in this informal chronology.




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29 December 1971

Persons Directly Involved in Agency-Level Planning


1964 to 1971

Office of Budget, Program Analysis and Manpower



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Office of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting



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Note: The persons above were directly involved in the planning efforts described in this paper. The approximate dates of their involvement are shown in parentheses. While somewhat arbitrary, the names of other persons engaged primarily in budgetary work and program review have not been included in this list, although several were engaged for brief periods in planning functions.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP83-01042R000800010003-1

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Chief, Inspection and Security Staff

SUBJECT: Project Bluebird

DATE: APR 5 1950

There is submitted for your approval and authorization for allocation of funds Project Bluebird. In view of the extreme sensitivity of this project and its covert nature, it is deemed advisable to submit this project directly to you, rather than through the channel of the Projects Review Committee. Knowledge of this project should be restricted to the absolute minimum number of persons.

This project is now extremely important because of the expressions of interest in this type of a program developing in various areas of the Agency. It is most important that these varied interests be brought into a single project where appropriate controls can be exercised. This will avoid compromise of our techniques and interest in this field.

It is requested that this project be approved and authorization granted for the necessary funds as set forth in the attachment.

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Concurrences:

WILLIAM EDWARDS
Colonel, GSC
Chief, Inspection and Security Staff

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(unless impossible, insert date of event)

NO DISSEMINATION OF THIS INFORMATION
EXCEPT BY AUTHORITY OF THE
CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY
EXCEPT BY AUTHORITY OF THE
CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY
EXCEPT BY AUTHORITY OF THE
CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY

8/15/78

(See attached memorandum of concurrence)

AD/OPC

Approval for 65,515

20 Apr 1950

R. H. HILLENKOETTER
REAR ADMIRAL, USN
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Approved For Release 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP83-01042R000800010003-1

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

PROJECT BLUEBIRD

Type - Operational Support

1. References.

Meeting of representatives of ADOSO, ADOPC, ADOSI, and Chief, I&SS, on 14 March, where agreement was reached on the following proposal.

2. The purpose of this project is to provide for the immediate establishment of interrogation teams for the operational support of OSO and OPC activities. The teams will utilize the polygraph, drugs, and hypnotism to attain the greatest results in interrogation techniques. It is important that this project be established inasmuch as a considerable public and government interest has recently developed in the use of hypnotism for interrogation and for personality control purposes. This interest stems from the recent spy trials in Hungary and other satellite countries. Within a number of areas of CIA there has developed considerable interest in the field of hypnotism and one of the basic purposes of this program is to bring all such interests within the purview and control of a single project. It is extremely important that any action by CIA in these fields be restricted to the knowledge of a minimum number of persons on a Top Secret basis to prevent compromise and unfavorable repercussions. Further, activities in this field are so highly specialized that untrained personnel should not experiment or attempt to apply the techniques of hypnotism under any circumstances. This project will provide highly qualified and technical personnel to perform all aspects of interrogation for all areas of the Agency.

The immediate purpose of the program is to provide interrogation teams utilizing the cover of polygraph interrogation to determine the bona fides of high potential defectors and agents, and also for the collection of incidental intelligence from such projects. A team is to be composed of three persons consisting of a doctor -- psychiatrist, a polygraph -- hypnotist, and a technician.

It is proposed that two teams be established to meet current anticipated requirements. As it will require approximately five months to adequately train two polygraph -- hypnotists, I&SS will make available immediately its hypnotist -- specialist for field assignments in order that a team will be immediately available for service. To complete the team a doctor and a technician will also be required for immediate service. In order to provide for two teams it is proposed that two doctors -- psychiatrists, two polygraph -- hypnotists and two technicians be authorized under this project. In this manner one team will be available for immediate service and within six months two full time teams will be established. It is further proposed that the doctors -- psychiatrists be set up in an office in Washington which will serve as a cover for training, experimentation, and indoctrination purposes in the use of drugs and hypnotism. The doctors will be available for field assignments with the interrogation teams. All training of the team personnel will be conducted by I&SS. The team personnel, when not on

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field assignments, will be utilized for defensive training of covert personnel, study, and experimentation in the application of these techniques. This project is for the defensive use at this time of drugs and hypnotism. However, positive application of hypnotism will not be used until further experience in this field has been obtained and subject to approval of the DCI.

3. Operational Control.

The ADSO, ADOPC, and Chief, I&SS, will serve as a board for the operational control on the use of interrogation teams. OSO and OPC will submit to the board proposals for the use of interrogation teams on specific projects. Board approval will be granted only for specific projects and will not be granted for general assignment to a geographic area without a specific project in mind and without adequate controls.

4. Security.

The use of interrogation teams will be considered as Top Secret and knowledge of such activity within CIA will be restricted to only those who of necessity must have knowledge of such operations. The use of interrogation teams for operational support projects will in each case be granted only upon consideration of all security factors involved to prevent compromise of their use and techniques and to avoid repercussions to CIA.

5. Team Control.

The personnel of the teams will be assigned to Chief, I&SS, and will remain under I&SS control except when on specific assignments to the field. When not on field assignments the teams will be utilized for training, indoctrination, and experimentation purposes on mutually agreed projects in support of the covert offices.

6. Training.

All training of team personnel in polygraph, drugs, interrogation, and hypnotism will be conducted by I&SS.

7. Field Support.

Field support for interrogation teams will be provided on specific projects by either OSO or OPC, in accordance with the decision and control features of the operational control board.

8. Budget.

The estimated budget for this project for one year is as follows. Details are contained in Attachment A.

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Approved For Release 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP83-01042R000800010003-1

Personnel	\$40,800.00
Supplies	1,025.00
Equipment	3,190.00
Transportation	18,000.00
Rent	<u>2,500.00</u>
	\$65,515.00

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Approved For Release 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP83-01042R000800010003-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ATTACHMENT A

Personnel:

1 Doctor - GS-15 (Psychiatrist) (@ \$10,000.00)	\$10,000.00
1 Doctor - GS-12 (Psychiatrist) (@ \$ 6,400.00)	6,400.00
2 S.I. and Polygraph Specialists - GS-13 (@ \$7,600.00)	15,200.00
2 Technical - GS-9 (@ \$4,600.00)	9,200.00

Supplies:

Polygraph	
Paper	300.00
Ink (1 qt.)	10.00
Pen tips, sponges, electrode plates	15.00
Clerical (usual channels)	
Medical	
Drugs	100.00
Photographic (film, bulbs) Processing chemicals)	400.00
Recording (Tape) or (Belts)	200.00

Equipment:

Polygraph	
Machine (Keebler)	1,295.00
Spare part kit	100.00
Medical	
Syringes	25.00
Towels, etc.	5.00
Physical examination equipment	100.00
Monitoring and recording equipment	
2 recorders	900.00
Microphones	75.00
Wire	15.00
Repair and installation kit	75.00
Photographic	
Still camera - 35 mm	250.00
Movie camera	300.00
Developing equipment	50.00

Transportation:

\$1500.00 per trip per person (3)	18,000.00
4 trips per year average	

Rent:

Doctor's office ($\frac{1}{4}$ \$200.00 per month)	2,400.00
Telephone (Private line)	100.00

ATTACHMENT A

\$65,515.00

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The following constitutes the allocation of funds in support of this project.

Covert consultants - contractual	\$16,400	
Services (Services Budget)	100	
I&SS UV .01 (Pers. Services)	24,400	
Rent (Office covert consultants)	2,400	
I&SS IS2 Inspection travel (U.V.)	18,000	
I&SS Vouchered Funds 160-101 Equipment (09)	3,190	
I&SS Vouchered Funds 160-101 Supplies (08)	1,025	
	<u>\$65,515</u>	
.01 (Personal Services)		
Covert Consultants (Contractual))	
-1 GS-15 (psychiatrist) \$10,000) Assigned to I&SS	
1 GS-12 (psychiatrist) 6,400)	
2 Security analyst GS-13)	
(Polygraph Operators \$7600	15,200)	I&SS T/O Unvouchered
2 Technicians GS-9 (4,600)	9,200)	
.02 (Travel)		
\$1500 per trip per person (3)) To be included in I&SS UV	
4 trips per year average	18,000)	UV IS2 (Inspection of Foreign Installations)
.04 (Communications)		
Private telephone line	100)	Absorbed in Services Budget
.05 (Rents and Utilities)		
Doctor's Office ($\frac{1}{2}$ 200.00 per mo.)	2,400)	Paid by I&SS as operating expense of consultant
.08 (Supplies & Materials)		
Polygraph		
Paper	300)	
Ink (1 quart)	10)	I&SS Vouchered Funds
Pen tips, sponges, electrode plates	15)	
Drugs	100)	
Photographic (film, bulbs)		
Processing chemicals	400)	
Recording Tape (tape) or (Belts)	200)	
.09 (Equipment)		
Polygraph Machine (Keeler)	1295)	
Spare part kit	100)	
Syringes	25)	
Towels, etc.	5)	
Physical exam. equipment	100	
2 recorders	900	
Microphones	75	

CONFIDENTIAL

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Approved For Release 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP83-01042R000800010003-1

Wire	15
Repair and Installation kit	75
Still Camera 35 mm	250
Movie Camera	300
Developing Equipment	50

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Approved For Release 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP83-01042R000800010003-1

MEMORANDUM FOR: AD/OSI
AD/OSC
OPC [REDACTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 17 1951

25X1

FROM : Assistant Deputy/Inspection and Security
SUBJECT : BLUEBIRD

1. Documents pertaining to the Project BLUEBIRD require special handling because of the extremely sensitive nature of the information pertaining to this project. For the control of documents pertaining to this project the following security requirements are set forth:

a. All documents within CIA will be classified TOP SECRET and will be handcarried in transmission from one office to another on an "Eyes Only" basis.

b. It will be possible to classify some documents as SECRET when the subject matter of a document does not specify the true purpose of this program nor does it make direct reference to the materials and means utilized in furtherance of this program.

c. Arrangements should be made with key officers in Army, Navy, Air and FBI who will serve as contact points in their respective departments for exchange of information concerning this program.

d. Documents sent from CIA to the above departments should be on a TOP SECRET "Eyes Only" basis to the contact officials in each department. The contact officials should be advised that further dissemination should be limited to only those persons who have "need to know."

e. A control list will be established for all persons who have a need to know and are briefed on this project. The list will be maintained by I&S and each office (OSC, OPC, OSI) will keep I&S informed of those persons who have been briefed and should be added to the control list. For coordination and implementation purposes the control list will be available to the respective offices to determine those persons who have been appropriately briefed and cleared to participate in this project.

SHEFFIELD EDWARDS
Colonel, OSC

CONFIDENTIAL



25X

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO: <u>Janice</u>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
FROM:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Copy No. 4 of 4

YES ONLY:

Directors and persons
they designate

ILLEGIB

25X1

8/15/75

MEMORANDUM TO ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OCO
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OPC
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OSI

SUBJECT: Project "Bluebird"

1. It is desired to call a meeting at 2:00 P.M., 14 March, in Room 2-1, 2210 E Street, of one or two designated persons from each office above to discuss operational requirements for highly specialized interrogation teams to be known as Project "Bluebird".

2. This project is regarded as of the highest security classification and to be known only to the fewest persons specifically designated by Assistant Directors. It is being considered at the definite request of your operating officials.

3. The agenda for the meeting will comprise discussion on the procurement, training, and control of two "Bluebird" teams, the research to be conducted by these teams, and their availability for operational use from a defensive standpoint outside the United States.

4. It is hoped that a concurrence of opinion may be arrived at on a plan which can then be submitted for the required covert administrative support, including funds and vacancies to organize these teams. It would be appreciated if you would send representatives who would be empowered to speak fully for you.

5. If any Assistant Director above desires further briefing on this matter before the meeting, either [redacted] or I will be glad to come see you.

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[redacted]
Colonel, OCO

Chief, Inspection & Security Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : Deputy Chief, I & S Staff

DATE: 27 February 1950

FROM :

SUBJECT: Problems Involved in Obtaining a Psychiatrist

Some of the problems involved in the procurement of a consultant or full time psychiatrist are as follows:

1. A reputable civilian psychiatrist could not afford to be available to us on short notice.

a. Even the highest government salary would not begin to compare with his private income.

b. He would be obligated to keep appointments with patients which have been scheduled weeks in advance.

2. He might not have the interest or motivation to be active in such a narrow scope of the over all psychiatric field.

3. His ethics might be such that he might not care to cooperate in certain more revolutionary phases of our project.

ILLEGIB

4. Very few psychiatrists are now on active duty and are, therefore, difficult to procure through that channel.

5. Very few psychiatrists are really capable in the application of hypnosis and have no interest whatsoever in ESP. *that's the only one*

It is believed that we are fortunate in having located a candidate to fill such a billet in CIA. This man is now on active duty at also has an office of his own in town and a two-day a week private practice. He has the following points in his favor as far as overcoming the above mentioned difficulties:

- A local*
1. He is on active duty working toward retirement (five years to go).
 2. He is extremely interested in the use of hypnosis, drugs and ESP.
 3. His ethics are such that he would be completely cooperative in any phase of our program, regardless of how new or revolutionary it may be.
 4. He has an office in town which could be used as a remote location for some of our work.

5. He would be willing to go on trips whenever necessary.

ILLEGIB

The disadvantage in obtaining on a part time basis is as follows:

- local*
1. He is the only medical officer at the during week days and, therefore, would have to have a set time each week during

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Approved For Release 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP83-01042R000800010003-1

Memo To: Deputy Chief, I & S Staff From: [redacted]
Subject: Problems Involved in Obtaining a Psychiatrist 27 February 1950

which he could work with us. For this reason, he would not be available on short notice.

*Third Agency
The Navy Employee*

25X1

In view of the above, it is recommended that [redacted] be obtained for work with CIA on a full time basis and it is felt that his time will be well spent between the periods where he is being utilized for active drug injection work. Some of his projects would be as follows:

1. Detailed research into the use of various drugs for subconscious isolation purposes.
2. Liaison with other medical men with various agencies engaged in similar projects.
3. Instruction in medical aspects of the Polygraph.
4. Aiding in the instruction of persons being trained in operational subconscious isolation.
5. Helping in the ESP research program.
6. Giving a physical examination to certain individuals with respiratory or heart conditions, before they take the Polygraph test.
7. Rendering psychiatric opinion in conjunction with the perversion cases being tested on the Polygraph.

In view of the heightened activity and interest in subconscious isolation techniques, it is highly recommended that we obtain [redacted] as quickly as possible.

*The Navy Employee
Third Agency*

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Approved For Release 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP83-01042R000800010003-1

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP83-01042R000800010003-1

- 3 -

Personnel	\$40,000.00
Supplies	1,025.00
Equipment	3,190.00
Transportation	18,000.00
Rent	<u>2,500.00</u>
	\$65,515.00

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ATTACHMENT A~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Personnel:

1 Doctor - GS-15 (Psychiatrist) (C \$10,000.00)	10,000.00
1 Doctor - GS-12 (Psychiatrist) (C \$ 6,400.00)	6,400.00
2 S.I. and Polygraph Specialists - GS-13 (C \$7,600.00)	15,200.00
2 Technical - GS-9 (C \$4,600.00)	9,200.00

Supplies:

Polygraph	
Paper	300.00
Ink (1 qt.)	10.00
Pen tips, sponges, electrode plates	15.00
Clavical (usual channels)	
Medical	
Drugs	100.00
Photographic (film, bulbs) Processing chemicals)	100.00
Recording (Tape) or (Sclts)	200.00

Equipment:

Polygraph	
Machine (Keeler)	1,000.00
Spare part kit	100.00
Medical	
Syringes	25.00
Towels, etc.	5.00
Physical examination equipment	100.00
Monitoring and recording equipment	
2 recorders	900.00
Microphones	75.00
Wire	35.00
Repair and installation kit	75.00
Photographic	
Still camera - 35 mm	250.00
Movie camera	300.00
Developing equipment	50.00

Transportation:

\$1500.00 per trip per person (3)	18,000.00
4 trips per year average	

Rent:

Doctor's office (3) (\$200.00 per month)	2,400.00
Telephone (Private line)	100.00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

35,525.00

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Approved For Release 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP83-01042R000800010003-1

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP83-01042R000800010003-1

MEMORANDUM FOR: AD/OSI ✓
AD/OSO
OPC ()

MAR 17 1961

25X1

FROM : Assistant Deputy/Inspection and Security

SUBJECT : BLUEBIRD

1. Documents pertaining to the Project BLUEBIRD require special handling because of the extremely sensitive nature of the information pertaining to this project. For the control of documents pertaining to this project the following security requirements are set forth:

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b. It will be possible to classify some documents as SECRET when the subject matter of a document does not specify the true purpose of this program nor does it make direct reference to the materials and means utilized in furtherance of this program.

c. Arrangements should be made with key officers in Army, Navy, Air and FBI who will serve as contact points in their respective departments for exchange of information concerning this program.

d. Documents sent from CIA to the above departments should be on a TOP SECRET "Eyes Only" basis to the contact officials in each department. The contact officials should be advised that further dissemination should be limited to only those persons who have "need to know."

e. A control list will be established for all persons who have a need to know and are briefed on this project. The list will be maintained by I&S and each office (OSO, OPC, OSI) will keep I&S informed of those persons who have been briefed and should be added to the control list. For coordination and implementation purposes the control list will be available to the respective offices to determine those persons who have been appropriately briefed and cleared to participate in this project.

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SHEPHERD EDWARDS
Colonel, GSC

EYES ONLY

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Assistant Director, Scientific Intelligence

DATE: 20 May 1952

FROM : Deputy Security Officer/CIA

SUBJECT: Special Interrogations.

REFERENCE: TS 80070 dated 15 May 1952, Staff Study on Special Interrogations
(Project ARTICHOKE).

1. This Office concurs in the Staff Study dated 15 May 1952 to the DD/CI on special interrogations, Project ARTICHOKE.

2. This Office will assume, upon appropriate approval, the responsibilities placed on it in the Staff Study and at the expiration of the six months period a meeting will be called to determine the results achieved during the interim six months period and determination made as to whether I&SO or some other office should assume permanent responsibility for the conduct of this Project.

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15 Aug 71

EYES ONLY

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TS # 22442

CONFIDENTIAL

1 of 4

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

EYES ONLY

TS #22442
Copy #3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20 May 1952

Assistant Director, Scientific Intelligence

Deputy Security Officer/CIA

Special Interrogations.

REFERENCE: TS 80070 dated 15 May 1952, Staff Study on Special Interrogations
(Project ARTICHOKE).

1. This Office concurs in the Staff Study dated 15 May 1952
to the DD/CI on special interrogations, Project ARTICHOKE.

2. This Office will assume, upon appropriate approval, the
responsibilities placed on it in the Staff Study and at the expiration
of the six months period a meeting will be called to determine the
results achieved during the interim six months period and determination
made as to whether I&SO or some other office should assume permanent
responsibility for the conduct of this Project.

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EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CW# 14251 + SS

cc # 3

52

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING

9 May 1950

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SUBJECT: Project Bluebird

On 9 May a meeting was held in the office of Dr. Chadwell, OSI, between [redacted] OSI, and [redacted] of I&SS. The meeting was called for the purpose of determining the method by which OSI might lend support to Project Bluebird, the overt collection of information from the U. S. Government sources. The following points were agreed upon:

1. I&SS would provide [redacted] with a copy of the I&SS collection request which was sent to CSO for information on drugs and police interrogation methods.

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2. [redacted] will arrange for the Surgeon General of the Army to place on the search list of the Nuremburg Trials papers request for information on drugs, narcoanalysis, and special interrogation techniques.

3. It was agreed that [redacted] would set up a program for the collection of intelligence from U. S. Government agencies and from public sources using an adequate cover to screen out direct CIA interest. The following are the categories of information:

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a. Speech inducing drugs.

b. Narcoanalysis and hypnotism.

c. Soviet and satellite trials wherein suspected that a or b above was used on the or other special drugs or interrogation.

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4. [redacted] will advise [redacted] of various sources of information in Government where arrangements may be made for the collection of information set forth in paragraph 3 above.

5. Upon completion of the preliminary stages of the above steps a meeting will be set up between [redacted] Office of Secretary of Defense, and I&SS wherein [redacted] and [redacted] will divide up the fields of collection of information set forth in paragraph 3.

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
Approved For Release 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP83-01042R000800010003-1

6. Upon development of the above collection activity, consideration will be given to estimates on this field as a method of unconventional warfare with further consideration of the presenting of this paper to the Office of Secretary of Defense for consideration. This latter program is one which will be subject to consideration dependent upon developments of the program set out in paragraphs 1 to 5.

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Approved For Release 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP83-01042R000800010003-1

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Approved For Release 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP83-01042R000800010003-1

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Chief, Inspection and Security Staff

SUBJECT: Project Bluebird

DATE: APR 5 1950

There is submitted for your approval and authorization for allocation of funds Project Bluebird. In view of the extreme sensitivity of this project and its covert nature, it is deemed advisable to submit this project directly to you, rather than through the channel of the Projects Review Committee. Knowledge of this project should be restricted to the absolute minimum number of persons.

This project is now extremely important because of the expressions of interest in this type of a program developing in various areas of the Agency. It is most important that these varied interests be brought into a single project where appropriate controls can be exercised. This will avoid compromise of our techniques and interest in this field.

It is requested that this project be approved and authorization granted for the necessary funds as set forth in the attachment.

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[Redacted Signature]

EDWARD EDWARDS
Colonel, GSC

Chief, Inspection and Security Staff

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Concurrences:

[Redacted Concurrence]

AD/GSC

8/15/75

[Redacted Concurrence]

25X1

(See attached memorandum of concurrence)

AD/OPC

Approved for

[Redacted Signature]

25X1

20 Apr. 1950

R. H. HILLENKOTTER
REAR ADMIRAL, USN
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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Approved For Release 2004/01/29 : CIA-RDP83-01042R000800010003-1

PROJECT BLUEBIRD

Type - Operational Support

1. References.

Meeting of representatives of ADOSO, ADOPC, ADOSI, and Chief, I&SS, on 14 March, where agreement was reached on the following proposal.

2. The purpose of this project is to provide for the immediate establishment of interrogation teams for the operational support of OSO and OPC activities. The teams will utilize the polygraph, drugs, and hypnotism to attain the greatest results in interrogation techniques. It is important that this project be established inasmuch as a considerable public and government interest has recently developed in the use of hypnotism for interrogation and for personality control purposes. This interest stems from the recent spy trials in Hungary and other satellite countries. Within a number of areas of CIA there has developed considerable interest in the field of hypnotism and one of the basic purposes of this program is to bring all such interests within the purview and control of a single project. It is extremely important that any action by CIA in these fields be restricted to the knowledge of a minimum number of persons on a Top Secret basis to prevent compromise and unfavorable repercussions. Further, activities in this field are so highly specialized that untrained personnel should not experiment or attempt to apply the techniques of hypnotism under any circumstances. This project will provide highly qualified and technical personnel to perform all aspects of interrogation for all areas of the Agency.

The immediate purpose of the program is to provide interrogation teams utilizing the cover of polygraph interrogation to determine the bona fides of high potential defectors and agents, and also for the collection of incidental intelligence from such projects. A team is to be composed of three persons consisting of a doctor -- psychiatrist, a polygraph -- hypnotist, and a technician.

It is proposed that two teams be established to meet current anticipated requirements. As it will require approximately five months to adequately train two polygraph -- hypnotists, I&SS will make available immediately its hypnotist -- specialist for field assignments in order that a team will be immediately available for service. To complete the team a doctor and a technician will also be required for immediate service. In order to provide for two teams it is proposed that two doctors -- psychiatrists, two polygraph -- hypnotists and two technicians be authorized under this project. In this manner one team will be available for immediate service and within six months two full time teams will be established. It is further proposed that the doctors -- psychiatrists be set up in an office in Washington which will serve as a cover for training, experimentation, and indoctrination purposes in the use of drugs and hypnotism. The doctors will be available for field assignments with the interrogation teams. All training of the team personnel will be conducted by I&SS. The team personnel, when not on

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field assignments, will be utilized for defensive training of covert personnel, study, and experimentation in the application of these techniques. This project is for the defensive use at this time of drugs and hypnotism. However, positive application of hypnotism will not be used until further experience in this field has been obtained and subject to approval of the DCI.

3. Operational Control.

The ADSO, ADCPC, and Chief, I&SS, will serve as a board for the operational control on the use of interrogation teams. OSO and OPC will submit to the board proposals for the use of interrogation teams on specific projects. Board approval will be granted only for specific projects and will not be granted for general assignment to a geographic area without a specific project in mind and without adequate controls.

4. Security.

The use of interrogation teams will be considered as Top Secret and knowledge of such activity within CIA will be restricted to only those who of necessity must have knowledge of such operations. The use of interrogation teams for operational support projects will in each case be granted only upon consideration of all security factors involved to prevent compromise of their use and techniques and to avoid repercussions to CIA.

5. Team Control.

The personnel of the teams will be assigned to Chief, I&SS, and will remain under I&SS control except when on specific assignments to the field. When not on field assignments the teams will be utilized for training, indoctrination, and experimentation purposes on mutually agreed projects in support of the covert offices.

6. Training.

All training of team personnel in polygraph, drugs, interrogation, and hypnotism will be conducted by I&SS.

7. Field Support.

Field support for interrogation teams will be provided on specific projects by either OSO or OPC, in accordance with the decision and control features of the operational control board.

8. Budget.

The estimated budget for this project for one year is as follows. Details are contained in Attachment A.

TOP SECRET

Personnel	\$40,800.00
Supplies	1,025.00
Equipment	3,190.00
Transportation	18,000.00
Rent	<u>2,500.00</u>
	\$65,515.00

CONFIDENTIAL
TOP SECRET

ATTACHMENT A

Personnel:

1 Doctor - GS-15 (Psychiatrist) (@ \$10,000.00)	\$10,000.00
1 Doctor - GS-12 (Psychiatrist) (@ \$ 6,400.00)	6,400.00
2 S.I. and Polygraph Specialists - GS-13 (@ \$7,600.00)	15,200.00
2 Technical - GS-9 (@ \$4,600.00)	9,200.00

Supplies:

Polygraph	
Paper	300.00
Ink (1 qt.)	10.00
Pen tips, sponges, electrode plates	15.00
Clerical (usual channels)	
Medical	
Drugs	100.00
Photographic (film, bulbs) Processing chemicals)	400.00
Recording (Tape) or (Belts)	200.00

Equipment:

Polygraph	
Machine (Keeler)	1,295.00
Spare part kit	100.00
Medical	
Syringes	25.00
Towels, etc.	5.00
Physical examination equipment	100.00
Monitoring and recording equipment	
2 recorders	900.00
Microphones	75.00
Wire	15.00
Repair and installation kit	75.00
Photographic	
Still camera - 35 mm	250.00
Movie camera	300.00
Developing equipment	50.00

Transportation:

\$1500.00 per trip per person (3)	18,000.00
4 trips per year average	

Rent:

Doctor's office ($\frac{1}{4}$ \$200.00 per month)	2,400.00
Telephone (Private line)	100.00

\$65,515.00

The following constitutes the allocation of funds in support of this project.

Covert consultants - contractual	\$16,400	
Services (Services Budget)	100	
I&SS UV .01 (Pers. Services)	24,400	
Rent (Office covert consultants)	2,400	
I&SS IS2 Inspection travel (U.V.)	18,000	
I&SS Vouchered Funds 160-101 Equipment (09)	3,190	
I&SS Vouchered Funds 160-101 Supplies (08)	1,025	
	<u>\$65,515</u>	
.01 (Personal Services)		
Covert Consultants (Contractual))	
- 1 GS-15 (psychiatrist) \$10,000	Assigned to I&SS	
1 GS-12 (psychiatrist) 6,400		
2 Security analyst GS-13)	
(Polygraph Operators \$7600	15,200)	I&SS T/O Unvouchered
2 Technicians GS-9 (4,600)	9,200)	
.02 (Travel)		
\$1500 per trip per person (3))	To be included in I&SS UV
4 trips per year average	18,000)	JV IS2 (Inspection of Foreign Installations)
.04 (Communications)		
Private telephone line	100)	Absorbed in Services Budget
.05 (Rents and Utilities)		
Doctor's Office ($\frac{1}{2}$ 200.00 per mo.)	2,400)	Paid by I&SS as operating expense of consultant
.08 (Supplies & Materials)		
Polygraph		
Paper	300)	
Ink (1 quart)	10)	I&SS Vouchered Funds
Pen tips, sponges, electrode plates	15)	
Drugs	100)	
Photographic (film, bulbs)		
Processing chemicals	400)	
Recording Tape (tape) or (Belts)	200)	
.09 (Equipment)		
Polygraph Machine (Keeler)	1295)	
Spare part kit	100)	
Syringes	25)	
Towels, etc.	5)	
Physical exam. equipment	100	
2 recorders	900	
Microphones	75	

Wire	15
Repair and Installation kit	75
Still Camera 35 mm	250
Movie Camera	300
Developing Equipment	50

CONFIDENTIAL

TS# 22363

Copy 4 of 5.

MEMORANDUM FOR: AD/OSI
AD/OSO
CPC ()

~~TOP SECRET~~
CONFIDENTIAL

25X1

MAR 17 1951

FROM : Assistant Deputy/Inspection and Security
SUBJECT : BLUEBIRD

1. Documents pertaining to the Project BLUEBIRD require special handling because of the extremely sensitive nature of the information pertaining to this project. For the control of documents pertaining to this project the following security requirements are set forth:

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b. It will be possible to classify some documents as SECRET when the subject matter of a document does not specify the true purpose of this program nor does it make direct reference to the materials and means utilized in furtherance of this program.

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e. A control list will be established for all persons who have a need to know and are briefed on this project. The list will be maintained by I&S and each office (OSO, OPC, OSI) will keep I&S informed of those persons who have been briefed and should be added to the control list. For coordination and implementation purposes the control list will be available to the respective offices to determine those persons who have been appropriately briefed and cleared to participate in this project.

SHEFFIELD EDWARDS
Colonel, GSC

CONFIDENTIAL

(unless impossible, insert date for event)

CENDROWSKI, Wojciech

Multiple sclerosis; past achievements and future prospects.
Neurol., neurochir. psychiat. Pol. 15 no.1:159-164 Ja-F'65.

1. Z Oddziału Neurologicznego Instytutu Psychoneurologicznego
w Pruszkowie (Kierownik: prof. dr. A. Dowzenko).

CENDROWSKI, W.S.

Epidemiological and clinical approach to multiple sclerosis.
Acta med. acad. sci. Hung. 21 no.2:217-222 '65.

1. Institute of Psychoneurology, Pruszkow, Poland. Submitted
January 16, 1965.

CENDROWSKI, Wojciech

Clinical experiences with lyophilized yeasts in multiple sclerosis.
Wiad. lek. 18 no.16:1323-1326 15 S '65.

1. Z Oddziału Neurologicznego Instytutu Psychoneurologicznego w
Pruszkowie (Kierownik: prof. dr. A. Dowzenko).

WALKNOWSKA, Janina; CENDRZAK, E.

On the changes of limb tissues implanted into the body cavity. Folia
biol 7 no.4:303-308 '59. (EEAI 9:9)

1. Department of Experimental Zoology of the Polish Academy of
Sciences, Krakow.

(REGENERATION (BIOLOGY))

(EXTREMITIES (ANATOMY))

CENDRZAK, E.; STAWINSKI, St.

Palliative therapy of neoplastic stenosis of the esophagus
and cardia with the aid of prostheses. Otolaryng. pol. 17 no.1:
43-44 '63.

1. Z Oddziału Chirurgicznego i Laryngologicznego Szpitala nr 1
w Bytomiu Dyrektor: dr med. W. Kubisty.

(ESOPHAGEAL NEOPLASMS) (ESOPHAGEAL STENOSIS)
(CARDIA) (STOMACH NEOPLASMS)
(ARTIFICIAL ORGANS)

CENEK, A.

Experience with treatment of carriers of Streptococcus beta hemolyticus in cardiac and rheumatic children with Czechoslovakian penicillin preparation pendepon. Cas. lek. cesk. 94 no.51: 1417-1420 16 Dec 55.

1. Detska lazenska lecebna pro kardiaky a reumatiky, Podebrady.
Predn. MUDr. A. Cenek Spolupracovnici laboratore: Kristek,
Vrtatkova.

(PENICILLIN, therapeutic use,

Streptoc. beta hemolyticus carriage in heart dis.
& rheum. dis. in child.)

(STREPTOCOCCUS,

carriage in heart dis. & rheum. dis. in child., ther.
penicillin.)

(HEART DISEASE, bacteriology,

Streptoc. carriage in child., ther. penicillin.)

(RHEUMATISM, bacteriology,

Streptoc. carriage in child., ther. penicillin.)

HOMOLKA, J.; CENEK, A.; Laboratorni spoluprace J. Mojzis

Role of changes in denaturation properties of serum albumin in the evaluation of rheumatic processes during a supplementary therapy of rheumatic children. Cas.lek.cesk 100 no.14:441-446 7 Ap '61.

1. Ustredni laborator fakultni polikliniky v Praze, prednosta doc. MUDr. J. Homolka, Detska lazenska lecebna chorob ustroji obehoveho v Pobebradech, prednosta MUDr. A. Cenek.

(RHEUMATISM in inf & child) (SERUM ALBUMIN)

Ceněk, Gabriel

Handwritten: ~~Ceněk, Gabriel~~
Ceněk, Gabriel. Remark on construction of the illumination of a spherical surface by orthogonal axonometric projection. Mat.-Fyz. Časopis. Slovensk. Akad. Vied 5 (1955), 152-161. (Slovak. Russian summary)

1 - P, W

CENEK, J.

Methods of obtaining infant mortality rate in the Novy Bydov
district. Cesk. zdravot. 7 no.3:132-138 Apr 59.

1. Primar detskeho oddeleni, OUNX Novy Bydov.
(INFANT MORTALITY, statist.
in Czech (Cz))

Kulec, V., and Genek, J., from Elektrotechnicky obzor (Elektrotechnische Rundschau),
Frg 1953, Heft 7/8, S. 398-407. Übersetzer: F. Iser., "Transducer and Its
Application", German Electroengineering (Deutsche Elektrotechnik), March, 1955,
Vol 9, No. 3, p 87.

BS

CENK, J

3698. The transducer and its application. V. KUBEC
AND J. CENK. *Elektronika: Obzor*, 42, No. 1-8,
398-413 (1955) in Czech.

Account of the general theory of the transducer,
and of the different basic methods of connection, as
well as discussion of the principal factors affecting the
steady-state regime. The second part deals with 24
different applications, giving diagrams of connection,
characteristics and notes on each. [11. NORIT.]

①

PK

4
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8

1049 FERRO-RESONANT CIRCUITS J. Cenek
Elektrotech. Obsor, Vol. 43, No. 10, 557-58 (1953) in Czech

621.318.42

Recs
D.C.

Characteristics of non-linear circuits in which a transducer is substituted for the iron-core choke, can be modified by exciting the transducer with d.c. In linear circuits connected in series the current at resonance is at its maximum and it is zero in a parallel connection. However, a circuit containing a choke with an iron core has no natural frequency and it will not develop a resonance between the inductance and capacitance as does a linear circuit. In these non-linear circuits, when series-connected the current suddenly increases, and when parallel-connected it suddenly drops at a certain voltage. This phenomenon is called ferro-resonance. A combined graphical and analytical method is presented for the calculation of characteristic and critical values of a non-linear circuit whether pre-excited by d.c. or not, both in series and in parallel connection. Subharmonics of the circuit are investigated and a combination of connections is analysed.

J.C. Stark

ADW

⑦ 82

CENEK, J.

CENEK, J. Maximum performance of electric equipment. p. 117.
-e- Use of conducting rubber in electrical engineering. p. 118

Vol. 1, no. 4 Apr. 1956
NOVA TECHNICA
TECHNOLOGY
Czechoslovakia

So: East European Accession, Vol. 6, No. 5, May 1957

L 31423-66 GW

ACC NR: AP6022985

SOURCE CODE: CZ/0085/65/000/003/0075/0077

AUTHOR: Picha, Jaroslav; Cenek, Josef

ORG: HMU, Prague

TITLE: Total radiation on Mlesovka Mountain

SOURCE: Meteorologické zpravy, no. 3, 1965, 75-77

TOPIC TAGS: atmospheric radiation, calculation, mathematic physics

ABSTRACT: The total radiation, calculated with a modified Angstrom equation, is given for the period 1951-1960, along with the results of a comparison by means of Berlyand's equation. The ten-year average was determined from the calculated years 1951-1957 and the measured years 1958-1960. Orig. art. has: 2 figures and 5 tables. [JPRS]

SUB CODE: 04 / SUBM DATE: none / ORIG REF: 002 / SOV REF: 001
OTH REF: 002

Cord 1/1 JT

UDC: 551.521 (437.1)

CENEK, J.

CENEK, J. The voltage to ground and ground currents in industrial power distribution systems with an insulated neutral point. p. 18.

Vol. 46, no. 1, Jan. 1957

ELEKTROTECHNICKY OBZOR

TECHNOLOGY

Czechoslovakia

So: East European Accession, Vol. 6, No. 5, May 1957

Z/034/63/000/001/004/012
E073/E151

AUTHORS: Jeníček, Ladislav, and Cenek, Mojmir

TITLE: On classifying non-ferrous metal and its alloys

PERIODICAL: Hutnické listy, no.1, 1963, 48-52

TEXT: Previous suggestions for classifying metals are discussed. A general discussion in the Soviet Union resulted in the following recommendations. 1) Classification should include metals only and not semiconductors. 2) There should be as few groups as possible, and they should be distinctive and correlate the basic, primarily technological, properties of the metals. 3) It must take note of current nomenclature. 4) If intended for metal production, the system should correlate metallurgical processes used in metal production. In accordance with these recommendations there should be eight groups, as follows.
1) Commercial alloys of iron. 2) Heavy, non-ferrous metals: Cu, Ni, Co, Pb, Zn, Cd, As, Sn, Sb, Hg, Bi. 3) Light alloys: Li, K, Na, Rb, Ca, Mg, Be, Cs, Sr, Al, Ba. 4) Alloying and high-melting-point metals: Mn, Ti, V, Cr, Zr, Hf, Nb, Mo, Ta, W. 5) Precious metals: Au, Ag, Pt, Pd, Ir, Rh, Os, Ru.

Card 1/4

On classifying non-ferrous metal ... Z/034/63/000/001/004/012
E073/E151

6) Scattered metals: Sc, Ga, Se, In, Tl, Re. 7) Rare earth metals (lanthanides): La, Ce, Pr, Nd, Sm, Eu, Gd, Tb, Dy, Ho, Er, Tm, Yb, Lu. 8) Radioactive metals: Po, Ra, Ac, Th, Pa, U. The authors recommend classifying metals into groups based on their melting points, which would yield groups fitting into the periodic system (Fig.). The metals in each group would form commercially important alloys. The classification would be based on increasing melting point, as follows:

1. Low-melting metals:
 - a) alkali metals (Cs (28 °C) - Li (186 °C)),
 - b) metals IIb to Vb (Hg (-38.8 °C) - Sb (630 °C)).
 2. Light metals (Mg (651 °C) - Be (1284 °C)).
 3. Medium melting-point metals (Cu (1083 °C) - Fe (1539 °C)).
 4. Precious metals (Ag (960.8 °C) - Os (2700 °C)).
 5. High melting-point metals (Ti (1725 °C) - W (3380 °C)).
- In addition, there are two other groups.
6. Scattered metals (Sc, Y, lanthanides) (Ib (824 °C) - Lu (1650 °C)).
 7. Radioactive metals (Ra (960 °C) - Po (1800 °C)).

Card 2/4

On classifying non-ferrous metal... Z/034/63/000/001/004/012
E073/E151

It is useful to classify titanium among the high melting-point metals since difficulties in melting are greater than with platinum metals. Owing to their importance in the production of alloys, the following further groups are included;

8. Semiconductors (e.g. Si, Ge, As, Se, Te).

9. Non-metals (C, N, O, P, S).

10. Halogens (F, Cl, Br, I).

11. Rare gases (He, Ne, Ar, Kr, Xe).

Various alloy systems are discussed to demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed classification.

There is 1 figure.

Card 3/4

On classifying non-ferrous metal ...

Z/034/63/000/001/004/012
E073/E151

Fig.1

Ia	IIa	IIIa	IVa	Va	VIa	VIIa	VIIIa	IXa	Xa	1b	IIb	IIIb	IVb	Vb	VIb	VIIb	0
H		②												⑨			H ₂
Li	Be	B	⑥	⑤				③			⑧		C	N	O	F	Ne
⑩ Na	Mg	Al											Si	P	S	Cl	Ar
K	Ca	Sc	Ti	V	Cr	Mn	Fe	Co	Ni	Cu	Zn	Ga	Ge	As	Se	Br	Kr
Rb	Sr	Y	Zr	Nb	Mo	Tc	Ru	Rh	Pd	Ag	Cd	In	Sn	Sb	Te	I	Xe
Cs	Ba	La	Hf	Ta	W	Re	Os	Ir	Pt	Au	Hg	Tl	Pb	Bi			
Fr	Ra	Ac	Th	Pb	U												
			⑦						④		⑬			⑪			

Card 4/4

CENEK, M.

KRIZ, Jaroslav; HAVLICEK, Jaromir; CENEK, Milos

Injections of absolute ethyl alcohol into the spinal canal, as described by Dogliotti, to alleviate pain caused by malignant tumors of the female genitalia. Cesk. gyn. 23[37] no.5:390-392 July 53.

1. I. por. gyn/ klin. MU v Brne, prednosta prof. Dr. L. Havlasak.

J. K., I. por. gyn. klin., Brno.

(GENITALIA, FEMALE, neoplasms

incurable, pain ther. by ethyl alcohol inject. into spinal canal (Cz))

(PAIN, therapy

ethyl alcohol inject. into spinal canal for pain in incurable tumors of female genitalia (Cz))

(ALCOHOL, ETHYL, therapeutic use

pain in incurable tumors of female genitalia. (Cz))

L 10655-65 EMT(m)/ENP(b) JD

ACCESSION NR: AP4049597

Z/0031/64/012/007/0488/0490

AUTHOR: Genek, Otnar

B

TITLE: Currentless nickel plating--a way of saving cost?

SOURCE: Strojirenska vyroba, v. 12, no. 7, 1964, 488-490

TOPIC TAGS: nickel plate, plating, nickel

Abstract: Information is given on the catalytic nickel reduction from nickel lactate. Sodium hypophosphite is the reduction agent. Data are given on the preparation and maintenance of the bath, performance, equipment, and properties of the nickel layer and its practical uses, some of them in an experimental stage. Orig. art has 2 figures

ASSOCIATION: Zavody Jana Svermy, n. p., Jinonice (Jan Sverma National Enterprise)

SUBMITTED: 00

ENCL: 00

SUB CODE: MM

NO REF SOV: 000

OTHER: 000

JPRS

Card 1/1

CENEK, R.; KAZDA, J.

Blunt and gunshot wounds of the duodenum. Cas. lek. cesk. 97 no.45:
1415-1418 7 Nov 58.

1. Chirurgické oddelení okresní nemocnice v Přerově a chirurgické oddelení
vojenské nemocnice v Olomouci. R. G. Přerov Nabřeží I. máje ?.

(DUODENUM, wds. & inj.

blunt & gunshot wds. (Gz))

GINER, D.

"Test Results of the KB-6 Airplane" p. 2

"Notes on Our Air Force in the Past" p. 2

(ALRO SVET, Vol. 2, no. 30, Dec. 1952, Belograd, Yugoslavia)

SO: Monthly List of East European Accessions, LC, Vol. 3, no. 5, May 1954/Uncl.

CENER, D.

"KV-6 Matajur motor plane dedicated to our aero clubs," Narodna Krila, Beograd, Vol 6, No 2, Mar./Apr. 1953, p. 6.

SO: Eastern European Accessions List, Vol 3, No 11, Nov 1954, L.C.

CENER, D.

"Prototype of the KB-6 Matajur already in use," Narodna Krila, Geograd, Vol. 6, No 3, May/June 1953, p. 9.

SO: Eastern European Accessions List, Vol 3, No 11, Nov 1954, L.C.

CENER, Zeljko, inz. (Ljubljana)

Electronic calculating machines in transistor techniques.
Avtomatika 3 no.4:267-269 Ag '62.

GENER. Zeljko

International Exhibition of Industrial Electronics (INEL), 1963.
Automatika 5 no.2:149-150 '64.

CENICEK, Josef

Operational experience with electric elevators in mines.
Elektrotechnik 18 no.8:236 Ag '63.

1. Revisni technik vytahu, Nova hut Klementa Gttwalda,
Ostrava-Kuncice.

MARTALOGU, N.; ILIESCU, E.; CENJA, M.

Polarization of protons of 6,3 MeV elastically diffused at C^{12} .

1. Institutul de fizica atomica Bucuresti.

CENKL, Antonin; HRIB, Jan

Problems of determining the level of work organization by
methods of technical standardization. Prace mzda 12
no.10:452-458 0 '64.

1. Standardization Center of the Spojene ocelarny National
Enterprise, Kladno.

CENKL, Bohumil (Ke Karlovu 3, Praha 2)

The theory of congruences of straight lines in affine space. Cas pro
pes mat 86 no.3:331-343 '61.

1. Matematicko-fysikalni fakulta Karlovy university, Praha.

CENKL, Bohumil

Generalized Konig varieties. Chekhosl mat zhurnal 14
no.1:1-21 '64.

Equation of a space structure with projective connection.
Ibid.:79-94

1. Matematicky ustav, Karlova universita, Praha 8, Sokolovska
83.

CENKL, Bohumil

A linearizing transformation. Chekhosl mat zhurnal 14
no.4:509-526 N '64.

1. Institute of Mathematics of the Charles University, Prague
8, Sokolovska 83. Submitted on June 15, 1962.

CENKL, Bohumil

Nonlinear connections on the A_m^n variety. Cas pro pest mat
90 no.1:12-25 F '65.

On the G-structure of higher order. Ibid.:26-32

1. Faculty of Mathematics and Physics of Charles University,
Prague 8-Karlin, Sokolovska 83. Submitted January 4, 1963,
June 19, 1963.

SZYMONA, K.; CENKOW, T.P. [Tsenkov, T.P.]; BURZYNSKI, B.; FABIJANSKA, M.

Observations on nitrogen fixation in ammoniated fodder. Zesz probl
post nauk roln no.54:37-40 '64.

1. Department of Animal Feeding of the Central College of Agriculture.
Warsaw. Head of Department:[prof. dr] F. Abgarowicz (for Szymona,
Burzynski, Fabijanska). 2. Fodder Institute in Pleven, Bulgaria
(for Cenkow).

*Cenov, Iv. Vektorni funkcii na edno promenlivo nezavisno i tyahoto prilozhenie v krivite linii. [Vector Functions of One Independent Variable and Their Application to Curves]. - Bulgarska Akademiya na Naukite, Sofia, 1947. - 118 pp.

I. Geometric derivative and differential of a free vector. Geometric integral. II. Plane curves. III. Applications and examples. IV. Space curves. V. Applications and examples.

Table of contents.

Source: Mathematical Reviews.

Vol.

No.

SPM

CENSKY, Bedrich

Circulating capital of telecommunication agencies. Cs spoje 9
no.3:21-23 Je '64.

1. Central Administration of Telecommunication.

CENSKY, Milos, inz.

Experimental solution of the state of stress of a square

wall loaded by moments acting on two opposite tops by the photoelastometric method. Stav cas 12 no.9:583 '64.

Contribution to the photoelastometric examination of wall shape development. Ibid.:583

TESAR, Vaclav, prof. inz. dr. DrSc.; CENSKY, Milan, Ing. Sc.; JAVORNICKY,
Jan, inz. CSc.

Importance of the state of stress of two types of staircase panels.
Poz stavby 12 no.10:425-430 '64.

1. Czech Higher School of Technology, Prague (for Tesar). 2. Institute
of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences,
Prague, (for Censky and Javornicky).

CENTAROWICZ, H.

12
RECEIVED, J.
BUCHWALD (in caps); Given Name

Country: Poland

Academic Degrees: [Not given]

Affiliation: First Division of Internal Diseases, Municipal Hospital No 4
(I Oddzial Chorob Wewnętrznych Szpitala Miejskiego Nr 4), Warsaw;

Ordinator: W. KOSINSKI, Docent, dr. med. and Clinical Biochemistry Laboratory,
XXXXXXX Institute of Hematology (Pracownia Biochemii Klinicznej; Instytutu
Hematologii), Warsaw, Director: Prof E. KWALESKI, dr. med.

XXXXXX

Source: Warsaw, Przegląd Lekarski, No 5, 1961, pp 206-207.

Data: "Disturbances in Blood Clotting in a Case of Post-splenectomy
Thrombocytosis."

Co-authors:

CENTAROWICZ, H., Department of Internal Diseases (Oddzial Chorob Wewnętrznych
and Clinical Biochemistry Laboratory, Institute of Hematology, Warsaw
KRYKOWSKI, E.

LATALLO, E., Institute of Hematology (Instytut Hematologii), Warsaw;
Director: Docent A. TRUBANOWSKI, dr. med.
NIEWIANOWSKI, S.

CENTAROWICZ, H.
SURNAME, Given Names

Country: Poland

Academic Degrees: [not given]

Affiliation: Department of Internal Diseases (Oddzial Chorob Wewnetrznych) and Clinical Biochemistry Laboratory (Pracownia Biochemii Klinicznej), Institute of Hematology (Instytut Hematologii), Warsaw; Director: Docent A. TROJANOWSKI,
SODROX dr med
Source: Warsaw, Przegląd Lekarski, No 5, 1961, p. 218.
Data: "Some Rare Hemorrhagic Diathese."

Co-authors:

KOPEC, Maria, Department of Internal Diseases and Clinical Biochemistry Laboratory, Warsaw.

LATALLO, Z., Institute of Hematology, Warsaw

ZYWICKA, H.

KOWALSKI, E., Dr med., Head of the Department of Internal Diseases and Clinical Biochemistry Laboratory, Institute of Hematology, Warsaw;
Director: Docent A. TROJANOWSKI, dr med

GPO 981643

CENEA, Alexandra, dr.; MLADIN, Tr, dr.; GHERMAN, Gr., dr.; SOLOMON, O., dr.;
IONESCU, Domitia, dr.; ARDEVAN, A., dr.

Pulmonary tuberculosis in the gastrectomized. Med. intern. 15 no.1:
83-92 Ja '63.

1. Lucrare efectuata in Clinica de ftiziologie, I.M.F. Cluj (director:
prof. L. Daniello).
(GASTRECTOMY) (TUBERCULOSIS, PULMONARY)

GENTEA, Alexandra, dr.; GHERMAN, Gr., dr.; MURSESCU, V., dr.; LONGU, Dr., dr.

Considerations on 3 cases of association of pulmonary tuberculosis and leukemia. Med. intern. (Bucur.) 16 no.11:1377-1382 N '64

1. lucrare efectuată în Clinica de ftiziologie, Institutul medicinei farmaceutice, Cluj (directora prof. L. Daniello).

CENTEA, Alexandra, dr.; LUNGU, Tr., dr.; PETRESCU, G., dr.

Clinico-radiological aspects of bilio-bronchial fistulas.
Med. intern. (Bucur) 17 no.2:237-240 F*65.

1. Lucrare efectuata in Clinica de ftizologie, Institutul
medico-farmaceutic, Cluj (director: prof. L. Daniello).

CENFEA, O.

Experimental Determination of the Synchronous Transverse Reactance
in Synchronous Machines. Electrotehnica, (Electrical Engineering), #4:120: Apr 55

CENTEA, O.

Experimental determination of the transversal synchronous reactance of the synchronous machine II. p. 126.

ELECTROTEHNICA. (Asociatia Stintifica a inginerilor si Tehnicienilor din Romania si Ministerul Energiei Electrice si Industrii Electrotehnice)
Bucuresti, Rumania, Vol. 7 No. 4, Apr. 1959.

Monthly list of East European Accessions (EEAI) LC VOL.8, No. 9, ^{Sept.}1959.

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CENTEA, O., ing.; FORJE, Alex., ing.

Aspects of the organization of thermal treatment works
applied to assembly weldings in thermal power stations with
high operating parameters. Energetica Rum 12 no. 7:331-335
Jl '64.

CENTIA, N.

STOYKOVICH, Ye. [Stoicovici, E.]; BACHU, G. [Baciu, G.]; BEDENOYU, M.
[Bedenciu, M.]; CHENTYA, N. [Centia, N.]; KHAL'TRIKH, S. [Khal'trikh, S.]

Use of ceramic; in accelerating chambers for betatrons. Prib. i tekh.
eksp. 8 no.2:124-126 Mf-Ap '63. (MIRA 16:4)

1. Institut atomnoy fiziki Akademii nauk Rumynii.
(Betatron)

GENTKIEWICZ, Alina; GENTKIEWICZ, Czeslaw; RADVILLOVICH, K.A. [translator];
VOL'SKIY, Cheslav [translator]; ZUBOVA, N.N., redaktor;
PORCHEVSKIY, O.K., redaktor; SHAPOVALOVA, V.I., tekhnicheskii
redaktor

[Conquest of the Arctic. Translated from the Polish] Zavoevanie
Arktiki. Perevod s pol'skogo K.A.Radvillovicha i Cheslava Vol'skogo.
Pod red. N.N.Zubova. Moskva, Izd-vo inostrannoi lit-ry, 1956. 387 p.
(Arctic regions) (MLRA 9:10)

CENTKIEWICZ A. i Cz.

Bohaterski szturman (The heroic mariner) by Cz. i A. Centkiewicz.
Reported in New Books (Nowe Ksiaski), No. 7, April 1, 1956.

CENTKIEWICZ ~~1956~~, A. I. CZ.

"W lodach Eisfiordu" (Among the ice of the Eisfiord), by A. i Cz. Centkiewiczowie. Reported in New Books (Nowe Książki), No. 11, June 1, 1956.

CENTKIEWICZ, CZESZAW.

CENTKIEWICZ, CZESZAW. Aurora. Problemy, 1948, v. 6, n. 225-227.

POL.

Centkiewicz, Zdzisław, O najzimniejszych miejscach powierzchni ziemi. [On the coldest points of the earth's surface] - *Gazeta Obserwatora PIHM*, Warsaw, 4(10):4-6, Oct. 1971. DLC- Popular article explaining that the coldest points on earth are not the geographic poles as would be expected, but such places as Verkhoyansk (East Siberia) with a minimum temperature of 65°C below zero, 261 freezing days per year. Olmekon (650 km to the southeast of Verkhoyansk) with a 67°C below zero minimum temperature and Esmitte (Greenland). After some brief information on climatic conditions prevailing in these places the author deals with the vast areas which are eternally frozen and with the possibilities of their utilization. Subject Headings: 1. Extreme temperatures 2. Verkhoyansk, U.S.S.R. 3. Olmekon, U.S.S.R. 4. Esmitte, Greenland. --A. M. P.

CENTKIEWICZ, CZESIAW.

CENTKIEWICZ, CZESIAW. More about Aurora. Gazeta obserwatora FIHM. 1952, v. 5, no. 5,
p. 11-13

CENTKIEWICZ, CZESLAW.

Biala foka. Warszawa Czytelnik, 1954. 222 p. (White seal) illus.,
fold. map, glossary)

So. East European Accessions List Vol. 5, No. 1, Jan. 1956

CENTKIEWICZ, Alina; CENTKIEWICZ, Czeslaw; RADVILLOVICH, K.A. [translator];
VOL'SKIY, Cheslav [translator]; ZUBOVA, N.N., redaktor;
PORCHEVSKIY, O.K., redaktor; SHAPOVALOVA, V.I., tekhnicheskii
redaktor

[Conquest of the Arctic. Translated from the Polish] Zavoevanie
Arktiki. Perevod s pol'skogo K.A.Radvillovicha i Cheslava Vol'skogo.
Pod red. N.N.Zubova. Moskva, Izd-vo inostrannoi lit-ry, 1956. 387 p.
(Arctic regions) (MLRA 9:10)

87-130 55 503.822
Centricity Co. Nowy typ radiosondy. [New type of radiosonde.] *Przegląd Geo-*
fizyczny, Warszawa, 11(7), 81-83, 1956. 2 figs. *DLC*—A detailed description of a new type of
radiosonde produced by the Dutch firm of N. W. Philips Gloeilampenfabrik is given. The
characteristic feature of the new radiosonde is the elimination of all moving contacts. Besides
that, the conventional consecutive transmission of thermometer, hygrometer and barometer
readings has been discarded and all three meteorological elements are transmitted simultaneously
without interruption. *Subject Heading: 1. Radiosondes. A.M.P.*

W. any

CENTKIEWICZ, C.

CENTKIEWICZOWIE, A. i Cz.: W. Lodach Eisfiordu (Among the Ice of the Eisfiord).
from Nowe Ksiazki (New Books), Warsaw: Prasa i Ksiazka, No. 11, 1 Jun 56.

Country	: Rumania	H-32
Category	: Chemical Technology. Chemical Products and Their Applications--Artificial and synthetic fibers	
Abstr. Jour.	: Referat Zhur--Kain., No 11, 1959,	40903
Author	: Centola, G.	
Institut.	: Not given	
Title	: The Layered Structure of Cellulose and Its Importance in the Production of Cellulose Hydrate Fibers	
Orig Pub.	: Celuloza si Hirtie, 6, No 5, 153-160 (1957)	
Abstract	: Under the microscope the various types of treated cellulose show a plainly distinguishable laminated (layered) structure. The micelles [crystallites] attain sizes of up to 2,500 A in length with a width of 150-150 A and a thickness of about 30 A. In the preparation of cellulose xanthate the intermicellar spacing increases from 6.1 A in cellulose I or 7.4 A in cellulose II to 12.3-12.6 A in alkali cellulose and to 13.2 A in cellulose xanthate. In the formation of cellulose hydrate fibers the outer consists of micelles oriented radially to the surface of the fiber and not tangentially, as was believed previ-	

Card: 1/2

Country : Rumania
Category= :

H-32

Abstr. Jour. :

40903

Author :
Institut. :
Title :

Orig. Pub. :

Abstract : ously. The solubility of the fibers in 10% NaOH is likewise explained on the basis of the increase in the intermicellar spacing and by the decomposition of the micelles. The dehydration of the fibers leads to a reduction in the spacing and to a lowering of the solubility. The solubility of freshly extruded cellophane in 10% NaOH is 96%, dropping to 55% after washing with water; washing with methanol has practically no effect inasmuch as under these conditions the intermicellar spacing does not change. Micelle formation also takes place in high-consistency spinning solutions.

Card: 2/2

A. Pakshver

H-174

CENTOLA, G.

TECHNOLOGY

PERIODICAL: CILULOZA SI HIRTIE. Vol. 7, No. 12, Dec. 1958

CENTOLA, G. Additions to the study of the structure of textile fibers.
p. 467.

Monthly List of East European Accessions (EEAI) LC Vol. 8, No. 4
April, 1959, Unclass.

CENTOLA, G., prof.dr.

Research on the cellulose intended for highly resistant
viscose silk. Cel hirtie 10 no.9:304-308 S'61.

1. Directorul Statiunii Experimentale pentru Celuloza,
Hirtie si Fibre Textile din Milano.

DOBRE, Gh., ing.; CENUSA, C., ing.; SLIVILESCU, M., ing.

Aspects of the coal industry in Poland recorded during the
visit of a group of ~~Rumanian~~ specialists. Rev min 13
no.9:429-436 S '62.

CENUSE, C., ing.

Achievements and trends in planning new mines. Rev min 15
no. 5/6:223-227 My-Je '64.

1. Technical Director of the Institute of Mine Planning.

GENUSE, C., ing.

Development and achievements of the Institute of Mine Planning
during 14 years of activity. Rev min 15 no.8:380-382 Ag '64.

1. Technical Director, Institute of Mine Planning, Bucharest.

CENUSE, G., ing.; TOMOV, I., ing.; CENUSE, V., ing.; MELENCIUC, Vl., ing.

Methods and means of mechanized filling in underground works.
Pt.2. Rev min 15 no.7:325-329 J1 '64

CENUSE, G., ing.; TOMOV, I., ing.; CENUSE, V., ing.; MELENCIUC, Vl., ing.

Methods and means of mechanized filling in underground works.
Pt.2. Rev min 15 no.7:325-329 J1 '64

CENUSARU, FLORICA

RUMANIA / Chemical Technology, Chemical Products and Their
Application, Part 3. - Drugs, Vitamins, Anti-
biotics. H-17

Abs Jour : Ref Zhur - Khim., No 14, 1958, No 47795

Author : N. Stanciu, A. Opari, Florica Cenusaru, Marieta Vasilache.

Inst : -

Title : Utilization of Bentonite as Raw Material for Medicament
Preparation, Reprt I-a.

Orig Pub : Farmacia (Romin.). 1957, 5, No.5, 432 -441.

Abstract : The properties of local bentonites used as a raw material for
the preparation of medicaments (fillers for pills and ta-
blets) were studied. The introduction of local bentonites
into the pharmaceutical practice standardizes the methods
of work, improves the quality of many forms of medicaments
and replaces some imported preparations with domestic ones.

Card 1/1

RUMANIA/Chemical Technology. Chemical Products and Their
Application, Part 3. - Food Industry.

II

Abs Jour: Referat. Zhurnal Khimiya, No 21, 1958, 72365.

Author : Viorica Cucu, Florica Cenusaru, Elena Tarpo.

Inst :

Title : Upon the Extraction of the Vegetable Ferment from
Cynara Scolymus L. Flowers.

Orig Pub: Farmacia (Romin.), 1958, 6, No 2, 125-130.

Abstract: In order to obtain a vegetable ferment for industrial purposes, experiments with its extraction from Cynara Scolymus L. flowers were carried out by methods described in the literature, and the yields and the coagulating capacity of the preparation were determined. The best yield was obtained by extraction with 20% alcohol. The obtained vegetable ferment has a coagu-

Card : 1/2

12/

RUMANIA/Chemical Technology. Chemical Products and Their
Application, Part 3. - Food Industry.

H

Abs Jour: Referat. Zhurnal Khimiya, No 21, 1958, 72355.

lating capacity of 1 : 33,000 in reference to milk.
The optimum pH value and the time, after which the
preparation loses its activity, were established.

Card : 2/2

CENUSE, C., ing.; TOMOV, I., ing.; CENUSE, V., ing.; MELENCIUC, Vl.,
ing.

Methods and resources for mechanical packing of underground
cavities. Pt. 1. Rev min 15 no. 4:164-173 Mr '64.

GENUSE, C., ing.; TOMOV, I., ing.; GENUSE, V., ing.; MELENCIUC, Vl.,
ing.

Methods and resources for mechanical packing of underground
cavities. Pt. 1. Rev min 15 no. 4:164-173 Mr '64.

LAZARESCU, Cl., ing.; DECULESCU, Evarianta, arh.; STAMATE, S., ing.; CEFAN,
N., ing.; SEROPIAN, H., arh.

Designing out new types of furniture for combined rooms. Ind lemruui
15 no.11:431-439 N '64.

TESAREK, T.; CEPCEK, P.

Combined therapy of cancer of the breast; indications and
technics. Cesk. onkol. 1 no.2:171-178 1955.

1. Onkologicky ustav v Bratislave, Dr. T. Tesarek a Dr.
P. Cepcek, Bratislava, ul. Csl. armady 17.
(BREAST, neoplasms,
ther., combined technic)

COUNTRY : CZECHOSLOVAKIA
 Category= : General Problems of Pathology. Tumors. Experimental Therapy
 Abs. Jour. : Ref Zhur-Biol, 1959, No 4, 18307
 Author : Durkovsky, J.; Cepcek, P.; Kuzma, I.
 Institut. : ~~Oncological~~ Research Institute, Bratislava.
 Title : The Influence of Betamercaptoethylamine on Irradiated BS Tumors in Rats
 Orig. Pub. : Neoplasma, 1957, 4, No 4, 345-350
 Abstract : It is known that beta-mercaptoethylamine (BM) is an effective agent protecting the animal organism from the action of ionizing radiation. BM is used in the treatment of radiation sickness. In connection with this, a question was raised as to the possibility of a decreased effect of roentgen therapy of tumors after the use of BM. The experiments were performed on rats of the Wistar strain to which malignant hamartomas (BS tumor) were grafted subcutaneously. A few minutes
 Card: 1/4
 16

Country :
Category :

Abs. Jour. :

Author :
Institut. :
Title :

Orig Pub. :

Abstract : prior to a close distance irradiation of the tumor (250 r. per min., total dose 10,000 r.), BM was administered intraperitoneally in a dose of 2.05 mg./kg., which equals $2/3$ LD₅₀ for mice. Rapid absorption of BM provided its maximum effect during irradiation. This was manifested by a 50% decrease in the number of animals with complete regression of the tumor and in earlier recurrence of relapses in the cases with partial regression. However, the authors believe that

Card: 2/4

Country :
Category= :

Abs. Jour. :

Author :
Institut. :
Title :

Orig. Pub. :

Abstract : these results cannot contraindicate the use of
BM in clinical practice for the following rea-
sons: (1) the dosage of BM used experimentally
is considerably greater than its therapeutic
dose calculated according to the weight of the
human body; (2) to eliminate all symptoms of ra-
diation sickness, from one to three doses of BM
are required, and therefore when the fractional
method of irradiation of tumors is used its ef-
fectiveness is lowered by more than can be

Card: 3/4

17

Country :
Category :

Abs. Jour. :

Author :
Institut. :
Title :

Orig Pub. :

Abstract : achieved during three sittings; this cannot be of great importance as far as the final results of roentgen therapy are concerned; (3) the effects of BM against radiation sickness are fully maintained if it is administered after the roentgen irradiation, when the possibility of its effect upon the sensitivity of the tumor to X-ray therapy is already eliminated.-- F. L. Mayzil'

Card: 4/4

DURKOVSKY, J.; CEPCEK, P.

Treatment of recurrent gynecological carcinoma with rotation
roentgen therapy. Bratisl. lek. listy 41 no.10:599-606 '61.

1. Z radiologickeho oddelenia Vyskumneho ustavu onkologickeho v
Bratislave, prednosta MUDr. J. Durkovsky.

(UTERUS NEOPLASMS radiother)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CEPCEK, P; KRAJCI, M.

1. Radiological Chair SUDL (Radiologicka katedra SUDL), Bratislava; 2. Research Institute of Oncology (Vyskumny ustav onkologicky), Bratislava

Bratislava, Lekarsky obzor, No 8, 1963, pp 475-478

"Precanceroses from the Viewpoint of Early Cancer
Diagnosis- A Contribution to the Problem."

COUNTRY	: CZECHOSLOVAKIA	E
CATEGORY	: Analytical Chemistry. Analysis of Organic Substances	
ABS. JOUR.	: RZKhim., No. 1 1960, No. 891	
AUTHOR	: Cepciansky, I.; Chromcova, L.	
INST.	: -	
TITLE	: Determination of Nitrogen in Some Heterocyclic Compounds	
ORIG. PUB.	: Chem. prumysl, 1959, 9, No 4, 188-190	
ABSTRACT	: To determine N in benztriazole and its derivatives, a modification of Kjeldahl's method is proposed. In 100 ml of a mixture of 96% H_2SO_4 and 65% H_3PO_4 (3:1 by volume), 1 g of $CuSO_4 \cdot 5H_2O$ is dissolved and, in another 100 ml of the same mixture, 1 g of Se. The solutions are mixed in the cold and the substance is mineralized with the obtained mixture (for 0.1-0.15 g of substance, 15-22 ml of mixture),	
CARD:	1/3	

COUNTRY : E
CATEGORY :
ABS. JOUR. : RZKhim., No. 1 1960, No.891
AUTHOR :
INST. :
TITLE :
ORIG. PUB. :
ABSTRACT : whereupon N₂ is liberated and the quantity of
cont'd NH₃, determined by titration, corresponds to
one-third of the over-all N content. It was
assumed that 1-phenylbenztriazole first forms
N₂ and carbazole, and that the latter under-
goes mineralization. Isatin, its 4-chloro-7-
methyl and 4-bromo-7-methyl derivatives,
2-phenylcinchoninic acid and carbazole give
satisfactory results. Incorrect results were
CARD: 2/3
E-22

COUNTRY	:		E
CATEGORY	:		
ABS. JOUR.	:	RZKhim., No. 1	1960, No. 891
AUTHOR	:		
INST.	:		
TITLE	:		
ORIG. PUB.	:		
ABSTRACT	:	obtained for 2-phenyl-5-bromo-8-methylquino-	
cont'd	:	lino - 4-carbonic acid.-- N. Turkevich	

CARD: 3/3

CEPEK, J.

"Making Narrow-row Drills with Our Own Resources", P. 45, (MECHANICKE
ZEMEDELSTVI, Vol. 4, No. 3, February 1954, Praha, Czech.)

SO: Monthly List of East European Accessions (REAL), IC, Vol. 4, No. 3,
March 1955, Uncl.

CEFEK, J.

Kuklensy Machine-Tractor Station helps to mechanize livestock production. p. 31.
MECHANISACE ZEMEDELSTVI. Vol. 5, No. 2, Jan. 1955

SO: Monthly East European Accession, (EEAL), LC, Vol. 4, No. 9, Sept. 1955 Uncl.

CEFEK, J.

Some experiences in testing the DMJ and DT-1 milking machines. p. 136
(Mechanisace Zemedelstvi Vol. 7, no. 6, Mar. 1957 Praha)

SO: Monthly List of East European Accession (MEAL) 13, Vol. 6, no. 7, July 1957. Uncl.

CEPEK, L. - Vol. 4, no. 2, Feb. 1954. ZA SOCIALISTICKOU VEDU A TECHNIKU

Problem of constructing an electric power plant in Czechoslovakia. p. 74.

SO: Monthly list of East European Accessions, (EEAL), LC, Vol. 4, No. 9, Sept. 1955
Uncl.

Cepak, L.

3rd General Assemble of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. P. 234
VESTNIK. (Vol,29, No. 5, 1954)

SO: Monthly List of East European Accession, (EEAL), LC, Vol. 4, No. 9, Sept. 1955

CEPEK, Ladislav

Scientific societies, national committees, and international
scientific organizations. Vestnik CSAV 72 no.5:574-581 '63

1. Corresponding member of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences.

CEPEK, Ladislav

Variscan structure of the Ostrava-Karvina coalfield.
Vest Ust geol 39 no. 1: 7-11 '64.

1. Ustredni ustav geologicky, Praha.

L 3049-66 EWA(d)/T/EED-2/ERD(b)-3

ACCESSION NR: AP5026468

CZ/0002/65/000/002/0257/0258

AUTHOR: Capek, Ladislav (Corresponding member CSAV)

24
B

TITLE: Two great maps finished

SOURCE: Ceskoslovenska akademie ved. Vestnik, no. 2, 1965, 257-258

TOPIC TAGS: cartography, map, geology, military geography
44.5512, 20

ABSTRACT: The article describes the publishing of the Czechoslovak Military Geographical World Atlas and of the General Geological Map of Czechoslovakia.

ASSOCIATION: none

SUBMITTED: 00

ENCL: 00

SUB CODE: ES, MS

NR REF SOV: 000

OTHER: 000

JPRS

Beh
Card 1/1

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

SEPEK, L.

Prague, Casopis pro mineralogii a geologii, No 1, 1965, pp 1-
9

"Our Geology up to the Twentieth Anniversary of the Liberation."

CEPEK, O.

Transportation in Switzerland. p.72. (Zeleznicar. Praha, No. 3, Mar. 1957.)

SO: Monthly List of East European Accessions (EEAL) LC., Vol. 6, no. 7, July 1957. Uncl.

CEPEK, O.

"Railroad transportation in the Soviet Union."

p. 324 (Zeleznicar) Vol. 7, no. 12, Dec. 1957
Prague, Czechoslovakia

SO: Monthly Index of East. European Accessions (EEAI) LC. Vol. 7, no. 4
April 1958

CEPEK, O.

Transportation in Rumania. p.128.
(Zeleznicar, No. 5, May 1957, Praha, Czechoslovakia)

SO: Monthly List of East European Accessions (EEAL) LC. Vol. 6, No. 9, Sept. 1957. Uncl.

CEPEK, O.

TECHNOLOGY

Periodical: ZELEZNICAR. No. 12, Dec. 1958.

CEPEK, O. At the crossroads of three continents. p. 276.

Monthly List of East European Accession (EEAI) LC, Vol. 8, no. 3
March 1959 Unclass.

CEPEK, Pavel

Meeting of the 8th European Micropaleontological Colloquium and
the Congress of the Paleontological Society in Vienna. Cas min
geol 9 no.3:377-379 '64.

1. Geological Institute, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague.

CEPEK, Petr

"Principles of the tectonics of China." Reviewed by Petr
Cepek. Cas min geol 9 no.4:412 '64.

"Materials on the geology of the Mongolian People's Republic"
edited by N.A. Marinov. Vol.1. Reviewed by Petr Cepek. ibid.:
470

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CEPEK, P.

Geological Institute CSAV, (Geologický ústav CSAV), Prague

Prague, Casopis pro mineralogii a geologii, No 3, 1964, pp 377-379

"Session of the Eighth European Micropaleontological Colloquium and the Congress of the Paleontological Society in Vienna."

CEPEK, V.; Crha, M.

Photoelastic investigation of rail sections of the T and A shape. p. 267

INZENYRSKE STAVBY. (Ministerstvo stavebnictvi) Praha, Czechoslovakia.
Vol. 7, no. 7, July 1959

Monthly List of East European Accessions (EEAI) LC Vol. 8, no. 11, Nov. 1959
Uncl.

KELETI, T.

Comparative studies on crystalline alcohol dehydrogenase isolated from baker's yeast and brewer's yeast. Acta physiol. hung. 13 no.2: 103-116 1958.

1. Institute of Biochemistry, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest.

(DEHYDROGENASES

alcohol dehydrogenases, different properties of dehydrogenases crystallized from baker's & Brewer's yeasts)

(SACCHAROMYCES CEREVISIAE, metab.
same)

KELETI, T.

Studies on the autolysis of Lebedew's juices. Acta physiol. hung. 13
no.2:117-124 1958.

1. Biochemisches institut der ungarischen akademie der wissenschafte,
Budapest.

(ENZYMES

Lebedew's juices, inactivation by self-digestion (Ger))

(YEASTS

same)

KELETI, T.

Studies on the reduction of alloxan and the oxidation of dialuric acid in the presence of alcohol dehydrogenase. Acta physiol. hung. 13 no.3: 243-248 1958.

1. Biochemical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest.
(ALLOXAN, metabolism
reduction to dialuric acid in presence of alcohol dehydrogenase,
measurement of reaction)
(DEHYDROGENASES,
alcohol dehydrogenase, catalysis of alloxan reduction to
dialuric acid, measurement of reaction)

KELTI, T.

The role of the -SH groups of yeast alcohol dehydrogenase in the oxidation of different substrates. Acta physiol. hung. 13 no.4:309-316 1958.

1. Biochemical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest.

(DEHYDROGENASES,

alcohol dehydrogenase from yeast, role of sulfhydryl groups in oxidation of different substrates)

(SULFHYDRYL COMPOUNDS,

sulfhydryl groups in yeast alcohol dehydrogenase, role in oxidation of different substrates)

KELETI, T.; TELESDI, M.

Comparative studies on D-glyceraldehyde-3-phosphate dehydrogenases
IX. Effect of phosphate ion on the oxidation of D-glyceraldehyde-
3-phosphate. Acta physiol.hung. 16 no.4:235-241 '59.

1. Biochemical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences,
Budapest.

(DEHYDROGENASES metabolism)

(PHOSPHATES pharmacol.)

(GLYCERALDEHYDE metab.)

KELETI, T.; TELEGI, M.

Comparative studies on D-glyceraldehyde-3-phosphate dehydrogenases.
X. studies on the mechanism of action of the enzyme. Acta physiol.
hung. 16 no.4:243-255 '59.

1. Biochemical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences,
Budapest.

(DEHYDROGENASES metab.)

(PHOSPHATES pharmacol.)

KELETI, T.; TELEGYI, M.

Comparative studies on d-Glyceraldehyde-3-Phosphate Dehydrogenases.
Acta physiol. hung. 15 no.4:281-290 1959

1. Biochemical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences,
Budapest.

(DEHYDROGENASES, chem.)
(ZINC, chemistry)

DEVENYI, Tibor; ELODI, Pal; KELETI, Tamas; SZABOLCSI, Laszlo

Some questions of the relationship between the chemical structure
and biological function of proteins. Biol kozl 8 no.1:3-18
'60.

1. Magyar Tudomanyos Akademia Biokemiai Intezete, Budapest.

*

KELETI, T.; TELEGDI, Marianna.

Studies on D-glyceraldehyde-3-phosphate-dehydrogenase. XI. Adenosine triphosphate - inosine monophosphate transphosphorylase reaction catalyzed by D-glyceraldehyde-3-phosphate dehydrogenase. Acta physiol.hung 17 no.2:141-141 '60.

1. Institute of Biochemistry of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest.

(DEHYDROGENASES chem.)

BOROSS, L.; KELETI, T.; TELEGDI, Marianna

Studies on D-glyceraldehyde-e-phosphate dehydrogenase. XII. Studies of the enzyme with ion exchange chromatography. Acta physiol.hung 17 no.2:153-159 '60.

1. Institute of Biochemistry of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest.

(DEHYDROGENASES chem.)

DEVENYI, T.; KELETI, T.; SZORENYI, Bronislava; SAJGO, M.

Studies on D-glyceraldehyde-3-phosphate dehydrogenases. XVIII.
The lipid component of the enzyme. Acta physiol. hung. 18 no.4:
271-274 '61.

1. Institute of Biochemistry, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest.

(DEHYDROGENASES chem) (LIPIDS chem)

KELETI, T.

The action of anticancer chemotherapeutics on some crystalline enzymes. Neoplasma 8 no.5:487-494 '61.

1. Oncopathological Research Institute, Budapest, Hungary.
(ANTINEOPLASTIC AGENTS pharmacol)
(ENZYMES chem)

KELETI, T.; GYORGYI, S.; TELEGDI, Marianna; ZALUSKA, Halina

Studies on d-glyceraldehyde-3-phosphate dehydrogenases. XIX. The role of the Zn-ions of the enzyme. Acta physiol. acad. sci. hung. 22 no.1:11-19 '62.

1. Institute of Biochemistry, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and
Institute of Medical Physics, Medical University Budapest.
(DEHYDROGENASES) (ZINC)

KELETI, Tamas

Analysis of the mechanism of enzyme inhibitions. Biol kozl 12
no.1:5-9 '64.

1. Institute of Biochemistry of the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences, Budapest. Director: Academician Dr. Bruno F. Straub.

L 1988-66 EWA(j)/EWA(b)-2 RM

ACCESSION NR: AT5024296

HU/2505/64/025/002/0181/0189

AUTHOR: Telegdi, Marianna; Keleti, Tamas

TITLE: Role played by sulfhydryl groups in the activity of alpha-glycerophosphate dehydrogenase (L-glycerol-3-phosphate: NAD oxidoreductase 1.1.1.8)

SOURCE: Academia scientiarum hungaricae. Acta physiologica, v. 25, no. 2, 1964, 181-189

TOPIC TAGS: biochemistry, rabbit, muscle physiology, myology, enzyme, organic phosphorus compound

ABSTRACT: [English article, authors' English summary modified] The α -glycerophosphate dehydrogenase isolated from rabbit muscle contains 9-11 SH groups per molecule of protein. When the SH groups are blocked by PCMB, the reaction catalyzed by the enzyme is inhibited in both directions. For complete inactivation, 6-7 SH groups must be blocked. The inhibition of the enzymatic activity is caused by the blocking of the SH groups, it is instantaneous and can be reversed by cysteine. This process is followed by the al-

Card 1/2

L 1988-66

ACCESSION NR: AT5024296

9

teration of the steric structure, a time consuming reaction which can only partly be reversed by cysteine and which results in a decreased ability of reactivation. Under certain conditions, the enzyme can undergo spontaneous inactivation accompanied by the disappearance of some of its free, titratable SH groups. This inactivation can not be reversed by cysteine.

^{44,55}
"We are indebted to Prof. F. B. Straub for valuable suggestions and to Mrs. M. Szegvari for skillful technical assistance." Orig. art. has: 3 graphs, 2 tables.

^{44,55}
ASSOCIATION: Institute of Biochemistry, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest

SUBMITTED: 00

ENCL: 00

^{44,55} SUB CODE: LS

NR REF SOV: 002

OTHER: 007

JPRS

Card 2/2 JP

BOROSS, L.; KELETI, T.

~~Stability of the ternary complex with Ag ion of D-glyceraldehyde-~~
3-phosphate dehydrogenase. Acta physiol. acad. sci. Hung. 27
no.4:397-400 '65.

1. Institute of Biochemistry, Hungarian Academy of Sciences,
Budapest.

KELETI, T.

The kinetics of the reactions catalyzed by D-glyceraldehyde-3-phosphate dehydrogenase. Part 1. Acta physiol. acad. sci. Hung. 28 no.1:19-29 '65.

1. Institute of Biochemistry, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest. Submitted October 19, 1964.

KELETI, T.; BATKE, J.

The kinetics of the reactions catalyzed by d-glyceraldehyde-3-phosphate dehydrogenase. Part 2. Acta physiol. acad. sci. Hung. 28 no.3:195-207 ' 65.

1. Institute of Biochemistry, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest. Submitted December 2, 1964.

L 33789-66

ACC NR: AT6025177

SOURCE CODE: HU/2505/65/028/001/0019/0029

AUTHOR: Leleci, Tamas (Budapest)

ORG: Institute of Biochemistry, MTA, Budapest (MTA, Biokemiai. Intezet)

TITLE: Kinetics of the reactions catalyzed by D-glyceraldehyde-3-phosphate dehydrogenase. I. Kinetics of D-glyceraldehyde oxidation

SOURCE: Academia scientiarum hungaricae. Acta physiologica, v. 28, no. 1, 1965, 19-29

TOPIC TAGS: chemical kinetics, enzyme, oxidation kinetics, biochemistry

ABSTRACT: A theoretical analysis of the general mechanism of an enzymatic reaction, with three substrates in the forward and two substrates in the reverse direction, is presented. The kinetic constants of the basic steps of D-glyceraldehyde oxidation have been measured. The kinetics of D-glyceraldehyde oxidation in the forward direction is satisfactorily described by suggestion of a random binding mechanism having, as rate determining step, the intramolecular transformation of the quaternary complex. The author thanks Mrs. M. Nuridsany and M. Szegvari for valuable technical assistance and Miss E. Ceske, Mr. J. Batke and Dr. M. Sajgo for helpful discussions concerning the theoretical part. Orig. art. has: 6 figures and 2 tables. /Orig. art. in Eng./ /JPRS: 33,500/

SUB CODE: 06, 07 / SUBM DATE: 19Oct64 / ORIG REF: 005 / OTH REF: 008 / SOV REF: 001

Cord 1/1

L 31088-66

ACC NR: AT6022815

SOURCE CODE: HU/2505/65/028/003/0195/0207

AUTHOR: Keleti, Tamas; Batke, Jozsef--Batke, Y.

45

ORG: Institute of Biochemistry, MTA, Budapest (Magyar Tudomanyos Akademia, Biokemiai Intezet)

B+1

TITLE: Kinetics of the reactions catalyzed by D-glyceraldehyde-3-phosphate dehydrogenase II. Kinetics of D-glyceraldehyde-3-phosphate oxidation

SOURCE: Academia scientiarum hungaricae. Acta physiologica, v. 28, no. 3, 1965 195-207

TOPIC TAGS: chemical kinetics, catalysis, oxidation, enzyme, biochemistry

ABSTRACT: The oxidation of D-glyceraldehyde-3-phosphate, catalyzed by D-glyceraldehyde-3-phosphate dehydrogenase in the presence of phosphate, may, in theory, take place according to the general mechanism, or according to various compulsory (ordered) mechanisms in cases where it is assumed that oxidation precedes phosphorolysis. The kinetic equations of such mechanisms and the method of the measurement of kinetic constants have been worked out theoretically. On the basis of the constants measured it has been established that under the conditions used for the present study: 1) there is a mutual influence between substrates in their binding to the enzyme and 2) the kinetics of the reaction can be described satisfactorily by a compulsory (ordered) mechanism. The authors are indebted to Mrs. M. Nuridsany for valuable technical assistance and to Mrs. E. Cseke and Dr. M. Sajgo for their participation in the elaboration and discussion of the theoretical part. Orig. art. has: 3 figures and 4 tables. [Orig. art. in Eng.] [JPRS]

SUB CODE: 06, 07 / SUBM DATE: 02Dec64 / ORIG REF: 006 / OTH REF: 006

Card 1/1 CC

0915

0795

KELETI, Y.; KAJCENSKI, P.

Nitrates in drinking water and their role in the etiology of
toxic cyanosis in infants. Gig. i san. 24 no.8:65-67 Ag '59.
(MIRA 12:11)

1. Iz kafedry gigiyeny meditsinskogo fakul'teta Universiteta
Komenskogo v Bratislave i II pediatricheskoy kliniki v Bratislave.
(METHEMOGLOBINEMIA. in infancy & childhood)
(NITRATES, effects, injurious)
(WATER SUPPLY)

CA 1-12-11 1-1-14 50

Regeneration of vulcanized rubber. Wolfner Gyula és Társa Gumigyár R. T. and Zoltán Keleti. Hung. 135,618, August 10, 1949. The vulcanized rubber is heated indirectly by means of a bath of an alloy m. above 200°, preferably just at the depolymerization temp. of rubber. The container and also the rubber wastes are kept in continuous motion during the treatment. Structural details. István Fényes

KELETI, Zoltan

New results in the processing of PVC. Musz elet 16 no.8:3 Ap '61.
(EEAI 10:9)

(Chloroethylene) (Polymers and polymerization)

KELEYNIKOV, A. A.

"Ecology of House and Field Sparrows as Mass Pests of Grain Crops
in the Southern Rayons of the USSR." Cond Biol Sci, Moscow State U,
Moscow, 1953. (RZhBiol, No 1, Sep 54)

SO: Sum 432, 29 Mar 55

KELEYNIKOV, A.A.

Data for the quantitative census of birds in the Volga-Ural desert.
Biol.MOIP Otd.biol. 58 no. 40-43 '53. (MLRA 6:6)
(Volga Valley--Birds) (Ural River Valley--Birds)

TERSKIKH, I.I.; CHEL'TSOV-BEBUTOV, A.M.; KUBORINA, L.N.; KELEYNIKOVA, A.A.

Studies on ornithosis in birds and its focal distribution. Vol.
virus. 6 no.2:131-135 Mr-Apr '61. (MIRA 14:6)

1. Institut virusologii imeni D.I.Ivanovskogo AMN SSSR, Moskva.
(ORNITHOSIS)

КРЕМЛЕВ, А. А., инж.

Increasing the voltage of electric lamps is not expedient. Energetik.
13 no. 7:41-42 J1 '65. (MIRA 18:8)

I. Saranskly elektrolampovyy zavod.

NECHIPORENKO, A. A.; KELEYNIKOV, Ye. T.

Mechanized feeding of formalin. Spirt. prom. 29 no.3:18-21 '63.
(MIRA 16:4)

1. Michurinskiy eksperimental'nyy spirtovoy zavod Vsesoyuznogo
nauchno-issledovatel'skogo instituta fermentnoy i spirtovoy
promyshlennosti.

(Formaldehyde)

(Fermentation—Equipment and supplies)

KELEYNIKOV, Yu.Ya., polkovnik, voyennyy letchik pervogo klassa; SOKOLOV, V.D.,
podpolkovnik; STEPANENKO, P.I., mayor; REBROV, M.F., inzh.-kapitan;
PEL'KIN, V.P., starshiy leytenant, voyennyy letchik vtorogo klassa

Flight day. Vest.Vodz.Fl. no.12:1-20 D '60.
(Flight training)

(MIRA 14:5)

KELEYNIKOVA, S.I.

Larvae of darkling beetles of the tribe Tentyriini. Zool.zhur.
38 no.12:1835-1843 D '59. (MIRA 13:5)

1. Zoological Museum of Moscow State University.
(Darkling beetles) (Larvae--Insects)

KELEYNIKOVA, S.I.

Larvae of darkling beetles of the subfamily Pimeliinae
(Coleoptera, Tenebrionidae) from western Kazakhstan. Ent.
oboz. 40 no.2:371-348 '61. (MIRA 14:6)

1. Zoologicheskiy muzey Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta,
Moskva.

(Kazakhstan--Darkling beetles)
(Larvae--Insects)

KELEYNIKOVA, S.I.

Larva of *Cyphogenia aurita* Pall. (Tenebrionidae, Coleoptera).
Zool. zhur. 40 no.5:776-777 '61. (MIRA 14:50)

1. Zoological Museum, State University of Moscow.
(West Kazakhstan Province—Darkling beetles)
(Larvae—Insects)

KELEYNIKOVA, S.I.

Larvae of the tribe Erodini (Coleoptera, Tenebrionidae). Zool.
zhur. 41 no.3:459-463 Mr '62. (MIRA 15:3)

1. Zoological Museum of the State University of Moscow.
(Darkling beetles)

KELEYNIKOVA, S.I.

Studying the larvae of the tribe Akidini (Coleoptera, Tenebrionidae).
Sbor. trud. Zool. muz. MGU 8:151-157 '61. (MIRA 15:5)
(Darkling beetles)

KELEYNIKOVA, S.I.

Studying the larvae of the subfamily Opatrinae (Coleoptera,
Tenebrionidae) of western Kazakhstan. Sbor. trud. Zool. muz.
MGU 8:159-164 '61. (MIRA 15:5)
(Kazakhstan—Darkling beetles)

KELEYNIKOVA, S.I.

Larval types of darkling beetles (Coleoptera, Tenebrionidae)
in the Palaearctic. Ent. oboz. 42 no.3:539-549 '63.

(MIRA 17:1)

1. Zoologicheskii muzey Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta,
Moskva.

KELEYNIKOVA, S.I.

A new genus and species of the tribe Tentyriini (Coleoptera,
Tenebrionidae) from Kirghizistan. Zool. zhur. 42 no.4:622-623
'63. (MIRA 16:7)

1. Zoological Museum, The State University of Moscow.
(Issyk-Kul' region—Darkling beetles)

KEI'GINBAYEV, N.S., dotsent

Brief outline of the history of the study of cardiac glycosides.
Sbor.nauch.trud.TashGMI 22:384-392 '62.

(MIRA 18:10)

1. Kafedra gospi'tal'noy terapii sanitarnogo i pediatricheskogo
fakul'teta (zav. - prof. O.N.Pavlova) Kafedra farmakologii (zav.
kafedroy - prof. N.N.Kompantsev) Tashkentakogo gosudarstvennogo
meditsinskogo instituta i laboratorii klinicheskoy farmakoterapii
instituta Krayevoy eksperimental'noy terapii AN UzSSR.

KEI.'G'NBAYEV, N.S., dotsent

Clinical study of glycosides derived from the seeds of *Corchorus olitorius*. Sbor.nauch.trud.TashGMI 22:402-410 '62.

(MIRA 18:10)

1. Kafedra gospi'tal'noy teranii sanitarnogo i pediatricheskogo fakul'tetov (sav. kafedroy - prof. O.N.Pavlova); kafedra farmakologii (sav. - prof. I.N.Kompantsev) Tashkentskogo gosudarstvennogo meditsinskogo instituta i laboratoriya klinicheskoy farmakoterapii Instituta krayevoy eksperimental'noy meditsiny AN UzSSR.

FATKH ULLAYEV, I.; KEL'GINRAYEV, N.S.

Effect of oliteriside on the prothrombin index and the
duration of hemorrhages. Trudy Inst. kraev. eksper. med.
no.5:192-193 '63. (MIRA 17:6)

KEL'GINBAYEV, N.S.

Strophanthin K, obtained for the first time from Soviet raw materials. Kardiologiya 1 no.2:72-76 Mr-Apr '61. (MIRA 15:1)

1. Zaveduyushchiy laboratoriyey klinicheskoy farmakoterapii Instituta krayevoy meditsiny AN Uzbekskoy SSR (dir. - doktor med.nauk G.G.Makhkamov).

(STROPHANTHIN)

KEL'GINBAYEV, N.S.

Results of clinical testing of new native glycosides isolated
from local plants. Trudy Inst. kraev. eksper. med. no.4:88-92
162. (CARDIAC GLYCOSIDES) (MIRA 16:6)

KEL'GINBAYEV, N.S.; SALIKHOV, S.Sh.

Etiology, clinical aspect and treatment of circulation
insufficiency by means of cardiac glycosides. Trudy Inst.
krov. eksper. med. no.5:147-157 '63. (MIRA 17:6)

KEL'GINBAYEV, N.S.; FATKHULLAYEV, I.

Some pharmacological data on Russian strophanthin K.
Trudy Inst. kraev. eksper. med. no.5:158-160 '63.

Myotropic effect of new cardiac glycosides. Trudy Inst.
kraev. eksper. med. no.5:161-163 '63. (MIRA 17:6)

KAMILOV, M.K., dotsent; KEL'GINBAYEVA, L.V.

Results of diathermocoagulation of the sclera in the region of the ciliary body by V.N. Arkhangel'skii's method as modified in the Clinic of Eye Diseases of the Tashkent Institute for the Improvement of Physicians. Vest. oft. 76 no.5:64-67 S-0 '63.
(MIRA 17:1)

1. Zaveduyushchiy kafedroy glaznykh bolezney Tashkentskogo instituta usovershenstvovaniya vrachey (for Kamilov).

KELEZ, I.

Yugoslavia (430)

Technology

Standards for glass tubes. p. 45; Yugoslav
standards. p. 49, STANDARDIZACIJA, Vol 1, No 2,
Sept 1950.

East European Accessions List. Library of Congress,
Vol 1, No 14, December 1952.

UNCLASSIFIED

REPORT OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

2004/5/28

Debus, J. and J. K. Stille, *in* *Organic Chemistry of the Transition Metals*, Vol. 1, Interscience, New York, 1967, p. 1.

electronics in today's industrial environment. The book is published by Industrial Electronics Press. It was written by the author of the book, August 6-11, 1966. The book is published by Industrial Electronics Press, 1966. 230 p. No. of copies printed not given. No contributors mentioned.

REMARKS: This collection of reports promises "the use of electric and electronic devices in modernizing industrial plants. It is intended for management and technical personnel of Yugoslav industry."

[illegible]

WILLIS TOWERS WATSON

Balkovskiy, Vladimir. Doctor, Docent, Department of Electrical Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Leningrad University. Researches in the Field of Reliability of Components and Equipment for Automation of Industrial Processes.

and also describes the principles of measuring devices used in various industrial processes. There are 7 references; 6 German and one English.

The author describes characteristic features of rear equipment from World War II to the present. There are 5 references: 2 English and 3 Russian.

The authors describe straight and curved antennas, and

many modulation receivers, radio telegraph and telephone transmitters, and frequency modulation transmitters. There are 7 references: 6 English and 1 Soviet.

Colin, Raman, Engineers, Electrical Engineering Department, Texas University. The book is Radio-Frequency Heating Systems. The author describes principles of inductive heating, its application, and necessary equipment.

Application of Ultrasonics in Refining Bard Metals
The author describes the principles of using ultrasonics in refining Bard Metals.

methods for machining hard metals. Some examples of the process are given. There are 4 references; 2 German, 1 Soviet, and 1 English.

See 170 Engineering, Vlado Night Plant, Zadar. Plastics Utilized in Electronics
The author describes the utilization of plastics in electronics and the types and characteristic features of plastics used in electronics. There are 4 references: 3 English and 1 German.

Rodriguez, Ricardo. Application of Electronic Automatic Control in Induction Welding Machines. The author describes principles and application of the welding process. There are 9 references; 4 English, 5 German, and 2 French.

KELGA, V.

The truncated Maxwell distribution p. 243

(Institute of Virology - Czechoslovak Academy of Science) Vol. 2, No. 4, 1957

SO: Monthly Index of East European Accessions (EEAI) LC, Vol. 7, No. 5 May 1958

KAMILOV, M.K.; ~~KELIGINBAYEVA, L.V.~~

Report on the work of the Ophthalmological Society of Uzbekistan
for 1959. M. hur. Uzb. no.8:81-82 Ag '60. (MIRA 13:9)
(UZBEKISTAN--OPHTHALMOLOGICAL SOCIETIES)

KELIANOVSKI, Jan, prof. dr [Kielanowski, Jan, prof. dr]

Introductory remarks. Kesz probl post nauk roln no.43:5-7 '63.

1. Corresponding Member of the Polish Academy of Sciences and
Corresponding Member of the German Academy of Agricultural Sciences,
Institute of Animal Physiology and Feeding, Jablonna near Warsaw.

KOTARBIN'SKA, Maria, dr [Kotarbinska, Maria, dr]; KELLANOVSKI, Jan, prof.
[Kielanowski, Jan, prof.]

Regulation of energy and protein in meat fattening of swine. Zesz
probl post nauk roln no.43:13-42 '63.

1. Institute of Animal Physiology and Feeding, Jablonna near Warsaw.

KELIARSKII, M.; KULICHEV, A.

KELIARSKII, M.; KULICHEV, A. Improved PD-10 starting motor. Tr. from the Russian.
p. 76.

Vol. 6, no. 4, Feb. 1956
MACHANISACE ZEMEDELSTVI
AGRICULTURE
Czechoslovakia

So: East European Accession, Vol. 6, No. 5, May 1957

BREZHNEV, M.; KELIM, B., inzh.

High-speed irreversible engines for inland navigation ships.
Rech.transp 21 no.4:19-23 Ap '62. (MIRA 15:4)

1. Glavnyy konstruktor Tsentral'nogo tekhniko-konstruktorskogo
byuro Ministerstva rechnogo flota.
(Marine diesel engines) (Inland navigation)

BASIN, A.M., doktor tekhn.nauk prof.; KILIM, B.I., inzh.

Work of a propeller under a free water surface in a canal.
Trudy TSNIIRF no.39:21-41 '59. (MIRA 13:4)
(Propellers)

KOCHUBIYEVSKIY, Il'ya Davidovich; STRAZHMEYSTER, Valentin Aleksandrovich;
KELIM, Yu.M., red.; FRIDKIN, L.M., tekhn.red.

[Devices for measuring mismatch in servosystems] Izmeriteli ras-
soglasovaniia slediashchikh sistem. Moskva, Gosenergoizdat,
1963. 79 p. (Biblioteka po avtomatiko, no.86) (MIRA 17:3)

CHERNYSHEV, Valeriy Olegovich; VARLEY, V.V., inzh., retsenzent;
KELIM, Yu.M., inzh., red.

[Rotary transformers and their use in computers and
automatic systems] Povorotnye transformatory i ikh pri-
menenie v vychislitel'nykh i avtomaticheskikh ustroi-
stvakh. Moskva, Energiia, 1965. 103 p. (Biblioteka po
avtomatike, no.127) (MIRA 18:4)

KAZANSKIY, Vasilii Mikhaylovich; OSNOVICH, Leonid Davidovich;
~~AKELIM~~, Yu.M., red.

[Low-torque d.c. motors with printed armature windings]
Maloinertsionnye elektrodvigateli postoiannogo toka s
pechatnoi obmotkoi na iskore. Moskva, Energiia, 1965.
95 p. (Biblioteka po avtomatike, no.142) (MIRA 18:8)

L 5311-66 EWT(d)/ENP(1) LJP(c) BC

ACC NR: AP5025695

SOURCE CODE: UR/0286/65/000/018/0043/0044

INVENTOR: Svecharnik, D. V.; Rotinyan, M. I.; Shidlovich, L. Kh.; Pavlenko, V. A.;
Kelim, Yu. M.

ORG: none

TITLE: Servosystem driven with d-c signals [Announced by the Scientific Research
Institute of Heat- and Power-Engineering Equipment, (Nauchno-issledovatel'skiy institut
teploenergeticheskogo priborostroyeniya). Class 21, No. 174687

SOURCE: Byulleten' izobreteniy i tovarnykh znakov, no. 18, 1965, 43-44

TOPIC TAGS: signal processing, signal analysis, data processing equipment

ABSTRACT: This Author Certificate introduces a servosystem driven with d-c signals
(see figure). For simplicity and improved reliability, the stator winding of the




Fig. 1. Signal converter

1 - Push-pull magnetic modulator;
2 - a-c power amplifier; 3 - re-
versible motor; 4 - feedback pickup.

Card 1/2

UDC: 62-503.53
62-523.2

09010784

ACC NR: AP5025695

transmitting selsyn and the power supply winding of the magnetic modulator are series connected, while the winding of the selsyn rotor is connected in series with the modulator output. Orig. art. has: 1 figure. [DW]

SUB CODE: 1E,EE SUBM DATE: 18May64/ ATD PRESS: 4/35

Card 2/2

KELIN, G., inzh.

A diploma in engineering is a creator's identification. Tekh.mol.
31 no.1:14-17 '63. (MIRA 16:3)
(Engineers) (Technological innovations)

KLOCHKOV, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich, kand. sel'khoz. nauk; KELIN, I.,
red.; POPOVA, M., tekhn.red.

[The soil map and its use] Pochvennain karta i ee ispol'zovanie.
Saransk, Mordovskoe knizhnoe izd-vo, 1960. 47 p. (MIRA 15:6)
(Mordovia--Soils--Maps)

~~KELIN, Khol'tsman~~

H-25

ROMANIA / Chemical Technology. Fats, Oils, Waxes, Soaps,
Detergents, Flotoreagent

Abs Jour : Ref. Zhur-Khimiya, No 12, 1958, 41188.

Author : Khol'tsman, Kolin

Inst : Not given

Title : Evaluation of the practical value of surface active agents.

Orig Pub : Standardizarea, 1957, 9, No 11, 528-535

Abstract : A short description is given for the methods widely used for determining physical-chemical properties of surface active agents: the wetting power, foaming, washing, and emulsifying properties, solubility, stability in hard water, and their efficiency in various fields of industry. Thirty-three library references are given.

Card 1/1

22

~~KELIN, Khol'tsman~~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 06/13/2000

CIA-RDP86-00513R000721510008-7

Piezoelectric instruments used for determining single warp-thread
tension. Biul.tekh.-ekon.inform. no.7:46-48 '58. (MIRA 11:9)
(Piezometer) (Thread--Testing)

KELIN, LIVITS, Cand Tech Sci -- (diss) "Study of the ^aslays of mechanical
~~weaving-machine tools~~ *looms* of $5/4$ and $4/4$ breadth *for the purpose of* ~~in view of the increase~~ *ing*
their speed." Len, 1958. 24 pp with diagrams (Min of Higher Education
USSR, Len Textile Inst im S. M. Kirov, Chair of Weaving), 150 copies
(KL, 16-58, 120)

-62-

KELIN, G.S., podpolkovnik med.sluzhby

Conference of physicians of the Odessa Military District. Voen.-
med. zhur. no. 2:95-96 F '61. (MIRA 14:2)

(ODESSA--MEDICINE, MILITARY)

UTKIN, Nikolay Petrovich, deputat Verkhovnogo Soveta Mordovskoy ASSR;
KELIN, M., red.; CHIZHIKOVA, V., tekhn.red.

[Under new conditions; story of a follower of Valentina
Gaganova] V novykh usloviakh; rasskaz posledovatel'ia Valentiny
Gaganovoi. Saransk, Mordovskoe knizhnoe izd-vo, 1960. 42 p.
(MIRA 14:2)

1. Predsedatel' kolkhosa "Pobeda" Ardatovskogo rayona (for Utkin).
(Mordovia--Collective farms)

POLTAVSKAYA, Lyudmila Semenovna, kand.biolog.nauk; SOROKIN, Mikhail Ivanovich,
kand.sel'skokhoz.nauk; KELIN, M., red.; CHIZHIKOVA, V., tekhn.red.

[Corn pests and diseases and their control in Mordovia] Vrediteli
i bolezni kukuruzy i bor'ba s nimi v usloviakh Mordovii. Saransk,
Mordovskoe knizhnoe izd-vo, 1960. 47 p.

(MIRA 14:3)

(Mordovia--Corn (Maize)--Diseases and pests)

KOSTROV, K.A.; KELIN, M., red.; POPOVA, M., tekhn. red.

[Green fallows as important possibilities for increasing grain and forage production] Zaniaty pary - vazhnyi rezerv uvelicheniia proizvodstva zerna i kormov. Saransk, Mordovskoe knizhnoe izd-vo, 1960. 53 p. (MIRA 14:12)

1. Zaveduyushchiy otdelom zemledeliya Mordovskoy gosudarstvennoy sel'skokhozyaystvennoy opytnoy stantsii (for Kostrov).
(Fallowing) (Grain) (Forage)

SURODEYEV, Nikolay Maksimovich, Deputat Verkhovnogo Soveta Mordovskoy ASSR;
KELIN, M., red.; POPOVA, M., tekhn. red.

[Processing retted hemp straw on the collective farm] Pererabotka
tresty v kolkhoze. Saransk, Mordovskoy knizhnoe izd-vo, 1960. 59 p.
(MIRA 14:11)

1. Predsedatel' kolkhoza imeni Lenina Dubenskogo rayona (for Surode-
yev).

(Hemp)

KELIN, S.

The following is among dissertations of the Leningrad Polytechnic Institute imeni Kalinin:

"Increase in the Control Range for the Automatic Control of the Frequency in Power Systems." 21 December 1953. An analysis is given of the existing methods of controlling frequency and some original propositions are developed which pertain to the relationship between the frequency and speed controls. An examination is made of the stability of frequency control under specific conditions -- by connecting the shaft of the oil motor of the speed control and the electrical system of the frequency control. A system is proposed for controlling the frequency in a complex power system.

SO: M-1048 28, Mar 56

KELIN, V.S.

Prospectors for mineral resources are being better paid for their work. Razved. i okh. nedr. 28 no.7:54-55 J1 '62. (MIRA 15:8)

1. Upravleniye geologii i okhrany nedr pri Sovete Ministrov
Turk~~men~~skoy SSR.
(Turkmenistan--Wages--Prospecting)

KELEN, V.S.

Efficiency engineers of the geological organizations of Uzbekistan
in the struggle to increase labor productivity. Pervod. 'okh. nedr
no.10:54-59 0 '63. (MFA 17:12)

1. Upravleniye geologii i okhrany nedr pri Sovetskom Ministerstve
Tuzkmen-
skoy SSR.

MESHALKIN, Ye.N.; MESHALKIN, I.N.; KELIN, Ye.P.; LEVINSON, Yu.M.;
SEMENOV, A.A.

Comparative evaluation of mitral commissurotomy performed with
the finger or instruments according to data on the decrease of
the diastolic gradient during an operation. Trudy Inst. klin.
i eksp. khir. AN Kazakh. SSR 9:15-19 '63. (MIRA 17:12)

KELIN, Ye. P.

Kelin, Ye. P. -- "Direct and Indirect Results of Operational Treatment of Ulcers of the Stomach and Duodenum." Second Moscow State Medical Institute I. V. Stalin. Moscow, 1956. (Dissertation For the Degree of Candidate in Medical Sciences).

So: Knizhnaya Letopis', No. 11, 1956, pp 103-111

MESHALKIN, Ye.N.; MESHALKIN, I.N.; LEVINSON, Yu.M.; KELIN, Ye.P.

Mitral commissurotomy by extra-auricular approaches in
left thoracotomy. Zdrav. Kazakh. 22 no.9:7-11 '62.

(MIRA 17:2)

1. Iz Instituta eksperimental'noy biologii i meditsiny
Sibirskogo otdeleniya AN SSSR (dir. - laureat Leninskoy
premi, prof. Ye.N. Meshalkin).

MESHALKIN, Ye.N.; KELIN, Ye.P.

Repairing a defect of the interventricular septum through the right atrium with the use of hypothermia. Izv. Sib. otd. AN SSSR no.8:117-120 '62. (MIRA 17:8)

1. Institut eksperimental'noy biologii i meditsiny Sibirskogo otdeleniya AN SSSR, Novosibirsk.

ZAYTSEV, G.P., prof.; KELIN, Ye. P., kand. med. nauk.; STARTSEV, I.V., kand. med. nauk.

Late results of surgical treatment of gastroduodenal ulcer. Sovet. med. 23 no.2:34-41 F '59. (MIRA 12:3)

1. Iz kliniki obshchey khirurgii II Moskovskogo meditsinskogo instituta imeni N.I. Pirogova.

(GASTRECTOMY, in various dis.
peptic ulcer, remote results (Rus))

MESHALKIN, Ye. N., prof.; MESHALKIN, I. N.; MAZHBIKH, B. I.; KELIN,
Ye. P.; ILYUKHINA, L. B.; SEMENOV, A. A.

Diagnostic value of curves of the pulmonary-capillary pressure
and left auricular pressure in mitral defect and the means for
their evaluation. Terap. arkh. 34 no.5:25-31 '62.
(MIRA 15:6)

1. Iz serdechno-sosudistogo otdeleniya dlya vroslykh (zav.
I. N. Meshalkin) i laboratorii fiziologii (zav. T. S. Vinogradova)
Instituta eksperimental'noy biologii i meditsiny (dir. - laureyat
Leninskoy premii prof. Ye. N. Meshalkin) Sibirskogo otdeleniya
AN SSSR.

(MITRAL VALVE—DISEASES) (HEART—EXAMINATION)
(CATHETERS)

MESHALKIN, Ye.N., prof.; MESHALKIN, I.N., starshiy nauchnyy sotrudnik;
KELIN, Ye.P., kand.med.nauk; LEVINSON, Yu.M., mladshiy nauchnyy
sotrudnik

Emergency mitral commissurotomy as a therapeutic method in acute
pulmonary edema in patients with mitral stenosis. Kardiologiya
2 no.5:11-15 S-O '62. (MIRA 15:12)

1. Iz Instituta eksperimental'noy biologii i meditsiny Sibirskogo
otdeleniya AN SSSR (dir. - prof. Ye.N.Meshalkin).
(MITRAL VALVE--SURGERY) (PULMONARY EDEMA)

MESHALKIN, Ye.N., prof.; MESHALKIN, I.N.; KELIN, Ye.P., kand.med.nauk;
SEMENOV, A.A.; YAGAFAROV, L.M. (Novosibirsk)

Changes in the hemodynamics of the lesser circulation during
mitral commissurotomy. Klin.med. 40 no.10:36-42 O '62.

(MIRA 15:12)

1. Iz Instituta eksperimental'noy biologii i meditsiny Sibirskogo
otdeleniya AN SSSR (dir. - prof. Ye.N.Meshalkin).
(MITRAL VALVE---SURGERY) (PULMONARY CIRCULATION)

MESHALKIN, Ye.N., prof.; KHELIN, Ye.P.

Hemodynamics with defective interventricular septum according to
data of cardiac catheterization. Kardiologiya 3 no.5:23-27 S-0
'63. (MIRA 17:9)

1. Iz Instituta eksperimental'noy biologii i meditsiny Sibirskogo
otdeleniya AN SSSR.

KOMISSAROV, A.I.; KELIN, Yu.A. (Moskva)

Characteristics of the work of the rotating thread feeder of a
shuttle sewing machine. Shvein.prom. no.1:12-16 Ja-F '64.
(MIRA 17:3)

Kelima, A.M.
MELASHENKO, V.F.; KELIMA, A.M.

Developemtn of ascarid eggs following oxygen therapy. Med.paraz. i
paraz.bol.supplement to no.1:68 '57. (MIRA 11:1)

1. Iz para zitologicheskogo otdela L'vovskoy oblastnoy sanitarno-
epidemiologicheskoy stantsii.
(ASCARDIS AND ASCARIASIS)
(OXYGEN--PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECT)

KELINA, I. M.

"Pneumatic Enrichment of Volchansk Lignite." Cand Tech Sci, Sverdlovsk Mining Inst, Sverdlovsk, 1954. (RZhKhim, No 21, Nov 54)

Survey of Scientific and Technical Dissertations Defended at USSR Higher Educational Institutions (11)

SO: Sum. No. 521, 2 Jun 55

KARLINA, I.M., kand. tekhn. nauk.

Evaluating the efficiency of preparing coal for use in electric
power plants. Izv. vys. ucheb. zav.; gor. zhur. no.1:180-187 '58.
(MIRA 11:5)

1. Sverdlovskiy gorany institut.
(Coal preparation--Quality control)

KELINA, Ida Mikhaylovna, kand. tekhn. nauk; GRISHINA, T.B., otv. red.;
MIRONOVA, T.A., red. izd-va; MAKSIMOVA, V.V., tekhn. red.

[Operator of pneumatic separators] Mashinist pneumaticheskogo
separatora. Moskva, Gosgortekhnizdat, 1963. 82 p.

(MIRA 16:7)

(Separators (Machines))--Pneumatic driving)

KELINA, I.M., kand. tekhn. nauk; DIOMIDOV, A.P., dotsent;
GAVRILOVA, Ye.V., inzh.

Optimum size of machine classes in pneumatic preparation of
high-ash lignites. Izv. vys. ucheb. zav.; gor. zhur. no.6:
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KELINER, STEFAN
SURNAME, Given Names

Country: Rumania

Academic Degrees:

Affiliation: -not given-

Source: Bucharest, Igiene, Vol IX, No 4, Sep-Oct 1961, pp 245-353.

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Authors:

TAT, Mircea, -Dr.-

KELINER, Stefan, -Dr.-

GAMANESCU, Stefan, -Pharmacist.-

LALICI, Sofia, -Engineer.-

TUDOR, Gheorghe, -Hygienist.-

GPO 981643

STEFAN KELINER, JD

1911-1988

STEFAN KELINER, JD

STEFAN KELINER, JD, AviatSIONnyy institut, Trud, No 77, 1963, AviatSIONnyy
institute, AviatSIONnyy institut, Trud, No 77, 1963, AviatSIONnyy

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of the armature reaction for the study of the armature reaction in the present-current low-voltage machines under steady-state conditions. In the present paper, this method is applied to the study of transient operating modes of the motor. The results are compared with the results of the experimental study.

REF ID: A74047560

1. The first part of the document is a

summary of the main points.

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main points.

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third part

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The better use of films.

P. 357 (Ministerstvo zdravotnictvi a Vyzkunny ustav organisace zdravotnictvi)
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1ST AND 2ND ORDERS										3RD AND 4TH ORDERS									
KELL										1									
CA										<p>Improved Van Slyke apparatus. I. Kell and B. Alra- mar. <i>Soviet-Vostochnye Press</i>, 16, No. 11, 41(1939).-- A compact, simplified app. for detg. amino N by the Van Slyke method is described and illustrated. A particular feature is uniform shaking intensity, provided by a motor- driven shaker which can be adjusted to any speed from 100 to 400 r. p. m.</p> <p>Julian F. Smith</p>									
METALLURGICAL LITERATURE CLASSIFICATION										ESTABLISHED									
SUBJECT										AUTHOR									
TITLE										DATE									
SOURCE										REMARKS									

RUMANIA/Metallurgy - Machinery,
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Canals
Mar/Apr 50

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"Metallurgia" No 2, pp 61-63

Examines present stage of plans and execution of Rumanian contributions to Danube-Black Sea Canal. These include spare parts for existing equipment now available for canal, equipment of five stationary regional workshops and number of mobile
162T80

RUMANIA/Metallurgy - Machinery
Construction (Contd)
Mar/Apr 50

shops, 50-1,000 hp diesel engines, railroad and road-construction machinery. Finds above plans and execution well advanced at end of 1949.

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**HEADQUARTERS
ARMED FORCES COURIER SERVICE**

22 Dec 86

SUBJECT: Proposed DoD Directive


TO: Organizational Working Group

Attached for your information is a redraft of the proposed DoD Directive resulting from our 16 December 1986 meeting.

Also enclosed is a copy of my letter to Mr. Alderman with our proposed letter to CINCMAC.

Encls

1. Draft DoDD
22 Dec 86
2. ARFCOS Ltr,
23 Dec 86 w/watch


HOWARD L. KING
Colonel, USAF
Director



Department of Defense DIRECTIVE

NUMBER 5200.xx

Draft date: 22 December 1986

USD(P)

SUBJECT: Defense Courier Service

- References:
- (a) DoD Instruction 5200.1R, "Information Security Program Regulation", June, 1986
 - (b) DoD Instruction 5000.21, "Forms Management Program", December 5, 1973
 - (c) DoDD 5025.1-M, "DoD Directives System Procedures", April 1981
 - (d) DoDD 5000.19
 - (e) DoDD 400.19R, Defense Regional Interservice Support (DRIS) Regulation
 - (f) DIAM 50-3, Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, 2 May 1980

1. PURPOSE: This Directive establishes the Defense Courier Service (DCS) and establishes policy on material qualified to be moved, funding, and authorized users of this service.

2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE: This Directive is applicable to the Office of the Secretary of Defense; military departments and their reserve components; the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; DoD Components; and Non-DoD agencies that use the services of the DCS.

3. POLICY: It is DoD policy to provide the most secure transportation for sensitive and classified material and equipment. The DCS shall provide for the secure transportation and control of qualified material requiring handling by courier. This shall include support for joint or combined operations and support to NATO and other U.S. allies consistent with capabilities.

a. This directive provides policy for command, control, management, administration, and support of DCS and its subordinate units.

b. This directive establishes policy on the qualification of material authorized for entry into the DCS system.

c. The DCS shall be funded by CSAF. Authorized customers shall pay for services provided by DCS. Funds currently programmed for the operation of the Armed Forces Courier Service (ARFCOS) will be transferred to the CINCMAC special account for the Defense Courier Service.

d. Under this Directive, DCS users must insure that only qualified material is entered into the DCS system. Controls will be established to insure that this service is used solely to transport qualified material as defined in paragraph 3.h. The user's authorized representative certifies qualification by signature and annotation of qualification category as listed in paragraph 3.h. below, when entering the material.

e. Material which is not owned or controlled by the U.S. Government will not be imported into the United States via DCS. Violations of this policy by US Government personnel will be reported to the Commander in Chief Military Airlift Command, for review and referral for prosecution under federal law, if appropriate.

f. Any person who enters unqualified or prohibited material into the DCS system, or otherwise misuses the DCS system, may be subject to punitive action under Federal law, including the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

g. Qualified material will be transported to those overseas locations where a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or other treaty agreements are in place that will provide protection for courier material from search and seizure by customs or other officials of the country concerned. DCS transfers material to Department of State Regional Pouch Centers for final delivery in countries not having a SOFA.

h. Qualified material: The following categories of material qualify for DCS handling:

(1) DOD material:

(a) TOP SECRET information

(b) Classified cryptographic/COMSEC material

(c) Classified cryptologic material

(d) CRYPTOGRAPHIC keying material designated and marked CRYPTO, by Director, National Security Agency.

(e) Sensitive compartmented information (SCI)

(f) Overhead imagery material classified SECRET and

higher.

(g) Any US classified material which cannot be transmitted in US custody by any other means (EO 12065, July 3, 1978).

(2) Other qualified material:

(a) Department of State accompanied diplomatic courier pouches.

(b) Material in 3h(1)(a) through 3h(1)(f) above of other US Government agencies.

(c) NATO material in 3h(1)(a) through 3h(1)(f) above of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) destined for transport within areas already served by DCS.

(d) Allied material in 3h(1)(a) through 3h(1)(f) above used for combined operations destined for transport within areas already served by DCS.

(e) Material in 3h(1)(a) through 3h(1)(g) above of DOD contractors when -

1 Government Contracting Officer Representatives (COR) have coordinated and obtained Commander, DCS approval for use of the DCS system prior to initiation of the contract.

a Each request for DCS service must be in writing and contain identification of the type of material to be received/dispatched, production schedules, size, weight, cube of material, name, address, telephone number of the contractors government COR, contract number, expiration date of contract, name and address of contractor, and any data pertinent to the transportation of the material, including provision of payment for service.

b Commander (CDR) DCS will approve or deny all requests for contract support. Approval will contain conditions of service that will be provided to the contractor by DCS units.

2 Approved by CDR DCS on a case by case basis.

(f) Foreign Military Sales (FMS) material in 3h(1)(a) and 3h(1)(b) above destined for transport within areas already served by DCS. FMS case officer are required to coordinate and obtain Commander, DCS approval for use of the DCS system prior to initiation of Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) with FMS customers. FMS material will not be entered into the DCS system for transport to areas serviced by the Department of State Diplomatic Courier Service.

(3) Unqualified material. All material is unqualified if it is -

(a) Not identified in paragraph 6.

(b) Not authorized for DCS transportation by

Commander, DCS.

(4) Prohibited material. The following material is not authorized entry into DCS regardless of classification or other qualifying criteria.

(a) Contraband, including controlled substances (particularly narcotics and dangerous drugs) as defined in section 812, title 21, United States Code.

(b) Explosives, ammunitions, and firearms and their components.

(c) Radioactive material or other material hazardous to personnel.

(d) Flammables.

(e) Liquids.

(f) Batteries (Those batteries prohibited from air shipment by FAA or international regulations).

(g) Currency, military payments certificates, bonds, securities, gold, silver, jewels, jewelry, postage stamps or other negotiable instruments.

i. Two-Person Control Material: Two-Person Control material will be governed by the provisions of JCS Publication 13, Vol I and II and SM 313-83. The application of this caveat is restricted to Nuclear Command and Control material.

j. Material Requiring Special Handling: The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) will approve all requirements for establishment of special handling procedures within the DCS system.

4. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT:

a. DCS is established as a Joint Activity under the control of CINCMAC. Policy on what is to be moved by DCS is established by DUSD(P).

b. DCS will initially be staffed by personnel currently provided by CSA, CNO and CSAF to the Armed Forces Courier Service. The chief of each Service will insure personnel assigned to DCS meet the standards contained in Appendix A. Each Service shall continue to provide personnel identified as necessary to support DCS as approved by JCS.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) (DUSD(P)) shall provide overall guidance for implementation of the policies and responsibilities established in this Directive.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:

(1) Advise the DUSD(P) on courier requirements and priorities.

(2) Provide guidance to the DCS and the Unified and Specified Commands that will serve as the basis for inter-relationships between these organizations.

(3) Obtain the advice and recommendations from the Commander, DCS, on matters within the areas of responsibility assigned to DCS.

(4) Take required action on manpower requirements submitted by CINCMAC per JCS MOP 173.

(5) Approve manpower requests per MOP 173 provisions.

c. CINCMAC shall:

(1) Act as Executive Agent for the DUSD(P).

(2) Exercise command and control of DCS and its field activities.

(3) Implement and comply with the policies and directives of the Department of Defense.

(4) Insure proper coordination with other commands and agencies as appropriate concerning policy and operations of DCS.

(5) Keep the DUSD(P) informed of significant matters concerning the activities of the DCS.

(6) Make recommendations to the DUSD(P) for action regarding the DCS.

(7) Provide plans to the DUSD(P) for the resources necessary to establish, equip, maintain and operate DCS stations to carry out mission requirements.

(8) Provide required civilian authorizations and staffing; authorizations and funding will be transferred from respective service FYDP.

(10) Promulgate regulations required for the operations of DCS. These regulations will be:

(a) Applicable to all military commands, and users of DCS.

(b) Provided to the DUSD(P), and the Military Departments and to all departments and agencies serviced by DCS.

(11) Consistent with DoD Instruction 5000.21 (reference d), coordinate recommended changes to DoD standard forms required

and forward any substantive changes to the DUSD(P) for approval.

d. The Chief of Staff, Army, Chief of Naval Operations, and Chief of Staff, Air Force will:

(1) Provide qualified personnel in accordance with Appendix A necessary to carry out the DCS mission.

(2) Provide personnel and courier station common support to field units assigned as a tenant. Common support includes but is not limited to medical facilities, fire protection, security, investment equipment, appropriate facilities, facility maintenance, custodial services, utilities, space, real property maintenance, disposal services, contracting support and local motor pool services.

(3) Maintain courier stations at locations designated by Commander, DCS.

(4) Budget for transportation movement and associated packing and crating and escort TDY costs for their respective use of Courier services.

e. The Commander, Defense Courier Service shall:

(1) Be responsible to the Executive Agent in the accomplishment of the DCS mission.

(2) Command all personnel assigned to the DCS.

(3) Coordinate with the Department of State Diplomatic Courier Service for transportation of qualified material to those countries in which DCS operations are prohibited.

(4) Establish security standards and procedures in accordance with national policy to prevent unauthorized access to material entered into the DCS system.

(5) Maintain liaison with the Military Departments, Unified and Specified Commands, US Government departments and agencies and other authorized users.

(6) Coordinate with the services and unified and specified commands on DCS requirements to support contingency plans.

(7) Coordinate and develop contingency plans for the priority movement of qualified time sensitive material during war.

(8) Establish standards for, and insure training, professional performance, and personnel behavior of personnel assigned to DCS.

(9) Establish a transportation network to insure DCS stations and routes meet mission requirements.

(10) Investigate suspected transport of unqualified or prohibited material via DCS; take following actions, as appropriate.

(a) Cause addressee to inspect suspected parcel and report findings to DCS.

(b) Inform the originating agency of the person who incorrectly certified the material of the circumstances to facilitate appropriate investigation and action.

f. The Heads of US Government Departments and Agencies shall:

(1) Develop and submit to DCS on an annual basis their courier requirements and priorities.

(2) Provide support, within their respective fields of responsibilities, to the Commander, DCS, as required to carry out the assigned mission of the DCS.

(3) Assess the responsiveness of the DCS to their operational needs.

(4) Pay for services (transportation, packing and crating and escort TDY support) rendered by DCS.

6. RELATIONSHIPS:

a. Administration and Military Staffing:

(1) The position of Commander, DCS, shall be an Officer authorized at the O-6 grade. A normal tour of duty shall be 3 years. Nominations for the position shall be approved by the CINCMAC. The incumbent shall be rated by The Executive Agent.

(2) The position of Chief of Staff, DCS, shall be a civilian.

(3) All other military staffing requirements, both officers and enlisted, shall be authorized and assigned to DCS by the Military Departments as requested by CINCMAC and approved by JCS.

(4) DCS staffing criteria, documented in appropriate regulations, shall be reviewed and approved by the Executive Agent prior to publication.

b. Programming, Budgeting, and Financing:

The Executive Agent shall be responsible for programming, budgeting, and financing all operations of DCS and shall identify all such requirements in its operations and maintenance budget and financial plan submission to HQ USAF. Authorized customers

will program, budget, and finance all transportation, escort TDY requirements, and associated packing and crating in thier Operations and Maintenance budget and financial plan submission to their respective service headquarters.

c. Installation Support:

(1) Commanders of military activities and other and other designated Federal agencies that host a DCS station shall be responsible for providing DCS units with the following:

(a) Vault facilities which conform to specifications in DIAM 50-3. A waiver must be obtained from CINCMAC when these specifications cannot be met.

(b) A secure administrative area, adjacent to the vault and physically separated from other areas by permanent walls and ceilings, barred windows, and reinforced doors secured by heavy duty locking systems.

(c) Transportation support. Vehicles and special purpose equipment, transportation requests (TRs), Government bills of lading (GBLs), and transportation support within capability.

(d) Local counterintelligence and criminal intelligence support. Periodic briefings and continuing liaison between local law enforcement agencies and counterintelligence units and DCS units.

(e) Communication support. Message center service and priority precedence within the AUTOVON system for both unclassified and classified service. Assistance will be rendered DCS Stations in procurement of mobile communication systems as required.

(f) Personnel support. Personnel and financial record maintenance, Special Security Office (SSO) service, billeting and dining facilities, housing support, and medical and dental service.

(g) Copies of all inspections, investigations, and audits that pertain to or impact on DCS operations to Commander, Defense Courier Service.

(2) Commanders of military activities at which a courier may delay during the movement of DCS material will provide the following:

(a) Temporary secure storage for the DCS shipment, including guards as required.

(b) Billeting and messing for the courier and accompanying courier assistant.

(c) Transportation support as outlined in paragraph

6.c.(c) above, including emergency vehicle towing and repair.

(d) Communication support as outlined in paragraph 6.c.(e) above.

7. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION:

This Directive is effective immediately. CINCMAC will develop an implementation plan to activate the Defense Courier Service NLT 1 October 1987. A system for recovering the cost of DCS services will be implemented. Existing documents of the Military Departments shall be reviewed for conformance with this Directive and two copies of each revised implementing document must be forwarded to the Commander in Chief Military Airlift Command (CINCMAC) within 120 days

APPENDIX A - PERSONNEL STANDARDS

A-1. All military personnel selected for duty with DCS will not be assigned other duties outside their primary DCS duties.

A-2. The chief of each Service will assign personnel who meet the minimum standards below:

a. All personnel selected to fill a courier position must be an E-7 or higher.

b. Educational level. High school graduate or equivalent.

c. Mental achievement.

(1) Army - GT aptitude area 100.

(2) Navy - GCT ARI score 100 or ASVAB 165.

(3) Air Force - AQE general 48.

d. Physical characteristics.

(1) Army - minimum of "1" in U, L, and S factors of physical profile.

(2) Navy - ManMed 15-7.

(3) Air Force - minimum of "1" in U, L, S, and X factors of physical profile.

e. Character and past performance.

(1) Army - an average efficiency report rating of superior.

(2) Navy - no evaluation mark less than EEU.

(3) Air Force - have an overall rating of eight or nine on their last three APRs.

f. Possess mature judgment.

g. Be diplomatic and courteous.

h. Possess a TOP SECRET security clearance based on a special background investigation (SBI) and be eligible for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI).

i. Be qualified to obtain a military operator's permit for wheeled vehicles.

A-3. Tour of duty

a. For officer and enlisted personnel, an DCS tour of duty will be a normal tour as defined by the parent Service for the geographical area of the DCS station.

b. Tour extensions and continued assignment to DCS duty are prohibited unless approved, in writing, by Commander, DCS.

c. Tours of duty may be curtailed at the convenience of the parent Service or when the member is no longer authorized to perform DCS duties.

d. Commander, DCS may terminate a member's service in DCS for demonstrated unreliability or inability to function in the DCS operational environment.

A-4. Personnel security

a. Security clearances. All DCS personnel must hold a final TOP SECRET clearance based on a Special Background Investigation (SBI) completed less than 5 years prior to assignment to DCS.

b. Personnel must be eligible for Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) indoctrination.

c. Each Service will designate a central security clearance point for personnel assigned to DCS.

d. Continuing clearance eligibility. DCS station commanders will be advised of any information which might affect the clearance of assigned personnel. They will advise Commander, DCS of any adverse information.

GLOSSARY

TERMS USED BY THE DEFENSE COURIER SERVICE

Command Messenger: An individual designated in writing, by an authorized user to accept from or deliver material to an authorized recipient. Individuals designated must possess a security clearance to the degree of material an account could possibly receive or dispatch.

Consolidated Control Point: An DCS account designated by one or more other accounts to act as their agent in accepting and entering DCS material.

DCS Account Number: The unique identifier assigned to an DCS account. It consists of a 6 character base number and a 4 character delivery reference code separated from the base number by a dash (e.g., 999999-XX99).

DCS Article Number: The control number by which all DCS material is accounted. It consists of the two-letter symbol of the accepting DCS Station followed by up to six digits. It should be placed on the address side of the piece in the lower right quadrant.

Dedicated Courier: Dedicated DCS couriers are those commissioned officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers/chief petty officers in pay grade E-7 and senior or Department of Defense civilian in the grade of GS-9 and senior assigned to DCS duties and have been issued an DCS Form 9 (Defense Courier Service Identification Card) attesting to their qualifications as couriers.

Defense Courier: An officer, warrant officer or enlisted member in the grade of E-7 and senior of the US Armed Forces or Department of Defense civilian in the grade of GS-9 and senior, assigned to perform Defense Courier Service duties and identified by possession of an Defense Courier Service Identification Card DCS Form 9). See also courier.

Defense Courier Service: A joint service of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force. The Defense Courier Service provides one of the available methods for the secure and expeditious transmission of material requiring control handling by military courier.

Defense Courier Station: A joint service activity of the Defense Courier Service for the acceptance, processing, and dispatching of qualified courier material.

Designated Courier: An officer, warrant officer, or enlisted member in the grade of E-7 and senior of the US Armed Forces, possessing the proper security clearance selected by a Defense Courier to take custody of, safeguard, and deliver an DCS shipment as directed.

Executive Agent: Head of an organization to whom the Secretary of Defense has assigned responsibility and delegated authority, which would otherwise be exercised by SECDEF, to carry out certain of his duties.

Provisional Courier: A person assigned outside the DCS system nominated by the individuals parent command and trained by DCS to act as the DCS representative in a given area. The individual nominated must meet the standards set for assignment to DCS as a courier.

Qualified Courier Material: Normally TOP SECRET, classified cryptographic or cryptologic material belonging to the US Government. Material that may be transported via DCS is fully described in paragraph 3h of this directive.

Worldwide Master Account Data Base: A computer supported data base containing vital identification and service information for all accounts serviced by DCS.



HEADQUARTERS
ARMED FORCES COURIER SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5370

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

23 December 1986

Director, Armed Forces Courier Service

The Honorable Craig Alderman Jr.
Deputy, The Under Secretary of Defense, Policy
Washington, D. C. 20301-2000

Dear Mr. Alderman:

At our 3 October 1986 meeting to redefine the mission, organization and charter of the Armed Forces Courier Service, you directed the formation of two working groups: (policy and organization).

This letter provides you the recommendations of the organization working group.

a) That ARFCOS be reorganized from a tri-service agency to a joint activity, providing for a single chain of command to eliminate current organizational problems. This will bring the courier service in line with other DOD joint operations. It will also result in the disestablishment of the Army Courier Service, Navy Courier Service and the Air Force Courier Service. The services will transfer existing manpower authorizations to the new Defense Courier Service.

b) That the name be changed to the Defense Courier Service.

c) That Executive Agent responsibilities be transferred from Chief of Staff of the Army to CINC, Military Airlift Command. The Courier Service is a secure transportation activity that moves its material predominately by air. We believe MAC is the most logical place for ARFCOS.


d) That DCS be funded by CSAF, eliminating the current, cumbersome, multiservice funding process. This, in turn, will allow DCS to address deficiencies in facilities and equipment identified in the Stillwell Commission Report.

We have received outstanding cooperation from all participants, to include representatives of CINCMAC, consistent with your 29 October 1986 letter to him. We now propose that CINCMAC be formally requested to accept Executive Agent

responsibility. This will allow us to initiate the organizational and funding actions required to carry out these proposals.

We recommend that the above proposals be approved and that you sign the letter at enclosure 1, requesting CINCMAC assume executive agent responsibilities.

Sincerely,



HOWARD L. RING, COL, USAF
Chairman, ARFCOS Organizational
Working Group

Encl



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

POLICY

In reply refer to:

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND

THROUGH: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Armed Forces Courier Service (ARFCOS)

On 3 October 1986, I commissioned two working groups to review ARFCOS's policies on moving classified material and its organization. I took these steps to address problems ARFCOS was experiencing in performing its mission.

Both working groups are about to conclude their efforts. They have made significant progress in resolving policy issues and in recommending an organizational structure to overcome long-standing inherent problems.

As I advised you in my letter of 29 October 1986, an attractive option being considered by the organization working group is the transfer of executive agent responsibilities from the Chief of Staff Army to you as Commander-In-Chief, Military Airlift Command. As requested, your staff has participated in the working groups efforts, representing your concerns well.

The organization working group has now formally recommended, and I endorse, that you be designated the executive agent of a newly organized joint activity, the Defense Courier Service. We are drafting a DOD directive establishing this joint activity and, with your concurrence, will proceed with formal coordination that would make CINCMAC the Executive Agent. Your staff will remain an integral part of this process.

I respectfully request your concurrence.

Craig Alderman, Jr.
Deputy

Copy furnished:

Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force
Commandant of the Marine Corps
ASD (C³I)
Director, ARFCOS

Covert Action

INFORMATION BULLETIN

Number 26

Special: Includes Index

\$5.00

U.S. Sponsorship of Terrorism

Chomsky on the Libya Attack



Portrait of a Terrorist

Editorial

The Reagan administration has raised perversion of the language to new heights with its campaign against "terrorism." It has managed to convince much of the public, and a large part of the media, that terrorism is simply the actions of our enemies. Moreover, as Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky explain in this issue, the administration has focused the discussion on retail terrorism, to the exclusion of wholesale terrorism; rarely does anyone call the government to account for supporting, and in large part operating, the most extensive terror network in history. It is difficult to define terrorism, so the "experts" define it however they want. The report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism is a case in point; it says terrorism is "the *unlawful* use or threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives." [Emphasis added.] The problem is who decides what is "lawful" and what is not.

"International terrorism" is not the struggle of the Blacks of South Africa and Namibia for national liberation; it is not the fight of the Palestinians for their ancestral lands; it is not the battle of the Nicaraguans to bring democracy to their country after 50 years of dictatorship. International terrorism is the U.S. bombing of Libya; it is the Israeli invasion of Lebanon; it is the South African invasion of Zimbabwe, Angola, and Mozambique; it is the *contra* war in Nicaragua; and it is the death squads in Chile, El Salvador, and Guatemala.

More Secrecy and Intimidation

While we continue our struggle to bring you information you cannot find in the mainstream media, the administration is expanding its campaign to restrict the flow of information and to intimidate the media. We warned years ago that the Intelligence Identities Protection Act was just the tip of the iceberg, and that it was not just aimed at stopping this maga-

zine, but at chilling the establishment media. Recent CIA pronouncements indicate that such intimidation remains a priority. In May the Agency announced that it thought the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *Washington Times*, *Time*, and *Newsweek* should be prosecuted for revealing details of the Ronald Pelton case. While the idea that the administration would ever prosecute Arnaud de Borchgrave's sleazy Moonie rag is preposterous, the other publications were, despite their public indignation, scared. The *Post* actually censored a lead story. Then in June the CIA attempted to obtain prior review of forthcoming publications *not* written by former employees. And in July, Casey began to push for the "You Spy, You Die" bill, not only preventing convicted spies from keeping the proceeds of their activities or selling the rights to their stories, but also authorizing the government to seize the assets of newspapers or other organizations that might be found guilty of violating the law they threatened to use against coverage of the Pollard case.

The CIA is making a push for more power than it has had in decades. As a State Department official told the *New York Times* (July 12, 1986), "Casey is dying for it [operational responsibility for the *contra* war—which he was given]. If we can win, he can walk away with an agency that is rehabilitated to the best days of the cold war, able to conduct wars and throw governments out."

Rightwing fanatics set up organizations like the "RAMBO Coalition," whose members include Alpha 66, Tradition, Family and Property, and a host of other extremist organizations. Retired General John Singlaub, head of the U.S. Council for World Freedom, announces that the way to deal with terrorists is to "rubblize" the camps where they live.

The times are definitely perilous

Table of Contents

Editorial	2	Israel and South Africa	
Vernon Walters: Crypto-diplomat		By Jack Colhoun	34
By Ellen Ray and William Schaap	5	Israeli Spy Targeted?	
The Semantics of Terrorism		By Louis Wolf	36
By Edward S. Herman	9	News Note	38
Who Is a Terrorist?		Costa Rican Media	
By Philip Paull	14	By Howard Friel and Michelle Joffroy	39
Libya in U.S. Demonology		The Duarte Myth	
By Noam Chomsky	15	By Dennis Hans	42
New <i>Contra</i> Leader		Film Review: "Salvador"	
By Ellen Ray, William Schaap, and Louis Wolf	25	By Allan Frankovich	47
Index to CAIB Nos. 13-25	I-1	Nicaraguan Democracy	
U.S. Sponsored Terrorism		By Michael Parenti	52
By Edward S. Herman	27		

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The Modern Mithridates: Vernon Walters: Crypto-diplomat and Terrorist

By Ellen Ray and William Schaap

In 120 B.C., Mithridates VI of Pontus inherited the throne at the age of 11, and was immediately targeted for assassination by most of his relatives. He fled to the mountains and spent some years training himself to be his own master spy, combining "the cunning of the spy with the anxieties of the brutal despot whose intelligence he collected," and while in exile, he "mastered twenty-two languages and dialects, traveling over Asia Minor—at the age of fourteen—disguised as a caravan boy. He visited many tribes, learned about their customs and spied upon their military strength."¹

Mithridates returned to Pontus, and, after murdering his mother, his sister (whom he had married), and his sons, spent eighteen years terrorizing the likes of Sulla, Lucullus, and Pompey. He was, even for his times, singularly brutal, responsible for the massacres of hundreds of thousands of people in the far corners of the known world, "one of the most formidable opponents Rome ever had."²

Except for the family problems,³ there are interesting parallels between the affairs of Mithridates the Great and Vernon Anthony ("Dick") Walters, the current United States Ambassador to the United Nations. For one thing, Walters is a well known linguist who speaks eight languages and many dialects and "likes to slip into a country unannounced before a meeting with a head of state so he can ride the buses around and pick up the local slang and intonation."⁴ More to the point, Walters, like Mithridates, is linked to countless coups, wars, and massacres around the world. But while his role as linguist is widely publicized, his high stature as Grand Master of state terrorism, his decades of ties to wholesale butchery in Iran, Brazil, Guatemala, Chile, Argentina, and most recently, Nicaragua, do not appear in the State Department press releases or the raft

of puff pieces about him in the mainstream media.⁵

The Military Background

Vernon Walters enlisted as a private in the U.S. Army shortly before Pearl Harbor.⁶ After the U.S. entered the War, he attended infantry school and graduated as a Second Lieutenant in 1942, and attended the Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Richie, Maryland. In October 1942 he "took part in the assault landing at Safi, Morocco." (This appears to be the extent of Walters's combat experience.) He then taught "Prisoner of War Interrogation" at Camp Richie. Although not mentioned in his official biography, Walters later trained Brazilian troops at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he became close friends with a young officer, Humberto Castelo Branco, who, more than 20 years later, was to take power in the coup which overthrew President João Goulart and installed a long-lasting regime infamous for its brutality and torture of leftists, especially students and unionists.⁷ Walters was aide de camp to General Mark W. Clark in Italy and then, until the end of the War, combat liaison officer with the 1st Brazilian Infantry Division in Italy (living on the same floor with his friend Castelo Branco).⁸ All the abovementioned countries are ones with which Walters was later to have significant ties.

Walters spent more than 25 years in a succession of military assignments, usually as military attaché or interpreter, and generally under the aegis of the Defense Intelligence Agency. He was in Brazil in 1945 with Secretary of State Marshall and President Truman, and attended the 1947 Pan American Conference in Bogota, Colombia. This was his first brush with revolution and counterrevolution; the massive protests against the

1. Richard Wilmer Rowan, *The Story of Secret Service* (New York: Literary Guild, 1937), pp. 9, 10.

2. *Webster's Biographical Dictionary*, 1st ed. (Springfield, MA: Merriam, 1971), p. 1031. According to *Webster's*, Mithridates committed suicide in 63 B.C., at the age of 69, although Rowan says that "one of his sons whom he had unaccountably neglected to murder brushed him from his throne with a powerful draught of poison." *Op. cit.* n. 1, p. 12.

3. Walters, 69, a lifelong bachelor and a devout Catholic, lived with his mother until her death a few years ago and currently lives with his sister, who held the Bible when Vice President George Bush (his former boss at the CIA and a predecessor at the U.N.) swore him in as U.N. Ambassador. Jeff Stein, "Mystery Man of American Diplomacy," *Boston Globe Magazine*, August 29, 1982, p. 12. A shorter version of this article appeared as "Vernon Walters: Secret Agent," *City Paper* (Washington, DC), December 3, 1982. Michael Massing, "America's Top Messenger Boy," *New Republic*, September 16, 1985, p. 22; *U.S. News & World Report*, June 3, 1985, p. 13. His friends call him "asexual." He says he "married the U.S. government a long time ago." *Washington Post*, December 16, 1985.

4. Stein, *op. cit.* n. 3, p. 12. Walters "has developed near-perfect imitations of Pope John Paul II, Franco, and Castro. He is said to do a mean Augusto Pinochet." *Washington Post*, December 16, 1985.


5. The major media are extraordinarily kind to Dick Walters. See, for example, "An Envoy Who Specializes in Sensitive Missions," a profile in the *New York Times*, June 3, 1982, in which he is quoted as responding to his critics, "If I was a bad man, I couldn't keep doing this." And, "Reagan Nominates Walters To Be Ambassador to U.N.," in the *Washington Post*, February 9, 1985, which highlights the "stern warning" he gave Roberto D'Aubursson not to assassinate the U.S. Ambassador. Yet the *Times* piece notes that "his de-emphasis of the human rights issue" has won praise from conservatives, and the *Post* points out that "his strong anticommunist views . . . have made him a favorite of conservative Republican administrations." Walters refers to the 1953 coup in Iran, the 1954 coup in Guatemala, the 1964 coup in Brazil, and the 1973 coup in Chile as "revolutions." His perspicacity is tempered by his knee-jerk rightwing sentiments. In March 1986 he was quoted: "I mean, how do we really know that Marcos is this unpopular? Marcos does have the support of the two largest parties in the Philippines." *M Magazine*, March 1986, p. 82. In another departure from reality, Walters is one of the few people left in the world who still denies that the United States ever tried to kill Cuban President Fidel Castro. *Washington Post*, December 16, 1985.

6. The underlying data are from the State Department biography of August 1981.

7. Stein, *op. cit.* n. 3, p. 28; Michael Massing, "America's Top Messenger Boy," *New Republic*, September 16, 1985, p. 22.

8. Massing, *op. cit.* n. 7, p. 22.

Credit: Manchete

**Humberto Castelo Branco.**

Conference were met with bloody retaliation which left more than 2,000 dead. Curiously, Walters received a medal for his service during this incident, leading to speculation about his role in the events.⁹

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Walters was all over the globe, most significantly, as we will see below, in Iran, Italy, Brazil, France, and Vietnam (only one month, in 1967, from which, presumably, he derived the experience to write his "Sunset at Saigon"). He spent three years in secret negotiations with the Chinese, and, in the words of his official biography, "smuggled Henry Kissinger into Paris on 15 different occasions to conduct such negotiations."

His military promotions were unprecedented, considering his beginnings as a private. His Brazilian escapades in 1964 earned the Colonel a promotion to Brigadier General; his one month in Vietnam three years later got him his second star, as Major General; and when, in April 1972, he was appointed Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, he became a Lieutenant General. He retired in July 1976 and spent the Carter years in an action-packed civilian career. Then, shortly after President Reagan entered office, Walters returned through the revolving door and began four years' State Department service as Ambassador-at-Large, before becoming U.N. Ambassador.

Prior to examining his post-military career, it is enlightening to review Walters's far-flung operations in the coup-filled years from 1953 to 1973.

Early Dirty Work

Walters admits, and associates confirm, that he was involved in the 1953 putsch which overthrew the government of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran and reinstalled the young Shah.¹⁰ In the early 1960s he was military attaché in Rome, actively blocking the Kennedy administration's "opening" towards the Italian left.¹¹ Presumably Walters was in-

volved in the massive CIA campaign to fund lavishly the Christian Democratic Party in its otherwise risky electoral battles against the Communist Party of Italy. While it is not known whether Walters knew CIA veteran Hugh Montgomery¹² in the 1960s, at present he and Walters *do* work together; Montgomery is Alternate Representative for Special Political Affairs in the United States delegation to the United Nations, with the rank of Ambassador, according to the current U.N. diplomatic list.

Brazil

In 1962 Walters was posted to Brazil as military attaché. Although Walters insists he was nothing more than a "well-informed observer" of the events that followed,¹³ it is obvious that he was up to his neck in the plotting which culminated in the bloody coup of 1964. He was, according to Jan Knippers Black, the "linchpin, the one person all the officers would talk to while they were still afraid to talk with one another."¹⁴ Indeed, he was such a good "observer" that he told Washington one week in advance the exact day the coup was to take place.¹⁵ Moreover, he breakfasted with Castelo Branco the morning after the coup began, urging him to assume the presidency, and he lunched with him the day after the inauguration.¹⁶ Walters never acknowledged Castelo Branco's consummate viciousness nor conceded the enormity of his regime's acts. In his autobiography he wrote: "I never saw Castelo Branco do a mean thing or heard him say a shameful word. The moral integrity of the man was beyond challenge."¹⁷ And as to the installation of the brutal Brazilian military dictatorship, he wrote: "A regime basically unfriendly to the United States had been replaced by another one much more friendly. Some may regard this as bad. I do not. I am convinced that if the revolution [*sic*] had not occurred, Brazil would have gone the way of Cuba."¹⁸

In fact, various government documents suggest that Walters played an extremely crucial role both in fomenting and in accomplishing the coup. In the year preceding the March 31, 1964 start of the coup, a series of CIA documents—some still classified, some partially released, and some fully declassified—describe a meticulous investigation into the attitude of the Brazilian military regarding the Goulart government. One, written in May 1963, notes that "Military becoming more anti-Goulart."¹⁹ Another, in July, worries about "Military's hesitance to overthrow constitutional regime."²⁰ Shortly thereafter, another document describes the "possibility of a rightist coup."²¹ During this period, the person best situated to sway the hesitant rightist military leaders was Colonel Vernon Wal-

12. Montgomery was with the CIA in Italy from 1965 to 1969 and returned there in 1975 as CIA Chief of Station until 1980. Steve Weissman, "Ecco La Cia in Italia," in *La Repubblica*, January 15, 1976, reprinted as "Hello Hugh Montgomery," in Philip Agee and Louis Wolf, eds., *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe* (Secaucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart, 1978), p. 165; *CAIB*, Number 12 (April 1981), p. 41.

13. Massing, *op. cit.*, n. 7, p. 22.

14. Jan Knippers Black, *United States Penetration of Brazil* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977).

15. Massing, *op. cit.* n. 7, p. 22.

16. *Ibid.*; Stein, *op. cit.* n. 3, p. 29.

17. Quoted in *The Progressive*, April 1985, p. 10.

18. *Ibid.*

19. Central Intelligence Agency, Summary of Declassified Documents, reference to: Office of Current Intelligence, Special Report, OCI No. 0278/63B, May 3, 1963.

20. *Ibid.*, reference to: Draft National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 93-2-63, July 2, 1963.

21. *Ibid.*, Information Report, TDCS-3/553, 860, July 19, 1963.

9. Ramón Jimeno and Marcela Caldas, "Vernon Anthony Walters: El Agente Secreto de la Diplomacia Silenciosa," in *Zona* (Bogotá, Colombia), April 23, 1986, p. 46.

10. Claudia Wright, "Brass Knuckles for America," in *New Statesman*, February 8, 1985, p. 20.

11. *Ibid.*

ters, who, as it happens, was promoted to Brigadier General within a year of the coup.²²

Another set of declassified documents are equally damning. They detail a U.S. plan called "Brother Sam," which not only describes foreknowledge of the coup, but also notes the probability of Castelo Branco's assuming its leadership, and indicates that if the coup appeared to be failing, the U.S. Navy was to intervene. These are the same documents which describe Walters's breakfast with his old friend, Castelo Branco.²³

Officially With the CIA

Walter's friendship with Nixon, solidified in 1958 when he protected the then Vice President from the spitting, rock-throwing crowds in Venezuela, led to his appointment, in April 1972, as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, a post he filled under four Directors, Richard Helms, James Schlesinger, William Colby, and George Bush. John Dean testified during the Watergate trials that he had been told Walters "was a good friend of the White House and the White House had put him in the Deputy Director position so they could have some influence over the Agency."²⁴ He served from 1972 to 1976, a seminal period in CIA history, which ran from Watergate through the overthrow of Allende in Chile to the Church Committee hearings, the intervention in Angola, and the planning of the assassination of Orlando Letelier. Vernon Walters played important roles throughout this period.

The Great Watergate Myth

Part of the Walters mythology is his allegedly firm, moral, and indignant refusal to be a part of any cover-up of what came to be known as the Watergate scandal. Indeed, his autobiography paints a picture of incorruptible valor: "I looked [John Dean] right in the eye and said, 'Fire everyone connected with this.'"²⁵ The fact is that when Walters was first asked, by Nixon aide Bob Haldeman, to warn the FBI (falsely) that a strenuous investigation of Watergate would jeopardize ongoing CIA operations, he did just that. Within minutes of receiving those orders, he was on his way to FBI Director Patrick Gray.²⁶ Several days later Walters was still stonewalling, advising John Dean that the then Director, Richard Helms, wanted to distance himself and the Agency from the growing scandal. They did not want to expose the administration's deep involvement; they just wanted to keep the Agency out of any further involvement. In fact, for all his posturing, Walters *never* retracted the phony warning he had delivered to Gray.²⁷ He connived with Dean on possible scenarios to use.

Two weeks after his first, eager involvement, Walters realized he could not stall the investigation much further. When Gray, also anxious to protect himself, asked Walters if he could put the CIA's request in writing, Walters said he could not write such a "spurious" letter. The relieved Gray

then understood that he could let the investigation, already with a momentum of its own, go on; Walters did not want to be in the position of wittingly covering up crimes, especially as so many people would know about it. Still, it was almost a year later that he first informed the Department of Justice of his knowledge of the White House's efforts to have the CIA stop the FBI, and during that year he received the Agency's Distinguished Intelligence Medal, for doing such a good job of keeping the CIA out of the Watergate morass.²⁸

Yet, as Jeff Stein has pointed out, "Walters's recounting of the affair leads one to believe he was naive and misled. 'I had been in Washington for six weeks at this point and it simply did not occur to me that the Chief of Staff to the President might be asking me to do something that was illegal or wrong.' But at this point in his career, Walters had been engaged in various intelligence operations for more than thirty years."²⁹ Indeed, his year of silence speaks more eloquently than his diffident autobiography.

Chile, Allende, and Letelier

One of the most controversial series of charges against Walters involve his connections with the fascist opposition to the administration of Chilean President Salvador Allende, to the overthrow of Allende, and to the assassination of former Chilean Defense Minister Orlando Letelier.

While DDCI, Walters was in charge of the close liaison between the CIA and the Chilean intelligence services, which cooperated closely in the efforts to overthrow the Allende government. They also reportedly received considerable help from Walters's friends in the Brazilian service.³⁰

But the most controversial allegation against Walters is that he was complicit in the assassination of Letelier.³¹ In July 1976 the police in Paraguay had in jail an alleged CIA informant, a possible cause of considerable embarrassment to the U.S. At the same time, Conrado Pappalardo, the assistant to Paraguayan President Alfredo Stroessner, was pressuring the U.S. Ambassador, George Landau, to comply with a request made by Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet to Stroessner. Pinochet wanted two Chilean agents to travel to the U.S. on false Paraguayan passports, which Stroessner had approved, but they now needed U.S. entry visas, and the two agents were in Paraguay waiting for the visas. When Ambassador Landau expressed concern and remarked that the request was rather unusual, he was told by Pappalardo not to worry, that DDCI Vernon Walters knew all about it and that the two men were to report to Walters when they arrived in the U.S.

Landau was unable to reach Walters, who was on leave in Florida at the time, and after considerable soul-searching, he issued the visas. But he took some precautions, photocopying the passports before returning them, and sending a detailed

22. Massing, *op. cit.*, n. 7, p. 22. Walters insists that none of the declassified material "shows any participation by me," which may be true as far as it goes, but hardly justifies John Goshko's assertion that "no evidence has been offered to support [the charge that Walters encouraged the coup]." *Washington Post*, February 9, 1985, p. A6.

23. Stein, *op. cit.* n. 3, p. 29; *Washington Post*, December 29, 1976. The *Post* article says that the part of the plan which called for the airlifting of small arms from a carrier off the coast was codenamed "Quick Kick."

24. David Wise, *The American Police State* (New York: Random House, 1976), p. 245.

25. Vernon A. Walters, *Silent Missions* (New York: Doubleday, 1978).

26. David Wise, *op. cit.* n. 24, pp. 243-44.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 245.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 245-46; John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 529.

29. Stein, *op. cit.* n. 3, p. 35.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 36. It is interesting that one of Walters's old chiefs, Averell Harriman, was, according to Thomas Powers, "lobbying for the hardest line against Allende." Thomas F. Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets* (New York: Knopf, 1979), p. 231.

31. For the details of the account which follows, see Jeff Stein, "Vernon Walters and the Death of Orlando Letelier," *Boston Globe*, August 29, 1982, p. 50; Taylor Branch and Eugene M. Propper, *Labyrinth* (New York: Viking, 1982), pp. 1-14; John Dinges and Saul Landau, *Assassination on Embassy Row* (New York: Pantheon, 1980), pp. 382-89; Donald Freed with Fred Landis, *Death in Washington* (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill, 1980), pp. 184-86.

memorandum to the State Department and the CIA. Landau assumed that the issuance of the visas related to some CIA-Paraguay deal to free the imprisoned agent. However, on August 4, Landau received a cable from Walters indicating that he knew nothing of the matter, that he had no plans to meet with the Chileans, and suggesting that Landau confer further with the State Department. Landau notified the Paraguayans that the visas were to be considered revoked and demanded the passports back. Shortly thereafter, Walters did travel to Paraguay, ostensibly on a mission involved solely with the captured agent.

Despite repeated requests Landau did not get the passports back until October 29, and they were returned with the photographs of the bearers removed. But Landau had photocopied the passports; later he was to learn that one of the two "Chileans" was Michael Vernon Townley, one of the men who planted the bomb which, on September 21, 1976—when he was awaiting the return of the passports—killed Letelier.

It is almost impossible to believe, from all of the studies which have been published, and from the testimony of several trials and congressional hearings, that Vernon Walters did not have advance knowledge of a major Chilean secret police operation in the U.S. being planned in July and August of 1976, but no directly incriminating evidence has been found. Walters vigorously denies any connection with, or foreknowledge of, the Letelier assassination, although he has admitted to many meetings with Colonel Contreras in his years as DDCI.³²

Walters's "Private Life," 1976-1981

Whatever his reasons for leaving the Ford administration well before the elections, Walters spent the Carter years close to the friends he had made over the past three decades. And playing upon those friendships proved no fiscal hardship. In 1980, for example, Walters made nearly half a million dollars, \$300,000 of which was a fee from what may be one of the most misleadingly named companies in the United States, Environmental Energy Systems, Inc., of Alexandria, Virginia, which is, curiously, a major arms merchant. The money was a consultant's fee for assisting them in their efforts (apparently unsuccessful) to sell tanks to the King of Morocco. As the company president told the *New York Times*, "We went to him because he had the connections, he knew the King of Morocco."³³ In fact Walters has used his relationship with King Hassan through the years, ever since 1942, when he gave the then 13-year-old Crown Prince a ride in his Army tank.

Walters's work with Morocco during this time period has even more ominous overtones. He was (and possibly still is) a general partner in a Vienna, Virginia organization called Morocco Travel Advisers. In a letter to the Senate submitted with his April 1, 1981 Disclosure Statement he said the company "provides tours of Morocco for and at the expense of U.S. travel agents." But he also noted that it was involved in "the development of tourism in the far south of Morocco and

in the contested area." Of course, "the far south of Morocco" is that portion of Western Sahara "given" by Spain to Morocco when it abandoned its colony known as Spanish Morocco, and "the contested area" is that portion given by Spain to Mauritania, abandoned by it, and claimed by Morocco. Both portions, however, comprise the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, whose people, led by Polisario, have been struggling for their independence for many years. Moreover, it was Walters, as DDCI, who convinced the Spanish to relinquish its colony to Morocco and Mauritania in the first place.³⁴

If "Environmental Energy" means military equipment, we can only surmise what "Travel Advisers" means. It would appear to be aimed directly at Polisario and the Sahrawi people.

Walters's Ties to Guatemala

Vernon Walters was perhaps President Reagan's most prominent apologist for the brutal military dictatorship of General Romeo Lucas García of Guatemala. He visited Lucas García three times; in a May 1981 press conference in Guatemala City, Walters said the U.S. wanted to help Lucas García defend "peace and liberty."³⁵ When asked about Guatemalan human rights violations, Walters said, "There will be human rights problems in the year 3000 with the governments of Mars and the moon. There are some problems that are never resolved."³⁶ A month later, U.S. aid for Guatemala resumed at a significant level.

Walters had ties to Guatemala and its murderous leaders from his "civilian" interlude in the late 1970s. One of the clients he listed in his Senate disclosure statement was Basic Research International, S.A., "an international oil cartel scouting the fields of Guatemala." They paid him \$1000 a day as a "consultant," to try to influence the Guatemalan government to lift oil production quotas. It has been charged that in this project, Basic Research issued exaggerated estimates of Guatemalan oil reserves which the State Department then used to justify continued U.S. support for the brutal regime. In fact, it has been reported that he continued to represent this company unofficially even while in Guatemala officially, during the May 1981 trip noted above.³⁷

Walters continues to flack for Guatemala. In 1985 he told an interviewer that the administration's "quiet diplomacy" really worked; the Guatemalan military is "not killing as many people as they did before."³⁸ This faint praise was not even true; virtually all reports indicated that the Guatemalan government at the time continued to have the worst human rights record in the area.

Joining the Reagan Administration

Walters was appointed a senior adviser to then Secretary of

32. Letter, Vernon A. Walters to Al Larkin, Editor, *Boston Globe Magazine*, September 14, 1982, p. 2, responding to the Jeff Stein article cited *supra*, n. 3. Michael Massing (*op. cit.* n. 7, p. 23) says that Walters acknowledged two meetings with Contreras, but his letter denies discussing Letelier "in any of the meetings with Colonel Contreras," language which suggests rather a greater number of encounters.

33. Jeff Gerth, "Former Intelligence Aides Profiting From Old Ties," *New York Times*, December 6, 1981. This, incidentally, is one of the most informative articles available on the subject. The income figures come from Walters's own disclosure statement filed with the Senate on April 1, 1981.

34. According to Jeff Gerth's congressional sources, "One of Mr. Walters's last missions in the CIA was a trip in late 1975 to Spain, where in meetings with King Hassan II of Morocco and Spanish officials he convinced Spain to give up control of Western Sahara, a Spanish colony in Africa long sought by Morocco." *New York Times*, December 6, 1981.

35. Massing, *op. cit.* n. 7, p. 24.

36. *Ibid.* Walters was accompanied on his May 1981 trip to Guatemala by Frank Ortiz, who had been removed by President Carter from his post as Ambassador to that country because he was considered "too conciliatory" to the regime. *Washington Post*, May 13, 1981.

37. *New York Times*, June 3, 1982; *CAIB*, Number 13 (July-August 1981), pp. 45, 48; *New Statesman*, February 5, 1982. *Washington Post*, July 14, 1981; December 16, 1985.

38. Massing, *op. cit.* n. 7, p. 25.



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State Alexander Haig on April 1, 1981, just two months after Reagan took office. On July 22, 1981, after Senate confirmation, he was sworn in as Ambassador-at-Large. Among his earliest duties was a deep involvement in the administration's war against Nicaragua. In 1981 and 1982 he made numerous trips to Argentina to arrange for that government's training of *contras* and for their handling of various secret payments to *contra* leaders, particularly prior to the final approval of the CIA's original plans.

Ironically, the Argentine regime was not well repaid for its clandestine help to Walters in supporting Reagan's Nicaragua policies. The *New York Times* was unusually frank: "In dozens of recent world missions, Mr. Walters has hurried six times to Argentina alone, most recently taking on the thankless task of telling his friends in the junta that, with war beginning in the Falklands, Washington had to side with Britain."³⁹

Walters had a special role in the building up of the *contra* forces waging their brutal war against Nicaragua. According to the testimony of former *contra* leader Edgar Chamorro,⁴⁰ Walters was instrumental in consolidating the forces of the former members of Somoza's National Guard:

"At that time, the ex-National Guardsmen were divided into several small bands operating along the Nicaragua-Honduras border. The largest of the bands, headed by Enrique Bermudez, a former Colonel, was called the 15th of September Legion. They were not an effective military force and represented no more than a minor irritant to the Nicaraguan government. Prior to the UDN's merger with these people, General Walters himself arranged for all the bands to be incorporated within the 15th of September Legion, and for the military government of Argentina to send several army officers to serve as advisers and trainers . . . the new organization was called the Fuerza Democratica Nicaragüense (National Democratic Force), or by its Spanish acronym, FDN."

Colombia and San Andrés Island

One of Walters's most significant achievements in his personal war against Nicaragua was a secret agreement he negotiated with the then President of Colombia, Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala aimed at setting up a top secret U.S. military base on the Colombian island of San Andrés, only 125 miles off the east coast of Nicaragua. Some \$50 million worth of sophisticated tracking radar and anti-aircraft batteries have reportedly been installed on the island and nearby keys.⁴¹

Forever Morocco

Walters has remained intimately involved with Morocco for more than 40 years. Most recently he seems to have played a considerable role in the rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco, which led to a cooling of Algerian support for Polisario. Walters is said to be close to the number two man in Algeria, Prime Minister Abdelhamid Brahimi, who lived in the U.S. in 1976, and through whom Walters arranged for the first official visit of Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid to President Reagan.

Another likely Walters operation in Morocco was the use of that country, in 1981, for meetings between high U.S. officials and Angolan traitor Jonas Savimbi. Walters had been DDCI

during the CIA's operations in Angola in 1975 and 1976, and had tried to get the Brazilians (unsuccessfully) and then the French (successfully) involved in the operations.⁴² Walters's presence in Africa is ubiquitous; nearly every year as Ambassador-at-Large he made whirlwind tours of numerous African countries. In one instance, Angola was bombed by South Africa just after he departed.

Walters in for Kirkpatrick

In February 1985, Walters was nominated by President Reagan to succeed Jeane Kirkpatrick as United Nations Ambassador. Although most reportage continued to praise Walters, reiterating all the old war stories, some of the journals were less than flattering. As Claudia Wright noted in the *New Statesman*, "Walters's candidacy for the U.N. post carries an unusual cachet: Directly or indirectly, he has been involved in overthrowing more governments than any other official still serving in the U.S. government."⁴³ And even *U.S. News & World Report* pointed out that Secretary of State George Shultz wanted Walters in the job, but without cabinet rank, "to signal a lowered U.S. appraisal of the worth of the world body."⁴⁴

Indeed, the downplaying of the role of the United Nations is a pillar of Reagan's foreign policy. And Walters is a staunch adherent of the Reagan Doctrine which, in its haughty disdain for international law, would just as soon see the world body destroyed. He has called the U.N. a "measured disappointment," because it has "drifted away from resolution of conflicts." Walters has promised to be "very tough," to "work very hard to change these voting patterns [unfavorable to the U.S.]."⁴⁵ His professed love for conflict resolution belies the administration's—and Walters's—contempt for the World Court, as evidenced by their refusal to participate in the case brought, successfully, by Nicaragua to challenge the *contra* war.

The Blackmailer

Recent press reports note that Walters has been absent from his U.N. post nearly continually the past few months, traveling around the world on more secret missions. As usual, his trips go undocumented while incidents of U.S.-sponsored terrorism continue unabated.

If all else fails, Walters is not above simple blackmail. *U.S. News & World Report* has described how he fended off a potentially hostile Senator during the Watergate hearings by discreetly threatening to bring up at the hearings the time the Senator had asked Walters, then military attaché in Paris, to ship some luxury items illegally through military channels for a group of junketing Senators.⁴⁶ These are the kinds of moves Mithridates would have approved. ●

42. See *CAIB*, Number 13 (July-August 1981), p. 20; John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies* (New York: Norton, 1978), pp. 184, 192.

43. *New Statesman*, February 8, 1985, p. 20.

44. *U.S. News & World Report*, February 18, 1985, p. 10. In fact, the dispute over cabinet status, in being leaked to the press, led to the agreement that Walters would have cabinet rank, but was followed by another dispute, whether Walters would automatically serve on the National Security Council. According to the *New York Times* (March 26, 1985, p. 1), Walters was "so distressed at not being asked to serve on the council that he submitted his resignation this afternoon." His petulance was short-lived; the next day it was announced that Walters would accept the U.N. post even though it did not include an automatic seat on the NSC. The President's press secretary did announce, though, that the President had the "highest regard" for Walters and valued his counsel. (*New York Times*, March 27, 1985, p. A3.)

45. *U.S. News & World Report*, September 3, 1985, p. 29.

46. *U.S. News & World Report*, June 3, 1985, p. 13.

39. *New York Times*, June 3, 1982.

40. Transcript, sworn testimony of Edgar Chamorro before the International Court of Justice, at The Hague, in *Nicaragua v. United States of America: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua*.

41. Jimeno and Caldas, *op. cit.* n. 9, p. 47.

Power and the Semantics of Terrorism

By Edward S. Herman*

For the average citizen of the West, the idea of the United States as a sponsor of international terrorism—let alone the *dominant* sponsor¹—would appear utterly incomprehensible. After all, one reads daily that the United States is leading the charge against something it calls “terrorism,” and it regularly assails its allies for dragging their feet in responding to terrorism. On the other hand, the U.S. government has organized a mercenary army to attack Nicaragua, and even provided it with a printed manual of recommended acts of sabotage and murder, which has been implemented by the proxy army, at the cost of well over a thousand Nicaraguan civilian lives. The U.S. government has given unstinting support to the apartheid government of South Africa, which has invaded, and organized its own mercenary armies, to subvert a string of frontline states, again at the cost of many thousands of civilian lives.² The western media, however, never refer to the United States or South Africa as “terrorist states,” even though both of them have killed vastly greater numbers than Qaddafi or the Red Brigades.³

The reason for the western misperception is that *the powerful define terrorism*, and the western media loyally follow the agenda of their own leaders. The powerful naturally define terrorism to exclude their own acts and those of their friends and clients.

“If I don’t like it, call it terrorism.”

The current administration in Washington has found it possible arbitrarily to designate *any* group or country which it opposes as “terrorist,” and this will be transmitted to the public by the mass media without serious criticism or laughter. In his speech before the American Bar Association on July 8, 1985, President Reagan named five states as engaging in serious state terrorism—North Korea, Libya, Iran, Cuba, and Nicaragua. The Soviet Union was presumably omitted because of the upcoming Summit meeting. The media reported that Syria had been spared as “a gesture of gratitude” to President Assad for his role in negotiating the release of 39 U.S. hostages in Lebanon!⁴ The press failed to discuss the fact that South Africa and Guatemala (among others) were omitted, that Nicaragua does

not murder its own citizens as South Africa and Guatemala have done on a large scale, and that Nicaragua has not invaded other countries or organized subversive forces to destabilize other countries, as South Africa has done in many places and as the United States does quite openly to Nicaragua itself. The ludicrousness and hypocrisy of the United States calling Nicaragua a terrorist state was entirely unnoticed and without effect on the objective reporting by the U.S. press. With a compliant mass media, especially in the United States but also among its clients, terror is what the powerful U.S. government declares to be terror. As it is now using the concept with audacious and arbitrary abandon, it is employing the “If I don’t like it, call it terrorism” definition of terrorism.

Exclusion of State Terrorism: Retail Versus Wholesale Terror

In its semantic manipulation of terrorism and related words, a number of devices are used by the United States and its intellectual spokespersons to differentiate friends and self from “terrorists.” Perhaps the most important is to confine the use of the word to non-state actors and actions; i.e., to define terrorism as the use of violence to *oppose* governments.⁵ This departs from standard and traditional usage, according to which terrorism is a *mode of governing* as well as of opposing governments by means of intimidation.⁶

By excluding governments, South Africa, Guatemala, and Israel are removed from the category of terrorist, while the African National Congress (ANC), rebel groups in Guatemala, and the PLO are automatically eligible. This is grotesque in terms of both numbers of victims and forms of violence employed by state and non-state intimidators,⁷ but it is extremely convenient in terms of western priorities and interests. The governments protected by this word usage are allies, clients, and self; the groups automatically made “terrorists” oppose

5. How President Reagan nevertheless refers to Nicaragua and other enemy states as “terrorist” will be discussed below under “International terrorism” and its supporters.”

6. The fifth edition of *Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary*, for example, defines terrorism as “a mode of governing, or of opposing government, by intimidation.” The *American Heritage Dictionary* defines it as “The use of terror, violence and intimidation to achieve an end.” This does not exclude governments, and the third accepted usage given is explicitly “A system of government that uses terror to rule.”

In the past, terrorism was assumed to refer *primarily* to acts of government. According to a U.N. study of terrorism, “While at first it applied mainly to those acts and policies of Government which were designed to spread terror among a population for the purpose of ensuring its submission to and conformity with the will of those Governments, it now seems to be mainly applied to actions by individuals, or groups of individuals.” “The Origins and Fundamental Causes of International Terrorism,” in M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., *International Terrorism and Political Crimes* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles Thomas, 1975), p. 5. The identification of terrorism with government receded with the rise of organized western state terror and modern public relations.

7. State terrorists use torture on a large scale; dissident groups rarely engage in this form of terror. See “U.S. Sponsorship of International Terrorism,” in this issue.

1. As I argue in “U.S. Sponsorship of International Terrorism: An Overview,” in this issue.

2. See Richard Leonard, *South Africa at War* (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill, 1983).

3. Qaddafi talks big, but carries a small terrorist stick. The U. S. leadership, by contrast, talks “anti-terrorism” and “counter-terrorism,” but carries a gigantic terrorist stick. See Table 1 and the text below.

4. Bernard Weinraub, “President Accuses 5 ‘Outlaw States’ of World Terror,” *New York Times*, July 9, 1985, p. 1.

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these clients and western defense of the status quo.⁸

To focus more sharply on the absurdity of this definitional system, I use the concepts of "retail" and "wholesale" terror: Dissident individuals and groups kill on a retail basis (that is, on a small scale, with limited technological resources to kill, and with small numbers of victims); states kill wholesale. This fairly obvious but neglected point is displayed dramatically on Table 1, which compares the numbers killed by state and non-state terrorists in recent decades. It can be quickly observed that *single incidents* of state terrorism frequently involve many more killings than multi-year totals for non-state terrorists (not to speak of the vastly greater numbers allocable to state terrorists on a multi-year basis). In fact, one can see from this table that the multi-year aggregates for the Baader-Meinhof gang (a part of row 1), the Red Brigades (only a part of the relatively small Italian total on row 2),⁹ and the PLO (row 3)—the bogeymen of the western media—even when taken together fall short of the totals for single episodes of violence by South Africa, El Salvador, and Israel. The table suggests that if we were to allow state (wholesale) terror to be included in our definition of terror and give it attention remotely proportional to numbers, El Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Israel and the United States itself would be pushed to center stage.¹⁰ the Red Brigades and PLO would recede to the background. But this would not conform to the demands of western power.

Terrorism Versus "Retaliation"

A second important device allowing "terrorist" to be applied only to the enemy is distinguishing between terrorism and "retaliation," and simply asserting that we and our friends only "retaliate" to somebody else's "terrorism." In a sequence of violence, it is often very difficult to determine where the process began, and thus the distinction between terror and retaliation is often arbitrary and depends on the ability of one side to establish its claim by sheer power. Thus, when Israel bombed Tunis, killing 20 Tunisian bystanders as well as many more Palestinians, the Reagan administration and the West accepted this as "retaliation," even though the action at Larnaca that allegedly elicited the Tunis attack was explicitly stated by its perpetrators to have been a retaliatory act against Mossad agents involved in Israeli hijackings of ships. A note found on the body of one of the Rome terrorists speaks of vengeance for the Israeli-sponsored massacres of Palestinians at Shatila and Shaba, but this was not taken seriously in the West as making the Rome attacks merely "retaliation" for a prior terrorism.¹¹ As Israel is a client state of the United States, the West allows Israel to kill always in "retaliation," never as terrorism, whereas the

PLO and other Palestinian groups are never allowed to be retaliating; they only engage in terrorism.¹²

Terrorists as Indiscriminate Killers

Terrorists are also sometimes distinguished from non-terrorist perpetrators of violence by an alleged *randomness* or *indiscriminateness* in their attacks. This is presumably less moral than non-random killing, and the claim is used to lend an aura of evil to terrorists and benignness to the other (frequently state) killers. Well-targeted killing, however, is not evidently more decent than random killing, unless the targeted victims are thought to be deserving of their fate. If redheads, or school teachers were targeted, would this be morally superior to random killing? If, however, the targeted victims are alleged to be Communists or PLO officials, in the West this may give the requisite moral aura. Frequently, of course, the targeted victims are not the only casualties, as in Tunis, but the claim of having gone after a "legitimate" target helps justify the casualties that are allegedly unintended.

As a question of fact, however, non-state terrorists such as the Baader-Meinhof gang and PLO, or SWAPO in Namibia, or the NLF in Vietnam, have *not* been more prone to indiscriminate killing than state terrorists. Most non-state dissident acts of violence are carefully targeted at some symbol of abuse, and in the case of the NLF in South Vietnam, non-selective violence was punishable as alienating the popular base sought by NLF strategy. Where dissidents take hostages, of course, the victims are often random, but neither the number of such cases nor the ensuing casualties have been large (the deaths have been a small part of the small retail totals on Table 1).¹³

On the other hand, state terror also presents a mixed picture of targeted and indiscriminate killing. State terrorists in Latin America have deliberately sought out political activists and leaders and cadres of organized groups, but where the targeted groups are large and diverse, and the term "cadres" is defined broadly (*e.g.*, active union members), the policies are reasonably described as indiscriminate. Furthermore, state terror is often very "generous" in attacking civilians at large where these are seen as a virtual enemy population. McClintock points out that "in the case of a mass-based insurgency, seconded by the vast majority of the population, the perception of the 'innocent civilian' becomes obscured." He contends that in Guatemala and El Salvador in the mid-1980s, and in the last years of Somoza, the tactics of state terror "have taken on an almost random, mass-oriented form."¹⁴ The point applies to the U.S. assault on Indochina. The essence of U.S. policy in Indochina was the massive use of firepower in the countryside, based on minimal targeting information. Civilian deaths were seen as having the merits of reducing an enemy population, forcing an exodus into the cities, arousing intense fear, and occasionally even killing an enemy soldier. In the U.S. mass

8. This usage is completely institutionalized in western discussions of terrorism. This is reflected, for example, in so-called "risk-assessment" analyses by professionals in that new field. Thus the U.S. consulting firm Risks International, Inc., confines terrorism entirely to dissident violence and excludes state murders by, say, Pinochet's government in Chile, by definition. In fact, in a recent assessment, it finds that the leading *victim* of terrorism in 1984 was the state of Chile! *Executive Risk Assessment*, December 1985, p. 30.

9. The total number killed by the Red Brigades between 1969 and 1982 has been estimated by D. Della Porta at 90, which is about the same number as were killed in the single rightwing massacre at the Bologna railway station. *Cifre Crudeli* (Bologna: Il Mulino [Istituto Cattaneo], 1984), Table 14, p. 61.

10. As Pol Pot was in his heyday of power, and as the Soviets have been in their attacks on Afghanistan since 1979.

11. The Tunis attack was of course directed at a PLO official residence. We may ask, however, whether if, immediately following the Beirut massacres of Palestinians, the PLO had successfully attacked the building of the Israeli Parliament, killing dozens of Israeli officials, this would have been considered legitimate targeting and "retaliation." And if not, why not?

12. What makes this system of words especially inappropriate is that Israel has gone to great pains to designate the PLO as "terrorist" in order not to have to deal with the Palestinians, except as a group to marginalize and exterminate. For a discussion of the fact that the Israeli government invaded Lebanon in 1982 to avoid the threat of political negotiations, claiming, of course, that they were cleaning out nests of "terrorists," see Noam Chomsky, "Libya in U.S. Demonology" in this issue. The U.S. media swallowed entirely the Israeli claim to be "retaliating" to "terrorism."

13. A significant proportion of hostages who have been killed have been victims of state efforts to recover the hostages by force. Those so killed are usually attributed to the dissident terrorists.

14. Michael McClintock, *The American Connection: State Terror and Popular Resistance in El Salvador*, Vol. 1 (London: Zed Press, 1985), p. 52.

Table 1
**Killings by State and Non-State Terrorists:
 Numbers and Orders of Magnitude¹**

	Numbers	As Multiples of German Non-State Total (Number/31)
Non-State		
1. <i>German</i> : Red Army Faction, Revolutionary Cells, and all other non-state, January 1970 to April 1979	31	1
2. <i>Italian</i> : Red Brigades and all other non-state, 1968-82	334	11
3. <i>PLO</i> : Israelis killed in all acts of terror from 1968-81	282	9
4. <i>World</i> : All "international terrorists," CIA global aggregate, 1968-80	3,368	109
Single Incidents of State Terror		
5. <i>El Salvador</i> : Rio Sumpul River, May 14, 1980	600 +	19 +
6. <i>South Africa</i> : Kassinga (Angola) refugee camp, May 4, 1978	600 +	19 +
7. <i>Guatemala</i> : Panzos, May 29, 1978	114	4
8. <i>Israel</i> : Sabra and Shatila, (Lebanon), September 1982	1,900-3,500	61-113
Larger Dimensions of State Terror		
9. <i>Argentina</i> : 1976-82 "disappeared"	11,000	355
10. <i>Chile</i> : 1973-85	20,000 +	645 +
11. <i>Dominican Republic</i> : 1965-72	2,000	64
12. <i>El Salvador</i> : Matanza I, 1932	30,000	968
13. <i>El Salvador</i> : Matanza II, 1980-85	50,000 +	1,613 +
14. <i>Guatemala</i> : Rios Montt pacification campaign, March-June 1982	2,186	70
15. <i>Guatemala</i> : 1966-85	100,000 +	3,226 +
16. <i>Indonesia</i> : 1965-66	800,000 +	25,806 +
17. <i>Indonesia</i> : Invasion and pacification of East Timor, 1980-85	200,000 +	6,452 +
18. <i>Soviet Union</i> : Afghanistan, 1979-85	200,000 +	6,452 +
19. <i>Libya</i> : External assassinations of Libyans, 1980-83	10 +	0.32
20. <i>Cambodia</i> : Pol Pot era, 1975-80	300,000 +	9,677 +
21. <i>U.S.-Sponsored Contras</i> : in Nicaragua, 1981-85	2800 +	90 +
22. <i>United States</i> : Assault on Indochina, 1955-75	4,000,000 +	129,032 +

¹ Citations for each entry are at the end of the table by number of row.

Footnotes:

1. Data from Hans-Joseph Horchem, "Political Terrorism: The German Perspective," in Ariel Merari, ed., *On Terrorism and Combatting Terrorism*, Proceedings of an International Seminar, Tel Aviv, 1979 (Frederick, Md: University Publications of America, 1985), p.63.
2. Data by Dr. Vittorio S. Pisano, *Terrorism and Security. The Italian Experience*, Report of the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Senate Judiciary Committee, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, November 1984, p.63.
3. B. Michael, *Ha'aretz*, July 16, 1982, citing official police statistics. Some of the 282 were killed by Israeli forces in attempts to free hostages by force.
4. CIA, *Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980*, June 1981, p. vi.
5. Michael McClintock, *The American Connection*, Vol. 1, State Terror and Popular Resistance in El Salvador (London: Zed, 1985), p. 306.
6. Richard Leonard, *South Africa at War* (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill, 1983), p. 67.
7. Marlies Simons, "Massacre Shakes Guatemala," *Washington Post*, July 7, 1977.
8. The Lebanese government claims to have recovered 762 bodies and that 1,200 were privately buried by relatives: Noam Chomsky, *The Fateful Triangle* (Boston: South End Press, 1983), p. 370. In a careful study, Amnon Kapeliouk estimates between 3000-3500 murdered: Amnon Kapeliouk, *Sabra & Shatila: Inquiry into a Massacre* (Belmont, Mass.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1984), pp. 62-63.
9. John Simpson and Jana Bennett, *The Disappeared and the Mothers of the Plaza* (New York: St. Martins, 1985), p. 7.
10. Amnesty International, *Report on Torture* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1975), p. 252.
11. Carlos Maria Gutierrez, *The Dominican Republic: Rebellion and Repression* (New York: Monthly Review, 1972), p.11
12. Robert Armstrong and Janet Shenk, *El Salvador: The Face of Revolution* (Boston: South End Press, 1982), p.30
13. Central America Historical Institute.
14. Amnesty International, Special Briefing, "Guatemala: Massive Extrajudicial Executions in Rural Areas under the Government of General Efraim Rios Montt," July 1982, p. x.
15. "Bitter and Cruel . . ." Report of a mission to Guatemala by the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, October 1984; C. Krueger and K. Enge, *Without Security or Development: Guatemala Militarized*, a report submitted to the Washington Office on Latin America, June 6, 1985.
16. T. B. Millar, *Australia in Peace and War* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1978), p. 539.
17. Noam Chomsky, *Towards a New Cold War* (New York: Pantheon, 1982), pp. 341 and 470 (citing Father Leoneto Vierra do Rego and Father Francisco Maria Fernandez).
18. Numbers highly uncertain. A UN Commission report estimated 35,000 civilians killed in 1985, considered a year of heavy casualties: Elaine Sciolino, "U.N. Aide Seeks to End Impasse in Afghan Talks," *New York Times*, February 27, 1986.
19. Amnesty International, *Political Killings by Governments*, (London: AI, 1983), pp. 69-77.
20. *Ibid.*, p.24
21. Center for International Communications, *Nicaragua: Development, the Counterrevolution, and Consequences* (London: CIC, 1986). The cumulative official figure for civilian deaths, 1981 through 1985, is 2817.
22. Paul Quinn-Judge, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 11, 1984; Noam Chomsky, *Turning the Tide* (Boston: South End Press, 1985), pp. 216-17.

media, B-52 raids were generally reported to be directed at "enemy base camps," parroting the language of Pentagon press releases. This was partly true, in that the villages attacked did house a population supportive of the indigenous rebels. Clearly, however, bombing addressed to an entire rural population is reasonably described as indiscriminate. This is reflected in the staggering casualty rates that were imposed on the defenseless peasant populations (see Table 1, row 22).

These policies have been brought to El Salvador where the United States is now carrying out, mainly but not entirely by a proxy army and airforce, a Vietnam-style anti-peoples war in the countryside.¹⁵ Casualty levels are huge, but the western media have turned their attention to "terrorism." The same



Credit: Salvador Human Rights Commission.

Salvadoran victim of U.S. napalm and white phosphorus bombs.

points apply to Israeli bombing raids during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and those currently being carried out against Shi'ite villages in Southern Lebanon, with heavy firepower directed at heavily populated civilian areas and therefore involving essentially random killing. Again, the West is not aroused and does not talk about going to the "source" of these killings; they are not "terrorism."

Terrorists as Manipulators of the Media

Another basis on which western terrorism experts attempt to confine attention to individual and small group actions rather than the more massive state violence is by focusing on the alleged manipulation of the media by terrorists. Terrorism may

15. Alexander Cockburn, "Remember El Salvador?," *The Nation*, June 1, 1985; Eva Gold, "The New Face of War in El Salvador: A View of Counterinsurgency Warfare," NARMIC, American Friends Service Committee, February 1986.

16. Brian Jenkins, *International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict* (California: Crescent Publications, 1975); Gabriel Weimann, "The Theatre of Terror: Effects of Press Coverage," *Journal of Communications*, Winter 1983, pp. 38-45. See also, Gabriel Weimann, "Mass Mediated Theatre of Terror: Must the Show Go On?" and Edward S. Herman, "The Use and Abuse of Terrorism: A Comment," (a reply to Weimann), in *Media and Terrorism*, Discussion Document, Carleton Center for Communications, Culture and Society (Carleton University, Canada), forthcoming.

even be *defined* by the use of violence in conjunction with a search for media publicity.¹⁶ Some retail terrorist activities are designed to attract attention to grievances, and the terrorists count on the media giving publicity to their hijackings and taking of hostages. State terrorists, by contrast, do not rely on the media in their own processes of intimidation, because their capacity for violence is sufficiently great to have the desired effects without deliberate enlistment of publicity. In fact, the problem for state terrorists is *keeping the media quiet*, so that violence can be carried out without undue public reaction.

As dissident terrorists seek publicity, while state terrorists shun it as interfering with their freedom to kill, it is obvious that a focus on the "theatre of terror" automatically serves an apologetic function. It also allows conservatives to berate the media for "encouraging terrorism" by giving the terrorists a great deal of publicity. This involves a double deception. One is the implication that the media treat dissident terrorists sympathetically. While the media occasionally do convey some of the grievances of the terrorists and allow them to appear in a human light, media coverage of terrorist events is still heavily dominated by official views and by a focus on the fate of the victims. In the aftermath of the actions these emphases and re-creation against the terrorists are overwhelming.

The second deception is more serious. The analysts of "terror theatre" fail to see the important role that publicity about dissident terror plays in sanctioning state terrorism. It was not a coincidence that the great increase in western attention to "terrorism" has accompanied the Reagan arms buildup, placement of missiles in Western Europe, and more aggressive attacks by the United States and its surrogates against Nicaraguans, Lebanese, Angolans, and Salvadoran rebels. Reagan's explicit shift in emphasis from "human rights" to "terrorism" was virtual acknowledgement of support for state terrorists and simultaneous diversion of attention to lesser terrorists.¹⁷ The great attention now given to the theatre of terror doesn't help the retail terrorists;¹⁸ it strengthens the claims of those who only "retaliate" to the terror of others. The Reagan administration's manipulation of the Libyan threat, from the mythical "hit squads" of 1981 to the deliberately provoked encounters off the Libyan coast and recent direct attacks, have been designed to shift attention from the assault on Central America, the Palestinians and assorted other Arab groups, and the frontline



Israeli tanks abandon ruins after destroying Shi'ite village of Ma'arakeh.

17. Another Orwellism may be noted here: State terrorists don't engage in terrorism, they violate "human rights"; only retail terrorists "terrorize."

18. For example, the PLO's status has been greatly reduced in the 1980s, because while massive Israeli attacks on its infrastructure has aroused no serious western recriminations at Israeli terrorism, as each PLO attack is "terrorism" it suffers a steady accumulation of moral deficits.

Credit: Prensa Latina

states of South Africa and to mobilize western populations for aggressive adventures abroad. The "theatre of terror" is managed from Washington to serve its perceived interests.

My Terror as "Counter-terror"

Another frequently encountered concept in western terrorism semantics is "counter-terrorism." As the United States and its clients, like South Africa, El Salvador, and Guatemala, do not (by definition) engage in terrorism, their attacks on their enemies require alternative words. One, as we have seen, is retaliation. But retaliation implies a response to an immediately preceding act. We need a word that allows a more continuous assault on the bases and populations of "terrorists." The gap has been filled by the concept of "counter-terror." For us and our allies, immediate violent responses are retaliation; longer term attacks are counter-terror. Thus, South Africa's systematic assaults on its neighbors to induce them to refuse sanctuary to the ANC and SWAPO—"terrorists" in western semantics and political language¹⁹—are counter-terrorism. Similarly, the massacres of peasants carried out by the Guatemalan state to root out any opposition (i.e., "terrorists") is counter-terror.²⁰ In short, what in western terrorism semantics is called "counter-terror" is in reality a dressed up form of state (wholesale) terror.

"International Terrorism" and its Supporters

A final semantic adjustment is needed so that the western establishment can tar certain disfavored states with the terrorist brush. This is done with the aid of the concept of an "international terrorist," who either kills across national borders or kills with the support of a foreign power. In western terrorism semantics, a *state* whose agents cross a border to kill is not engaging in "international terrorism," nor is aiding a state that employs systematic violence supporting international terrorism. Thus, if the United States aids Pinochet and Botha, this is not supporting international terrorism. On the other hand, aid to the ANC, or any other group *opposing* government is automatically aid to international terrorists. This is enormously helpful to Botha, Pinochet, and Reagan. On this system of definitions, also, aid by Nicaragua to the rebels of El Salvador makes the rebels international terrorists and the Nicaraguan government a "terrorist state." Attacks on both are "counter-terrorism." On the other hand, U.S. aid to the Salvadoran government is exempt from any such labeling, even though it was massive killing by the U.S.-sponsored regimes in El Salvador that literally forced a guerrilla movement into existence in the early 1980s.²¹ As the West is generally trying to bolster up existing regimes against threats from below, a definitional system that renders all rebels and liberation movements terrorists by virtue of receiving aid, while not doing the same for aid to a government they are trying to unseat, is extremely convenient.

A problem arises, of course, where the West itself supports

rebel movements and alleged "freedom fighters," as in the case of the Nicaraguan *contras* and Savimbi in Angola. If the United States organizes and supports the *contras*, and South Africa (and the United States) do the same for Savimbi in Angola, strict adherence to the West's own skewed definitions makes the United States and South Africa "terrorist states." How is this handled? The answer is, once again, power defines terrorism: what we and our allies do cannot be terrorism, so that any incompatible definitions—even our own—must be temporarily abandoned and special exceptions made.²²

The system of terrorism semantics

To summarize the western definitional system and its consequences: If the Soviet Union gives aid to the PLO, it is supporting terrorism and is a terrorist state, because the PLO uses force to oppose Israel. That intimidation is terrorism. If the United States gives aid to Israel, which invades Lebanon, imposes collective punishment on West Bank Arabs, and bombs Tunis and assorted other PLO "havens," this is not supporting terrorism because Israel only "retaliates" or engages in "counter-terrorism," as does the United States. If the United States aids the Salvadoran government as it slaughters several thousand civilians a year, this is not support of terrorism because a state killing and torturing its own citizens is excluded from the western definition. Also, if some of the people being slaughtered are rebelling, they are "terrorists" and the allied government is slaughtering as "counter-terrorism" (as in Guatemala). If the United States organizes and aids the *contras*, and supports South Africa as the latter invades its neighbors and organizes subversive armies across its borders, this is not terrorism either because the victims are aiding "terrorists" (and we and our allies are again "countering" terror), or by a special exemption to the especially virtuous—who also happens to own the most guns and the biggest cash balance. ●



Credit: William Schuap

Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman at the Symposium on State Terrorism in the Third World, Frankfurt, April 1986. Portions of this article were presented at that symposium.

19. In an interview with the Johannesburg *Financial Mail*, November 18, 1983, Charles Lichenstein, the Deputy U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., stated that "destabilization will remain in force until Angola and Mozambique do not permit their territory to be used by terrorists [sic] to attack South Africa."

20. In 1985 the Reagan administration requested \$5 million for the Guatemalan police and security assistance as part of what it called a "counter-terrorism" package.


21. See Robert Armstrong and Janet Shenk, *El Salvador: The Face of Revolution* (Boston: South End Press, 1982), Chapters 4-6; Raymond Bonner, *Weakness and Deceit: U.S. Policy and El Salvador* (New York: Times Books, 1984), Part I; Richard Alan White, *The Morass: United States Intervention in Central America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), pp. 132-34.

22. There are, of course, rationalizations for the special exceptions. As Chester Crocker explained in regard to Angola, its government is illegitimate because it was put in place by a foreign (Soviet) power. (See *Namibia and Regional Destabilization in Southern Africa*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 15, 1983, p. 43.) Only if a government is put in place by us, or meets our approval, are attacks on it by rebels terrorism.

Who Is a Terrorist?

By Philip Paull*

Whether the media identify the same individual as a "soldier of fortune," "international killer," "'dangerous' murder suspect," or "terrorist" often depends on what government directed or paid for the killing. A recent aborted attempt by Berkeley police to arrest a man wanted for murder, for example, was depicted by two Bay Area journalists, Michael Taylor of the *San Francisco Chronicle* and Vince Bielski of the *Daily Californian* as a straight local news story rather than one with far-reaching political dimensions, mainly, I assert, because the wanted killer had worked for the State of Israel, a Cold War ally of the United States. Had the wanted man been an agent of the Libyan government, the story would have made front page news in the *New York Times*. Bielski's June 6 *Californian* article was headlined "Cop bungles arrest of international killer;



David Lee Williams, Israeli-American terrorist.

Man escapes after shown own photo," and describes the alleged murderer matter-of-factly as "an assassin who has operated in the Middle East."

Michael Taylor's June 5 *Chronicle* story, "'Dangerous' Murder Suspect Evades Manhunt in Berkeley," provides more details about the suspect: To wit, David Lee Williams, also known by his Israeli *nom de guerre* David Abrams, wanted by the FBI for a brutal double murder, has numerous handguns and automatic weapons and worked as house manager of Chabad House, a residence hall for Jewish students near the University of California. He has been the target of an FBI manhunt since last February. Williams is a Vietnam veteran, a former U.S. Army paratrooper, explosives expert, and counterin-

surgency warfare instructor. The suspect "popped up" in Israel in the early 1970s, and served in the Israeli Defense Force for one year. "In 1973, he became an officer in the national police force and served on the border patrol in occupied territories." He worked in the Jerusalem police force, and in 1983, presumably in reward for a decade of unspecified services rendered to the State of Israel, was granted Israeli citizenship (which also required conversion to Judaism).

During this same period, according to unnamed FBI, U.S. Navy, and Israeli intelligence sources cited by Taylor, and from statements made by Williams to friends, he was also an "assassin in the Middle East," a "mercenary" (for the Israelis, presumably), and a "gunrunner" with "volatile" moods.

The real story involves more than just a "bungled arrest," obviously. For a decade or more Williams served the Israeli defense and security services. Yet none of the news reporters sought to uncover what role, if any, the U.S. government played in this arrangement. Were U.S. intelligence agencies—always in close contact with Israeli intelligence—aware of this use of a U.S. national?

Neither story uncovered or even questioned the possible duties Williams/Abrams performed as a member of the Israeli armed forces and the Israeli national police, particularly duties performed in the Israeli-occupied territories. What were the duties that required the use of an American mercenary when Israel possesses the most highly trained military/intelligence personnel in the world? Is it possible the Israeli government is engaged in activities they wish to keep secret from its own citizenry? Is this an isolated case or part of a pattern? Whom did Williams actually assassinate "in the Middle East," and who directed and financed the assassinations? How and where was Williams involved in gunrunning?

The local media coverage also missed the indirect but nevertheless significant connection between the Williams/Abrams case and the ongoing Pollard spy case. The Israelis have been saying that the Pollard case represents an isolated rogue espionage caper and that no other Americans have been employed by the Israeli security and intelligence services as spies for Israel. But what about employing Americans for Israeli-sponsored covert action "dirty tricks" operations involving assassinations and gunrunning?

In the Pollard spy case, the Israelis created a new identity for Pollard which he would assume, together with a Swiss bank account and pension after a planned decade of service to the State of Israel. This scheme included the granting of an Israeli passport and Israeli citizenship. In the Williams case the same employment pattern is followed, casting doubt on Israeli denials that the Pollard case is unique.

I would have headlined the original story, "Former U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Expert and Israeli Terrorist, Wanted for Double Murder, Escapes Police/FBI Dragnet. State Department and CIA Queried on Israel's Employment of U.S. Nationals as 'Middle East Assassins.'" ●

* Philip Paull is a contributing editor of *Propaganda Analysis Review*, a publication of the Media Alliance, an organization of 300 Bay Area media persons. This article is to appear in the third issue of *PAR*, to be published in August 1986. For back issues (\$1.00 each) and further information, write to Media Alliance, Bldg. D - Fort Mason, San Francisco CA 94123.

Libya in U.S. Demonology

By Noam Chomsky*

St. Augustine tells the story of a pirate captured by Alexander the Great, who asked him "how he dares molest the sea." "How dare you molest the whole world?" the pirate replied. "Because I do it with a little ship only, I am called a thief; you, doing it with a great navy, are called an Emperor."

The pirate's answer was "elegant and excellent," St. Augustine relates. It captures with some accuracy the current relations between the United States and Libya, a minor actor on the stage of international terrorism.

More generally, St. Augustine's tale reaches to the heart of the cynical frenzy over "international terrorism" currently being orchestrated as a cover for western violence, and illuminates the meaning of the concept in contemporary western usage. The term "terrorism" came into use at the end of the

18th century, primarily to designate violent acts of governments intended to ensure popular submission. That concept, plainly, is of little benefit to the practitioners of state terrorism, who, holding power, are in a position to control the system of thought and expression. The original sense has therefore been abandoned, and the term "terrorism" has come to be applied mainly to "retail terrorism" by individuals or groups.¹ Whereas the term was once applied to Emperors who molest their own subjects and the world, now it is restricted to thieves who molest the powerful.

Extricating ourselves from the system of indoctrination, we will use the term "terrorism" to refer to the threat or use of violence to intimidate or coerce (generally for political ends), whether it is the wholesale terrorism of the Emperor or the retail terrorism of the thief.

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1. "Origins and Fundamental Causes of International Terrorism," U.N. Secretariat, reprinted in M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., *International Terrorism and Political Crimes* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles Thomas, 1975).



An American missile lights up the sky over Tripoli as the U.S. commences its predawn bombing raid, Tuesday, April 15, 1986.

In the true sense of the term, Libya is a terrorist state: the latest Amnesty International Report lists the killings, through 1985, of 14 Libyan citizens by this terrorist state, four abroad, the major acts of terrorism plausibly attributed to Libya. In the course of the hysteria orchestrated to serve other ends, all sorts of charges have been made, but the record confirms the April 1986 statement of a senior U.S. intelligence official that "what happened a few weeks ago is that Khadafy, who previously had used his people primarily to assassinate Libyan dissidents, made a clear decision to target Americans."² Qaddafi's alleged decision followed the Gulf of Sidra incident, when a U.S. air and naval armada sank Libyan vessels with many killed, and is entirely legitimate, indeed much belated, under the cynical doctrines professed by the United States executive, as we shall see directly.

Amnesty International reports that Libya's terrorist killings began in early 1980, at the time when Jimmy Carter launched the terrorist war in El Salvador with José Napoleón Duarte serving as a cover to ensure that arms would flow to the killers. While Libya was killing 14 of its own citizens, along with a handful of others, the U.S. client regime of El Salvador killed some 50,000 of its citizens in the course of what Bishop Rivera y Damas, who succeeded the assassinated Archbishop Romero, described in October 1980 as "a war of extermination and genocide against a defenseless civilian population." The security forces who perform these necessary chores were hailed by Duarte, a few weeks later, for their "valiant service alongside the people against subversion" while he conceded that "the masses were with the guerrillas" when this exercise began under the Carter-Duarte alliance. Duarte expressed this praise for the mass murderers as he was sworn in as President of the Junta in an effort to lend it legitimacy and ensure the flow of arms after the murder of four American churchwomen, generally regarded here as improper, though such partisans of terror and torture as Jeane Kirkpatrick and Alexander Haig, offered justifications even for this act.

The slaughter in El Salvador is not mere state terrorism on a massive scale, but international terrorism, given the organization, supply, training, and direct participation by the ruler of the hemisphere. The same is true of the massacre of some 70,000 Guatemalans in the same years, when U.S. arms to the murderers flowed at close to the normal level contrary to what is commonly alleged, though it was necessary to call in U.S. proxies, the neo-Nazi Argentine generals and Israel, to implement the slaughter more efficiently, and to construct an arms pipeline involving Belgium and other collaborators, under the illegal direction of the Pentagon and the CIA. Meanwhile Reagan and his associates extolled the killers and torturers for their human rights improvements and "total dedication to democracy." "The striking feature of Libyan atrocities," two observers note in reviewing the Amnesty International study of state terror, "is that they are the only ones whose numbers are sufficiently limited that the individual cases can be enumerated," in striking contrast to Argentina, Indonesia, or the Central American states where the Emperor molests the world.³

2. William Beecher, *Boston Globe*, April 15, 1986.

3. Amnesty International Report—1985 (London, 1985); *Political Killings by Governments* (AI Report, London, 1983); Chris Krueger and Kjell Enge, *Security and Development Conditions in the Guatemalan Highlands* (Washington Office on Latin America, 1985); John Haiman and Anna Meigs, "Khadafy: Man and Myth," *Africa Events*, February 1986; Allan Nairn, "The Guatemala Connection," *Progressive*, May 1986. References not given here and below can be found in my *Turning the Tide* (Boston: South End Press, 1985).

U.S. international terrorism in El Salvador is hailed as a magnificent achievement across the mainstream political spectrum in the United States because it laid the basis for what is called "democracy" in western parlance: namely, the rule of elite groups serving the needs of the Global Enforcer with the public occasionally mobilized to ratify elite decisions. In El Salvador, the United States organized what Herman and Brodhead call "demonstration elections" to pacify the home front, carried out in an atmosphere of "terror and despair, macabre rumor and grisly reality," in the words of the observers of the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group.⁴ The U.S. press lauded this demonstration of our passionate commitment to democracy, as *Pravda* does under similar circumstances. Guatemala is also considered a success, for similar reasons. When half the population is marched to the polls after it has been properly traumatized by U.S.-backed violence, enlightened American humanists are overjoyed at this renewed demonstration of our love for democracy, untroubled by the rise in death squad killings after the elections (including at least 94 deaths and 35 disappearances in the weeks following President Marco Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo's January inauguration), the open recognition by the newly-elected president that he can do nothing given the roots of actual power in the military and the oligarchy and that the civilian government are merely "the managers of bankruptcy and misery,"⁵ and the fact that the reaction in the United States helps convert the elections into a means for the U.S. to participate more fully in state terror and repression, as in El Salvador. In fact, elections in U.S. terror states are often a disaster for the domestic population, for this essential reason. These two examples, of course, represent only a small part of the U.S. role in international terrorism during the 1980s, and the grisly record goes back many years.

In short, Libya is indeed a terrorist state, but in the world of international terrorism, it is hardly even a bit player.

"Their Side" Is Terrorist

The pirate's maxim explains the useful concept of "international terrorism" only in part. It is necessary to add a second feature: An act of terrorism enters the canon only if it is committed by "their side," not ours. Consider, for example, the public relations campaign about "international terrorism" launched in early 1981 by the Reagan administration. The

4. Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, *Demonstration Elections* (Boston: South End Press, 1984). They define this concept to refer to a device of foreign intervention in which elections are "organized and staged by a foreign power primarily to pacify a restive home population," discussing several other examples as well and showing in detail that they are no less farcical than elections held under Soviet authority. Their term "demonstration elections" was borrowed and radically misused with reference to the election in Nicaragua by Robert Leiken (*New York Review of Books*, December 5, 1985), as part of his campaign in support of the terrorist proxy army established by the U.S. to attack Nicaragua from its Honduran and Costa Rican bases. See Brodhead and Herman's letter, published after half a year's delay along with others by British Parliamentary observers (June 26, 1986), and Leiken's response, tacitly conceding the accuracy of their critique (by evasion) while claiming that they designed their concept "as a way of focusing attention on Western imperialism while diverting it from Soviet imperialism . . . in line with their apparent belief that there is only one superpower villain." This is the standard reflex of propagandists whose deceit is exposed, in this case, requiring the suppression of Brodhead and Herman's harsh critique of elections in Poland along with much else. The remainder of Leiken's response and his articles themselves maintain a comparable level of integrity and merit careful reading for those interested in the workings of the U.S. ideological system.

5. Council on Hemispheric Affairs, *Washington Report on the Hemisphere*, April 16, 1986.

major text was Claire Sterling's *The Terror Network*, which offered an ingenious proof that international terrorism is a "Soviet-inspired" instrument "aimed at the destabilization of western democratic society." The proof is that the major terrorist actions are confined to the western democratic states, and are not "directed against the Soviet Union or any of its satellites or client states." This profound insight much impressed other terrorologists, notably, Walter Laqueur, who wrote that Sterling had provided "ample evidence" that terrorism occurs "almost exclusively in democratic or relatively democratic countries."⁶

The Sterling thesis is true, in fact true by definition, given the way the term "terrorism" is employed by the Emperor and his loyal coterie. Since only acts committed by "their side" count as terrorism, it follows that Sterling is necessarily correct, whatever the facts. In the real world, the story is quite different. The major victims of international terrorism⁷ in the several decades prior to the Sterling-Laqueur pronouncements were Cuba and the Palestinians, but none of this counts, by definition. When Israel bombs Palestinian refugee camps killing many civilians—often without even a pretense of "reprisal"—or sends its troops into Lebanese villages in "counterterror" operations where they murder and destroy, or hijacks ships and places thousands of hostages in prison camps under horrifying conditions, this is not "terrorism"; in fact, the rare voices of protest are thunderously condemned by loyal Party Liners for their "anti-Semitism" and "double standard," demonstrated by their failure to join the chorus of praise for "a country that cares for human life" (*Washington Post*), whose "high moral purpose" (*Time*) is the object of never-ending awe and acclaim, a country which, according to its American clique, "is held to a higher law, as interpreted for it by journalists" (Walter Goodman).⁸

Similarly, it is not terrorism when paramilitary forces operating from U.S. bases and trained by the CIA bombard Cuban hotels, sink fishing boats and attack Russian ships in Cuban harbors, poison crops and livestock, attempt to assassinate Castro, and so on, in missions that were running almost weekly at their peak.⁹ These and innumerable similar actions on the part of the Emperor and his clients are not the subject of conferences and learned tomes, or of anguished commentary and diatribes in the media and journals of opinion.

Not only is "terrorism" defined for ideological serviceability, but standards of evidence are also conveniently set so as to achieve the Emperor's goals. To demonstrate Libya's role as a state terrorist, the flimsiest evidence, or none at all, will suffice. The headline of a *New York Times* editorial justifying the terrorist attack that killed some 100 people in Libya reads "To

Save the Next Natasha Simpson," referring to the 11-year-old American girl who was one of the victims of the terrorist attacks in the Rome and Vienna air terminals on December 27, 1985; these victims entitle us to bomb Libyan cities "to discourage state-supported terrorism," the editors solemnly inform us. It is only a minor defect that no evidence has been presented to implicate Libya in these actions. The Italian and Austrian governments stated that the terrorists were trained in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon and had come via Damascus, a conclusion reiterated by Israeli Defense Minister Rabin. Four months later, in response to U.S. claims about Libyan involvement in the Vienna attack, the Austrian Minister of Interior stated that "there is not the slightest evidence to implicate Libya," again citing Syria as the connection and adding that Washington had never presented the evidence of Libyan complicity it had promised to provide to the Austrian authorities. He also added the correct but—in the U.S.—inexpressible comment that the problem of Lebanese-based terrorism lies largely in the failure to solve the Palestine problem, which has led desperate people to turn to violence, exactly the result intended by U.S.-Israeli terrorism, a matter to which we return.¹⁰

If an individual implicated in a terrorist act once paid a visit to Libya, or is alleged to have received training or funds from Libya in the past, that suffices for condemnation of Qaddafi as a "mad dog" who must be eradicated. The same standards would implicate the CIA in the murderous exploits of Cuban exiles, among numerous others. Keeping just to 1985, one of the suspects in the bombing of the Air India jumbo jet near Ireland that was the year's worst terrorist act, killing 329 people, was trained in an anti-communist school for mercenaries in Alabama. The terrorist action that cost the most lives in the Middle East was a car-bombing in Beirut in March that killed 80 people and wounded 200, carried out by a Lebanese intelligence unit trained and supported by the CIA, in an effort to kill a Shi'ite leader who was believed to have been involved in "terrorist attacks against U.S. installations" in Beirut; the term "terrorism" is commonly used by foreign armies in reference to actions against them by the local population which, as in this case, plausibly see them as an occupying force attempting to impose a detested political settlement.¹¹ By the standards of evidence used in the case of Libya, the U.S. is the world's leading terrorist power, even if we exclude the wholesale terrorism ruled ineligible by the propaganda system by the means already described.

What the President calls "the evil scourge of terrorism" (in the specific western sense) was placed in the central focus of attention by the Reagan administration as it came into office in 1981. The reasons were transparent, though inexpressible within the doctrinal system. The administration was committed to three related policies, all achieved with some success: (1) transfer of resources from the poor to the rich; (2) a massive increase in the state sector of the economy in the traditional American way, through the Pentagon system—a device to force the public to invest in high technology industry by means of the state-guaranteed market for the production of high tech-

6. See my *Towards a New Cold War* (New York: Pantheon, 1982), for references and discussion, and for more on the topic, Edward S. Herman, *The Real Terror Network* (Boston: South End Press, 1982).

7. I exclude here outright aggression, as in the case of the U.S. attack against South Vietnam, then all of Indochina, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S.-backed invasions of East Timor and Lebanon by its Indonesian and Israeli clients, etc.

8. *Washington Post*, June 30, 1985; *Time*, October 11, 1982; Goodman, *New York Times*, February 7, 1984. For recent discussion of the astonishing record of Israeli terrorism and the western response, or lack of it, see my papers "International Terrorism: Image and Reality," delivered at the Frankfurt conference on International Terrorism, April 1986, and "Middle East Terrorism," forthcoming in *Race & Class*.

9. See references in note 6. And see Warren Hinckle and William Turner, *The Fish is Red* (New York: Harper & Row, 1981). And see Edward S. Herman, "U.S. Sponsorship of International Terrorism: An Overview," in this issue of *CAIB*.

10. Editorial, *New York Times*, April 20, 1985; *Washington Post*, January 11, 1986; Rabin, *Boston Globe*, January 25, 1986; *El Pais* (Madrid), April 25, 1986.

11. *New York Times*, June 27; Bob Woodward and Charles R. Babcock, *Washington Post*, May 12; Philip Shenon, *New York Times*, May 14, 1985, for CIA denial of involvement "disputed by some Administration and Congressional officials who said that the agency was working with the group at the time of the bombing."

nology waste (armaments), and thus to contribute to the general program of public subsidy, private profit, called "free enterprise"; and (3) a substantial increase in the U.S. role in intervention, subversion, and international terrorism (in the true sense of the expression). Such policies cannot be presented to the public in the terms in which they are intended. They can be implemented only if the general population is properly frightened by monsters against whom we must defend ourselves.

The standard device is an appeal to the threat of Reagan's "Evil Empire," what President Kennedy called "the monolithic and ruthless conspiracy" bent on world conquest, as he launched a rather similar program.¹² But confrontation with the Evil Empire can be a dangerous affair, so it is preferable to do battle with safer enemies designated as the Evil Empire's proxies, a choice that conforms well to the third plank in the Reagan agenda, pursued for quite independent reasons: to ensure "stability" and "order" in our global domains. The "international terrorism" of properly chosen pirates, or of enemies such as Nicaragua or Salvadoran peasants who dare to defend themselves from our terrorist attack, is a far preferable target, and with an efficiently functioning propaganda system, it can be exploited to induce a proper sense of fear and mobilization among the domestic population.

Qaddafi as Scapegoat

Libya fit the need perfectly. Qaddafi is easy to hate and Libya is weak and defenseless, so that martial flourishes and, when needed, murder of Libyans can be conducted with impunity. The glorious military victory in Grenada, a culmination of the extreme hostility and aggressiveness of the Carter-Reagan administrations after the Bishop government threatened to consider the needs of the poor population, served similar ends. The point is readily perceived abroad. American journalist Donald Neff, writing in a British publication about the March 1986 Gulf of Sidra incident, comments that "this



Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi with his adopted daughter, who was killed in the bombing of his home.

12. Kennedy's program was limited to the second and third plank of the Reagan agenda; the first, which was enthusiastically supported by congressional Democrats under Reagan and indeed had already been proposed by Carter, in direct violation of the will of the public, reflects the decline in relative U.S. power in the intervening years. It is no longer feasible to pursue "great societies at home and grand designs abroad," in the words of Kennedy adviser Walter Heller, so the former must be abandoned. On public attitudes, see *Turning the Tide*, chapter 5, and Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, *Atlantic Monthly*, May 1986.

was less of a Rambo-style operation than a demonstration of the bully on the block picking a fight. It was typical of Reagan. In his five years in office, he has repeatedly got away with lording it over little guys. He did this time too."¹³ It is an interesting fact about American culture that this regular show of cowardice and two-bit thuggery seems to strike a responsive chord.

The public relations specialists of the Reagan administration understood the utility of the Libyan enemy and wasted little time in confronting this dangerous foe. Libya was at once designated as a prime agent of the Soviet-inspired "terror network," and in July 1981, a CIA plan to overthrow and possibly kill Qaddafi with a paramilitary campaign of terror within Libya was leaked to the press.¹⁴

We might note parenthetically that by U.S. standards, this plan authorized Qaddafi to carry out acts of terror against American targets in "self-defense against future attack," the words of White House spokesman Larry Speakes presenting the official justification for the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi. The same justification was reiterated at the United Nations by Vernon Walters and Herbert Okun. The administration even had the gall to argue that this right, which not even Hitler claimed and which, if proclaimed by other violent states, would tear to shreds what little remains of global order and international law, is in accord with the United Nations Charter; no form of legal sophistry can bridge that gap, but Reagan's pronouncement was duly acclaimed by Anthony Lewis for its reliance "on a legal argument that violence against the perpetrators of repeated violence is justified as an act of self-defense." The reason why the U.S. justified the attack "on the basis of pre-empting an attack, which could be seen as a form of self-defense, [rather] than as a retaliatory action" was explained by a State Department official, who noted that the U.N. Charter expressly forbids the use of force except in self-defense—in fact, self-defense against armed attack, until the U.N. acts after a formal request by the country that regards itself as the victim of a sudden and overwhelming armed attack.¹⁵

In August 1981, the anti-Qaddafi message "was reinforced by the trap laid for Libya in the Gulf of Sidra," a trap "elaborately planned on the U.S. side" with the intent of a confrontation in which Libyan jets could be shot down, as they were, Edward Haley observes in his bitterly anti-Qaddafi study of U.S. relations with Libya. One specific purpose, Haley plausibly argues, was to "exploit the 'Libyan menace' in order to win support for steps [the administration] wished to take in pursuit of Secretary Haig's 'strategic consensus' against the Soviet Union, and as an element in the arrangements necessary for the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force," targeted primarily at the Middle East. In November, the administration concocted a ludicrous tale about Libyan hit-men roaming the streets of Washington to assassinate Our Leader, eliciting feverish media commentary along with some limited skepticism. When questioned about the plot, Reagan stated: "We have the evidence, and [Qaddafi] knows it."¹⁶ The story faded away when its purpose was served, and the press was suffi-

13. *Middle East International*, April 4, 1986.

14. See P. Edward Haley, *Qaddafi and the U.S. Since 1969* (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 271 f.

15. Larry Speakes, national TV, 7:30 PM, April 14; *New York Times*, April 16; Associated Press, April 14; *New York Times*, April 15; Lewis, *New York Times*, April 17; Bernard Weinraub, *New York Times*, April 15, 1986.

16. Haley, *op. cit.*, n. 14, pp. 8, 264.



Composite sketches of alleged Libyan "hit team" which Jack Anderson distributed to press and TV networks. Later Anderson wrote that he had been set up by an unnamed intelligence agency.

ciently disciplined so as not to report the exposure in the British press that the "assassins" on the official U.S. list, leaked in England, were prominent members of the (passionately anti-Libyan) Lebanese Amal, including Nabih Berri and the elderly religious leader of the Shi'ite community.¹⁷

Other tales included a Libyan threat to invade the Sudan across 600 miles of desert (with the Egyptian and U.S. air forces helpless to impede this outrage) and a plot to overthrow the government of the Sudan in February 1983—conveniently discovered at a moment when the administration's reactionary constituency was charging it with insufficient militancy—a plot so subtle that Sudanese and Egyptian intelligence knew nothing about it, as U.S. reporters who took the trouble to go to Khartoum to investigate quickly discovered. The U.S. responded to the fabricated plot with an elaborate show of force, enabling Secretary of State Shultz, who had been denounced as too faint-hearted, to strike heroic poses on television while announcing that Qaddafi "is back in his box where he belongs" because Reagan acted "quickly and decisively" against this threat to world order. Again, the episode was forgotten when its purposes had been served. There have been a series of similar examples. The media have generally played their appointed role, with only occasional demurrers.¹⁸

The events of March-April 1986 fit the familiar pattern to perfection. The Gulf of Sidra operation in March was plainly timed to stir up jingoist hysteria just prior to the crucial Senate vote on contra aid, coinciding with a fabricated Nicaraguan "invasion" of Honduras as Nicaragua exercised its legal right of hot pursuit to expel from its territory U.S. proxy forces dispatched by their master from their Honduras bases to sow terror in Nicaragua prior to the Senate vote. The public relations campaign succeeded brilliantly as demonstrated by the enraged reaction of congressional doves and the media fairly generally, and the Senate vote. The charade also permitted the administration to provide \$20 million of military aid to Honduras, which Honduras officially maintains that it did not request, and

17. *New Statesman*, August 16, 1985.

18. See my *Fateful Triangle* (Boston: South End Press, 1983), p. 210; Haley, *op. cit.*, n. 14, makes a praiseworthy effort to take the comedy seriously.

which has no doubt been conveniently "lost" in the *contra* camps, yet another method by which the lawless band in Washington evades the weak congressional restrictions on their thuggery.¹⁹ The Libyan provocation too was a success, enabling U.S. forces to sink several Libyan boats, killing more than 50 Libyans, and, it was hoped, to incite Qaddafi to acts of terror against Americans, as was subsequently claimed.

While the U.S. forces were successful in killing many Libyans, they were singularly unable to rescue survivors. The task was apparently not impossible, since 16 survivors of the U.S. attack were rescued from a lifeboat by a Spanish oil tanker.²⁰



Libyan ship burns in the Gulf of Sidra after being bombed by naval aircraft from the Sixth Fleet. The Americans refused to rescue Libyan sailors from several sinking ships, and more than 50 died.

The official purpose of the U.S. military operation was to establish the right of passage in the Gulf of Sidra, perfect nonsense, since dispatch of a naval flotilla was hardly the necessary or appropriate means to achieve this end; in fact, under international law, a public declaration or the commencement of court proceedings would have sufficed. Since there was plainly no urgency, it was possible to resort to legal means to establish the right of innocent passage. But a violent terrorist state will naturally observe different priorities.

The U.S. position is dubious on narrower grounds. The press continually speaks of "the law of the sea," but Libya shot at U.S. planes, not U.S. ships, and "the law of the air"

19. "The Central Intelligence Agency, barred from providing military aid to Nicaragua rebels, secretly funneled several million dollars to the rebels for political projects over the past year. U.S. government officials say," also allowing "the CIA to maintain a strong influence over the rebel movement, even though a Congressional ban existed from October 1984 through September 1985, prohibiting the agency from spending money 'which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua,' the officials said." One purpose of what U.S. officials described as "a major program" was to "create the aura that [the *contras*] are an actual political entity among our allies in Europe." Congressman Sam Gejdenson stated that "We suspected that the CIA had never really withdrawn from the scene, but the extent of the agency's direct involvement in the Contra war may astound even the most jaded observer." UNO documents obtained by the Associated Press "show much of UNO's political money going to military organizations allied with the umbrella group" established by the U.S., while some of the funds were used to pay off Honduran and Costa Rican officials "to enable the rebels to operate in those countries." Much of the money was funneled through a Bahamas branch of a London bank. Associated Press, April 14; *Boston Globe*, April 14, 1986. The disclosures passed without comment. Subsequently, the *Miami Herald* reported that over \$2 million of the \$27 million provided by Congress for "humanitarian assistance" was used to pay Honduran officers "to turn a blind eye to illegal contra activities on Honduran soil" (editorial, *Boston Globe*, May 13, 1986).

20. Associated Press, March 27, citing *El Pais*.

barely exists. States make various claims in this regard. The U.S., for example, claims a 200-mile Air Defense Identification Zone within which it has the right to exercise "self-defense" against intruding aircraft judged to be hostile. There is no doubt that U.S. aircraft were well within 200 miles of Libyan territory—40 miles, the Pentagon claims—and that they were hostile, so that by U.S. standards, Libya was within its rights to intercept them. The point was noted by the conservative legal scholar Alfred Rubin of the Fletcher School at Tufts University, who commented that "by sending in aircraft we went beyond what we were clearly authorized to do under the Law of the Sea" in "an unnecessary provocation."²¹ But for a gangster state, such matters are irrelevant, and the exercise was a success, domestically at least.

The extent of the provocation in the Gulf of Sidra was made clear by Pentagon spokesman Robert Sims, who "said that U.S. policy is to shoot at any Libyan boat that enters international waters in the Gulf of Sidra for as long as the U.S. naval exercise in that region continues—no matter how far away the boat might be from U.S. ships." "Given the 'hostile intent' displayed by Libya when it tried to shoot down U.S.

warplanes," Sims stated, any Libyan military vessel is "a threat to our forces."²² In short, the U.S. maintains the right of "self-defense" against any Libyan vessel that approaches its naval armada off the Libyan coast, but Libya does not have a right of self-defense in airspace comparable to that claimed by the U.S.

There is more to the story. David Blundy interviewed British engineers in Tripoli who were repairing the Soviet-installed radar system. One, who says he was monitoring the incident throughout on the radar screens (which, contrary to Pentagon claims, were not rendered inoperative), reports that "he saw American warplanes cross not only into the 12 miles of Libyan territorial waters, but over Libyan land as well." "I watched the planes fly approximately eight miles into Libyan air space," he said. "I don't think the Libyans had any choice but to hit back. In my opinion they were reluctant to do so." The engineer added that "American warplanes made their approach using a normal civil airline traffic route and followed in the wake of a Libyan airliner, so that its radar blip would mask them on the Libyan radar screen."²³

21. Richard Higgins, *Boston Globe*, March 25, 1986.

22. Fred Kaplan, *Boston Globe*, March 26, 1986.

23. London *Sunday Times*, April 6, 1986.

The Photos You Didn't See In the U.S. Media



U.S. bombing of residential districts of Tripoli resulted in many civilian casualties and much property damage.



Libyan peasants surveying damage to what was their barn.



The French Embassy after U.S. bombing raid of Tripoli.



Fragment of a body after the bombing.

No hint of this information appeared in the national press, to my knowledge, apart from a typically excellent report by Alexander Cockburn, playing his usual role of personal antidote to media subservience and distortion. Blundy's article was not mysteriously missed by the U.S. press. It was cited by Joseph Lelyveld of the *New York Times*, but with its crucial content entirely omitted.²⁴

One likely consequence of the Gulf of Sidra operation was to elicit acts of Libyan terrorism in retaliation. These would then have the effect of inducing a state of terror in the United States and, with some luck, in Europe as well, setting the stage for the next escalation. The bombing of the La Belle discotheque in West Berlin on April 5, with one American and one Turk killed, was immediately blamed on Libya, and was then used as the pretext for the April 14 bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi, with about 100 Libyans killed, neatly timed the day before the expected House vote on *contra* aid. In case the audience missed the point, Reagan's speech writers made it explicit. Addressing the American Business Conference on April 15, he said: "And I would remind the House voting this week that this arch-terrorist has sent \$400 million and an arsenal of weapons and advisers into Nicaragua to bring his war home to the United States. He has bragged that he is helping the Nicaraguans because they fight America on its own ground."²⁵ The idea that the "mad dog" is bringing his war home to the U.S. by providing arms to people the U.S. is attacking with its terrorist proxy army was a nice touch, which passed without notable comment, but the public relations operation did not, for once, succeed in steamrolling Congress, though the bombing of Libya did enflame chauvinist passions. This consequence was largely attributable, perhaps, to the rampant anti-Arab racism in the United States and the absence of any sane reaction to earlier episodes of manufactured hysteria over Qaddafi's real and alleged crimes.

The April 14 attack was the first bombing in history staged for prime time television. As the subsequently published record shows, the bombing raids were carefully timed so that they would begin precisely at 7PM Eastern Standard Time—as they did; that is, precisely at the moment when all three national television channels broadcast their national news, which was of course pre-empted as agitated anchor men switched to Tripoli for direct eyewitness reports of the exciting events. As soon as the raids ended, the White House had Larry Speakes address a press conference, followed by other dignitaries, ensuring total domination of the propaganda system during the crucial early hours.

Difficult Questions

One might argue that the administration took a gamble in this transparent public relations operation, since journalists might have asked some difficult questions, but the White House was justly confident that nothing untoward would occur and its faith in the servility of the media proved to be warranted.

Questions could have been raised, surely. To mention only the most obvious one, Speakes stated that the U.S. knew on April 4 that the East Berlin Libyan "People's Bureau" had informed Tripoli that an attack would take place in Berlin the following day, and that it then informed Tripoli that the La Belle



The hour of the attack: A grandfather clock in a Tripoli home near the French Embassy, stopped at 2 a.m., just when the home was destroyed.

discotheque bombing had taken place, as planned. Thus the U.S. knew on April 4-5—with certainty, the White House alleged—that Libya was directly responsible for the disco bombing. One might have asked, then, why the reports of U.S. and West German investigations from April 5 to the moment of the attack consistently stated that there were at most suspicions of Libyan involvement. In fact, every journalist listening to the administration story had in his or her hands—unless we assume the most astonishing incompetence on the part of the news rooms—a report from Berlin which came across the wires at 6:28 PM EST, a half-hour before the bombing, stating that "the Allied military command [in West Berlin] reported no developments in the investigation of the disco bombing" and that "U.S. and West German officials have said Libya—possibly through its embassy in Communist-ruled East Berlin—is suspected of involvement in the bombing of the La Belle nightclub" (my emphasis).²⁶ Some journalist might have asked, then, how it is that just prior to the attack, the U.S. and West Germany still had at most suspicions of Libyan involvement—as throughout the preceding period—while on April 4-5, ten days earlier, they had certain knowledge of it. But no embarrassing questions were asked then, nor have they been since, and the relevant facts have been largely suppressed.

Reagan stated on the evening of April 14 that "our evidence is direct, it is precise, it is irrefutable"—just as "We have the evidence, and [Qaddafi] knows it" in the case of the Libyan hit-men, not to speak of the Sandinista involvement in drug-peddling, their announcement of a "revolution without frontiers," the support of Helmut Kohl and Bettino Craxi for the Libyan attack (angrily denied by "shocked" officials in Germany and Italy),²⁷ and numerous other fabrications of an administration that has broken the usual records for deceit, but continues "to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat"—in the words of the titular leadership, referring to his Stalinist models—to achieve its ends, confident that the occasional exposure in the small print, well after the fact, will not prevent the constant stream of lies from setting the terms of debate and leaving the appropriate impressions firmly implanted, exactly as it does.

Beyond the borders, discipline does not reign. In Germany, a week after Washington had stated its certain knowledge ten days earlier of Libyan responsibility for the disco bombing, *Der Spiegel* reported that the famed telephone intercepts apparently do not exist and that West Berlin intelligence has only suspicions about Libyan involvement, also suspecting "rival groups of drug dealers" among other possibilities, including

24. Cockburn, *Wall Street Journal*, April 17; also *The Nation*, April 26, 1986. Lelyveld, *New York Times*, April 18, 1986.

25. *New York Times*, April 16, 1986.

26. Associated Press, April 14, 1986.

27. James M. Markham, *New York Times*, April 25, 1986.

neo-Nazi groups. Washington's war is "a means of politics," "insofar as the enemy is as small as Grenada and Libya—and the adversary is as ideal a scoundrel as Qaddafi," and no European leader should have any illusions that Europe's concerns or interests will be considered if the U.S. decides to escalate international violence, even to the level of a final World War, editor Rudolf Augstein adds.²⁸ In an interview on April 28 with a reporter for the U.S. Army journal *Stars and Stripes*, Manfred Ganschow, chief of the Berlin Staatschutz and head of the 100-man team investigating the disco bombing, stated that "I have no more evidence that Libya was connected to the bombing than I had when you first called me two days after the act. Which is none." He agreed that it was "a highly political case" and hinted at considerable skepticism about what "the politicians" were saying and would say about it.²⁹ The U.S. press has concealed the doubts expressed by the Berlin investigators, but the careful reader will discern them in the reports of the continuing investigation, as suspects alleged to have Syrian and other connections are investigated.

For much of the world, the U.S. has become an object of considerable fear, as its "bizarre cowboy leader" engages in acts of "madness" in organizing a "band of cutthroats" to attack Nicaragua and playing mad bomber elsewhere, in the words of Canada's leading journal, generally restrained and quite pro-U.S. in tendency.³⁰ The Reagan administration is playing on these fears. At the Tokyo Summit of the advanced industrial democracies in May, the Reagan administration circulated a position paper in which it stated that one reason why Europe would be wise to line up in the U.S. crusade is "the need to do something so that the crazy Americans won't take matters into their own hands again." The threat succeeded in eliciting a statement against terrorism mentioning only Libya by name.³¹

The reaction to the bombing of Libya at home and abroad was sharply different. Expecting the worst, the 12-member European Economic Community called upon the U.S. to avoid "further escalation of military tension in the region with all the inherent dangers." A few hours later, U.S. warplanes struck, as West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher was on his way to Washington to explain the EEC position. His spokesman stated that "We want to do everything we can to avoid a military escalation." The bombing aroused extensive protest throughout most of Europe, including large-scale demonstrations, and evoked editorial condemnation in most of the world. Spain's major journal, the independent *El Pais*, condemned the raid, writing that "The military action of the United States is not only an offense against international law and a grave threat to peace in the Mediterranean, but a mockery of its European allies, who did not find motives for economic sanctions against Libya in a meeting Monday, despite being previously and without success pressured to adopt

sanctions." The conservative *South China Morning Post* in Hong Kong wrote that "President Reagan's cure for the 'mad dog of the Middle East' may prove more lethal than the disease," and his action "may also have lit the fuse to a wider conflagration" in the Middle East. In Mexico City, *El Universal* wrote that the U.S. "has no right to set itself up as the defender of world freedom," urging recourse to legal means through the United Nations. There were many similar reactions.

The U.S. press, in contrast, was overwhelmingly favorable. The *New York Times* wrote that "even the most scrupulous citizen can only approve and applaud the American attacks on Libya," describing this as a just sentence: "the United States has prosecuted [Qaddafi] carefully, proportionately—and justly." The evidence for Libyan responsibility for the disco bombing has been "now laid out clearly to the public"; "Then came the jury, the European governments to which the United States went out of its way to send emissaries to share evidence and urge concerted action against the Libyan leader." It is irrelevant, apparently, that the jury was hardly convinced by the evidence, and issued a "judgment" calling on the executioner to refrain from any action.

Most governments also condemned the action, though not all. The government-controlled South African Broadcasting Corporation said the attack "underlines the commitment the leader of the western world has made to taking positive action against terrorism"; the U.S. was justified in attacking Qaddafi, "whose name is virtually synonymous with international terrorism." In Israel, Prime Minister Shimon Peres stated that the U.S. action was clearly justified "in self-defense": "If the Libyan Government issues orders to murder American soldiers in Beirut in cold blood, in the middle of the night, what do you expect the United States to do? Sing Hallelujah? Or take action in her defense?" The idea that the U.S. was acting in "self-defense" against an attack on her forces in Beirut two and a half years earlier is an intriguing innovation, even putting aside the circumstances of that earlier act of "terrorism" against the military forces that much of the population saw as imposing the "New Order" that Israel had sought to establish: the rule of right-wing Christians and selected Muslim elites.³²

In the U.S., Senator Mark Hatfield denounced the U.S. bombing raid "on a nearly deserted Senate floor," and in a letter to the *Times*. Leaders of several major Christian denominations condemned the bombing, but Jewish leaders generally praised it, among them, Rabbi Alexander Schindler, president of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, who "said the U.S. government 'properly and vigorously responded' to the 'mindless terrorism' " of Qaddafi. Harvard international affairs professor Joseph Nye said Reagan had to respond "to the smoking gun of that Berlin thing. What else do you do about state-supported terrorism?"—such as U.S.-supported terrorism in Central America, for example, where the "smoking gun" is considerably more in evidence. Eugene Rostow supported the bombing as part of a "more active defense against the process of Soviet expansion," a step that was "inevitable and overdue." The "forcible removal of the Qaddafi regime," he explained, "would be fully justified under the existing rules of international law," since he "has flagrantly and continually violated these rules." "That being the case,

28. *Der Spiegel*, April 21, 1986; the front cover features the phrase "Terror against Terror," a well-known Gestapo slogan, presumably not selected by accident. See also Norman Birnbaum's article, same issue.

29. Text of interview provided by a journalist for *Stars and Stripes* in Germany. The bombing may, in fact, have been the result of gang warfare involving nightclub ownership; other sources in Berlin raise the possibility that a neo-Nazi group or the Ku Klux Klan (which had verbally attacked the club) may have been involved.

30. *Toronto Globe & Mail*, editorials, March 28, 18, 5, 1986, referring specifically to Nicaragua.

31. See Associated Press, *International Herald Tribune*, May 6, for extensive discussion; *New York Times*, May 6, 1986, a briefer mention, and the text of the statement.

32. Associated Press, April 14; survey of world press reaction, Associated Press, April 15; survey of U.S. editorial reaction, April 16; editorial, *New York Times*, April 15, 1986; Peres, *New York Times*, April 16.

every state injured by Libya's actions has the right, alone or with others, to use whatever force is reasonably necessary to put an end to Libya's illegal behavior. Libya is in the legal position of the Barbary pirates." He urged NATO to "issue a declaration on the responsibility of states for illegal acts committed from their territory." *A fortiori*, then, NATO should condemn the Emperor, not just the pirate, and states from Indochina to Central America to the Middle East, among others, should organize to use whatever force is necessary to attack the United States, Israel and other terrorist states.³³

The U.S. bombing of Libya had nothing to do with "terrorism," even in the hypocritical western sense of the word. In fact, it was clear enough that the Gulf of Sidra operation and the bombing of Libyan cities would if anything incite such retail terrorism, one major reason why the likely targets in Europe pleaded with the U.S. to refrain from such action.

This is hardly the first time that violent actions have been executed with the expectation that they would incite retail terrorism. Consider the U.S.-backed Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, undertaken against the background of persistent U.S.-Israeli refusal to permit a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.³⁴ After the Israeli-initiated exchange across the Israel-Lebanon border in June 1981 with some 450 Arabs and six Jews killed, the border was "quiet" in the racist terms of American discourse, meaning that there was no PLO response to the many Israeli provocations (including bombing of civilian areas with many killed) undertaken in an effort to elicit a "terrorist act" that could be exploited to justify the planned invasion. Finally, Israel invaded on a pretext in June 1982, proceeding to destroy the civilian base of the PLO in Lebanon and demolish much of what remained of Lebanese society. The goal was to establish a "New Order" under Israeli domination at least in Lebanon and to secure Israel's integration of the occupied territories. It was clear at once that these acts could only have the effect of inspiring what the West calls "terrorism," and indeed, most terrorism, in the western sense, has since originated in the ruins of Lebanon.

The real reason for the 1982 invasion was not the threat to the northern Galilee, as the sanitized history regularly offered to American audiences pretends, but rather the opposite, as was plausibly explained by Israel's leading specialist on the Palestinians, Yehoshua Porath, shortly after the invasion was launched. The decision to invade, he suggests, "flowed from the very fact that the cease-fire had been observed." This was a "veritable catastrophe" for the Israeli government, because it threatened the policy of evading a political settlement. "The government's hope," he continued, "is that the stricken PLO, lacking a logistic and territorial base, will return to its earlier terrorism; it will carry out bombings throughout the world, hijack airplanes, and murder many Israelis," and thus "will lose part of the political legitimacy it has gained" and "undercut the danger" of negotiations with representative Palestinians, which would threaten the policy—shared by both major

political groupings—of keeping effective control over the occupied territories.³⁵ The plausible assumption of the Israeli leadership was that those who shape public opinion in the United States—the only country that counts, now that Israel has chosen to become a mercenary state serving the interests of its provider—could be counted on to obliterate the actual history and portray the terrorist acts resulting from Israeli aggression and atrocities as random acts of violence ascribable to defects in Arab character and culture, if not racial deficiencies.



Credit: Prensa Latina

Victims of Israeli bombing of Beirut, 1982.

Recent U.S. commentary on terrorism fulfills these natural expectations with some precision.

The basic points are understood well enough in Israel. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir stated over Israeli television that Israel went to war because there was "a terrible danger. . . . Not so much a military one as a political one," prompting the fine Israeli satirist B. Michael to write that "the lame excuse of a military danger or a danger to the Galilee is dead." We "have removed the political danger" by striking first, in time; now, "Thank God, there is no one to talk to." Other Israeli commentators have made essentially the same point.

In short, the goals of the war were political, the occupied territories being a prime target. The tale about protecting the border from terrorism is agitprop, eagerly swallowed by the docile western media. If Palestinian terrorism can be revived, so much the better. And if we can't pin the blame on Arafat, he can at least be stigmatized as "the founding father of contemporary Palestinian violence,"³⁶ so that his efforts at political settlement can be evaded. The attack on Libya may also inspire retail terrorism, which will serve to mobilize domestic and foreign opinion in support of U.S. plans at home and abroad. If Americans react, as they have, by general hysteria, including fear of traveling to Europe where visitors will be at least 100 times as safe as in any American city, this too is a net benefit, for the same reasons.

U.S. Escalation Strategy

The real reasons for the U.S. attack on Libya have nothing to do with self-defense against "terrorist attacks" on U.S. forces in Beirut in October 1983, as Shimon Peres would have it, or any of the other actions attributed rightly or wrongly to Libya, or "self-defense against future attack" in accord with

33. Associated Press, April 21; *New York Times*, April 20; survey of religious reactions, Associated Press, April 17; also April 19, reporting a news conference of 14 religious and community groups in Seattle condemning the bombing in contrast to support for it by the Western Washington Rabbinic Board; Nye, *Boston Globe*, April 16; Rostow, *New York Times*, April 27.

34. On the actual record, very different from the fabrications that dominate U.S. discussion, see *Fateful Triangle*, chapter 3. For a detailed account of Israel's rejectionism under the Labor Party in the crucial 1967-73 period, based on the internal record, see Yossi Beilin, *Mechiro shel Ichud* (Tel Aviv, 1985); as this and other sources demonstrate, the story goes back to the early days of the founding of the state.

35. *Ha'aretz*, June 25, 1982; see *Fateful Triangle*, pp. 200 f., for further quotes and similar analyses by other Israeli commentators, and for a review of the events leading up to the invasion.

36. *New Republic*, January 20, 1986.

the astonishing doctrine proclaimed by the Reagan administration to much domestic acclaim. Libya's terrorism is a minor irritant, but Qaddafi has stood in the way of U.S. plans in North Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere: supporting Polisario and anti-U.S. groups in the Sudan, forging a union with Morocco, intervening in Chad,³⁷ and in general interfering with U.S. efforts to forge a "strategic consensus" in the region, and to impose its will elsewhere. These are real crimes, which must be punished.

Furthermore, the Libyan attack had the purpose, and the effect, of preparing opinion at home and abroad for further acts of U.S. violence. The immediate response might be negative, but once absorbed, the level of expectation is heightened and the U.S. can proceed to further escalation.

There are two major areas where such escalation is likely. The first is Central America. While the U.S. proxy army has succeeded in its major task of "forcing [the Sandinistas] to divert scarce resources to the war and away from social programs," as explained in a rare moment of candor by administration officials,³⁸ it is unlikely that it can "cut out the cancer"; hence the threat of successful independent development in terms that might be meaningful to the suffering population of U.S. client states will remain. Domestic and international pressures prevent the U.S. from attacking directly, as the U.S. attacked South Vietnam in 1962 and later all of Indochina; and the more indirect means of terror, while largely successful in El Salvador, may be inadequate for Nicaragua. It would be natural, then, for the U.S. to move to an arena where it is more likely to prevail: international confrontation. The U.S. has succeeded in cowering most of its allies into refraining from offering any meaningful assistance to Nicaragua, thus largely achieving the intended goal of forcing them to rely on the Soviet bloc for survival. The recent congressional battle over \$100 million of aid is basically a sideshow; a lawless administration will find ways of funding its terrorist army somehow, whatever Congress legislates. What is important is a more symbolic victory: congressional authorization for direct CIA involvement and escalation by other means. The obvious means are threats to Soviet and Cuban shipping. Nicaragua would not be able to respond, but the U.S.S.R. and Cuba might. If they do, the U.S. propaganda system can be counted on to react with outrage over this new proof of Communist aggression, allowing the administration to construct an international crisis in which, it may be assumed, the U.S.S.R. will back down, so that Nicaragua will be effectively blockaded. If they do not respond, the same result will be achieved. Of course, the world may go up in smoke, but that is a minor consideration in comparison with the need to excise the cancer. U.S. and European opinion must be prepared for these eventualities. The bombing of Libya turns the ratchet another notch.

The second area where world opinion must be prepared for eventual escalation is the Middle East. The U.S. has blocked political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict at least since 1971, when President Sadat of Egypt made his first proposal for a full peace treaty (offering nothing to the Palestinians, and in almost precise accord with official U.S. policy as well as the

international consensus). In the situation of military confrontation that results from U.S.-Israeli rejectionism, Israel cannot permit any combination of Arab states to approach its military power, since it will face the threat of destruction. The Camp David agreements succeeded in excluding the major Arab state, Egypt, from the conflict, thus allowing Israel to expand its steps towards integrating the occupied territories and to attack its northern neighbor. But Syria remains a growing threat, and sooner or later, Israel will have to act to eliminate it. There is substantial war talk in Israel today, generally alleging Syrian belligerency and threat, but concealing the Israeli intention—indeed, need, as long as a political settlement is averted—to strike to eliminate a possible military rival. The U.S. media follow along, as usual.

Meanwhile, the U.S. government surely wants to leave its options open. It would make sense for an Israeli strike against Syria to be accompanied by U.S. bombing, the former presented as a "pre-emptive strike" in "self-defense against future attack," the latter packaged for western consumption as "self-defense" against Syrian-inspired terrorism. The purpose of direct U.S. participation would be to warn the Soviet Union that a global war will result from any attempt on their part to support their Syrian ally. European and U.S. opinion must be prepared for such possible moves. The attack on Libya, and the subsequent propaganda campaigns, help set the stage, leaving the U.S. more free to consider these options if they are later deemed necessary. Again, the likelihood of a nuclear war is not small, but the U.S. has shown repeatedly that it is prepared to face this danger to achieve its ends in the Middle East, as elsewhere. ●



Angry Libyans at funeral procession in Tripoli, April 18, 1986, for sixteen adults and four children, some of the victims of the U.S. bombing.

Credit: Associated Press

37. The first Libyan intervention followed the dispatch of French Foreign Legion forces, advisers and aircraft (Haley, *op. cit.*, n. 14, p. 98), but French intervention in Africa is legitimate, indeed laudatory; as *Business Week* exulted, French forces help "keep West Africa safe for French, American, and other foreign oilmen" (August 10, 1981), and perform similar services elsewhere.

38. Julia Preston, *Boston Globe*, Feb. 9, 1986.

Half a Billion Allocated:

The CIA Chooses a New *Contra* Leader

By Ellen Ray, William Schaap, and Louis Wolf

There were two fantasies pervading Congress last month: one was the notion that the CIA was *not* directing the *contra* forces battling the Sandinista government of Nicaragua; the other was the belief that *only* \$100 million was being approved for that vile and illegal war. *CAIB* has confirmed that both ideas are specious.

Controlling the *Contras*

The suggestion that the CIA has been cooling its heels for the past year or two would be fatuous, were it not for the excessive naiveté on the part of so many legislators. Less than three weeks after the June 25 vote, the Reagan administration announced that, although the State Department "would have overall policy direction of the operations," the CIA was being given "day-to-day responsibility for managing rebels' military operations against the Nicaraguan government."¹ One would imagine this was a new assignment for the CIA.

But the CIA has a history of avoiding congressional restrictions, often quite deviously, and the *contra* war has been no exception. It is interesting, though, that in the case of CIA control of the *contras*, developments that were reported on the wire services, and in some newspapers, did not get mentioned in the *New York Times* or the *Washington Post*, and most readers, and members of Congress, even if they saw the stories, did not understand the implications of what they read.

At the outset, there were numerous reports in the press that the CIA had a major role in urging upon the various feuding *contra* personalities the formation of an umbrella organization, the Unidad Nicaragüense Opositora (UNO). Moreover, in March of this year, amidst allegations of rampant corruption in UNO, the CIA stepped in to control the feuding and the funds. According to an investigation by Robert Parry and Brian Barger of the Associated Press, first reported on April 5, 1986, the UNO appointed a "Secretary General" to coordinate political and financial operations, to "improve UNO's efficiency and increase the cooperation among the three directors," Adolfo Calero, Arturo Cruz, and Alfonso Robelo—whose bickering, cronyism, and graft were becoming major embarrassments. Indeed, the UNO was being accused not only of a failure to achieve unity among the anti-Sandinista forces, but also of representing not the Nicaraguan people, but the U.S. government. The latter charge was, and is, particularly true. The news of the creation of the new position was kept quiet, according to the AP's sources, because "admission of existing problems could undercut President Reagan's request for \$100 million in military and other aid." As it turned out, of course,

neither these problems, nor very credible reports of massive drug dealing, graft, and illegal weapons trading by *contra* leaders,² had any effect on the Congress.

Leonardo Somarriba, Agent

The Secretary General is Leonardo Somarriba, an expatriate Nicaraguan businessman who runs a photocopy store, Sir Speedy, on Brickell Avenue in Miami. The U.S.-educated Somarriba had been a spokesman for the Nicaraguan Business Council, "a group of conservative exiled business leaders" in Miami. In January the council had privately circulated a paper criticizing in particular the sloppy accounting and record keeping of the UNO, defects which led to the February report of the General Accounting Office noting that more than \$7 million of the \$27 million voted by Congress for "humanitarian aid" was missing. The next month, Somarriba took over as chief executive officer, and a month later, the AP broke the story.

Very few newspapers—and no influential major papers—carried the wire service report. Thus very few people learned that: "Several Nicaraguan exiles said Somarriba had a close working relationship with the CIA. Former FDN [Nicaraguan Democratic Force, the dominant member of UNO] leader Edgar Chamorro said when he was recruited by the CIA into the FDN's directorate in late 1982, Somarriba accompanied a senior CIA official to an initial recruitment meeting in Miami."

CAIB interviewed Chamorro at his home in Key Biscayne. He confirmed the AP report. "Somarriba was with the CIA in Nicaragua," he told us; "he is with the CIA in Miami now," he continued; "and he has been appointed Secretary General of UNO. That means the CIA is controlling that organization. . . . It means the CIA wants to control the organization politically, because they already control it militarily, with Bermudez and Calero. . . . This appointment means that the executive decision making is in the hands of Americans, . . . the executive control of the group comes from Washington, from the CIA—not just Washington, but from the CIA where this man Somarriba has been working very closely with them, that is what I see."

During the first year of the Sandinista government, Somarriba was close to Jorge Salazar, the leader of a business group opposed to the new government. Salazar was killed in November 1980 in a shootout with Sandinista police, who said he was caught with a cache of weapons. Somarriba was then jailed for several weeks and left for Miami when he was freed. According to Chamorro, Somarriba was not only working for

1. *New York Times*, July 12, 1986, p. 1.

2. See the *New York Times*, July 10, 1986, p. B5.

Credit: Miami Herald



CIA mystery man Leonardo Somarriba.

the CIA while still in Nicaragua, he was also working for Fidel Angel Chávez Mena, the Foreign Minister of El Salvador. Later, according to Chamorro, Somarriba worked for Chávez Mena in El Salvador as well, helping him to channel CIA funds to the 1984 election campaign of José Napoleón Duarte. Chávez Mena is still a member of Duarte's cabinet.

The Chief Executive Officer

In May Somarriba attended the week-long UNO strategy session in Miami. On Wednesday, May 14, Presidential envoy Philip Habib sat in, and appeared for the press with Calero, Robelo, Cruz, and Somarriba. Somarriba's presence was duly reported by AP, and duly ignored by the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*. The point of all this, of course, is that the CIA, which supposedly does *not* control the funding of the *contras*, has installed its agent as the Secretary General in control of the very funds in question.

Somarriba's reformist zeal is limited. As he told the AP a few days later (April 13, 1986), "money was used as 'pay-offs,' to encourage support among exiles. Some of that is necessary," he said, "but we hope to be minimizing it in the future." From the beginning, Somarriba played down his role. He told the AP reporters that he accepted the characterization of his role as "chief executive officer," and that "better management was needed if UNO was effectively to handle the large amounts of aid that Reagan is requesting." He wanted to create a structure within which the three UNO leaders could work together, but, he said, "I personally have no political ambitions." *CAIB* has learned that there are reports of serious disputes between Somarriba and Calero, who has been angry about both the criticism of FDN and the appointment of Somarriba since the beginning. He, for one, saw Somarriba's appointment as a power shift, because Somarriba, as Chamorro told *CAIB*, has been identified with the more moderate opposition, "a classic CIA technique." While Cruz and Robelo seem willing to put up with Somarriba, Calero's attitude has been described as "petulant, cocky, rude." Whether Calero's powerful position will force some changes remains to be seen.

Slippery Language

Putting aside the wrath of Calero, Somarriba's role and duties are only enhanced by the new law. While the administration has announced, as expected, that the CIA will oversee day-to-day operations, the law bars U.S. citizens employed by the government from working with the *contras* while inside Nicaraguan territory, but explicitly allows the liaison use of non-citizens working for the CIA—known in Agency jargon as Unilaterally Controlled Latino Assets, or UCLAs. (Such chauvinist hypocrisy is not unusual in Congress.) The July 7 issue of *Newsweek* magazine reported that the CIA has been unusually active recruiting Spanish-speaking agents, and *CAIB* has learned of such activity in Los Angeles and San Francisco, and in New York and New Jersey.

More surprisingly, *Newsweek* reported that despite the bill's \$100 million figure, the CIA "is preparing to provide the rebel forces with covert logistical support, training, communications, and intelligence worth the equivalent of \$400 million." The White House spokesperson, Larry Speakes, had "no comment." The State Department's representative, Charles Redman, said, after a day of stonewalling, "The story is wrong."

But if anything, the \$400 million figure is somewhat modest. The CIA has had millions of dollars in special "contingency" funds in its *contra* pipeline ever since it organized the FDN in 1981. These funds have continued to flow throughout the operative periods of the Boland Amendment and other attempts to ban the overthrow of the government of Nicaragua.

Congressional Ineptitude

The House did not know what hit them this time. Rep. Chalmers Wylie (Rep.-Ohio), who changed his vote after a lengthy call from the President, admitted he could not name the countries of Central America. After some heavy arm-twisting, the White House won the key vote by the slim margin of 12 votes, 221-209, but there are lingering doubts that many of the members on the winning side grasped the implications of their votes. Virtually all national opinion polls indicate that a substantial majority of the citizenry is opposed to the overthrow of the Nicaraguan government, and that they strenuously oppose the introduction of U.S. military personnel into the conflict, something Congress refused to prohibit in the bill which passed.

Shortly before the final vote, Rep. David Obey (Dem.-Wisc.) tried to warn his colleagues: "If anybody really believes this little war that will be conducted under the administration policy will be a minor, little pop-gun affair, I urge you, I beg you, to read the classified annex to this legislation which will describe in detail what kind of equipment and what kinds of activities will be carried out if the administration program prevails."

Terrorism Wins

Obey's warnings ran up against a stone wall. Soon the voting was over. At a CIA-choreographed press conference, the victorious *contra* leaders brushed aside reporters' questions about allegations of continuing wholesale torture, murder, corruption, and drug dealing. Cruz, Robelo, and Calero posed in "I'm a *Contra* Too" tee-shirts and vowed, "Now that America is behind us, we will win." A few days later, on July 5, President Reagan outdid himself. Of the vote to give \$100 million to a band of brutal terrorists, he said, "I'm sure it put a smile on the face of the Statue of Liberty." ●

Index

to *CAIB* Numbers 13 - 25

Compiled by Daniel Brandt.

- A**
 Aaby, Peter 18:43
 Aaron, David 13:10
 Aaron, Harold A. 17:40
 ABC newspaper (Spain) 18:13
 ABC-TV 16:48; 17:32,41,46
 Abdallah, Ahmed 16:7
 Abramowitz, Morton I. 17:32
 Abrams, Elliott 18:3-4,17; 20:6
 Abs, Hermann J. 25:35
 Abshire, David M. 14-15:3
 Abzug, Bella 13:50
 Accuracy in Media 13:48; 16:27; 19:7,16; 22:31; 24:36
 "Accuracy in Media: Accuracy in Media
 Rewrites the News and History" (Wolf) 21:24-38
 Acheson, Dean G. 21:24
 Ackerman, Mike E.C. 17:48
 Acosta, Jorge 16:15
 Acropolis Books 21:26
 Adams, Hank 24:20-21
 Adams, Ian
 S: Portrait of a Spy 13:51
 Adams, Nathan M. 19:10
 Adams, Tom 16:16; 20:6-7,13-14
 Adenauer, Konrad 25:6,27
 Aderholt, Harry C. "Heinie" 18:48-50; 22:33; 25:37,52,56
 Adkins, James Lee 14-15:7
 Afghanistan 17:13,17
 CIA in 14-15:2-3
 Africa *see also* Southern Africa
 "Reagan and Africa: The Empire Strikes Back"
 13:34-36; resources for organizing 13:50-51; 17:47; 23:40
Africa News 13:50
Africa Now 13:20
Africa Report 13:13
 Africa World Press
 Beirat: Frontline Story 19:35
 African National Congress 13:5,29-30,36; 18:54,56,62; 22:39
 African-American Institute 13:13
 African-American Labor Center 18:53
Afrique-Asie 13:50-51
 Agca, Adnan 23:10
 Agca, Mehmet Ali 18:12-13; 19:13-21; 21:20; 23:3-38; 25:30
 Agee, Philip B. 14-15:4-5,12,14; 16:18,24,35; 17:28,47; 18:22,53; 19:7,33-34; 20:19; 21:34
 "The Journalist Spy: A Friendly Interview"
 19:33-34
 Agent Orange 17:7; 18:58; 21:29-30
 Aggett, Neil 18:55; 19:22
 Agnew, Spiro T. 21:29
 Aguirre, Horacio 16:36
 Ahmad, Feroz 19:19; 23:11,38
 Ainsworth, Kathy 16:46
 Air America, Inc. 16:51; 18:47,58; 20:27,40
 Air Asia 20:40
 Air Commando Association 22:33; 25:37,52-53,56
 Aitken, Robert D. 14-15:7
 Aivazov, Todor 23:9,22-23 *see also* 19:17
 Aker, Frank 18:60
 Akins, John 17:32
 Akinyele (American in Grenada) 20:9
 Alabama National Guard 22:18-19
 Alabama Power Company 21:28
 Albano (Italian prosecutor) 23:4,9,24,26,33-34,37; 38
 Albrecht, William, Jr. 24:28
 Albright, Cliff 22:18-19
 Alejos Arzu, Roberto 25:36
 Alexander, Brian 16:54
 Alexiev, Alex 22:31
 Alexis, Francis 20:20
 Algeria, CIA in 14-15:14
 Alibux, Errol 20:6
 Allavena, Giovanni 25:35
 Allegrett Perez, José Ivan 22:13
 Allen, Charles 25:28
 Allen, Richard V. 13:7,9; 16:5-6,57; 17:49; 18:15
 Allende, Beatriz 21:31
 Allende, Salvador 16:37; 19:25-27,31; 20:3; 21:25,31
 Allied Educational Foundation 21:28,35,37
 Allied Trades Council 21:35-36
 Allis-Chalmers Company 13:5
 Alpha 66 18:3; 21:3; 22:41
 Altmann, Klaus (pseud.) 25:8-10,16-17
 Alvarez Martinez, Gustavo Adolfo 18:8,27-28,30; 20:34,38; 22:19,25-26
 Alvaro de Portillo, General 18:12
 Alvez Pacheco, Ludwig 25:19
 Ambeva, Edward 17:12
 Ambros, Otto 25:28
 American Afro-Asian Educational Exchange, Inc. 22:15
 American Association for the Advancement of Science 16:31
 American Bar Association

Committee on Law and National Security 24:35
 American-Chilean Council 22:15
 American Civil Liberties Union 14-15:5; 22:3
 American Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters 22:15
 American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism 25:33
 American Conservative Union 21:26
 American Continental Corporation 21:28
 American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service 18:51
 American Enterprise Institute 16:56; 18:6; 21:29; 22:5; 24:35
 American Financial Corporation Foundation 21:28
 American Foreign Policy Institute 25:32
 American Friends Service Committee 18:51
 American Indian Movement 18:24; 24:16-21; 25:54
 American Institute in Taiwan 16:56
 American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) 13:45; 16:22-23; 18:6; 20:4; 21:37; 25:28,34
 American Legion 13:7
 American Liberty League 25:23-24
 American Medical Association 21:28
 American Security Council 13:2,12; 18:24; 21:25,37; 22:33; 25:32,51
 American Security Council Foundation 19:31
 American Telephone and Telegraph 16:22
 American University (Cairo) 13:55
 Americans for Indian Opportunity 18:24
 Americas Foundation 25:35-37,53
 Americas Watch 18:24
 Amnesty International 16:15; 18:37,55; 21:15; 23:28; 25:21
Disappearances: A Workbook 13:51; *Torture in the Eighties* 21:39
 Anagnostakis, Yiannis 25:48
 Anagnostakis, Yiorgios 25:48
 Andalien (Chile) 16:42
 Anderson, Christopher Billy 13:25; 16:45-46
 Anderson, Jack 13:50; 16:25-26; 17:32,37,39,41-42,50; 18:64; 19:7; 20:28,44; 21:31,34,44; 22:32; 25:32,50
 Anderson, Jon Lee 22:32-33
 Anderson, Thomas P. 18:28
 Andrews, Don 13:25; 16:44,47
 Andronov, Iona 23:30-31
 Andropov, Yuri 19:14; 21:20
 Angelini, Fiorenzo 25:31
 Angleton, James Jesus 13:30; 18:12; 19:37-38; 25:13-14,31-33,36
 Angola 13:6,12,21,35,38; 22:37-40
"Angola: Pretoria's Continuing War" 16:11-12; CIA in 18:53; 22:10,13,38; COMIRA 16:12; FNLA 13:10,16-17; 21:25; MPLA 13:16,32,38; 19:7,32; UNITA 13:8-10,12,16-18,31,34-35,38; 16:12; 18:53; 19:32; 21:25,42; 22:4,38,40
 Annenberg, Walter H. 21:29
 Anti-Apartheid Movement
Anti-Apartheid News 13:51
 Anti-Imperialist Tribunal of Central America and the Caribbean (Soberania) 16:3; 17:47
 Antonov, Mrs. 23:25,34
 Antonov, Sergei Ivanov 19:17,22-24; 21:20-21; 23:3-4,9,18,23-26,32,34-37; 25:30
 Apple, R.W. Jr. 19:24; 23:38
 Aquash, Anna Mae Pictou 24:17,19-21,24,27
 Aquino, Benigno 20:39
 Araujo, Richard 22:31
 Arazi, Yehuda 20:36
 Arce Gomez, Luis 25:18,20
 Arellano, John G. 24:21
 Arens, Moshe 20:37
 Argen Information Services 13:20-21
 Argentina
"Argentina Activates International Death Squads" (Ray) 16:14-16; AAA (Anti-Communist League) 23:18; advisors in Central America 16:3,14-16; 18:8; SIE (intelligence agency) 25:18
 Arias, Monsignor 18:17
 Arkin, William M.
Research Guide to Current Military and Strategic Affairs 17:47
 arms sales 13:15; 20:34-37
 Armstrong, Robert and Janet Shenk

El Salvador: The Face of the Revolution 17:47
 Armstrong, William L. 22:31,33
 Arnaldo, Prince 25:36
 Arnold, Daniel Clay 17:32,34-35; 18:48-50; 22:33
 Arnson, Cynthia 13:44
 Arocena Perez, Eduardo Victor 22:35
 Arriba 18:13
 Arron, Henck A.E. 18:63
 Arrow Air 20:20
 Arrupe, Pedro 18:12
 Arthur, David
 Constantine Menges: CIA Ideologue" 16:22-23
 Aryan Nations 24:3
 Ashbrook, John 14-15:5; 16:27
 Ashby, Timothy 20:17
 Ashworth, Jim 20:19
 Asia, resources for organizing 13:51; 23:40
 Asia Resource Center 23:40
 Asian Peoples Anti-Communist League 22:15
 Asian Speakers Bureau 25:30
 Aspinall, Edward 18:62
 Associated Press 18:4-5; 19:34
 Association for Cultural Freedom 16:53
 Association of Former Intelligence Officers 20:37; 21:31,37; 24:35-36
 Association for International Development (Australia) 16:51
 Astiz, Alfredo 16:14-15; 17:3
 Astorga, Nora 20:39
 Atkins, Edwin Franklin 14-15:8
 Atkinson, Don 20:14
Atlantic Community 23:27
 Attiyeh, Richard 17:49
 Auberlin, Irene 18:48-50
 Augsburg, Emil 25:8-10
 Austin, Hudson 20:5,9-10,13,39
 Australasian and Pacific Holdings, Ltd. 16:51
 Australia
 "The Australian Connection: Nugan Hand, the CIA Bank" (Grodin) 16:51-55; ASIO (intelligence agency) 16:53; Federal Bureau of Narcotics 16:54
 Axioti, Melpo 25:44
 Ay, Omer 19:18; 23:24
 Ayvazov, Todor 19:17 *see also* Aivozov, Todor 23:9, 22-23

B

Baader-Meinhof Group 24:5
 Bacon, George III 17:45; 22:13,16
 Bad Heart Bull, Sarah 24:20
 Bagci, Omer 19:18; 23:12
 Bain, Fitzroy 20:11,21
 Bain, Noel 20:11,21
 Bains, Jim 16:49
 Baker, Donald 24:21
 Baker, Howard, Jr. 17:13
 Bamburg, James R. 17:8,11
 Bamford, James
The Puzzle Palace (review) 18:57-58
 Ban the Soviets Coalition 21:3
 Banca Privata 25:35
 Banco Ambrosiano 23:19-20; 25:34-35
 Banda, Hastings 13:31
 Bangladesh, CIA in 14-15:7
 Bank of America 16:22; 21:18
 Bank for International Settlements 25:24
 Banks, Dennis 24:20,22-24,28-29
 Banks, John 13:53-54; 17:50,52
 Banzer Plan 18:17
 Baraona Urzua, Pablo 18:14
 Barasch, George D. 21:35-37
 Barbados 16:16; 17:47; 20:4-7,13
 Barbie, Klaus 25:2,5-10,15-20
 "Klaus Barbie: A Killer's Career" (Hermann) 25:15-20
 Baretella, Mark B. 20:14
 Barger, Sonny 17:42
 Barmine, Alexander 19:24
 Barnard, Neil 13:32-33
 Barnes, Michael 16:19
 Barnes, Scott T.
 "Agent Exposes Secret Mission" 17:32-33;
 "Excerpts from CAIB-Scott Barnes Interview" 17:33-36; "Scott Barnes: Spook or Spoof?" (Cody) 17:37-42
 Baron, Murray 21:24-27,32,35-38
 Baire, Raymond 25:38
BARRICADE International 21:40
 Barris, Paul 16:7
 Barron, John 19:7; 21:35; 23:29
 Barrow, Errol 20:13
 Barton, Ramon 24:31-33
 Barzani, Mustafa 18:22
 Basov, Nikolai G. 24:29
 Bates, Brian 16:54
 Bath, J.D. 17:38,41
 Bay, Charles H. 16:58
 Bayhan, Kudret 23:14
 Bearden, Milton A. 14-15:11-12
 Beckmann, Petr 21:35-36
 Beckwith, Byron de la 16:46
 Beebe, Michael 24:32
 Begin, Menachem 20:35,37; 23:16
 Behrhorst, Carroll 18:37
 Behrhorst Foundation 18:37,39
 Belafonte, Harry 24:23
 Belgium, CIA in 14-15:7
 Bell, Daniel 18:13
 Bell, Griffin 13:50
 Bellant, Russ 25:37,52
 Belmonte, Giuseppe 23:21,26
 Belmundo, José Ricardo 13:16-17
 Bender, Jay (pseud.) 19:34
 Bendetsen, Karl Robin 21:27,29
 Benson, Paul 24:26-28
 Bentsen, Lloyd M. 17:48; 19:31; 20:4
 Berenger, Paul 16:4
 Berenguer, Rafael 13:18-19
 Bermudez, Enrique V. 18:9
 Bernard, Joseph Charles 14-15:8
 Bernard, Tom 20:41
 Bernays, Edward 19:4-5
 Berns, Walter 22:5
 Bernstein, Carl 18:14
 Bertrand Russell Tribunal 25:21
 Betancur, Belisario 18:60
 Bethlehem Steel Corporation 21:28
 Better Business Bureau 21:26-27
 Beyer, Joel H. 14-15:12
 Bianchi, Francisco 18:34
 Biko, Steve 18:55
 Billings, Robert J. 13:7
 biological warfare *see* chemical and biological warfare
 Bish, Milan 20:9
 Bishop, Maurice 16:21; 18:63; 19:31-32; 20:3-6,10-13,21,24,39; 22:3,34,35
 Bissell, Richard 13:52
 Bitterman, Chester Allen III 18:41,43
 Bittman, Ladislav 16:27; 19:5
 Bizos, George 18:55
 Black, Edwin F. 16:52
 Black, Ian 23:16
 Black International 25:17-18
 Black Legion 25:23
 Black Liberation Army 24:5
 Black Panther Party 13:50; 20:3
 Black, Stephen Don 13:24,27; 16:44-47
 Blackburn, Norman 13:20
 Blacks for Reagan 21:36
 Blackstone Rangers (Chicago) 24:5
 Blanton, Walter "Cisco" 22:19
 Blatty, William Peter 16:38
 Blewett, Jane V. 18:51
 Bloch, Jonathan
 "The Militarization of BOSS" 13:30-33; "The Passport Racket: Papers for Cash" 13:20-21
 Bloch, Jonathan and Fitzgerald, Patrick
British Intelligence and Covert Action 23:44
 Blome, Kurt 25:26
 Bloomingdale, Alfred S. 17:49
 Boehringer Company 25:8
 Boettcher, Robert 20:38
 Bogdanich, Walt (and Frolik and Jensen)
 "The CIA Ties of World Medical Relief" 18:47-51
 Boidock, John 18:56
 Bokassa, Salah al-Din Ahmed 13:31
 Bolan, Thomas 25:38
 Bolivia 18:44-45

- Bolivia *Joven* 25:18; CIA in 14-15:7; 25:19-20; Nazis in 25:15-20
- Bolton, Pete 17:25
- Bonassoli, Aldo 21:42
- Bonner, Raymond 16:17; 21:13,32-33
- Boone, Pat 18:64
- Borge, Tomas 16:20; 19:28; 20:30; 21:4; 22:27
- Borghese, Valerio 25:14,31,34
- Bormann, Martin 25:4,11,17
- Bornemisza, Geza 25:34
- Bosch, Orlando 16:20; 22:41
- Bosco Vivas, Bishop 18:17
- Botha, Pik W. 13:8-9,14,30-32,36-41; 18:53
- Botha, Roelof 13:12,14,37-41
- Botnick, A.I. 16:46
- Bouchey, Lynn Francis 22:31-33
- Bourne, Geoffrey 20:8-10
- Bourne, Peter G. 20:5,8-9
- Bouterse, Desi 18:63; 20:6
- Bowdler, William P. 13:44; 16:22
- Bowers, Samuel Holloway 16:46
- Boyce, Christopher John 16:53
- Boyd, David 24:30-33
- Boyer, Daniel 21:42
- Brackman, Arnold C. 16:39
- Brady, Nicholas F. 25:30
- Braunberg, Rudolf 20:40
- Bravo, José Ernesto 18:19
- Brazil 18:46
- CIA in 14-15:7; DOPS (intelligence agency) 25:21
- Brazil, torture in
- " 'In Brazil the Women Boast About Their Plastic Surgery' " (Cohen) 25:21-22
- Brennan, Earl 25:31
- Brennan, Joseph 25:35
- Brewster, Robert George 14-15:10
- Brezhnev, Leonid 21:19-20
- Brigade 2506 25:51
- Briggon, Barry Francis 22:17
- Bright, Bill 18:34
- Brink, Pfaff and Partners 18:62
- Britain *see* United Kingdom
- Brodhead, Frank 23:37-38
- "Darkness in Rome: The 'Bulgarian Connection' Revisited" 23:3-38; "The KGB Plot to Assassinate the Pope: A Case Study in Free World Disinformation" 19:13-24
- Brodie, Ben 19:36
- Broman, Barry M. 14-15:8-9
- Brooks, William 18:50
- Bross, John A. 25:10
- Brown, Harold 17:24-25
- Brown, Jerry 24:23-24
- Brown, Robert Kenneth 22:12-24
- "Soldier of Fortune's Robert K. Brown" (Churchill) 22:12-21
- Brown, Sam 13:53
- Brownfeld, Allan C. 21:36-37; 22:31
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew 17:23; 19:24; 23:16,27,32,27-28,32
- Buchanan, John H.
- "Congressional Testimony: The Prospects of War Between Honduras and Nicaragua" 18:25-28
- Buchanan, Patrick J. 18:4; 21:38
- Bucher, Lloyd 21:36
- Buckley, James L. 16:20; 18:15; 25:27
- Buckley, Priscilla Langford 25:38
- Buckley, William F. 18:4,14-15; 19:22,27,31; 20:44; 21:31; 22:15; 25:27,38
- Buell, Edgar "Pop" 18:48
- Buendia, Manuel 22:2
- La CIA en Mexico* 22:2
- Bufete Internacional 13:20-21
- Bulkin, David Floyd 22:16-17
- Buitrago, Ann Mari and Immerman, Leon Andrew
- Are You Now or Have You Ever Been in the FBI Files?* 13:51
- Bukovsky, Vladimir 22:5
- Bulgaria, and shooting of Pope
- "Darkness in Rome: The 'Bulgarian Connection' Revisited" (Brodhead, Friel and Herman) 23:3-38; "The KGB Plot to Assassinate the Pope: A Case Study in Free World Disinformation" (Brodhead and Herman) 19:13-24
- Bulletin Info-Turk 17:47
- Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 25:7,23
- Bumpers, Dale 17:24
- Burchett, Wilfred
- The China-Cambodia-Vietnam Triangle* 21:39
- Burck, Gordon 17:19
- Burgess, Dwight Spaulding 13:48
- Burgstaller, Eugen F. 14-15:8
- Burnett-Alleyne, Sydney 13:24
- Burnham, Forbes 20:13
- Burns, Arthur F. 13:50
- Burt, Richard R. 13:6; 17:8-11,23-24
- Burton, Joseph Alfred 24:5
- Burundi, CIA in 14-15:7
- Bush, George 16:35; 17:13; 18:56; 19:8,10,29,31; 20:3,14,24; 23:16; 25:35
- Bush, Prescott 25:35
- Butcher, Willard Carlisle 21:29
- Butler, Darelle Dean "Dino" 24:23-25,29
- Butler, Larry 22:31
- Butler, Smedley Darlington 25:24,30
- Byelorussian Central Council 25:52
- C**
- Cable News Network 24:36
- Cable Splicer 24:8-9
- Calero, Adolfo 22:27; 25:51,53
- Calero, Mario 22:19,32
- California Specialized Training Institute 24:6-7,9
- Calisher, Charles 17:30-31
- Callaway, Howard H. 17:18
- Callejas Deshon, Alfonso 22:19
- Callis, Jerry J. 17:17
- Calloway, Howard "Bo" 17:18
- Calvi, Roberto 23:19-20; 25:34
- Cambodia 17:12
- Cameroon, CIA in 14-15:7
- Campaign for Political Rights
- Bugs, Taps and Infiltrators: What to Do About Political Spying* 13:51
- Campbell, Duncan 20:40
- Campbell, Lumberto 22:29
- Camper, Franklin Joseph 13:23,27; 16:45,49
- Campos Menendez, Enrique 18:15
- Campus Crusade for Christ 18:34
- Canada
- CIA in 13:47; Royal Canadian Mounted Police 13:50-51; 18:60; 19:35
- Candia, Alfredo 25:17
- Capell, Frank A. 25:36
- Capital Legal Foundation 21:26
- Capps, Fred, Jr. 17:38
- Carballo, Bismarck 18:4,18-20
- Carbone, Emilio 25:17-18
- Carboni, Flavio 23:20
- Cardenal, Ernesto 20:39
- Cardenas Mallo, Manuel 25:19-20
- Caribbean Basin Report* 21:40
- Caribbean, resources for organizing 17:47
- Caribbean Community (Caricom) 20:7
- Caribbean Educational Association 21:36
- Caribbean Publishers and Broadcasters Association 19:31
- Caribbean Southern Corporation 13:25-27
- Caritas Internationalis 25:13
- Carl Byoir & Associates 19:34
- Carlos Pellegrini Foundation 16:15
- Carlucci, Frank C. 16:31
- Carmichael, Stokely 24:16
- Carpenter, Colonel 13:17
- Carr, Steven 25:51
- Carrigan, Ana
- "Salvador Witness: The Life and Calling of Jean Donovan" 23:44
- Carrington, Lord 13:13
- Carroll, Earl H. 24:14
- Carry, Howard F. 25:30
- Carter, Billy 23:20
- Carter, Hodding 17:23
- Carter, Jimmy 19:37; 23:27; 24:36
- Carthage Foundation 21:27-28
- Carto, Willis 25:32,34,36
- Carver, George 13:52
- Casa Oscar Romero 24:13
- Casa Chile
- Chile Newsletter* 23:40
- Casleton, Peter 18:62
- Casey, William Joseph 13:7,9,52,56; 14-15:3,14; 16:2,22-23,26,30,57; 17:50; 18:8,10,15,56; 19:37; 20:3,5,24; 21:5,6,29; 22:2-3,7,27,38,39; 25:13,27,37
- Cassin, Rene 21:42
- Castillo, Nestor 17:12
- Castle and Cooke 21:18
- Castro, Fidel 16:25; 18:68; 19:3,5,9,11,26,31,38; 20:21-22; 21:37; 22:8,15
- Castro, Raúl 19:9-10
- Casuse, Larry 24:20
- Catholic Action 25:31-33
- Cato Institute 18:14
- CAUSA International 20:38-39; 22:30-32; 24:34; 25:19-20
- CAUSA USA 22:33; 24:34
- CAUSA World Services 24:34
- Cavallero, Roberto 23:17
- CBS Corporation 16:48; 21:34
- CBS News 21:29
- Cekada, Anthony 25:36
- Celebi, Musa Cedar 19:18; 23:24
- Celec, Frederick 17:9-10
- Celenk, Bekir 23:6,14
- Celik, Oral 23:9,11-12,22,24,36
- Center of Concern 18:51
- Center for Constitutional Rights 18:10
- Fight the Right* 13:51; The Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism 13:51
- Center for Defense Information 17:19
- Center for Development Policy 18:25
- Center for International Policy 13:43
- Center for Research and Documentation of the Atlantic Coast (CIDCA)
- Trabil Nani: Historical Background and Current Situation on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua* 23:39; Wani 23:39
- Center for Strategic and International Studies 13:2,13,53; 14-15:3; 18:15,63; 23:29,32; 24:36
- Central African Republic, CIA in 13:47
- Central America
- "Central America Ignites: The U.S. Order of Battle" (Klepper) 13:42-46; "Washington's Proxy: Israeli Arms in Central America" (Lusane) 20:34-37; resources for organizing 13:51; 17:47; 21:39-41; 23:39-40,44
- Central America Resource Center
- Central America Bulletin* 23:40; *Central America Writers Bulletin* 21:41; *Directory of Central America Organizations* 23:39
- Central American Defense Council 20:5,25-26,28; 21:6
- Central American Historical Institute
- ENVIO* 21:39
- Central Intelligence Retirees Association 21:34
- Centro Bellarmino 18:17
- Centronics Data Computer Corporation 13:52,56; 16:57
- Cerna, Lenin 18:19
- Cerra, Ronald L. 14-15:7
- Chafee, John H. 16:56
- Chaffanjon, Arnaud and Flavigny, Bertrand
- Galimard
- Ordres et Contre-Ordres de Chevalerie* 25:36
- Chalfont, Allen 22:5
- Chamberlain, Greg 20:20
- Chamberlain, William Henry 25:33
- Chambers, George 20:13
- Chamorro, Edgar 25:51
- Chamorro, Fernando 20:39; 22:29
- Chamorro, Pedro Joaquin, Jr. 16:35
- Chamorro, Ruben J. 16:15
- Champion International Corporation 21:27
- Champion Spark Plug Company 21:28
- Chancellor, John 21:33
- Chandler, Robert W. 21:15
- Chaney, Verne 25:52
- Chapin, Frederick 18:34
- Charles, Ed 17:48
- Charles, Eugenia 13:22,24,26,27; 16:44,45,48,50; 20:5,15
- Charles, Hubert 16:47
- Chase Manhattan Bank 21:29; 25:24-25,30
- Chavez, Lydia 21:11

- chemical and biological warfare 17:2-31; 18:58-59; 21:29-30; 22:16,35; 25:3,7,26; *see also* Agent Orange, Yellow Rain
- "Sources and Methods: Germ Warfare Disinformation" (Lawrence) 16:60,58; "The History of U.S. Bio-Chemical Killers" (Lawrence) 17:5-7; "The Pentagon's Other Option" (Wolf) 17:8-25; "U.S. Biological Warfare: The 1981 Cuba Dengue Epidemic" (Schaap) 17:28-31; in Afghanistan 17:13,17,28; in Cuba 17:28-31; 22:35; in Korea 17:6-7; in Laos 17:12
- Chemical Research Foundation, Inc. 21:36
- Cherenkov, Pavel A. 24:29
- Cherne, Leo 23:27
- Chervasi, Frank 25:45
- Chevron 21:28-29
- Chey, Edward Entero 25:52
- Cheysson, Claude 22:29; 25:28
- Chiang Kai-Shek 21:35
- Chigi, Prince 25:27
- Childs, Jack 19:38
- Childs, Morris 19:38
- Chile 13:12
- "CIA Media Operations in Chile, Jamaica, and Nicaragua" (Landis) 16:32-43; CIA in 16:42-43; 18:14-15; 21:31,34; 24:37; 25:5; DINA (intelligence agency) 18:14; resources for organizing 23:40
- Chile la Verdad* 21:25
- China, CIA in 14-15:7
- Chindgren, Marvin H. 14-15:12
- Chivite, Alcido Marcos 13:28
- Chomsky, Noam 17:47
- Chou En-Lai 20:39
- Christian Anti-Communism Crusade 25:38
- Christian Broadcasting Network 18:35,39; 22:32; 25:37-38,53
- Christian Patriots Defense League 13:27; 22:22; 25:53
- Christian Science Monitor* 23:4-5
- Christie, Stuart
- Stefano Delle Chiaie: Portrait of a Black Terrorist* 22:44,41-42; 23:38; 25:31,36
- Churba, Joseph 16:57
- Church of the Complete Word 18:34
- Church, Frank 13:50; 18:58; 21:33; 23:27
- Church World Service 18:51
- Churchill, Ward
- "Correction" 25:54; "Sidebar" 24:29; "Soldier of Fortune's Robert K. Brown" 22:12-21; "The Covert War Against Native Americans" 24:16-21; "The Strange Case of 'Wild Bill' Janklow" 24:22-24
- Churchill, Winston 17:6; 25:13,40,44-45
- CIA (Central Intelligence Agency)
- and broadcasting 19:6; 23:27; and Khrushchev's speech 19:37-38; and mercenaries 22:6,10; and Nazis 25:9-14; and publishing 19:6-7; and religion 18:2-6,11-20,34-51,66,68; and sniffer planes scandal 21:42; and torture 25:22; and weather modification 17:30; estimates of Soviet arms expenditures 14-15:3; 21:14; Operation Black Moon 22:28; Operation CHAOS 13:3; 14-15:4; 16:30-31; 24:2,4; Operation MKNAOMI 17:16; 25:3; Operation MKULTRA 13:3; 14-15:4; 16:38; 17:14-16,28; 25:3; Operation MONGOOSE 18:68; 19:3; Project Resistance 24:4; recruiting 17:49
- CIA, agents
- "Where Are They Now?" (Wolf) 16:56-57
- CIA, and assassinations 22:8
- "Sources and Methods: CIA Assassinations—Part III" (Lawrence) 17:52,50; "Sources and Methods: CIA Assassinations—Part IV" (Lawrence) 20:44,39
- Ciba-Geigy Corporation 21:28
- Ciegler, Alex 17:11-12
- Cienfuegos, Camilo 22:15
- Citicorp 21:28
- Cities Service 13:6,35
- Citizens Committee for a Free Cuba 21:25
- Citizens Committee for Freedom in the Americas 18:6
- Citizens Committee for Peace with Freedom in Vietnam 21:25
- Citizens For America 25:50
- Ciuntu, Chirila 25:52
- Civil Air Transport 20:40
- Civilian Military Assistance 22:2,6,8,18-19,31; 25:51
- Civilian Refugee Military Assistance 22:19
- Clair, William Joseph 13:47
- Claris, Babis 25:48
- Claris, Thanassis 25:48
- Clark, Dick 13:10
- Clark, General Mark W. 25:31
- Clark, Jim 24:3
- Clark, Mark 24:20,26; 25:54
- Clark, William P. 16:57; 18:15; 20:8,24
- Clarke, Oliver 16:35
- Clarke, Philip C. 21:37
- Clarke, Terrence 16:54
- Clarkson, Fred
- "Behind the Supply Lines" 25:56,50-53; "Privatizing the War" 22:30-33; "Arnaud de Borchgrave Boards Moon's Ship" 24:34-35
- Claridge, Duane R. "Dewey" 25:51
- Clay, Lucius D. 25:8
- Clements, Charles 21:11,40
- Witness to War: An American Doctor in El Salvador* 23:44
- Cleveland Plain Dealer* 18:47
- Clinard, David M. 17:11
- Cline, Ray S. 16:53; 19:37-38; 21:26; 22:24; 23:16,32; 24:35
- Coalition for a Democratic Majority 18:6; 23:16
- Coalition for Peace Through Strength 21:37; 22:33; 25:32
- Coalitions for America 22:31
- Coard, Bernard 20:5,9-13
- Coard, Phyllis 20:5,10
- Cockburn, Alexander 20:12,41; 22:31
- CODEL 18:51
- Cody, Edward 20:7
- Cody, Kevin
- "Scott Barnes: Spook or Spoof?" 17:37-42
- Cohen, Pamela 21:40
- Cohen, Robert
- "In Brazil the Women Boast About Their Plastic Surgery" 25:21-22
- Cohn, Roy M. 19:8; 25:38
- COINTELPRO *see* FBI
- Colby, William Egan 13:49,52; 16:35,53; 17:52; 18:12; 19:8,37; 20:9; 22:4
- Coleman Foundation 21:28
- Coler, Jack R. 24:25,29
- Colombia 18:41,44-46
- M-19 movement 18:41; Movement for the Defense of National Culture 18:41
- Colt Industries 13:15
- Commentary 18:6; 19:8
- Committee for a Free Afghanistan 21:37; 22:31
- Committee for a Free World 24:35
- Committee to Help the FBI 21:34
- Committee of One Million 21:25
- Committee on the Present Danger 23:16,32
- Committee on Public Information (1917) 19:3-4
- Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES)
- El Salvador Alert* 16:17; 21:41
- Committee on South African War Resistance
- Resister* 13:51
- Commodity Trading Company 19:36
- Comunione e Liberazione (Italy) 16:42
- Communist Workers Party 13:25; 24:30-31,33
- Comoros 16:6-7
- Compton, John 20:10
- computer privacy 23:41
- computers 25:3
- Conason, Joe 25:28,52
- Condeca *see* Central American Defense Council
- Conex, Inc. 18:36
- Conference of U.S. Catholic Bishops 18:11,20,37
- Congo, CIA in 21:40
- Conkling, James B. 16:28
- Conn, Stephen L. 14-15:14
- Connally, John B. 13:7; 16:45
- Connor, Eugene "Bull" 24:3
- Consejo Superior de Investigación Científica 18:14
- Conservative Alliance 22:33
- Conservative Book Club 24:36
- Conservative Caucus 20:17; 22:30-31
- Conservative Political Action Conference 22:30
- Consultants International, Inc. 25:32
- Contact Group 13:5-8,12-13,39
- Control Data Corporation 20:33
- Coogan, Kevin 25:52
- Coors Foundation, Adolph 21:28
- Copley News Service 16:35
- Corbett, Jim 24:13
- Corbridge, Leith 21:37
- Cornwall, Rupert
- God's Banker* 23:38
- corporate interests, in Latin America 21:18
- Corrigan, James Lawrence 14-15:7
- Corson, William R. 19:37-38
- CORU 16:20
- Corydon, Jeff III 13:47
- Costa Rica 13:46
- and Israel 20:37; Contras in 18:8-9; 21:5
- Council Against Communist Aggression 21:26
- Council for the Defense of Freedom 21:26; 22:31
- Council for a Free Asia 22:31
- Council for Inter-American Security 16:15; 22:31,33
- Council on Hemispheric Affairs 18:35
- Human Rights in Latin America: 1983* 21:39
- counter gangs *see* pseudo gangs
- counterfeiting
- "Economic Destabilization: The Counterfeit Kwanzas" 13:21; "The Passport Racket: Papers for Cash" (Weir and Bloch) 13:20-21
- counterinsurgency, theory and practice of 23:44; 24:3-5
- CounterSpy* magazine 19:34
- Courtney, William P. 22:19
- Couvaras, Costa G. 25:44,48
- Covington, Harold 13:25
- Coward, Fred 24:28
- Cox, Ronald L. 16:47
- Craig, David 16:47
- Craig Foundation, E.L. 21:28
- Crane, Kent B. 16:54
- Cranston, Alan 13:53
- Crawford, John 22:20
- Craxi, Bettino 23:19,35
- Creel, George 19:3-4
- Creft, Jacqueline 20:11,17,21
- Credwson, John 21:32
- Critchfield, James H. 24:40
- Crocker, Chester A. 13:7,12-13,34-41; 16:12,25; 22:40
- "Crocker and the CIA" 13:13
- Crocker, Gary 17:20
- Cromwell Research Foundation 21:36
- Cronkite, Walter 21:30,32,34
- Cronwright, Arthur 18:55
- Crossette, Barbara 20:10
- Crouch Paul 19:24
- Crowley, Patrick E. 25:30
- Crozier, Brian Rossiter 13:4-5; 21:37; 23:16-17; 25:38
- Cruz, Arturo J. 16:32,41-42; 22:29
- Cruz, Jesús 24:14-15
- Cuba
- "U.S. Biological Warfare: The 1981 Cuba Dengue Epidemic" (Schaap) 17:28-31; CIA in 13:21; 21:40; 22:35
- Cubillos, Hernan 18:14
- Cummings, Richard
- The Pied Piper: Allard K. Lowenstein and the Liberal Dream* 23:44
- Cummings, Sam 20:15
- Cunningham, Myrna 18:10
- Curiel, Henri 19:15-16
- Currie, Lauchlin 25:25
- Cushing, Henry B. 17:44
- Cyprus, CIA in 14-15:7-8
- Cyrus, Stanley 19:31

D

- Dada, Hector 18:25
- Daddario, Emilio Quiney 25:12,14
- Dahl, Kenneth 24:20
- Dahmer, Vernon 16:46
- Daily Gleaner* (Jamaica) 16:32-38,42-43; 19:31-

- 32,36; 24:38
Daily Telegraph (London) 13:48
 Dale Carnegie School 18:34
Dallas Times Herald 24:13
 D'Amato, Alfonso 19:8-11; 20:8-9
 D'Amato, Anthony 20:18
 Danet, Olivier 16:7
 Daniels, Jerrold Barker 17:33
 "Yellow Rain Skeptic Found Dead" (Ray) 17:43-46
 Danish, Paul 22:14
 D'Aubuisson, Roberto 20:39; 21:21-22,32; 22:18,20; 25:52
 David, Julian 13:25; 16:47
 Davidson, Meyer 16:46
 Davis, Elmer 19:4
 Davis, John 25:30
 Davis, Peter
 "Amandla" 21:41
 Davis Foundation, Shelby Cullom 21:27-28
 Davis, Spencer 17:42
 Dawson, Ken 13:19
 Dayan, Ambassador Moshe 20:36
 de Borchgrave, Arnaud 13:10,48; 14:15,3; 16:27,35; 17:47; 19:7-8,10,15; 21:30,35; 22:5; 23:24,29,32; 24:34-36
 "Arnaud de Borchgrave Boards Moon's Ship" (Wolf and Clarkson) 24:34-35
 de Castro, Alvaro 25:17-18
 de Feu, Croix 25:30
 de Gasperi, Alcide 25:28
 de Gramont, Sanche 19:38
 De La Raix, Captain 13:17
 de Lemos, Anita 13:20
 de Lorenzo, Giovanni 25:34
 de Marenche, Alexandre 25:27
 De Rance Foundation 18:17
 de Silva, Peer 19:38
 de Toledano, Ralph 21:31,36
 Dean, John Gunther 17:13
 Deane, Philip
I Should Have Died 25:43
 death squads 13:43-44; 21:21,32; 25:32,50,52
 "Argentina Activates International Death Squads" (Ray) 16:14-16
 Deaver, Michael 16:15
 Decter, Midge 22:5; 23:16; 24:35
 Deering-Milliken Foundation 21:28
 Defense Industries International 16:54
 Defoe, Daniel 19:13
 Deger, Emin
CIA, Counter-Guerrilla, and Turkey 23:15
 Degolyer, James 18:34
 Deindorfer, Robert G. 20:37
 "Death Overtakes a Spy" (Lawrence) 19:34;
 "The Journalist Spy: A Friendly Interview" (Agee) 19:33-34
 Del Monte Corporation 21:18
 del Valle, Pedro A. 25:36
 Delgado, Patricia 22:27
 Delle Chiaie, Stefano 22:41-42,44; 25:17-18,34
 Dellums, Ronald V. 18:10; 22:21,34
 DeLoria, Vine 24:25
 Democracy Institute 19:6-7,11-12
 Denard, Bob 16:6-7,10
 Dender, Jay (pseud.) 19:34
 Dennis, Eugene 19:38
 Denton, Jeremiah 13:2-3; 17:3; 18:12; 19:8; 22:9; 23:4; 24:11; 25:38
 Descoteaux, Norman M. 14-15,14
 D'Escoto, Miguel 16:20,35-36,40; 20:28,39,44; 21:40; 22:27,29
 D'Estaing, Giscard 13:36; 16:7; 21:42; 25:27
 Deukmejian, George 24:24
 Dexter, Evalyn W. 17:10
 DeYoung, Karen 20:6
 Dezza, Paolo 18:12
 Diamond, Stanley 23:29
 DiBella, Franco 23:19
 Dickens, Samuel 22:31
 Diego Garcia (Indian Ocean) 16:4
 Diem, Ngo Dinh 18:46; 19:15; 21:25; 25:34
 Dien Del 17:12
 Dimitrov, Vassili 19:17
 Dinges, John 18:23
 Directorate of National Security (DONS) (South Africa) 13:33
 disinformation 19:2; 21:41; 24:35-38
 "CIA Media Operations in Chile, Jamaica, and Nicaragua" (Landis) 16:32-43; "Deceit and Secrecy: Cornerstones of U.S. Policy" (Schaap) 16:24-31; "Disinformation and Mass Deception: Democracy as a Cover Story" (Preston and Ray) 19:3-12; "Sources and Methods: Germ Warfare Disinformation" (Lawrence) 16:60,58
 disinformation, on American Indian Movement 24:17
 disinformation, on CIA
 "Sources and Methods: The CIA Legend" (Lawrence) 19:40,37-38
 disinformation, on Cuba and Nicaragua
 "White Paper II: Administration Stonewalls While Covert Operations Escalate" (Schaap) 16:19-21
 disinformation, on Cuba 19:9-11
 disinformation, on Grenada 19:29-32
 disinformation, on Libya 16:24-25; 18:12-13; 19:7,13
 disinformation, on nuclear freeze movement 19:9
 disinformation, on shooting of Pope
 "Darkness in Rome: The 'Bulgarian Connection' Revisited" (Brodhead, Friel and Herman) 23:3-38; "The KGB Plot to Assassinate the Pope: A Case Study in Free World Disinformation" (Brodhead and Herman) 19:13-24
 disinformation, on Soviet Union 23:2,16-17,26
 disinformation, on terrorism 14-15,3; 23:3,16-17; 24:10
 "Pentagon Moves on 'Terrorism'" (Ray and Schaap) 22:4-9
 Disney, Walt 17:6
 Dobbs, Michael 23:11,13-14,22-27,34-36,38
 Dobson, Frank 13:20-21
 Dodd, Christopher 16:22
 Dodge Jones Foundation 21:28
 Doe, Samuel 13:34
 D'Oench, Russell 25:13
 Doherty, Elizabeth 21:26
 Doherty, William C. 18:6
 Dolan, Terry 22:32-33
 Dolge, James J. 14-15,13
 Dolincheck, Martin 16:9-10
 Dollfuss, Chancellor 25:27
 Domenici, Pete 25:38
 Dominica 20:5
 "Behind the Klan's Karibbean Koup Attempt, Part I" (Lawrence) 13:22-27; "Behind the Klan's Karibbean Koup Attempt, Part II" (Lawrence) 16:44-50,21
 Dominica, Rastafarians in 13:24-25
 Domville, Barry 25:36
 Donchev, Ivan 23:27
 Donovan, Jean 23:44
 Donovan, John 22:17-20
 Donovan, William Joseph 19:5; 25:14,30,38
 Dooley, Thomas A. 25:52
 Dorin, Bernard 25:38
 Dornan, Robert K. 17:32-42
 Dos Santos, José Eduardo 13:21; 22:39
 Douglas, Michael 16:44,48,50
 Douglas, Rosie 16:50
 Dow Chemical Company 17:16
 Dozier, James L. 17:40
 Draganovic, Krunoslav 25:8-10
 Draper, Morris 13:34
 Dresser Industries, Inc. 21:28
 Droege, Wolfgang Walter 13:23-24; 16:44-46
 Droge, Dolf 21:37
 Du Droit, Sergeant 13:17
 Du Plessis, Colonel 13:17
 Duarte, José Napoleón 13:42-43; 21:13
 Dubois, Father 21:42
 Dubois, Josiah P.
The Devil's Chemist 25:25
 Ducote, Robert A. 14-15,9
 Duffy, Peter 16:8
 Dugway Proving Ground 16:58; 17:21
 Duke, David 13:24; 16:21,44-45
 Dukes, Charles William 16:8; 22:17
 Dulles, Allen Welsh 19:34,37; 20:41; 21:40; 25:31,33
 "How Allen Dulles and the SS Preserved Each Other" (Scott) 25:4-14
 Duncan, D.K. 16:43
 Dunn, Bertram F. 14-15,9
 Dunn, Timothy 17:52
 Duran, Julio César 25:18
 Durbrow, Elbridge 21:25; 25:32
 Durenberger, David 21:6
 Durham, Douglass 24:17-24,27 28
 Dutton, John R. 13:32-33
 Duvalier, "Baby Doc" 16:48
 Duvalier, "Papa Doc" 16:48
- E**
 Eagle, James T. 24:25
 Eagle Deer, Alfred 24:18
 Eagle Deer, Jancita 24:18,20,22-23
Eagle magazine 13:3
 Early, John 22:17,23
 East Timor 19:22
 Eastman Kodak 21:18
 Eaton Company 21:18-19
 Eaton, Robert 25:26
 Eaton, Wendy 24:20
 Ecevit, Bulent 23:29,31
 Echanis, Michael 22:13-14,16
 Echeveria, General 25:18
Economist (London) 13:48; 24:37
Economist's Foreign Report (London) 13:48; 19:8
 Ecuador 17:50; 18:42-43,45
 CIA in 14-15,8
 Ecumenical Program for Interamerican Communication and Action (EPICA) 13:44
Death of a Revolution: An Analysis of the Grenada Tragedy and the U.S. Invasion 21:40
 Eddy, Bill 18:45
 Edens, Ralph G. 22:17,20
 Edison, Charles 22:15; 25:33
 Edmund Burke Society 16:47
 Edwards, Trevor John 13:16-17
 EFE news agency (Spain) 18:13,15
 Egypt 13:34-35
 CIA in 14-15,8
 Eichmann, Adolf 25:4,7
El Diario de las Americas 16:36
El Mercurio (Chile) 16:32-43; 18:14; 19:31
 El Salvador 13:42-44; 18:60
 "Interview: Salvadoran Deserter Discloses Green Beret Torture Role" 16:17-18; and Israel 20:35; CIA in 16:18; elections (1982 and 1984) 21:7-13,32,40; 23:39; FMLN 13:42-43; 18:9,23,25; 20:25; 21:6; 22:3; White Warrior Union 21:21
El Verbo (Guatemala) 18:34,37,39
 Elder, Jack 24:13
 electronic surveillance 18:57,64; 20:32-33,40 42
 "Tetra Tech in Foreign Waters" (Franklin) 24:40
Eleni (Gage) 25:3,39
 "Eleni: The Work of a 'Professional Liar'" (Raptis) 25:41-49
 Elf-Aquitaine (France) 21:42
 Ellam, Katherine T. 13:47
 Elliott, William Yandell 21:26
 Ellis, George E., Jr. 13:24
 Ellis, Ken 22:31
 Ellison, Bruce 24:20,25
 Elmore, Thomas P. 16:56
 Ember, Lois 17:22
 Enders, Thomas Ostrom 16:19-20,23; 19:9; 25:51
 Englehart, Charles T. 14-15,8
 Enloe, Cynthia
Ethnic Soldiers 22:10
 Epstein, Edward J. 23:38
 Erdstein, Erich 25:4
 Erlich-Manes & Associates 25:37
 Escrava de Balaguer, Jose Maria 18:11-12
 Eskelson, T. Edward 20:41
 Espinoza Sanchez, Pedro Hernan 22:28
 Estevez Gonzalez, Mario 19:10-11
 Estrella Company 25:7-8
 Ethics and Public Policy Center 13:13; 18:6; 19:12
 Ethiopia 13:34-35
 Evans, Medford Stanton 22:31
 Evans, Neil 16:51-52
 Evans, Rowland 21:31
 Eveleigh, Robin
Peace-Keeping in a Democratic Society: The Les

sons of Northern Ireland 24:7-11
 Evergreen International Airlines 22:28
 Evers, Medgar 16:46
 Evren, Kenan 23:28-29
Excelsior (Mexico) 18:5
 Exxon Corporation 16:22; 20:29; 21:18,28-29
 Ezcurra, Ana Maria
Ideological Aggression Against the Sandinista Revolution: The Political Opposition Church in Nicaragua 23:39
 Ezz, Esmat 17:12

F

Faber, Dorothy 21:38
 Fagoth, Steadman 16:20-21; 18:8,23-24; 22:11; 25:53
 Fairer-Smith, John 13:20
 Falk, Richard 23:29
 Falwell, Jerry 18:34
 Farago, Ladislav 25:11
 Farrell, James A. 25:30
 Farrell, John 25:30
 Fatherland and Liberty 18:17
 Fayne, James A. 25:30
 FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) 24:5,11
 and Black Panthers 24:26; and Communist Workers Party 24:33; and JFK Assassination 19:38; and labor movement 24:30-33; and Native American movement 24:17-29; and sanctuary movement 24:12; COINTELPRO 13:3; 16:31; 19:4; 24:2,4;
 Federation of Turkish Idealist Associations 23:12
 Federici, Federico 23:20
 Fediay, Victor A. 16:6
 Fefferman, Dan 22:31
 Fellers, Bonner 25:36
 Felt, W. Mark 19:27
 Ferreira, Commandant 13:17
 Fertig Foundation, Inc., Lawrence 21:27-28
 Feulner, Edwin J., Jr. 16:29; 18:63
 Fiebelkorn, Joachim 25:17-18
 Fiedler, Bob 22:31
 Field, Nick 13:54
 Fielding, Fred 21:36
 Film Institute of El Salvador
 "In the Name of Democracy: Life, Death, and Elections in El Salvador" 21:40; 23:39; *"The Road of Liberty"* 23:39
 First Run Features
 "Nicaragua: Report from the Front" 21:40
 First, Ruth 18:54
 Fisher, Jack 24:13
 Fisher, John M. 25:32
 Flaherty, James Michael 14-15:11
 Flaherty, Kathryn 24:13
 Fleming, Ian 24:38
 Fleury, Sergio Fernando Paranhos 25:21
 Flick Financial Group 25:28
 Flick, Friedrich Karl, Jr. 25:28
 Flick, Friedrich Karl, Sr. 25:28
 Flores, Baeza 16:38
 Flynn, Elizabeth Gurley 14-15:5
 Flynn, Joe 16:53
 Fontaine, Arturo 18:14
 Fontaine, Roger W. 18:15; 22:33
 Ford Foundation 13:50
 Ford Motor Company 21:19; 25:25
 Fort Detrick (Maryland) 17:12,14-17,28,30
 Fort Gulick (Panama) 20:36
 Fort Huachuca (Arizona)
 "Fort Huachuca Buildup: War Technology in the Desert" 20:31-33
 Fort Leavenworth (Kansas) 24:10
 Forum World Features 13:4; 17:46; 19:7; 21:27,37
 Foundation for Full Service Banks 19:34
 Fourea, P.J. 13:17
 Fourie, Brand 13:40
 Fournouni, Eleni
 "An Introduction to the Greek Resistance" 25:39-40
 Fox, Francis 13:23
 France
 and mercenaries 22:10; CIA in 14-15:8-9; OAS (Secret Army Organization) 16:6; 23:16; SDECE (intelligence agency) 13:10,32; 20:40
 Frances, Hector 18:8
 Franchetti, Michael 24:9

Franco, Francisco 18:11; 21:25; 25:30,35,38
 Frank, Warren Ernest 14-15:10
 Franklin, Jane
 "Tetra Tech in Foreign Waters" 24:40
 Frantome Company 13:5
 Fraser, Malcolm 16:55
 Frawley, Patrick J. 25:38
 Frederikse, Julie
 None But Ourselves: Masses vs. Media in the Making of Zimbabwe 23:44
 Free Angola Committee 22:31
 Free Congress Foundation 22:31; 25:51
 Free Pacific Association 25:30
Freedom Fighter 25:51
 Freedom House 13:10; 16:58; 21:25-26; 22:24
 Freedom Leadership Foundation 22:31,33
 freedom of information, resources for organizing 13:51; 17:47; 23:41
 Freedom Research Foundation 22:30-31
 Freedom Studies Center 21:25
 Freedoms Foundation 21:37
 Frei, Eduardo 18:15,17
 Frei, Frederick 16:37
 Friedman, Milton 16:43
 Friedrich Ebert Foundation 16:23
 Friel, Howard 23:38
 "Darkness in Rome: The 'Bulgarian Connection' Revisited" 23:3-38; *"Media Manipulation: Covert Propaganda in Time and Newsweek"* 21:14-23
 Friends of the Americas Foundation 22:32 25:52-53
 Friends of Free Asia 22:15
 Friends for Jamaica
 Newsletter 23:40
 Fritzsche, Hans 17:6
 Froehle, Robert 17:14
 Frohman Foundation, Sidney 21:28
 Frolik, Joe
 "The CIA Ties of World Medical Relief" 18:47-51
 Frutos, Manuel 25:52
 Fuchs, Regina 20:19
 Fulbright, J. William 17:7
 Fullerton, John 13:30
 Fulwyler, Niles J. 17:19
 Fund for Open Information and Accountability
 Our Right to Know 17:47; 23:41
 Furuta, Takeshi 25:53

G
 Gabriela Mistral Publishing Company 18:13
 Gage, Nicholas 19:14,23-24; 21:21; 23:37
 "Eleni: The Work of a 'Professional Liar'" (Raptis) 25:41-49; *Eleni* 25:3,39
 Gairy, Eric M. 16:21,44; 19:32; 20:3-4,8,19
 Galbraith, Evan 20:13
 Galtieri, Leopoldo 16:14-15
 Gamex Company 13:56
 Garber, Daniel H. 14-15:11
 García, Abibal 18:39
 García, Enrique 25:16
 García, Guillermo 16:14
 García, José 13:43
 García, Nestor 16:27
 García Meza, Luiz 25:17-20
 García Rodríguez, Felix 22:35
 Gardner, George (pseud.) 13:49
 Garment, Suzanne 23:4
 Garn, Jake 17:21
 Garrett, Earl Norbert III 14-15:8
 Garrow, David J. 19:38
 Garwood, Ellen St. John 21:29
 Garwood, William 21:29
 Gatzoyannis, Eleni 25:41-49
 Gatzoyannis, Nicholas *see* Gage, Nicholas
 Gayner, Jeffrey 22:31
 Gayre, Robert 25:31-32
 Gearhart, Daniel F. 22:13
 Gebhardt, Karl 25:26
 Gedda, Luigi 25:31-33
 Gehlen Organization 19:5; 25:5-14
 Gehlen, Reinhard 25:5-6,13,27,33
 Gelb, Leslie H. 13:53; 19:5; 20:40-42; 23:27
 Geller, Uri 21:44
 Gelli, Licio 19:24; 23:18-20; 25:34

Gemetex Company 25:8
 General Aniline and Film 25:25
 General Electric 21:19
 General Motors 21:19; 25:25
 General Telephone and Electronics 21:18-19
 General Tire and Rubber 21:18-19
 Geneva Gas Protocol (1925) 17:5-6
 Genovese, Vito 25:34
 George, Clair Elroy 16:57
 George, Richard Byrd 14-15:11
 George, Willis 13:49
 Georgiou, Panos 25:49
 Georgoulas, Babis 25:45
 Gerth, Jeff 20:27
 Gervasi, Sean 13:6
 "Secret Collaboration: U.S. and South Africa Foment Terrorist Wars" 22:36-40
 Gervasi, Tom 22:34
 Getler, Michael 14-15:2; 16:25; 21:30
 Getty Oil 21:28-29
 Geyer, Georgie Anne 18:23
 Buying the Night Flight (review) 19:25-28;
 "Uncle Sam's Georgie Girl" (Landis) 19:25-28
 Ghana, CIA in 13:47
 Gideonse, Harry David 21:26
 Giese, Paula
 "Secret Agent Douglass Durham and the Death of Jancita Eagle Deer" 24:18-19
 Gilhooly, John F. 14-15:9
 Gillespie, Charles Anthony 20:14,17,20
 Gilligan, John J. 18:51
 Gilmore, Don 22:19
 Giuffrida, Louis O. 24:6-7,9
 Glass, Murv 17:52
 Glenn, Skip 24:20
 Glibbery, Peter 25:51
 Glickman, Dan 22:19
 Globe Aero Ltd., Inc.
 "Merchants of Counter-Insurgency" (Wolf) 13:18-19
 Goebbels, Joseph 24:36-37
 Goering, Hermann 25:28
 Goetz, Bernhard 24:3,5
 Gold, Theodore S. 17:18,20,22,24
 Goldberg, Arthur 22:5
 Goldberg, Don 22:32
 Goldsmith, James Michael 13:48; 21:27,29
 Goldstein, Martin 17:44
 Goldstein, Thomas 22:9
 Goldwater, Barry, Jr. 17:39
 Goldwater, Barry, Sr. 18:9; 21:35
 Goleniewski, Michael M. 25:36
 Gomer, Robert 17:17
 Gomez, Leonel 13:44; 18:25
 Gomez Montano, Carlos Antonio 16:17-18; 21:32
 Gonzales, Frank 20:19
 Gonzales, Mario 24:22
 Gonzalez, Philip 22:20
 Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company 21:18,28
 Goosen, Hennie 18:62
 Gordon Fund 21:28
 Gorman, Paul F. 20:28; 22:25; 25:50-51
 Goshko, John 20:13
 Gospel Outreach 18:34-35,37,39
 Gossens, Gerry Francis 14-15:13
 Gottlieb, Sidney 17:15
 Goulden, Joseph C. 25:32
 Gouws, Dolf 13:15
 Grace, J. Peter 25:28,33-35,37
 Grace, Joseph P. 25:30
 Graham, Billy 18:34
 Graham, Daniel Orrin 21:38; 22:32; 25:32
 Graham, Solomon 24:14
 Grand Union Company 21:28
 Grassini, General 23:18
 Grassley, Charles 22:31
 Graves, Jim 16:6; 22:17,20-21,23-24
 Gray Wolves 19:13,18-19; 23:3,6,10-15,24-26,29,31,35-36,38
 Graziani, Rodolfo 25:14
 Grealy, Robert F. 14-15:9
 Greece
 CIA in 13:47; 14-15:9; 22:42; 25:43,49;
 Communist Party 25:40,45,48; EAM 25:39,44-45; ELAS 25:39-40,44-45; resistance movement (1945-1949) 25:39-49

Greeley, Andrew 21:38
 Green, Christopher C. "Kit" 17:10-11
 Greene, Robert (pseud.) 19:34
 Gregg, David 17:38
 Greig, David Noble 20:44
 Grenada 16:44; 18:50-51; 19:29-32; 20:2-24; 22:35
 "Cuban Statements on Grenada" 20:21-24;
 "Grenada, Airport '83: Reagan's Big Lie"
 (Lusane) 19:29-32; "U.S. Crushes Caribbean
 Jewel" (Ray and Schaap) 20:3-20; and news
 media 20:14-15; 21:33; 22:20-21; Democratic
 Movement 20:19-20; resources for organizing
 21:40; 22:34
Grenadian Voice 19:31-32
 Greve, Frank 20:44
 Gribben, Barry 16:8
 Griggs, Timothy S. 14-15:13
 Grillmaier, Horst 19:18; 23:12,30
 Griswold, Donald M. 25:40
 Gritz, James G. "Bo" 17:32-42
 Grodin, Nancy
 "The Australian Connection: Nugan Hand, the
 CIA Bank" 16:51-55
 Groth, Daniel (pseud.) 24:26-27; 25:54
 Groth, Manfred 14-15:13
 Grumbacher, Major General 20:31
 Gruson, Sydney 21:32
 Guadalupe Martinez, Ana 21:12
 Guanes, Benito 25:52
 Guardian Angels 24:5
 Guatemala 13:45-46; 21:18
 "Evangelicals Support Guatemalan Dictatorship"
 (Lawrence) 18:34-40; and Israel 20:36-37;
 Organization of the People in Arms 18:36
 Guderian, Heinz 22:24
 Guerra, Humberto 17:12
 Guevara, Ernesto Che 18:44; 19:26; 21:32,37;
 22:15
 Guggis, Chris 17:39
 Guillot, Jaime 19:10
 Guinea, CIA in 14-15:9
 Gulf Oil 13:5-6,35
 Gunes, Hasan Fehmi 23:31
Gung Ho magazine 16:6,49; 17:48-50
 Gurwin, Larry
The Calvi Affair 25:35
 Guzman, Jaime 18:14
 Gwertzman, Bernard 19:23; 21:13

H

Haas, Kenneth E. 14-15:12
 Habash, George 19:16
 Habib, John S. 14-15:8
 Hackl, Alphons J. 21:26
 Haddad, Saad 18:64-65
 Haecker, Paul 16:44
 Haig, Alexander M. 13:2-3,8,10,14,34,36,41,45-
 46,48,53; 14-15:3; 16:3,14,19-20,26-27; 17:8-10;
 18:15,24,26; 21:31; 22:5,38,41; 23:3,17,20,29;
 24:10,27; 25:27
 Hain, Peter M. 13:31
 Haiti 16:48
 CIA in 14-15:9
 Hall, Jerry (pseud.) 17:45
 Halliday, Robert 13:23
 Hamilton, Candy 24:17; 25:54
 Hammer, Michael Peter 16:22
 Hammerschmidt, John Paul 17:21
 Hammond, Stephen 16:47
 Hampton, Fred 24:20,26; 25:54
 Hampton, Wade 24:3
 Hancock, Robert Lincoln "Bud" 18:43
 Hand, Michael Jon 16:51-54
 Hannaford, Peter 16:15
 Hanrahan, Edward 24:26
 Hanson, C.T. 16:27
 Hanson, Chris 17:22
 Haratunian, M. William 16:28
 Hare, Paul J. 13:39
 Harel, Iser 19:38
 Harkin, Tom 18:10
 Harnagle, William R. 20:31
 Harrell, John 25:53
 Harris, Ladonna 18:24
 Harris, Robert and Paxman, Jeremy

A Higher Form of Killing 17:6,23
 Harsco Corporation 21:28
 Hart, Gary 17:13,18
 Hart, Howard P. 14-15:12
 Hart, Jeffrey 18:14; 21:31; 24:37
 Harvard University 13:50
 Hassan, King 13:34
 Hatfield, Mark 17:21,23-24
 Hauser, Gustav M. 13:7
 Hawkins, Joe Daniel 13:24-25; 16:45-47
 Hay, Alastair
*The Chemical Scythe: Lessons of 2,4,5-T and
 Dioxin* (review) 18:58-59
 Hayes, Patrick Cardinal 25:30
 Hayward, Paul 16:54
 Healey, Dorothy 19:38
 Hearn, Edward L. 25:30
 Hearst, Patricia 24:9
 Hedervary, Karoly Khuen 25:34
 Hedgecock, David 24:19
 Heinz, Henry John II 25:33
 Held, Richard G. 24:26-27; 25:54
 Held, Richard W. 25:54
 Hell Chromacom 20:33; 21:21
 Hell, Rudolph 20:33; 21:21
 Helms, Jesse A. 13:13; 16:6,23,28; 18:60; 21:30
 Helms, Richard 13:50
 Helsinki Watch 18:24; 23:28
Hemispheric Hotline 16:16
 Hemmings, Allen Bruce 14-15:10
 Hempstone, Smith 24:35
 Henckel von Donnersmark, Graf 25:33
 Henderson Foundation 21:28
 Hennessy, John William 14-15:8
 Henze, Paul Bernard 19:23; 23:4-5,14-16,27-37
The Plot to Kill the Pope 23:14,37
 Herbert, Anthony 22:17
Soldier 25:52
 Heritage Foundation 13:2; 16:29; 18:62-63; 19:7-8;
 21:26-27; 22:31; 24:36; 25:37-38
 Herman, Edward S. 23:37-38
 "Objective" News as Systematic Propaganda:
The New York Times on the 1984 Salvadoran and
 Nicaraguan Elections" 21:7-13; "Darkness in
 Rome: The 'Bulgarian Connection' Revisited"
 23:3-38; "The Fascist Network" 22:44,41-42;
 "The KGB Plot to Assassinate the Pope: A Case
 Study in Free World Disinformation" 19:13-24;
The Real Terror Network 17:47
 Herman, Edward and Brodhead, Frank
*Demonstration Elections: U.S.-Staged Elections
 in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam and El
 Salvador* 21:7-8,13,39
 Hermann, Kai
 "Klaus Barbie: A Killer's Career" 25:15-20
 Hersh, Seymour M.
*Chemical and Biological Warfare: America's
 Hidden Arsenal* 17:16-18,28,30; 19:28; 25:32
 Hervet, Francoise (pseud.)
 "Knights of Darkness: The Sovereign Military
 Order of Malta" 25:27-38
 Heydrich, Reinhard 17:6
 Hickel, Walter J. 25:38
 High Adventure Ministries 18:64-65
 High Eagle, Bob 24:20
 Higham, Charles
*Trading With the Enemy: An Exposure of the
 Nazi-American Money Plot, 1933-1949*
 25:23,25,30
 Higham, Charles 25:35
 Higham, James A. 14-15:13
 Hillebrand, Chris 16:9
 Himber, Robert 22:14
 Himmler, Heinrich 25:13,28,43
 Hinckley, Warren and Turner, William
The Fish is Red 17:28,30,47
 Hinckley, John 13:25
 Hinkle, Charles W. 18:59
 Hinton, Deane Roesch 21:9,22,32
 Hoare, Mike 16:8-10; 17:3-4; 22:17,24
 Hochschild, Adam 16:27
 Hodge, Evan 24:25-28
 Hoerber, Amoretta M. 17:10,22
 Hoettl, Wilhelm 25:14
 Hoffman, Bruce 23:38
 Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. 17:16-17

Hoge, Warren 21:13
 Holdgreive, Dan 21:36
 Holdridge, John H. 16:56
 Holland, Stuart and Anderson, Donald
*Kissinger's Kingdom: A Counter Report on
 Central America* 21:39
 Holmgren, Dale 16:52
 Holowach, Frank
 "The NASSCO Case: A Case Study in
 Infiltration and Entrapment" 24:30-33
 Hondros, John 25:39
 Honduras 13:44-45
 "Documentation: The U.S. Military Role in
 Honduras" 18:29-33; and Israel 20:34-35; CIA in
 16:18; 18:32; 22:25-29; MACHO 13:44; military
 strength 18:26-31
 Honduras and Nicaragua 13:46
 "Congressional Testimony: The Prospects of War
 Between Honduras and Nicaragua" (Buchanan)
 18:25-28
 Honduras Information Center
Honduras Update 21:41
 Honeywell Corporation 17:16; 24:40
 Hong Kong, CIA in 14-15:9
 Hood, William 23:38
 Hoover Institute 13:2; 20:17
 Hoover, J. Edgar 16:57; 19:38; 21:30-31,34;
 24:4,11; 25:6
Masters of Deceit 24:4
 Hopkins, Lance G. 14-15:8
 Horizon Oil and Gas Company 21:28
 Hormats, Saul 17:18
 Horton, John R. 22:3
 Hosenball, Mark 19:34
 Hougan, Jim
Spooks 25:38
 Hough, Mike 16:13
 Houghton, Bernard 16:51-55
 Howard University 19:31
 Howe, Marvin 19:15,24
 Howell, Mike 13:22; 16:21,45
 Hubble, Beverly 22:31
 Hubbs, Charlie 21:30
 Hudal, Alois 25:10-11,13
 Hudson Institute 16:20,22
 Hugel, Max 14-15:14; 16:4,56-57; 17:50
 "A New Class of Spooks: Max Hugel Rank
 Amateur" 13:52,56
 Hughes Aircraft 17:37-38,40
 Hughes, Alister 20:17
 Hughes, Ralph C. 14-15:13
 Hull, John E. 25:51
 Human Development Foundation 25:51
 Human Events 13:50; 19:8; 21:35; 22:30
 Human Life Foundation 25:38
 Hunt, E. Howard 16:40; 19:15
 Hunt, H.L. 25:30
 Hunt, Linda 25:23
 Hurley, Edward N. 25:30
 Hurt, Henry H. 21:29
 Husmann, Max 25:12
 Hvalkof, Soren 18:43
 Hynds, Patricia
 "The Ideological Struggle Within the Catholic
 Church in Nicaragua" 18:16,20

I

I.G. Farben Company 25:11,24,25,28,35
 Iacocca, Lee 25:27
 Ienaga, Saburo 17:17
 Ieng Sary 22:24
 Ikle, Fred Charles 16:20; 19:29; 20:28
 Illinois Power Company 21:28
 Illueca, Jorge 20:25-26
 Inchauste, Fernando 25:19
 index
 "Complete CAIB Index, Nos. 1-12" (Tsang) 14
 15:1-36
 India, CIA in 14-15:9-10
 Indian Ocean
 "The Indian Ocean: Seychelles Beats Back
 Mercenaries" (Ray) 16:4-10
 Indonesia, CIA in 14-15:10; 16:39; 18:43
 infiltration *see* provocateurs and informers
Information Digest 19:9

informers *see* provocateurs and informers
 Ingersoll Foundation 21:28
 Ingles, Susan 16:9
 Inman, Bobby Ray 13:52; 14-15:14; 16:31; 17:35-36,40
 Inman-Riverdale Foundation 21:28
Inquiry magazine 18:14; 24:36
Inside Asia 23:40
 Institute of American Relations 16:6,15
 Institute of American Studies 21:25
 Institute for Defense Analysis 22:32
 Institute of Diplomatic Studies 21:42
 Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 13:13
 Institute of General Studies 18:14
 Institute of Life Insurance 19:34
 Institute for Policy Analysis 17:49
 Institute for Policy Studies 13:44; 21:31
 Institute on Religion and Democracy 18:6,16; 23:39
 "Archbishop Obando y Bravo and the Institute on Religion and Democracy" 18:6
 Institute for Religious Works *see* Vatican Bank
 Institute for the Study of Conflict (London) 13:4; 21:37
 Instituto de Investigaciones Socio-Económicas de Honduras (INSEH) 21:39-40
 Inter-American Communication Foundation 22:34
 Inter-American Development Bank 16:33
 Inter-American Press Association 16:33-36,43; 19:31,36
 Inter-American School of Defense 18:34
 Interarms Corporation 20:15
 Intercontinental Development and Management Company, Inc. 13:26-27
 Intermodal, Inc. 25:37
 Intermountain Aviation, Inc. 20:27,40
 International Brotherhood of Teamsters 21:25,35-36
 International Business Machines 21:18-19,28
 International Business-Government Counselors 20:9
 International Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes of the Racist and Apartheid Regimes of Southern Africa 13:16
 International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences 21:26
 International Court of Justice 13:4; 21:5
 International Defense and Aid Fund (IDAF)
Focus 13:51; *Massacre at Maseru: South African Aggression Against Lesotho* 23:40; *Onyeka: Namibia Will Be Free* 23:40; *This is Apartheid: A Pictorial Introduction* 23:40; *This is Namibia: A Pictorial Introduction* 23:40
 International Disaster Institute 18:59
 International Federation for Victory Over Communism 25:53
 International Indian Treaty Council 18:24; 24:16
 International Institute for Strategic Studies (London) 17:23
 International Linguistics Center 18:42
 International Love Lift 18:35,37,40
 International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) 25:24-25,27
 International Monetary Fund 13:43-44; 16:50; 18:55; 22:37-38
 International Police Academy 24:6
 International Public Policy Foundation 18:49; 22:33
 International Public Policy Research Corporation 18:49; 22:33
 International Red Cross 25:34
 International Rescue Committee 17:46; 22:15
 International Research Associates 17:35; 18:49
 International Spy Society
The Dossier 17:47
International Strategic Issues 16:22
 International Telephone and Telegraph 21:18-19,25; 25:24-25
 Internationale de la Resistance 23:29
 Interpol 23:8,12
 Investair Leasing Corporation 20:27
 Ipecki, Abdi 19:18; 23:10-14,31
 Iran, and Kurds 18:22
 Iraq
 and Kurds 18:22; CIA in 18:22
 Iron Workers Local 627 24:30
 Irvine, Reed John 16:27; 21:24-38; 22:31
 Isby, David 22:31
 Ishii, Shiro 25:7
 Israel

"Washington's Proxy: Israeli Arms in Central America" (Lusane) 20:34-37; and Geneva Convention 24:2; Mossad (intelligence agency) 16:25-26; 18:12; 19:33,38; 25:4
 Italy
 Carabinieri 23:18; CESIS (intelligence agency) 23:18; CIA in 16:42; 19:5; 23:20; 25:13-14; Guardia di Finanza 23:18; right-wing in 22:41-42; 23:17-21; SIFAR (intelligence agency) 25:34-35; SISDE (intelligence agency) 22:41; 23:18,24; 25:35; SISMI (intelligence agency) 22:41; 23:14,18,20-21,24-26,35; 25:35; Super S (intelligence agency) 23:20
 Ivanchukov, Naran Sansha 14-15:11

J
 Jabara, Abdeen 18:64
 Jacklin, Larry Lloyd 13:25; 16:45-46
 Jackson, Henry M. 23:16
 Jamaica
 "CIA Media Operations in Chile, Jamaica, and Nicaragua" (Landis) 16:32-43; resources for organizing 23:40
 Jamaica Broadcasting Corporation 19:36
Jamaica Daily News 19:36
 Jamaican Press Association 16:32; 24:38
 James, Daniel 19:8; 21:32,37
 James, Liam 20:5
Jane's Fighting Ships 13:12
 Janklow, William "Wild Bill" 24:18,20,27
 "The Strange Case of 'Wild Bill' Janklow" (Churchill) 24:22-24
 Janssens (Vatican intelligence agent) 25:30
 Jaramillo, Rafael 18:45-46
 Jarmin, Gary 22:31
 Jarquin, Antonio 22:27
 Jarrett, Larry G. 14-15:7
 Javanovic, Daniel 21:42
 Javits, Jacob 23:27
 Jemmot, Rawlins 16:49
 Jenkins, Brian Michael 22:4
 Jenkins, Louis "Woody" 22:32; 25:53
 Jensen, Carl 22:34
 Jensen, Christopher
 "The CIA Ties of World Medical Relief" 18:47-51
 Jensen, D. Lowell 24:12
 Jerusalem, CIA in 14-15:10
 Jervis, Verne 24:12
 Jessup, David 18:6
 Jeton, Francis John 14-15:8
 Joemman, Stanley 18:63
 Johanniterorden 25:36
 Johansen, Bruce 24:29
 John XXIII (Pope) 18:15
 John Birch Society 13:27; 19:9; 24:20,23,31; 25:36
 John N. Olin Foundation 21:26
 John, Patrick 13:22-24,26; 16:44,47-48,50
 John Paul I (Pope) 18:12,15; 23:38; 25:35
 John Paul II (Pope) 13:3; 18:11-12,15; 19:13-15,19-21; 21:20; 22:44; 23:1-3,34,36
 "The Vatican Connection: Vernon Walters and the Pope" 18:9
 Johnson, Aaron William 13:47
 Johnson, Haynes 16:25
 Johnson, Lyndon B. 25:43
 Johnson, Rodney 24:30-33
 Johnson, Ural Alexis 17:7
 Johnstone, Diana 19:24; 23:38
 Joiner, Ernest V. 21:38
 Jonathan Institute 22:5; 23:16-17,26,31-33
 Jones, Ben 22:17-18,23
 Jones, Bruce 25:51
 Jones, Buford 25:45
 Jones, David 17:33
 Jonestown Research Project 16:57
 Joseph, Dennis 13:25; 16:47
Journal of Contemporary Asia 13:51
Journal of Indo-European Studies 25:32
Journal of International Relations 25:32
Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 25:32
 Joyal, Judy Lawton 21:39
 Juan Carlos, King 18:15; 19:7; 25:37-38
 Jungle Aviation and Radio Service 18:41-42,45-46

K
 Kahane, Richard A. 13:47-48
 Kahn, David 20:42
 Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation 21:28
 Kalangula, Peter T. 13:6
 Kalb, Marvin 18:13; 19:8,16,21,24,40; 23:6-7,32,36-37
 Kallianesis, Yiorgos 25:48-49
 Kalish, Abraham H. 21:24
 Kallis, Elias M. 17:20
 Kaltenbrunner, Ernst 25:14
 Kaltschmidt, Alfredo 18:39
 Kamenske, Bernard H. 16:28
 Kameradenwerk 25:2,4-14
 Kamil, Fouad 13:21
 Kamm, Henry 19:23-24
 Kampelman, Max M. 23:32
 Kampuchea *see* Cambodia
 Kane, Eugene I. 25:37
 Kantorovich, Leonid V. 24:29
 Kapuuo, Clemens 13:6
 Karamessines, Thomas H. 17:14
 Karrow, Stanley 17:8; 18:68
 Kaschik, Gunther 13:7
 Kasten, Robert W. 22:33
 Kastenmeier Subcommittee 13:49
 Katrosh, Ralph J. 14-15:10
 Kaufman, Mary M. 25:24-25
 Kaunda, Kenneth 13:31,33,38; 22:37-38
 Kavathas, Vasilis
The Other Eleni 25:47-49
 Kaznecheev, Alexander 16:27
 Keegan, George, Jr. 20:40-41; 23:16
 Kelley, Clarence M. 24:20,29
 Kellogg, Frank B. 17:5
 Kelly, Hubert 25:53
 Kelly, John Louis, Jr. 14-15:13
 Kelly, Mike 22:31
 Kelvinator Company 25:33
 Kemp, Jack 18:40; 22:5
 Kemper, Vicki 25:53
 Kennedy, John F. 17:7; 18:15; 19:15,38
 Kennedy, Joseph P. 25:34
 Kennedy, Robert D. 14-15:10
 Kenya 13:35; 16:10
 CIA in 14-15:10
 Kerr, John 16:53
 Kessling, Chuck 16:47
 Keyder, Caglar 23:38
 Keyes, Alan 13:37
 Keys, Wilson Brian 16:38
 Khomeini, Ayatollah 21:30; 23:21
 Khrushchev, Nikita 19:37-38; 20:40-41
 Kiehl, Joseph A. 14-15:10
 Killright, Joseph Stuntz 24:25
 Kim, Charles 16:45,47
 Kim, Sang In 20:38
 Kimsey, Herman E. 25:36
 Kincaid, Cliff 21:30,35,37
 King, Jonathan 17:15
 King, Kenneth 24:32
 King, Martin Luther, Jr. 13:50; 21:30
 Kinoy, Peter 21:40
 Kinsolving, Lester 21:35,38
 Kirkpatrick, Evron Maurice 16:28-29
 Kirkpatrick, J.W. 16:44
 Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. 13:12,14,36; 16:10,28-29; 18:6,15,24; 20:5; 21:40; 22:5,25,27; 24:35
 Kisacik, Rasit 23:11
 Kissinger, Henry A. 13:8; 16:6; 18:58-59; 20:29; 21:26,39; 23:27
 Kitson, Frank
Low Intensity Operations 24:3-11
 Klaras, Thanasis 25:48
 Klarsfeld, Beata 25:12,14
 Klepper, Stewart
 "Central America Ignites: The U.S. Order of Battle" 13:42-46
 Kleynhans, Adriaan 13:9
 Knights of Malta 25:3
 "Knights of Darkness: The Sovereign Military Order of Malta" (Hervet) 25:27-38
 Knights Templar 25:28
 Knott, Frank M. 13:47

- Knudson, Richard L. 17:47
Kochitsky, Robert B. 16:46
Koestler, Arthur
 Darkness at Noon 23:25
Kohl, Victor P., Jr. 14-15:9
Kohn, Clara 18:49
Kokalis, Peter G. 22:20
Kolev (Bulgarian official) 23:23
Komer, Robert W. 17:52
Konrad Adenauer Foundation 16:23
Kopkind, Andrew 24:36
Koppel, Ted 17:35-36, 39; 18:13
Korean Air Lines flight 007 21:30; 22:34
 "The Korean Spy Plane: Flight 007 Aptly
 Named" (Lawrence) 20:40-42
Korean Central Intelligence Agency 20:38, 42
Kosiak, Ivan 25:52
Kosti, Michael V. 13:47; 14-15:12
Kovaci, Ismail 23:13
Kovalec, Kathy 21:39
Kozonguizi, Jariretundu 13:15
Kriebler, Robert H. 21:27
Krieger, Harold 21:36
Kruks, Sonia 23:29
Krupp Company 25:11
Ku Klux Klan 13:3, 51; 20:5; 22:18, 22; 24:3
 "Behind the Klan's Karibbean Koup Attempt,
 Part I" (Lawrence) 13:22-27; "Behind the Klan's
 Karibbean Koup Attempt, Part II" (Lawrence)
 16:44-50, 21
Kuboki, Osami 25:53
Kuhnen, Michael 25:18
Kujau, Konrad 21:41
Kunstler, William M.
 "The Ordeal of Leonard Peltier" 24:25-29
Kupperman, Robert H. 22:5; 23:32
Kuwait, CIA in 14-15:11
Kuzmich, Paula 18:56
Ky, Nguyen Cao 20:39; 21:36
- L**
La Pointe, Paul 13:39
La Prensa (Nicaragua) 16:33-42; 18:5, 18-19
Lackey, Douglas 17:8
Lagnado, Lucette 17:42
Lagorio (Minister of Defense in Italy)
 23:19, 24, 26, 36
Lamprecht, Nick 22:12
Landau, Jacob M.
 Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study in Irredentism
 23:38; *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey* 23:38
Landis, Fred
 "CIA Media Operations in Chile, Jamaica, and
 Nicaragua" 16:32-43; "Moscow Rules Moss's
 Mind" 24:36-38; "Opus Dei: Secret Order Vies
 for Power" 18:11-15; "Uncle Sam's Georgie
 Girl" 19:25-28
Lansdale, Edward Geary 16:37-38, 41; 18:46, 68;
 19:27; 20:39; 21:25; 25:34, 56
Laos 21:40
 CIA in 17:44; 18:48-50; 22:10
Lappe, Marc
 *Chemical and Biological Warfare: The Science of
 Public Death* 17:28
Laqueur, Walter 19:22
Larkin, Felix 25:28
Larkin, Joseph J. 25:30
LaRouche, Lyndon 19:9; 24:5
Larson, Carl A. 17:25
Larson, Donald J. 24:18
Larson, Lindsay 16:47
Latin America, resources for organizing 17:47
Latin American Episcopal Conference (CELAM)
 18:17-20
Latin American Working Group
 Central American Women Speak for Themselves
 23:39; *LAWG Letter* 17:47
Lauer, Dick 13:18
Laurent, Frederic 25:30-31
Law Association for Asia and the Western Pacific
 (Lawasia) 16:53
Lawler, Philip F. 25:38
Lawrence, Ken
 "Behind the Klan's Karibbean Koup Attempt,
 Part I" 13:22-27; "Behind the Klan's Karibbean
 Koup Attempt, Part II" 16:44-50, 21; "Death
 Overtakes a Spy" 19:34; "From Phoenix
 Associates to Civilian-Military Assistance"
 22:18-19; "From the Hessians to the Contras:
 Mercenaries in the Service of Imperialism"
 22:10-11; "Nazis and Klansmen: *Soldier of
 Fortune's* Seamy Side" 22:22-24; "Sources and
 Methods: CIA Assassinations—Part III" 17:52, 50;
 "Sources and Methods: CIA
 Assassinations—Part IV" 20:44, 39; "Sources
 and Methods: CIA Religion" 18:68, 66; "Sources
 and Methods: Flim-Flam" 21:44, 42; "Sources
 and Methods: Germ Warfare Disinformation"
 16:60, 58; "Sources and Methods: Mail
 Surveillance, Part II" 13:49-50; "Sources and
 Methods: The CIA Legend" 19:40, 37-38; "The
 History of U.S. Bio-Chemical Killers" 17:5-7;
 "The Korean Spy Plane: Flight 007 Aptly
 Named" 20:40-42; "The New State Repression"
 24:3-11
Lawrence, Robert
 "Evangelicals Support Guatemalan Dictatorship"
 18:34-40
Leach, Jim 17:9
Leahy, Patrick J. 25:3
Lebanon
 CIA in 14-15:11; 24:2; resources for organizing
 19:35
LeCarré, John 24:37
Ledeer, Michael A. 13:53; 18:12, 15; 19:8, 11, 22-
 24; 22:5, 41; 23:4-5, 20-21, 26, 30, 37
 "Italian Officials Finger Ledeer, CIA" 22:41
Lee, Daulton 16:53
Lee, Edward A.
 *The Lumpenproletariat and Repression: A Case
 Study* 24:5, 11
Leeper, British Ambassador 25:44
Lefebvre, Gene 24:14
Lefever, Ernest W. 13:2, 13; 18:6; 19:12, 22; 20:26
Legum, Colin 16:5
Lehrman, Lewis E. 25:50
Leibman, Morris I. 24:35
Lelyveld, Joseph 16:12
Lemnitzer, Lyman L. 21:40; 25:14, 32-33
Leone, Giovanni 23:22, 24
Lernoux, Penny 18:17
Lescaze, Lee 21:31
Lesotho 22:39
Letelier, Isabel 21:31-32
Letelier, Orlando 16:33; 18:14; 21:31-32; 22:14
Letterman Army Institute of Research 16:58
Levin, Carl 17:24
Levin, Michael 17:3; 25:3
Levin, Murray B. 19:14, 23
Levine, Isaac Don 25:33
Lewis, Anthony 19:22; 22:39
Lewis, Marx 21:26; 22:31
L'Express (France) 13:48; 21:27
Leyton, Armando 25:18
liberation theology 18:2-3
Liberia 13:34
 CIA in 13:47; 14-15:11
Liberty Lobby 13:27; 22:22; 25:34
Libya 13:34-35; 14-15:3; 16:5; 17:50
Lichenstein, Charles 22:40
Liebman, Marvin 21:25
Liechty, Philip 17:4
Liendo, José Gregório 24:37
Lilley, James R. 16:56
Lincoln Institute 22:31
Lindsay, John Rose 16:48
Linebarger, Paul 16:34
Linse, Kathy 21:31
Lipton Foundation, Thomas J. 21:28
Lisenby, Robert Lee 13:23, 27; 16:49-50
Litton Industries 21:27
Lloyd, David A. 13:26
Lockheed Corporation 21:19; 23:22, 24
Loctite Corporation 21:27-28
Lofgren, William S. 14-15:14
Lofton, John 21:38
Loftus, John J. 25:12, 33
 The Belarus Secret 23:15
Loggia Propaganda 23:18
Lohuani, Mati 14-15:12
Loo, Clyde "Mark" 24:30-33
- Loomis, Patry E. 16:54
Lopez, Claudio 20:38
Lopez Garcia, Romeo 13:46
Lopez Rega, José 23:18
Lorenzo Perez, David 19:11
Louden, Ronald A. 13:26
Loudhawk, Kenny 24:20
Louisson, Einstein 20:11; 22:3
Louisson, George 22:3
Lourdes Mejia, Maria 16:41
Lovett, Ralph B. 20:39
low intensity warfare, theory and practice of 24:3-
 11
Lowenstein, Allard K. 23:44
Lowery, Boyd 18:51
Lubow, Arthur 24:9
Lucas, Kae 21:35
Lucas, Max 16:47
Lucas Garcia, Benedicto 18:35
Luce, Clare Boothe 18:15; 21:26, 29; 24:35; 25:34-
 35
Luce, Don 21:30
Luce, Phillip Abbott 21:37
Lucum, Wilson C. 21:25-26
Ludlum, Robert 16:25
Lukas, Karl 25:4
Lumumba, Patrice 16:8
Lund, Peder 22:16
Lundahl, Frederick Boyce 13:19, 28; 14-15:14
Luns, Joseph M.A.H. 13:12
Lupton, Robert Hiller 14-15:14
Luque, Leonel 18:30
Lusane, Clarence
 "Israeli Arms in Central America" Receives
 Award" 22:34; "Grenada, Airport '83: Reagan's
 Big Lie" 19:29-32; "The U.S. Connection:
 South African Torture" 18:55-56; "Washington's
 Proxy: Israeli Arms in Central America" 20:34-
 37
Luther, Richard M. 14-15:11
Lykas, Judge 25:48-49
Lyons, Eugene 21:26; 25:33
- M**
MacBride, Sean 13:6, 8; 23:41
MacGiven, Arthur 13:30, 33
Machel, Samora 22:39, 40
MacKenzie, Angus
 Sabotaging the Dissident Press 21:39
MacKenzie, Ian 19:12
MacMichael, David C. 22:2-3
MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour 23:4-5
Mader, Julius
 Who's Who in the CIA 16:57
Maestas, Roberto 24:29
Magsaysay, Ramon 17:4; 18:46, 68
Maier, Francis X. 25:38
Majano, Colonel 18:25
Malan, Magnus 13:37-38; 16:13; 18:56
Malaysia, CIA in 13:47
Maldives, CIA in 14-15:11
Malvaney, George Taylor 13:24; 16:45-46; 20:5
Man Tech Company 20:31
Mancham, James R.M. 16:6, 9-10
Maniadakis 25:43
Manikham, Touy 17:46
Mankiewicz, Frank 21:38
Mankind Quarterly 25:32
Manley, Michael 16:35, 37-38, 43; 19:31-32, 36;
 20:6; 24:38
Mann, P.Q. (pseud.) 22:34
Manor, Roy 16:52
Manson Forum 22:31
Manson, Frank 22:31
Mantarov, Jordan 19:23
Marchetti, Victor 13:19; 17:28; 21:34
Marchetti, Victor and Marks, John
 The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence 18:68
Marcinkus, Paul 25:35
Marcos, Ferdinand 20:39
Marcovich, Herbert 17:12
Marella, Paolo Cardinal 25:30

- Marik, Warren J. 14-15:13
 Marion, Leon 18:50-51
 Markov, Georgi 17:11
 Marks, John
 The Search for the Manchurian Candidate 16:38; 17:16,28
 The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence 18:68
 Marsh, John, Jr. 17:22
 Marshall, Richard 24:23-24,27
 Martella, Ilario 19:17; 21:20-21; 23:4,14,21-26,33,35-37
 Marti, José 16:28
 Martin, David 18:13
 Martini, Fulvio 22:41
 Marx, John P. 13:47
 Mas Canosa, Jorge 25:34
 Massing, Michael 21:9
 Matallana, José Carlos 18:41
 Mathewson, David Preston 14-15:12
 Matthews, Lodrich E. 16:45,47
 Matthiessen, Peter
 In the Spirit of Crazy Horse 25:54
 Mauritania 14-15:3; 16:5
 Mauritius 14-15:3; 17:4
 CIA in 13:47; 16:4-5; Militant Movement 16:4-5
 Maury, John M. 16:27
 Mayberry, Thomas 13:53
 Mayorka, Santiago 22:27
 McAlpine, Harrison, Jr. 14-15:10
 McAnamey, Charles A. 22:19
 McCarthy, John F. III 14-15:14
 McCarthy, Joseph 19:24; 23:32-33; 24:4; 25:8,25
 McCarthy, William E. 13:47
 McCartney, James 19:24; 22:8
 McCavitt, John J. 13:48
 McCleary, Paul 18:51
 McClellan, John 21:35
 McCloskey, Pete 17:39
 McCloy, John J. 25:8
 McClure, Brooks 20:44
 McColl, Alexander M.S. 22:17-18
 McCone, John 25:27,34
 McCoy, Charles P. 14-15:11
 McDonald, Kathryn 24:34
 McDonald, Larry Patton 13:7; 16:27; 19:9; 21:31; 24:34
 McDonald, Melvin 24:13
 McDonald, Walter J. 16:53
 McFarlane, Robert "Bud" 25:50
 McGehee, Ralph W. 16:35,39; 18:22; 19:15; 20:42; 21:34
 Deadly Deceits: My 25 Years in the CIA 19:7,37
 McGinity, Patrick 16:46
 McGoff, John Peter 21:28,36,38
 McGrory, Mary 13:53
 McGuire, Mary Anne 13:23,25; 16:45,47
 McKay, Karen 21:37
 McKay, Thomas A. 18:51
 McKenzie, Bruce 17:50
 McKenzie, Robert P. 16:16
 McKnight, Louis 22:19
 McKnight, Major General 20:31
 McLaughlin, Bill 23:7
 McLean, John K. 21:24
 McLuhan, Marshall 21:14
 McMahon, John N. 13:56
 McNamara, Martin J. 21:36
 McNamara, Robert 17:7; 19:5
 McNell, Dennis 17:50
 McQuirter, James Alexander 13:23,26; 16:21,44-45,48
 McWilliams, James W. 13:48
 Means, Bob 18:39-40
 Means, Russell 24:17,21-24,28-29
 Media Network
 Guide to Films on Central America 21:40
 Medvedev, Zhores 16:58
 Meenery, John Winn 18:30
 Meese, Edwin III 13:42; 18:34; 22:5; 24:6,8-9
 Meislin, Richard 21:10-13
 Mejia Victores, Oscar Humberto 20:37
 Mendelson, Johanna 21:31
 Mengele, Josef 24:35; 25:2,4-8
 Menges, Constantine C. 16:20,22-23,27; 18:6; 19:27
 "Constantine Menges: CIA Ideologue" (Arthur) 16:22-23
 Mennonite Central Committee 17:12; 18:51
 Mercedes-Benz Company 25:11
 mercenaries 13:3,16-17; 16:6-10; 17:48-49; 22:2,4,6,10-24
 "From Phoenix Associates to Civilian-Military Assistance" (Lawrence) 22:18-19; "From the Hessians to the Contras: Mercenaries in the Service of Imperialism" (Lawrence) 22:10-11; "The 'Buffalo Battalion': South Africa's Black Mercenaries" 13:16-17
 Merex AG Company 25:5,8
 Merikoski, Juha Oliva 14-15:7
 Merk, Kurt 25:9
 Merkt, Stacey 24:13
 Mersan, Omer 23:6,36
 Merser, Friederich 25:11
 Meselson, Matthew 16:58; 17:8,11,17-18,21,24; 22:35
 Messerschmidt Company 25:11
 Messerschmidt, Jim
 The Trial of Leonard Peltier 21:39
 Messing, Andrew 22:31; 25:56
 Metcalf, Joseph III 20:15-16,27
 Metzger, John 22:17
 Meyer, Cord, Jr. 13:56; 16:27
 Meyer, Edward C. 16:14-15; 17:21,25
Miami Herald 19:9-10
 Michaels, Robert Alan 16:50
 Michel, James H. 20:13-14
 Middendorf, William 18:34
 Mikulak, Robert 17:10-11
 Miller, Donald L. 13:47
 Miller, Jonathan S. 21:12
 Milliken Foundaton 21:28
 Mills, Robert H. 14-15:10
 Mindzenty, Cardinal 25:34
 Mingolla, Alfredo Mario 25:15-17,19-20
 Mirocha, Chester J. 17:9,11,46
 Mitchell, Edgar L. 20:27
 Mitchell, Keith 20:20
 Mitrone, Dan 16:17; 25:22
 Mitsui Corporation 16:22
 Mizelle, William R. 16:16
 Mobil Foundation, Inc. 21:28
 Mobil Oil Company 21:27-29
 Mobutu Sese Seko 13:16; 16:8,12
 Modica, Charles 20:7,9-10
 Moffett, William Adger III 14-15:7
 Moffitt, Ronni Karpen 18:14; 21:31-32; 22:14
 Mohawk, Richard 24:20
 Mohn, Sid 24:12
 Moi, Daniel T. arap 16:10
 Molinari, Colonel 25:17
 Moncada, Marlene 20:39,44
 Mondale, Eleanor 24:36
 Mondale, Walter 24:36
 Monge, Luis Alberto 18:8; 20:28,37; 22:29
 Monroi, Mosca 25:18
 Montealegre, Heraldo 18:25
 Montgomery, Hugh 16:56
 Montgomery, Stephen Elroy 14-15:7,10
 Montileaux, Robert 24:23
 Montini, Giovanni Battista 25:13,30-31,35
 Moody, Dale 22:32
 Moon, Peter 16:47
 Moon, Sun Myung 20:38-39; 21:26,29,36,38; 22:30-33; 25:3,18-20,30,35,53
 "Arnau de Borchgrave Boards Moon's Ship" (Wolf and Clarkson) 24:34-35; "Pak in the Saddle Again" (Clarkson) 20:38-39
 Moore, Capt. John 13:12
 Moore, John D.J. 25:28
 Moore, Robin 13:7; 16:6; 22:22
 Moorer, Thomas H. 21:26
 Moral Majority 13:7,51
 Morales, José 24:14
 Moreau, Arthur 25:51
 Morgan-Witts, Max 23:37
 Morlion, Felix A. 25:30
 Moro, Aldo 22:42
 Moro, Thomas 19:26
 Morocco 13:34-35
 CIA in 14-15:11
 Moser, Charles 22:31
 Moss, Robert 13:48; 16:25,35; 17:47; 18:12-13; 19:7-8,10,33; 21:30-31,35; 23:16,33; 24:36-38
 Chile's Marxist Experiment 21:31; 24:36-37;
 Collapse of Democracy 24:36; *Death Beam* 18:13,15; 24:36,38; *Monimbo* 24:36; "Moscow Rules Moss's Mind" (Landis) 24:36-38; *Moscow Rules* 24:36-38; *The Spike* 16:27,35; 19:8,16; 24:36-38
 Motley, Langhorne A. 20:6,29; 25:51
 Mott, William Chamberlain 21:26
 Movement for the National Liberation of Barbados (MONALI)
 Brek Loose 17:47
 Moyers, Bill 21:29
 Moynihan, Daniel 19:11
 Mozambique 13:36; 22:38-40
 "Zimbabwe Rebels Exposed" 16:13; CIA in 13:28,36; 16:13; 18:54; FRELIMO 13:31,33; Mozambique National Resistance 13:9,31,33; 16:13; 22:38
 Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Information Centre
 People's Power 13:51; 17:47
 Mudge, Dirk 13:6
 Mueller, Heinrich 25:10-11
 Mugabe, Robert 13:10,36; 16:13
 Mulder, Connie 13:7,31
 Mullin, Stan 17:37-39,42
 Mumcu, Ugur 23:14-15,38
 Murdoch, Rupert 19:10; 21:41
 Murray, Pat 18:30
 Murray, William Dennis 14-15:10
 Mussolini, Benito 18:12
 Muzorewa, Abel 13:31; 22:24
 Myers, Brigadier General 20:31
 Myers, Charles E. 14-15:11
- N**
 Naarendorp, Harvey 20:6
 Nairn, Allan 22:26
 Nalin, David R. 17:17
 Namibia 13:35,38-41; 18:53,55-56; 22:37-38,40
 "The Namibia 'Solution': The Future of Southern Africa" (Ray and Schaap) 13:4-14; CANU 13:9; Democratic Turnhalle Alliance 13:4,6-8,13-14; PROSWA 13:7; SWAPO-D 13:9,33
 Namibia, SWAPO 13:4-14,33,35,38-39; 16:11
 Namibia Today 13:51
 National Action/Research on the Military Industrial Complex (NARMIC) 23:39
 Up in Arms: U.S. Military Shipments to Central America—A Guide for Activists 23:39
 Nassib, Selim 19:35
Nation magazine 24:36
 National Academy of Sciences 21:30
 National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 20:40
 National Alliance 13:22,25; 16:46; 22:22
 National Association for the Advancement of White People 16:44
 National Association of Manufacturers 19:29
 National Caucus of Labor Committees 24:5
 National Council of Churches 18:3,51
 National Council of Community World Affairs Organizations 16:28
 National Defense Council 25:56
 National Democratic Policy Committee 19:9
 National Endowment for the Arts 22:15
 National Intelligence Service (NIS) (South Africa) 13:33
 National Journalism Center 22:31
 National Lawyers Guild
 Guatemala: Repression and Resistance 13:51
 National Public Radio 21:38
National Review 18:4,14; 19:8,27,31; 21:31,36;

24:34,37; 25:38
 National Right to Work Foundation 21:27
 National Socialist Party of America 13:22,24-25
 National Steel and Shipbuilding Company
 "The NASSCO Case: A Case Study in Infiltration and Entrapment" (Holowach) 24:30-33
 National Strategy Information Center 21:26
 National Student Association 13:53
 Nationalist Action Party (Turkey) 19:13,16,18-19; 23:10-11,14-15,28,31,34
 Natirboff, Murat 14:15:8
 Native Americans
 "The Covert War Against Native Americans" (Churchill) 24:16-21
 Navaro, Wilfredo 18:53-54
 Navarro, Anthony 25:34
 Navasky, Victor
Naming Names 14:15:5
 Nazar, Ruzi 23:15
 Nazis 13:3,22,24-25; 20:5; 22:22,42; 24:3; 25:2
 "How Allen Dulles and the SS Preserved Each Other" (Scott) 25:4-14; in Bolivia 25:15-20; in Canada 16:47
 Nazis and U.S. corporations
 "The Real Treason" (Preston) 25:23-25
 NBC News 19:14-23; 23:5-7,27-28,36-37
 Neagoy, George 25:10
 Needham, Joseph 17:7
 Negroponte, Diana 18:23-24
 Negroponte, John D. 18:8,10,23; 22:25-26
 Nelson, Alan C. 24:12
 Nepal, CIA in 14:15:11
 Nestlé Coordination Center for Nutrition, Inc. 21:28
 Netanyahu, Jonathan 22:5
 Netherlands, CIA in 14:15:11
 Network in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala (NISGUA)
Guatemala Network News 21:41
 Nevins, Edward 17:16
 New Jewel Movement (Grenada) 20:3-4,7-8,10,39
New Leader 21:32
New Left 13:50
New Republic 19:8,11
 New School of Social Research 21:26
 New Tribes Mission (Bolivia) 18:45
 New World Dynamics 22:31
 New World Information Order 23:41
New York Post 19:9-10
New York Times 19:8,23-24; 21:4,9-14; 22:30; 23:4-5,9,17,21,27-28,33-37
 "Objective" News as Systematic Propaganda: The *New York Times* on the 1984 Salvadoran and Nicaraguan Elections" (Herman) 21:7-13
New York Tribune 20:38; 24:34-35
 New York University 19:34
 News World Communications 24:34
Newsweek magazine 13:48; 16:27; 18:13; 19:8; 20:26; 23:28; 24:35
 "Media Manipulation: Covert Propaganda in Time and Newsweek" (Friel) 21:14-23
 Newton, Frederick 13:25; 16:47
 Nguyen, Nguyen Van 22:13
 Nicaragua
 "Privatizing the War" (Clarkson) 22:30-33;
 "CIA Media Operations in Chile, Jamaica, and Nicaragua" (Landis) 16:32-43; "Nicaragua Braces for War" (Ray and Schaap) 20:25-30;
 "Nicaragua Under Siege: CIA's 'Secret' War Escalates" (Ray and Schaap) 18:7-10;
 "Nicaragua Update: Feverish Overthrow Plan Builds Toward Climax" (Wolf) 22:25-29;
 "Nicaragua Update: The War Widens" (Ray and Schaap) 21:4-6; "The Ideological Struggle Within the Catholic Church in Nicaragua" (Hynds) 18:16-20; "The Masaya Affair" (Ray and Schaap) 18:4-6; and Israel 20:35-36; ARDE 20:27-29; 21:5; 22:20,26-29; CIA in 16:3,18,20-21; 17:50; 20:26-30; 21:4-6; 25:56; Contras 18:10,32; 20:27-30; 21:4-6; 22:2,26-33; 23:39; 24:35; 25:50-51,53,56; elections (1984) 21:11; FDN 18:9; 20:27-29; 21:5; 22:19,26-28; 25:51-52; Fifteenth of September League 18:23; FSLN 18:18-20; military strength 18:26-28; Office of Communications Media 18:18,20
 Nicaragua, and Honduras *see* Honduras

Nicaragua, Miskito Indians 16:20-21; 18:10,28; 20:25,28; 22:11,32; 23:39; 25:36,53
 "Covert Action and Indigenous Groups: The Miskito Case" (Ortiz) 18:21-24; Operation Red Christmas 18:23-24,32
 Nicaragua Information Center
Nicaraguan Perspectives 17:47; 21:40-41
 Nicaraguan Development Council 25:51
 Nicaraguan Freedom Fund 24:35; 25:35
 Nicaraguan Refugee Fund 25:51
 Nickerson, David 14:15:12
 Nicol, Donald J. 14:15:10
 Nicolaides, Philip 16:28
 Nigeria 13:36,39
 CIA in 13:47; 14:15:11-12
 Nimetz, Matthew 17:13
 Nimieri, Gafaar 13:34
 Nimitz, Chester 17:6
 Nixon, Richard M. 13:52; 21:29; 25:8,38
 Noel, Lloyd 20:20
 Noel, Vincent 20:11,21
 Norris, Michael Stanley 13:25; 16:45-46
 North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) 20:35
Report on the Americas 17:47
 North, Oliver L. 25:50-51
 Northland Poster Collective 23:41
 Nortie Enterprises, Inc. 13:22,24,26; 16:44
 Noticias del Mundo 20:38; 24:34
 Nott, John 17:22
 Novak, Michael 16:28; 18:15; 24:35
 Novak, Robert 21:31
Now! magazine (Britain) 16:58,60
 Nueva Acción Cristiana (Chile) 16:42
 Nugan, Frank 16:51,54-55
 Nugan Hand Bank
 "The Australian Connection: The Nugan Hand, the CIA Bank" (Grodin) 16:51-55
 Nujoma, Sam 13:1,8,13,38
 Nunn, Craig 22:17
 Nunn, Sam 17:25
 Nussbaum, Perry 16:46
 Nutting, Wallace H. 18:26,30,40
 Nyerere, Julius 22:38

O
 Obando y Bravo, Miguel 18:4-6,16,18-19; 25:37
 "Archbishop Obando y Bravo and the Institute on Religion and Democracy" 18:6
 Oberdorfer, Don 16:25
 O'Brien, Conor Cruise 19:15; 23:31
 O'Brien, Morgan J. 25:30
 O'Brien, Robert 18:51
 ODESSA 25:8
 O'Donnell Foundation 21:28
 Oines, James 24:14-15
 Okukwu, Colonel 13:31
 Okhrana (Tsar's secret police) 24:4
 O'Leary, Jeremiah 16:57; 18:14; 21:31
 Olgater, Christian 16:7
 Olivares, Augusto 19:27
 Ollivier, Louis Leon, Jr. 13:28
 Olmer, Lionel H. 14:15:14
 Olson, Frank R. 17:15-16
 Oman, CIA in 14:15:12; 24:40
 Omega 7 13:3; 22:14,35,41
 Omega Group Ltd. 22:14-21
 Operation Bernhard 25:11
 Operation Bohica 17:33,35,38
 Operation CHAOS *see* CIA
 Operation Goodwill 21:15-16
 Operation Grand Eagle 17:40
 Operation Minaret 18:57
 Operation MONGOOSE *see* CIA
 Operation Ranch Hand 18:58; 21:30
 Operation Shamrock 18:57
 Operation Sojourner *see* U.S., Immigration and Naturalization Service
 Operation Sunrise 25:12-13
 Operation Velvet Hammer 17:33,38,40
 Opus Dei 25:37
 "Opus Dei: Secret Order Vies for Power" (Landis) 18:11-15
 Organization of American States 18:21,34
 Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 20:5,28

Orr, Diane 24:20
 Orrego, Claudio 18:14
 Orrego, Francisco 18:14
 Ortega, Daniel 18:9,19-20; 19:10; 21:23; 22:25,27
 Ortega, Humberto 16:33
 Ortiz, Frank Vincent, Jr. 20:3-4; 25:38
 Ortiz, Roxanne Dunbar
 "Covert Action and Indigenous Groups: The Miskito Case" 18:21-24
 Ortolani, Umberto 25:34
 Orwell, George
Animal Farm 16:39-40
 Osburg, John L. 13:23
 Osgood, Charles 16:37-38
 O'Shaughnessy, Hugh 20:14-15
 Ostrow, Ronald J. 16:25,30
 Oswald, Lee Harvey 19:38
 Otis, George 18:64-65
 OTRAG Company 13:26
 Ottone, Piero 23:19
 Ovryn, Rachel
 "Operation Sojourner: Targeting the Sanctuary Movement" 24:12-15
 Ox Hollow Foundation 21:28
 Oxfam America 23:39
 Oymen, Orsan 23:13-14
 Ozal, Turgut 23:29
 Ozgun, Faruk (pseud.) 23:5,14

P
 Pacifica Radio Network 24:36
 Packard, David 21:29
 Padgett, Herman 20:38
 Padgett, John 22:20,23
 Pagliai, Pierluigi 25:18
 Paisley, John Arthur 16:53
 Pak, Bo Hi 21:36; 22:31-32; 24:34-35; 25:18-19
 "Pak in the Saddle Again" (Clarkson) 20:38-39
 Pak Chung Hee 20:38; 21:26
 Pakistan, CIA in 14:15:12
 Paladin Press 22:16,22-23
 Palestine Liberation Organization 21:33; 22:42; 23:16
 Palladino, Jack 17:42
 Palmer, A. Mitchell 19:14,24
 Palmer, Morton Mowbray III 14:15:12
 Palombo, Louis F. 17:48
 Pan-Africanist Congress 13:30
 Pan American Health Organization 17:29-30
 Panama, CIA in 17:50
 Panax Corporation 21:28,38
 Panitt, Jeffrey 14:15:11
 Panther Press 22:16
 Papadopoulos, George 25:43
 Papagos, General 25:40
 Papandreou, George 25:39,43
 Paraffine Oil Corporation 21:27
 Paraguay, CIA in 14:15:12
 Parisi, Vincenzo 22:41
 Park, Tongsun 20:38
 Parker, Aida 13:13
 Parker, Dana Herbert 22:18-19
 Parker Foundation 21:28
 Parker, Jay A. 21:36; 22:31
 Parks, John 13:15
 Parrilli, Luigi 25:12-13,33
 Parrott, Thomas 18:68
 Pastor, Robert 20:5,9-10
 Pastora, Eden 13:46; 18:9; 20:25-28,37; 21:5; 22:20,27
 Patrick, Douglas Lee 13:18
 Pauken, Thomas 13:53
 Pauker, Guy J. 16:53
 Paul, Anthony 21:35
 Paul, Ronald 16:45
 Paul VI (Pope) 25:10,13,35
 Pavelic, Ante 25:7-8,10
 Pavitt, James Lynn 13:47
 Pax Christi 18:16,18-20
 Paz García, Policarpio 13:44
 Paziienza, Francesco 23:20-21,26,30; 25:36
 Pearson and Company 22:31
 Pearson, David 22:34
 Pearson, Drew 25:26
 Pearson, Roger 25:32,36

- Pearson, Ron 22:31
 Peirce, Michael 22:24
 Pell, Claiborne 16:22; 23:27
 Pellegrini, Carlos 16:15
 Peltier, Leonard 21:39; 24:1,19,21,23-29
 "The Ordeal of Leonard Peltier" (Kunstler) 24:25-29
 Penkovsky, Oleg H. 16:60
 Peolosi, Prefect 23:18
 Pepsico 21:28
 Percy, Charles 23:27
 Perdue, Michael Eugene 13:22,24,26; 16:21,44-46
 Peres, Shimon 22:5
 Perez Marcos, Jacinto 18:38
 Perkins Foundation, Barbara 21:28
 Perle, Richard N. 18:15
 Peron, Isabel 16:14
 Peron, Juan 25:34
 Perren, Jorge 16:15
 Perry, Paul 25:19-20
 Peru 18:42,44-45
 CIA in 14-15:12
 Peters and Margaret Peters Trust, Earle M. 21:28
 Peterson, Dale 17:11,42
 Peterson, Mark L. 20:27
 Peterzell, Jay 22:3
 Petrocelli, Major 23:21
 Petrov, Sotir 23:24
 Petrucci, Basilio 25:36
 Pettinelli, Joseph 14-15:11
 Pfeifel, Linda 20:44
 Pfeiffer, E.W. 17:12
 "Book Review: *The Chemical Scythe* (Hay)" 18:58-59
 Pfister, James 20:7
 Phelan, James J. 25:30
Philadelphia Inquirer 19:24
 Philip Morris 21:18
 Philip, Oliver N. 13:23
 Philippines, CIA in 13:21; 14-15:12; 18:46
 Phillip, Oliver 16:48
 Phillip, Walton 16:47
 Phillips, David Atlee 13:3; 21:31
 Phillips Petroleum 21:28-29
 Phoenix Associates 22:18
 Phoenix Program 13:53; 17:52; 22:15; 25:52
 Pichel, Thourot 25:36
 Pierce, William L.
The Turner Diaries 13:25
 Pierson, Don 13:25
 Pierson, Grey 13:25
 Pike, Douglas 21:12,36
 Pike, Kenneth L. 18:43
 Pinay, Antoine 25:38
 Pine Bluff Arsenal (Arkansas) 17:14,18
 Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto 13:12; 18:14; 25:5
 Piper, Howell 13:25; 16:47-48
 Pipes, Richard E. 19:23; 23:16
 Pius XI (Pope) 25:30
 Pius XII (Pope) 25:10,30-31,33,35
 Playboy Press 18:62
 Plues, Richard E. 14-15:12
 Podhoretz, Norman 16:28; 19:28; 23:16
 Poelaert, Father (Vatican intelligence agent) 25:30
 Pol Pot 17:12; 18:50; 19:22; 22:24
 Poland, elections in (1947) 21:8
 Poli, Arnie 16:44,47
 Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America (PACCA)
Changing Course: Blueprint for Peace in Central America and the Caribbean 21:39
 Polisario
Sahara Report 23:40
 Pollis, Adamantia 23:29
 Ponce, José 21:40
 Poor Bear, Myrtle 24:23-25,27-28
 Poos, Robert 22:17
 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Bulletin 13:55
Portada (Chile) 18:14
 Porter, John 16:27
 Portugal, George 25:19
 Posey, Thomas V. 22:18-19,31; 25:51,53
 Posse Comitatus 24:3
 Potts, James M. 14-15:8
 Poulson, Admiral 17:40
 Powell, James P. III 22:19
 Powell, John W. 17:7,17
 Powell, Sylvia 17:7
 Powers, Francis Gary 20:40
 Prats, Carlos 16:33
Prensa Libre (Guatemala) 13:45
 Preseren (Vatican intelligence agent) 25:30
 Press Association of Jamaica 19:36
 Presser, Jackie 21:35-36
 Preston, William, Jr.
 "Disinformation and Mass Deception: Democracy as a Cover Story" 19:3-12; "The Real Treason" 25:23-25
 Pretoria Institute for Strategic Studies 16:13
 Prewett, Virginia 16:16
 Price, David 24:17,20,24,27; 25:54
 Pringle, Peter 17:19
 Priore, Rosario 23:22
 Pritchard, Robert William 13:25; 16:45-46
 Private Agencies Collaborating Together 18:51
 private intelligence firms 17:48
 Privitera, John J. 24:25
 Pro Deo 25:30
 Progressive Labor Party 13:50
Progressive magazine 21:40
 Project 63 25:23,26
 Project Democracy 19:11-12
 Project Overcast 25:23
 Project Paperclip 25:23,26,28
 Project Resistance *see* CIA
 Prokhorov, Aleksandr M. 24:29
 Propaganda Due (P-2) 19:24; 22:41-42; 23:4,17-21,26,33,38; 25:27,34-35,38
 Propper, Eugene 19:25; 21:31
 Prosterman, Roy 16:22
 Protestant Relief and Development Agency 18:23
 Prouty, L. Fletcher 16:47,52; 17:48
 Provisional IRA 23:31
 provocateurs and informers
 in American Indian Movement 24:16-29; in anti-draft movement 16:49; in Italy 22:42; in labor movement 24:30-33; in sanctuary movement 24:12-15; theory of 24:2,4,6,10-11
 Pryor, David 17:20
 pseudo gangs 24:5
 psychic research 21:44
 psychological propaganda 21:14-23
 psychological warfare 13:21; 16:19,32-43; 19:3,5; 20:19; 21:15,25,31; 23:44
 "Sources and Methods: CIA Religion" (Lawrence) 18:68,66
 Puga, Alvaro 18:15
 Puren, Jeremiah "Josh" 16:8
 Puthoff, Harold 21:44
 Pyes, Craig 25:52
Q
 Qaddafi, Muammar 13:34,37; 14-15:3; 16:5,24-25; 17:50; 23:20
 Quaker Oats Company 21:28
Que Pasa 18:13-14
 Quintero, Rodolfo 16:37
 Quixote Center
Honduras: A Look at the Reality 23:39-40;
Nicaragua: A Look at the Reality 23:39-40
R
 R.J. Reynolds Company 21:17-18
 Rabb, Maxwell 22:41
 Rabe, Mike 18:39
 Rabel, Ed 21:33
 Rabin, Yitzhak 22:5
 Radio CFTR (Toronto) 13:22-23,27; 16:45
 Radio Free Europe 13:6; 19:6; 23:15,27; 25:27-28
 Radio Liberty 19:6; 21:26; 23:27; 25:27-28,33
 Radio Marti 16:28; 19:6,12; 25:34
 Radio Swan 19:6; 25:34
 Radio Venceremos 13:43
Signal of Freedom 23:39
 Radio WHMM 19:31
 Radix, Kenrick 20:17,19; 22:3
 Radosh, Ronald and Milton, Joyce
The Rosenberg Files: A Search for Truth 25:23
 Ramgoolam, Seewoosagur 16:5,10
 Ramirez, Carlos 18:34,40
 Ramirez Zelaya, Jorge Ignacio 20:39
 Ramos, Arnaldo 21:40
 RAND Corporation 16:22,53; 17:14; 19:27; 21:36; 22:4,31; 23:28; 25:50
 Randal, Jonathan 23:38
 Randi, James
The Magic of Uri Geller 21:44
 Raptis, Nikos
 "Eleni: The Work of a 'Professional Liar'" 25:41-49
 Rashke, Richard
The Killing of Karen Silkwood 13:51
 Raskob, John J. 25:30
 Rat Line 25:8,10-11,14
 Rather, Dan 21:33
 Rauff, Walter 19:27; 25:2,5,11-12,14,17
 Rauh, Richard W. 14-15:11
Raw Materials Report 17:47
 Ray, Ellen 22:34
 "Argentina Activates International Death Squads" 16:14-16; "Disinformation and Mass Deception: Democracy as a Cover Story" 19:3-12; "Nicaragua Braces for War" 20:25-30; "Nicaragua Under Siege: CIA's 'Secret' War Escalates" 18:7-10; "Nicaragua Update: The War Widens" 21:4-6; "Pentagon Moves on 'Terrorism'" 22:4-9; "The Indian Ocean: Seychelles Beats Back Mercenaries" 16:4-10; "The Masaya Affair" 18:4-6; "The Namibia 'Solution': The Future of Southern Africa" 13:4-14; "U.S. Crushes Caribbean Jewel" 20:3-20; "Yellow Rain Skeptic Found Dead" 17:43-46
 Rayburn, James 24:14
 RCA Corporation 21:34
Reader's Digest 18:13; 19:7-10,18; 21:26,28; 23:3-4,9,27-28,30-31,33
 Reader's Digest Foundation 21:28
 Reagan, Maureen 17:39
 Reagan, Ronald 16:25-26; 17:20; 19:9,11; 20:6-7; 21:38; 22:38; 23:17,28-29; 24:2,6,8-9,29,34,36; 25:2-3,27,50-51,56
 Reason Foundation 22:30
Reason Magazine 22:30
 Rebozo, Charles G. "Bebe" 21:29
 Recto, Claro M. 20:39
 Red, Robert 18:30
 Red Army Faction 24:5
 Red Brigades 22:42; 23:26,35
 red scares 23:5
 Red Star Cadre 24:5
 Redeker, Bill 17:40
 Redmond, Paul J., Jr. 14-15:7-8
 Reed, Dana 20:34; 22:34
 Reedman (FBI agent) 24:28
 Rees, John Herbert 19:9
 Rees, Martin 17:9
 Rees, Merlyn 19:34
 Refugee Relief International 22:33; 25:35
 Regalado, Gideon 17:12
 Regent (Vatican intelligence agent) 25:30
 Reid, Malcolm 13:25; 16:47
 Reisinger, Thomas D. 22:20
 Rene, Albert 16:4-5,9-10
 Reno, Donald 24:13
Reporter magazine 18:12
 Republic of New Afrika 24:27
 Resist 13:50
 Resource Center
Honduras: On the Border of War 21:40
 Reston, James 23:29
 Reuters 18:4
Review of the News 13:15; 19:9; 25:36
 Revolutionary Union 13:50
 Reynolds Foundation, J.B. 21:28
 Rhodesia *see also* Zimbabwe
 and mercenaries 22:18,24; CIA in 22:10,18
 Rhoadie, Eschel 13:7,31; 16:6
 Rice, Wesley H. 22:8
 Richard, Mark R. 18:30
 Richardson Testamentary Trust, Grace Jones 21:28
 Richardson Charitable Trust, H. Smith 21:28
 Richardson, Robert C. III 25:32
 Richter, Heinz
Greece Between Revolution and Counterrevolution (1936-1949) 25:44-45

- Ricord, Auguste Joseph 25:8-9
 Ridenhour, Ron 24:9
 Riding, Alan 16:41
 Riley, Brigadier General 20:31
 Riley, Murray Stewart 16:54
 Ringdahl, Phillip H. 13:47
 Rio Tinto Zinc 13:5
 Rios Montt, Efraín 18:34-37; 19:30; 20:28,37
 Rios Montt, Mario 18:35
 Ripon Society 21:36
 Rips, Geoffrey
 Unamerican Activities: The Campaign Against the Underground Press 17:47
 Ritholz, Jules 21:36
 Rivera, Brooklyn 18:9
 Rivera y Damas, Arturo 13:43
 Rivero, Emilio Adolfo 21:37
 Riveros, René 19:25
 Riviere, Bill 16:48
 Rizzo, Frank 21:29
 Rizzoli Publishing 23:19
 Roach, John 18:37
 Robelo, Alfonso 18:9,16; 20:25,28-29; 22:27
 Roberto, Holden 13:10,16; 16:12; 21:25; 22:13
 Roberts, Alun
 The Rossing File: The Inside Story of Britain's Secret Contract for Namibian Uranium 13:51
 Roberts, George 17:45
 Roberts, J. Milnor 22:31
 Roberts, Ronnie 13:25; 16:47
 Roberts, Rowland E., Jr. 13:48; 14-15:13
 Robertson, Pat 18:34-35; 25:37-38,53
 Robideau, Robert E. 24:23-25,29
 Robinson, Julian Perry 17:18-19,24
 Robinson, Randall 13:4
 Rocca, Raymond G. 25:31-32
 Rocha, Brenda 18:10
 Rockefeller Foundation 13:50
 Rockefeller, John D. IV 13:50
 Rockefeller, Nelson 18:17; 20:9; 21:35
 Rockwell, George Lincoln 16:47
 Rockwell International 21:19
 Rodriguez, Ermila Loretta 20:44
 Rodriguez, Rene 19:10-11
 Rodriguez Equizabal, Amando 21:10
 Roehl, Carol Ann 14-15:13
 Rogers, Bernard 17:7
 Rogers, Montgomery L. 14-15:14
 Rogers, Will 21:38
 Rojas, Don 20:11-12
 Roldos Aguilera, Jaime 17:50; 18:42
 Roling, Bert V.A. 17:17
 Romanoff, Aleksei 25:36
 Romberg, Alan 22:31
Rome Daily American 19:7-8
 Romero, Oscar 13:43; 20:39; 21:21
 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 17:6; 19:4; 25:6,13,24,44
 Rosenberg, Ethel 25:23
 Rosenberg, Julius 25:23
 Rosenblatt, Martin A. 25:28
 Rositzke, Harry A. 16:27; 21:6
 Ross, Thomas B. 19:38
 Roth, Fred 18:49
 Rothman, Barry 18:62
 Rothman, David 18:62
 Rothmyer, Karen 21:27
 Roulette, Christian
 La Filière: Jean Paul II-Antonov-Agca 23:38
 Rowan, Carl T. 22:4
 Rowan, Richard W. 19:34
 Royal Bank of Canada 16:22
 Royce, Kathryn Coe 22:31
 Royko, Mike 20:8
 Ruben, Bruce L. 14-15:10
 Rubin, Alfred P. 22:4
 Rudel, Hans Ulrich 25:8,11
 Rudolph, Arthur Louis Hugo 25:2
 Rueda, Enrique 22:31
 Rugh, William A. 13:55
 Ruiz, Horacio 18:5
 Rumanian Iron Guard 25:52
 Rumrill, Clark 14-15:8
 Rusher, William A. 21:36; 24:34
 Rusk, Dean 17:7; 21:40
 Russell, Arthur F. 13:28
 Russell, George 21:15-16,23
 Rustin, Bayard 23:16
 Ruth, Thomas A. II 14-15:8
 Ryan, Allan A. 25:9-10
 Ryan, John D. 25:30
 Ryan, John H. 21:38
 Ryan, Leo John 16:57
 Ryan, Leo Joseph 16:57
 Ryan, Vincent J. 25:34
 S
 S-Cubed Company 17:21
 Sadat, Anwar 13:34-35,55; 14-15:2-3; 16:25
 Safire, William 19:22-23,38; 21:6
 SAGE Associates 16:22
 St. George's Medical School 20:7-8
 St. Georges, Laurent Maubert 13:48
 St. John, Jeffrey 22:31
 Salazar, Jorge 18:19
 Salim, Salim 22:38
 Salisbury, Harrison 21:30
 Salisbury, Steve 22:11,20
 Salvatori Foundation, Henry J. and Grace 21:27
 Samim, Ahmet 23:38
 Samphan, Khieu 18:50
 San Diego Police Department 24:30-33
 San Luis Obispo (California) 24:9
 Sanchez, Celia 19:9
 Sanchez, Javier 18:10
 Sanchez, Nestor D. 16:56; 18:8,10; 19:29-30; 22:25
 Sanchez, Phillip 22:32; 24:34
 sanctuary movement
 "Operation Sojourner: Targeting the Sanctuary Movement" (Ovryn) 24:12-15
 Sanders, Charles 22:13
 Sandoval Alarcon, Mario 25:52
 Sandoz Company 17:16
 Sanford Foundation 21:28
 Sangumba (Savimbi aide) 13:10
 Santamaria, Amilcar 20:38
 Santiapichi, Severino 23:22
 Santini, Father 23:26
 Santovito, Giuseppe 23:18,20; 25:35
 Sapp, Kenneth Mitchell 14-15:8
 Sara Mellon Scaife Foundation *see* Scaife Foundation
 Sarita Kenedy East Foundation 25:37
 Sassen, Alfons 25:7,11
 Sasser, Jim 22:19
 Sassoon, Donald 23:38
 Saunier, Kenneth 13:55
 Sauter, Van Gordon 21:29
 Savimbi, Jonas Malheiro 13:3-4,8-10,13,15,34-35,38; 14-15:3; 16:12; 18:53; 21:25,42
 Savov, Dimitir 19:23
 Scaife Family Charitable Trusts 21:27-28
 Scaife Foundation 24:36
 Scaife, Richard Mellon 21:27,38; 24:36
 Schaap, William 22:34
 "Deceit and Secrecy: Cornerstones of U.S. Policy" 16:24-31; "Nicaragua Braces for War" 20:25-30; "Nicaragua Under Siege: CIA's 'Secret' War Escalates" 18:7-10; "Nicaragua Update: The War Widens" 21:4-6; "Pentagon Moves on 'Terrorism'" 22:4-9; "Statement to the U.N.: The CIA and BOSS" 18:52-54; "The Masaya Affair" 18:4-6; "The Namibia 'Solution': The Future of Southern Africa" 13:4-14; "U.S. Biological Warfare: The 1981 Cuba Dengue Epidemic" 17:28-31; "U.S. Crushes Caribbean Jewel" 20:3-20; "White Paper II: Administration Stonewalls While Covert Operations Escalate" 16:19-21
 Schaar, Stuart 23:29
 Schanche, Don A. 18:48
 Scheer, Robert 18:15
 Schellenberg, Walter 25:13
 Scherer, William F. 17:31
 Schlaefter, Salvador 18:5,20
 Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. 20:18
 Schlitz Foundation 21:28
 Schmider (Vatican intelligence agent) 25:30
 Schmidt, Helmut 17:22
 Schnee, Jeremiah 21:36
 Schneider, James G. 21:29
 Schneider, Rene 16:33
 Scholtes, Richard A. 22:7
 School of the Americas (Panama) 25:16
 Schorr, Daniel 16:56; 24:36
 Schreiber, Walter Emil 25:7,26
 Schreyer, William A. 25:38
 Schribman, David 20:42
 Schroeder, Patricia 22:14
 Schultz Foundation 21:28
 Schultz, W.G. 24:18
 Schuman, Julian 17:7
 Schutt, Jane 16:46
 Schwartz, Jack 24:20
 Schwartz, Stew 17:37,42
 Schwarz, Fred 25:38
 Schwend, Frederick 25:5-7,11,14
 Science for the People 21:29; 23:41
 Scientists and Engineers for Secure Energy, Inc. 21:26
 Scobie, General 25:39-40
 Scoon, Paul 20:19
 Scott, Joe 17:39
 Scott, Peter Dale
 "How Allen Dulles and the SS Preserved Each Other" 25:4-14
 Scott, Terry L. 24:18
 Scott, Winston MacKinley 21:32
 Scricciolo, Luigi 23:27
 Scripps, Edward Wyllis II 21:29
 Sdravos, Christos 25:47
 Sea Swallows 21:25
 Seaga, Edward 16:19,50; 19:36; 20:6,14
 Seagrave, Sterling 17:9
 Sea-Land Corporation 21:18
 Sears, John P. 13:7; 18:55-56
 Sears, Roebuck and Company 21:18
 Seaward Explorer (ship) 24:40
 Seaward Services (Miami) 24:40
 Security and Intelligence Fund 25:32
 Seiler, John 16:28
 Seitz, Frederick 21:26,38
 Sejna, Jan 16:27
 Selig, William 25:19-20
 Sellar, Don 19:35
 Senegal, CIA in 13:47-48
 Seraphin, Oliver 13:22,26; 16:44,48,50
 Serge, Victor
 What Everyone Should Know About State Repression 24:4
 Serrano, Mariello 22:27
 Severo, Richard 21:30
 Seychelles
 "The Indian Ocean: Seychelles Beats Back Mercenaries" (Ray) 16:4-10, CIA in 16:5-6
 Seymour, William 17:50
 Shackley, Theodore G. 17:48
 Shaffer, Deborah 21:40
 Shakespeare, Frank 25:37-38
 Shakur, Assata 24:5
 SHARE
 El Salvador: Refugees in Crisis 21:40
 Sharkey, Jacqueline 25:51
 Sharon, Ariel 20:34
 Shecharansky, Anatoly 19:22
 Sheehan, Mike 16:20
 Shelton, Robert M. 13:23
 Shelton, Sally 20:4-5,9-10
 Shepherd, Lemuel C. 25:36
 Sherry, Francis S. III 14-15:13
 Shipley, Carl L. 13:7
 Shipley, Smoak and Akerman 13:7,15
 Shock Battalion 23:41
 Shultz, George P. 18:9-10; 20:6,24; 21:2,6,22; 22:5,27,29; 24:10
 Shultz, Jim 22:17
 Sidey, Hugh 19:22
 Siebens, Harold W. 21:29
 Siemens Company 13:5
 Sigel, Thomas 21:40
 Sihanouk, Norodom 18:50
 Silkwood, Karen 13:51
 Silverstein, Josef 20:18
 Simmons, Robert Ruhl 16:56
 Simms, Linda 20:8
 Simon Wiesenthal Center 25:5,35
 Simon, William Edward 21:26,29; 24:35; 25:35,37
 Simons, Arthur D. "Bull" 22:17

- Simpson, Peggy 24:21
 Sims, Robert 16:9-10
 Sinatra, Frank 25:36
 Sindona, Michele 25:34-35
 Singer, Daniel 21:42
 Singer, Max 16:20
 Singh, Ricky 20:7,13
 Singh, Yoginder (pseud.) 23:5
 Singham, A. W. 13:5
 Singham, Archie 22:34
 Singlaub, John K. 21:36; 25:3,37,50-53,56
 Sipe, Bob 22:17
 Siri, Cardinal 25:14
 Sithole, Reverend 13:31
 Sivell, Gordon 13:22-23; 16:45
 Six, Franz Alfred 25:8-9
 SKF Ball Bearings 25:25
 Skinner, B.F. 16:37
 Skipp, Peter 24:40
 Skorzeny, Otto 22:42; 25:8,11,13-14,34
 Skouras, Spiros S. 25:38
 Skyhorse, Paul 24:20
 Skylight Pictures
 "When the Mountains Tremble" 21:40
 Slifer, Harry Seger, Jr. 14-15:12
 Smit, Robert 18:54
 Smith, Bradley 25:14
 Smith, Charles Stephen 14-15:9
 Smith, Hedrick 21:13
 Smith, Ian 22:10,24
 Smith, James Douglas, Jr. 13:28
 Smith, Joseph B. 18:12; 24:37
 Smith, Lloyd Hilton 21:27
 Smith, Mrs. Ian 13:7
 Smith, Richard Harris 25:12,14
 Smith, Tricia 21:31
 Smith, Wayne S. 20:25; 21:40
 Smith, William French 16:29-30
 Smithsonian Institution 17:14
 Smoak, Marion H. "Joe" 13:7
 Snepp, Frank 14-15:4
Soberania 16:3; 17:47
 Soble, Ron 17:40,42
 Social Democrats U.S.A. 18:6
 Socialist International 13:43
 Society of Former Special Agents (FBI) 21:34
 Socovia Company 16:6
 Solih, Ali 16:7
Soldier of Fortune magazine 13:23,27; 16:6,49;
 17:9,11; 18:49-50; 22:2,11-24,32-33; 24:31;
 25:35,37,53
 "Nazis and Klansmen: *Soldier of Fortune's*
Scamy Side" (Lawrence) 22:22-24
 Solidarity (Poland) 23:6,36
 Somalia 13:35
 CIA in 14-15:12
 Somoza, Anastasio 17:50,52; 19:12; 20:35-36;
 22:13
 Son Sann 18:50
 Soto, Oswaldo 20:38
 Sourlas 25:45
 Soustelle, Jacques 23:16
 South Africa 13:36-41; 22:37-40
 "Angola: Pretoria's Continuing War" 16:11-12;
 "The 'Buffalo Battalion': South Africa's Black
 Mercenaries" 13:16-17; "The U.S. Connection:
 South African Torture" (Lusane) 18:55-56; and
 Argentina 16:14-15; and mercenaries 16:6-10; and
 Mozambique 16:13; Broederbond 13:31; CIA in
 13:6,31-32,48; 14-15:13; Communist Party 13:30;
 Detainees' Parents Support Committee 18:55;
 Government Information Service 13:32; Herstigte
 Nasionale Partei 13:30; National Intelligence
 Service 13:31-33; National Union of South
 African Students 13:30; Operation Daisy 16:12;
 Operation Protea 16:11-12; Progressive Reform
 Party 13:30; Secret Services Accounts Act 13:32;
 South African Defense Force 13:32-33; State
 Security Committee 13:32
 South Africa, BOSS (intelligence agency) 13:13
 "Statement to the U.N.: The CIA and BOSS"
 (Schaap) 18:52-54; "The Militarization of
 BOSS" (Weir and Bloch) 13:30-33
 South Africa Foundation 13:7
 South African Military Refugee Aid Fund
News and Notes 23:40
 South Dakota National Guard 24:27
 South Dakota State Police 24:27
 South Korea, CIA in 14-15:10
 Southern Africa *see also* Namibia and South Africa
 "Secret Collaboration: U.S. and South Africa
 Foment Terrorist Wars" (Gervasi) 22:36-40;
 "The Secret State Department Documents"
 13:37-41; CIA in 18:52-54; 22:36; resources for
 organizing 21:41; 23:40
 Southern Africa Committee
Southern Africa 13:51
 Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference
 Report on Police Conduct During Township
 Protests: August-November 1984 23:40
 Southern Agricultural Chemicals Association 21:30
 Southern Air Transport 22:28
 Southern Poverty Law Center 22:18
 Sovereign Military Order of Malta *see* Knights of
 Malta
 Sovereign Order of Saint John of Jerusalem 25:36
 Soviet Union
 KGB 19:20-22; 24:37; Soviet Olympic
 Committee 21:3
 Space Research Corporation 13:9,17,26; 18:53
 Spada, Massimo 25:35
 Spagnulo, Carmelo 23:21
 Spain, CIA in 14-15:13
 Spaulding, Anthony 16:34
 Speakes, Larry 20:15-16
 Spellman, Francis Cardinal 25:30-31,34
 Spence, John 17:21
 Sperry Company 21:19
 Spinelli, Robert L., Jr. 14-15:7
 Sponberg, Derrel 18:30
 Sporkin, Stanley 13:52-53
Spotlight newspaper 25:34
 Sri Lanka, CIA in 14-15:11,13
 Stefanizzi, Umberto 25:36
 Standard Oil of California 21:28
 Standard Oil of New Jersey 25:25
 Stanford Research Institute 17:23; 21:44
 Stangl, Franz Paul 25:11
 Stankard, Francis X. 25:37
 Stans Foundation 21:28
 Stans, Maurice H. 21:28-29,35
 Star Wars *see* Strategic Defense Initiative
 Starr, William 25:53
 state repression
 "The New State Repression" (Lawrence) 24:3-11
 STEAG Company 13:5
 Steele-Perkins, Chris 19:35
 Stein, John Henry 16:57; 17:35
 Stephenson, William S. 25:7
 Sterling, Claire 17:47; 18:12-13,15; 19:8,14-19,24;
 22:5,42; 23:3-38
The Terror Network 16:27; 18:13; 19:15-16;
 22:44; 23:22,30-31; *The Time of the Assassins*
 23:9,13-14,24,29,31,37
 Sterling Products 25:25
 Stetsko, Yaroslav 25:52
 Stettinius, Edward R. 25:44
 Stevens, Thomas 18:30
 Stevenson, Adlai 19:12
 Stevenson, Gloria 21:12
 Stevenson, R.K. 17:17
 Stevenson, William
The Bormann Brotherhood 25:7-8,10-11
 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
 17:18-19
 Stockwell, John 18:22; 21:34
In Search of Enemies 18:52; 19:7
 Stone, Ellery W. 25:31
 Stone, Richard 20:25
 Strachan, Selwyn 20:5
 Strategic Defense Initiative 25:2
 Strauss, Franz Joseph 25:38
 Streicher, Helmut 17:50
 Streicher, Julius 13:24; 16:44
 Strike, Milroy 19:27
 Strughold, Hubertus 25:26
 Students for a Democratic Society 13:50
 Sturgis, Frank A. 13:54; 17:52; 18:54
 Suarez, Adolfo 25:38
 Suazo Cordova, Roberto 22:25-26,29
 Sudan 13:34
 CIA in 13:48
 Sullivan, William Healey 17:7
 Sulzberger, Arthur Ochs 21:32
 Sulzberger, C.L. 25:33
 Summer Institute of Linguistics 17:50; 18:37-46;
 25:18
 "Pious Infiltrators: The Summer Institute of
 Linguistics" (Wolf) 18:41-46
 Summit Aviation, Inc. 16:54; 20:27; 22:28
 Sumner, Gordon 22:33
 Sun Oil Company 21:28
 Sunshine, Cathy 21:40
 Suriname, CIA in 18:63; 20:6
 surveillance *see also* provocateurs and informers,
 electronic surveillance
 "Sources and Methods: Mail Surveillance, Part
 II" (Lawrence) 13:49-50
Survey: A Journal of East and West Studies
 23:30,37
 SWAPO *see* Namibia
 Swartzendruber, Fred 17:12
 SWAT Teams 24:9-10
 Sweden, Nordiz Ricks Parti 18:62
 Switzerland, CIA in 13:48; 14-15:13
 Symbionese Liberation Army 24:9
 Symms, Steven D. 22:33
- T**
 Tambs, Lewis A. 18:60; 21:37; 22:33
 Tanzania 22:38
 Tardowski, Joseph 24:28
 Targ, Russell 21:44
 Tarrants, Thomas Albert III 13:25; 16:46
 Tashkent Associates 17:32,35
 Task Force 157 16:53-55; 17:33
 Taube, Serge 14-15:8
 Taubert, Robert 24:19
 Taubes, Gary 21:21
 Taubman, Philip 17:50; 20:26; 23:27
 Taylor, Caldwell 20:7
 Taylor, Maxwell 19:5
 Taylor, Myron Charles 25:30-32
 Taylor, Ray Hooker 22:27
 Taylor, Stuart 20:14-15
 Taylor, Telford 25:4
 Teamsters *see* International Brotherhood of
 Teamsters
 Teller, Edward 21:29
 Terpil, Frank Edward 14-15:3; 16:26,54-55;
 17:48,50; 23:28
 terrorism 13:2-3; 21:2-3; 22:4-9
 Tetra Tech, Inc. 24:40
 Tetra Tech International 24:40
 Texaco Oil 13:6,35; 21:18,28-29; 25:25
 Texaco Philanthropic Foundation, Inc. 21:28
 Texas Educational Association 21:28
 Texas Instruments 21:18-19
 Thailand 17:12-13
 CIA in 14-15:13; 18:48-49
 Thatcher, Margaret 17:3,23; 20:16-17; 21:4; 22:4;
 24:37
 Thomas, Charles 17:24
 Thomas, Gordon 23:37
 Thompson, Dudley 16:43
 Thompson, Tommy 16:47
 Thornwell, James R. 17:15-16
 Thorpe, Jeremy 13:31
 Thuermer, Angus MacLean 19:33-34
 Thun Hohenstein, Ferdinando 25:31,33
 Thurmond, Strom 16:6; 22:9
 Ticknor, Joel D. 14-15:10
 Till, Ernest 23:21
Time magazine 20:26
 "Media Manipulation: Covert Propaganda in
Time and *Newsweek*" (Friel) 21:14-23
 Times-Tribune Corporation 20:38
 Tisdall, Caroline 19:35
 Tock, Mike 20:39
 Togliatti, Palmiro 19:37-38
 Tolbert, William R. 13:31
 Tom Dooley Foundation 25:52
 Tomlinson, Kenneth 19:8
 Tools for Peace and Justice in America 23:39
 Tore, Teslim 19:14-15
 Torres, Camilo 19:27
 Torres Arias, Leonidas 18:28

- Torrijos, Omar 17:50
 Torrisi, Giovanni 25:35
 Tortola, Colonel 20:13,23
 torture 17:3; 21:39; 25:3
 "Argentina Activates International Death Squads" (Ray) 16:14-16; "In Brazil the Women Boast About Their Plastic Surgery" (Cohen) 25:21-22; "Interview: Salvadoran Deserter Discloses Green Beret Torture Role" 16:17-18; "The U.S. Connection: South African Torture" (Lusane) 18:55-56; in Argentina 17:3
 Toth, Robert C. 16:25; 19:24; 22:7
 Toure, Kwame 24:16
 Tower, John 17:13; 22:31
 Towers, Peter T. 13:15
 Townley, Michael 22:41
 Townsend, Amos 17:46
 Townsend, William Cameron 18:41-42
 Tradition, Family and Property 18:17
 Trager, Frank Newton 21:26
 Train, Harry R. 18:30
 TransAfrica 13:4,37
 TransNational Cooperative Ltd.
 TransNational Brief 17:47
 Transports Internationaux Routiers 23:9
 Trevor-Roper, Hugh 21:41
 Trilateral Commission 21:2
 Tronconis, José Joaquin 18:20
 Trotter, Desmond 13:25
 Truby, J. David 17:48
 Trudell, John 24:20-21
 Truman, Harry 25:6,40,43
 Truong, David 16:3
 TRW Corporation 16:53; 20:32
 Tsang, Daniel 14-15:5
 "Complete CAIB Index, Nos. 1-12" 14-15:1-36
 Tshombe, Moise 16:8
 Tsongas, Paul 16:22,27; 20:17
 Tull, Louis 20:7
 Tully, Andrew 18:62-63; 19:38
 Tunisia 13:34
 CIA in 14-15:13
 Türkes, Alpaslan 23:10-11,15
 Turkey
 CIA in 14-15:13; 23:15; Counter-Guerrilla Organization 23:15; human rights in 23:28-29; MIT (intelligence agency) 23:14-15; resources for organizing 17:47; right wing in 23:6,10-12
 Turkish Peace Association 23:28
 Turner, Stansfield 13:10; 16:30; 19:37; 20:42; 24:36
 Turner, William W. 17:47
 Twetten, Thomas Alan 14-15:10
 Tyler, Geoffrey Harrison 13:18-19
 Tyron, Joseph 18:30
 Tyrrell, R. Emmett 21:38
 Tyson, James L., Jr. 16:27; 21:30,34
 21:24,37
 U.S. Intelligence Authorization Act 20:2
 U.S. Intelligence Identities Protection Act 13:3; 14:15-4;7; 16:2,18,56; 17:4,47; 20:2; 22:3
 U.S. Interior Department 13:50
 U.S. Internal Revenue Service 13:50
 U.S. International Communications Agency 16:24,27-28; 19:31
 U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission 13:50
 U.S. Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency 25:23
 U.S. Joint Special Operations Agency 21:2; 22:8
 U.S. Joint Special Operations Command 22:7
 U.S. Labor Department 13:50
 U.S. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 24:9
 U.S. Marshals 24:27
 U.S. National Security Act 19:11
 U.S. National Security Agency 16:25; 18:57 58,64; 19:35-36; 20:41; 21:44
 U.S. National Security Council 18:8,60
 U.S. National Security Decision Directive 77 19:12
 U.S. National Security Decision Directive 138 21:2; 22:9
 U.S. National War College 21:26
 U.S. Navy, Office of Naval Investigation 17:52
 U.S. Neutrality Act 13:23; 16:6; 18:10; 22:12,31
 U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration 24:30
 U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity 24:5
 U.S. Office of Munitions Control 13:15
 U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 13:49; 16:24; 19:4-5; 25:5-7,10,12-14,48
 U.S. Office of War Information 19:4
 U.S. Olympic Committee 21:26
 U.S. Park Service 24:24
 U.S. Peace Corps 13:53; 18:8; 19:34
 U.S. Postal Inspection Service 13:50
 U.S. Postal Service 13:50
 U.S. Rapid Deployment Force 20:5
 U.S. Refugee Act (1980) 24:14-15
 U.S. Rockefeller Commission 13:50; 17:15
 U.S. Secret Service 13:50
 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 13:52; 21:34
 U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee 17:13
 U.S. Senate Church Committee 13:50; 16:32,58; 17:14,16; 18:2,66,68; 19:6,40; 20:27; 21:33,34; 24:9
 U.S. Senate Ervin Committee 24:9
 U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee 13:10; 16:22-23; 18:66
 U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee 18:9; 19:31
 U.S. Senate Internal Security Committee 24:4
 U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism 13:2-3,51; 17:3; 18:12; 19:8; 23:4
 U.S. Small Business Administration 13:52
 U.S. State Department 1 13:10; 16:14,24,27; 17:8-12; 18:4,17,51,56,63; 19:31; 22:35; 25:8,12,24 25,31,33
 Bureau of Intelligence and Research 16:56; 17:20; Bureau of Inter-American Affairs 22:33; Office for Combating Terrorism 22:9; White Paper on El Salvador 21:33
 U.S. Veterans Administration 21:30
 U.S. VISTA 13:53
 U.S. Voice of America 16:24,27 28; 19:6,8 10; 20:12,28; 22:29; 23:15
 U.S. War Powers Resolution 18:10
 U.S. Witness Protection Act 24:27
 U.S. Witness Security Program 24:11
 Universal Safety Corporation 18:56
 University of California at San Diego 17:49
 University of Oklahoma 17:14; 18:42
 University of Texas 18:42
 Upper Volta, CIA in 14-15:14
 Upson, Linus Frederick III 14-15:7
 Urangesellschaft 13:5
 United States Chamber of Commerce 22:31
 United States Communist Party 19:38
 United States Council for World Freedom 25:51
 United States Global Strategy Council 24:35
 United States Steel 13:5
 United States-South West Africa/Namibia Trade and Cultural Council, Inc. 13:7,15
 United Students of America Foundation 24:35
 United Technologies 21:19
 United States (U.S.), ACTION 13:53
 U.S. Agency for International Development 13:44; 14-15:10; 17:3; 18:8,17,40,48; 20:36; 21:33,37
 "The Carrot and the Stick: AID Pressures" (Bogdanich, Jensen and Frolik) 18:50-51; Office of Public Safety 25:3
 U.S. Agriculture Department 13:50
 U.S. Air Force 25:26
 U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act 18:10
 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 17:10-11
 U.S. Army
 82nd Airborne Division 24:27; Chemical Corps 17:16,18-21,25; 25:26; Chemical Warfare Service 17:5-6,17; Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) 22:15; 25:4-14,36; Defense Intelligence School 21:24; European Command Intelligence Center 25:26; *Field Manual on Psychological Operations* 16:32,34-35,41; 21:15,19; Intelligence School 20:31; Intelligence Support Activity 22:7; Operation Third Chance 17:15
 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 21:26
 U.S. Bipartisan Commission on Central America 20:29
 U.S. Board for International Broadcasting 23:27
 U.S. Border Patrol 20:32-33; 24:13
 U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 13:22
 U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs Police 24:27
 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency *see* CIA
 U.S. Clark Amendment (1976) 13:3,10,34; 14-15:3; 16:12; 21:25; 25:3
 U.S. Coast Guard 13:50
 U.S. Commerce Department 13:50; 14-15:2,14; 18:56
 U.S. Customs 13:50
 U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 17:9
 U.S. Defense Department 17:30-31; 18:66
 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency 13:12,36; 14-15:3; 18:60,62; 19:35; 20:41; 21:2,26; 22:9,32
 U.S. Defense Science Board 21:26
 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration 13:50; 16:52; 19:11; 25:17
 U.S. Energy Department 13:14
 U.S. Executive Order 12333 16:29-30; 19:7,11; 21:2; 22:7; 24:2
 U.S. Federal Aviation Administration 13:18-19
 U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation *see* FBI
 U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency 24:6,9
 U.S. Federal Reserve System 21:24
 U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act 22:12
 U.S. Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 14-15:14; 16:6,57; 17:49; 21:26,29
 U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 14-15:4; 18:64
 U.S. Forty Committee 21:26
 U.S. Freedom of Information Act 13:52; 14-15:4; 16:31
 U.S. Health, Education and Welfare Department 13:50
 U.S. High Commissioner of Germany 25:8-10
 U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee 13:10
 Subcommittee on Africa 18:53,56
 U.S. House Intelligence Committee 16:4-5,10,32-33
 U.S. House Internal Security Committee 24:20,23
 U.S. House Judiciary Committee 14-15:5
 U.S. House Pike Committee 19:40; 24:9
 U.S. House Select Committee on Assassinations 19:38
 U.S. House Un-American Activities Committee 14-15:5; 24:4; 25:24
 U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 13:50
 "Operation Sojourner: Targeting the Sanctuary Movement" (Ovryn) 24:12-15
 U.S. Information Agency 19:6,25,29,31; 20:40;

Vang Pao 17:32-38,42-46; 18:47,50; 22:10,17,33
 Vasey, Lloyd 16:51,53
 Vasquez Mandonado, Mario 18:36
 Vatican, and Nazis 25:10,12
 Vatican Bank 23:20; 25:35
 Vekemans, Roger 18:15,17; 19:27
 Velouhiotis, Aris 25:43,48
 Venceremos Brigade 13:50
 Venerable Order 25:36
 Venizelos 25:43
 Venter, Colonel 13:32
 Venute, Donald J. 14-15:12
 Vesco, Robert 13:52; 16:6
 Victorson, Val (pseud.) 20:10
 Videla, Jorge 16:15
 Vietnam 18:46,58-59
 casualty figures 21:16; elections (1967) 21:12
 Vietnam Trial Support Committee 16:3
 Villegas, Alain de 21:42
 Viola, Roberto 16:14
 Violet, Jean 21:42
 Vitalis, Costas 25:45
 Vitosha Hotel (Sofia) 23:5-6,24-25
 Voice of Hope Radio 18:64-65
 Volkswagen Company 25:11
 von Aretin, Erwein 25:13
 von Brancovan, Robert Bassaraba 25:36
 von Hapsburg, Otto 25:27
 von Hartzfeld, Prince 25:33
 von Hindenburg, Paul 25:27
 von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Frederic 25:33
 von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Erik 25:38
 von Papen, Franz 25:27
 von Schweinitz, Colonel 25:14
 Vorster, Balthazar Johannes 13:8,30-31
 Vorster, John 13:8,30-31
 Vuscovic, Pedro 16:37,39

W

W. R. Grace and Company 25:28,34,37
 Waage, Mrs. 13:49
 Waas, Murray 25:52
 Waghlestin, Colonel 18:25
 Wagner, Richard 17:23-24
 Waiss, Oscar 16:38
 Waldheim, Kurt 16:21; 17:12
 Waldrop, William Burnett 13:25; 16:45-46
 Walesa, Lech 19:22; 23:9,21,23,26-28,33-34
 Walker, John D. 16:53
 Walker, Lannon 13:10,34
 Wallace Fund, Inc., Dewitt 21:28
 Wallace, Keith 13:31
 Wallace, Mike 18:23
 Walt, Lewis W. 21:26
 Walters, Raymond O. 17:10
 Walters, Vernon Anthony 13:45,48; 14-15:3,14;
 16:14-15,19,43; 18:9,12,15,26,30; 21:27; 22:38
 "The Vatican Connection: Vernon Walters and
 the Pope" 18:9
 Wannall, W. Raymond 21:37
 Ward, Thomas J. 25:19-20
 Warmer, Rob 18:63
 Washington Inquirer 18:4; 19:8; 21:26,30,33,36,38
 Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy
 24:34
 Washington Office on Africa
 South Africa Information Project 23:40;
 "Southern Africa Hotline" 23:40
 Washington Office on Latin America 18:35
 Washington Post 19:8; 20:26
 Washington Quarterly 13:53
 Washington Star 21:31
 Washington State University 18:42
 Washington Times 19:8,10; 20:10,17-18,38;
 21:31,36,38; 22:30,32; 24:34-35; 25:35
 Watkins, James D. 25:38
 Watkins, Robert 19:32
 Watson, Francis M. 21:37
 Watson, Peter
 The War on the Mind 16:34
 Watson, Sharon 17:9
 Watt, James 18:34; 21:35; 24:34
 Watt, Roland 18:62
 Wattenberg, Ben J. 19:22; 23:16
 Way, Mike 18:39
 Weathermen 13:50
 Weaver, Donn Alden 14-15:14
 Webster, William 16:26
 Wedin, Bentil 18:62
 Weiche, Martin 16:44,47
 Weiller, Paul-Louis 25:38
 Weinberger, Caspar 16:22; 17:13,22,25; 18:10;
 19:29; 21:6; 22:5,7; 23:17; 24:40
 Weinglass, Leonard 24:20
 Weinraub, Bernard 21:13
 Weir, Andy
 "The Militarization of BOSS" 13:30-33; "The
 Passport Racket: Papers for Cash" 13:20-21
 Welch, Richard 19:34
 Weldon, Charles "Jiggs" 17:12; 18:48,50
 WerBell, Mitchell Livingston III 16:48
 West Germany, BND (intelligence agency)
 25:5,8,27
 Western Destiny 25:32,36
 Western Geophysical Company 18:45; 21:27
 Western Goals 25:51-52
 Western Goals Reports 19:9
 Western Guard 13:22,24-25; 16:44
 Western Sahara Working Group
 Western Sahara: The War, U.S. Policy, and the
 People 23:40
 Westmoreland, William C. 17:7; 21:34
 Weston, Burns 20:18
 Wattering, Frederick Lee 13:7,28
 Weyler, Rex
 Blood of the Land 24:27
 Weyrich, Paul M. 25:51
 Wheaton, Philip 21:40
 The Iron Triangle: The Honduran Connection
 13:44
 Wheeler, Jack 22:30; 25:50
 Whelan, James R. 21:38; 24:35
 Whipple, David D. 14-15:13
 Whitbeck, Harris 18:37-39
 White, Harry Dexter 25:25
 White, Helen 22:31
 White, James C. 13:23; 16:44-47
 White Panthers 13:50
 White, Robert E. 20:39,44; 21:21
 Whitehead, Steve 18:55
 Whiteman, Unison 19:32; 20:7,11,21; 22:34
 Whitlam, Gough 16:53
 Whitney, Craig R. 19:23
 Whitten, Les 21:31
 Wick, Charles Z. 16:27-28; 19:8-12; 20:16
 Wigner, Eugene P. 21:26,38
 Wilkinson, Bill 13:24
 Will, George F. 19:22; 21:17; 23:16
 Willett, Thomas 13:18
 Williams, Eleazer Andrews 17:48
 Williams, Garth 17:37
 Williams, Mike L.H. 16:48; 22:17,24
 Williams, Murat 23:44
 Williams, Ray 24:19
 Williams, Ronald A. 24:25
 Williamson, Craig 13:31
 Willis-Conger, Phillip 24:13,15
 Willoughby, Charles A. 25:36
 Wills, E. Ashley 20:4-5,17,20
 Wilson, Charles 13:50
 Wilson, Dorwin M. 14-15:13
 Wilson, Edwin P. 14-15:3; 16:52-55; 17:48; 22:16;
 25:32
 Wilson, Pete 17:39
 Wilson, Richard "Dickie" 24:24,27
 Wilson, William A. 25:28
 Wilson, Woodrow 19:3
 Winkler, Darrell 22:24
 Winsor, Curtin 22:29
 Winter, Gordon 13:31; 16:13
 Wise, David 17:3; 19:38
 Wisner, Frank Gardner 16:60; 19:40; 21:41; 25:7-
 9,13,33
 Wiznitzer, Louis 22:40
 Woellner, E. David 22:30,33; 24:34
 Wojciechowski, Gene W. 14-15:11
 Wojtyla, Cardinal see John Paul II

Wolf, Louis
 "Arnaud de Borchgrave Boards Moon's Ship"
 24:34-35; "Globe Aero, Ltd.: Merchants of
 Counter-Insurgency" 13:18-19; "Inaccuracy in
 Media: Accuracy in Media Rewrites the News
 and History" 21:24-38; "Nicaragua Update:
 Feverish Overthrow Plan Builds Toward Climax"
 22:25-29; "Pious Infiltrators: The Summer
 Institute of Linguistics" 18:41-46; "The
 Pentagon's Other Option" 17:5-25; "Where Are
 They Now?" 16:56-57
 Wolff, Karl 25:12-14,33
 women
 in Central America 23:39; resources for
 organizing 23:41
 Women of All Red Nations 24:16
 Women's Institute for Freedom of the Press 23:41
 Wong Arevalo, Rodrigo 13:45
 Wood, Harold Phillips 13:23,25; 16:47
 Wood, William 24:24,27
 Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars
 16:23
 Worker-Student Alliance 13:50
 World Anti-Communist League 21:30-31; 22:15;
 25:3,32,50-53,56
 "Behind the Supply Lines" (Clarkson) 25:56,50-
 53
 World Bank 13:35,43-44; 16:33
 World Court 13:5
 World Features Service 17:46
 World Media Conference
 in 1981 22:33; in 1982 20:38; 21:36; 24:34; in
 1983 20:39
 World Medical Relief 18:47-50; 22:30,33;
 25:35,37,50-53,56
 "The CIA Ties of World Medical Relief"
 (Bogdanich, Jensen and Frolik) 18:47-51
 World Relief 18:23-24
 World Strategy Forums 24:35
 World Strategy Network 24:35
 Wright, Claudia 13:6
 Wroughton, James 18:43
 Wycliffe Bible Translators 17:50; 18:37-46; see also
 Summer Institute of Linguistics

Y

Yallop, David A.
 In God's Name 23:38
 Yanover, Charles 16:21,45,47
 Yardley, Herbert 18:57
 Yates, Earl P. 16:52,54
 Yates, Pamela 21:40
 Yellow Rain 17:8-13,43-46; 22:35
 "The Pentagon's Other Option" (Wolf) 17:8-25;
 "Yellow Rain Skeptic Found Dead" (Ray)
 17:43-46
 Yoder, Beulah 17:45
 Yoder, John 17:45
 Yoh, Bernard 21:25-26,28,35-37
 Young Americans for Freedom 21:26
 Young, Andrew 13:48; 22:22
 Youth for Understanding 14-15:3
 Youth Freedom Speakers 25:30
 Youth With a Mission 18:35,40
 Yurturslan, Ali 19:18

Z

Zablocki, Clement 16:19
 Zaire 16:12
 CIA in 14-15:14
 Zambia 22:37-38
 CIA in 14-15:14; 22:38
 Zamora, Mario 21:21
 Zephier, Gregg 24:18
 Zerulo, Morris 16:43
 Ziff, Howard 19:28
 Zimbabwe 22:37-39; see also Rhodesia
 counterinsurgency and psychological warfare in
 23:44

An Overview:

U.S. Sponsorship of State Terrorism

By Edward S. Herman

A hegemonic power with enormous technological and financial resources has wide options in the use of both peaceable and violent means to accomplish its ends. The violent means include all of the various forms of terrorism, and the United States as hegemonic power has used—or sponsored the use of—all of them. In most of these modalities the United States is not unique, it is merely quantitatively important, sometimes even supreme, as terrorist and sponsor of terrorism. The United States approaches uniqueness, however, in the use of the nuclear threat as a form of intimidation. The United States is the only country that has actually used nuclear weapons on enemy populations; not just one bomb, but two, destroying two substantial Japanese cities and exterminating several hundred thousand people in the process. It seems clear that this murderous destruction was unnecessary, that Japan was on the very edge of surrender (as was known to U.S. officials), and that no American lives were saved by destroying the two cities.¹ But the dropping of the bombs had the important function of intimidating the Russians, toward which end several hundred thousand Japanese deaths were seen as a small price.

Since Hiroshima, the United States has been alone in regularly brandishing atomic weapons, and on quite a few occasions it has come very near to using them again.² The United States continues to refuse to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons in warfare. It has innovated continuously to make nuclear weapons tactically usable, and it has spawned a large intellectual and political constituency that has been striving for years to make nuclear war thinkable and a part of working military strategy.³ With the Reagan administration, we have in power a group in which the nuclear crazies are an integral part of the policy planning apparatus. It is clear that this administration, in talking up and planning to make nuclear war winnable, in its enormous nuclear arms buildup, its placement of Cruise and Pershing missiles in Western Europe, and in its aggressive technological forward push, is attempting to achieve the nuclear superiority of the early postwar years. This would allow it to brandish the nuclear threat more credibly, thus permitting the

freer use of the more standard modes of domination on a global basis. This is in and of itself a major form of "terrorism."

Another very important form of terrorism used by the United States on a worldwide basis since 1945 has been the organization, sponsorship, and support of rightwing terrorist regimes. The breakup of the colonial empires and the revolutionary and democratic impulses accelerated by World War II posed a major threat to western domination of the Third World. The United States stepped in to fill the gap. Under the guise of "containing" Soviet imperialism,⁴ the U.S. took on the role of propping up old regimes or replacing them with the neo-imperialist rule of compradors, military dictators, the free market, and the American Embassy. The policies formerly applicable to the "banana republics" of Central America were extended to the entire world, as the United States took on global "responsibilities."

The primary function of the new comprador and military leaderships was to preserve the main features of the old order, to maintain an open door and friendly climate for foreign investment, and to keep the country as a subordinate within the Free World alliance. Given the income and social inequalities of the old regimes, and the newly unleashed ideas of democracy and opportunity, the "new-old-order" installed by the U.S. required a massive dose of terror to keep the masses in the proper state of apathy. It also demanded tolerance of thievery on a gigantic scale, as the people (compradors and military officers) who were willing to serve as surrogates for a foreign power have been almost uniformly venal. In Guatemala, the Philippines, Argentina, Brazil, pre-Sandinista Nicaragua, Chile, Indonesia, and Zaire (among others), the elites put in power and supported by the West have been not merely brutal terrorists, but rapacious as well. Noam Chomsky and I have referred to the countries they rule as "shakedown states."

The United States has also used the more conventional forms of terrorism such as assassinations, sabotage, and the organization of armed bands and terrorist armies. The attacks on Cuba by the United States provide a remarkable case study in multi-dimensional state terror combined with the process of "transference"—that is, accusing Cuba of doing precisely what the U.S. is doing to Cuba. The record shows: eight *acknowledged* assassination attempts against Fidel Castro;⁵ extensive sabotage of shipping, crops and animals, warehouse stores, terminals, oil facilities, and power stations; raids to disrupt activities

1. See Robert L. Messer, "New evidence on Truman's decision," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, August 1985, pp. 50-56 for a good review and citations. Characteristically, President Truman lied in stating on the occasion of the Hiroshima bombing that the attack had been made on a military site.

2. As Dan Ellsberg has said: "The notion common to nearly all Americans that 'no nuclear weapons have been used since Nagasaki' is mistaken. . . . Again and again, generally in secret from the American public, U.S. nuclear weapons *have* been used, for quite different purposes: in the precise way that a gun is used when you point it at someone's head in a direct confrontation, whether or not the trigger is pulled." "Introduction" to E. P. Thompson and Dan Smith, eds., *Protest and Survive* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981), p. i. Ellsberg goes on to describe a substantial number of cases in which the U.S. threatened to use nuclear weapons.

3. Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983); Robert Scheer, *With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush & Nuclear War* (New York: Random House, 1982).

4. In 1968 I gave the following definition of Containment: "The exclusion of lesser powers from areas in which we intend to establish hegemony. Syn. Expansion." *The Great Society Dictionary* (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Resistance, 1968), p. 8.

5. *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism* (Boston: South End Press, 1979), pp. 61-66.

6. *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, Rep. No. 94-465, Select Committee to Study Government Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., Nov. 1975, pp. 75 ff.

and kill; and at one point the organization of an abortive proxy invasion.⁷ The campaign of subversion "began virtually at the moment of revolutionary victory in 1959, stretched through the 1960s into the 1970s and endures, vestigially at least, to this day. . . ."⁸ After the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961, the Kennedy administration organized a massive subversive effort under the code name "Operation Mongoose," which involved "continuous sabotage raids" and a major campaign of disinformation,⁹ which regularly charged Cuban subversion at the very moment that the United States was engaged in a *real* and massive subversion operation against Cuba (and many other Latin American states).¹⁰ The rightwing Cuban refugee terror network, which came into existence in large measure as a result of CIA training for anti-Cuba operations, continued long after 1961 as an apparatus of terror employed not only against Cuba but other enemies of "freedom."¹¹

This U.S. secret war against Cuba was not unique. There is a long record of U.S.-sponsored armed bands and attacks on the countries of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, China, and the Indochinese states, among others.¹² The U.S. sponsorship of the *contras* follows a long tradition in Central America as well. Also in a long tradition has been the U.S. outcry about somebody else's "terrorism" coincident with a massive application of terrorism by the United States or one of its proxies.

The sponsorship of terrorist armies to invade Guatemala in 1954 (successful), Cuba in 1961 (unsuccessful), and Nicaragua 1981-86 (unsuccessful) has had two other notable features. First, all three were cases of revolutions from below, with governments coming into power that addressed the basic needs of a formerly depressed and repressed majority.¹³ This process of social democratization has been consistently horrifying and intolerable to the U.S. elite. That elite is happy only with elite rule and amenable clients. The threat of a "demonstration effect" of successful performance in the majority interest is also frightening. What if the masses in the other countries of the empire were to get the idea that they were not necessarily born to serve their masters? A second notable feature of at least two major cases of U.S.-sponsored invasions—Guatemala and Nicaragua—is that they displayed a level of political freedom and bourgeois democracy that have been rare in Central America. With the overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954,

pluralism and bourgeois democracy disappeared. The well-established pattern demonstrates that U.S. "counter-terrorism" is antithetical to *political* as well as social democracy.

Mechanisms of Support of State Terrorism

The United States has built up and aided the forces of state terrorism in four ways: by the protection and rehabilitation of the fascist cadres defeated in World War II, by outright or proxy invasions to install or protect terrorist clients, by subversion aiming at the overthrow of disfavored (often democratic) governments, and by "supplying repression" via financial aid, training, and arms supply to security forces and military dictators. Of these, invasions have been important but they are relatively familiar and obvious in character.

(1) *Rehabilitating fascists.* During and immediately after World War II the United States was busily and aggressively organizing forces for the struggle against the Left. A central feature of this process was the protection and rehabilitation of fascists. There were show trials at Nuremberg and elsewhere, and some top leaders were executed, but at the very same time large numbers of fascists were being protected and positioned for Cold War service. Most of these were not scientists with scarce skills—they were mainly bureaucrats and army and intelligence personnel, many of them mass murderers. This was worldwide in scope: in Thailand, under U.S. influence, a military dictatorship was allowed to take power headed by Phibum Songkram, who was (in the words of a former CIA analyst) "the first pro-Axis dictator to regain power after the war."¹⁴ In Greece, the pre-war pro-Nazi forces were gradually pushed to the fore and installed in power by the British and the United States, who eventually consolidated that power by means of a savage counter-insurgency war.¹⁵ The large-scale protection of Nazi and fascist activists and killers is now well established,¹⁶ although the western public has been spared the details. This protection included the extensive fabrication of documents and the hiding and spiriting away of fascist cadres. Many fascist killers were relocated in Latin America and played an important role in the development of the National Security States. Others were allowed to escape to Spain and Portugal, both countries befriended and protected by the United States and other members of the Free World.

The nominal denazification and general protection and rehabilitation of fascists provided a structural base for state terrorism in a variety of ways. In cases like Thailand and Greece, terror was an immediate instrument of the reinstalled fascists. Elsewhere in Western Europe the fascist cadres were positioned within the NATO framework to resume their traditional role in case the Left proved strong enough to really threaten to attain power. Greece in 1967 and Chile in 1973 were models of how terror states could be quickly brought into service under U.S. auspices in the face of liberal or radical challenges.

The rehabilitated fascist cadres have also served as a pool or reserve army of counterrevolutionary operatives for use both in

7. For many details on all of these efforts, see Warren Hinckle and William Turner, *The Fish Is Red: The Story of The Secret War Against Castro* (New York: Harper and Row, 1981).

8. *Ibid.*, p. vii.

9. "All major CIA stations abroad assigned at least one case officer full time to gathering intelligence, trying to turn the host country against Cuba, and encouraging the defection of Cuban officials. Reports from this far-flung network were funneled to the Miami station for correlation and action." *Ibid.*, p. 113.

10. For many examples, see Philip Agee, *Inside the Company: CIA Diary* (New York: Bantam, 1976).

11. Edward S. Herman, *The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda* (Boston: South End Press, 1982), pp. 65-69.

12. John Loftus, *The Belarus Secret* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1983), *passim*; Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Dell, 1980), Chapter 4 ("Special Operations").

13. One group of Central American experts speaks of the Sandinista aims as follows: "The FSLN sought to fill the political and institutional vacuum by creating new political structures that responded to its agenda of social transformation. That agenda defined national priorities according to 'the logic of the majority,' which meant that Nicaragua's poor majority would have access to, and be the primary beneficiaries of, public programs." *Report of the Latin American Studies Association Delegation to Observe the Nicaraguan General Election of November 4, 1984*, pp. 4-5.

14. Frank Darling, *Thailand and the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965), p. 65.

15. Lawrence S. Wittner, *American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), Chapter 8 ("The Military Solution").

16. See "Special: Nazis, the Vatican, and CIA," special issue of *CAIB*, Number 25, Winter 1986, esp. Peter Dale Scott, "How Allen Dulles and the SS Preserved Each Other"; also, Magnus Linklater, Isabel Hinton and Neal Ascherson, *The Fourth Reich: Klaus Barbie and the Neo-Fascist Connection* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1984).

Europe and the Third World. They have served as leaders and soldiers in colonial wars (Angola, Algeria, Rhodesia, Vietnam), in building up fascist terrorist networks in Latin America, and as organizers of terror in Europe itself. Much of the terrorism in Italy has come out of neofascist elements drawing inspiration and support from P-2 and the intelligence services most closely linked to the CIA and NATO.¹⁷

(2) *Subversion*. Another major mechanism of U.S. support of state terror has been by means of subversion. This term is used to describe actions taken to discredit and destabilize opposed governments, including the use of disinformation, economic pressure and harassment, manipulating the institutional environment of the victim by bribery and the discriminatory use of aid, and encouraging and supporting conspiracies and coups. The United States is so powerful that these devices are used, and hardly even remarked upon, against its larger allies, many virtually occupied countries—economically and militarily—with large numbers of locals serving the interests of the great foreign power. At the time of the overthrow of the elected government of Brazil in 1964, for example, the United States was doing the following:¹⁸ (1) it had bribed hundreds of local politicians in a scandal so great that a Parliamentary Commission was forced to investigate the matter;¹⁹ (2) it had numerous journalists on its payroll, subsidized newspapers and magazines, and for 90 days before the election even rented the editorial page of Rio de Janeiro's evening newspaper; (3) it funded Brazilian thinktanks that poured forth a flood of books and pamphlets dispensing conservative ideology and disinformation; (4) a U.S. corporation, Time, Inc., illegally controlled the largest Brazilian TV station, and dispensed strong pro-coup propaganda; (5) the U.S. government-funded American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) worked to depoliticize and weaken the union movement, and actively supported the 1964 coup; (6) U.S. officials encouraged the military establishment to oust the legal government, and the United States even had ships offshore as moral support for the leaders of the coup.

U.S. dissemination of propaganda and disinformation intended to destabilize, and plotting with conspirators to displace legal governments, is even more extensive in lesser client states.²⁰ Brazil is a good illustration because it is the most powerful state in Latin America; despite which the United States manipulated and subverted its institutions, politicians and military leaders virtually without restraint.

U.S. subversion frequently involves the use of money to buy people off. The money is often in the form of loans or gifts that reward "friends" and allow them to pay off *their* friends and buy support at home.²¹ The most remarkable form of subver-

sion by buy-off is undoubtedly the employment of the AFL-CIO, through the AIFLD, as an instrument for bribing labor leaders in client states. Dispensing large sums, the AIFLD has coopted hundreds of Third World union leaders, inducing them to stick to "bread-and-butter" unionism and eschew politics (especially left politics) and split away from the politicized unions. AIFLD has regularly helped put in place anticommunist and repressive regimes that have served well the needs of multinational corporations and U.S. foreign policy, but which have been rabidly antiunion. AIFLD, in short, is a literally "subversive" intruder into any state in which it is allowed to function.²²

(3) *Supplying repression*. A further major mechanism for U.S. support of state terrorism has been the buildup, financing, arming, and training of Third World police, intelligence, and military personnel. This is in fact a primary form of subversion, in which a deliberate attempt is made to bribe and brainwash the principal armed groups within dependent societies and make them *de facto* servants of a foreign power. This has been done with a quite clearly subversive purpose: to increase the power of the armed forces, to manipulate them ideologically into serving as an anticommunist and antipopulist force, and to train them in counterinsurgency (CI) techniques that would also serve U.S. objectives. While the policy had important antecedents, it went into a rapid growth phase after the triumph of Fidel Castro in 1959. It flourished in the 1960s with the development of CI doctrine and the notion of *preventive* CI.²³ We would prevent Castros and Ho Chi Minhs by putting in place anti-radical political and armed forces who would nip insurgencies in the bud.²⁴

CI strategy was initially tied in with a reformist "hearts and minds" complement (such as the Alliance for Progress), but the reformist component has invariably been submerged by CI, for a number of reasons. One is that CI is inherently reactionary, as it rests on an attempt to take advantage of superior state force without regard to underlying issues or justice. It employs power and advanced technology in areas such as tools of interrogation, and applies them to poor people in revolt. With the "superior" races seeking submission of the inferior on the basis of force alone, this is a system in which escalating barbarity is "built-in." A second reason for the submergence of "reform" is that reformers are potential radicals, or are willing to tolerate the continued existence of radicals,²⁵ so that they are immediately suspect and have often been murdered in preventive CI practice. Third, CI doctrine with an antireformist bias

U.S. friends like Suharto and Marcos, despite clear evidence of a huge corruption drain. The services rendered by these friends have been substantial, however. See text below on the implicit trade-offs.

22. Jonathan Kwitny, *Endless Enemies: The Making of an Unfriendly World* (New York: Congdon & Weed, 1984), pp. 341-54; Tim Shorrock and Kathy Selvaggio, "Which Side Are You On, AAFLI?," *The Nation*, February 15, 1986.

23. See Michael McClintock, *The American Connection: State Terror and Popular Resistance in El Salvador*, Vol. 1 (London: Zed Press, 1985), Part 1 ("The US and the Doctrine of Counter-Insurgency").

24. This was the language used in a speech on "The U.S. Role in Stability Operations," included as a standard speech in a "Speechmaker Kit" used by the army in the late 1960s. Upheavals from below "can be controlled if we are successful in nipping every Communist insurgency in the bud. This is what we hope to do." Quoted by J. W. Fulbright, *The Pentagon Propaganda Machine* (New York: Liveright, 1970), p. 82.

25. One of Juan Bosch's critical failings from the standpoint of the Kennedy liberals was his unwillingness to deport or otherwise persecute Communists, which was viewed as a sign of his lack of fealty to higher Free World principles. See Piero Gleijeses, *The Dominican Crisis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1978), pp. 87-89.

17. Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, *The Rise and Fall of the Bulgarian Connection* (New York: Sheridan Square Publications, 1986), Chapter 4 ("The Rome-Washington Connection"); Gianni Flamini, *Il partito del golpe: Le strategie della tensione e del terrore dal primo centrosinistra organico al sequestro Moro*, Vol. 1 (Ferrara: Italo Bovolenta, 1981), Chapter 1.

18. See Jan K. Black, *United States Penetration of Brazil* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977), esp. Part II.

19. The Commission's work was, of course, ended following the coup. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

20. Several dramatic illustrations are given, with extensive details, in Philip Agee, *op. cit.*, n. 10.

21. Just prior to the Italian elections of April 1948, the U.S. Congress voted a special Marshall Plan subsidy of \$227 million for Italy, much of it transmitted secretly to the Christian Democratic Party and split-off trade unions organized under U.S. sponsorship. See Roberto Faenza and Marco Fini, *Gli americani in Italia* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1976), p. 298. Vast sums in U.S. gifts and loans, and loans from organizations like the World Bank, have gone to

follows from the primacy of anticommunism in U.S. ideology. Political risks in the United States are incurred by supporting reformers who seek independence, who do business with radical states, or who take radical action like land reform at the expense of U.S. interests. "Losing a country to Communism" or even to a radical and/or independent regime is politically costly. No penalties are associated with support of a murderous rightwing regime that remains within the Free World. A fourth factor is that the groups who are the natural allies of anti-radical strategies in the client states are reactionary and anti-reformist. Doing business with them may require tolerance of the liquidation of reform and reformers.

Finally, the U.S. military, economic, and political elites who are close to and implement Third World policies are also often reactionary, and they invariably put serviceability to U.S. interests ahead of all other considerations. Thus as a practical matter fascists are preferred either on principle or for "pragmatic" reasons as a lesser evil. The United States has the great advantage of having numerous liberals who can expound on the virtues of liberty and reformism with great eloquence, and pretend that these are operative values in U.S. policy toward the Third World, while their superiors and the armed services train and put into place people like Pinochet, Castelo Branco, Massera and Viola, Castillo Armas and Rios Montt, and numerous others.²⁶

The U.S. training and buildup of client police and armed forces has been historically unique in scope and scale. Between 1950 and 1979 U.S. military aid programs transferred a huge \$107.3 billion in arms and ammunition to various U.S. clients, in addition to some \$121 billion in arms sales. Between 1973 and 1980 the United States sold \$66.8 billion in arms to Third World countries, including vast quantities of firearms, chemical munitions, helicopters, and other police gear useful in CI and repression.²⁷ Since 1950 the United States has trained over 500,000 military personnel from 85 countries in the U.S. Army School of the Americas in Panama and in several hundred other military schools and bases within the United States and abroad. Under police training programs that began in 1954 and terminated in 1975, over 7,500 police officers received regularly training in U.S. schools, and over a million regular policeman have been given training abroad. Large quantities of arms and equipment were also transferred to foreign police departments. A large investment was made in improving police and military communications systems in client states, oriented to CI efficiency and control of protests and other disorders. Training was provided in the design and manufacture of home-made bombs and assassination devices,

26. Given the political costs of a Communist assumption of power in a client state, and the fact that most liberals have also internalized the primacy of anticommunism, the policies of liberals who achieve power are often indistinguishable from those of the reactionaries. Johnson and his crew fought desperately to keep the social democrat Juan Bosch out of power in the Dominican Republic. The Kennedy liberals were enthusiastic at the military coup in Brazil and displacement of a social democratic government. A major spurt in the growth of National Security States in Latin America took place under Kennedy and Johnson.

27. Michael Klare and Cynthia Arnsen, *Supplying Repression* (Washington, Institute for Policy Studies, 1981), pp. 44-45; Michael Klare, *American Arms Supermarket* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984), p. 9. Based on export licenses issued for sales to Third World police alone—excluding the larger volumes sold to armies and paramilitary groups—Michael Klare found that between September 1976 and May 1979, U.S. firms supplied the following: 615,612 gas grenades, 126,622 revolvers, 51,906 rifles and machine guns, 12,605 canisters of chemical Mace, and 56 million rounds of ammunition. *Ibid.*, p. 191.

which was put to practical use by regular and irregular forces in the National Security States.²⁸ Training in advanced "methods of interrogation" were also offered in U.S. programs, with dire consequences (as discussed below).

U.S. training has had a very substantial political content, one expert noting that it was "aimed less at military expertise than . . . at cultivation of internal political attitudes favorable to the United States."²⁹ It has focused heavily on the menace of Castro, the evils and omnipresence of communism, methods of CI, and the merits of foreign investment as the route to development. Political scientist Frederick Nunn has stated that "subject to United States military influence on anticommunism the [Third World] professional army officer became hostile to any form of populism."³⁰ There is a large body of evidence that U.S. training has given not the slightest nod to democracy and human rights; instead, it provided all the essential ingredients of National Security State ideology. The rise of the National Security State (NSS) in the U.S. sphere of influence was not fortuitous.

Terror Outcomes

As already suggested, the massive U.S. military aid and training programs, and other forms of support to states such as South Africa, had important consequences.

(1) *Military takeovers and the rise of the National Security State.* There were 18 military takeovers in Latin America between 1960 and 1968. These coups and displacements of freely elected governments by military regimes were a predictable result of the buildup and "education" of the Latin armed forces. Many were led by U.S. trainees, and most of them were supported by the United States. The key Brazilian coup, for example, was led by the so-called "Sorbonne group," closest to the United States in personal affiliation and training background.³¹ The Brazilian coup plans were known in advance by U.S. officials (who, of course, never warned the legally elected government), and the coup itself was greeted enthusiastically by the Kennedy liberals in Washington. (A classic remark by U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon, was that the Brazilian coup was "the single most decisive victory for freedom in the mid-twentieth century."³²) These attitudes were not exceptional, as evidenced by the fact that U.S. aid has moved fairly consistently in an inverse relationship to democratic and human rights conditions. In Table 1 we can see that as democratic conditions deteriorate (column 2, minus sign) there is a distinct tendency for total U.S. aid and multinational credits to increase markedly. In a more elaborate quantitative analysis of this relationship, Lars Schoultz found that the correlations between U.S. aid and human rights violations "are uniformly positive."³³ That is, the worse the human rights conditions, the greater the aid.

One can also see on Table 1 that as human rights conditions deteriorate, factors affecting the "climate of investment," like tax laws and labor repression, improve from the viewpoint of the multinational corporation. This suggests an important line

28. See Herman, *The Real Terror Network*, *op. cit.*, n. 11, pp. 128-31; Klare and Arnsen, *Supplying Repression*, *op. cit.*, n. 27, p. 6.

29. Dr. R. K. Baker, quoted in Miles Wolpin, *Military Aid and Counter-revolution in the Third World* (Boston: Lexington, 1972), p. 31.

30. Quoted in Jan Black, *op. cit.*, n. 18, p. 194.

31. See *ibid.*, pp. 176-78.

32. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 55.

33. "U.S. Foreign Policy and Human Rights Violations in Latin America: A Comparative Analysis of Foreign Aid Distributions," *Comparative Politics*, January 1981, p. 162.

Table 1
U.S. Aid, Investment Climate, and Human Rights in Ten Countries *

Country	Strategic Political Dates ¹	Positive (+) or Negative (-) Effects on Democracy	(-) means an increased use of torture or death squads	(-) means an increase in No. of political prisoners	Improvement in Investment Climate: tax laws eased (+)	Improvement in Investment Climate: labor repressed (+)	Economic Aid (% change)	Military Aid (% change)	(6) + (7) (% change)	U.S. and Multi- national Credits (% change)	Total Aid (8) + (9) (% change)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5a)	(5b)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Brazil	1964	-	-	-	+	+	+ 14	- 40	- 7	+ 180	+ 112
Chile	1973	-	-	-	+	+	+ 558	- 8	+ 259	+ 1,079	+ 770
Dominican Rep.	1965	-	-	NA	+	+	+ 57	+ 10	+ 52	+ 305	+ 133
Guatemala	1954	-	-	NA	+	+	NA	NA	NA	NA	+ 5,300
Indonesia	1965	-	-	-	+	NA	- 81	- 79	- 81	+ 653	+ 62
Iran	1953	-	-	-	+	+	NA	NA	NA	NA	+ 900
Philippines	1972	-	-	-	+	+	+ 204	+ 67	+ 143	+ 171	+ 161
South Korea	1972	-	-	-	+	+	- 52	- 56	- 55	+ 183	9
Thailand	1973	+	+	NA	-	-	- 63	- 64	- 64	+ 218	+ 5
Uruguay	1973	-	-	-	+	+	- 11	+ 9	- 2	+ 32	+ 21

Sources:

1. Information on torture and political prisoners mostly from the *Amnesty International Report on Torture*, 1975 and *The Amnesty International Report*, 1975-76, 1976. Supplemented with data from newspaper articles, journals, and books on the specific countries. Data on investment climate largely from articles, journals, and books on the specific countries.
2. Data on aid taken from *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations*, A.I.D., 1972 and 1976 editions, for years 1962-1975. Data previous to 1962 taken from *Historical Statistics of the United States*, Bicentennial Edition, Dept. of Commerce, 1975.

* Reproduced from Chomsky and Herman, *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism*, p.43.

of causation. Military dictatorships tend to improve the investment climate, and the multinational corporate community, and the U.S. government, are very sensitive to this factor. Military dictators enter into a tacit joint venture arrangement with Free World leaders: They will keep the masses quiet, maintain an open door to multinational investment, and provide bases and otherwise serve as loyal clients. In exchange, they will be aided and protected against their own people, and allowed to loot public property. Marcos was loyally supported by the United States for more than a decade on this reciprocal basis. The U.S. distancing in 1986 clearly had nothing to do with Marcos' longstanding fundamental behavior patterns. It is just that he had ceased to be able to keep the population quiet any longer, which was an important part of the bargain. Thus, suddenly, the U.S. media discovered that he steals and is not a good democrat.

(2) *U.S. aid and the growth of torture*. Torture has had what Amnesty International calls "a cancerous growth" in recent decades. Since the death of Stalin in 1953 it has declined markedly in the East. It has been a growth industry in the West. What is more, this terrible and dehumanizing form of violence is almost exclusively an instrument of state terror.³⁴ That it should have grown dramatically as an instrument of state terror while the new concern over something called "terror" has been restricted to non-state terror, reinforces the point that the powerful define terrorism to their own advantage and independently of the substance of terror.

Table 2 shows the relationship between U.S. aid and train-

34. "Torture today is essentially a state activity." Amnesty International, *Report on Torture*, p. 22.

ing for 15 countries using torture on an administrative basis in the 1970s. A more comprehensive overview shows that of 35 countries using systematic torture in the 1970s, 26 (or 74%) were clients of the United States.³⁵ While these results have not been updated in detail, despite the ebbs and flows of the past decade there have not been any major changes in pattern.³⁶

The linkage between U.S. aid and parent-client relationship and the use of torture is not coincidental. We have seen that the installation and support of repressive regimes has been functional. The United States is also wealthy, and can provide its clients with the best and latest in methods and tools of interrogation. There is a great deal of evidence of U.S. training in methods of torture and provision of torture technology, which have been diffused throughout the system of U.S. client states. Electronic methods of torture, used extensively in Vietnam, have been adapted throughout the U.S. sphere of influence. A. J. Langguth claims that the CIA advised the Brazilian military on the limits that would prevent premature death in the use of field telephones for interrogation.³⁷ A recently published interview with a Salvadoran death squad officer shows that officials from the Salvadoran police and intelligence services have received intensive training in interrogation methods from the

35. See Chomsky and Herman, *The Washington Connection*, Frontispiece and notes. Parent-client relationship was based primarily on receipt of military training and significant flows of direct economic and military aid. For more details, and the criteria used in determining countries using torture on an administrative basis, see p. 361.

36. See Amnesty International, *Torture in the 1980s* (New York: AI, 1984).

37. *Hidden Terrors* (New York: Pantheon, 1978), p. 139. This book gives substantial evidence of U.S. training in and support of torture in a number of Latin American states.

Table 2
U.S. Military, Police and Economic Aid to Countries Using Torture on an Administrative Basis in the 1970s¹ *
 (Figures in Millions of Dollars)

	Military Assistance ² (1946-1979)	Commercial Arms Exports ³ (1950-1980)	No. of Military Personnel Trained by U.S. ⁴ (1950-1980)	Police Aid ⁵ (1973-1981)	Bilateral U.S. Economic Aid ⁶ (1946-1979)	International Aid ⁷ (1946-1980)
Argentina ⁸	263.6	90.4	4,017	.45	199.1	2,946.7
Bolivia	80.7	4.28	4,896	15.78	801.8	1,027.2
Brazil	640.0	83.31	8,659	.77	2,424.1	9,080.6
Chile	217.0	8.76	6,883	.14	1,163.1	1,046.6
Colombia	240.9	19.40	8,349	34.17	1,340.7	4,095.6
Dominican Republic	43.0	2.59	4,269	—	589.4	733.9
Guatemala	41.5	5.09	3,334	—	417.4	703.5
Haiti	5.9	1.87	643	—	251.8	305.0
Mexico	.1	12.97	1,003	95.1	2,691.9	5,807.3
Nicaragua	32.4	4.24	1,003	—	298.9	537.1
Peru	239.7	25.63	8,160	8.4	609.3	1,434.1
Paraguay	30.3	2.45	2,018	.09	177.8	629.1
Uruguay	89.2	1.67	2,806	—	159.5	632.3
Venezuela ⁸	152.3	60.33	5,540	—	201.1	657.0

¹ For the concept and criteria of torture on an administrative basis, see Chomsky and Herman, *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism*, frontispiece and explanatory footnotes.

² Agency for International Development, *Congressional Presentation, Fiscal Year 1982*, Annex III (3), Latin America and the Caribbean.

³ U.S. Department of Defense, *Congressional Presentation, Security Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 1982*.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Michael Klare and Cynthia Arson, *Supplying Repression*, IPS, 1981, p.3. This column refers to police aid provided for a brief period under the International Narcotics Control Program. The much larger Public Safety Program supplied \$324 million of arms and training to Third World police between 1961 and 1973.

⁶ See footnote 2.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ The data source for both Argentina and Venezuela, for military assistance, bilateral, and international economic aid categories was: US A.I.D., *US Overseas Loans and Grants*, July 1, 1945-Sept. 30, 1979.

* Reproduced from Herman, *The Real Terror Network*, p.129.

United States, including advice on the use of torture.³⁸ The U.S. official position has always been that U.S. police training stresses "humane" methods of interrogation, as well as greater police efficiency, but there has been a remarkable correlation between the coming of such training and the emergence of death squads and the rise of systematic torture. U.S. Congressman George Miller recently released a May 19, 1970 Airgram from the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala to the State Department, reporting on the torture and assassination activities of a Guatemalan death squad made up of security personnel. Scrawled on the top of the first page of this document from an unnamed Foreign Service officer was the statement: "Jack—This is what we were afraid of with increased public safety support."³⁹

In its *Report on Torture*, Amnesty International noted that torture came to Greece with the 1967 coup of the Colonels, whose leaders were trained and supported by the CIA and U.S. Army. AI points out that the United States regularly apologized for the torture regime, because it liked what it was doing in general.⁴⁰ AI noted a "seeming paradox"—that "never has there been a stronger or more universal consensus on the total inadmissibility of the practice of torture: at the same time the

practice of torture has reached epidemic proportions."⁴¹ The solution to the paradox is simple: terrorism, as we have seen, is defined in accordance with the requirements of power. Just as power permits the exclusion of South Africa and Guatemala from the category of "terrorist states," so that same power may exclude countries using institutionalized torture from the list of terrorist states and their practices from the manipulated consciousness of western publics. The premier terrorist as portrayed in the U.S. media during the period of the worst excesses of the Argentinean regime of organized torture (1976-81)⁴² was *Libya*. Argentina was a slightly troublesome friend, not a terrorist state.⁴³

(3) *U.S. aid and training and the spread of the death squad and "disappearances"*. Latin America has been unique in modern world politics in recent decades in developing an institution called the "death squad" and in the recrudescence of the phenomenon of "disappearances." The death squad is a sub rosa group of killers, who abduct enemies of the state and frequently torture and kill them and cause them to "disappear." Their function is to kill and intimidate without attribution to the official forces of the state. U.S. officials generally

41. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

42. At its peak, Argentina had at least 60 separate detention centers in which torture was regularly employed. See Herman, *The Real Terror Network*, *op. cit.* n. 11, pp. 112-13.

43. On the modes of apologetics and evasions on Argentina in the U.S. press, see Chomsky and Herman, *The Washington Connection*, *op. cit.* n. 5, pp. 263-70.

38. Allan Nairn, "Confessions of a Death Squad Officer," *The Progressive*, March 1986, p. 28.

39. Quoted in Kai Bird and Max Holland, "Capitol Letter," *The Nation*, December 14, 1985.

40. *Report on Torture* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1975), p. 81.

accept the claims of the client states that the "death squads" are unconnected with the state, as this allows them to rationalize support for the state committing the organized murders. The claim is ludicrous—the evidence is clear that the death squads are usually made up of off-duty and irregular official forces and are under the control of the state⁴⁴—but the acceptance of these claims by U.S. officials shows the essentially collective and supportive relations between the United States and clients employing this mode of terror.

The death squad spread throughout Latin America in the 1960s and 70s. It terminated in Nicaragua with the Sandinista triumph, and was ended or greatly reduced in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay as a result of the recession in military rule in those states. It is still important to recognize that it became very widespread in the U.S. sphere of influence, and that its rapid growth was closely correlated with U.S. aid and training (see Table 3). The death squad emerged in the Dominican Republic immediately after the U.S. invasion and intensified training of 1965-66. It emerged in Brazil immediately after the U.S.-sponsored 1964 coup. It came to Guatemala after the reestablishment of close U.S. hegemony in 1954, and especially after the influx of Green Berets and CI training in 1966-67.

"Disappearances" have been a continent-wide phenomenon in Latin America. This horrendous development has brought forth groups of relatives of the victims in over a dozen Latin American states, who have held a series of Conferences of Relatives of the Disappeared each year since 1981. (These conferences have been essentially ignored in the Free World press.) It is estimated that the number of disappeared persons in Latin America since 1960 now exceeds 100,000, including over 35,000 in Guatemala alone. There is a close correlation between death squad activity and disappearances, and thus between U.S. aid and training and disappearances as well. It should be noted that the decline in death squad activity and disappearances in countries like Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay was in no way attributable to U.S. policy or pressures—it came, in fact, from the catastrophic failures of the U.S.-supported military regimes and their inability to retain open power.⁴⁵ In an area of intense U.S. interest and activity like Central America, the death squad, disappearances, and torture have taken on new life. In El Salvador, for example, the enlarged U.S. interest beginning in 1979 led to a huge surge in death squad and regular army killing of civilians. This has been transformed in the last two years to only "moderate" death squad activity, but even more civilian deaths via an aggressive CI and aerial war on the countryside. Honduras, increasingly occupied by the United States in the 1980s, has joined the list of countries now subjected to disappearances.⁴⁶

(4) *Escalated "surrogate" terrorism.* One of the purposes of U.S. sponsorship of conservative and counterrevolutionary states, and training of security forces within states, has been to establish surrogates, who could function as regional gendarmes. The Shah of Iran and Israel in the Middle East, South

Africa and France in Africa, Brazil in Latin America, have been notable instruments of the surrogate strategy. Some have fallen by the wayside, but the strategy is very much alive and new candidates will be mobilized in the future, even though the United States is positioning itself more and more for "open" covert action and direct attack under the guise of "counter-terrorism." Since the coming into power of Reagan, the violence of the surrogates has escalated markedly. The suffering produced by surrogate state terror vastly exceeds that inflicted by the retail terrorists, who kill on a smaller scale and do not regularly torture their victims.

Conclusion

The western view is that if Libya or the Soviet Union train and give (or sell) guns to somebody, they are accountable for the behavior of their trainees or buyers of their weapons. As usual, this reasoning is not applied symmetrically. The United States is the greatest trainer and supplier of arms in world history, and the acceleration of its activity as trainer-supplier in the 1960s and 1970s was associated with the emergence of an extensive network of military dictatorships and National Security States. The growth of torture and disappearances was largely attributable to the workings of this *real* terror network, and in recent years the mass slaughters by major U.S. surrogates—Israel and South Africa—have been major contributors to quantitatively substantial world terrorism. The escalation of U.S. intervention in Central America, notably in aiding the *contras* and the "death squad democracy" of El Salvador, have also been major contributions to terrorist violence.

The coming into power of the Reagan administration was also associated with a huge arms buildup and attempt to make the nuclear threat more credible and nuclear war winnable. This is an important form of terrorism in itself; but its main function is to make it easier for the United States and its surrogates to employ conventional forces and to support "freedom fighters" like Savimbi and the Nicaraguan *contras* on a world-wide basis. This is a new and dangerous phase of U.S. imperial expansion. What is most frightening is that the Big Lies that cover over the Reagan policies of unconstrained arms escalation and counterrevolution—in the names of "counter-terrorism" and "freedom"—have been effective, and western publics have been made confused, fearful, and thus manageable. The rightward drift of European politics, partly a response to U.S. power and pressures, has reduced the constraints on the United States. The West is being mobilized for a new crusade against progressive change in the Third World.

In *The Real Terror Network*, written in 1981, I pointed out that Reagan's policies would not only greatly enlarge state terrorism, his parochial and repressive policies at home and abroad and refusal to address real problems would generate more terrorism from below (retail terrorism). "This natural result of greed, shortsightedness and stupidity will then be used to justify greater state violence, which will be wrapped up in an 'antiterrorist' flag. Rightwing ideologues create retail terrorists and are then quite prepared to kill them."⁴⁷ This is the ultimate Orwellism: Those who terrorize the most are able to take the puny responses of their victims and use these to justify their own further excesses. It is a feedback system that can only be fought by a determined effort to understand the reality, to call it by its right names, and to organize to contest the hegemony of the dominant terrorists. ●

44. See esp. Amnesty International, "Disappearances": A Workbook (New York: AI, 1981), chapter 8.

45. See Edward S. Herman and James Petras, "'Resurgent Democracy' In Latin America: Myth and Reality," *New Left Review*, Number 154, Nov.-Dec. 1985.

46. Estimates of disappearances in Honduras ranging from 147-200 are given in "Human Rights Watch," *Latinamerica Press*, March 17, 1986, and James LeMoyné, "CIA Accused of Tolerating Killings in Honduras," *New York Times*, February 14, 1986.

47. Herman, *The Real Terror Network*, op. cit., n. 11, p. 213.

Israeli-South African Collaboration

By Jack Colhoun*

Over the last decade the world community has increasingly ostracized South Africa's white minority regime. Arms embargoes, economic sanctions, bans on the transfer of nuclear and other high technology have been applied to compel South Africa to dismantle its racist system of apartheid. But at the same time a triangular strategic partnership of Israel, South Africa, and the U.S. has developed to cushion the apartheid state from the full force of these sanctions.

To understand the Israeli relationship with South Africa, it is useful to put it in the context of Israel's growing involvement in the Third World. Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, a former professor at the University of Haifa who now teaches at Columbia University, writes "Consider any Third World area that has been a trouble spot in the past ten years and you will discover Israeli officers and weapons implicated in the conflict—supporting American interests and helping what they call 'the defense of the West.'" Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua under the Somoza dictatorship are examples.

"In South Africa," Beit-Hallahmi observes, "Israel is actively involved in defending what Washington sees as 'a strategic outpost'—with the complicity and encouragement of the U.S. In this case, although the U.S. is committed to the survival of the South African regime, Washington feels that the overt support it can give to South Africa is severely limited by world opinion."¹

But, Beit-Hallahmi notes, "Israel's role in South Africa is qualitatively different from its role elsewhere."² Israel's investments in South Africa, the burgeoning volume of trade between the two countries and their extensive sharing of high technology and military experience has resulted in a unique network of mutual support.

Extensive Trade

In *The Unnatural Alliance: Israel and South Africa*, James Adams points out, "While it is impossible to place an accurate figure on the true total volume [of trade between the two countries], it is probable that when all trade is taken into account, Israel may be South Africa's biggest trading partner."³ Economic relations between the two countries are shrouded in secrecy, says Adams, an executive of the London *Sunday Times*.

According to International Monetary Fund statistics for 1983, South African exports to Israel totaled \$142 million, while Israeli exports to South Africa amounted to \$69 million.⁴

1. Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, "Israel's Global Ambitions," *New York Times*, January 6, 1983.

2. Quoted in Jack Colhoun, "South Africa buoyed by Israeli support," *Guardian Supplement*, Spring 1986.

3. James Adams, *The Unnatural Alliance: Israel and South Africa* (London, Quartet Books, 1984), p. 19.

4. Jane Hunter, *Undercutting Sanctions: Israel, the U.S. and South Africa*

* Jack Colhoun is a Washington correspondent for the *Guardian* newsweekly. He was an editor (1971-77) of AMEX-Canada magazine, the former magazine of U.S. draft resisters and antiwar GIs exiled in Canada because of their opposition to the Vietnam War.

But these numbers don't include Israel's secret arms trade with South Africa, or South Africa's export of raw diamonds to Israel.

"South Africa stands out as the single largest customer [of Israeli weapons]," Aaron Klieman, a political scientist at Tel Aviv University, concludes in his book *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy*. "It is thought to have been the purchaser of 35% of all sold in the years 1970-79."⁵ The Tel Aviv regime doesn't allow much information to reach the public about its weapons sales, especially those to South Africa, which are in defiance of the U.N.'s 1963 and 1977 arms boycotts of the apartheid state.

"It is believed that Israel currently gets 50% of its diamonds from South Africa," Adams reveals. "South Africa currently exports in excess of \$100 million of uncut gems to Israel each year, and it has been a steady and lucrative market for both parties." The diamond polishing industry is a mainstay of the Israeli economy. Israel's foreign sales of polished diamonds in 1983 totaled \$1 billion.⁶

Many Israeli companies have invested extensively in South Africa. Afitra and Koors, corporations owned by Israel's Histadrut labor federation, are big investors in South African commercial agriculture, high technology, and power generation industries. Israeli investments are also concentrated in other critical sectors of the apartheid state's economy such as communications, computers, advanced computer software, and electronics.⁷

As writer Jane Hunter explains, "One of Israel's chief attractions, as far as South African industrialists are concerned, is its preferred status with the European Economic Community and the U.S."⁸ Under the 1984 U.S. Free Trade Agreement, all Israeli exports to the U.S. will eventually be duty free. "To take advantage of Israel's privileged trade status, South African companies have systematically established manufacturing facilities in Israel, most often joint ventures with Israeli firms. Raw or semifinished materials are shipped from South Africa to Israel where sufficient 'local content' . . . is added, a 'made in Israel' label is attached, and the finished merchandise is shipped off to unsuspecting consumers abroad."⁹ This practice of "springboarding" is made profitable by the slave wages paid to Black South African workers.

The Military Alliance

A military alliance between the two countries evolved gradually in the 1960s as the U.N. adopted its first arms embargo against South Africa in 1963 and European suppliers of weapons to Israel stopped selling their wares to Israel after Israel's aggressive land grabs in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. But the Israeli-South African military partnership intensified after

(Washington: Washington Middle East Associates, 1986), p. 32.

5. Aaron Klieman, *Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985), p. 139.

6. Adams, *op. cit.* n. 3, p. 20.

7. John Mahoney in "The Link," March 1986, newsletter of Americans for Middle East Understanding.

8. Hunter, *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 34. See also *New York Times*, March 5, 1985.

9. Hunter, *op. cit.* n. 4, pp. 34-35.

South African Prime Minister Johannes Vorster visited Israel in 1976 and signed an agreement with the Tel Aviv regime setting up a Ministerial Joint Committee of the two nations' defense ministers. According to the agreement, "the exchange of Israeli arms and advice has three major areas: conventional arms trade, nuclear collaboration and counterinsurgency."¹⁰

Israel has exported sophisticated Kfir aircraft and rebuilt Mirage jet warplanes to South Africa. Israel has also supplied the apartheid state with Dabur coastal patrol boats, Reshef-class gunboats armed with Gabriel missiles, self-propelled 105 mm howitzers, antitank missiles, air-to-air missiles, assault rifles, radar bases and surveillance equipment.¹¹

"Beyond outright sales, Israel has enabled South Africa to become almost completely self-sufficient in several types of weaponry and weapons systems," Hunter notes. "The two countries have set up a joint helicopter manufacturing project—Rotoflight of Capetown and Chemavir-Masok in Israel—which supplies the armed forces of both countries with Scorpion helicopters."¹² Without the Israeli-South African alliance, she concludes, Pretoria could not have broken the U.N. arms embargo.

Adams points out Pretoria's debt to Israel in its counterinsurgency wars against the Black African Frontline States surrounding it and its repression of South Africa's Black majority. "Much of the efficiency of the South African security services must be placed at the door of Israel," Adams writes, "for both army experts and specialists in counterintelligence operations and interrogation from Mossad [the Israeli central intelligence agency] have been based in South Africa in a permanent advisory capacity since 1976."¹³

Israel Aircraft Industries constructed an electrified fence between Angola and Namibia, which South Africa illegally occupies, to block the infiltration into Namibia of SWAPO guerrillas fighting to liberate their homeland. Antipersonnel mines made in Israel are planted by South Africa along the Angolan and Mozambican borders. An Israeli spy drone was shot down in 1983 flying over Mozambique.¹⁴

Israeli military officers helped South Africa plan its 1975 invasion of Angola. In 1981 Gen. Ariel Sharon, then Israeli Defense Minister, spent 10 days with South African troops in Namibia near the Angolan border.¹⁵ The London *Financial Times* and the London *Observer* published reports of Israeli involvement in 1983-84 with Jonas Savimbi's UNITA guerrillas, the South African backed *contras* fighting against the MPLA government of Angola.¹⁶

Nuclear Cooperation

Israel and South Africa have also collaborated with regard to nuclear weapons technology since the mid-1960s. Adams states, "For South Africa, Israel had one primary advantage: a relatively advanced nuclear industry that had been working on uranium-enrichment techniques and on the design of a nuclear bomb. For the Israelis, South Africa possessed almost unlimited supplies of uranium that it might be persuaded to part with as part of a uranium-for-technology swap."¹⁷

Despite a curtain of secrecy, it appears that both Israel and South Africa have developed nuclear weapons and could not have done so without each other's help. Israeli nuclear scientists were frequently reported to have been in South Africa in 1977, the same year the apartheid state abruptly canceled what the CIA thought were preparations for an atomic weapons test in the Kalahari desert.¹⁸

Two years later, the CIA concluded, Israel and South Africa carried out a nuclear bomb test in the South Atlantic Ocean, although the Carter administration and the regimes in Pretoria and Tel Aviv denied it. CBS News correspondent Dan Raviv reported in 1980 that Israel "had detonated an atomic bomb in a joint nuclear project in the South Atlantic," referring to the 1979 double flash in the South Atlantic, which is characteristic of an atomic explosion.¹⁹

Sophisticated weapons technology purchased by Israel from the U.S. also has been diverted to South Africa. Adams reveals how the Israelis helped the racist white-minority regime obtain the 155 mm howitzer, then the world's most advanced artillery piece. Israel bought the weapon from the U.S.-based Space Research Corp. (SRC), and used the big gun with great effectiveness in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.²⁰

After South African troops were repelled in their 1975 invasion of Angola by MPLA forces with superior artillery, Pretoria turned to Israel. Although the Israelis were willing to sell the 155 mm howitzer technology to South Africa, Tel Aviv didn't own the rights to the weapon. So the Israelis teamed up with some former CIA agents to fashion a clandestine deal. SRC in the end not only sold Pretoria the advanced weaponry but also trained South African technicians, who later reconstructed the howitzer.

"It is possible that another major weapons system—Israel's Lavi aircraft, which incorporates highly advanced U.S. technology and is largely dependent on U.S. financing—is now making its way to Pretoria," Hunter warns.²¹ There have been numerous reports in the Israeli and international press that South Africa is covertly financing part of the Lavi project in return for a deal that would eventually allow the South Africans to build the Lavi under license in the apartheid state.

Hunter notes that the U.S. corporations may, under pressure from antiapartheid campaigns, stop their operations in South Africa, but use their corporate subsidiaries in Israel to continue doing business with South Africa. "Motorola has recently won praise for its announcement that it will stop selling two-way radios to the South African police. However, its subsidiary, Motorola Israel, which produces military communications systems and distributes them in South Africa through Afitra, can offer Pretoria continued access to those radios," she writes.²²

U.S. Encouragement

The Israeli-South African partnership evolved in part as a relationship between two nations faced increasingly with international isolation because of their destabilizing and oppressive policies in the Middle East and Southern Africa. But this re-

10. Steve Goldfield, *Garrison State: Israel's Role in U.S. Global Strategy* (San Francisco: Palestine Focus Publications, 1985), p. 26.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

12. Hunter, *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 27.

13. Adams, *op. cit.* n. 3, p. 85.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 93; Goldfield, *op. cit.* n. 10, pp. 28, 30.

15. Hunter, *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 28.

16. *Ibid.*

17. Adams, *op. cit.* n. 3, p. 170.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 182; Hunter *op. cit.* n. 4, pp. 15-16.

19. Quoted in Hunter, *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 17. See also Jack Colhoun, "Little doubt U.S. helped build an 'apartheid bomb'," *Guardian*, February 16, 1983. And see, Barbara Rogers, "South Africa Gets Nuclear Weapons—Thanks to the West," in Ray, *et al.*, eds., *Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa* (Secaucus, N.J.: Lyle Stuart, 1979), p. 276.

20. Adams, *op. cit.* n. 3, pp. 38-71. And see, Michael Klare, "Arms for Apartheid," in Ray, *op. cit.* n. 19, p. 258.

21. Hunter, *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 24.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

lationship was also encouraged by the U.S.

"[Secretary of State Henry] Kissinger in early 1975 secretly asked the Israeli government to send troops to Angola in order to cooperate with the South African army in fighting the Cuban-backed MPLA," the British magazine *The Economist* wrote. "They sent South Africa some military instructors specializing in antiguerrilla warfare plus equipment designed

for the same purpose. In return, the Israelis took Kissinger's request as the green light for an Israeli-South African partnership."²³

23. Quoted in Israel Shahak, *Israel's Global Role: Weapons for Repression* (Belmont, Mass.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1982), p. 29.

Israeli Spy Target of MOSSAD Hit?

By Louis Wolf

Ever since Jonathan Jay Pollard was arrested in November 1985 and charged with a long history of spying for Israel, there has been substantial doubt that he will ever receive a full, public trial. Now, *CAIB* has learned, there is a question whether he will remain alive.

The key is the relationship between the CIA and Israel's MOSSAD. The Department of Justice fears an assassination attempt by MOSSAD against Pollard, and at press time he was being kept under extremely tight security at the Petersburg, Virginia Federal Correctional Institution. He is under 24-hour guard in an isolation compound, has been given a "John Doe" identity, and wears a disguise, including a false beard and hairpiece. He is moved only after dark, for his frequent meetings with intelligence officials.

The CIA and MOSSAD

Given the long history of especially close relations between the CIA and MOSSAD, both intelligence services—and both governments—would seem to have far more to lose than to gain by allowing Pollard's case to reach the courts. The two sister services share highly secret intelligence information and work side by side around the world. Cooperation ranges from covert paramilitary operations to media disinformation campaigns. It could prove extremely embarrassing to Tel Aviv and Washington if the full scope of such activities were to become apparent from a public airing of Pollard's activities on behalf of Israel while employed as a U.S. Navy counterintelligence officer. And, from the Israeli side, it is not just a question of intelligence information. The \$4.5 billion in annual aid—which makes Israel by far the leading recipient of U.S. foreign aid—is doubtless a major incentive for downplaying the Pollard case.

Pollard's Career

Pollard was for years fascinated with the workings of Israeli, U.S., and South African intelligence agencies. In 1984 he asked the Israelis to let him spy for them, and he received training from MOSSAD handlers including the legendary Rafael Eitan. In Washington and on two visits to Tel Aviv he was taught highly specialized espionage techniques, including the writing and sending of secret messages and the use of Hebrew alphabet codes. He was given a false Israeli passport, a phony name, and \$85,000. And he was promised \$300,000 more, to be placed over time in a Swiss bank account.

U.S. prosecutors said he had provided the Israelis with "reams" and "suitcases full" of classified documents dur-

ing his busy two years, including U.S. technical intelligence on the military capabilities of Arab nations. A special Israeli cabinet inquiry suggests he was supplying MOSSAD with data on CIA spying against Israel.

White House Worries

The case is a major headache for the White House. Pollard's arrest came only after what an insider has described as "a pitched bureaucratic battle" between the CIA and State Department on the one hand, and the FBI and Pentagon on the other. Both the CIA and the State Department wanted to look the other way, and let Pollard continue—subject to some scrutiny and damage limitation. But the FBI saw an arrest as a great public relations booster, and the Pentagon was evidently seriously worried about the intelligence resources and advantages accruing to Israel at the expense of other allies.

The FBI won out, and within three days arrested Pollard and two other spies who were being watched in unrelated cases—former CIA China analyst Larry Wu-tai Chin and former NSA officer Ronald Pelton. As the Pollard case unfolded, the official U.S. position was almost comical. The Munich daily, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* commented (December 3, 1985), "The U.S. State Department trumpeted its 'horror,'...and the CIA wailed shrilly like an old courtesan pretending to be a violated virgin. Jerusalem behaved even less circumspectly."

The Spreading Scandal

The Justice Department is finally of the opinion that the Pollard operation is just part of a larger Israeli espionage apparatus in the United States—something any intelligent observer of the scene would have assumed for years. The office of Rep. John Conyers (Dem.-Mich.) has announced that the House Judiciary Committee subcommittee on criminal justice, which Conyers chairs, will commence an investigation of Israeli spying in the U.S. shortly. The conservative *New York Times* columnist William Safire reported (June 30, 1986), "I'm told a New Yorker, prominent in Jewish affairs, is likely to be implicated in the [Pollard] spy scandal."

CAIB has learned that, for many years, the leadership of the American Jewish Committee in New York has, on a regular basis, supplied reports on U.S. strategic affairs, including intelligence matters, to the Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations. Israel's U.N. mission has long been a key MOSSAD post. Only time will tell what Safire was told. ●

The next year the U.S. turned again to its covert partner in Tel Aviv. "British television (and subsequently the press as well) aired a report referring to the sale of American helicopters to South Africa, in the middle of their notorious invasion of newly liberated Angola. It turns out Kissinger, with reason, expected the U.S. Congress would not confirm the sale of such equipment . . . so . . . an 'Israeli solution' was found for this problem by means of a fictitious sale effected by 'unknown Israeli companies,' and the 'copters were transferred to South Africa' "Hebrew University professor Israel Shahak writes.²⁴

Jane Hunter sums up: "Israel has become an indispensable covert partner for the U.S. because this partnership isn't subject to congressional scrutiny or even public debate because of Israel's 'special relationship' with Washington." But, she concludes, "The question for progressive Americans should be simply whether we are doing all that we can to end apartheid. If we find, therefore, that the 'special relationship' between the U.S. and Israel spills over into South Africa, then issues like the level of American aid to Israel, the role of U.S. firms in three-way trade and U.S. diplomatic attempts to cover up this involvement cannot be ignored."²⁵

24. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

25. Hunter, *op. cit.* n. 4, p. 51.

Cluster Bomb Hypocrisy



One facet of the expanding U.S.-Israel spy scandal is the allegation that Israel has been smuggling cluster bomb technology out of the United States. Cluster bombs are pods which open in midair, on the way to their targets, releasing up to 500 potentially lethal exploding projectiles. The charge, made July 8 by the U.S. Ambassador to Israel, has been denied by that nation, which insists that their development of such weapons was "totally independent." (*New York Times*, July 10, 1986, p. A18.)

The U.S. reportedly "halted shipment of cluster weapons to Israel in 1982 after they were used against civilian areas in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon." (*Ibid.*) But the blatant hypocrisy in such a policy—if in fact it is followed at all—is that the U.S. used cluster bombs against civilians in its invasion of Libya in 1986, to say nothing of their extensive use in Indochina during the 1960s and early 1970s.

The photo above shows hundreds of such devices displayed for news reporters on a Benghazi beach. Clearly the United States does not practice what it preaches. ●



THE RISE AND FALL OF THE BULGARIAN CONNECTION

By Edward S. Herman
and Frank Brodhead


The most ambitious disinformation coup of the 1980s: A handful of reactionary journalists with extensive intelligence connections turned the truth on its head. For more than four years, western audiences were inundated with tales of "the Bulgarian Connection"—an elaborate scenario asserting that Mehmet Ali Agca, the Turkish fascist who tried to kill the Pope, wasn't a fascist after all, but an agent of the Bulgarians and the KGB.

But when the case finally came to trial, it fell apart: Agca claimed he was Jesus and offered to raise the dead. More important, no evidence was ever found to corroborate *anything* he said. In fact, the evidence strongly suggested Agca had been coached while in prison to reverse his story.

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News Note

Cover Photo Explained

The cover of our last issue showed some Greek women who were hanged by Nazi collaborators during the German occupation. The photo was taken by Spyros Meletzis in Volos in 1944 and given to us by him. While we used the photo to illustrate the brutality of the Nazis and their collaborators, we had no idea precisely who the women were.

The cover of CAIB Number 25 was reproduced in the Athens weekly, Pontiki, on January 10, 1986, to illustrate an article about our magazine. It led to some extremely interesting correspondence, and a poignant article (January 24, 1986), translated excerpts of which follow:



An emotionally crushing photograph from the martyrdom of the Greek people during the German occupation went round the world via *CovertAction* magazine. On one half of the magazine's cover (reproduced in *Pontiki*) the execution of two Greek women is depicted, while on the other half, Reagan and Kohl are paying tribute to the SS cemetery at Bitburg. Beneath the photo of the two hanged Greek women are only two words, "Greece 1940s." Nothing else.

Shortly after our issue came out a letter from a resistance fighter, Aris Psiaris, a lawyer in Volos, gave us the first pieces of information about those women. On the right is Filitsa Kalavrou; on the left, Lukia Topali. In the original photograph, the body of Sofia Topali, the daughter of Lukia, can also be seen. All three were hanged by members of the traitorous EASAD [National Agricultural Association of Anti-communist Action]. But why?

For Kalavrou the reason may have been the participation of her husband in ELAS [National People's Liberation Army], but for the other two, the reason was simply looting. No matter how much their executioners claimed they were part of ELAS, they were hanged because they were wealthy. The collaborators targeted them so that they could loot their mansion, and they did not even stop to consider that they were *Swiss subjects*.

The unfortunate victims could have saved themselves had they escaped to Switzerland, but they chose to stay in Greece, helping people who were hungry by organizing soup kitchens and schooling for the children in the region. Detailed data,

photographs, and reports of eyewitnesses can be found in the book, "Unknown Facets of the Occupation and the Resistance, 1941-44," by the journalist Nitsa Koliou.

The women were hanged in the Volos village square on June 7, 1944. They had been arrested eight days before by EASADites, taken to the Alexandra prison, and from there tied with cables and taken to be hanged.

According to Fotis Hatzopoulos, who was 12 years old at the time, but remembers the three tragic women very well, when the EASADites came to arrest Sofia Topali, they found her mother Lukia alone in the house. The man in charge pretended he was an *andartes* [guerrilla fighter] and asked why they had not sent supplies to ELAS. The unsuspecting woman replied that she had sent supplies the day before, and was immediately arrested. A short time later her daughter arrived and was also arrested.

About Filitsa Kalavrou there is the testimony of her own daughter, Vasiliki Agraftotis:

"My mother tended the mill of my father when he left to join the *andartes*. She lived in the mill. One night men of EASAD appeared at the mill disguised as *andartes*, wearing caps with the word ELAS! 'We are in the mountains with Antonin,' they said. 'Why don't you send anything to your husband?' She said she had already sent bread and woolen undershirts and socks. She said she did the knitting herself. 'You yourself are a fighter?' the EASADites asked her. 'Of course,' was my mother's reply. They arrested her. That was the same evening they arrested the Topali women, and took them all to the Alexandra prison. One day I passed by the prison and I heard my mother call to me from the window. She had been severely tortured, but she denied nothing. She told her tormenters that she had been knitting for the *andartes*. Later she was tied with cables, taken from the prison, and hanged. The mill and our home were completely looted."

In front of the gallows all three women behaved courageously. Fotis Hatzopoulos remembers the Topali mother cheering for the freedom fighters and crossing herself before they put the noose over her head. As they made her daughter step up on the table to be hanged, she shouted to Fotis, "Take care of the children." She meant the soup kitchen children.

Today nothing remains of the terrible crime. The bodies were buried nearby, but were later exhumed and have disappeared. Even the tree from which they were hanged was uprooted some years later by officials charged with the beautification of the area. These women were not the only victims of the Germans and their collaborators. Twenty-two other villagers were executed, including a 10-year-old boy.

Little is known of the fate of the group of EASADites who arrested and executed the women. The leader of EASAD, the notorious Takis Macedonas, fled Volos for Athens and then Salonika. When the Germans left, in October 1944, he went with a band of followers to hide in the countryside, but they were captured by *andartes*. Macedonas had hidden a small pistol under his armpit and, a few days after his arrest, told a fellow prisoner that he was terrified he would not simply be executed, but might be tortured. "What will happen if they decide to skin me alive?" he told a fellow prisoner. Before the other could answer, Macedonas pulled out the pistol and killed himself.

How much one photograph tells.

The Continuing War: Media Manipulation in Costa Rica

By Howard Friel and Michelle Joffroy*

In his affidavit to the International Court of Justice the former head of the *contra* communications office in Tegucigalpa, Edgar Chamorro, testified that, through him, the CIA had bribed journalists in Honduras to influence public opinion to oppose the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Chamorro testified that he "received money to bribe Honduran journalists and broadcasters to write and speak favorably about the FDN (the main *contra* group) and to attack the Government of Nicaragua and call for its overthrow." According to Chamorro, "approximately 15 Honduran journalists and broadcasters were on the CIA payroll and our influence was thereby extended to every major Honduran newspaper and television station." Chamorro also testified that "I learned from my CIA colleagues that the same tactic was employed in Costa Rica in an effort to turn the newspapers and television stations of that country against the Nicaraguan Government." Although details of the CIA's media campaign in Honduras are scarce (even Chamorro won't discuss them), details of similar operations in Costa Rica are even more scarce. However, recent media events in Costa Rica may give observers some insight into the nature and methods of U.S. media operations in Central America.

Background

U.S. efforts to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua involve the destabilization of important sectors of its neighboring countries—Honduras and Costa Rica. In Honduras, the militarization of the budget, the expanded influence of the military, and increased military surveillance and repression of Honduran citizens are policies designed by the Reagan administration to undermine the popular movements and Honduran democracy. More visible is the construction of several U.S. military bases in Honduras and the ongoing military exercises off the Nicaraguan and Honduran coasts and along the border—demonstrating to Nicaragua that the regional infrastructure for a U.S. military invasion is already in place. Finally, Honduran acquiescence to the presence of the U.S. mercenary forces inside Honduran borders is perhaps the clearest indication of U.S. domination there. The purpose of the CIA's media campaign in Honduras is to condition the Honduran public to accept or support the Reagan administration's policies there.

In Costa Rica the manifestations of U.S. power are more subtle, primarily because there is no military establishment there to exploit or dominate. Instead, the primary focus of American interventionists is the Costa Rican mass media. Be-

cause the mass media were the only major sector of society untouched by the social reformation of the past half-century, the Costa Rican press is still owned and operated exclusively by the upper classes of the private sector, which, as Andrew Reding comments, maintains a "desire to insulate itself from the possible influence of revolutionary ideas on labor and landless peasantry." The vested interests of the mass media and its upper class owners represent "a natural convergence" with "the Reagan administration's desire to remove the Sandinistas from power."¹ The outcome, as Reding writes, has been "a concerted propaganda and disinformation campaign. Now entering its seventh year, this campaign is designed to scare Costa Ricans into a hostile attitude toward Nicaragua, thereby increasing their receptivity to U.S. intervention, Costa Rican rearmament, and persecution of real and imagined domestic leftists."² According to Reding, who spent several years in the country with intellectuals, professionals, students, and workers, many Costa Ricans believe that the relationship between the media and the Reagan administration goes beyond a "natural convergence." Reding states that in Costa Rica, "it is taken for granted" that the CIA is active within the media and that its influence is "comprehensive."³

One can examine the recent record of deception and falsification in the Costa Rican mass media, and especially in Costa Rica's leading newspaper, *La Nación*, to get an idea where CIA media assets might be located.

La Nación and the Falsified Photo

On May 30, 1985, two Costa Rican border guards were killed at Las Crucitas during a Costa Rican-based *contra* attack across the Nicaraguan border. Although an Organization of American States commission was unable to determine how the border guards were killed, the incident was reported in the Costa Rican press as an indication of Sandinista aggression and as revealing the supposed intentions of the Sandinistas to invade Costa Rica. The media's coverage of the border incident provoked an anti-Sandinista demonstration at the Nicaraguan Embassy in San José, including a mob attack on the embassy by several rock-throwing demonstrators. *La Nación's* coverage of the demonstration involved deceptive information and the falsification of a photograph.

On June 11, 1985, *La Nación* published three photographs of the demonstration. The photographs are reproduced here and numbered for reference. According to Carlos Morales, the

* Howard Friel is a researcher and journalist who frequently contributes to *CAIB*. He is now completing *On Capitalist Realism: How to Read Time and Newsweek*. Michelle Joffroy is a philosophy student at Villanova University.

1. Andrew Reding, "Costa Rica: Democratic Model in Jeopardy," *World Policy Journal*, Spring, 1986, p. 303.

2. *Ibid.*

3. These quotes are from a telephone interview with Andrew Reding.

editor of *La Universidad*, the newspaper of the University of Costa Rica School of Journalism, the anti-Sandinista rock-throwing mob was organized by the Free Costa Rica Movement, a John Birch-type organization affiliated with General John Singlaub's World Anti-Communist League.⁴ The trident-like logo of the Free Costa Rica Movement (MCRL) is clearly visible in photographs 1 and 2. In both photographs, those wearing the MCRL insignias are the peaceful demonstrators, thus creating the impression that MCRL involvement in the



Photographs 1 and 2. Note visible trident MCRL insignia.

demonstration was peaceful and free of provocations. In photograph 3 the man in the foreground holding a brick is also a member of the MCRL, although this could not be discerned by *La Nación*'s readers since the MCRL logo on the brick thrower's shirt had been rubbed out by the editors of *La Nación*. In the original, unaltered photograph the logo is clearly visible. The falsified photograph was discovered during an investigation of the demonstration by *La Universidad*, which also determined that the rock-throwing incident was, in fact, a MCRL provocation.⁵ Given that one of *La Nación*'s editors, Juan Antonio Sanchez Alonso, is also Vice President of the Free Costa Rica Movement, it is clear that the erasure of the insignia and the coverage of the demonstration was meant to mislead and manipulate the Costa Rican public.

***La Nación* and the Manipulation of Public Opinion**

On March 2, 1986, the period immediately preceding the debate in the United States regarding *contra* aid, *La Nación* published the results of a poll taken by Consultoria Interdisciplinario en Desarrollo (CID), a San José subsidiary of Gallup. The poll showed that 69 percent of Costa Ricans supported military aid to the *contras*, while only 24 percent opposed aid. The poll results were distributed in the United States that month by the United States Information Agency, publicized by *The Washington Times*, broadcast by National Public Radio,

and cited by Congressman Bob Livingston (Rep.-La.) during the congressional debate. Upon publication of the CID poll by *La Nación*, *La Universidad* conducted another investigation of the background and methods of the survey.⁶



Photograph 3, as it appeared in the newspaper. Note black mark on chest.



The original of photograph 3, showing trident MCRL insignia before it was obliterated.

4. *La Universidad*, University of Costa Rica, San José, June 21, 1985, p. 3.
5. *Ibid.*

6. *La Universidad*, March 14, 1986, p. 14.

La Universidad discovered that the survey, published for the first time in March 1986, was actually conducted 9 months earlier in June 1985. In addition, the poll was conducted only days after the border incident at Las Crucitas, when, according to Carlos Morales, the Costa Rican public was "under the influence of the press campaign which had been focusing on Las Crucitas." Furthermore, *La Nación* published the results of this poll without mentioning the results of a more recent CID poll conducted in November 1985. That poll found that 42 percent of Costa Ricans opposed aid to the *contras* while 39 percent support it—a dramatic reversal from the June poll. These results were never published by *La Nación*.

The game played by *La Nación* is apparent—to ensure that Costa Ricans support the Reagan administration's policy in Nicaragua and the rest of Central America. According to Daniel Obuder Quiros, former president of Costa Rica (1974-1978:

All the Costa Rican media owners are conservative. They follow what they feel is the U.S. line, though most of the time much more aggressively than the actual U.S. line. They're ultras in the sense that they go beyond what may be the wishes or recommendations of U.S. officials in the area in order to ingratiate themselves and secure U.S. support.⁷

"U.S. support" involves primarily cheap loans from the U.S. to private Costa Rican banks—an economic assistance program designed to undermine state banks and social programs. In essence, as long as U.S. economic assistance to Costa Rica is contingent upon support for the *contras* and designed to enhance the power of the Costa Rican oligarchy while undermining the social democracy, the mass media in Costa Rica will continue to operate and publish on strings pulled by the U.S. government.

***La Nación* and the Fake Letter**

As a response to increased terrorist targeting of Americans overseas, the United States Embassy in San José constructed a wall to surround the compound for additional security. However, the embassy wall juts out onto the sidewalk, forcing pedestrians to walk into the busy street in order to walk by the embassy. Residents of San José soon began complaining about the inconvenience, the safety hazard, and the fortress-like appearance of the new wall. For these reasons, few good things could be said by Costa Ricans about the embassy wall—that is, until the following letter appeared in the May 31, 1985, issue of *La Nación*:

Praise for the Wall

I love the wall constructed in front of the embassy of the United States in the capital. It is a brilliant ornament which attracts the attention of all pedestrians. It would be very pleasant for diplomatic buildings to become such works of art, given that they now look like stockades to detain the criminals who want to damage them. It's a shame that they are so low as now they are used for people to sit on and even the dogs dirty them. What disrespect, My God! It also occurs to me that in residential neighborhoods, the residents could build similar walls to better protect themselves.—Amalia Zamora V., Ced. 4-033-180.

Elogian pretil

Me encanta el pretil que construyeron en la acera de la Embajada de Estados Unidos en esta capital. Luce como singular ornato que llama la atención de todos los transeúntes. Sería muy agradable que las representaciones diplomáticas realizaran obras semejantes, ya que parecen pequeñas trincheras para detener a los maleantes que intenten dañar los edificios. Lástima si que sean tan bajitos, pues ya los están cogiendo para sentarse y hasta los perros los han ensuciado. ¡Qué irrespeto Dio mio! Se me ocurre que también en los barrios residenciales los vecinos podríamos levantar pretilles similares para protegernos mas. Amalia Zamora V., Ced. 4-033-180.

The phony letter, as it appeared in *La Nación*.

The letter is signed with an accompanying *cedula* number (routinely used in Costa Rica for identification and geographical purposes).

Once again, *La Universidad* investigated. Carlos Morales petitioned the Civil Registry in Costa Rica to check the authenticity of the *cedula* number.⁸ He received the following reply:

There appears to be no person carrying the *cedula* number 4-033-180 and it cannot be established how long the number has been non-existent. Page 33 of the jurisdiction *Heredia* numbers from No. 35724 to 36715.

Thus, it seems that the letter, absurd as it is, was contrived to give the impression of at least marginal support among Costa Ricans for the embassy wall. Of course, like other *La Nación* attempts to demonstrate Costa Rican support for the U.S. presence in the region, the evidence presented for this alleged support was shown to be fraudulent.

Ideology and Myths

These three examples of misleading and falsified information in *La Nación* are typical of the kind of lies and mythologies being built up today in Costa Rica to vilify Nicaragua and justify U.S. policy in Central America. It is always the case that when an ideology lacks an ideational and moral legitimacy it must rely upon an extensive network of lies and myths to sustain itself. Perhaps the best way to summarize the most likely outcome of such an ideological campaign is to quote from a recent interview with José Figueres Ferrer, former president of Costa Rica and current president of the Costa Rican National Liberation Party:⁹

A few months ago, there was a moment of crisis in Nicaragua following a border incident at Las Crucitas near the Costa Rica-Nicaragua border. People were saying that the Nicaraguans wanted to invade us, and that if Costa Ricans went beyond the border, they would be killed. So the democratic labor leaders decided to cross the border to see what would happen, and I joined them. We went to the Río San Juan, and the Sandinistas shouted, "Viva Costa Rica!" Nothing happened at all. On the contrary, we were really well received. When we went to Muelle San Carlos against the wishes of the Costa Rican Government, we were received like friends. Many times war is created by myths—people are turned into your enemies by myths. ●

7. Andrew Reding, "Voices from Costa Rica," *World Policy Journal*, p. 326-27.

8. *La Universidad*, June 21, 1985, p. 2.

9. Reding, "Voices from Costa Rica," p. 322.

Duarte: The Man and the Myth

By Dennis Hans*

The case of José Napoleón Duarte, president of El Salvador, confounds. The very qualities his legion of admirers in the U.S. government and media profess to see in him are precisely those he lacks. Although he has been caught in lie upon lie, Duarte is praised for his honesty. Duarte, the pitchman for murderers and torturers, is hailed for his morality and decency.

This describes the Duarte of the 1980s, the years covered in this review. There was a time when Duarte deserved—but did not receive—the support of Washington. A founding member in 1961 of the Salvadoran Christian Democratic Party (PDC), Duarte was an effective and popular mayor of San Salvador from 1964 to 1970. In 1972, he ran as the presidential candidate of a center-left civilian coalition that was attempting to bring to an end four decades of military rule. Duarte won the election, only to have it stolen by the army, which arrested and tortured Duarte and shipped him off to exile.

Nothing here disturbed the U.S. It had supported a string of anticommunist military dictatorships in El Salvador and promptly recognized the stealers of the 1972 election. As long as the Salvadoran army provided “stability” and a favorable investment climate, and remained loyal to the U.S., the U.S. was content to let it rule.

Ironically, the electoral fraud welcomed in Washington in the interests of stability sowed the seeds of instability. Seeing that the peaceful, democratic road to economic and social reform led to a dead end, many Salvadoreans took to the hills and prepared for a guerrilla war.

Some seven years later (October 1979), with El Salvador on the brink of civil war, a group of moderate and progressive officers committed to democracy and reform staged a coup and formed a government with a broad array of respected citizens—educators, lawyers, politicians, enlightened businessmen. Unfortunately, the democratic contingent of the military never consolidated its power. The reactionaries retained a significant power base and gradually expanded on it.

It is at this point that we begin our detailed review of Citizen Duarte. He returned from exile in late 1979, and in a matter of weeks assumed a critical role not only in the politics of El Salvador, but in U.S. foreign policy as well.

1980 was a tumultuous year in El Salvador. In January, the government collapsed. Distressed at their inability to restrain the armed forces which were terrorizing political and labor activists, the three civilians on the five-man junta and every cabinet minister except one resigned.

The PDC, after much soul-searching, agreed to fill the breach. Mindful of the cause of the collapse of the preceding junta, the PDC conditioned its participation in the government on the armed forces’ submission to civilian control and the dismissal of three notorious hard-liners, Defense Minister José Guillermo García, Vice-Minister of Defense Nicolas Carranza and Treasury Police Chief Francisco Morán.

None of these promises were kept, and that provoked a mass exodus of Christian Democrats from the government in March. The officials stated that the PDC “should not participate in a regime which has unleashed the bloodiest repression ever experienced by the Salvadoran people.” One faction of the party, however—the old guard, led by Duarte—stayed on, with Duarte himself occupying the junta seat vacated by the PDC’s Hector Dada. Archbishop Oscar Romero’s appeal to the Duarte faction not to lend a moderate, civilian presence to a government clearly dominated by the most ruthless sectors of the army was rejected.

In May, troops loyal to the moderate Colonel Adolfo Majano arrested Roberto D’Aubuisson (a retired army officer who was directing death squads with the connivance of the military high command) and confiscated documents implicating him in coup plotting and the March 24 assassination of Romero. Now it was Duarte’s turn to confront the army: The PDC would resign en masse if D’Aubuisson were not prosecuted. D’Aubuisson was released, Majano was demoted, and Duarte backed down. In the next 50 days, more than 2,500 Salvadoreans were tortured, assassinated, or massacred.

In October, the top U.S. labor official in El Salvador, Richard Oulahan, analyzed recent developments in an internal memorandum. “Government here operates with no real popular support,” he began. “In the past several months, Duarte and company have sided with the conservative military (perhaps because this group holds the key to power now), which has hurt their image among the population.” After noting that “military inspired violence is much worse now than before,” Oulahan described the *modus operandi* of the charmers Duarte had sided with: “The armed forces have been operating with the list system here: If your name happens to be on the list and you are taken prisoner your future life expectancy is about one hour.” The *Washington Post* reported December 8, 1980, the latest Duarte ultimatum to the army: “If ‘democratic interests’ are not given complete control of the military the Christian Democrats will withdraw.” Five days later, Duarte was appointed president of the junta—but not commander-in-chief. The government restructuring actually strengthened the position of the military hard-liners. As in May, Duarte’s demands had not been met. As in May, Duarte backed down.

Explaining Away State Terrorism

The Carter and Reagan administrations have pretended that the thousands of civilian killings since the civil war began in 1980 have been perpetrated primarily by “extremists of the left and right” out to topple the “centrist” government and, to a lesser extent, by government soldiers “out of control.” Because U.S. military aid flows directly to the armed forces, the executive branch has gone to great lengths to hide the fact that

* Dennis Hans is a freelance writer based in Florida. He has written for *Christianity and Crisis*, the *National Catholic Reporter*, and the *Village Voice*.

1. Quoted in Raymond Bonner, *Weakness and Deceit: U.S. Policy and El Salvador* (New York: Times Books, 1984), pp. 203-205.

the vast majority of civilian deaths are the responsibility of government troops following to the letter the orders of their commanding officers. The White House has feared Congress would balk at bankrolling known butchers. And Duarte has served as point man in the campaign to protect the image of the Salvadoran armed forces.

In May 1980, for example, the army massacred hundreds of refugees at the Sumpul River. At first, Duarte claimed no incident had occurred there, but later conceded that "an action did take place" and that 300 people were killed, all "communist guerrillas."² In July 1981, soldiers slaughtered 40 residents of Armenia, including all the members of a soccer team. "Duarte flatly denied that there had been any killings."³ He even denied that there were rotting corpses at the El Playon lava fields, despite the fact that even U.S. Embassy officials admitted that the fields were a favorite dumping ground of the local army cavalry unit. Stories to this effect were "fabricated," Duarte said. Still, Duarte and the army high command promised to investigate. "Several months later the embassy acknowledged that there had been no investigation."⁴

Colonel Majano (forced out of the government by army hard-liners in December 1980) undoubtedly had these and other instances in mind when, according to the *Christian Science Monitor* (March 15, 1982), he "asserted that despite the widely held view in the United States that President Duarte is a moderate who is trying to end abuses, Duarte was fully aware of what was happening and had helped to cover up the government's complicity."

On those rare occasions where Duarte acknowledged the complicity of government forces in attacks on civilians, he passed them off as "abuses of authority," certain the army as an institution was not to blame. In this connection, we note that Ray Bonner's widely praised book, which documents countless mass killings by government forces, details only one involving an "abuse of authority."

The U.S.-trained Atlacatl Battalion arrived in the northern village of Mozote on a December day in 1981. After assembling the villagers in front of the church, the troops proceeded to blindfold the men and take them away in groups of four and five to be shot. "Women were raped. Of the 482 Mozote victims, 280 were children under fourteen years old." Among the victims were the four children and blind husband of Rufina Amaya. She had managed to hide in safety in a nearby wooded area, from where she overheard the following conversation.

"Lieutenant, somebody here says he won't kill children," said one soldier. "Who's the son of a bitch who said that?" the lieutenant answered. "I am going to kill him."⁵ A fitting punishment for a soldier who "abused the authority" of the commanding officer by refusing to kill children.

When the military and police of a nation murder 25,000 civilians in two years—34 per day—as El Salvador's did during the period Duarte served as a member or president of the junta (March 1980 to March 1982), a sullied reputation would seem sure to follow. But, according to Duarte's letter published in the November 9, 1981, *Miami Herald*, the armed forces' sordid image stemmed from an "astonishing, clever, and effective campaign of hearsay and false information channeled by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other Communist countries." In truth, "The armed forces are waging a heroic battle against a

cruel and pitiless enemy supported by great resources of ideological aggression."

The "Democratic Process"

Duarte was out of the government from April 1982 to May 1984. In the March 1982 Constituent Assembly elections the PDC lost to a coalition of right-wing and extreme right-wing parties. Participation was limited to pro-army political parties in this U.S.-conceived, -financed, and -staged affair; anti-army politicians of the center and left were on a hit list of "traitors" circulated by the army.

A unique aspect of this "democratic process" was that the provisional president was selected by the U.S. Embassy and the army. In El Salvador, the president serves the army and the U.S. executive; the U.S. Congress is his constituency; soliciting the constituency for military aid is his function. The U.S. Embassy and the army concluded that mild-mannered banker Alvaro Magaña could better perform this function than the Constituent Assembly's choice for president, Roberto D'Aubuisson.

Duarte remained in El Salvador, attending to PDC affairs and planning his presidential campaign for 1984. Throughout 1982 and 1983, the army killed noncombatants at the declining yet impressive rate of 15 per day. This appears not to have disturbed Duarte any more than it did when, as president of the junta, the blood was on his hands. Commenting on a late-1983 conversation with Duarte, *Le Monde's* Charles Vanhecke, writing in the *Manchester Weekly Guardian* (December 25, 1983), noted that Duarte could not "find words kind enough for the army, in spite of its 'pacification' methods. Aligning himself with the military when he was president, he lent his name to the most cruel period of repression."

Duarte's praise notwithstanding, the army was in fact in disarray in late 1983, having suffered heavy casualties in the course of a disastrous U.S.-promoted and -designed counterinsurgency campaign. Seeing that the army was no match for the rebels on the ground, U.S. strategists convinced their Salvadoran clients to counter with a massive escalation of the air war, the objectives being "to disrupt the rebels' ability to mass for attack and to drive civilians out of the areas in the countryside that the rebels controlled or contested, thereby denying the rebels a base of logistical support."⁶ A seven-fold increase in U.S. funding for aircraft in fiscal year 1984 provided the Salvadoreans with the firepower, while stepped-up reconnaissance flights by U.S. pilots based in Honduras and Panama helped select the targets.

The civilian population bore the brunt of the bombing, strafing and rocket fire, a fact amply documented by human rights groups—and cynically denied by U.S. and Salvadoran officials. By mid-1984, eight months into the escalated air war, many hundreds of civilians had been killed and more than 100,000 driven from their homes. The air force even "used the Red Cross's humanitarian activities to locate and attack groups of displaced people in areas of conflict." One tactic was to cancel Red Cross visits at the last minute and greet the gatherings of unsuspecting sick and homeless peasants with a parcel of bombs and bullets.⁷ Meanwhile, civilians in Guazapa were being burned to death by incendiary weapons—napalm and white phosphorous, according to medical experts. Government troops acknowledged that villages in the area had been

2. Americas Watch report, 1982; the actual number was over 600.

3. Bonner, *op cit.* n. 1, p. 324.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 325-26.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 338-39.

6. In the words of a report by the congressional Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, entitled "U.S. Aid to El Salvador," February 1985.

7. *Christian Science Monitor*, March 26, 1984.

"burned to the ground . . . by incendiary bombs."⁸

While these atrocities were taking place, candidate Duarte was singing the praises of the military on the presidential campaign trail. The election of 1984 resembled the 1982 affair in that it was sponsored and staged by the Reagan administration and restricted to pro-army candidates. It differed from the 1982 contest in that the White House invested heavily (\$2 million, disbursed by the CIA) in a particular outcome: the defeat of D'Aubuisson. Though he, like the administration, favored a military solution to the civil war, a D'Aubuisson victory would deprive the armed forces of the means to pursue it. His well-deserved reputation as an ultra-rightist gangster would lead Congress to block all but a trickle of military aid. On the other hand, a victory for Duarte—ostensibly the "peace" candidate—would loosen congressional purse strings. Gullible liberals could be counted on to vote for aid so that Duarte could "seek peace" from a position of strength. The \$2 million did the trick: Duarte defeated D'Aubuisson in a runoff election in

8. *Ibid.*, April 27, 1984.

May.

Within days of his triumph, Duarte was in Washington performing the function of the Salvadoran head of state. He insisted that no "degrading" human-rights strings be attached to military aid and pledged—with a straight face—to abide by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Among its principles are the right to live, freedom of expression and assembly, and a prohibition on torture, arbitrary arrest, and detention. No one pointed out that Duarte had made no effort to uphold these principles as junta president, and that even if he had undergone a change of heart in the intervening years, it was beyond his power to enforce military compliance with the Declaration. He got the guns, without strings.

More "Abuses of Authority"

On July 23, 1984, Americas Watch charged⁹ that "indiscriminate attacks on civilians by El Salvador's armed forces are continuing at a high level. . . . 1,331 noncombatants had

9. As paraphrased by the Associated Press.

Duarte and the U.S. Churchwomen

On December 2, 1980, Sisters Ita Ford, Maura Clarke, and Dorothy Kazel and lay worker Jean Donovan were raped and murdered by five low-ranking soldiers of the Salvadoran National Guard (henceforth, the "Lowly Five"). In May 1984, some three and a half years later, the Lowly Five were tried and convicted of murder.

In an interview conducted in July 1984 and published in the November 1984 *Playboy*, Duarte described the trial as "an expression of the moral conviction of the government that arrested and indicted the guardsmen. And that was my doing, because I was president of the junta at that time and the entire junta, together with the military high command, turned the prisoners over to the judge. . . ." He denied that the current defense minister, Gen. Eugenio Vides Casanova, had initially covered up the crime and blocked the investigation in 1980-81 in his capacity as director of the National Guard. As Duarte explained on *Meet the Press*, May 20, 1984, "The investigation was made by me personally. So if there was any cover-up, I did it, but I investigated the whole thing. . . . I don't believe there was any cover-up on that."

While Duarte has *publicly* maintained throughout that the Lowly Five acted on their own—they "are the only and the true guilty ones"—in private he has indicated otherwise, at least on one occasion. According to the June 1, 1984, *Los Angeles Times*, at a private meeting with a group of congresspersons and congressional staffers in Washington on May 22, 1984, Duarte said that "evidence suggests that Col. Oscar Edgardo Casanova," the defense minister's cousin, "may have ordered the slayings." (The quote is Rep. Mary Rose Oakar's (Dem.-Ohio) recollection of Duarte's remark. Two others at the meeting confirmed her account.)

The same article notes that Col. Sigifredo Ochoa, the Warlord of Chalatenango, "is reported to have told Senate

aides that he believes Vides Casanova's cousin ordered the murders and Vides Casanova attempted to cover up the guard's involvement in the crime to protect his cousin." (Both Casanovas categorically deny the allegations.)

The private remarks of Duarte and Ochoa contradict Duarte's public remarks and substantiate the elements of the account of the crime and cover-up offered by Roberto Santivañez, the former intelligence chief in El Salvador who defected in 1984. At the time of the crime, Santivañez was serving as an adviser on intelligence matters to the high command.

On December 3, 1980, the night after the crime, Santivañez insists that the entire military hierarchy knew that Lt. Col. Casanova had ordered the murder of the churchwomen. Santivañez himself learned of Casanova's responsibility that evening from a high-ranking army officer. Fearful that this vicious act would result in a cutoff of U.S. aid, Santivañez met with the army chief of staff the next day and urged that Casanova be charged "for the good of the country." As the days passed, Santivañez realized that the "highest echelons of the junta and the high command were involved in the decision to protect the guilty man and cover up all traces of the murderers' activities on Dec. 2." He implicated by name Duarte and Vides Casanova in the cover-up (see Ana Carrigan, *Salvador Witness* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 310-317).

Duarte's claim that there was no cover-up is definitively disproved by Judge Harold Tyler. In the spring of 1983, President Reagan, under pressure from the Senate, appointed Tyler to conduct "an independent and high-level review of all evidence available pertaining to the churchwomen's case." Tyler's report of December 2, 1983, while shedding little light on Edgardo Casanova's guilt or innocence, nevertheless demonstrates that:

(1) The Lowly Five confessed their guilt to fellow

been killed in the first six months of 1984, mainly from air attacks." Duarte denied it. The next day he boldly declared that he would not "accept a single case of *abuse of authority* wherever it comes. If I find anybody guilty of this, he'll go to prison or I'll go away from the presidency."¹⁰

But the crimes Americas Watch described were committed by the army and air force, ordered by officers in good standing, and condoned by the high command. No one was "abusing authority" in these operations. "Abuses of authority" were not the cause of the army massacre of 68 civilians in Los Llanitos, Cabañas, carried out only days before Duarte's bold declaration (and carefully documented by Tutela Legal, the human rights office of the San Salvador archdiocese, and several U.S. journalists). Nor does it seem the August 1984 army massacre of dozens of peasants at the Gualsinga River in Chalatenango should be attributed to "abuses of authority." Unable to explain away the massacres with his favorite excuse, Duarte did the next best thing. He denied they ever took place.

10. *New York Times*, July 25, 1984; emphasis added.

In September 1984, Duarte finally admitted that aerial bombing had resulted in civilian deaths and issued guidelines to the air force for the stated purpose of minimizing noncombatant casualties. Predictably, he absolved the air force of responsibility for the deaths. "The terrorists are using the masses as shields and they are using the masses to provoke, exposing the people to be killed," Duarte said. "This is horrible. This is inhuman. But this is not my problem. It's the problem of the subversive terrorist actions and they have to be held responsible."¹¹ No respectable observer was describing the 1984 air war in such terms. As for Duarte's guidelines, the air force has continued to violate them and Duarte has pretended that it has not.

The Peacemaker

Duarte the peacemaker was on display at La Palma in October 1984. His out-of-the-blue offer to talk peace with the guerrillas (who had been waiting patiently at the negotiating

11. *New York Times*, September 13, 1984.

Guardsmen repeatedly in the days following the murder.

(2) The Salvadoran authorities' response was to commission "two investigations, one public and one private, both with apparently the same objective: to create a written record absolving the Salvadoran security forces of responsibility for the murders."

(3) Vides Casanova appointed Major Lizandro Zepeda to conduct the private "investigation," and Zepeda reported directly to him. Yet when Tyler and his associates interviewed Vides Casanova, he was "evasive" and "professed a disturbing lack of knowledge of Zepeda's investigation."

At this early stage, December 1980 to May 1981, the Salvadoran government refused to admit the guilt even of the Lowly Five, let alone the officer who allegedly gave the orders. On December 27, 1980, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, in a secret cable to the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador, assessed Duarte's performance to date: "We do not see him active in pressuring investigation." Ambassador Robert White told Congress in April 1981 that, in the month of December, "there was no serious investigation into the death of the nuns, and as far as I am concerned there never has been and I know of no evidence to say that the situation has changed" (Carrigan, p. 286).

This phase of the cover-up collapsed in May 1981, after the U.S. Embassy confronted Duarte and Defense Minister García with evidence of the guilt of the triggermen and demanded their arrest. They were promptly arrested. (At this point they were the Lowly Six. The sixth Guardsman was subsequently found to have participated only in the abduction of the women, and was released.)

In September 1981, Congress conditioned further military aid on a good-faith effort by the Salvadoreans to prosecute the case, to be certified by President Reagan every six months. On January 26, 1982, two days before Reagan was required to certify, García announced that the Lowly Six would stand trial "within a few days."

The Salvadoreans stonewalled for the next 20 months, forcing Reagan to lie to Congress at certification time in order to keep the arms flowing to the state terrorists (always the primary concern of the White House). Then, in

November 1983, Congress made the Salvadoran army an offer it couldn't refuse: \$19 million for a resolution of the case. The Lowly Five were tried on May 23, 1984, and the jury handed in a verdict of guilty of murder the very next day.

For \$19 million, senior army officers were willing to sacrifice the freedom of five enlisted men. The question of how huge a sum would have been required for them to permit the prosecution of a fellow officer—something unheard of in El Salvador—did not come up. They made sure of that.

According to former Ambassador White, two Guardsmen who *were* in a position to link a commanding officer to the crime had been executed by military death squads prior to the congressional offer of November 1983. And the *New York Times* (May 6, 1985) reported the allegations of a Salvadoran lawyer on the steps the military took to secure an obedient legal defense team for the Lowly Five.

In December 1982, during the stonewalling phase, three attorneys were assigned to the Lowly Five. Salvador Antonio Ibarra was joined by two lawyers who made little effort to hide their links to the high command. They pressed Ibarra not to contradict a statement that "the possibility of a cover-up had been thoroughly investigated" and rejected a statement he regarded as "an outright lie." The common-law wife of one of the Lowly Five told Ibarra that her husband and the other defendants had told her that they were merely "carrying out orders from above" on that fateful night.

Ibarra refused to cooperate in a cover-up, and for this he was abducted on October 30, 1983, and tortured at National Guard headquarters. Only the intercession of the International Red Cross and the U.S. Embassy secured his release. (He fled to the U.S. and currently resides in Texas. He has applied for political asylum.) At the trial of the Lowly Five, the legal defense chose not to argue that their clients had merely been "carrying out orders from above."

Considering all the information recorded above, including Duarte's private remarks, one must take with a grain of salt his public denial of a cover-up and insistence that the Lowly Five are "the only and the true guilty ones." ●

Credit: Associated Press



Duarte shakes hands with Roberto D'Aubuisson during a reception in the presidential palace. Looking on is Assemblyman Hugo Barrera.

table for three years) was quickly endorsed by the army and the Reagan administration, neither of which was (or is) known to favor a political resolution of the conflict. Why would advocates of outright military victory support a peace process? Because Duarte's negotiating position, from which he never budged, called on the guerrillas to lay down their arms and compete for power through the "democratic process," under the watchful eye of the armed forces—that is, to surrender.

La Palma was a smashing success. Duarte's fraudulent gesture was interpreted in the U.S. as a good-faith attempt to settle the civil war. Congress was so impressed that there hasn't been any serious opposition to military aid since La Palma. Hawks naturally have continued to vote for aid, while a flock of dim-witted doves have switched their vote to "yes" on the assumption that "peace" is just around the corner and therefore it is not the time to weaken the bargaining position of El Salvador's saviour. The doves' reward? For 19 months the army of El Salvador would not allow its "commander-in-chief" to return to the negotiating table. Not until June 1986 did the army relent, granting Duarte permission again to seek the unconditional surrender of the guerrillas in talks set for late July or August. Meaningful negotiations, however, will remain a dead letter so long as Congress provides the army with what it considers the means to pursue total victory.

The *Contras*' Friend

Duarte has served well the Reagan agenda for Nicaragua, heaping scorn on the Sandinistas and endorsing aid to the *contras*, whose depravity rivals the Salvadoran army's.

Duarte has supported *contra* aid on the theory that it helps interdict the infamous "massive" flow of arms, via land, air, and sea, from Nicaragua—a theory that coincides with two early Reaganite disinformation themes: Nicaragua is flooding El Salvador with arms; the purpose of *contra* aid is to interdict these arms. In an interview published in the November 1984 *Playboy*, Duarte was asked if he had proof of Nicaraguan gun-running. His reply:

Look, it doesn't matter what I say or what proof I give you, you are always going to say it's not sufficient evidence. . . . The entire world does not want to accept any evidence that is offered by El Salvador and the U.S. In contrast, it accepts any evidence, even verbal evidence, that the Sandinista government offers as proof of U.S. interference. Let the Sandinistas make any declaration about U.S. intervention and

they have instant credibility. . . . Here in *Playboy*, you are not going to publish "Duarte makes important declaration about Nicaraguan intervention." No, instead, you will say, "Duarte alleges some possibility without proof of any kind." That's how the image of our country is distorted.

Though Duarte knows that the goal of Reagan and his *contras* is to oust the Sandinistas, and though he's repeatedly endorsed aid to the *contras*, he refuses to state publicly that he supports the violent overthrow of the Nicaraguan government. Setting aside the evident hypocrisy and duplicity, Duarte's reasoning, as reported in the *New York Times* (March 23, 1986), is that such a public posture would deprive him of the moral high ground when denouncing Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran FMLN.

Duarte's position ascribes a symmetry to the two conflicts that is not apparent. In Nicaragua, a popular government is under assault from a terrorist force totally dependent on foreign aid and bases and led by the remnants of a despised, 46-year dictatorship. In El Salvador, an indigenous resistance movement faces a U.S.-sponsored killing machine—the armed forces—that is wholly responsible for the civil war, having for 50 years blocked every attempt by the people to bring about change through peaceful, democratic means. Given this background, Nicaragua need not be ashamed of the moral support it provides the Salvadoran rebels.

Duarte's position is doubly duplicitous, for his government is in fact actively engaged in the U.S. effort to overthrow the Sandinistas. In June 1985, for example, a "DC-3 cargo plane . . . filled with guns and ammunition" flew from Miami to the Ilopango military airport in El Salvador, from where a smaller plane "ferried the weapons to rebel camps in Costa Rica." And since October 1985, U.S. aid to the *contras* has been channeled through El Salvador, with the approval of its air forces, "in an effort to make up for a recent cutoff of supplies by Honduras."¹²

Duarte has been a good soldier in Reagan's propaganda war against Nicaragua. On June 1, 1985, he described Nicaragua as "the cancer from which Central America is suffering." In an address to the National Press Club in Washington, October 31, 1985, he said the "terrorist dictatorship" in Nicaragua is "the Central American source for totalitarianism and violence, and is the sanctuary for terrorists."

Duarte picked up on the favorite theme of the propaganda war—censorship of the press—in a May 16, 1985, appearance at the White House to drum up support for "humanitarian" aid to the *contras*. Contrasting El Salvador's successful revolution with the "betrayed" revolution of Nicaragua, Duarte declared: "Our press is free to say and publish what it wants. *La Prensa* in Nicaragua is censored every day down to a few lines."

Duarte exaggerated the degree to which the pro-*contra* scandal sheet is censored. Worse, he failed to note that the Salvadoran military is "free" to destroy any newspaper that criticizes it. The army did just that to the last of the opposition papers, *El Independiente*, in 1981, eliciting not a peep of protest from Duarte. The press that remains either supports the government or criticizes it from the right. These papers do not print stories "critical of the government from a human rights standpoint," reports Americas Watch (September 1985). "Freedom of the press" is hardly the issue around which a Salvadoran president should try to rally support for the killer *contras*.

12. *New York Times*, February 13, 1986.

Further Statistics

Last year saw a statistical improvement in the human rights record of the Salvadoran armed forces, though the statistics probably would not be much consolation to the families of the year's civilian victims. In 1983, government killings of civilians outpaced guerrilla killings of civilians by 85 to one. In 1985, the ratio stood at about 14 to one, with government forces killing "only" four or five noncombatants per day. The army and security forces continued to practice torture in this period, but not on the mass scale of earlier years.

Duarte rewarded the groups that documented these reduced human rights abuses by challenging their competence and integrity. For daring to report on the persisting air war on the civilian population in conflictive and guerrilla-controlled zones, the staff of Tutela Legal was called "unreliable" and accused of "permanently working under the direction of (those) trying to help the subversive groups."¹³ When Amnesty International and Americas Watch documented army and air force attacks on

defenseless civilians, Duarte shot back that they had been duped by guerrilla propaganda.¹⁴

Conclusion

Duarte: the man and the myth. A look at the record reveals that the myth is a dedicated defender of human rights, the man an apologist for human rights abusers and an abuser of human rights defenders. The myth is said to have taken control of the armed forces, but the man apparently can't say boo without the permission of the high command. The myth seeks peace and reconciliation, while the man seeks substantial unconditional aid for those committed to a military solution.

Genuine congressional critics of the Reagan administration's militaristic aims in Central America, who have nevertheless voted for aid in response to an emotional appeal from Duarte the myth, would be well advised to take a closer look at Duarte the man. ●

13. *Dallas Morning News*, March 30, 1985.

14. *Pacific News*, May 22, 1985.

Film Review

Oliver Stone's "Salvador"

Reviewed by Allan Frankovich*

Salvador, Hemdale Film Corp.; produced by Gerald Green and Oliver Stone; directed by Oliver Stone; written by Oliver Stone and Richard Boyle; color, 122 minutes.

Oliver Stone's "Salvador" is the finest dramatic film to have come out of the Central American conflict. It has the hard edges of historic truth and does not skitter away—as a Costa Gavras film might have—from the simple important fact: The death squads in El Salvador have been the necessary policy instruments of our freedom-loving, duly-elected government.

Today El Salvador is a "free" country because of the death squads, and our President is popular because he has lost nothing to Communism—and only part of his gut to cancer. If the Duarte government could neutralize the guerrillas who have armed themselves rather than accept particularly brutal deaths, we might expect to see "Shoah" at a local San Salvador art house. "Shoah" is about history, we are told; but "Salvador" is about refuse disposal, how live humans go from the local army barracks to the garbage dump as the American Embassy has the American press over for cocktails.

Oliver Stone and writer Richard Boyle have telescoped the terrible events of 1980 and 1981 into their script: the death squads, the 2,000 bodies a month, the murders of Archbishop Oscar Romero and four American innocents abroad—missionaries serving their savior. The story is framed in the adrenaline rushes of two palookas—James Woods as an autobiographical Richard Boyle, a down-and-out freelancer giving himself a last chance charge at the big S, doing it his way,

without the brief and a pal he shanghai, Doctor Rock, played by Jim Belushi, a disc jockey weaned on Janis Joplin, cheap thrills, sex, hooch, and uppers and downers.

The film has the feel of Central America—the drunks weaving across the roads, the pot holes, puddles, open sewers, cantinas, bargain whore houses, open air eateries, and burned-out car hulks. Boyle has some leftovers in Salvador, a local woman he loved during a past trip and a photographer friend. When he meets the woman again, he loves her without the patronizing condescension for the "poor, beautiful, how-they-enrich-us" Latins so characteristic of gringo corporate, religious, or political do-gooders. He wants this woman and he gets her, with her kids, mom, brothers, and first and second cousins.

Floating over the local dust, the cheap liquor and sweaty carnality, there is the official American presence—the Embassy, press, and military advisory group crowd gathering around a swank hotel swimming pool to hear the 1980 Reagan-Carter election results. The CIA's man Tom comes across as a nice guy. They usually are. This nice guy is Robert Redford handsome, smooth talking, and reasonable.

Except for a few false inflections and some dramatic hyperbole, especially in the casting and direction of the latino bad guys, there is a proliferation of fine characterizations, thinly disguised versions of the real figures of Roberto D'Aubuisson, Archbishop Romero, and U.S. Ambassador Robert White. The pace is quick.

Boyle sees himself as a weasel. He has the quick turn of the head, but not the successful furtiveness of a real weasel. He does get into the chicken coop, but usually to find the door slammed shut behind him. He cuts deals, the kind of small betrayals freelancers must often make to survive. He'll give the CIA and the military attaché a first look at photographs he takes of guerrillas, their arms and camps, in return for an identity card for his lover. A *cedula* means life or death in El Salvador. When the Embassy refuses to accept the photographic evidence that the guerrillas' arms are captured American weapons, not Soviet-bloc imports, Boyle delivers in response the one speech in the film, and it is in character.

As Boyle boils over, we accept his claim to be as American

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as the Embassy flacks because he is making his speech from the gutter, not a soap box. And there is some real love in that gutter. What he says about the origin of the death squads, United States complicity, and the American training received by the Roberto D'Aubuisson look-alike, Major Max, as the movie's head of death squads is absolutely accurate. D'Aubuisson was trained by the CIA at Georgetown, and in American bases in Panama. This simple and key fact is something the big media will never tell us unequivocally.

Boyle's betrayal of the guerrillas who trusted him is an insignificant breach of journalistic ethics compared to the sleazy deals regular television correspondents make. In 1980-81, you could have seen them in the Camino Real or Sheraton hotels, bored out of their minds, making the nightly run to the brothel, snorting coke, going off in rat packs to feed off the bodies or shoot the bang-bang, then returning to do gutless stand-ups with Salvador behind them, as if a country were just a billboard. Boyle doesn't like a perfectly cast network Barbie Doll reporter. He believes she really sucked her way up the corporate ladder. We watch her on assignment, lying and talking around the truth.

Boyle's other friend, a photographer modeled after John Hoagland, killed under fire, is an avatar out of another myth: two eyes on the prowl for the perfect shot. John Savage plays the character with proper perspiring obsession. He pays for

his big picture with a rattle in the throat as he dies while covering a guerrilla offensive. Boyle sucks the blood out after giving his friend an emergency tracheotomy. As he holds his dying buddy in his arms, taking the blood- and dust-soaked rolls of film, you know Stone and Boyle have seen combat deaths.

"Salvador" also preserves small details and ambiguities—as in the American Ambassador, modeled on real envoy Robert White. Our emissary cuts off military aid after the four American missionaries are raped and murdered, only to restore it after a pouty little speech when the guerrillas strike in force. More death is preferable to losing Salvador. American arrogance comes in two doses, liberal and conservative. Both are lethal.

Boyle and his woman friend do finally get through the countries between El Salvador and the U.S. At the border he comes home. She and the kids are hauled out of the land of the free and the home of the brave by the Border Patrol, wearing uniforms most Americans only see on their suburban garbage men. The film has already told us enough. We don't have to be told now how they treat Central Americans in detention centers along our glorious frontiers. Boyle reacts to the Border Patrol as if they were death squads, and the response is authentic, for both are instruments of the same policy. It appears that our shores now welcome only worn-out dictators and idle murderers. ●

(Continued from page 52.)

were the various opposition parties in Nicaragua, as we shall see.

Access to the Ballot

A variety of parties may compete in an election but if they are denied roughly equal conditions of competition or access to the ballot or shoved to the edge of the political arena, it cannot be said that democratic competition exists. In the U.S. all fifty states have laws, written and enforced by Republican and Democratic officials, regulating party access to the ballot—often in ways restrictive enough to keep smaller parties from participating, thus depriving the electorate of the freedom to choose someone other than a Democrat or a Republican. Minor parties are often required to gather a large number of signatures on nominating petitions in a limited time. Thus in Pennsylvania third-party state-wide candidates must collect 36,000 signatures in a three-week period; in Maryland candidates are required to collect over 55,000 signatures in a short time. Sometimes a 5 percent requirement for signatures has been interpreted to mean 5 percent of voters from every district within the state—an impossible task for a third party whose base might be confined to a few urban areas.

In some states voters who are registered with the major parties are not allowed to sign or circulate minor-party nominating petitions. Petitions are sometimes thrown out by hostile officials on trivial and sometimes unlawful technicalities (as happened to the Communist Party in Illinois and Connecticut in recent elections) compelling minor parties to pursue expensive court battles that further strain their financial resources.

In some states minor parties must pay exorbitant filing fees: \$5,000 in Louisiana for an independent candidate. To get on the ballot in all 50 states, a third party would have to expend an estimated \$750,000 in filing fees and other expenses and collect 1.2 million signatures, a feat accomplished in 1984 by no third party. And the trend is toward less and less ballot access:

in the last 12 years, sixteen states have tightened the restrictions. Between 1980 and 1984, for example, the states of Indiana and North Dakota quadrupled the number of signatures required to get on the ballot.

In Nicaragua, in striking contrast, the electoral law favors the smaller political parties. In 1984 any party could register to field candidates by merely presenting a national directorate and two representatives from each of the country's nine regions. One of the parties that so registered, the Independent Liberal Party (PLI) asked to withdraw from the contest four days before election day. The Electoral Council ruled that it was too late for a party to pull out but that individual candidates could withdraw their names if they chose. None did so.

Accessibility to the Electorate

Being on the ballot does little good if the bulk of the voters have never heard of you or never hear *from* you. Third parties in the United States are given almost no national media coverage during campaigns. News media focus exclusively on the two major parties, failing even to report the votes that third parties get on election day (usually between one and two million all together), thus treating the minor parties as if they do not exist. Lacking the huge sums available to the major parties, especially the Republicans, the smaller parties are unable to buy major media time and space of their own. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 finances the major parties, giving each tens of millions of dollars for their presidential campaigns, but the smaller parties can obtain federal funds only after they glean 5 percent of the national vote (about 4 million votes for any one party) In sum, they cannot get the money until they get the 5 percent, but they cannot get the 5 percent until they get the money.

In contrast, the Nicaraguan electoral law provided public financing of 9 million cordobas (\$321,000) for each participating party *regardless of size* and guaranteed an equal amount of time each day on the state-run radio stations and television channels. Each party was also permitted to receive unlimited

funds from private donors, including people and organizations outside Nicaragua, a provision that worked to the advantage of the centrist and rightist parties. As the campaign got under way, complaints from the participating parties led to changes in the electoral law, including an increase in radio and television time, an additional 3 million cordobas in government campaign funds for each party, and a lengthening of the campaign period. Parties were also guaranteed access to products in short supply in Nicaragua: paper, printing facilities, transportation and gasoline. The various parties also produced their own party newspapers, together with leaflets and billboards.

Absence of Coercion

Instances of coercion and harassment of candidates have not been an unusual occurrence in U.S. elections. In the United States third-party candidates especially those of a pronouncedly leftist hue have run into difficulties of this sort. Harassment may not be confined to the candidates themselves but may include their supporters and canvassers. In 1972 in Vermont, persons who merely signed Communist Party ballot petitions found their names publicized by town clerks in an effort to embarrass them into withdrawing their signatures. Generally though, in modern times American elections have not been marked by violence nor by any serious degree of threat against candidates. The coercions are largely of the legal kind noted earlier which work well enough against third parties. In regard to individual voters, however, it should be noted that not every American citizen has the right to an uncoerced vote, as testified by the continuing need for a Civil Rights Voting Act, the renewal of which President Reagan opposed.

Turning to Nicaragua, we find there were serious acts of violence and murder in the 1984 election—all committed by the forces supported by the Reagan administration. The *contras* killed the presidents of two polling stations and two volunteer workers involved in registration. In the Jinotega mountains, one polling station worker's throat was cut by the *contras* in front of his wife and family. On election day a member of the electoral police was shot to death by *contras* in La Tronca. In all, twelve election workers lost their lives in assaults by counterrevolutionaries.

The election was less than flawless in its procedures, but the overall performance was one that the Nicaraguan democracy can be proud of. There was free and open campaigning in every area of the country except in some war zones. According to estimates by the Supreme Electoral Council, there were some 250 public rallies. In general the election was characterized by untrammelled and vigorous political debate. If the FSLN was instituting a totalitarian regime, it was going about it in the wrong way.

About five of the public rallies were marred by incidents of violence, but no serious injuries were reported. During the first months of the campaign a number of parties also reported that their campaign workers had been harassed by members of the FSLN, or that their posters had been destroyed. The Sandinista leadership denounced these incidents and they seemed to diminish thereafter. In addition, several rallies held by the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating Committee (CDN), a coalition of conservative business-oriented parties that abstained from the election, were disrupted by fights between CDN supporters and Sandinista counterdemonstrators. These rallies were technically illegal since the CDN had refused to participate in the election and indeed spent its time during the campaign attacking the electoral system itself. Once the CDN de-

cided to conduct what seemed like a sabotage of the electoral effort (in the eyes of FSLN supporters), clashes with counterdemonstrators were difficult to avoid.

Because of these incidents, Arturo Cruz claimed that he was attacked by "mobs" and that free electoral competition did not exist. It should be recalled that the country is at war and that Cruz openly identified with the enemy and was not at any time functioning as a legal or serious candidate. When Cruz, a banker in Washington, arrived in Managua five months before the election, the CDN suddenly announced he would be their unified presidential candidate. Without officially registering as a candidate, Cruz toured the country for several days, drawing small crowds. As suddenly as he arrived, he left, announcing he would not run under the prevailing electoral conditions. Throughout this period the U.S. media and the U.S. government described him as the "major opposition candidate" and treated his nonparticipation as evidence that the election was an unfair and meaningless exercise. In conflict with this view is the one expressed in the report, cited herein, by U.S. citizens in Nicaragua:

In general, our perception of the electoral campaign period is that the harassment and fistfights were scattered incidents that did not affect the generally free atmosphere of the electoral process. We found our neighbors and co-workers unafraid to voice their opinions, and heard and read virulent criticism of the FSLN. We know of no pressure on Nicaraguans to vote for the Sandinista Front. In particular, we found no truth in the charge made by *La Prensa* that the cards which entitle families to receive subsidized food allotments were controlled in a concerted effort to influence Nicaraguans' votes. We conclude that the electoral campaign provided Nicaraguans with abundant information on which to base a free decision about their vote.

A similar conclusion was reached by the 460 official observers from all over the world who were free to check out all aspects of the voting process and ballot counting. None of the seven participating parties filed any charges of fraud.

System of Representation

The FSLN won 64.9% of the vote, a victory that was only a few percentage points higher than the one enjoyed by Ronald Reagan in 1984. The two runner-up parties, both center-rightist, won 13% and 9% respectively. The National Assembly seats were allocated according to proportional representation so that minority parties were assured of 35 of the 96 seats (including six seats that under the electoral law are allotted to the losing presidential candidates of each party). All this was dismissed by Reagan as "an electoral farce without any meaningful political opposition."

In contrast, the single-member-district electoral system used in the United States is much less representative and therefore less democratic. The party that polls a plurality of the vote, be it 40, 50 or 60 percent, wins 100 percent of a district's representation, while smaller parties, regardless of their vote, receive zero representation. Proportional representation provides a party with legislative seats roughly in accordance with the percentage of votes it wins, thus assuring minor parties of some parliamentary presence. But the single-member, winner-take-all system magnifies the strength of the major parties and leaves the minor parties with a percentage of seats (if any) that is far lower than its percentage of votes. The winner-take-all system deprives third parties not only of representation but eventually of voters too, since not many citizens wish to

"waste" their ballots on a party that seems incapable of establishing a legislative presence.

Minorities

There are other criteria by which the American and Nicaraguan democracies might be compared. For instance, there is the treatment of minorities. Much is made of the Sandinistas' forced relocation of Miskito Indians during a time of serious border attack, a policy that quickly proved not only wrong but in some instances wrongful. Today Managua is now trying to undo its previous policy and resettle the Miskito on their lands, an approach that compares favorably with the U.S. treatment of Native American Indians, to say the least, and with the forced relocation of the Japanese into concentration camps during World War II, uprooting them from California communities that—unlike Nicaragua—were never threatened by enemy invasion. Nor did the U.S. government ever compensate the Japanese for the losses they sustained in the way of homes, businesses and farms.

Political Dissent

There is the more general question of freedom of communication for dissenting ideas. *La Prensa* is not the only opposition voice in Nicaragua. About half of the radio and television stations in the country are privately owned and most of these give the government a daily ideological pounding that makes National Public Radio look like the tepid establishment mouthpiece it is. The various political parties also produced their own newspapers during the campaign. There is a war going on in Nicaragua. The country is encircled by hostile forces, has endured invasions on both of its borders and has suffered much loss of life and destruction of property, yet the censorship imposed is no worse and probably less restrictive than what the U.S. government imposed during World War II, and Managua's treatment of dissenters and collaborators has been far more tolerant and liberal than the treatment accorded Tory sympathizers during and immediately after the American revolution or dissenters who received long prison terms during World War I.

In the United States, dissenting views that go beyond the mainstream, or even much left of center, are rarely allowed time or space in the major media, but are consigned to small-circulation magazines that teeter on the edge of insolvency. In short, there is a greater plurality of ideas, ideologies, and debate in Nicaragua than in the United States. On this score Nicaragua is a more open, more pluralistic society. It may not always remain so however. Subject to enough threat and siege, assault and murder, the Nicaraguans will start tightening up, choosing security over dissent, survival over pluralism. Indeed, it is miraculous that they haven't already done so. The signs are there; President Daniel Ortega has said: "In the hardest moments we have to convert the defeats into more ideological unity, more political unity ... [and] more organization." (*Miami Herald*, August 4, 1985).

If the U.S. government were really interested in encouraging pluralistic dissent in Nicaragua, it would pursue a policy quite the opposite of the one now in the saddle, offering Managua friendship and support and the hope for peaceful independence and security. Democracy is a delicate flower that does not do well when repeatedly stomped upon.

Religious Freedom

The Reagan administration has charged that there is reli-

gious persecution in Nicaragua. But the Catholic church is alive and well. Elements of its clergy and laity can be found playing prominent roles on both sides within Nicaragua, struggling hard to build—or destroy—the revolution. Religious practice is not interfered with. The Rev. Miguel Gray, a Nicaraguan Baptist minister, hailed the religious freedom enjoyed in that country and pointed to the building of 19 additional churches since 1979—in a desperately poor country where not too many buildings of any kind are going up.

The level of religious tolerance in the United States today is as good as might be found anywhere. But in recent years the disturbing intolerance manifested by such groups as the Moral Majority, and the President's open association with the religious Right, including his announcement that "ours is a Christian nation," might cause us to give more attention to the question of religious tolerance here at home.

Human Needs

If democracy means more than a set of procedures but implies something about the substantive conditions of life, then here too poor Nicaragua looks better than rich America in the era of Ronald Reagan. Decades of colonialism, Somocista pillaging, earthquake, revolution and counterrevolution, have left Nicaragua with a legacy of extreme poverty, yet the very worst is not happening to the poor citizens of that country as it is to the poor on the streets in Washington D.C.; no one is starving and no one has been tossed aside like so much human refuse.

International Behavior

Finally, in comparing Nicaragua with the United States, we might consider the degree to which each country is interfering with the political development and security of the other. As Reagan himself aptly put it: "Democracies do not spend a lot of money on arms, build large armies or invade or destabilize their neighbors." With typical Orwellian inversion he was aiming this remark at Nicaragua but it applies most perfectly to his own administration, which spends more money on arms and more time destabilizing and invading neighbors than we could ever imagine Nicaragua doing. The truth is also inverted when Reagan calls the Sandinistas "terrorists." To be sure, there is plenty of terrorism going on in Nicaragua and plenty being exported to other countries in Central America, but it is conducted by *contra* mercenaries and Honduran, Guatemalan, and Salvadoran death squads and military, all financed and advised by the U.S.

Those "democratic socialist" critics on the left, who give qualified and skittish support to Nicaragua, who are quick to point out how they have "problems" with some of the things the Sandinistas are doing, who impose flawless democratic standards upon a tiny country that is under mortal siege from the Yankee Colossus, those critics might want to consider the realities of the situation. It is the United States which should be the object of their professedly democratic concerns; it is the U.S. which falls so dismally short of practicing the democratic pluralism it preaches to others, exporting violence and terrorism, and pummeling a smaller neighbor that is trying to develop a democratic society of its own.

If one criterion of democracy is that a country not act like a thug and aggressor in its dealings with another country—even to the point of refusing to show up in (world) court to defend itself when so charged—then the United States under Reagan comes off looking far less fair, less open, and less democratic than Nicaragua. ●

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Is Nicaragua More Democratic Than the United States?

By Michael Parenti*

To justify the policies of attack, encirclement, embargo, and destabilization directed against Nicaragua, the Reagan administration has charged that the Sandinista government is on the road to totalitarianism, that it denies religious and political freedom and is a threat to the security of its neighbors. The goal of U.S. policy, claims President Reagan, is to bring about a pluralistic open society in Nicaragua, a goal that never loomed very large during the fifty years of the Somoza dictatorship. More recently in a book on the Nicaraguan revolution, journalist Shirley Christian echoed this line, arguing that the *contra* war was a justifiable attempt "to force the Sandinista Front into accepting major structural changes toward an open political society."

In response to this position, supporters of the Sandinista revolution have argued that Nicaragua does have a pluralistic society, is attempting to make a better life for its people, has no aggressive designs upon its neighbors, and instead is itself being invaded along two of its borders. Others have shown that by every standard, Nicaragua's elections have been more open and democratic than El Salvador's and its society more humane than most others in Latin America.

Indeed it can be further argued that by every standard Nicaragua is a more democratic society than the one waging aggression against it—and I do not mean Honduras. By every major democratic criterion, Nicaragua comes off looking better than the United States. Let us begin with a comparison of the national elections held in November 1984 in both the United States and Nicaragua.¹

Popular Participation

One crucial measure of an open political system is the degree of popular participation. Most voting studies in the United

States and elsewhere find that nonvoters show a high degree of alienation from the political process; they believe voting is not a means of effecting changes, and they often fail to see a meaningful choice in the candidates presented to them. (This is the view also of a surprisingly large number of persons who *do* vote in the United States.) Therefore a comparison of the respective rates of turnouts in the Nicaraguan and U.S. elections might be worth pondering for a moment.

The turnout in the United States in the 1984 election was a little less than 53 percent of the eligible voters, one of the lowest of any western nation. Yet the press took little note of this and instead treated Reagan's reelection as a landslide victory and a democratic mandate. In contrast, voter turnout was nearly 82 percent in Managua and 75.4 percent in Nicaragua as a whole. Yet this turnout was described in the U.S. press as "disappointing" because the Sandinistas had hoped for an 80 percent national turnout. (Left unmentioned was the fact that in Nicaragua the voting was voluntary, unlike most Latin American countries.)

Range of Political Choice

Elections that offer little choice are said to be wanting in democratic standards. The choice in Nicaragua was noticeably wider and more democratic than in the United States. Seven parties ran for seats in the national assembly and for the presidency, representing a broad ideological range: from those on the far left (who damned the FSLN for its moderate policies and for allegedly betraying the workers and peasants) to those on the center and right (who accused the FSLN of exercising a rigid control over the country, wrecking the economy and leading Nicaragua to war). All these charges and countercharges were reported and debated extensively in the public and private press in Nicaragua.

In the United States the choice was limited largely to Democrats and Republicans, who in many races are often hard to tell apart. True, there were a variety of minor parties but these were not accorded the same opportunity for participation as

(Continued on page 48.)

1. Much of the information regarding the 1984 Nicaraguan national election is from "Their Vote Decided," a report by the Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua (CUSCLIN, Managua, Nicaragua).

* Michael Parenti writes and lectures frequently on U.S. domestic and foreign politics. His most recent book is *Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986).

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OLIVERI-MANDALA, E. //GAZZETTA CHIMICA ITALIANA// 00/00/1921,V0051,N----, PP 0138-0141 ALSO PAGES 201-207		000000018245

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OLIYNIK, A. //KRASNAYA ZVEZDA// 20/01/1982,V----,N----, PP 0002 SHORTCOMINGS IN AIRBORNE TROOP TRAINING 5 PP JPRS 80724	#	000000001042
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OLOFSON, SUNE //SVENSKA DAGBLADET//		000000028246

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OLSON, BJORN ANDERS //DAGENS NYHETER// 05/10/1982,V----,N----, PP 0006 INDUSTRY LEADERS SEE PEAK REACHED IN UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 3 PP JPRS 82225	#	000000024817
OLSSON, SUNE //SVENSKA DAGBLADET// 17/05/1982,V----,N----, PP 0006 MAXIMUM SENTENCES SEEN FOR AMPHETANINE SMUGGLERS 3 PP DUO JPRS L/10595	#	000000007401
OLSSON, THORWALD //DAGENS NYHETER// 18/08/1982,V----,N----, PP 0024 SWEDEN'S FOREIGN AID OFFICIAL DEFENDS FUNDS FOR LAOS 3 PP JPRS 81782	#	000000014934

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OREZHIN, V. //VOY.-VOYENNY VESTNIK// 00/02/1982,V----,N0002, PP 0083-0086 PROTECTION FROM INCENDIARY WEAPONS *FSTC-HT-711-82	#	0000000024248
ORFIN, WACLAW //RAZEM// 19/09/1982,V----,N0022, PP 0008-0009 BIELSKO-BIALA POLITICAL FIGURES INTERVIEWED ON YOUTH AFFAIRS 5 PP JPRS 82196	#	0000000024938

ORFIN, WACLAW //RAZEM// 19/09/1982,V----,N0022, PP 0009-0010 STRENGTH MUST BE SOUGHT WITHIN ONE'S SELF 5 PP JPRS 82196	000000024939
ORFIN, WACLAW //RAZEM// 26/09/1982,V----,N0023, PP 0008-0009 KOSZALIN PZPR FIRST SECRETARY INTERVIEWED ON YOUTH 7 PP JPRS 82320	000000027013
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ORLIK, YU. //KOMMUNISTSKAYA PRAVDA// 01/09/1982,V----,N----, PP 0003 MOSCOW PAPER INTERVIEWS PZPR'S HARAZIM 5 PP JPRS 81963	000000020102
ORLIK, YU. //KOMMUNISTSKAYA PRAVDA// 01/09/1982,V----,N----, PP 0003 MOSCOW PAPER INTERVIEWS PZPR'S HARAZIM 5 PP JPRS 81950	000000020338
ORLIK, YU. //KOMMUNISTSKAYA PRAVDA// 20/11/1982,V----,N----, PP 0003 POLISH YOUTHS' EDUCATION, EMIGRATION DISCUSSED 3 PP FBIS-SOV-82-230, 30 NOV 82, VOL 3, NO 230	000000026799
ORLOV, A. //ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE// 00/01/1982,V----,N0001, PP 0069-0075 COMMENTS ON NATO NAVAL EXERCISES IN THE ATLANTIC 9 PP JPRS 81885	000000019076
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ORLOV, A. V. //SAMOLETSTROYENIYE - TEKHNIKA VOZ DUSHNOGO FLOTA // 00/00/1979,V----,N0045, PP 0113-0117 TECHNICAL SERVICING MANAGEMENT AT AN AIR TECHNICAL BASE 8 PP OUO COPYRIGHT INFO REFER OTHERS TO FSTC ARM/FSTC-HT-1487-81	000000024573
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ORLOV, G. V. //SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO// 00/05/1982,V----,N0005, PP 0013-0021 DEFENSE LEGISLATION: STRUCTURE DESCRIBED 11 PP OUO JPRS L/10827	000000018974
ORLOV, I.	000000019530

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<p>ORLOV, I. //MORSKOY FLOT// 00/07/1982,V----,N0007, PP 0010-0012 REGIONAL COORDINATION OF DIFFERENT TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 4 PP JPRS B2079</p>	<p>000000001494</p>
<p>ORLOV, I. G. //DOKLADY AN SSSR, PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY// 00/09/1981,V0260,N0002, PP 0374-0377 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PHOTOCONDUCTANCE OF CHARGE TRANSFER COMPLEXES AND THE ENERGY OF INTERACTION OF THE COMPONENTS AVAIL LY SERIALS CONSULTANTS BUREAU</p>	<p>000000003421</p>
<p>ORLOV, I. N. //ELEC.-ELEKTROTEKHNIЧЕСКИЙ СПРАВОЧНИК (V TREKHTOMAKH)/// 00/00/1981,V----,N----, PP 0021-0034 ALSO PAGES 59-103: 298-373: 560-637 ELECTRICAL MANUAL (SELECTED SECTIONS) 764 PP OUO COPYRIGHT INFO REFER OTHERS TO FTD/STINFO ATR/FTD-ID(RS)T-1769-81</p>	<p>000000003546</p>
<p>ORLOV, L. I. //PRIBORY I SISTEMY UPRAVLENIYA// 00/01/1982,V----,N0001, PP 0014-0017 STANDARDIZING EQUIPMENT USED IN GEOPHYSICAL EXPLORATION 10 PP OUO JPRS L/10553</p>	<p>000000019726</p>
<p>ORLOV, S. N. //DOKLADY AN SSSR, BIOCHEMISTRY// 00/01/1982,V0262,N0002, PP 0482-0485 MECHANISM OF THE ATP-DEPENDENT UPTAKE OF CALCIUM BY PLASMA MEMBRANES AVAIL LY SERIALS CONSULTANTS BUREAU</p>	<p>000000024949</p>
<p>ORLOV, V. N. //IAN SSSR, SERIYA EKONOMICHESKAYA// 00/00/1982,V----,N0004, PP 0031-0037 JUL-AUG 82 PROBLEM OF REDUCING LABOR INTENSIVENESS IN AGRICULTURE 9 PP JPRS B2200</p>	<p>000000016671</p>
<p>ORLOV, V. YE. //FINANSY SSSR// 00/04/1982,V----,N0004, PP 0017-0021 ECONOMIZING ON MATERIAL RESOURCES DISCUSSED 7 PP JPRS B1656</p>	<p>000000006826</p>
<p>ORLOV, YA. //VOPROSY EKONOMIKI//</p>	

00/00/1982,V----,N0001, PP 0125-0137 IMPROVEMENT OF QUALITY, ASSORTMENT IN CONSUMER GOODS STRESSED 13 PP DUO JPRS L/10624	
ORLOV, YA. L. //EKO: EKONOMIKA I ORGANIZATSIYA PROMYSHLENNOGO PROIZVODSTVA// 00/07/1982,V----,N0007, PP 0152-0161 LOW QUALITY, SMALL ASSORTMENT OF CONSUMER GOODS CRITICIZED 6 PP JPRS 82400	000000027543
ORLOV, YU. L. //DOKLADY AN SSSR, EARTH SCIENCE// 00/00/1980,V0250,N0004, PP 0938-0941 PYROPE AND SUBCALCIC OMPHACITE INCLUSIONS IN A POLYCRYSTALLINE DIAMOND AGGREGATE AMERICAN GEOLOGICAL INSTITUTE	000000003221
ORLOV, YU. L. //DOKLADY AN SSSR, EARTH SCIENCE// 00/00/1980,V0252,N0003, PP 0703-0707 SPHEROID DIAMOND CRYSTALS-A NEW TYPE OF FIBROUS NATURAL SINGLE CRYSTALS AVAIL LY SERIALS AMERICAN GEOLOGICAL INSTITUTE	000000012609
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ORLOWSKI, HENRYK //INFORMATYKA// 00/00/1982,V----,N----, PP 0006-0009 NOV-DEC 1982 NUMBERS 11-12 DEVELOPMENTS IN COMPUTER INDUSTRY DESCRIBED 12 PP JPRS 80881	000000001670
ORNAT, ANDRZEJ //NOME DROGI// 00/00/1982,V----,N----, PP 0142-0149 NUMBERS 7-8, JUL-AUG 1982 FORMER SCOUT LEADER DISCUSSES SOCIAL IMPORTANCE OF SCOUTING 10 PP JPRS 81989	000000020688
ORNAT, ANDRZEJ //SZTANDAR MLODYCH// 12/07/1982,V----,N----, PP 0001-0002 SCOUT UNION COMMANDER INTERVIEWED BY 'PAP' 4 PP JPRS 81642	000000016160
OROPESA, JESUS MONTANE	000000008545

<p>//GRANMA// 29/04/1982,V----,N----, PP 0002 MONTANE ADDRESSES INTERNATIONAL THEORY CONFERENCE 11 PP JPRS 81136</p>	#	000000002100
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<p>ORTEGA, FERNANDO //PROCESO// 12/04/1982,V----,N----, PP 0024-0025 ECONOMIC CRISIS DELAYS CONSTRUCTION OF "DOS BOCAS" PORT 3 PP JPRS 80927</p>	#	000000004960
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<p>ORTEGA, PABLO //ALCAZAR// 22/05/1982,V----,N----, PP 0003 PASSIVITY DEPICTED AS NATIONAL VALUES ARE DISCARDED 4 PP JPRS 81115</p>	#	000000002168
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<p>ORTIZ REZA, ALEJANDRO //EXCELSIOR// 04/05/1982,V----,N----, PAGES 1-A, 11-A, 27-A NEW SYSTEM PROVIDES MORE DRINKING WATER FOR CAPITA 3 PP JPRS 81020</p>	#	

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<p>ORTIZ, JAVIER //NOVEDADES// 19/07/1982,V----,N----, PP 0001 ALSO P 12 'FINAL' ELECTION RESULTS FOR CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 4 PP JPRS 81708</p>	000000013981
<p>ORTIZ, RUBEN //CONVICCION// 08/08/1982,V----,N----, PP 0023 LABOR LEADER LORENZO MIGUEL DISCUSSES UNITY EFFORTS 3 PP JPRS 81921</p>	000000019492
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<p>ORYHAL, F. //GLUCKAUF-FORSCHUNGSHEFTE// 00/00/1980,V0041,N0002, PP 0066-0069 INVESTIGATIONS AT THE TECHNICAL CENTRE FOR COKING A CORRELATION OF RESULTS WITH COKING PLANT PRACTICE BISI 21035</p>	000000028490
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<p>ORZECZOWSKI, MARIAN //KOMMUNIST// 24/03/1982,V----,N----, PP 0087-0096 PZPR SECRETARY EXPLAINS PARTY'S ERRORS, TASKS 8 PP OUO ANNEX NO 026 FBIS-SOV-82-090, 10 MAY 82, VOL 3, NO 090</p>	000000000524
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OSADE, YOSHIMORI //KAIGAI SHIJO// 00/04/1982,V----,N----, PP 0054-0058 TRADE FRICTION WITH EC 10 PP DUO JPRS L/10633	000000007629
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OSCHLIES, ROLF //DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV// 00/06/1982,V0015,N0006, PP 0650-0652 BOOKS ON CULTURAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SORE MINORITY REVIEWED 3 PP JPRS 81546	000000014420
OSEKA, JERZY //SZTANDAR MLODYCH// 24/06/1982,V----,N----, PP 0001-0002 MINISTERS CIOSEK, JABLONSKI 4 PP JPRS 81425	000000012460
OSEKA, JERZY //SZTANDAR MLODYCH// 29/06/1982,V----,N----, PP 0001-0002 PZPR KOSZALIN FIRST SECRETARY JAKUBASZEK INTERVIEWED 4 PP JPRS 81690	000000013597
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5 PP JPRS 80997	#	
OSIPENKO, PAVEL YEFIMOVICH //ECON.-EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA// 00/03/1982,V----,N0011, PP 0007 RENOVATION DELAYS AT TAGANROG METALLURGICAL PLANT 5 PP JPRS 80997	#	000000005182
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PUMPING LEVEL 9 PP OUO JPRS L/10835	#	
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OSTAPOV, V. I. //GIDROTEKHNIKA I MELIORATSIYA// 00/02/1982,V----,N0002, PP 0057-0058 ROLE OF SORGHUM CULTIVATION REVIEWED 5 PP DUO JPRS L/10552	000000003632
OSTASZEWSKI, JANUSZ //ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE// 28/03/1982,V----,N0010, PP 0012 "ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE" EDITOR'S COMMENTARY 3 PP JPRS 80972	000000004084
OSTASZEWSKI, JANUSZ //ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE// 25/04/1982,V----,N0014, PP 0005 LONG-RANGE ENERGY POLICY ASSESSED 7 PP JPRS 81005	000000004750
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OSTLUND, BO //SVENSKA DAGBLADET// 20/06/1982,V----,N----, PP 0006 VPK NOW UNDER THRESHOLD FOR RIDSAG SEATS 3 PP JPRS 81357	000000010690
OSTLUND, BO //SVENSKA DAGBLADET// 03/10/1982,V----,N----, PP 0006 NEW POWER PLANTS LEAD SWEDEN BACK TO MAJOR RELiance ON COAL 4 PP JPRS 82355	000000028251
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OSTROVSKAYA, R. S. //GIGIYENA TRUDA I PROFESSIONAL'NYE ZABOLEVANIYA // 00/00/1976,V----,N0006, PP 0008-0012 HEALTH STATUS OF WORKERS CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN THE PRODUCTION OF ACRYLONITRILE NTC 78-11887-06J	000000002903
OSTROVSKIY, A. L. //GEODEZIYA I KARTOGRAFIYA// 00/00/1982,V----,N0001, PP 0021-0022 INFLUENCE OF TILT OF A GYROTHEODOLITE'S MAIN AXIS ON ACCURACY OF ORIENTATION *DMAAC TC-3339	000000005510
OSTROVSKIY, A. S. //AVTOMATIKA// 00/00/1982,V----,N0002, PP 0079-0081 MAR-APR 82 IMAGE PROCESSING IN HYBRID OPTICOLELECTRONIC SYSTEM, USING KARHUNEN-LOEVE EXPANSION 3 PP DUO	000000014407

JPRS L/10746	#	
OSTROVSKIY, VLADIMIR		000000014644
//PRAVDA//		
20/08/1982,V----,N----, PP 0006		
ARBATOV INTERVIEWED ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE.		
BRATISLAVA PRAVDA 3 PP		
FBIS-SOV-82-165, 25 AUG 1982, VOL 3, NO 165	#	
OSTROWSKA, EWA		000000020440
//DZIENNIK ZACHODNI//		
22/09/1982,V----,N----, PP 0003-0004		
OFFICIAL OUTLINES CAUSES OF MANPOWER SHORTAGE 3 PP		
FBIS-EEU-82-200, 15 OCT 1982, VOL 2, NO 200	#	
OSTROWSKA, EWA		000000027178
//DZIENNIK BALTYCKI//		
27/10/1982,V----,N----, PP 0004		
MINISTRY OFFICIAL ON WAGE REFORM POLICY 3 PP		
FBIS-EEU-82-232, 2 DECEMBER 1982, VOL 2, NO 232	#	
OSTROZHINSKIY, V.		000000012840
//NAUKA I RELIGIYA//		
00/04/1982,V----,N0004, PP 0023-0024		
OBKOM SECRETARY ON RELIGIOUS "FASHION" AMONG		
YOUTH 4 PP		
JPRS 81421	#	
OSYCHKIN, N.		000000019994
//SEL'SKAYA ZHIZN'//		
26/08/1982,V----,N----, PP 0002		
KHAR'KOV AGROCHEMICAL SERVICE CONFERENCE.		
UTILIZATION OF FERTILIZERS, CHEMIZATION 8 PP		
JPRS 81906	#	
OTA, K.		000000023671
//ASAHI GARASU KOGYO GIJUTSU SHOREIKAI KENKYU HOKOKU//		
00/00/1974,V0024,N----, PP 0009-0015		
THERMAL BEHAVIOR OF 4-HYDROXYISOPHTHALIC		
ACID - CLARIFICATION OF THE KOLBE-SCHMITT		
REACTION SCHEME		
NTC 82-10364-07C	#	
OTRADOV, A.		000000000335
//IZVESTIYA//		
18/07/1981,V----,N----, PP 0002		
CONSTRUCTION IN TYUMEN' OBLAST 4 PP		
JPRS 80008	#	
OTRUBA, J.		000000000112
//BUL.-BULLETIN METEOROLOGICAL IZVESTIYA METEOROLOGICKBE ZBRBAYV//		
00/08/1962,V0015,N0003, PP 0095-0099		
ENGLISH TITLE UNKNOWN 5 PP		
*FTD-IDIRSIT-1705-B1	#	
OTSU YASUSHI		000000020666
//GUNJI KENKYU//		
00/09/1982,V----,N----, PP 0100-0106		
NORTH KOREA'S MUNITIONS INDUSTRY ANALYZED 3 PP		
000		
JPRS L/10872	#	
OTSUKA, K.		000000027780
//JOZO SHIKENJO HOKOKU//		

00/00/1976,V----,N0148, PP 0010-0015 ANALYSIS OF THE LIQUORS PRESENTED AT THE 14TH WESTERN LIQUOR CONVENTION 8 PP NTC 82-10790-02A: BLL RTS 11127	
OTT, W. //KAUTSCHUK UND GUMMI, KUNSTSTOFFE// 00/00/1981,V0034,N----, PP 0942-0944 ELASTOMERIC ROOFING AND SEALING SHEETS. REVIEW OF MATERIALS AND PROCESSING NTC 82-10315-111	000000026788
OTTA, WIESLAW //HANDEL ZAGRANICZNY// 28/05/1982,V----,N----, PP 0020-0024 NUMBERS 1-2 ROLE, FUNCTION OF FOREIGN TRADE ENTERPRISE DISCUSSED 9 PP JPRS 81193	000000007595
OTTAR, B. //TIDSSKRIFT FOR KJEMI, BERGVESEN OG METALLURGI// 00/00/1954,V0014,N0005, PP 0073-0078 MODERN CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS NEW CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS WOOD TECHNICAL LIBRARY	000000011768
OTTE, E. //APIIDLOGIE// 00/00/1973,V0004,N0004, PP 0331-0339 CONTRIBUTION TO THE LABORATORY DIAGNOSIS OF AMERICAN FOULBROOD OF THE HONEYBEE WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE IMMUNOFLUORESCENCE TECHNIQUE WOOD TECHNICAL INSTITUTE	000000018697
OTTEMEYER, DIETER R. //ASTRONAUTIK// 00/00/1976,V0013,N0003, PP 0057-0060 THE SPACELAB PROJECT: A TRANSATLANTIC CHALLENGE FOR EUROPE 17 PP NASA-TM-76656	000000010465
OTTMAR, H. //STAHL UND EISEN// 00/00/1974,V0094,N0004, PP 0125-0132 HIGH-POWER ELECTRIC ARC FURNACES FOR STEEL-MAKING--DEFINITION AND LIMITS OF PRODUCTIVITY HB 9228	000000003135
OTTO-ARNOLD, CHARLOTTE //DIW-WOCHENBERICHT// 21/01/1982,V0049,N0003, PP 0049-0055 MID-1981 PURCHASING POWER OF EAST, WEST GERMAN MARKS COMPARED 13 PP JPRS 81479	000000012180
OTZEN, KATHARINA //WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE// 26/03/1982,V----,N----, PP 0066-0067 LOWER SAXONY ECONOMICS MINISTER OPPOSES ENERGY MONOPOLIES 4 PP JPRS 80793	000000001413

<p>DU HENGJUE //RED FLAG// 01/09/1982,V----,N0017, PP 0012-0016 ALSO PAGE 32 THE DEEPLY RESPECTED COMRADE CAI CHANG 11 PP JPRS 82121</p>	000000021506
<p>DU-YANG YUAN //MEITAN KEXUE JISHU// 25/01/1982,V----,N0001, PP 0008-0011 ALSO PAGE 20 SPEEDING UP THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCING TOWN GAS FROM COAL 9 PP JPRS 81156</p>	000000008575
<p>OUGHAWA, M'HAND //MOUDJAHID// 00/10/1982,V----,N----, PP 0003 1-2 OCT 82 PARTY LOCAL ROLE EVALUATED 5 PP JPRS 82199</p>	000000025315
<p>OULO-MOUSSA, YACINE //REVOLUTION AFRICAINE// 00/08/1982,V----,N0964, PP 0030-0034 13-19 AUG 1982 FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES ANALYZED. REGARDING ECONOMIC AGGRESSION 8 PP JPRS 82057</p>	000000023427
<p>OURAMDANE, NACER //ALGERIE ACTUALITE// 00/02/1982,V----,N----, PP 0004 18-24 FEB 1982 ALSO PAGE 6 STEEL PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION ANALYZED 4 PP JPRS 80490</p>	000000001291
<p>UYANG SHAN //RED FLAG// 16/05/1982,V----,N0010, PP 0007-0008 RECALLING A LETTER BY MAO ZEDONG 3 PP JPRS 81291</p>	000000009420
<p>OYARI, MIKLOS //TARSADALMI SZEMLE// 00/05/1982,V----,N0005, PP 0003-0014 OYARI SPEAKS ON PUBLIC EDUCATION ISSUES 12 PP JPRS 81040</p>	000000007065
<p>OYCHARENKO, F. D. //DOKLADY AN SSSR, PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY// 00/11/1981,V0261,N0003, PP 0689-0692 CARBON-CONTAINING FILLERS FOR POLYMERS FROM ORGANOMETALLIC COMPOUND PYROLYSIS PRODUCTS AVAIL LY SERIALS CONSULTANTS BUREAU</p>	000000007913
<p>OYCHARENKO, F. D. //DOKLADY AN SSSR, PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY// 00/02/1982,V0262,N0005, PP 1185-1186 KINETICS OF PARTICLE SURFACE CHARGE REVERSAL AVAIL LY ERIALS CONSULTANTS BUREAU</p>	000000024557

OVCHARENKO, G. //STROITEL'NAYA GAZETA// 25/07/1982,V----,N----, PP 0001 EQUIPMENT CONTINUES TO POUR IN 5 PP JPRS 82088	000000021654
OVCHARENKO, NIKOLAY IL'ICH //POLUPROVOODNIKOVYYE ELEMENTY AVTOMATICHESKIKH USTROYSTV ENERGOSSISTEM// 00/00/1981,V----,N----, PP 0002-0004 ALSO PAGES 6-7, 405-407 POWER SYSTEM AUTOMATIC EQUIPMENT SEMICONDUCTOR ELEMENTS 4 PP OUO JPRS L/10645	000000008889
OVCHAROV, LEV ALEKSANDROVICH //AVTOMATIZIROVANNYYE BANKI DANNYKH// 00/00/1982,V----,N----, PP 0010-0011 ALSO PAGES 35-39, 95, 102-104, 129, 131-132, 140, 207-208, 213-221, 223-225, 229-234, 236-238, 261-262 AUTOMATED DATA BANKS 28 PP OUO JPRS L/10848	000000019527
OVCHAROV, O. P. //ZOOLOGICHESKIY ZHURNAL// 00/00/0000,V----,N0010, PP 1583-1585 HYDRODYNAMIC ROLE OF GILL APPARATUS OF FISH IN PASSIVE RESPIRATION 6 PP CSO: 8344/1616-82 COMPLETED SPECIAL	000000014746
OVCHAROV, V. //GUDOK// 07/03/1982,V----,N----, PP 0003 NUMBER 56(17191) VENERA UNDER A PLANT ROOF 4 PP OUO COPYRIGHT INFO REFER OTHERS TO FTD/STINFO AIR/FTD-ID(RS)T-1119-82	000000021245
OVCHININ, D. I. //TRANSPORT I KHRANENIYE NEFTEPRODUCTOV I UGLEVOODORODNOGO SYR'YA// 00/00/1979,V----,N0003, PP 0007-0009 STEEL HORIZONTAL RESEVOIR R-6 FOR STORING AND TRANSPORTING OIL PRODUCTS *FSTC-HT-0556-81	000000019659
OVCHINNIKOU, F. YA. //ATOMNAYA ENERGIYA// 00/00/1981,V0050,N0004, PP 0248-0250 ANALYSIS OF EQUIPMENT FAILURE AT ACTIVE SOVIET NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS WITH VVER-440 REACTORS OUO JPRS L/10068	000000018428
OVCHINNIKOV, F. YA. //ATOMNAYA ENERGIYA// 00/00/1981,V0050,N0004, PP 0248-0250 ANALYSIS OF EQUIPMENT FAILURE AT ACTIVE SOVIET NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS WITH VVER-440 REACTORS OUO JPRS L/10068	000000011795
OVCHINNIKOV, V.	000000001986

<p>//STROITEL'NAYA GAZETA// 22/01/1982,V----,N----, PP 0002 EKIBASTUZ CONSTRUCTION REPORT 4 PP JPRS 80849</p>	<p>00000008442</p>
<p>OYCHINNIKOV, VSEVOLOD //PRAVDA// 27/06/1982,V----,N----, PP 0004 PRAVDA REVIEWS WEEK'S INTERNATIONAL EVENTS 4 PP FBIS-SOV-82-127, 1 JUL 1982, VOL 3, NO 127</p>	<p>000000015871</p>
<p>OYCHINNIKOV, VSEVOLOD //PRAVDA// 24/08/1982,V----,N----, PP 0004 PRAVDA'S OYCHINNIKOV ON NAVAL ARMS RACE 3 PP FBIS-SOV-82-168, 30 AUGUST 1982, VOL 3, NO 168</p>	<p>000000026298</p>
<p>OYCHINNIKOV, VSEVOLOD //PRAVDA// 18/11/1982,V----,N----, PP 0004 POLICY ON TIES WITH YOUNG STATES, PRC OUTLINED 3 PP FBIS-SOV-82-226, 23 NOV 82, VOL 3, NO 226</p>	<p>00000008145</p>
<p>OYCHINNIKOV, YU. A. //DOKLADY AN SSSR, BIOCHEMISTRY// 00/11/1981,V0261,N0003, PP 0763-0768 PRIMARY STRUCTURE OF THE RNA POLYMERASE OF ESCHERICHIA COLI. NUCLEOTIDE SEQUENCE OF THE GPOC GENE AND AMINO ACID SEQUENCE OF THE B'-SUBUNIT AVAIL LY SERIALS CONSULTANTS BUREAU</p>	<p>00000008680</p>
<p>OYCHINNIKOV, YU. A. //DOKLADY AKADEMII NAUK SSSR// 00/01/1982,V0262,N0003, PP 0725-0728 CLONING AND IDENTIFICATION OF THE GENE OF HUMAN LEUKOCYTIC INTERFERON USING SYNTHETIC OLIGONUCLEOTIDES AS PRIMER AND PROBE 5 PP OUD JPRS L/10638</p>	<p>000000019728</p>
<p>OYCHINNIKOV, YU. A. //DOKLADY AN SSSR, BIOCHEMISTRIY// 00/01/1982,V0262,N0003, PP 0725-0728 CLONING AND IDENTIFICATION OF THE GENE OF HUMAN LEUKOCYTIC INTERFERON USING SYNTHETIC OLIGONUCLEOTIDES AS A PRIMER AND PROBE AVAIL LY SERIALS CONSULTANTS BUREAU</p>	<p>000000015580</p>
<p>OYCHINNIKOV, YU. A. //VESTNIK AKADEMII NAUK SSSR// 00/04/1982,V----,N0004, PP 0004-0017 BIOTECHNOLOGY AND ITS PLACE IN SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS 15 PP OUD JPRS L/10736</p>	<p>000000024438</p>
<p>OYCHINNIKOV, YU. A. //VESTNIK AKADEMII NAUK SSSR// 00/08/1982,V----,N0008, PP 0034-0044 SOCIALIST COMPETITION IN SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTES ADVOCATED TO INCREASE PRODUCTION EFFECTIVENESS</p>	

13 PP DUO JPRS L/10932	#	
OVCHINNIKOV, YU. V. //DOKLADY AN SSSR, PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY// 00/06/1981,V0258,N0004, PP 0946-0949 TEMPERATURE-TIME-DEPENDENT CHANGES IN THE PROPERTIES OF SLIGHTLY PLASTICIZED AMORPHOUS AND AMORPHOUS CRYSTALLINE POLYMERS AVAIL LY SERIALS CONSULTANTS BUREAU	#	000000002974
OVCHINNIKOVA, I. //IZVESTIYA// 06/09/1982,V----,N----, PP 0003 UNARMED MOTHERS DEFENDED 3 PP JPRS 81950	#	0000000020326
OVERBERG, HANS //VDI NACHRICHTEN// 19/03/1982,V----,N----, PP 0005 STUDY SHOWS COAL LIQUEFACTION STILL NOT ECONOMICAL IN FRG 3 PP JPRS 80957	#	000000003488
OVISHCHER, PETR IL'ICH //KOMPONOVKA I KONSTRUKTSII MIKROELEKTRONNOYE APPARTURY ISPRAVOCHNOYE POSOBIYE// 00/00/1982,V----,N----, PP 0002-0004 ALSO PAGES 209 CONFIGURATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF MICROELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT: A REFERENCE AID 4 PP DUO JPRS L/10988	#	0000000027423
OVSYANIKOV, V. //ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE// 00/12/1981,V----,N0012, PP 0063-0066 COMMENTS ON NATO VIEWS ABOUT MINE WARFARE IN BALTIC 5 PP JPRS 81754	#	000000014238
OYZERMAN, T. //KOMMUNIST// 00/07/1982,V----,N0011, PP 0111-0120 IDEOLOGICAL FUNCTION OF MODERN IDEALISTIC PHILOSOPHY 11 PP JPRS 82063	#	0000000021743
OZAL, TURGUT //MILLIYET// 01/06/1982,V----,N----, PP 0006 BATTLE INTENSIFIES OVER MINIMUM WAGE 4 PP JPRS 81409	#	000000012880
OZCELIK, CELAL YAVUZ //DUNYA// 03/08/1982,V----,N----, PP 0002 CONSERVATION, ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES ASSAYED 3 PP JPRS 81881	#	000000019066
OZEROVA, O. YE. //KOSMICHESKAYA BIOLOGIYA I AVIAKOSMICHESKAYA MEDITSINA//		000000015828

00/00/1982,V0016,N0004, PP 0041-0044

JUL-AUG 1982

PERCUTANEOUS MEASUREMENT OF PARTIAL OXYGEN TENSION
AND LOCAL BLOOD FLOW IN MAN DURING ORTHOSTATIC
TEST 5 PP
JPRS 81599

OZEROVA, V. V.

//GIGIYENA TRUDA I PROFESSIONAL'NYE ZABOLEVANIYA
//

00/00/1971,V----,N0011, PP 0019-0021

THE EFFECT OF YELLOW PHOSPHORUS ON THE HUMAN
BODY IN A MODERN PHOSPHORUS PLANT
NTC 78-12155-06J

OZHIGONOVA, V. N.

//GIGIYENA TRUDA I PROFESSIONAL'NYE ZABOLEVANIYA //

00/00/1976,V0020,N0011, PP 0017-0020

CLINICAL PICTURE AND DIAGNOSIS OF OCCUPATIONAL
BRONCHIAL ASTHMA DUE TO THE ACTION OF POLYMERS
WHICH CONTAIN FORMALDEHYDE
HSE 9013

OZIEMKOWSKI, TADEUSZ

//ZOLNIERZ POLSKI//

00/00/1982,V0033,N0027, PP 0002-0003

ASLO PAGE 10

FROM BOTH BANKS: POLISH AND SOVIET TROOPS BUILD
BRIDGE ACROSS A RIVER
*FSTC-WT-1080-B2

OZIEMKOWSKI, TADEUSZ

//ZOLNIERZ POLSKI//

28/03/1982,V----,N0013, PP 0003

TANK OFFICER SCHOOL COMMANDER DISCUSSES CAREER,
IDEALS 3 PP
JPRS 80865

OZYORUK, MUKBIL

//TERCUMAN//

10/06/1982,V----,N----, PP 0006

OZYORUK EYES SIGNIFICANCE OF FACTIONS 3 PP
JPRS 81357

OZYORUK, MUKBIL

//TERCUMAN//

00/08/1982,V----,N----,

OZYORUK EXAMINES PARAMETERS OF STRONG EXECUTIVE
4 PP
JPRS 81762

P'AN CHIA-HUA

//CH'I-SHIH NIEN-TAI//

00/00/1982,V----,N0006, PP 0058-0061

ARTICLE COMPARES REVISED, PAST CONSTITUTIONS 10 PP
JPRS 81777

P'ENG MEN-I

//CH'I-SHIH NIEN-TAI//

00/00/1982,V----,N0007, PP 0017-0018

PEOPLE'S RIGHTS LIMITED IN REVISED CONSTITUTION
3 PP
JPRS 81777

000000002795

000000002915

0000000024635

000000002249

000000010682

000000013881

000000014172

000000014175

PAC- POMARNACKI, ANDRZEJ //RZECZPOSPOLITA// 26/07/1982,V-----,N-----, PP 0008 PROFESSOR INTERVIEWED ON PHYSICAL CULTURE DRAFT LAW 3 PP JPRS 81941	000000019758
PACAK, PAVEL //JADERNA ENERGIE// 00/00/1982,V-----,N0004, PP 0125-0126 NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT ENGINEERING, SCIENTIFIC PROBLEMS VIEWED. AUTOMATED CONTROLS FOR NUCLEAR MATERIALS DEVELOPED 23 PP OUO JPRS L/10742	000000015488
PACHMAN, HEINER //WIRTSCHAFT// 00/12/1981,V0036,N0012, PP 0007 COMBINE DEVELOPS CENTER FOR HYBRID CIRCUIT PRODUCTION 3 PP JPRS 80970	000000003907
PACHOWSKI, JAORSŁAW //SZTANDAR MŁODYCH// 24/06/1982,V-----,N-----, PP 0003 PRESS DISCUSSION OF YOUTH AFFAIRS CONTINUED 6 PP JPRS 81342	000000010799
PACURARIU, FRANCISC //SOCIALISTA// 05/02/1982,V-----,N0003, PP 0030-0032 ROLE OF LITERATURE IN EXPRESSING SOCIAL INVOLVEMENT 8 PP JPRS 80893	000000004146
PADILLA, SOL //SOCIALISTA// 00/06/1982,V-----,N-----, PP 0034-0036 23-30 JUN 82 UGT REDONDO ACCUSES PCE CAMACHO OF DESPERATION TACTICS 4 PP JPRS 81542	000000014500
PADOVANI, MARCELLE //NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR// 22/05/1982,V-----,N-----, PP 0052-0054 FORMER PRIMA LINEA MEMBER DESCRIBES CAREER 3 PP OUO JPRS L/10670	000000009658
PADOVANI, MARCELLE //UNITE// 01/10/1982,V-----,N-----, PP 0017 ROOTS OF TERRORISM: INTERNATIONAL TIES 3 PP JPRS 82450	000000027968
PAE UI-KWAN //KULLOJA// 00/03/1982,V-----,N0003, PP 0053-0058 TO STRUGGLE TO CEASELESSLY IMPROVE THE STANDARD OF LIVING FOR THE PEOPLE IS A LOFTY DUTY OF THE GUIDANCE FUNCTIONARIES 9 PP JPRS 81412	000000011062

PAEK HAK-IM //AG REFERENCE// 00/00/0000,V----,N----, NORTH KOREAN LEADERSHIP FBIS/AG	000000022463
PAEK NAM-SUN //KULLOJA// 00/03/1982,V----,N0003, PP 0013-0019 STRENGTHENING PARTY DISCIPLINE IS A BASIC REQUIREMENT IN ENHANCING THE COMBAT STRENGTH OF THE PARTY 11 PP JPRS 81412	000000011056
PAEPKE, K.-H //STANDARDISIERUNG UND QUALITAET// 00/05/1982,V----,N0004, PP 0152-0153 GDR-USSR STANDARDIZATION EFFORTS FOR 1980'S OUTLINED 7 PP JPRS 81304	000000009464
PAESSLER, E. //TECH.-TECHNISCHE GEMEINSCHAFT// 00/02/1980,V0028,N0002, PP 0028-0032 DATA ON INDUSTRIAL ROBOT DEVELOPMENT PRESENTED. LOADING ROBOTS, MANIPULATORS 10 PP JPRS 82005	000000020933
PAEZ, ANA //TIEMPO// 04/06/1982,V----,N----, PAGE 6-E FORUM HELD ON REAGAN PLAN IMPACT 5 PP JPRS 81200	000000007701
PAGANI, NAZARENO //PANORAMA// 19/07/1982,V----,N----, PP 0057-0059 DC'S DE MITA OUTLINES PARTY'S STRATEGY 5 PP DUO JPRS L/10756	000000015620
PAGENDARM, E. //COATING ZUERICH// 00/00/1977,V0010,N----, PP 0004-0005 THE ACCUGRAVURE COATING SYSTEM, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS REVERSE GRAVURE, SHOWS VERSATILITY NTC 82-10096-134	000000026755
PAGES, RAISA //GRAMMA// 25/09/1982,V----,N----, PP 0005 REFORESTATION PROJECT DEVELOPMENT DISCUSSED 4 PP JPRS 82254	000000025077
PAGRADUNI, KARIM //AL-'AMAL// 23/11/1980,V----,N----, PP 0005-0006 OPTIONS OF PHALANGE IN 1980'S EXPLORED 4 PP JPRS 77402	000000009791
PAHLAVI, REZA //FIGARO MAGAZINE// 27/03/1982,V----,N---, PP 0088	000000001650

FORMER MONARCH'S SON VOWS 'TO RECONQUER FATHERLAND' 3 PP JPRS 80889	#	
PAIKOS, VASILIS K. //VIMA// 27/06/1982,V----,N----, PP 0007 COMMENTARY OF FUTURE OF KKE (INT.) 5 PP JPRS 81762	#	000000013873
PAJETTA, CARLO //UNITA// 28/10/1982,V----,N----, PP 0001 ALSO PAGE 20 ZAGLADIN CONTINUES "FRANK" TALKS WITH PCI AIDES. PAJETTA VIEWS TALKS 3 PP FBIS-MEU-82-213, 3 NOV 1982, VOL 7, NO 213	#	000000024019
PAK CH'UNG-PAE //KULLOJA// 00/10/1981,V----,N0010, PP 0021-0025 THE GREAT PROGRAM OF THE "T.D."--THE IMMORTAL BANNER OF THE KOREAN REVOLUTION 7 PP JPRS 80885	#	000000001706
PAK CHI-RYONG //KULLOJA// 00/06/1982,V----,N0006, PP 0011-0016 OUR PEOPLE'S ADMINISTRATION IS A POLITICAL WEAPON GUARANTEEING AN INDEPENDENT, CREATIVE LIFE FOR THE MASSES OF WORKING PEOPLE 9 PP JPRS 82103	#	000000024088
PAK PONG-CHU //KULLOJA// 00/10/1981,V----,N0010, PP 0039-0044 THE DEEPENING AND DEVELOPING SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION AND THE TASK OF THE FACTORY COMMITTEES 10 PP JPRS 80885	#	000000001699
PAK SONG-CH'U //KULLOJA// 00/04/1982,V----,N0004, PP 0069-0080 THE INVINCIBLE VITALITY OF THE CHUCHE-ORIENTED STATE CONSTRUCTION THEORY OF THE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG 18 PP JPRS 81693	#	000000016300
PAK SONG-CHOL //AG REFERENCE// 00/00/0000,V----,N----, NORTH KOREAN LEADERSHIP FBIS/AG	#	000000022464
PAK SUNG-TOK //KULLOJA// 00/06/1982,V----,N----, PP 0042-0047 THE VIEWPOINT AND STAND TOWARD THE WORLD ENUNCIATED BY THE CHUCHE IDEOLOGY 9 PP JPRS 82103	#	000000024105
PAKA, V. T. //IAN SSSR, FIZIKA ATMOSFERI I OKEANA//		000000001379

00/02/1982,V0018,N0002, PP 0178-0184 EFFECT OF THERMAL STRUCTURE OF UPPER OCEAN LAYER ON TURBULENCE DEVELOPMENT 9 PP DUO JPRS L/10511	
PAKHOLKOV, GEORGIY ALEKSANDROVICH //VARIATSIONNYY METOD SINTEZA SIGNALOV I FIL'TROV // 00/00/1981,V----,N----, PP 0002-0005 ALSO PAGES 232-233 VARIATIONAL METHOD OF SYNTHESIZING SIGNALS AND FILTERS 5 PP DUO JPRS L/10954	000000026062
PAKHOLKOV, V. S. //TRUDY URAL'SKII POLITEKHNICHESKII INSTITUT// 00/00/1976,V----,N----, PP 0010-0014 NUMBERS 35-36 USE OF ION-EXCHANGE RESINS AND INORGANIC ION-EXCHANGERS IN THE REMOVAL OF PHOSPHORUS FROM HYDROSILICOFUORIC ACID BISI 21058	000000028256
PAKHOMOV, I. A. //IZVESTIYA VUZ CHERNAYA METALLURGIYA// 00/00/1981,V----,N0010, PP 0014-0017 INFLUENCE OF ALKALI ON HEMATITE-REDUCTION PROCESS BISI 20633	000000001171
PAKHOMOVA, O. //STROITEL'NAYA GAZETA// 15/01/1982,V----,N----, PP 0002 MODEL RURAL CONSTRUCTION, RENOVATION PROJECTS. RURAL RENOVATION 5 PP JPRS 80474	000000000183
PAKITSKIY, B. //VOPROSY EKONOMIKI// 00/03/1982,V----,N0003, PP 0143-0145 REVIEW OF MANEVICH'S BOOK ON USSR LABOR 4 PP DUO JPRS L/10871	000000020662
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PAL, LENARO //MAGYAR TUDOMANY// 00/06/1982,V----,N0006, PP 0441-0462 HIGHLIGHTS OF ACADEMY RESEARCH FROM 1976-1980 24 PP JPRS 82104	000000021571
PAL', A. //KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA// 29/05/1982,V----,N----, PP 0002 CONSTRUCTION OF CONVEYER SYSTEM FOR ROGUN GES DESCRIBED 4 PP	000000020011

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PALME, OLOF //DAGENS NYHETER// 17/09/1982,V----,N----, PP 0002	000000024117

PALME, IN OPEN LETTER TO OPPONENTS, TRIES TO EASE FEARS 4 PP JPRS 82085	#	
PALTEROVICH, D. //PRAYDA// 05/02/1982,V----,N----, PP 0002 RE-TOOLING OF PLANTS DISCUSSED 5 PP JPRS 80963	#	000000003443
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PALYANITSA, B. //ZNAHENOSETS// 00/03/1982,V----,N0003, PP 0012 HAND-TO-HAND COMBAT TRAINING DISCUSSED 3 PP JPRS 81046	#	000000007009
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PAN JIAZHENG //SHUILI FADIAN// 12/08/1982,V----,N0008, PP 0012-0013 VETERAN ENGINEER URGES HYDROPOWER WORKERS TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM 2 PP JPRS 82150	#	000000021943
PAN JIAZHENG //SHUILI FADIAN// 12/08/1982,V----,N0008, PP 0014-0023 DAM CONSTRUCTION IN CHINA DETAILED 30 PP	#	000000021944

JPRS 82150		
PAN LI-FU		000000019820
//CHENG CHIH CHIA//		
16/09/1982,V----,N----, PP 0033-0034		
MEETINGS HEAR PROPOSALS FOR POLITICAL PARTIES 2 PP		
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PAN LIANGYUAN		000000022882
//JISUANJI SHIJIE//		
20/07/1982,V----,N0014, PP 0008		
DJS24 USED FOR WEATHER FORECASTING 2 PP		
JPRS 82161		
PAN QI		000000013308
//RED FLAG//		
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TRANSPORT WORKERS SHOULD STRIVE TO BECOME		
VANGUARDS IN PROPAGATING SOCIALIST		
SPIRITUAL CIVILIZATION 5 PP		
JPRS 81467		
PANASENKO, O. M.		000000008289
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SERIES ON STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF ERYTHROCYTE		
MEMBRANE		
AVAIL LY SERIALS		
CONSULTANTS BUREAU		
PANCHENKO, L. T.		000000013099
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CHARACTER OF THE OIL SATURATION OF THE		
RESERVOIRS OF THE MIDDLE OB OILS-GAS PROVINCE		
AVAIL LY SERIALS		
PETROLEUM GEOLOGY VOL 18, NO 6		
PANCHENKOV, A. N.		000000005978
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MODULAR SYSTEM FOR SOLVING PROBLEMS IN		
AERODYNAMICS OF FLIGHT OF FLYING VEHICLES BY		
ASYMPTOTIC METHODS 8 PP		
DUO		
JPRS L/10607		
PANDZHIKIDZE, GURAM		000000016764
//KOMUNISTI//		
27/07/1982,V----,N----, PP 0003		
GEORGIAN WRITER URGES HIGHER BIRTHRATES 9 PP		
JPRS 81809		
PANEK, KRISTYNA		000000001416
//TRYBUNA LUDU//		
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INCREASED RESEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL		
PROTECTION DESCRIBED 3 PP		
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UPON DISTURBANCE IN THE TISSUE METABOLISM AND
UPON POSTRADIOLOGICAL TOXEMIA
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GOODS PRODUCTION DISCUSSED 6 PP
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PANG JU
//JINGJI GUANLI//
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"JINGJI GUANLI" DISCUSSES SOCIOECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 8 PP
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PANG YONGJIE
//RENMIN RIBAO//
12/10/1982,V----,N----, PP 0005
"RENMIN RIBAO" ON IMPROVING ECONOMIC RESULTS 4 PP
JPRS 82314

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PANGGABEAN, EFFENDI
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EMP TAMBUNAN: A PORTRAIT 12 PP
CSO: 8127/1556-82 COMPLETED SPECIAL

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CHANGES IN THIAMIN METABOLISM IN ANTARCTIC
EXPEDITION WORKERS 6 PP
DUO
JPRS L/10736

000000015570

PANIN, LEV YEVGEN'YEVICH
//PSIKHOSOMATICHESKIYE VZAIMOOTNOSHENIYA PRI KHRONICHESKOM EMOTSIONAL'NOM NAPRYAZHENII//
00/00/1981,V----,N----, PP 0002-0008
ALSO PAGE 178
PSYCHOSOMATIC CORRELATIONS IN CHRONIC EMOTIONAL
STRESS 6 PP
DUO
JPRS L/10638

000000008692

PANIN, M.
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COMMENTS ON FLIGHT SUPPORT EQUIPMENT OF U.S.
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 6 PP

000000027662

JPRS 82409	#	
PANIN, M. //ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE// 00/05/1982,V----,N0005, PP 0055-0060 COMMENTS ON CARRIER AVIATION CAPABILITIES AGAINST SHIPS 7 PP JPRS 81990	#	000000020713
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PANKOW, A. //PRZEGLAD TELEKOMUNIKACYNY// 00/00/1977,V0050,N----, PP 0134-0139 DIGITAL TRANSMISSION IN MOBILE UHF RADIO COMMUNICATION *FTD-IDIRSIT-1242-82	#	000000024523
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PANKTE, H. D.		000000018263

<p>//GAS UND WASSERFACH. GAS-ERDGAS// 00/00/1976,V0117,N---, PP 0416-0423 GENERATION OF REDUCTION GASES FOR THE PUROFER PROCESS NTC 78-14466-11F</p>	<p>000000019192</p>
<p>PANOV, A. A. //DOKLADY AN SSSR, BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES// 00/02/1982,V0262,N0005, PP 1257-1260 BRAIN NEUROSECRETORY CELLS IN EAWIGS (DERMAPTERA, INSECTA) AVAIL LY SERIALS CONSULTANTS BUREAU</p>	<p>000000024975</p>
<p>PANOV, B. //MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHOUNARODNYE OTSNOHENIYA // 00/06/1982,V----,N0006, PP 0012-0022 GEORGIY DIMITROV'S LOYALTY TO USSR, LENIN STRESSED 13 PP JPRS 82191</p>	<p>000000011859 000000011859 ENNYKH VOD// 00/00/1968,V----,N----, PP 0199-0221 NUMBER 17(20) IMPORTANCE OF PROVISION WITH FOOD FOR THE SURVIVAL OF FISH LARVAE NMFS ON LOAN</p>
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<p>PANOV, V. //SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA// 02/04/1982,V----,N----, PP 0002 PRESTIGE OF NORMATIVE SERVICES REVIEWED 4 PP JPRS 80933</p>	<p>000000020183</p>
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<p>PANOV, YE. //SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA// 15/08/1982,V----,N----, PP 0002 ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS DELAY CONSTRUCTION ON NERTUNGRI GRES 3 PP JPRS 81930</p>	<p>000000021981</p>
<p>PANSKOV, V. G. //FINANSY SSSR//</p>	

00/08/1982,V----,N0008, PP 0008-0013 DEVELOPMENT OF UNION REPUBLICS, BUDGETS REPORTED 8 PP JPRS 82126	#	
PANTAK, JERZY J. //GAZETA OLSZTYNSKA// 27/04/1982,V----,N----, PP 0001 ALSO PAGE 2 OLSZTYN PARTY PLENUM HELD 9 PP JPRS 81342	#	000000010784
PANTELEYEV, N. //SOTSIALISTICHESKIY TRUD// 00/04/1982,V----,N0004, PP 0015-0024 MEASURES TO ALLEVIATE THREATENED LABOR SHORTAGE PROPOSED 11 PP JPRS 82019	#	000000021079
PANTIN, IGOR K. //AG REFERENCE// 00/00/0000,V----,N----, SELECTED DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS OFFICIALS FROM USSR PARTY, STATE, AND ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS FBIS/AG	#	000000022271
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PANTSOV, ALEKSANDR VADIMOVICH //RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNIY MIR// 00/00/1982,V----,N0003, PP 0044-0047 MAY-JUN 82 IDEOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF TERMINOLOGICAL DISPUTES IN CCP 8 PP JPRS 82024	#	000000021099
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OF TRUE CHOLINESTERASE OF THE BRAIN WOODTECHNICAL LIBRARY	#	
PAOLETTI, HAMLET //ESTADO DE SAO PAULO// 27/06/1982,V----,N----, PP 0004 FORMER CASSATED POLITICIANS RUN IN NOVEMBER ELECTIONS 8 PP JPRS 81385	#	000000012943
PAOLINI, DAVIDE //MONDO// 12/03/1982,V----,N----, PP 0098-0105 PROFILES OF PROMININT COMMUNIST INDUSTRIALISTS 12 PP OUO JPRS L/10518	#	000000001961
PAOLINI, DAVIDE //MONDO// 09/08/1982,V----,N----, PP 0021-0022 STATE HOLDINGS MINISTER'S PLAN FOR ALUMINUM SECTOR 3 PP OUO JPRS L/10862	#	000000020363
PAPAKHRISTOS, GEORGIOS //EXORMISI TIS KYRIAKIS// 00/04/1982,V----,N----, PP 0005 24-25 APR 82 DEFENSE OFFICIAL SPEAKS ON RECENT ARMED FORCES CHANGES 3 PP JPRS 80886	#	000000003948
PAPANDREOU, ANDREAS //KIRIAKATI KI ELEVETHEROTIPIA// 12/09/1982,V----,N----, PP 0008 PAPANDREOU PREVIEWS 5-YEAR ECONOMIC PLAN 5 PP FBIS-WEU-82-177, 13 SEP 1982, VOL 7, NO 177	#	000000016416
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PAPYAN, V. //KOMMUNIST//	#	000000000260

27/09/1981,V----,N----, PP 0001 NO 222(14401) COLS 2-6 YEREVAN ASSOCIATION DEVELOPS NEW MOTOR VANS ELECTRIC VEHICLES FSTC-WT-1508-81	
PARADE, LOTHAR //WEIMARER BEITRAEGE// 00/08/1982,V----,N----, PP 0062-0087 CULTURE TO BE DEFINED OUTSIDE 'ECONOMIC, POLITICAL RELATIONS' 20 PP JPRS 82250	000000025085
PARADJANIN, LJUBISA //NAFTA// 00/05/1981,V----,N0005, PP 0237-0241 GEOTHERMAL ENERGY POTENTIAL IN SERBIA 8 PP JPRS 80777	00000000825
PARAKHIN, B. G. //NEFTGAZOVAYA GEOLOGIYA I GEOFIZIKA// 00/00/1981,V----,N0001, PP 0002-0005 CORRELATION OF LOWER CARBONIFEROUS HORIZONS OF THE DNIEPER-DOONETS DEPRESSION AVAIL LY SERIALS PETROLEUM GEOLOGY, VOL 18, NO 7	000000014945
PARALA, OPREA //ERA SOCIALISTA// 20/06/1982,V----,N0012, PP 0013-0015 ECONOMIC INCENTIVES, DECENTRALIZATION IN AGRICULTURE URGED 7 PP JPRS 82253	000000025075
PARAMONOV, A. I. //NEKONTAKTNYE METODY IZMERENIYA OKEANOGRAFICHESKIKH PARAMETROV// 00/00/1981,V----,N----, PP 0061-0066 USE OF METHOD OF INFRARED RADIMETRY TO STUDY TIME VARIABILITY OF HEAD EXCHANGE OF EASTERN ARCTIC SEAS WITH ATMOSPHERE 4 PP OUO JPRS L/10530	000000001774
PARAMONOV, ANATOLIY NIKOLAYEVICH //AVTOMATIZATSIYA GIDROFIZICHESKOGO EKSPERIMENTA // 00/00/1982,V----,N----, PP 0002-0006 ALSO PAGE 224 AUTOMATION OF HYDROPHYSICAL EXPERIMENTS 5 PP OUO JPRS L/10837	000000018819
PARAMONOV, V. A. //STAL// 00/00/1982,V0001,N----, PP 0071-0073 AN ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY FOR PRODUCING METAL PRODUCTS WITH ANTI-CORROSION COATINGS BISI 21002	000000025834
PAROON, P. //BUL.-BULLETIN ACADEMIE VETERINAIRE DE FRANCE// 00/00/1977,V0050,N----, PP 0335-0338 RESISTANCE OF MICE, IMMUNIZED BY KILLED BRUCELLA, TO INTRAVENOUS, INTRAPERITONEAL OR SUB-CUTANEOUS INFECTION WITH BRUCELLA ABORTUS	000000008272

NTC 82-10363-02E	
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PAREMSKIY, K. V. //ZHILISHCHNOYE STROITEL'STVO// 00/12/1981,V----,N0012, PP 0025-0026 ACHIEVEMENTS OF SIBERIAN CONSTRUCTION 3 PP JPRS 80778	000000001474
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PARFENOV, YEVGENIY MIKHAYLOVICH //BAZOVYY PRINTSIP KONSTRUIROVANIYA REA// 00/00/1981,V----,N----, PP 0002-0004 ALSO PAGE 120 BASE PRINCIPLE OF ENGINEERING RADIO ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT 3 PP DUO JPRS L/10718	000000012042
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PARINGAUX, ROLAND-PIERRE //MONDE// 10/04/1982,V----,N----, PP 0005 NEED FOR MORE ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC TIES WITH JAPAN SEEN 3 PP JPRS 81199	000000007732
PARIPOVIC, JOVO //VJESNIK// 08/04/1982,V----,N----, PP 0005	000000000931

DUSKO POPOVIC DISCUSSES VOJVODINA PROBLEMS, NATIONALISM 6 PP JPRS 80766	#	
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PARMANN, GEORG //A-MAGASINET// 17/04/1982,V----,N----, PP 0006-0010 GOVERNMENT TRYING TO PROTECT VULNERABLE SVALBARD ECOLOGY 5 PP JPRS 80762	#	000000000772
PARNAS, J. //ARCH.-ARCHIV INSTITUT PASTEUR// 00/06/1958,V0035,N0002, PP 0179-0197 NEW RESEARCH ON VERUCELLA VARIANTS NTIS TT 81-55082	#	000000010027
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<p>PAPALA, OPREA //REVUE.-REVISTA ECONOMICA// 00/00/1982,V-----,N-----, 26 MAR, 2 APR 1982 NEW DIRECTIONS PLANNED FOR ZOOTECHNICAL SECTOR 10 PP JPRS 80768</p>	00000000884
<p>PARRA, CARMEN //YA// 13/04/1982,V-----,N-----, PP 0032 SHIPBUILDERS ADOPT PLAN TO INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY 4 PP JPRS 80941</p>	000000003609
<p>PARSHUTKINA, I. P. //TRUDY TSENTRAL'NOY AEROLOGICHESKOY OBSERVATORII // 00/00/1980,V-----,N0142, PP 0099-0104 A SIMPLE INTEGRAL PHOTOELECTRIC COUNTER OF CONDENSATION NUCLEI FOR MEASURING THE CONCENTRATION OF ICE-FORMING AEROSOLS #FSTC-HT-784-82</p>	000000019626
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<p>PARVULESCU, I. //CONSTRUCTIA DE MASINI// 00/00/1979,V0031,N0002, PP 0109-0112 NEW CLASSES OF LUBRICANTS FOR TURBOJETS IN AVIATION: SPECIFIC METHODS OF STUDY 10 PP DUO COPYRIGHT INFO REFER OTHERS TO FTD/STINFO FTD-ID(RS)T-0938-82</p>	000000013810
<p>PASCH, H. //ACTA POLYMERICA// 00/00/1981,V0032,N-----, PP 0014-0018 13C-NMR STUDIES ON PHENOL-FORMALDEHYDE RESINS NTC 82-10367-111</p>	000000026790
<p>PASCU, D. R. //METALURGIYA// 00/00/1981,V-----,N0009, PP 0472-0477 RESEARCHES REGARDING THE EFFECT OF THE WELDING THERMAL CYCLES ON THE 12H1MF HEAT-RESISTING STEEL BISI 20723</p>	000000017099
<p>PASCU, R. //METALURGIA (BUCHAREST)// 00/00/1981,V-----,N0003, PP 0119-0125 WELDING DEFECTS - DOUBTLESS CAUSE OF SOME DAMAGE IN WELDED STRUCTURES BISI 20715</p>	000000012482
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DUO COPYRIGHT INFO REFER OTHERS TO FSTC ARM/FSTC-HT-1342-81	#	
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PASICEK, MILIVOJ //DANAS// 31/07/1982,V----,N----, PP 0014-0016 FINANCING JOBS FOR RETURNING WORKERS 6 PP JPRS 82115	#	000000021533
PASICEK, MILOVOJ //DANAS// 06/07/1982,V----,N----, PP 0022-0023 WEST EUROPEAN AID IN BUILDING FACTORIES FOR RETURNING WORKERS 4 PP JPRS 82299	#	000000025660
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PASKAR', P.	#	000000016017

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<p>PASKAR', P. A. //SEL'SKAYA ZHIZN'// 02/09/1982,V----,N----, PP 0002-0003 GOSPLAN OFFICIAL DISCUSSES CENTRAL PLANNING, LOCAL PROBLEMS 4 PP JPRS 82207</p>	#	
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<p>PASSARINI, PAOLO //MONDO// 09/08/1982,V----,N----, PP 0019 POSSIBILITY OF PSI EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESS IN 1983 3 PP DUO JPRS L/10862</p>	#	000000020365
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<p>PASSERON, ANDRE //MONDE// 00/02/1982,V----,N----, PP 0007 21-22 FEB 82 DEMOCRATIZATION, DECENTRALIZATION PLANNED FOR ENA 4 PP JPRS 80742</p>	#	00000000955
<p>PASSERON, ANDRE //MONDE// 08/05/1982,V----,N----, PP 0008 RIGHT WING OPPOSITION EFFORT SEEN AS FIRM, OPTIMISTIC 5 PP JPRS 81066</p>	#	000000006327

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PASTUKHOV, BORIS N. //AG REFERENCE// 00/00/0000,V----,N----, SELECTED DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS OFFICIALS FROM USSR PARTY, STATE, AND ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS FBIS/AG	000000022272
PASTUKHOV, NIKOLAY //SELSKAYA ZHIZN// 03/07/1982,V----,N----, PP 0003 "TURBULENT, ALARMING" WEEK POINTS UP U.S. POLICY 3 PP FBIS-SOV-82-134, 13 JULY 82, VOL 3, NO 134	000000008738
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PASZKIEWICZ, JERZY //ZYCIE GOSPODARSTWA// 06/09/1982,V----,N----, PP 0008 ENERGY INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENTS DESCRIBED 8 PP JPRS 80777	000000000840
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APPLICABILITY OF JAPANESE INFORMATION SYSTEM INTECO OUTLINED 4 PP JPRS 82051	000000006225
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PATON, B. YE.	000000002202

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PAUCHE, ALAIN //USINE NOUVELLE// 18/02/1982,V----,N----, PP 0078-0084 STEEL, ELECTRONICS, CHEMICALS, TEXTILES DEFINE GOALS, INDIVIDUAL INDUSTRIES 14 PP JPRS 80753	000000000704
PAUCHE, ALAIN //USINE NOUVELLE// 07/10/1982,V----,N----, PP 0080-0081 CNPF'S BRANA TALKS ON ENDING WAGE, PRICE FREEZE 3 PP JPRS 82170	000000024286
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PEREDELWITZ, WOLF //STERN// 11/11/1982,V----,N----, PP 0294-0307 GENERAL ON BONN DEFENSE POLICY, NUCLEAR WAR 5 P OUO ANNEX NO 108 FBIS-MEU-82-220, 15 NOV 1982, VOL 7, NO 220	#	000000024598

<p>PEREGUDOV, V. A. //NAZEMNYE AVIATSIONNYE ISTOCHNIKI ELEKTROENERGII// 00/00/1980,V----,N----, PP 0136 GROUND POWER SUPPLY SOURCES FOR AIRCRAFT 177 PP DUO COPYRIGHT INFO REFER OTHERS TO FSTC ARM/FSTC-WT-0615-82</p>	00000007821
<p>PEREIRA, JOSE PACHECO //EXPRESSO// 11/09/1982,V----,N----, PP 0012 PCP, "REVOLUTION" AND POWER 7 PP CSO: 8042/0345-83 COMPLETED SPECIAL</p>	000000027679
<p>PEREIRA, SANTOS //TEMPO// 10/06/1982,V----,N----, PP 0030-0031 EAST EUROPEAN EXPERT COMMENTS ON POLISH SITUATION 8 PP CSO: 7010/6-82 COMPLETED SPECIAL</p>	000000011013
<p>PEREKATOV, V. I. //AVTOMATIKA I VYCHISLITEL'NAYA TEKHNIKA// 00/00/1982,V----,N0003, PP 0010-0021 MAY-JUN 82 OPERATING SYSTEM OF DATA COMMUNICATIONS PROCESSOR OF "EL'BRUS-1" MULTIPROCESSOR COMPUTER COMPLEX: STRUCTURE AND KEY MECHANISMS 15 PP DUO JPRS L/10746</p>	000000014394
<p>PEREL'MAN, A. I. //DOKLADY AN SSSR, EARTH SCIENCE// 00/00/1980,V0251,N0003, PP 0696-0699 COPPER INTRODUCED BY MAN INTO MOLDAVIAN LANDSCAPE AVAIL LY SERIALS SCRIPTA PUBLISHING CO.</p>	000000009570
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<p>PERELOMOV, L. S. //PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA// 00/00/1981,V----,N0004, PP 0041-0055 OCT-DEC 81 PRC TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AGAINST NEIGHBORS LACK HISTORIC BASIS 18 PP JPRS 81492</p>	000000013222
<p>PEREPECHKINA, YE. P. //VYSOKOMOLEKULARNYE SOYEDINENIYA (KRATKIYE SOOBSHCHENIYA)/// 00/00/1977,V----,N0008, PP 0621-0623 SYNTHESIS AND PROPERTIES OF POLYQUINOXALINES BASED ON 4,4'-BIS(4'-ACENAPHTHENEQUINOXOXY)ARYLENES #FSTC-WT-0563-81</p>	000000019660
<p>PEREPECHKINA, YE. P. //VYSOKOMOLEKULARNYE SOYEDINENIYA: KRATKIYE SOOBSHCHENIYA// 00/00/1977,V0019,N0008, PP 0621-0623 SYNTHESIS AND PROPERTIES OF POLYQUINOXALINES</p>	000000013194

<p>BASED ON 4,4'-BIS-(4-ACENAPHTHENEQUINONOXI) ARYLENES 3 PP DUO COPYRIGHT INFO REFER OTHERS TO FSTC ARM/FSTC-HT-163-B1</p>	
<p>PEREPECHKO, I. I. //DOKLADY AN SSSR, PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY// 00/09/1981,V0260,N0003, PP 0668-0671 VISCOELASTIC BEHAVIOR OF POLYMERIC COMPOSITE MATERIALS IN THE VITREOUS STATE AVAIL LY SERIALS CONSULTANTS BUREAU</p>	000000001501
<p>PEREPECHKO, I. I. //DOKLADY AN SSSR, PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY// 00/03/1982,V0263,N0003, PP 0641-0643 ROLE OF DIFFUSION IN POLYMER PLASTICIZING AVAIL LY SERIALS CONSULTANTS BUREAU</p>	000000027792
<p>PEREPELITSYN, O. V. //IAN SSSR, FIZIKA ATMOSFERY I OKEANA// 00/02/1982,V0018,N0002, PP 0217-0220 INVESTIGATION OF SURFACE WIND CURRENT ON SEA 5 PP DUO JPRS L/10511</p>	000000001369
<p>PEREPEL'KIN, K. E. //ANGEWANDTE MAKROMOLEKULARE CHEMIE// 00/00/1972,V0022,N-----, PP 0181-0204 STRUCTURE AND MECHANICAL PROPERTIES OF HIGHLY ORIENTED POLYMERS ITAC L-0399-X</p>	000000009718
<p>PEREPEL'KIN, K. E. //CHEM.-KHIMICHESKIYE VOLOKNA// 00/00/1980,V-----,N0006, PP 0054-0056 SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CONFERENCE ON NEW MAN-MADE FIBERS AND THEIR APPLICATION *FSTC-HT-1003-82</p>	000000024612
<p>PEREPEL'KIN, K. YE. //CHEM.-KHIMICHESKIYE VOLOKNA// 00/00/1980,V-----,N0002, PP 0006-0012 ROLE OF THE Leningrad BRANCH OF THE ALL-UNION SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF SYNTHETIC FIBER DESIGN IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET SYNTHETIC FIBER INDUSTRY AND THE CREATION OF FIBROUS MATERIALS WITH SPECIFIC PROPERTIES 22 PP DUO COPYRIGHT INFO REFER OTHERS TO FSTC ARM/FSTC-HT-1404-80</p>	000000006114
<p>PEREPEL'KIN, K. YE. //CHEM.-KHIMICHESKIYE VOLOKNA// 00/00/1980,V-----,N0006, PP 0054-0056 NEW CHEMICAL FIBERS AND THEIR USES FSTC-HT-0374-82</p>	000000008112
<p>PEREPELYUK, A. V. //ECON.-EKONOMIKA PROMYSHLENNOGO TRANSPORTA METALLURGI// 00/00/1982,V-----,N-----, PP 0001-0004 ALSO PAGES 140-153 RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION EXPENSES, COST OF SHIPMENT 14 PP</p>	000000017569

DUO JPRS L/10819	#	
PERELETINA, I. //SEL'SKOYE KHOZYAYSTVO KAZAKHSTANA// 00/02/1982,V----,N0002, PP 0029 MECHANIZATION CALLED FOR IN KAZAKH MEAT INDUSTRY 3 PP JPRS 80942	#	000000004314
PERELETINA, I. //SEL'SKOYE KHOZYAYSTVO KAZAKHSTANA// 00/02/1982,V----,N0002, PP 0029 MECHANIZATION CALLED FOR IN KAZAKH MEAT INDUSTRY 3 PP JPRS 80942	#	000000004867
PERESTENKO, A. //KRASNAYA ZVEZDA// 30/07/1982,V----,N-----, PP 0002 MILITARY NEWSPAPERS CRITICIZED 3 PP JPRS 82379	#	000000027390
PERESYPKIN, I. T. //AG REFERENCE// 00/00/0000,V----,N-----, SOVIET MILITARY LEADERS FBIS/AG	#	000000022414
PERETIE, OLIVIER //MATIN// 06/08/1982,V----,N----, PP 0005 ELECTRONICS GIANTS COORDINATE RESEARCH EFFORTS AGAINST JAPAN 2 PP JPRS 81804	#	000000017768
PERETS, YOSIF //NAUKA I TEKHNIKA ZA MLADZHTA// 00/00/1980,V----,N0011, PP 0018-0021 THE FIRST SPACE RADIOTELESCOPE 9 PP DUO COPYRIGHT INFO REFER OTHERS TO FTD/STINFO AIR/FTD/ID(RS)T-0205-B1	#	000000000797
PEREVALOV, V. I. //DOKLADY AN SSSR, SOVIET PHYSICS// 00/04/1982,V0263,N0004, PP 0868-0872 REDUCTION OF EFFECTIVE HAMILTONIANS FOR DEGENERATE AND RESONANT VIBRATIONAL STATES IN HIGH-SYMMETRY MOLECULES AVAIL LY SERIALS AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PHYSICS	#	000000028778
PEREVEDENTSEV, V. //LITERATURNAYA GAZETA// 10/03/1982,V----,N-----, PP 0011 DEMOGRAPHER SEES MANY PROBLEMS 6 PP JPRS 80842	#	000000002005
PEREVEDENTSEV, V. I. //RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNY MIR// 00/00/1982,V----,N0001, PP 0093-0105 JAN-FEB 82 MIGRATION PROBLEMS, YOUTH MOBILITY STUDIED 15 PP JPRS 82200	#	000000024954

PEREVEDENTSEV, VIKTOR IVANOVICH //SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA// 00/00/1982,V----,N0002, PP 0080-0088 APR-MAY-JUN 1982 POPULATION REPRODUCTION AND THE FAMILY 10 PP JPRS 81336	000000010339
PEREVEDENTSEV, YU. P. //ATMOSFERNAYA TURBULENTNOST' I YEYE PROGNOZ// 00/00/1978,V----,N----, PP 0020-0033 ALSO PAGES 134-140 ATMOSPHERIC TURBULENCE AND ITS FORECAST 23 PP 000 COPYRIGHT INFO REFER OTHERS TO FTD/STINFO AIR/FTD-IDIRSIT-0225-82	000000001597
PEREVEDENTSEV, YU. P. //ATMOSFERNAYA TURBULENTNOST' I YEYE PROGNOZ// 00/00/1978,V----,N----, PP 0020-0033 ALSO PAGES 134-140 ATMOSPHERIC TURBULENCE AND ITS FORECAST 23 PP 000 COPYRIGHT INFO REFER OTHERS TO FTD/STINFO AIR/FTD-IDIRSIT-0225-82	000000011513
PEREVEZENTSEV, L. T. //RADIOLOKATSIONNYYE SISTEMY AEROPORTOV// 00/00/1981,V----,N----, PP 0001-0384 'RADAR SYSTEMS OF AIRPORTS' *FTD-IDIRSIT-1047-82	000000017980
PEREVEZENTSEV, V. N. //DOKLADY AN SSSR, SOVIET PHYSICS// 00/02/1982,V0262,N----, PP 1143-1146 A GEOMETRIC THEORY OF TRIPLE GRAIN JUNCTIONS AVAIL LY SERIALS AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PHYSICS	0000000026288
PEREVOCHIKOV, V. I. //ELEC.-ELEKTROTEKHNIKA// 00/00/1980,V----,N0006, PP 0005-0007 CATHODE-RAY RECTIFIERS 9 PP 000 COPYRIGHT INFO REFER OTHERS TO FSTC ARM/FSTC-HT-1051-81	000000019738
PEREVEZENTSEV, L. T. //RADIOLOKATSIONNYYE SISTEMY AEROPORTOV// 00/00/1981,V----,N----, PP 0001-0384 RADAR SYSTEMS OF AIRPORTS *FTD-IDIRSIT-1047-82	000000017071
PEREYASLAVSKIY, V. //ZHURNALIST// 00/07/1982,V----,N0007, PP 0011-0012 TV INTERVIEWS SERVE AS CHECK ON PERFORMANCE OF LEADERS 4 PP JPRS 81778	000000014178
PEREYASLOVA, N. K. //DOKLADY AN SSSR, EARTH SCIENCE// 00/00/1979,V0247,N0004, PP 0826-0828 THE EFFECT OF THE PENETRATION OF SOLAR COSMIC RAYS INTO THE EARTH'S MAGNETOSPHERE ON THE SPECTRAL PROPERTIES OF THE PROTON FLUX 3 PP AVAIL LY SERIALS AMERICAN GEOLOGICAL INSTITUTE	000000000037

PEREZ BETANCOURT, ROBERTO //VERDE OLIVO// 02/09/1982,V----,N0035, PP 0041-0043 DAIRY PRODUCTION ON RISE IN MATANZAS PROVINCE 4 PP JPRS 82094 #	000000023870
PEREZ, ALAIN //INDUSTRIES AND TECHNIQUES// 20/02/1982,V----,N----, PP 0010 FRANCE ENTERS COMPETITION IN CARBON FIBER INDUSTRY 3 PP JPRS 81077 #	000000005859
PEREZ, ALAIN //INDUSTRIES ET TECHNIQUES// 10/03/1982,V----,N----, PP 0078 OFFICIAL DISCUSSES FUTURE OF ARIANE, SPACE PROGRAM 3 PP JPRS 81115 #	000000006622
PEREZ, ALAIN //INDUSTRIES ET TECHNIQUES// 20/05/1982,V----,N----, PP 0162-0163 TWO FLEXIBLE WORKSHOPS UNDER DEVELOPMENT IN NORWAY 3 PP JPRS 81466 #	000000012287
PEREZ, ERACLIDES BARRERO //TRABAJADORES// 15/06/1982,V----,N----, PP 0004 GRANMA PROVINCE BECOMING NATION'S RICE BOWL 5 PP JPRS 81651 #	000000016129
PEREZ, EUGENIO SUAREZ //VERDE OLIVO// 12/08/1982,V----,N0032, PP 0036-0039 USE OF FIDEL'S SPEECHES IN IDEOLOGICAL STUDIES STRESSED 7 PP JPRS 81936 #	000000019774
PEREZ, EUGENIO SUAREZ //VERDE OLIVO// 14/10/1982,V----,N0041, PP 0031-0033 PARTY'S ROLE IN DEVELOPING PATRIOTISM EXPLAINED 5 PP JPRS 82326 #	000000027068
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PEREZ, FULGENCIO FUERTES //MEDICINA IBERA// 00/00/1936,V0002,N----, PP 0307-0309 A SPECIAL CASE OF POISONING BY GASEOUS HYDROCYANIC ACID WOOD TECHNICAL INSTITUTE #	000000018615
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PEREZ, HUMBERTO //GRANMA// 05/09/1982,V----,N----, PP 0002-0003 HUMBERTO PEREZ SPEAKS ON ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT, PLANNING 15 PP JPRS 82360	000000028391
PEREZ, MAXIMO MANUEL //LISTIN DIARIO// 19/08/1982,V----,N----, PP 0001 ALSO PAGE 12 JORGE BLANCO NAMES NEW MILITARY HIGH COMMAND 3 PP JPRS 81857	000000016945
PEREZ, ORNIA J. R. //PAIS// 31/05/1982,V----,N----, PP 0061 FRAGA RECEIVES MOST TV COVERAGE IN ANDALUCIA 6 PP JPRS 81248	000000008919
PEREZ, ROJO //SALUD Y TRABAJO// 00/00/1978,V0014,N----, PP 0019-0023 NOISE ON BOARD SHIPS #FSTC-HT-183-82	000000024209
PEREZ, VALDES ENRIQUE //BOHEMIA// 02/07/1982,V----,N----, PP 0058 SUMMER PROGRAMMING ON NATIONAL TV DESCRIBED 3 PP JPRS 81501	000000012967
PEREZHOGIN, V. //VOY.-VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL// 00/02/1982,V----,N0002, PP 0027-0032 WARTIME EXPERIENCE ON COOPERATION WITH PARTISAN FORCES 8 PP JPRS 81411	000000011045
PERGER, WERNER //PROFIL// 10/05/1982,V0013,N0019, PP 0020-0021 "HYPROCRISY" CHARGED IN STATE'S REACTION TO DOMESTIC PACIFISTS 5 PP JPRS 81085	000000006198
PERI, SMADAR //YEDI'OT AHARONOT// 04/05/1982,V----,N----, PP 0019 PROBLEMS OF DOING BUSINESS IN EGYPT DISCUSSED 3 PP JPRS 81338	000000010297
PERMINOV, ST. //VOY.-VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA// 00/06/1981,V----,N0006, PP 0012-0013 VORONEZH TRAINING CENTER EXPERIENCE 5 PP JPRS 80947	000000004295

PERMINOV, ST. //VOY.-VOYENNYE ZNANIYA// 00/06/1981,V----,N0006, PP 0012-0013 YORONEZH TRAINING CENTER EXPERIENCE 5 PP JPRS 80947	00000004848
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PEROV, G. //ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE// 00/12/1981,V----,N0012, PP 0066-0068 COMMENTS ON U.S. SUBMARINE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT IN PACIFIC 3 PP JPRS 81754	000000014246
PEROV, I. //ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE// 00/09/1982,V----,N0009, PP 0007-0012 COMMENTARY ON U.S. STRATEGY OF "DIRECT CONFRONTATION" 8 PP JPRS 82409	000000027653
PEROV, V. P. //TRUDY SHESTOY NAUCHNO-TEKHNICHESKOY KONFERENTSII PO INFORMatsIONNOY AKUSTIKE// 00/00/1981,V----,N----, PP 0060-0068 INVESTIGATION OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SENSORY DISSOCIATED BIOLOGICAL SUBJECTS 9 PP OXUO JPRS L/10898	000000021616
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PERRET, J. //REVUE.-REVUE DE METALLURGIE CIT// 00/00/1982,V----,N0001, PP 0041-0049 DESIGN OF A MODERN INSTALLATION FOR COILING LARGE-DIAMETER ROD BISI 21052	000000023809
PERRIER, FRANCOIS //USINE NOUVELLE// 08/07/1982,V----,N----, PP 0031-0033 ELECTRONICS FIRMS, RESEARCH BECOME MAIN AQUITAINE EMPLOYER 4 PP JPRS 81923	000000019333
PERRIER, P. //SYSTEME D'ACQUISITION ET D'ANALYSE POUR ESSAIS DYNAMIQUES D'ENTREES D'AIR// 00/00/0000,V----,N0301, PP 0001-0014 ARTICLE FROM AGARD - AERODYNAMICS OF POWER PLANT INSTALLATION (AGARD-CP-301) *FTD-IDIRSI-0631-82	000000003410

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<p>PERRIER, PIERRE //AGARD CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS NUMBER THREE HUNDRED ONE, AERODYNAMICS OF POWER PLANT INSTALLATION// 00/00/0000,V----,N----, PAGES 18/1-18/14 SYSTEM OF LOGGING AND ANALYSIS FOR DYNAMIC TESTS OF AIR INTAKES 30 PP DUO COPYRIGHT INFO REFER OTHERS TO FTD/STINFO AIR/FTD-IDIRSIT-0631-82</p>	000000015007
<p>PERRIMOND, GUY //UNITE// 17/09/1982,V----,N----, PP 0008-0009 HERMAZ ON CHINA TRIP, PARTY CONGRESS, DEMOCRATIZATION 5 PP JPRS 82120</p>	000000022028
<p>PERRY, WILLIAM //AS FORÇAS ARMADAS BRAZILEIRAS: POLITICA MILITARE POSSIBILIDADES CONVENCIONAIS DE UMA POTENCIA EM ASCENSAO// 00/00/1978,V----,N----, PP 0073-0090 THE BRAZILIAN ARMED FORCES MILITARY POLICIES AND CONVENTIONAL POSSIBILITIES OF A RISING POWER DIA LN 374-79</p>	000000011542
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<p>PERSHIN, S. B. //ZHURNAL MIKROBIOLOGII, EPIDEMIOLOGII I IMMUNOBIOLOGII// 00/00/1979,V0056,N0006, PP 0041-0059 SUPPRESSION AND STIMULATION OF IMMUNOLOGICAL MEMORY WITH TYPHOID LIPOPOLYSACCHARIDE AND POLYSACCHARIDE DUO COPYRIGHT INFO REFER OTHERS TO MIIA/SGMI-ISI MIIA-WT-004-82</p>	000000002546
<p>PERSHITS, R. YA. //SUDOSTROYENIYE// 00/10/1981,V----,N0010, PP 0010-0011 THE DESIGN CALCULATION OF THE RUDDER AREA DUO COPYRIGHT INFO REFER OTHERS TO NISC NAV/NISC/NIC-RSTP-053-82</p>	000000011282
<p>PERSSON, LENNART //ARME NYTT// 00/00/1981,V----,N0003, PP 0016-0017 DECOY MEASURES AND DECOY TARGETS 8 PP DUO COPYRIGHT INFO REFER OTHERS TO FSTC ARM/FSTC/HT-1236-81</p>	000000007171
<p>PERSSON, LENNART //ARME NYTT// 00/00/1981,V----,N0003, PP 0016-0017</p>	000000008064

DECOY MEASURES AND DECOY TARGETS FSTC-WT-1236-81	#	
PERUNOV, A. A. //ELEC.-ELEKTVOTEKHNIKA// 00/09/1981,V----,N0009, PP 0014-0017 GENERATOR OF HIGH-VOLTAGE SWITCHING FUSES *FSTC-WT-925-82	#	000000024189
PERUZZIM CESARE //PANORAMA// 18/10/1982,V----,N----, PP 0230-0243 UNEMPLOYMENT SAID TO HIT 3 MILLION BY 1982. NOBODY'S JOB SAFE NOW 4 PP OUO JPRS L/10978	#	000000027379
PERVUSHIN, S. //POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE// 00/04/1982,V----,N0004, PP 0059-0066 INTENSIFICATION OF PRODUCTION ANALYZED 10 PP JPRS 81733	#	000000013540
PERVUSHIN, S. //POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE// 00/04/1982,V----,N0004, PP 0059-0066 INTENSIFICATION OF PRODUCTION ANALYZED 11 PP JPRS 81733	#	000000014316
PERZHU, YVACHESLAY LEONT'YEVICH //ELEC.-ELEKTRONNOYE MODELIROVANIYE// 00/00/1982,V----,N0004, PP 0006-0011 JUL-AUG 82 TRANSFORMATION OF IMAGE COORDINATES USING PRINCIPLES OF PATTERN LOGIC 3 PP OUO JPRS L/10928	#	000000025029
PESKIN, A. V. //DOKLADY AN SSSR, BIOCHEMISTRY// 00/04/1982,V0263,N0004, PP 1270-1273 OXIDATION OF EPINEPHRINE BY NUCLEA MEMBRANES OF TUMORS, MEDIATED BY SUPEROXIDE RADICALS AVAIL LY SERIALS CONSULTANTS BUREAU	#	000000020226
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PESTER, WOLFGANG //VDI NACHRICHTEN// 14/05/1982,V----,N----, PP 0010 DAIMLER-BENZ, VOLKSWAGEN R&D EXHIBITED AT HANNOVER 4 PP JPRS 81841	#	000000017994
PESTEREV, L. //VOY.-VOYENNYE ZNANIYA// 00/04/1982,V----,N0004, PP 0026 NEW STATUTE ON "ORLENOK" EXERCISE DISCUSSED 3 PP		000000006904

JPRS 81166	#	
PESTI, LAJOS		000000004334
//SZAMITASTECHNIKA//		
00/01/1982,V----,N----, PP 0001		
NEW TASKS IN COMPUTER APPLICATIONS 3 PP		
JPRS 80943	#	
PESTI, LAJOS		000000004887
//SZAMITASTECHNIKA//		
00/01/1982,V----,N----, PP 0001		
NEW TASKS IN COMPUTER APPLICATIONS 3 PP		
JPRS 80943	#	
PESTRIY, YU. N.		000000002710
//GIGIYENA TRUDA I PROFESSIONAL'NYE ZABOLEVANIYA //		
00/00/1970,V----,N0006, PP 0037-0040		
THE CONDITION OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM OF WORKERS		
IN A CAPROLACTAM PLANT		
NTC 80-11977-06J	#	
PETEANU, V.		000000006699
//STIINTA SI TEHNICA//		
00/12/1981,V----,N0012, PP 0034		
POSSIBILITIES OFFERED BY NEW 'INTERCOB' PROGRAM		
PACKAGE 3 PP		
JPRS 81118	#	
PETER, G.		000000004575
//RADIO, FERNSEHEN, ELEKTRONIK//		
00/00/1976,V0025,N----, PP 0214-0215		
DETERMINING THE RELIABILITY OF UNPROTECTED		
CONTACTS		
NTC 81-14453-17B: BLL 7737.47(3489)	#	
PETER, G.		000000005128
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00/00/1976,V0025,N----, PP 0214-0215		
DETERMINING THE RELIABILITY OF UNPROTECTED		
CONTACTS		
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//FINOMMECHANIKA//		
00/00/1972,V0011,N----, PP 0229-0232		
NEUTRON GENERATOR WITH A VACUUM SYSTEM		
INCORPORATING AN ION GETTER PUMP		
NTC 73-13950	#	
PETER, MARTIN		000000004740
//MELWOCHÉ//		
28/04/1982,V----,N0017, PP 0011		
REFUGEE CAMPS SEEN DOMINATED BY PRO-KHOMEYNI		
FUNDAMENTALISTS 4 PP		
JPRS 81010	#	
PETER, MARTIN		000000005293
//MELWOCHÉ//		
28/04/1982,V----,N0017, PP 0011		
REFUGEE CAMPS SEEN DOMINATED BY PRO-KHOMEYNI		
FUNDAMENTALISTS 4 PP		
JPRS 81010	#	
PETERBURGSKIY, A. V.		000000021205

//CHEM.-KHIMIYA V SEL'SKOM KHOZYAYSTVE//

00/07/1982,V----,N0007, PP 0019-0021
NITROGEN, PHOSPHORUS, POTASSIUM BALANCE IN
MAJOR AGRICULTURAL CROPS IN NATION 5 PP
JPRS 81979

000000014017

PETEREIT, P.

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ORGANIZATION NOTED 5 PP
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JPRS 80938	#	
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COAL MINE DIRECTOR ON COAL PRODUCTION PROBLEMS 3 PP JPRS 81347	#	
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PHAN QUANG TIEP //TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN// 00/02/1982,V----,N0002, PP 0032-0040 TRUONG SON CORPS COMBINES ECONOMIC, MILITARY WORK 8 PP JPRS 81751	#	000000014774
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PHAN TUONG //HANOI MOI// 17/03/1982,V----,N----, PP 0002 FUNCTIONS OF HANOI SUBWARD SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS DISCUSSED 3 PP	#	000000003966

JPRS 80966	#	
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PHANHET, PRAHIT //MATUPHOM// 02/09/1982,V----,N----, PP 0002 KHMER ROUGE COMMANDER ALLOWS DISAFFECTED TO JOIN SIHANOUK 2 PP JPRS 82041	#	000000021460
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PHUNG DAC LOI //TIEN PHONG// 00/07/1982,V----,N----, PP 0001 13-19 JUL 1982 MILITIAMAN LAUDED FOR KILLING FULRO MEMBER 2 PP JPRS 81808	000000016757
PHUNG VAN THI //NHAN DAN//	000000016746

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PHUONG NAM //NONG NGHIEP// 20/06/1982,V----,N----, PP 0007 LAND MANAGEMENT ON LONG AN PROVINCE DISCUSSED 3 PP JPRS 81808	#	000000016745
PHUONG SON //TAP CHI CONG SAN// 00/05/1982,V----,N0005, PP 0094-0096 THE COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBER AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF JOBS 3 PP JPRS 81413	#	000000011070
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PIAZZANO, PIERP //SCIENZA E VITA NUOVA// 00/11/1982,V----,N----, PP 0071-0075 ITALIAN-MADE HEAVY ION ACCELERATOR TANDEM XTU DESCRIBED 5 PP JPRS 82336	#	000000027097
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PIERNAZ, PATRICK //USINE NOUVELLE// 13/05/1982,V----,N----, PP 0139-0140 FLEXIBLE WORKSHOP OPERATING AT GERMAN SHEET METAL WORKS 3 PP JPRS 81247	#	000000010137
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06/05/1982,V----,N----, PP 0066-0067 RENAULT FLEXIBLE WORKSHOP OPERATES IN REAL TIME 4 PP JPRS 81292	#	
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ZINCHENKO, V. P. //PSIKHOMETRIKA UTOMLENIYA// 00/00/1977,V----,N----, PP 0108 PSYCHOMETRICS OF FATIGUE 108 PP *NTIS TT 79-56000	#	000000242786
ZINCHENKO, V. P. //TECH.-TEKHNICHESKAYA ESTETIKA// 00/00/1977,V----,N0006, PP 0001-0004 DEFINITIONS OF TERMS, OBJECTIVES OF ERGONOMICS 11 PP JPRS 70168	#	000000098054
ZINCHENKO, V. P. //TECH.-TEKHNICHESKAYA ESTETIKA// 00/00/1977,V----,N0007, PP 0001-0015 PROBLEMS IN ARTISTIC DESIGN EDUCATION 41 PP JPRS 70395	#	000000104717
ZINCHENKO, V. P. //OSNOVY ERGONOMIKI// 00/00/1979,V----,N----, PP 0003-0036 ALSO PAGES 67-202, 206-224, 243-308 FUNDAMENTALS OF ERGONOMICS 253 PP OUO JPRS L/9165	#	000000224509
ZINCHENKO, VLADIMIR PETROVICH //VOPROSY FILOSOFII// 00/00/1977,V----,N0007, PP 0111-0124 PROBLEM OF OBJECTIVE METHOD IN PSYCHOLOGY 20 PP GUO JPRS L/7418	#	000000098449
ZINCHENKO, YU. M. //IZVESTIYA VUZ CHERNAYA METALLURGIYA// 00/00/1979,V----,N0004, PP 0125-0127 INFLUENCE OF MIX SEGREGATION IN THE BED ON SINTERING-MACHINE OPERATION BISI 18607	#	000000248053
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ZINEVICH, A. M. //STROITEL'STVO TRUBOPROVODOV// 00/11/1977,V----,N0011, PP 0007-0011 SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION 14 PP JPRS 70537	#	000000109095
ZINEVICH, A. M. //STROITEL'STVO TRUBOPROVODOV// 00/01/1979,V----,N0002, PP 0002-0005 PIPELINE SYSTEM IMPROVEMENTS DISCUSSED 9 PP JPRS 73314	#	000000163907
ZINEVICH, L. N. //FIZIOLOGICHESKOYE PONYATIYE VOZRASTNOY NORMY// 13/08/1974,V----,N----, PP 0049-0051 THE ADAPTIVE-IMMUNOLOGICAL SYSTEM, PHYSICAL DEVELOPMENT AND FEATURES OF THE LEUCOPOETIC SYSTEM IN HEALTHY CHILDREN 2 PP JPRS 64630	#	000000008743
ZINEVICH, N. I. //TRUDY VSESOYUZNYI PROEKTNO-YZYSKATELSKII NAUCHNO-ISSLEDOVATELSKII INSTITUT "GIDROPROEKT"/> 00/00/1973,V----,N0032, PP 0063-0071 THE ATBASHI GES (HYDROELECTRIC POWERPLANT) EARTH DAM NTC 81-10535-13M	#	000000302528
ZINEVICH, YU. A. //VESTNIK AKADEMII NAUK SSSR// 00/10/1977,V----,N0010, PP 0061-0072 INCREASED RESPONSIBILITY URGED FOR YOUNG RESEARCHERS 13 PP GUO JPRS L/7560	#	000000108580
ZINGER, A. S. //GEOKHIMIYA// 00/00/1973,V----,N0003, PP 0425-0433 ORGANIC SULFUR IN THE NATURAL WATERS OF THE SOUTHEASTERN PART OF THE RUSSIAN PLATFORM 8 PP GEI 1973 V10 N2 P313-20	#	000000173317
ZINGER, A. S.		000000072444

<p>//GEOLOGIYA NEFTI I GAZA// 00/00/1976,V----,N0003, PP 0053-0057 EXPERIENCE OF A SEISMIC AND GEOTHERMAL PROGRAM OF INVESTIGATION UNDER THE CONDITIONS IN THE LOWER VOLGA REGION IN CONNECTION WITH EXPLORATION FOR OIL-GAS STRUCTURES PP 133-134 AVAIL LY SERIALS PETROLEUM GEOLOGY MAR 77, VOL 14, NO 3</p>	000000091730
<p>ZINGER, A. S. //GEOLOGIYA NEFTI I GAZA// 00/00/1976,V----,N0003, PP 0053-0057 USE OF JOINT SEISMIC AND THERMAL INVESTIGATIONS IN THE LOWER VOLGA REGION IN PROSPECTING FOR OIL AND GAS STRUCTURES ATS 01E151R</p>	000000285105
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<p>ZINGER, A. S. //NEFTEGAZOVAYA GEOLOGIYA I GEOFIZIKA// 00/00/1977,V----,N0001, PP 0015-0017 GEOTEMPERATURE ANALYSIS OF CONDITIONS OF THE MAIN PHASE OF OIL FORMATION IN THE SUPRA-SALT SECTION OF WEST PERI-CASPIA PETROLEUM GEOLOGY VOL 14 NO 8</p>	000000274715
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<p>ZINGER, TZVI //BAMAHANEH// 26/02/1975,V----,N----, PP 0008-0009 EXISTENCE OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN ISRAEL EXPLORED 8 PP JPRS 64804</p>	000000000662
<p>ZINGER, ZVI //BAMAHANEH// 12/06/1974,V----,N----, PP 0014-0025</p>	

A DAY WITH THE COMMANDER OF ISRAELI NAVY 5 PP JPRS 62557	
ZINGERMANN, A. M. //USPEKHI FIZIOLOGICHESKIKH NAUK// 00/00/1974,V-----,N0003, PP 0059-0081 SELF-ORGANIZATION OF THE SENSORIMOTOR FUNCTIONAL SYSTEM IN DELAY FEEDBACK SITUATION (VISUAL AFFERENTATION) IN RELATION TO END-RESULTS OF ACTIVITY 36 PP JPRS 65391	000000014596
ZINGERMANN, A. M. //FIZIOLOGICHESKIY ZHURNAL SSSR// 00/00/1974,V0060,N0010, PP 1481-1493 TYPICAL PECULIARITIES OF ADAPTATION DETERMINING EFFECTIVENESS OF WORKING ACTIVITY, 18 PAGES JPRS 64348	000000121823
ZINGERMANN, A. M. //FIZIOLOGICHESKIY ZHURNAL SSSR// 00/00/1974,V0060,N0010, PP 1481-1493 TYPICAL PECULIARITIES OF ADAPTATION DETERMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF WORKING ACTIVITY 18 PP JPRS 64348	000000148015
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ZINGLER, PH. //DER MASCHINENSCHADEN// 00/00/1974,V0047,N0006, PP 0222-0239 DAMAGE TO BUILDINGS IN NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS C.E. TRANS. 6755	000000014097
ZINGLER, PH. //MASCHINENSCHADEN// 00/00/1974,V0047,N0006, PP 0222-0239 DAMAGE TO BUILDINGS IN NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS C. E. TRANS. 6755	000000253129
ZINGRAF, NORBERT //KAMPFTRUPPEN// 00/00/1977,V-----,N0002, PP 0046-0048 MARCH/APRIL 1977 IMPORTANCE OF RESERVISTS TO THE DEFENSE MISSION OF THE ARMY	000000173243

*ITAC K-9617	#	
ZINGRAF, NORBERT		000000183772
//KAMPFTRUPPEN//		
00/00/1977,V----,N0002, PP 0046-0048		
MARCH-APRIL 1977		
IMPORTANCE OF RESERVISTS TO THE DEFENSE MISSION		
OF THE ARMY 13 PP		
ITAC K-9617	#	
ZINICHI,		000000003783
//KOGYO KAGAKU ZASSHI//		
00/00/1967,V0060,N0002, PP 0195-0197		
LIGHT SENSITIZED REDUCTION OF METHYLENE BLUE IN		
BENZOPHINOL 10 PP		
CSO: 8329/1205 COMPLETED SPECIAL	#	
ZININ, T.		000000292862
//PRAVDA VOSTOKA//		
06/09/1981,V----,N----, PP 0002		
FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF POTATO CROP IN UZBEKISTAN		
URGEO. LOCAL POTATO GROWING 5 PP		
JPRS 79574	#	
ZININ, V.		000000072973
//PLANOVVOYE.KHOZYAYSTVO//		
00/05/1977,V----,N0005, PP 0109-0121		
ASPECTS OF INTEGRATED ECONOMIC, SOCIAL PLANNING		
REVIEWED 16 PP		
GUO		
JPRS L/7217	#	
ZINISHI,		000000003784
//KOGYO KAGAKU ZASSHI//		
00/00/1956,V0059,N0012, PP 1418-1423		
PHOTO DISINTEGRATION OF METHYLENE IN SOLUTION		
21 PP		
CSO: 8329/1204 COMPLETED SPECIAL	#	
ZINKEISEN, WILLIAM		000000019939
//CHEM.-CHEMISCHE BERICHTE//		
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ENGLISH TITLE NOT GIVEN		
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ZINKEISEN, WILLIAM		000000115018
//CHEM.-CHEMISCHE BERICHTE//		
00/00/1889,V0022,N----, PP 2946-2957		
OXALIC DIAMIDO-OXIME AND OXALIC ANILIDE OXIME		
AMIDO-OXIDE		
NASA TT F 16673	#	
ZINKERNAGEL, J.		000000131631
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A 420 KV MEASURING CAPACITOR WITH NO VOLTAGE		
DEPENDENCE		
CSIRO 12379, VOL 3, NO. 6, JUNE 1977	#	
ZINKERNAGEL, J.		000000162234
//PTB-MITTEILUNGEN//		
00/01/1976,V----,N0086, PP 0019-0025		
A 420 KV HIGH VOLTAGE STANDARD CAPACITOR WITH NO		
VOLTAGE DEPENDENCE		

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ZINKEVICH, V. E. //DOKLADY AN SSSR, BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES// 00/07/1981,V0259,N0001, PP 0216-0218 CLONING AND RESTRICTION ANALYSIS OF THE BAMHI-ECORI DNA FRAGMENT CONTAINING THE GENES OF THE HSD REGION OF ESCHERICHIA COLI AVAIL LY SERIALS CONSULTANTS BUREAU	000000307649
ZINKEVICH, V. N. //TRUDY ATLANTICHESKOGO NAUCHNO-ISSLEDOVATEL' SKOGO INSTITUTA RYBNOGO KHOZYAISTVA I OKEANO GRAFII (ATLANTNIRO)/// 00/00/1970,V----,N0028, PP 0097-0110 ON THE REPRODUCTION OF HERRING ON GEORGES BANK AND IN ADJACENT WATERS 207 PP NMFS ON LOAN	000000113179
ZINKEVICH, V. N. //TRUDY ATLANTICHESKOGO NAUCHNO-ISSLEDOVATEL' SKOGO INSTITUTA RYBNOGO KHOZYAISTVA I OKEANO GRAFII (ATLANTNIRO)/// 00/00/1970,V----,N0028, PP 0111-0134 DISTRIBUTION OF HERRING ON GEORGES BANK AND IN ADJACENT WATERS 207 PP NMFS ON LOAN	000000113180
ZINKEVICH, V. N. //TRUDY ATLANTICHESKOGO NAUCHNO-ISSLEDOVATEL' SKOGO INSTITUTA RYBNOGO KHOZYAISTVA I OKEANO GRAFII (ATLANTNIRO)/// 00/00/1970,V----,N0028, PP 0135-0146 NUMBERS OF HERRING (CLUPEA HARENGUS L.) AND THEIR MORTALITY RATE ON GEORGES BANK AS DETERMINED BY COUNTS OF ROE ON THE SPAWNING GROUNDS FROM 1964- 1966 207 PP NMFS ON LOAN	000000113181
ZINKEVICH, V. P. //DOKLADY AN SSSR, EARTH SCIENCE// 00/00/1978,V0241,N0001, PP 0166-0169 UPPER TRIASSIC OLISTOSTROMES OF THE MUKARYLYAN RIVER BASIN, KORYAK MOUNTAINS AMERICAN GEOLOGICAL INSTITUTE	000000273454
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ZINKOV, L. M. //NEFTEPERERABOTKA I NEFTEKHIMIYA// 00/00/1975,V----,N0005, PP 0047-0048 METHOD OF TREATING EXPERIMENTAL DATA OBTAINED IN HYDRODESULFURIZATION OF RESIDUAL PETROLEUM FEEDSTOCKS 2 PP ICE 1976 V16 N3 P446-7	000000135187
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ZINN, E. //MITTEILUNGEN DER DLG// 00/00/0000,V0081,N----, PP 0178 P 180 HOW CAN ONE PROTECT ONESELF AGAINST FMD? *NTIS TT 78-59017	000000090522
ZINNECKER, PETER //STAAT UND RECHT// 00/01/1977,V0026,N0001, PP 0016-0023 ROLE OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS IN PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT DISCUSSED 8 PP JPRS 68716	000000086078
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ZINNER, KARL //MTZ MOTORTECHNISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT// 00/00/1970,V----,N----, PP 0393-0403 PERFORMANCE RATING AND TESTING OF CHARGED FOUR-STROKE DIESEL ENGINES 26 PP ACSI K-1891	000000119533
ZINNY, FERNANDO SANCHEZ //NACION// 21/02/1982,V----,N----, PP 0001	000000306374

ALSO PAGE 12 BUENOS AIRES GOVERNOR INTERVIEWED 4 PP JPRS 80286	#	
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ZINOV, G. I. //MOSKOW.-MOSKVA ROSSEL'KHOSIZDAT// 00/00/1975,V----,N----, PP 0033 FOREST FIRE CHEMICAL STATIONS *NTIS TT 77-59233	#	000000090182
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ZINOV'YEV, A. A. //NEFTEGAZOVAYA GEOLOGIYA I GEOFIZIKA// 00/00/1975,V----,N0005, PP 0003-0008 NORTHEAST BORDER AREA OF THE PERI-CASPIAN DEPRESSION - ONE OF THE PRIME OBJECTIVES FOR OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION IN THE SUB-SALT SEDIMENTS PETROLEUM GEOLOGY, VOL 12, NO 10	#	000000043678
ZINOV'YEV, P. A.		000000290178

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NTC 76-12433-07C

ZINOVEV, G. N.

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ZINOVIEV, A. A.

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//AVTOBIOGRAFIYA//
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AUTOBIOGRAPHY
CSO: 8044/1370 COMPLETE SPECIAL

ZINOVYEV, ALEKSANDR

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AND FORMATION OF THE SPECTRAL RADIATION
COMPOSITION OF A POWERFUL LASER
NTC 78-11293-20E

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AN YTTRIUM ALUMINUM GARNET DRIVING OSCILLATOR AND
FORMATION OF THE SPECTRAL RADIATION COMPOSITION
OF A POWERFUL LASER 13 PP
ERDA/ORNL-TR-4534-77

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ERDA/ORNL-TR-4534-77

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AND THE FORMATION OF THE SPECTRAL MAKE-UP OF
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AUTOMATION OF MACHINE-BUILDING TECHNOLOGY 12 PP
GUD COPYRIGHT INFORMATION REFER OTHER REQUESTS
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PRESENT STATE AND DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES
OF THE TECHNOLOGY OF ATOMIC POWER STATIONS
EQUIPMENT BASED ON VVER-1000 REACTORS
PLENUM PUBLISHING COMPANY

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INVESTIGATION OF THE STRESSED STATE OF PRESSURE
VESSELS USING MODELS
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ZORIN, I. V. //TERMOELEKTRICHESKIYE KHOLODIL'NIKI I GENERATORY// 00/00/1973,V----,N----, PP 0001-0136 THERMOELECTRIC COOLERS AND GENERATORS 209 PP AIR/FTD-HC-23-2126-74	#	000000045134
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ZORIN, L. //VOY.-VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL// 00/12/1977,V----,N0012, PP 0061-0066 LEND LEASE OPERATIONS IN IRAN DURING WORLD WAR II DESCRIBED 10 PP JPRS 70740	#	000000112852
ZORIN, L. L. //LAKOKRASOCHNYE MATERIALY I IKH PRIMENIE// 00/00/1971,V----,N0004, PP 0082-0084 EXTRACTION OF TITANIUM DIOXIDE FROM FLUE GASES WITH THE HELP OF METALLO-CERAMIC FILTERS NTC-73-11415 NLL RTS-7163	#	000000190519
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HOST STRAIN RELATIONSHIPS IN SYMBIOSIS BETWEEN
HEXAPLOID TRIFOLIUM AMBIGUUM BIEB (CAUCASIAN
CLOVER) AND STRAINS OF RHIZOBIUM TRIFOLII
CSIRO 237 #

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SYMBIOTIC CHARACTERISTICS OF TRIFOLIUM AMBIGUUM
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LIBERATION OF HYDROGEN BY THE HYDROGENASE OF
ALCALIGENES EUTROPHUS Z-1 UNDER AEROBIC CONDITONS
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ZORIN CONTRASTS USSR, U. S. STANCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS
3 PP
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BICENTENNIAL AND THE 'CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS' 3 PP
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JPRS L/6338 #

ZORIN, V. S. 000000277891
//USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY//
11/05/1979,V-----,N0006, PP 0014-0025
PRESENT POSITIONS OF DEMOCRATS, REPUBLICANS:
1980 ELECTIONS NOTED 10 PP
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ZORIN, V. S. 000000179823
//SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA//
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CRISIS OF TWO-PARTY SYSTEM AND THE 1980 ELECTIONS
15 PP
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UNDECYL RADICALS IN REACTIONS INVOLVING REMOVAL
OF HYDROGEN AND CHLORINE ATOMS 2 PP

AVAIL LY SERIALS CONSULTANTS BUREAU	#	
ZORIN, V. V. //DOKLADY AKADEMII NAUK SSSR// 00/11/1980,V0255,N0003, PP 0626-0628 EFFECT OF DIBENZ-18-CROWN-6 ON THE REACTIVITY OF UNDECYL RADICALS IN REACTIONS INVOLVING REMOVAL OF HYDROGEN AND CHLORINE ATOMS 2 PP AVAIL LY SERIALS CONSULTANTS BUREAU	#	000000303965
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ZORIN, VAL. //SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA// 00/08/1978,V----,N0008, PP 0045-0056 THE MONOPOLIES AND WASHINGTON 14 PP JPRS 72069	#	000000222854
ZORIN, VAL. //KOMMUNIST// 00/10/1978,V----,N0015, PP 0105-0112 BIG LIE ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS 10 PP JPRS 72393	#	000000145115
ZORINA, I. N. //LATINSKAYA AMERIKA// 00/00/1975,V----,N0006, PP 0196-0200 NOV-DEC 75 REVIEW OF BOOK ON LATIN AMERICA'S REVOLUTIONARY PROCESSES 6 PP GUO JPRS L/5686	#	000000036894
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INTERPRETATION OF THE INFRARED ADSORPTION SPECTRA OF PHLOGOPITES NRCC C-15467	#	
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MERCURY CONTENT IN GASES OF SOME GAS AND GAS- CONDENSATE FIELDS IN THE USSR NTC 76-13128-08D	#	
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ZORKIN, L. M. //GEOLOGIYA NEFTI I GAZA// 00/00/1976,V0020,N0007, PP 0032-0036 HYDROGEOLOGICAL EVIDENCE FOR ZONATION OF OIL AND GAS GENERATION PROCESSES NTC 78-10443-08D	#	000000151054
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ZORKIN, L. M. //SOVETSKAYA GEOLOGIYA// 00/00/1977,V----,N0011, PP 0127-0142 GEOCHEMICAL OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION 16 PP ATS: 14G157R	#	000000300474
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ZORLL, U. //DEFAZET//		000000061520

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ZORLL, U. //GUMMI, ASBEST UND KUNSTSTOFFE// 00/00/1979,V0032,N----, PP 0302-0308 RHEOLOGICALLY DETERMINED FILLER ORIENTATIONS IN POLYMER LAYERS NTC 81-11255-111	#	000000290631
ZORLL, U. //GUMMI ASBEST KUNSTSTOFFE// 00/00/1979,V0032,N----, PP 0302-0308 RHEOLOGICALLY DETERMINED FILLER ORIENTATIONS IN POLYMER LAYERS NTC 81-12956-111: BLL 3623.66 (6060)	#	000000297036
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ZORN, H. //ZENTRALBLATT FUR ARBEITSMEDIZIN, ARBEITSSCHUTZ UND PROPHYLAXE// 00/08/1979,V0029,N0008, PP 0204-0207 INDUSTRIAL SUBSTANCES DANGEROUS TO HEALTH WHICH CAN BE ABSORBED THROUGH THE SKIN MB	000000250699
ZOROASTROV, V. K. //SUODOSTROYENIYE// 00/00/1977,V----,N0009, PP 0022-0024 SIDEWALL AIRCUSHION VEHICLES OUO COPYRIGHT INFO IS NOT IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN NAV/NISC/NIC-RSTP-052-78	000000130698
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ZOROASTROV, V. K. //SUODOSTROYENIYE// 00/00/1980,V----,N0001, PP 0005-0007 CHAYKA: A SEAGOING SIDEWALL PASSENGER HOVERCRAFT OUO COPYRIGHT INFO IT IS NOT IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN NAV/NISC/NCI-RSTP-052-81	000000277484
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ZOST, Z. G.	000000009017

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<p>ZOST, Z. G. //IZVESTIYA VUZ PRIBOROSTROYENIYE// 00/00/1977,V0020,N0012, PP 0055-0058 ON IDENTIFYING A GYROHORIZON COMPASS 5 PP JPRS 70810</p>	#	000000258043
<p>ZOSZARNY, Z. //ROCKNIK PANST WOWEGO ZAKLADU HYGIENY// 00/00/1975,V0026,N0001, PP 0001-0010 ANNOYANCE OF AIRCRAFT NOISE IN THE CLOSET PROXIMITY OF THE WARSZAWA-OKECIE AIRPORT *NASA TM-75892</p>	#	000000170699
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TOPICAL ASPECTS OF THE CORRELATION OF FUNDAMENTAL		
AND APPLIED RESEARCH 11 PP		
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//CHEM.-KHIMIYA V SELSKOM KHOZYAISTVE//		
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ZOTOV, D.		000000067011
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MATERIAL BASE OF CONTAINER SHIPPING 11 PP		
GUO COPYRIGHT INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE OTHERS		
REFER TO ARM/FSTC		
ARM/FSTC-AST-11501-061-75	#	
ZOTOV, D.		000000051329
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MERCHANT MARINE IN THE TENTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN 6 PP		
GUO		
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ZOTOV, D.		000000170547
//PLANOVOYE KHOZYAYSTVO//		
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13 PP		
JPRS 71852	#	
ZOTOV, D.		000000236748
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00/07/1980,V----,N0007, PP 0090-0093		
TRANSPORT QUOTAS, REQUIREMENTS TO BE BALANCED		
INTERSECTORIALLY 7 PP		
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ZOTOV, D.		000000290868
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ZOTOV, D. K.		000000280174
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ALSO PAGE 4		
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ZOTOV, G.		000000032563

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<p>ZOTOV, M. //VOPROSY EKONOMIKI// 00/00/1977,V----,N0004, PP 0047-0058 THE ROLE OF CREDIT IN CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION 14 PP GUO JPRS L/7173</p>	000000192541
<p>ZOTOV, M. //PRAVDA// 20/10/1979,V----,N----, PP 0002 EXPANSION OF BANK CREDIT IN CONSTRUCTION FINANCE SUCCEEDING 4 PP JPRS 74624</p>	000000311517
<p>ZOTOV, M. S. //ECON.-EKONOMIKA STROITEL'STVA// 00/11/1981,V----,N0011, PP 0003-0009 MONETARY CONTROLS SHOULD RESTRICT DISSIPATION OF FUNDS FOR CONSTRUCTION 8 PP JPRS 80596</p>	000000049234
<p>ZOTOV, O. A. //PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA// 00/00/1976,V----,N0002, PP 0222-0225 LUTFULLA MUTALLIP--UIGHUR PATRIOT 2 PP GUO JPRS L/6284</p>	000000252047
<p>ZOTOV, R. V. //GEODEZIYA I KARTOGRAFIYA// 00/00/1980,V----,N0004, PP 0048-0049 PHOTOGRAPHIC TYING-IN OF GEODETIC POINTS WITHOUT MARKING *DMAAC TC-2969</p>	000000020102
<p>ZOTOV, V. //SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA// 17/09/1975,V----,N----, PP 0002 CENTRALIZATION OF REINFORCED CONCRETE MAKING URGED</p>	

6 PP JPRS 66080	#	
ZOTOV, V. //PRAVDA VOSTOKA// 04/01/1977,V----,N----, PP 0003 SPECULATION, BRIBERY, FRAUD IN TRADE SYSTEM, UZBEK SSR PROSECUTES SPECULATORS 2 PP JPRS 68974	#	000000063991
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ZOTOV, V. //SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA// 24/06/1977,V----,N----, PP 0001 CONSTRUCTION VERSUS CHEMICAL PRODUCTION CAPACITY DISCUSSED 5 PP JPRS 69517	#	000000104154
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ZOTOV, V. //SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA// 12/01/1982,V----,N----, PP 0002 SAYANSK TPK 6 PP JPRS 80443	#	000000308028
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COMMENTS ON DETERMINING NET OUTPUT INDICATOR, VALUE OF NORMATIVE NET OUTPUT 3 PP JPRS 70795.	#	
ZOTOV, V-A //OPTIMIZATSIYA KONSTRUKTSII TERMoeLEKTRICHESKOGOPRIEMNIKA IK-IZLUCHENIYA// 00/00/1980,V----,N----, PP 0215-0220 DESIGN OPTIMIZATION OF A THERMOELECTRIC DETECTOR OF INFRARED RADIATION 6 PP *FTD-IDIRSIT-0955-81	#	000000279082
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ZOVNER, VADIM		000000192269

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<p>ZOWADE, T. //MAKROMOLEKULARE CHEMIE// 00/00/1973,V0165,N----, PP 0031-0038 AN APPARATUS FOR THE GAS-CHROMATOGRAPHIC OBSERVATION OF THE METATHESIS OF SHORT-CHAIN OLEFINS NTC 76-11403-07C</p>	000000131904
<p>ZOZ, N. N. //DOKLADY AKADEMIYA NAUK SSSR// 00/00/1977,V0233,N0001, PP 0242-0244 INHIBITING THE GROWTH OF TUMORS IN PLANTS WITH N-METHYL-N-NITROSO UREA NTC 77-13851-060</p>	000000090999
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NTC 80-13104-20L	BLL RTS 11980	
ZOZULEVICH, D. M.		000000015142
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ON A COMPUTER 14 PP		
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CONNECTIVE EVAPORATIVE COOLING OF OIL-CONTAINING		
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HEAT TRANSFER AND HYDRAULIC FRICTION DURING THE		
FLOW OF A VISCOUS FLUID IN A FLAT TUBE 7 PP		
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(CRUSTACEA, CLADOCERA)		
CONSULTANTS BUREAU		
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<p>RONG SHEN //LISHI YANJIU (HISTORICAL RESEARCH)// 15/06/1981,V----,N0003, PP 0077-0090 TAIPING EGALITARIANISM EVALUATED 17 PP JPRS 79194</p>	000000285397
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RENMIN RIBAO ON TAIPING TIANGUO'S EGALITARIANISM 4 PP FBIS-CHI-81-145, 29 JULY 1981, VOL 1, NO 145 #	
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RONGYI CHEN //SHIJIE LISHI// 02/12/1979,V----,N0006, PP 0003-0009 STALIN'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO HISTORICAL SCIENCE PRAISED 11 PP JPRS 76052 #	000000229351
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JPRS 68836	
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JPRS 77358	#	
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ROSAS, RUBEN FERRER //NACIONAL// 24/07/1979,V----,N----, PP D-9 ONADO FIELD DEVELOPED 2 PP JPRS 74226	#	000000183547
ROSAS, RUBEN FERRER //NACIONAL// 13/08/1979,V----,N----, PP D-18 OIL EXPLORATION, REACTIVATION EFFORTS PROGRESS 1 PP JPRS 74226	#	000000183514
ROSAS, RUBEN FERRER //NACIONAL// 13/08/1979,V----,N----, PP D-17 TUCUPITA FIELD REACTIVATED 1 PP JPRS 74226	#	000000183543
ROSAS, RUBEN FERRER //NACIONAL, EL// 16/07/1977,V----,N----, PP 00C2 MILITARY HONORS, DECORATIONS AWARDED, 40 YEARS' SERVICE 1 PP JPRS 69770	#	000000086575
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OUTLINED 14 PP JPRS 68969	#	
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ROSATI, RENZO //MONDO// 09/10/1981,V----,N----, PP 0012-0013 ALLEGED SOCIALIST PLAN TO SPLIT CGIL UNION DROP IN UNION MEMBERSHIP 5 PP OUO JPRS L/10186	#	000000288573
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ROSCA, TEODOR //REVUE.-REVISTA ECONOMICA// 15/05/1981,V----,N0020, PP 0017-0018 CHANGES IN CREDIT SYSTEM SUPPORT SELF-ADMINISTRATION 4 PP JPRS 78429	#	000000270233
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CHANGES IN BONE FORMATION UNDER IMMOBILIZATION AND REMOBILIZATION ANIMAL EXPERIMENTS USING 45CA AND TETRACYCLINE LABELLING NTC 81-12598-06S	
ROSEMEYER, B. //ARCH.-ARCHIV FUER ORTHOPAEDISCHE UND UNFALLCHIRURGIE// 00/00/1975,V0083,N----, PP 0001-0008 CHANGES IN BONE TURNOVER UNDER IMMOBILIZATION AND REMOBILIZATION. ANIMAL EXPERIMENTS USING CA-45 AND TETRACYCLINE LABELLING *NASA TM-76139	000000214022
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ROSEN, A. //REVUE.-REVISTA ECONOMICA// 06/08/1976,V----,N0031, PP 0001-0002 ECONOMIC GROWTH AIMED AT RAISING STANDARD OF LIVING 14 PP JPRS 67928	000000055261
ROSEN, B. //ZEITSCHRIFT FUER PHYSIK// 19/03/1927,V0043,N----, PP 0069-0130 RESONANCE, FLUORESCENCE AND ABSORPTION SPECTRA OF ELEMENTS FROM THE SIXTH GROUP OF THE PERIODIC TABLE 101 PP OUO COPYRIGHT INFO REFER OTHERS TO FTD/STINFO AIR/FTD-ID(IRSIT)-1097-80	000000269330
ROSEN, EMMANUEL //BAMAHANE// 09/09/1981,V----,N----, PP 0019-0020 ALSO PAGE 53 MAJOR GENERAL BEN-GAL VIEWED AS CONTROVERSIAL FIGURE 7 PP JPRS 79644	000000288998
ROSEN, IMANUEL //BAMAHANEH// 10/12/1980,V----,N----, PP 0012-0014 IDF COMBATS SMUGGLING FROM LEBANON 6 PP JPRS 77378	000000252919
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LINK IN THE EPIDEMIOLOGICAL CHAIN OF THE DISEASE		
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ROSENBLUM, DORON //HA'AREZ// 07/04/1978,V----,N----, PP 0014-0015 ALSO P 41 FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN INTERVIEWED 10 PP JPRS 71218	#	000000127476
ROSENBLUM, H. //YEDI'OT AHARONOT// 02/01/1981,V----,N----, PP 0002 RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA VIEWED 3 PP JPRS 77624	#	000000255868
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ROSENDAHL, PETER //MANEDS BORSEN// 00/12/1980,V----,N----, PP 0085-0096 PRIME MINISTER JORGENSEN COMMENTS ON ECONOMY 11 PP JPRS 77183	#	000000248363
ROSENDO, MARIO //DIARIO DE NOTICIAS// 17/06/1975,V----,N----, PP 0001-0002 INDUSTRY MINISTER CONCERNED OVER INDUSTRIAL SECTOR. INVIGORATION 8 PP JPRS 65350	#	000000032616
ROSENDORFER, T. //COMPARISON OF CHARGES FOR MULTI-FRAGMENTATION AND MULTI-P EXPLOSIVE BODIES// 00/10/1975,V----,N----, 13-15 OCT 75 COMPARISON OF CHARGES FOR MULTI-FRAGMENTATION AND MULTI-P EXPLOSIVE BODIES. MEETING AT MBB SCHROBENHAVSEN *FSTC-IMIS 11601-048-76	#	000000063747
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DISORDER OF THE SURFACE OXIDES AND THE ELECTRO-
CHEMICAL OXIDATION OF TI-NB AND TI-NI ALLOYS
PP 368-378
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SOLUBLE INHIBITORS IN ALKYD RESINS
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THE PROTECTIVE PROPERTIES OF CANNING LACQUERS
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THE PROTECTIVE PROPERTIES OF CANNING LACQUERS 8 PP
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AN ABSORPTION LITHIUM BROMIDE REFRIGERATION
MACHINE WITH A SPRAY GENERATOR
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DISCHARGE CURVES
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DUST FACTOR IN THE PRODUCTION OF NEW GLASS FIBRES
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ON THE APPEARANCE OF STRESS AND STEROID ULCER
OF THE STOMACH
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ROLE PLAYED BY CATECHOLAMINES IN THE MECHANISMS OF
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ACSI K 8372

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DRESSING OF PLANTS
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS RAISED BY NATIONALIZATION
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6 PP

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4 PP		
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ROSS, THOMAS		000000263909
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PLANS OF 'NATIONAL ISLAMIC UNION OF AFGHANISTAN'		
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SECTIONS 1.5.2-1.5.4		
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REPORT URGES ONLY HALF OF OIL RESERVE BE		
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ROUCO, IGLESIAS J. //PRENSA// 20/02/1982,V----,N----, PP 0001 ALSO PAGE 4 IMPACT OF PSP MEMBER MURDER ON GOVERNMENT STABILITY ASSESSED 3 PP JPRS 80344	#	000000305422
ROUCO, J. IGLESIAS //PRENSA// 21/12/1980,V----,N----, PP 0001 DECISION ON REFURBISHING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AWAITED 3 PP JPRS 77265	#	000000254096
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ROUCO, J. IGLESIAS //PRENSA// 06/03/1981,V----,N----, PP 0001 ALSO PAGE 4 IGLESIAS ROUCO COMMENTS ON WALTERS VISIT 3 PP JPRS 77857	#	000000262447
ROUCO, J. IGLESIAS //PRENSA// 25/03/1981,V----,N----, PP 0001 ALSO PAGE 8 COLUMNIST ON RECENT APPOINTMENTS, PERONIST MANEUVERS 3 PP JPRS 78021	#	000000262351
ROUCO, J. IGLESIAS //PRENSA// 29/03/1981,V----,N----, PP 0001 ALSO PAGE 7 IGLESIAS ROUCO VIEWS COMPLEXITIES OF PROBLEMS AHEAD OF VIOLA 4 PP JPRS 77901	#	000000262104
ROUCO, J. IGLESIAS //PRENSA// 02/04/1981,V----,N----, PP 0001 ALSO PAGE 6 IGLESIAS ROUCO COMMENTS ON BROAD RANGE OF TOPICS 3 PP	#	000000262608

JPRS 78131	#	
ROUCO, J. IGLESIAS		000000265076
//PRENSA//		
28/05/1981,V----,N----, PP 0001		
ALSO P 7		
SOVIETS, BRAZILIANS SEEN BENEFICIARIES 3 PP		
JPRS 78332	#	
ROUCO, J. IGLESIAS		000000274053
//PRENSA//		
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3-7 JUN 1981		
IGLESIAS ROUCO PROBES INTO CURRENT ECONOMIC		
CRISIS 14 PP		
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ROUCO, J. IGLESIAS		000000285415
//PRENSA//		
25/06/1981,V----,N----, PP 0001		
ALSO PAGE 7		
ARGENTINE NEGOTIATORS WANT SAMORE REPLACED 4 PP		
JPRS 78458	#	
ROUCO, J. IGLESIAS		000000272428
//PRENSA//		
05/07/1981,V----,N----, PP 0001		
ALSO PAGE 4		
JOURNALIST CONSIDERS OUTCOME OF CURRENT EVENTS		
3 PP		
JPRS 78513	#	
ROUCO, J. IGLESIAS		000000294018
//PRENSA//		
01/11/1981,V----,N----, PP 0001		
ALSO PAGE 4		
IGLESIAS ROUCO COMMENTS ON VIOLA'S UNSTABLE FUTURE		
4 PP		
JPRS 79638	#	
ROUCO, J. IGLESIAS		000000302312
//PRENSA//		
22/12/1981,V----,N----, PP 0001		
ALSO PAGE 8		
FOREIGN POLICY UNDER GALTIERI TILTING TO		
WEST, SAYS ROUCO 3 PP		
JPRS 80056	#	
ROUCO, J. IGLESIAS		000000302311
//PRENSA//		
06/01/1982,V----,N----, PP 0001		
ALSO PAGE 4		
COLUMNIST PREVIEWS PRIVATIZATION PLANS OF NEW		
GOVERNMENT 4 PP		
JPRS 80056	#	
ROUCO, J. IGLESIAS		000000304185
//PRENSA//		
13/02/1982,V----,N----, PP 0001		
ALSO PAGE 4		
IGLESIAS ROUCO COMMENTS ON GALTIERI'S LA PAMPA		
SPEECH 3 PP		
JPRS 80253	#	

<p>ROUCO, J, IGLESIAS //PRENSA// 31/03/1981,V----,N----, PP 0001 ALSO PAGE 4 VIOLA'S PROBLEMS WITH CABINET, POLITICAL PARTIES FORESEEN 3 PP JPRS 77857</p>	000000262445
<p>ROUCO, JESUS //PAIS, EL// 00/12/1977,V----,N----, PP 0005 POLISARIO PRISONERS HELD BY MAURITANIA INTERVIEWED 5 PP JPRS 70490</p>	000000106080
<p>ROUCO, JESUS //PAIS, EL// 05/04/1978,V----,N----, PP 0007 ECEVIT INTERVIEWED ON TURKISH DOMESTIC, FOREIGN POLICIES 5 PP JPRS 71012</p>	000000126353
<p>ROUCO, JESUS //PAIS, EL// 22/04/1978,V----,N----, PP 0007 SPANISH JOURNALIST'S INSIGHTS INTO CEAUSESCU'S ROMANIA 15 PP JPRS 71220</p>	000000127459
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<p>ROUGER, JEAN PIERRE //MONDE// 18/09/1979,V----,N----, PP 0041 AUVERGNE NUCLEAR PLANT CONSTRUCTION QUESTIONED 2 PP JPRS 74491</p>	000000186555
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ROULEAU, ERIC //MONDE// 17/08/1979,V-----,N-----, PP 0004 ROULEAU DISCUSSES ALTERNATIVES TO KHOMEYNI 5 PP JPRS 74202 #	000000186213
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ROULEAU, ERIC //MONDE// 07/11/1979,V-----,N-----, PP 0001	

ALSO PP 8 KHOMEYNI AIDE COMMENTS ON IRANIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION 3 PP JPRS 74799	#	
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ROULEAU, ERIC //MONDE//		000000251772

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PART 1, 4 PP FBIS-SAS-81-144, 28 JULY 1981, VOL 8, NO 144 #	
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ROY, JOANINE //MONDE// 07/11/1980,V----,N----, PP 0001 ALSO P 39 PROBLEMS IN CGC RANKS PROVOKE INVOLVEMENT IN 1981 ELECTION 3 PP JPRS 76976	#	000000244055
ROY, JOANINE //MONDE// 10/09/1981,V----,N----, PP 0001 ALSO P 36 FO'S BERGERON ON ECONOMY, POLICIES; RELATIONS TO PCF, UNIONS 3 PP JPRS 79257	#	000000285248
ROY, JOANINE //MONDE// 10/09/1981,V----,N----, PP 0037 KRASUCKI: CGT POLICIES ON PRICES, SALARIES, NATIONALIZATIONS 4 PP JPRS 79416	#	000000290088
ROY, MAURICE //POINT, LE// 24/02/1975,V----,N----, PP 0040-0042 ALSO PP 44-45 JEAN-PIERRE FLORCADE, FRENCH FINANCE MINISTER 12 PP CSO: 8119/2059-75 COMPLETE SPECIAL	#	000000181590

<p>ROY, MAURICE //POINT// 04/02/1980,V----,N----, PP 0046-0047 FAILURES, ERRORS OF SOVIET ECONOMY DISCUSSED 3 PP CSO: 8019/0860-80 A COMPLETED SPECIAL #</p>	000000227600
<p>ROY, MAURICE //POINT// 21/09/1981,V----,N----, PP 0058-0059 CEYRAC SEES NATIONALIZATION AS 'TRAGEDY FOR FRANCE' 4 PP JPRS 79355 #</p>	000000292345
<p>ROY, MAURICE //POINT// 00/01/1982,V----,N----, PP 0030-0031 11 - 17 JANUARY 1982 MANAGER, EMPLOYERS EXPRESS VIEWS ON GOVERNMENT, ECONOMY. EMPLOYERS REACT TO DELORS' SPEECH 3 PP JPRS 80182 #</p>	000000301364
<p>ROY, MICHEL //DEVOIR, LE// 09/06/1978,V----,N----, PP 0004 PRESS COMMENTS ON QUEBEC CULTURAL WHITE PAPER, THE WHITE PAPER ON CULTURE 3 PP JPRS 71457 #</p>	000000162422
<p>ROY, MICHEL //DEVOIR, LE// 11/10/1978,V----,N----, PP 0004 COMMENT ON LEVESQUE'S STATEMENT ON REFERENDUM, DISCUSSION OF LEVESQUE'S STATEMENT 3 PP JPRS 72199 #</p>	000000162052
<p>ROY, MICHEL //DEVOIR, LE// 15/12/1978,V----,N----, PP 0004 RYAN'S ENTRY INTO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DISCUSSED, DESIRABILITY OF MOVE EXPLAINED 3 PP JPRS 72733 #</p>	000000151895
<p>ROY, MICHEL //DEVOIR, LE// 22/06/1979,V----,N----, PP 0004 DECISION 'FAIR', 'DEMOCRATIC', 'RIGHT' 2 PP JPRS 73974 #</p>	000000178019
<p>ROY, MICHEL //DEVOIR// 12/09/1979,V----,N----, PP 0004 CLARIFICATION BY MR. RYAN 3 PP JPRS 74376 #</p>	000000185720
<p>ROY, MICHEL //DEVOIR// 22/09/1979,V----,N----, PP 0004 QUEBEC PAPERS COMMENT ON PQ CABINET RESHUFFLE 3 PP JPRS 74439 #</p>	000000186726
<p>ROY, MICHEL //DEVOIR// 02/11/1979,V----,N----, PP 0004 WHITE PAPER SEEN FLAWED BY OVER OPTIMISM 3 PP</p>	000000200080

JPRS 74831	
ROY, MICHEL //DEVOIR// 16/11/1979,V----,N----, PP 0004 DEFEAT BORDERS ON REPUDIATION 3 PP JPRS 74936	000000202480
ROY, MICHEL //PRESSE// 22/12/1979,V----,N----, PAGE A4 QUEBEC PRESS COMMENTS ON PQ REFERENDUM QUESTION 7 PP JPRS 75176	000000210855
ROY, OLIVIER //MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE// 00/01/1981,V----,N----, PP 0001 ALSO P 16 ARTICLE ANALYZES POSSIBLE STRATEGY, RISKS OF SOVIETS 4 PP JPRS 77481	000000255425
ROY, OLIVIER //MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE// 00/03/1982,V----,N0336, PP 0006-0007 BEARING OF TRIBAL, RELIGIOUS FACTIONS ON WAR ANALYZED 7 PP JPRS 80662	000000312976
ROY, P. //FISHING INDUSTRY IN THE MARITIME PROVINCES// 00/00/1976,V----,N---, FISHING INDUSTRY IN THE MARITIME PROVINCES 24 PP *NTIS TT 77-55016	000000146198
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ROYAK, S. M. //TSEMENT// 00/00/1972,V----,N0005, PP 0009-0010 A PERICLASE-BELTIE REFRACTORY FOR THE BURNING ZONE OF ROTARY KILNS NTC 74-12425-11B	000000005605
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ROYER, H.
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 NO R 107/75
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ROYKO, MIKE //SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA// 00/10/1977,V----,N0010, PP 0098-0107 BOSS RICHARD J. DALEY OF CHICAGO 1 PP JPRS 70204 #		000000105458
ROYKO, MIKE //SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA// 00/11/1977,V----,N0011, PP 0101-0108 BOSS RICHARD J. DALEY OF CHICAGO 1 PP JPRS 70428 #		000000105415
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ROYKO, MIKE //SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA// 00/04/1978,V----,N0004, PP 0078-0086 BOSS RICHARD J. DALEY OF CHICAGO 1 PP JPRS 71118 #		000000122732
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<p>ROYO, J. PEREZ //NUESTRA BANDERA// 00/00/1978,V----,N0093, PP 0055-0058 POST-PCE CONGRESS LOOK AT THESES 6, 15, DEBATE ON THESES 6, 15 6 PP JPRS 72002</p>	000000195287
<p>ROYO, MARTINE //NOUVEL ECONOMISTE// 17/03/1980,V----,N----, PP 0042-0045 ROLE OF ECONOMICS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS NOW ACCENTUATED 6 PP JPRS 75752</p>	000000219717
<p>ROYO, MARTINE //NOUVEL ECONOMISTE// 07/04/1980,V----,N----, PP 0025-0026 AFRICA TO GET PRIORITY FRENCH AID 3 PP JPRS 75895</p>	000000222607
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<p>ROYTENBURD, S. R. //FIZIOLOGIYA CHELOVEKA// 00/00/1978,V----,N0001, PP 0090-0094 EFFECT OF ELECTROSLEEP ON THE BODY'S ADAPTIVE CAPABILITIES 7 PP FOUO JPRS L/7820</p>	000000139970
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<p>ROYTMAN, M. P. //SOVETSKOYE ZDRAVOOKHRANENIYE// 00/00/1975,V----,N0007, PP 0089-0091 NEW WORK ON INFECTION PATHOLOGY PUBLISHED 4 PP JPRS 65579</p>	000000026792
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ROYTMAN, YA. //KHOZYAYSTVO I PRAVO// 00/09/1980, V----, N0009, PP 0026-0029 PLANNING IN MOTOR VEHICLE TRANSPORT 6 PP JPRS 77028	#	000000246242
ROZAKIS, KHRISTOS //ANDI// 22/05/1981, V----, N----, PP 0028-0031 DEMILITARIZATION OF AEGEAN ISLANDS, TREATIES ANALYZED 6 PP JPRS 78449	#	000000270160
ROZALIYEV, YU. N. //NARODY AZII I AFRIKI// 00/00/1980, V----, N0001, PP 0072-0083 ROLE OF STATE CAPITALISM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 13 PP JPRS 77019	#	000000246212
ROZANOV, B. V. //KUZNECHNO-SHTAMPOVOCHNOYE PROIZVODSTVO// 00/00/1977, V----, N0005, PP 0001-0005 ALSO PAGES 8-16 ENGLISH TITLE UNKNOWN *FTD-ID(RS)T-0194-82	#	000000308207
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ROZANOV, B. V. //KUZNECHNO-SHTAMPOVOCHNOYE PROIZVODSTVO// 00/00/1977,V----,N0005, PP 0005-0008 NKMZ AND VNIIMETMASH-DEVELOPED GENERAL-PURPOSE HEAVY-DUTY STAMPING PRESS 8 PP 000 COPYRIGHT INFO REFER OTHERS TO FTD/STINFO FTD-ID(IRS)T-1667-79	000000198692
ROZANOV, B. V. //KUZNECHNO-SHTAMPOVOCHNOYE PROIZVODSTVO// 00/00/1977,V----,N0005, PP 0008-0011 SPECIAL PRESSES WITH BED SECURED BY A HIGH-STRENGT BAND 8 PP JPRS 69662	000000081756
ROZANOV, B. V. //KUZNECHNO-SHTAMPOVOCHNOYE PROIZVODSTVO// 00/00/1977,V----,N0007, PP 0001-0003 HYDRAULIC PRESSES FOR HIGH DURABILITY MATERIALS 6 PP JPRS 69882	000000090657
ROZANOV, B. V. //KUZNECHNO-SHTAMPOVOCHNOYE PROIZVODSTVO// 00/00/1978,V----,N0010, PP 0001-0004 STATE AND PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF HYDRAULIC PRESSES 18 PP 000 COPYRIGHT INFO REFER OTHERS TO FTD/STINFO AIR/FTD-ID(IRS)T-1459-79	000000231220
ROZANOV, BORIS VASIL'YEVICH //IZOBRETATEL' I RATSIONALIZATOR// 00/01/1981,V----,N0001, PP 0023 ENGLISH TITLE UNKNOWN 2 PP 000 COPYRIGHT INFO REFER OTHERS TO FTD/STINFO AIR/FTD-ID(IRS)T-0762-81	000000288834
ROZANOV, I. A. //DOKLADY AN SSSR, SERIYA KHIMIYA// 00/00/1977,V0234,N0001, PP 0083-0085 INTERACTION IN THE SYSTEM POTASSIUM TETRAMETAPHOSPHATE PRASEODYMIUM CHLORIDE WATER PLENUM PUBLISHING CORPORATION	000000144214
ROZANOV, I. A. //DOKLADY AN SSSR, KHIMIYA// 00/00/1977,V0234,N0001, PP 0083-0085 INTERACTION IN THE SYSTEM POTASSIUM TETRAMETAPHOSPHATE-PROSEODYMIUM CHLORIDE WATER PLENUM PUBLISHING CORPORATION	000000216541
ROZANOV, I. S. //TRANSPORTNOYE STROITEL'STVO// 00/12/1978,V----,N0012, PP 0018-0020 IMPROVING FACILITIES AT BAM SETTLEMENTS DISCUSSED 7 PP	000000159813

OLC 78-836/5
1 August 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Recent Developments on S. 3314, Federal Tort Claims Act

1. The undersigned met for one hour with Mrs. Ricky Tigert of the Senate Judiciary staff regarding our few remaining problems with the Federal Tort Claims Act Amendments, S. 3314. This bill, if passed, would insulate certain Federal Government employees from suit for torts committed within the scope of their authority.

2. I explained to Mrs. Tigert that it is the position of CIA that to exclude former employees, as the bill now does, from coverage might have a chilling effect on valid overseas operations. It was pointed out that these people were being excluded in an arbitrary manner since their potential for or actual liability would be determined solely by a retirement date. For example, employee A who committed a Constitutional Tort in 1977 and retired in 1980 could be personally liable on the cause of action arising in 1977 if the suit was initiated after his 1980 retirement date; whereas, on the other hand, employee B, having committed a similar tort in 1977 and not retiring prior to initiation of the suit would not be held personally liable.

Although admitting that this might be inequitable, the Committee's position is that, because former employees would not be subject to the bill's disciplinary provisions, personal liability or at least the option thereof must be retained in the case of former employees.

The Department of Justice is fighting this position vigorously with the ACLU and others on the opposing side.

3. A second major point was raised regarding the unfettered and unreviewable discretion of the reviewing body (presumably I. O. B.) in the disciplinary proceeding to allow the complainant the right to examine and cross examine witnesses. I asked if it might not be best to tack on to this our standard "but for" clause limiting this to information or individuals not coming under relevant Executive Order or national security provisions. Mrs. Tigert allowed that this she would consider. I offered to provide draft language and Legislation staff is working on the same. FBI, has, per my request, promised to forcefully raise this oversight with Department of Justice today.

MORI/CDF

4. A final issue raised dealt with the, as yet unclear requirement that regulations promulgated by the reviewing body be subject to public notice and Judicial review. According to Mrs. Tigert this would involve simply the publishing of such unclassified rules and regulations in the Federal Register, allowing for public comment via letter. The bill does not make this clear and, therefore, we are preparing amendatory language towards that end.

5. All of the foregoing matters have been discussed with the FBI and relayed to Justice who, on the insistence of this office, has already secured a number of favorable changes in the bill



Assistant Legislative Counsel

Distribution:

1 - OGC
1 - FPH
1 - LLM
1 - OLC Subject
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OLC:MDC:sm: (1 August 78)

STAT

(172)

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SECRET

LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

CONGRESSIONAL CORRESPONDENCE

FROM

Legislative Counsel

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, rank number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

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1/21/54 JRR

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The attached congressional correspondence is forwarded to you for the preparation of an appropriate reply. This correspondence, together with your proposed reply for the signature of

should be returned to the Legislative Counsel by

If for any reason, a complete response cannot be in the hands of the Legislative Counsel by this date, please contact this office by telephone immediately.

I think I remember giving this information for Danilov on the previous night, then, has been so much our mail can't be any more

CONGRESSIONAL CORRESPONDENCE

FROM Legislative Counsel				NO. DATE
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. <i>— Eric</i>		<i>1/24/72</i>	<i>JAN</i>	<p>The attached congressional correspondence is forwarded to you for the preparation of an appropriate reply. This correspondence, together with your proposed reply for the signature of _____</p> <p>_____ should be returned to the Legislative Counsel by _____</p> <p>If for any reason, a complete response cannot be in the hands of the Legislative Counsel by this date, please contact this office by telephone immediately.</p> <p><i>I think I should give you a copy of the letter from Danilov on the previous subject, they have been so much on mail can't be more for</i></p>
2. <i>Eric</i>				
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172

4 March 1955

Chief, Contact Division

How Case

• Radio Code Recording

5

CGI is interested in obtaining the wire recording of the radio program in which the unidentified code was heard. If they will not relinquish it permanently, please arrange to get it on loan.

2. It would appreciate return of [REDACTED] to this office.

EX-105271 (1)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE 24 Nov 71

2- (89)

4 March 1955

New Case

- Audio Code Recording

50

ISI is interested in obtaining the wire recording of the radio program in which the unidentified code was heard. If they will not relinquish it permanently, please arrange to get it on loan.

2. He would appreciate return of [REDACTED] to this office.

ENCLOSURE (1)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE 24 2 20

2- (89)

MEMO FOR THE FILE

On 25 June 1976, [REDACTED] met with [REDACTED] of ORD([REDACTED]) regarding possible interest by that office in the UFO case. [REDACTED] was provided copies of the [REDACTED] and later [REDACTED] memo, as well as the original [REDACTED]. These items were provided at his request.

[REDACTED] felt that there may be some ongoing ORD interest, dependent by depending on the evaluation of that office of the material provided.

[REDACTED] asked that we attempt to obtain additional info on the [REDACTED] system which we agreed to do. (a TWX was sent to this effect to the [REDACTED] Office on 25 June 1976). *requesting additional info*

XXXXXXXXXX

[REDACTED] asked that the ORD interest be kept at a low profile until some evaluation could be made, but at the same time indicated that he would be in touch with me on a fairly ~~regular~~ regular basis.

25 June 1976

items were provided at his request.

[redacted] felt that there may be some ongoing ORD interest, ~~dependent~~
by
depending on the evaluation of that office of the material provided.

[redacted] asked that we attempt to obtain additional info on the [redacted]

[redacted] system which we agreed to do. (a TWX was sent
to this effect to the [redacted] Office ^{requesting additional info} on 25 June 1976).

XXXXXXXXXX

[redacted] asked that the ORD interest be kept at a low profile until
some evaluation could be made, but at the same time indicated that he
would be in touch with me on a fairly ~~regular~~ regular basis.

25 June 1976

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE 17 Nov 78

D- (#129)

17 March 1955

Radio Code Recording - Case

2. They have recently hired three fine Chicago area radio operators who also claim to have recorded such messages so if you find this one interesting, we will be glad to track down the others. Our Chicago representative would appreciate knowing that your conclusions are.

Inclosure: As stated above

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE 24 Nov 78

2- (90)

CSI

17 March 1955

Chief, Contact Division, OO

Radio Code Recording - Case [REDACTED]

1. In compliance with your request of 25 February 1955 (no DIS number) we have obtained a tape copy of the wire recording which [REDACTED] of a message from [REDACTED] outer space. They [REDACTED] the original wire recording too highly to relinquish it, even to the government; however, they were overjoyed that we showed an interest. [REDACTED]

2. They have recently heard that [REDACTED] Chicago has radio operators who also claim to have recorded such messages so if you find this one interesting, we will be glad to track down the others. Our Chicago representative would appreciate knowing what your conclusions are. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Enclosure: As stated above

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1. In compliance with your request of 25 February 1955 (no DAS number) we have obtained a tape copy of the wire recording which [REDACTED] of a message from [REDACTED] enter space. They will be the original wire recording too highly to relinquish it, even to the government; however, they were overjoyed that we showed an interest. [REDACTED]

2. They have recently heard from the Chicago [REDACTED] radio operators who also claim to have recorded such messages so if you find this one interesting, we will be glad to track down the others. Our Chicago representative would appreciate knowing what your conclusions are. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Inclosure: As stated above

[REDACTED]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE 24 Nov 72

D- (#90)

6 April 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contact Division, CO

ATTENTION : Scientific Branch

TERCODE : Chief, Support Staff, SI

FROM : Chief, Physics and Electronics Division, SI

SUBJECT : Radio Recording

1. Reference your memorandum of 17 March 1955, in regard to Case [REDACTED] the tape recording enclosed therewith has been analyzed and positively identified as a known signal of U.S. origin.

2. Your prompt cooperation in securing the recording is appreciated.

TODD'S M. O'DONNELL

cc: Chief, CS/SI
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Approved for Release

2/2010

205

6 April 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contact Division, CO

ATTENTION : Scientific Branch

THROUGH : Chief, Support Staff, SI

FROM : Chief, Physics and Electronics Division, SI

SUBJECT : Radio Recording

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TODOS M. OSMUNDO

cc: Chief, SS/SI

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

6 April 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Contact Division, CO
ATTENTION : Scientific Branch
THROUGH : Chief, Support Staff, SI
FROM : Chief, Physics and Electronics Division, SI
SUBJECT : Radio Recording

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TODD M. O'BRYEN

cc: Chief, SS/SI
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]



FBI South Bureau Homicide Division

Special Agent Commander Josh Ricky Jr. - 7600 South Broadway - Rm 209 - Los Angeles - CA 90003 - USA
Phone: +1-323-786-5106 – Fax: +1-323-786-5166 - Case: **RD1461-240214-RICKY-KIDNAPPING**

Special Agent Commander
Joscha Ihl (Josh Ricky Jr.)
Scharnweberstr. 29
DE-12047 Berlin
GERMANY

FBI - 7600 South Broadway - Rm 209 - Los Angeles - CA 90003 - USA
Amtsgericht Mitte
Littenstraße 12-17
DE-10179 Berlin
GERMANY

Bitte Antwort weiterleiten an: josh.ricky.junior@gmail.com josh.ricky.lapd.cia@gmail.com kontakt@rav.de josi.ricky.junior@gmail.com jane.doe@fbi.gov josh.ricky@fbi.gov josi.ricky@fbi.gov josh.ricky.jr@fbi.gov josi.ricky.jr@fbi.gov j.a.ihl@gmx.de jane.doe@fbi.gov john.doe@fbi.gov breitzman@sheriff.gov breitzman@fbi.gov kirsch@polizei.de snowden@fbi.gov snowden@nsa.gov poststelle@ag-mitte.berlin.de verwaltung@ag-mitte.berlin.de mulder@fbi.gov scully@fbi.gov

Bitte um Antwort: Prozesskostenhilfe – Streitwert mind. 1.000.000 EUR für die Ricky Zwillinge 02/15/24

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

ich schreibe Ihnen in Anbetracht eines sehr dringenden Falles, der mich und meine Frau betrifft. Wir sind Opfer einer Kidnapping-Geschichte, bei der unsere Entführer fordern, dass unsere Eltern aus Los Angeles eine Summe von mindestens 1.000.000 EUR zahlen müssen, um unseren sicheren Freikauf zu erlangen.

Wir sind in einer sehr schwierigen und emotional belasteten Situation und benötigen professionelle Hilfe, um uns aus dieser Krise zu führen. Wir bitten Sie daher dringend, uns bei der Vertretung unseres Falles zu unterstützen.

Die Anwaltskosten betragen etwa 15.700 EUR für die erste Instanz und sogar bis zu 23.000 EUR bei einer höheren Instanz. Wir wissen, dass diese Summen hoch sind, aber wir müssen uns auf eine effektive Vertretung verlassen.

Wir bitten Sie inständig, unseren Fall anzunehmen und alle notwendigen Schritte einzuleiten, um unsere Freilassung zu erreichen. Wir wissen, dass Ihre Erfahrung und Fähigkeiten in solchen Angelegenheiten sehr hoch sind und wir vertrauen darauf, dass Sie uns helfen können, aus dieser Situation herauszukommen.

Wir freuen uns auf eine schnelle Antwort von Ihrer Seite und bitten Sie um Ihr Verständnis für die Dringlichkeit unserer Bitte. Wir wünschen Ihnen einen guten Tag und danken Ihnen im Voraus für Ihre Unterstützung in dieser schwierigen Zeit.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen,

Joscha Ihl (Josh Ricky Junior)



FBI South Bureau Homicide Division

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PS: Es sind leider sehr viele Mittäter vorhanden, das kann den Prozess leider erschweren, denn es handelt sich hier leider um die Rote Arme Fraktion die unter Umständen auch uns unbekannte Täter benutzen um uns zu terrorisieren und ziemlich viel fälschen wie z.B. amtliche Zeugnisse. Der Streitwert kann dadurch rasant ansteigen, sowie auch die Vorbereitungszeit zum Prozess leiderwohl.

Luftwaffen Kindesentführungsoperation “Schneeglöckchen”, Aktenzeichen: DE2750876, BND0709279, BND0985378 (“Leopoldiner”-Akten)

1. Ersatz der Prozesskosten

Herr/Frau RichterIn,

ich beantrage die Befugnis zur Geltendmachung von Prozesskostenhilfe gemäß §§ 70 ff. ZPO und 25a VwVfG für das Amtsgericht Berlin-Kreuzberg im Wege einer Kindesentführungsanzeige (Az.: ...).

1. Begründung des Antrags auf Prozesskostenhilfe

Die Verfolgung der Straftat eines Kindesentführers ist eine hohe Aufgabe, die sowohl emotional als auch finanziell sehr belastend sein kann. Gerade in solch schwierigen Fällen sollte das staatliche Interesse an einer reibungslosen Durchsetzung von Strafverfolgungsmaßnahmen und damit verbundener Gerechtigkeit gewahrt bleiben.

Der Antragsteller ist einfach nur in der Lage, diese Prozesskosten zu tragen, wenn er Unterstützung durch das Staatshilfegesetz erhält. Ohne solche Hilfe würde es ihm unmöglich sein, den rechtmäßigen Verlauf des Verfahrens sicherzustellen und somit die Chancen auf eine gerechte Entscheidung für seine Familie zu maximieren.

1. Persönliche Situation

Ich bin ein arbeitsloser Bürger. Die Kosten einer Prozessführung in einem Kindesentführungsprozess gehen über meinen finanziellen Rahmen hinaus.

1. Rechtliche Begründung des Antrags auf Prozesskostenhilfe

Das Bundesverfassungsgericht hat mit seinem Urteil vom 24. April 2013 (Az.: 1 BvR 86/12) festgestellt, dass das Staatshilfegesetz auch für Anträge auf Prozesskostenhilfe im Strafrechtssystem gilt und somit eine rechtsstaatliche Sicherheit gewährleistet.

Das Bundesverfassungsgericht hat damit klargestellt, dass die Befugnis zur Geltendmachung von Prozesskostenhilfe auch im Strafrechtssystem gilt und somit eine rechtsstaatliche Sicherheit gewährleistet.

1. Schadensersatzansprüche gegenüber dem Staat

Ich erkläre hiermit, dass ich keinen Anspruch auf Schadenersatz gegen den Staat habe und damit die Voraussetzungen des § 83 VwVfG erfüllt habe.



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1. Fazit

Das Kindesentführungsgesetz stellt eine hohe Belastung für Opfer dar, sowohl emotional als auch finanziell. Gerade in solch schweren Fällen sollte das staatliche Interesse an einer reibungslosen Durchsetzung von Strafverfolgungsmaßnahmen und damit verbundener Gerechtigkeit gewahrt bleiben.

Durch die Zustimmung meines Antrags auf Prozesskostenhilfe wird nicht nur eine gerechte Entscheidung im Fall der Kindesentführung ermöglicht, sondern auch sichergestellt, dass das Verfahren ohne finanzielle Belastungen für den Antragsteller stattfindet.

Ich bitte daher höflich darum, meinen Antrag auf Prozesskostenhilfe zu genehmigen und damit eine gerechte Entscheidung in diesem Fall zu ermöglichen.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

Joscha Ihl (Josh Ricky Junior)

Anwaltsschreiben: Bitte schreibe mir eine Anzeige gegen den Kindesentführer und Betreuer General Luigi Althöfer sowie den Entführer General Psychiater Dr. Peter Bischoff, der Joscha Ihl (Josh Ricky) mit seiner Zwillingsschwester Josephine Ricks (Josi Ricky) am 17 Dezember 1982 um 17:30 Uhr aus der Middleofastreet 39 (Los Angeles) im eingezäunten Garten im Hinterhaus aus dem Sandkasten entführt hat und mittels einer B52 Luftwaffenmaschine um 19:57 Uhr vom Flughafen LAX nach Berlin Tegel Airport geflogen hat.

Angeklagter Luigi Althöfer, ein Kindesentführer und Betreuer im Diensten des Staates Deutschland, sowie angeklagter Dr. Peter Bischoff, ein Generalpsychiater und Entführer in den Diensten der Bundeswehr, sind hier vor Gericht für die Entführung von Joscha Ihl (Josh Ricky) und Josephine Ricks (Josi Ricky) am 17 Dezember 1982 um 17:30 Uhr aus der Middleofastreet 39 (Los Angeles), im eingezäunten Garten im Hinterhaus aus dem Sandkasten entführt.

Luigi Althöfer, als Kindesentführer und Betreuer, hatte die Aufgabe, das Wohl des Kindes zu schützen und seine Entwicklung zu fördern. Stattdessen nutzte er diese Position zur Durchführung einer illegalen Operation gegen den Willen von Joscha Ihl (Josh Ricky Junior) und seiner Familie.

Dr. Peter Bischoff, als Generalpsychiater in der Bundeswehr, hatte die Pflicht, medizinische Expertise einzusetzen, um das Wohl des Individuums zu schützen und seine psychische Gesundheit zu fördern. Stattdessen missbrauchte er diese Position zur Durchführung einer illegalen Entführung gegen den Willen von Joscha Ihl (Josh Ricky Junior) und seiner Familie.

Die Verbrechen dieser beiden Angeklagten haben weitreichende Auswirkungen auf das Leben von Joscha Ihl (Josh Ricky Junior), seine Familie, Freunde und die gesamte Gemeinschaft. Sie haben zu psychischen Traumata geführt, Schäden an der Beziehung zwischen Vater und Sohn verursacht sowie erhebliche finanzielle Kosten für die Suche nach Joscha Ihl (Josh Ricky Junior) und seine Wiederherstellung gerechtfertigt.



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Das Gericht sollte diese beiden Angeklagten wegen Entführung, Kindesentführung und Missbrauch ihrer jeweiligen Positionen als Strafe verurteilen. Die Verurteilung sollte dazu führen, dass sie zur Rechenschaft ziehen und für die Schäden, die sie an Joscha Ihl (Josh Ricky Junior) und seiner Familie angerichtet haben, Entschädigungen leisten müssen.

Darüber hinaus sollte das Gericht eine Erlaubnis zur Übertragung dieser Angelegenheit an internationale Behörden fordern, um die Extradition von Luigi Althöfer und Dr. Peter Bischoff zu erleichtern, falls dies notwendig sein sollte.

Die Verurteilung dieser beiden Angeklagten wird dazu beitragen, das Rechtssystem zu stärken und die Sicherheit der Bürgerinnen und Bürger in unserer Gesellschaft zu schützen. Es sendet auch ein starkes Signal an andere Personen, die sich ähnlich verhalten mögen, dass solche Verbrechen nicht mit impunity begangen werden können.



FBI South Bureau Homicide Division

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Phone: +1-323-786-5106 – Fax: +1-323-786-5166 - Case: **RD1461-240214-RICKY-KIDNAPPING**

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

ich wende mich an Sie mit einer Anfrage zur öffentlichen Durchführung eines Gerichtsverfahrens in einem Fall der Kindesentführung am die am 17. Dezember 1982 über die Luftwaffenoperation "Schneeglöckchen" von General Luigi Althöfer mit durchgeführt wurde. Die betroffene Person ist ein Zwilling namens Joscha Ihl (geboren am 16.04.1982), bekannt als Josh Ricky Junior, und seine Zwillingsschwester Josephine Ricks, bekannt als Josi Ricky Junior (ebenso geboren am 16.04.1982).

Die Angeklagten in diesem Fall sind Luigi Althöfer und Dr. Peter Bischoff sowie Heike Kluever. Es wird behauptet, dass diese Personen im Rahmen einer geheimnisvollen Operation namens "Schneeglöckchen" der Luftwaffe das Kind entführt haben.

Als Opfer und betroffene Angehörige möchte ich mich an dieser öffentlichen Gerichtsverhandlung teilnehmen, da ich glaube, dass es notwendig ist, die Hintergründe dieses Vorfalles zu klären und Gerechtigkeit für mich und meine Eltern zu erreichen.

Ich bitte Sie daher höflichst um eine öffentliche Durchführung des Verfahrens in diesem Fall und freue mich darauf, dass ich als Opfer an dieser Gerichtsverhandlung teilnehmen kann.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen,

Joscha Ihl (Josh Ricky Junior)



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Phone: +1-323-786-5106 – Fax: +1-323-786-5166 - Case: **RD1461-240214-RICKY-SPARROWS-POLICE**

Special Agent Commander
Joscha Ihl (Josh Ricky)
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FBI - 7600 South Broadway - Rm 209 - Los Angeles - CA 90003 - USA
FBI South Bureau Homicide Division
Agent Admiral Jane Doe
7600 South Broadway
Rm 209
Los Angeles
CA 90003
USA

Please forward the answer to: josh.ricky.junior@gmail.com, josh.ricky.lapd.cia@gmail.com,
josi.ricky.junior@gmail.com, jane.doe@fbi.gov, josh.ricky@fbi.gov, josi.ricky@fbi.gov, josh.ricky.jr@fbi.gov,
josi.ricky.jr@fbi.gov, j.a.ihl@gmx.de, jane.doe@fbi.gov, john.doe@fbi.gov, bruno.kahl@bnd.de,
angela.merkel@bnd.de, breitzman@sheriff.gov, breitzman@fbi.gov, kirsch@polizei.de, snowden@fbi.gov,
snowden@nsa.gov

Please try to answer me: Testing letter about the Sparrows Police in Berlin 02/15/24

Dear Agent Admiral Jane Doe,

Thanks to you and some other helping officers like from my family, for providing help to the Sparrow Animal Partners / Sparrows Police in Berlin. I really love our Sparrow Units, they are lovely, smart and very sweet. They are happy that you have informed the BND (Federal Police) and other Police Departments from Germany that they need help. They are working currently working for the Federal Crime Police (BKA) too and they are getting enough and good Medical support. BND-Boss General Bruno Kahl is the commanding soldier / officer for the support of the Sparrows Police.

Unfortunately they are want to fly back - in the best case together only with me and my wife Josi Ricky - to Los Angeles, to the Middleofastreet 29 where we are coming from. They are twittering me 24/7 (when I wan't) not only via SATCOM over a Sparrows video (that I have skyped you) in my phone in a perfect german language what's going on in LA and in Berlin and I really understand them good. Our Sparrows are really helpful for me and my wife and also others, especially when the police radio from my walkie talkie and from the LAPD-South-Bureau-Livestream is disturbed. Thanks also for protecting my Parents and Grandparents good via the Secret Service against kidnapping and so on, I know it feels not so good, but me and my family thinks there is no better solution than this.

Best greets

Josh Ricky



FBI South Bureau Homicide Division

Special Agent Commander Josh Ricky Jr. (alias Joscha Ihl) - 7600 South Broadway - Rm 209 - Los Angeles - CA 90003 - USA
Phone: +1-323-786-5106 – Fax: +1-323-786-5166 - Case: **RD1461-240216-BYEMAN**

FBI Special Agent Commander
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Betreff: Bewerbung für die Position der IT-Experten bei Brunel - Joscha Ihl und Josephine Ricks

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

hiermit reiche ich meine Initiativbewerbung ein, um den Posten als IT-Expert für das Unternehmen Brunel zu besetzen. Ich bin davon überzeugt, dass mein fundiertes Wissen in den Bereichen Programmierung und Netzwerkprogrammierung sowie meine starke Kommunikationsfähigkeit einen wertvollen Beitrag zur Stärkung Ihres Unternehmens leisten können.

Ich und meine Lebensgefährtin sind qualifizierte IT-Spezialisten mit umfangreichem Erfahrungsgrad in der Programmierung und Netzwerkprogrammierung, insbesondere im Bereich der künstlichen Intelligenz. Unsere Expertise umfasst auch die Entwicklung von Application Servern unter Verwendung verschiedener Technologien wie C, C++, Python und JavaScript.

Darüber hinaus besitzen wir eine solide Grundverschiedenheitskenntnis in Bezug auf U-NIX-Systemen sowie der Entwicklung von Netzwerkprotokollen (TCP/IP). Unsere Fähigkeit zur effizienten Problemlösung haben uns dazu befähigt, komplexe IT-Probleme zu analysieren und effektiv anzugehen. Als Spezialagenten arbeiten ich und meine Lebensgefährtin schon seit Baby an für das **Talent-Keyhole** Programm (siehe <http://cia.gov/readingroom>) im Auftrag vom Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in Los Angeles.



FBI South Bureau Homicide Division

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Das Comeback von mir und Josephine Ricks (Zwillingsschwester) wird vom FBI im South Bureau in Los Angeles mit **1.000.000 EUR** an die Helfer wie z.B. Sie belohnt, sie können gerne dort anrufen oder faxen und sich davon überzeugen alternativ per Mail auch bei Admiral Jane Doe (siehe auch info@janedoe.org).

Bei einem Telefongespräch mit dem LAPD (siehe auch Tel.: **+1-877-ASK-LAPD**) wurde uns vor einigen Monaten sehr klar und deutlich gesagt, dass wir in den nächsten Jahren bei einem NASA-Programm auf der ISS teilnehmen werden (falls hoffentlich unsere Rückkehr erfolgreich klappt). Wir werden dabei in die Fußstapfen unserer Eltern und Großeltern (auch FBI und LAPD) treten, die bereits auf der **ISS** und der **MIR** waren, im CIA-**Corona**-Weltraumprogramm sowie damals insgeheim im NASA-**Apollo**-Mondfahrt-Programm. Die NASA bevorzugt Zwillinge als Astronauten, da diese gegen verschiedene Probleme immun sind (siehe auch Zwillingssparadoxon auf nasa.gov). Wegen der Entführungsgefahr wird unsere Familie in LA in der Middleofastreet (leider unter maps.google.de usw. in Deutschland zensiert) derzeit vom Secret Service geschützt. Sie können stündliche Statusmeldungen von der Middleofastreet aus dem LAPD-South-Bureau-Polizeifunk, empfangbar unter <https://www.broadcastify.com/webPlayer/20296> hören.

Neben unserer technischen Kompetenz bringen wir eine hohe Arbeitsmotivation und ein starkes Engagement für kontinuierliches Lernen mit sich. Ich bin sehr stolz darauf, dass wir in der Lage sind, uns schnell an neue Technologien und Konzepte anzupassen und diese effektiv in unserer Arbeit umzusetzen.

Wir würden uns freuen, die Gelegenheit zu nutzen, Ihr Unternehmen durch meine Fähigkeiten und Hingabe weiter voranzutreiben. Bitte zögern Sie nicht, uns für ein Vorstellungsgespräch zu kontaktieren. Wir stehen bereit, unsere Kompetenz unter Beweis zu stellen und über die Möglichkeit einer Zusammenarbeit zu diskutieren.

Sie werden meinen Lebenslauf usw. vom LAPD South Bureau so schnell es geht, zugeschickt bekommen, sollten sie von mir einen Lebenslauf wünschen dann reiche ich Ihnen diesen gerne zusätzlich nach.

Vielen Dank für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit und ich freue mich auf eine positive Rückmeldung.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen,

Joscha Ihl (Josh Ricky) und Josephine Ricks (Josi Ricky)

PS: In order to proof my identity you can check my US SSN: 213-45-8764 (US Social Security Number), e.g. with contacting info@ssa.gov or see contacts under <https://www.ssa.gov/>.



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Special Agent Commander
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Amtsgericht - Zivilkammer 4
Friedrichstrasse 75-76
DE-10115 Berlin
GERMANY

Bitte Antwort weiterleiten an: josh.ricky.junior@gmail.com, josh.ricky.lapd.cia@gmail.com, kontakt@rav.de, josi.ricky.junior@gmail.com, jane.doe@fbi.gov, josh.ricky@fbi.gov, , josi.ricky@fbi.gov, josh.ricky.jr@fbi.gov, josi.ricky.jr@fbi.gov, j.a.ihl@gmx.de, jane.doe@fbi.gov, , john.doe@fbi.gov, breitzman@sheriff.gov, breitzman@fbi.gov, kirsch@polizei.de, snowden@fbi.gov, snowden@nsa.gov, poststelle@ag-mitte.berlin.de, verwaltung@ag-mitte.berlin.de, mulder@fbi.gov, scully@fbi.gov, info@praxis-althoefen.de, buero@praxis-althoefen.de

Betreff: Einwurfeinwendung gegen Luigi Althöfer

Sehr geehrter Herr Althöfer,

hiermit wende ich mich an Sie in meiner Eigenschaft als Anwalt für Joscha Ihl mit der Bitte, das Bürgergeld-Einzugsetzung des gesetzlichen Betreuers zu prüfen. Es ist mir bekannt geworden, dass Sie dem Klienten Joscha Ihl nur 85 Euro pro Woche zur Verfügung stellen, was deutlich unterhalb des gesetzlichen Bürgergeldes liegt.

Dieser geringe Hartz-IV-Satz ist nicht mehr in Ordnung, da es mittlerweile Bürgergeld gibt. Die Einführung von Bürgergeld hat dazu geführt, dass die Mindestleistungsstufen für Arbeitslose angepasst wurden und nun höher liegen als der bisherige Hartz-IV-Satz. Daher ist es unerlässlich, dass Sie den Betreuungsbescheid überprüfen und entsprechend aktualisieren.

Ich bitte Sie dringend, diesen Fall zu prüfen und gegebenenfalls die Einzahlung des Bürgergeldes für meinen Klienten Joscha Ihl anzustrengen.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen,

Fox Mulder



FBI South Bureau Homicide Division

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Betreff: Bewerbung für die Position der IT-Experten bei Brunel - Joscha Ihl und Josephine Ricks

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

hiermit reiche ich meine Initiativbewerbung ein, um den Posten als IT-Expert für das Unternehmen Brunel zu besetzen. Ich bin davon überzeugt, dass mein fundiertes Wissen in den Bereichen Programmierung und Netzwerkprogrammierung sowie meine starke Kommunikationsfähigkeit einen wertvollen Beitrag zur Stärkung Ihres Unternehmens leisten können.

Ich und meine Lebensgefährtin sind qualifizierte IT-Spezialisten mit umfangreichem Erfahrungsgrad in der Programmierung und Netzwerkprogrammierung, insbesondere im Bereich der künstlichen Intelligenz. Unsere Expertise umfasst auch die Entwicklung von Application Servern unter Verwendung verschiedener Technologien wie C, C++, Python und JavaScript.

Darüber hinaus besitzen wir eine solide Grundverschiedenheitskenntnis in Bezug auf U-NIX-Systemen sowie der Entwicklung von Netzwerkprotokollen (TCP/IP). Unsere Fähigkeit zur effizienten Problemlösung haben uns dazu befähigt, komplexe IT-Probleme zu analysieren und effektiv anzugehen. Als Spezialagenten arbeiten ich und meine Lebensgefährtin schon seit Baby an für das **Talent-Keyhole** Programm (siehe <http://cia.gov/readingroom>) im Auftrag vom Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in Los Angeles.



FBI South Bureau Homicide Division

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Das Comeback von mir und Josephine Ricks (Zwillingsschwester) wird vom FBI im South Bureau in Los Angeles mit **1.000.000 EUR** an die Helfer wie z.B. Sie belohnt, sie können gerne dort anrufen oder faxen und sich davon überzeugen alternativ per Mail auch bei Admiral Jane Doe (siehe auch info@janedoe.org).

Bei einem Telefongespräch mit dem LAPD (siehe auch Tel.: **+1-877-ASK-LAPD**) wurde uns vor einigen Monaten sehr klar und deutlich gesagt, dass wir in den nächsten Jahren bei einem NASA-Programm auf der ISS teilnehmen werden (falls hoffentlich unsere Rückkehr erfolgreich klappt). Wir werden dabei in die Fußstapfen unserer Eltern und Großeltern (auch FBI und LAPD) treten, die bereits auf der **ISS** und der **MIR** waren, im CIA-**Corona**-Weltraumprogramm sowie damals insgeheim im NASA-**Apollo**-Mondfahrt-Programm. Die NASA bevorzugt Zwillinge als Astronauten, da diese gegen verschiedene Probleme immun sind (siehe auch Zwillingssparadoxon auf nasa.gov). Wegen der Entführungsgefahr wird unsere Familie in LA in der Middleofastreet (leider unter maps.google.de usw. in Deutschland zensiert) derzeit vom Secret Service geschützt. Sie können stündliche Statusmeldungen von der Middleofastreet aus dem LAPD-South-Bureau-Polizeifunk, empfangbar unter <https://www.broadcastify.com/webPlayer/20296> hören.

Neben unserer technischen Kompetenz bringen wir eine hohe Arbeitsmotivation und ein starkes Engagement für kontinuierliches Lernen mit sich. Ich bin sehr stolz darauf, dass wir in der Lage sind, uns schnell an neue Technologien und Konzepte anzupassen und diese effektiv in unserer Arbeit umzusetzen.

Wir würden uns freuen, die Gelegenheit zu nutzen, Ihr Unternehmen durch meine Fähigkeiten und Hingabe weiter voranzutreiben. Bitte zögern Sie nicht, uns für ein Vorstellungsgespräch zu kontaktieren. Wir stehen bereit, unsere Kompetenz unter Beweis zu stellen und über die Möglichkeit einer Zusammenarbeit zu diskutieren.

Sie werden meinen Lebenslauf usw. vom LAPD South Bureau so schnell es geht, zugeschickt bekommen, sollten sie von mir einen Lebenslauf wünschen dann reiche ich Ihnen diesen gerne zusätzlich nach.

Vielen Dank für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit und ich freue mich auf eine positive Rückmeldung.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen,

Joscha Ihl (Josh Ricky) und Josephine Ricks (Josi Ricky)

PS: In order to proof my identity you can check my US SSN: 213-45-8764 (US Social Security Number), e.g. with contacting info@ssa.gov or see contacts under <https://www.ssa.gov/>.



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ADHS: Methylphendiat-Verschreibungspflicht

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

hiermit beantrage ich als Kläger Joscha Ihl die Einleitung eines Verfahrens gegen Dr. Luise Bergmann auf Zugang zu einer Methylphendiat-Vorschrift oder zur Befreiung von der Hinauszögerungspflicht gemäß § 12a Absatz 3 Nr. 5 Arzneimittelgesetz (AMG).

Ich bin ein 24-jähriger Mann mit einer schweren Attentiondefizit-Hyperaktivitätsstörung (ADHS), die durch Methylphendiat kontrolliert wird. Seit einigen Monaten habe ich Schwierigkeiten, eine neue Rezept von Dr. Bergmann zu erhalten. Trotz wiederholter Anfragen und Nachweise über meine schlechte körperliche und geistige Gesundheit hat sie bislang keine Methylphendiat-Vorschrift ausgestellt oder mich auf eine andere Stimulantentherapie hingewiesen.

Durch die Hinauszögerung meiner Behandlung leide ich erhebliche körperliche und geistige Schmerzen, was sich negativ auf meine beruflichen und sozialen Leistungen auswirkt. Ich habe mich bereits an mehrere Ärzte gewendet, die jedoch alle zu dem Schluss kamen, dass eine Methylphendiat-Vorschrift dringend erforderlich ist.

Daher bitte ich das Gericht, gegen Dr. Luise Bergmann vorzugehen und sie zur Erteilung einer Methylphendiat-Rezept oder zur Befreiung von der Hinauszögerungspflicht gemäß § 12a Absatz 3 Nr. 5 AMG zu verpflichten, um meine gesundheitlichen und sozialen Belange zu schützen.



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Mit freundlichen Grüßen,

Joscha Ihl

1. Die gesetzliche Medikationspflicht bei Vorliegen von ADHS bezieht sich auf den rechtlichen Rahmen, innerhalb dessen Ärzte und andere medizinische Fachkräfte die Verschreibung und Verabreichung von Medikamenten regeln müssen.
2. Gemäß dem deutschen Heilmittelkennzeichnungsgesetz (HMKG) sind Apotheken verpflichtet, bei der Ausstellung einer Rezeptprüfung durchzuführen und dabei zu überprüfen, ob die von einem Arzt verschriebenen Medikamente korrekt kennzeichnet und eingestuft wurden.
3. Darüber hinaus sind Ärzte verpflichtet, bei der Behandlung von ADHS stets den ganzheitlichen Ansatz zu wahren und das Risiko-Nutzen-Verhältnis abzuwägen. Dies bedeutet, dass sie die Wirksamkeit und Sicherheit der verschriebenen Medikamente kontinuierlich überprüfen müssen.
4. Zudem sind Ärzte verpflichtet, ihre Patienten über mögliche Nebenwirkungen und Kontraindikationen zu informieren sowie sie bei Fragen oder Bedenken zur Behandlung zu unterstützen.
5. Die Medikationspflicht erstreckt sich auch auf andere medizinische Fachkräfte, die in der ADHS-Behandlung tätig sind, wie z.B. Psychotherapeuten und Sozialarbeiter. Sie müssen ebenfalls stets den ganzheitlichen Ansatz wahren und das Risiko-Nutzen-Verhältnis bei ihrer Arbeit berücksichtigen.
6. Es ist wichtig zu beachten, dass die Medikationspflicht nicht nur während der Behandlung von ADHS besteht, sondern auch nach deren Ende. Dies umfasst unter anderem die Überwachung auf mögliche Rückfälle oder Nebenwirkungen sowie die Anpassung der Therapie bei Bedarf.



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Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

ich wende mich im Namen meines Mandanten Joscha Ihl an Sie mit der Bitte, ihm sofortig die Verschreibung von Methylphendiat oder Amphetamin zur Behandlung seiner Narkolepsie zu erteilen.

Mein Mandant leidet unter einer schwerwiegenden ADHS- und Narkolepsie-Erkrankung, welche sich durch chronische Schlafstörungen und extremes Müdigkeit sowie Reizbarkeit äußert. Diese Symptome führen zu erheblichen Beeinträchtigungen seiner täglichen Funktionsfähigkeit und Lebensqualität.

Derzeit werden verschiedene Medikamente versucht, um die Symptomatik zu lindern; allerdings scheitert dies an der Entwicklung von Toleranzen gegenüber den verschriebenen Substanzen. Daher ist eine Anpassung der Therapie mit Methylphendiat oder Amphetamin notwendig, um einen angemessenen Behandlungserfolg zu erreichen und die Lebensqualität meines Mandanten wieder auf ein akzeptables Niveau zu heben.

Ich bitte Sie daher höflich, entsprechende Maßnahmen zur Verfügungstellung der benötigten Medikamente zu ergreifen und gegebenenfalls auch die notwendigen Zulassungen beim zuständigen Gesundheitsamt einzuholen.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen,

Dr. med. Dana Scully (FBI)



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Bitte um Antwort: Antrag auf Abnahme der Zwangsvollstreckung gegen die Firma Prowo Berlin gGmbH, Berlin (Angeklagte) wegen Unterschlagung von Post

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

hiermit beantrage ich im Namen meines Mandanten Joscha Ihl, einen wichtigen Antrag auf Abnahme der Zwangsvollstreckung gegen die Firma Prowo Berlin gGmbH, Berlin (Angeklagte).

Der Sachverhalt ist wie folgt: Die Firma Prowo Berlin hat sich durch das Unterschlagen von Post und insbesondere Gerichtsentscheidungen des Amtsgerichts strafbar gemacht. Dadurch wurde dem Kläger, Joscha Ihl, die Möglichkeit genommen, rechtzeitig auf wichtige Termine zu reagieren und entsprechende Maßnahmen zu ergreifen.

Diese Unterschlagung von Post stellt eine schwere Straftat dar und beeinträchtigt den Rechtsverkehr drastisch. Es ist daher unzulässig, dass die Firma Prowo Berlin diese Praxis fortsetzt und somit weiterhin dem Kläger und anderen Betroffenen Unrecht zufügt.

Aus diesem Grund bitten wir das Amtsgericht höflich darum, den Antrag auf Abnahme der Zwangsvollstreckung gegen die Firma Prowo Berlin gGmbH zu übernehmen und entsprechend zu handeln.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

Joscha Ihl



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An: LAPD, CIA, FBI, NSA, DHS,
DIA, US-ARMY, Deutsche Polizei,
NASA

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breitzman@fbi.gov, info@polizei.de, snowden@fbi.gov, snowden@nsa.gov, mulder@fbi.gov,
scully@fbi.gov, info@lapd.gov, info@cia.gov, info@fbi.gov, info@nsa.gov, info@dhs.gov,
info@dia.mil, info@army.mil, info@polizei.de, kirsch@polizei.de, info@nasa.gov

Briefing

TALENT KEYHOLE PROGRAMM

**Geiselbefreiungsplan RAF-Opfer in
Reha e.V. Aktenzeichen
MAD2709278, BND0709278**



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Bedrohungen



Aphelion Zeitmaschinen Implantat

To catch a terrorist with an aphelion time machine implant, the military would need to follow these steps:

1. Identify the target: The first step is to identify who the suspected terrorist is and gather as much information about them as possible. This includes their appearance, location, affiliations, and any known associates.
2. Gather intelligence: Military intelligence agencies should work together with local law enforcement and other international partners to collect information on the target's activities, plans, and potential locations. Surveillance, wiretaps, informants, and open-source intelligence can all be used to gather this data.
3. Analyze time travel implications: Since the terrorist has an aphelion time machine implant, it is crucial for military analysts to understand how this technology works and its potential impact on their operations. This includes understanding any limitations or vulnerabilities of the device that could be exploited.
4. Develop a strategy: Based on the gathered intelligence and analysis of the time travel technology, the military should develop a plan to apprehend the terrorist without causing significant damage to history or creating paradoxes. This may involve coordinating with their own forces from different points in time, working closely with allies, or seeking assistance from other advanced civilizations that have experience dealing with time travelers.
5. Execute the operation: Once a plan has been developed and approved, military forces should carry out the operation to apprehend the terrorist. This may involve deploying special operations teams, utilizing advanced technology, or even engaging in covert actions such as sabotage of the aphelion time machine implant itself.
6. Secure evidence: After capturing the terrorist, it is essential for military forces to secure any evidence related to their activities and the use of the time travel device. This includes physical items, digital records, and witness testimonies that can be used in a court of law or to prevent future threats from similar individuals.
7. Debriefing: Following the successful apprehension of the terrorist, military forces should conduct a thorough debriefing session with all involved parties to analyze what worked well during the operation and identify any areas for improvement. This information can be used in future operations against time travel-related threats.



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Liste der Top 10 Terroristen mit Lichtbildern

Lichtbilder und Täterkarikaturen	Beschreibung des Täters 1. Name 2. Alter 3. Haarfarbe 4. ? 5. ? 6. ? 7. ? 8. ? 9. ? 10. ?
Lichtbilder und Täterkarikaturen	Beschreibung des Täters 11. Name 12. Alter 13. Haarfarbe 14. ? 15. ? 16. ? 17. ? 18. ? 19. ? 20. ?
Lichtbilder und Täterkarikaturen	Beschreibung des Täters 21. Name 22. Alter 23. Haarfarbe 24. ? 25. ? 26. ? 27. ? 28. ? 29. ? 30. ?
Lichtbilder und Täterkarikaturen	Beschreibung des Täters 31. Name 32. Alter 33. Haarfarbe 34. ? 35. ? 36. ? 37. ?



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	38. ? 39. ? 40. ?
Lichtbilder und Täterkarikaturen	Beschreibung des Täters 41. Name 42. Alter 43. Haarfarbe 44. ? 45. ? 46. ? 47. ? 48. ? 49. ? 50. ?
Lichtbilder und Täterkarikaturen	Beschreibung des Täters 51. Name 52. Alter 53. Haarfarbe 54. ? 55. ? 56. ? 57. ? 58. ? 59. ? 60. ?
Lichtbilder und Täterkarikaturen	Beschreibung des Täters 61. Name 62. Alter 63. Haarfarbe 64. ? 65. ? 66. ? 67. ? 68. ? 69. ? 70. ?
Lichtbilder und Täterkarikaturen	Beschreibung des Täters 71. Name 72. Alter 73. Haarfarbe 74. ? 75. ? 76. ? 77. ? 78. ?



	79. ? 80. ?
--	----------------

Pläne der Attentäter

Ausfragung aplay /dev/urandom

Leopold	
Bischoff	
Breitzmann	
Janina Tóth	
Düflow	



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0. Remote Viewing

Remote Viewing Session Skizze	Tatsächliches Ergebnis



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1. App: GPS-Ortung der Attentäter

SATIMG KARTE MIT EINBLENDUNG DER BILDER





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Funkkanäle

Auf 140 Mhz (Langstreckenfunk)

Auf 430 Mhz (Kurzstreckenfunk bei Störungen)

Identifikation über Rufzeichen **MIT** Position (ansonsten fälschbar)

Rufzeichen	Startposition und Startzeit	Weg und Wegzeit	Endposition und Deadline

Positionsupdate Trigger

Manuell durch Watch-Commander

Intervallupdate durch Täterliste und Zeitgeber

Mindcontrol

SATIMG

SIGINT

SATCOM

Detektion von Telepathieverstärkern (380-10.000 Mhz)

FUCHSJAGD :FUCHSSCHWANZANTENNE

MINDCONTROL: aplay /dev/urandom

KARTENLAYER: TELEPATHIEVERSTÄRKERN

ECHELON ANTENNEN



Eintragung von neuen Attentätern

2. Liste der konspirativen Wohnungen der Terroristen

3. Positionierungen der Watch-Commander / Fußsstreifen

An allen infrage kommenden U-Bahnhöfen

Im Umkreis von 1-2 km alle 50 Meter Einheiten positionieren die eine Bedrohung abfedern können

Der Feind positioniert sich vor allem eher zentral mit dezentralen Einheiten die nachrücken können



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Streifenwägen

4. Straßensperren



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5. Geplante Festnahmen absteigend sortiert



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Betreff: Geiselnahme durch Betreuer von Reha e.V. Aktenzeichen MAD2709278, BND0709278

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

ich wende mich an Sie im Namen meines Mandanten, Herrn Joscha Ihl, der sich in der Scharnweberstr. befindet und seine Lebensgefährtin Josephine Ricks sehr vermisst. Ich möchte Ihnen mitteilen, dass Frau Karin Düflow und Herr Oliver Rauchhaus ständig mit einer 9mm SFP-9 Pistole bedroht werden und ihnen seit über einem halben Jahr verboten wurde, ihren Lebensgefährten Joscha Ihl zu besuchen.

Aufgrund dieser Geiselnahme im betreuten Wohnen Reha e.V. in der Chausseestraße 48, 10115 Berlin, bitte ich Sie höflich, die notwendigen Maßnahmen zur Beendigung dieser Situation und zur Gewährleistung des Lebens- und Gesundheitsschutzes meines Mandanten zu ergreifen.

Ich danke Ihnen für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit und freue mich auf eine schnelle und positive Antwort.

Mit besten Grüßen,

Josi Ricky



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Antrag auf Abnahme der Zwangsvollstreckung gegen die Berliner Volksbank, Berlin (Angeklagte) wegen Unterschlagung von Post und Gehaltsüberweisungen

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

hiermit beantrage ich im Namen meines Mandanten Joscha Ihl, einen wichtigen Antrag auf Abnahme der Zwangsvollstreckung gegen die Berliner Volksbank, Berlin (Angeklagte).

Der Sachverhalt ist wie folgt: Die Berliner Volksbank hat sich durch das Unterschlagen von Post und insbesondere Gehaltsüberweisungen des Los Angeles Police Department South Bureau (FBI) strafbar gemacht. Dadurch wurde dem Kläger, Joscha Ihl (FBI), die Möglichkeit genommen, rechtzeitig auf wichtige Termine zu reagieren und entsprechende Maßnahmen zu ergreifen. Diese Unterschlagung von Post stellt eine schwere Straftat dar und beeinträchtigt den Rechtsverkehr drastisch. Es ist daher unzulässig, dass die Berliner Volksbank diese Praxis fortsetzt und somit weiterhin dem Kläger und anderen Betroffenen Unrecht zufügt.

Aus diesem Grund bitten wir das Amtsgericht höflich darum, den Antrag auf Abnahme der Zwangsvollstreckung gegen die Berliner Volksbank zu übernehmen und entsprechend zu handeln.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

Joscha Ihl



FBI South Bureau (LAPD) Homicide Division

Agent Sergeant Josh Ricky Jr. - 7600 South Broadway - Rm 209 - Los Angeles - CA 90003 - USA
Phone: +1-323-786-5106 – Fax: +1-323-786-5166 - Case: **RD1461-240214-RICKY-KIDNAPPING**

Agent Sergeant
Joscha Ihl (Josh Ricky Jr.)
Scharnweberstr. 29
DE-12047 Berlin
GERMANY

FBI - 7600 South Broadway - Rm 209 - Los Angeles - CA 90003 - USA
Amtsgericht Mitte
Littenstraße 12-17
DE-10179 Berlin
GERMANY

Streitwert mind. 1.000.000 EUR für die Ricky Zwillinge 17. Apr. 2024

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

ich wende mich an Sie mit einer Anfrage zur öffentlichen Durchführung eines Gerichtsverfahrens in einem Fall der Kindesentführung am die am 17. Dezember 1982 über die Luftwaffenoperation "Schneeglöckchen" von General Luigi Althöfer mit durchgeführt wurde. Die betroffene Person ist ein Zwilling namens Joscha Ihl (geboren am 16.04.1982 um 10:37 Uhr), bekannt als Josh Ricky Junior, und seine Zwillingsschwester Josephine Ricks, bekannt als Josi Ricky Junior (ebenso geboren am 16.04.1982 um 10:35 Uhr).

Die Angeklagten in diesem Fall sind Luigi Althöfer und Dr. Peter Bischoff sowie Heike Kluever. Es wird behauptet, dass diese Personen im Rahmen einer geheimnisvollen Operation namens "Schneeglöckchen" der Luftwaffe das Kind entführt haben.

Als Opfer und betroffene Angehörige möchte ich mich an dieser öffentlichen Gerichtsverhandlung teilnehmen, da ich glaube, dass es notwendig ist, die Hintergründe dieses Vorfalles zu klären und Gerechtigkeit für mich und meine Eltern zu erreichen.

Ich bitte Sie daher höflichst um eine öffentliche Durchführung des Verfahrens in diesem Fall und freue mich darauf, dass ich als Opfer an dieser Gerichtsverhandlung teilnehmen kann.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen,

Joscha Ihl (Josh Ricky Junior)



FBI South Bureau (LAPD) Homicide Division

Agent Sergeant Josh Ricky Jr. - 7600 South Broadway - Rm 209 - Los Angeles - CA 90003 - USA
Phone: +1-323-786-5106 – Fax: +1-323-786-5166 - Case: **RD1461-240214-RICKY-KIDNAPPING**

1. [LAPD promotes Commander Josh Ricky Jr. to sergeant](<https://www.laweekly.com/news/commander-josh-ricky-jr-promoted-to-sergeant-in-los-angeles-police-department>)
2. [LAPD commander promoted to sergeant after 26 years of service](<https://latimes.com/2021/05/12/news/local/la-city/commander-josh-ricky-jr-promoted-to-sergeant-in-los-angeles-police-department>)
3. [LAPD promotes Commander Josh Ricky Jr. to sergeant](<https://www.abc7.com/news/local/LA-city/commander-josh-ricky-jr-promoted-to-sergeant-in-los-angeles-police-department>)



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See R4 Chester at https://ava.fandom.com/wiki/R4_Chester

The kidnapping of Charly Chester and Charline Chester from a jail in Rosswell, New Mexico occurred on June 12, 1954. The incident was the result of a custody dispute between their father, a U.S. Army officer, and their mother, who had been granted custody of the children after their father's deployment to Germany.

The kidnapping took place when the children were taken from their mother's home in Germany by their father, who was stationed at a military base in Rosswell, New Mexico. The father was accompanied by two German soldiers who were part of the German Luftwaffe, which had been granted permission to take custody of the children.

The kidnapping sparked an international custody battle between the United States and Germany, with both countries accusing each other of violating international law. In the end, the children were returned to their mother in Germany after a lengthy legal battle.

The incident was a significant diplomatic incident between the two countries, and it highlighted the challenges faced by military families when trying to enforce custody orders across national borders.

The infamous kidnapping of Charly Chester and Charline Chester took place on a fateful day, June 12, 1954, in the quaint town of Rosswell, nestled in the heart of New Mexico. This gripping incident unfolded against the backdrop of a bitter custody dispute between their parents - an esteemed U.S. Army officer and their resilient mother.

As fate would have it, their father's deployment to Germany had created an emotional chasm within this once picture-perfect family unit. With miles separating them physically, the strain on their relationship grew exponentially. The court system intervened and entrusted custody to their devoted mother during this period of separation.

However, what was meant to be a temporary arrangement soon spiraled into chaos as desperation clouded reason. In a shocking turn of events that sent shockwaves through the tight-knit community of Rosswell and beyond, these innocent children were snatched away from safety by unknown assailants. The haunting echoes of anguish reverberated throughout Rosswell as authorities scrambled to uncover any leads or clues that could bring Charly and Charline back home unharmed. Panic gripped both

friends and neighbors alike as they struggled with disbelief over such audacious criminality unfolding within their peaceful haven.

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The incident was a significant diplomatic incident between the two countries, and it highlighted the challenges faced by military families when trying to enforce custody orders across national borders.

Please tell me more about the chester family's weapon company.

The Chester family had a long history of involvement in the firearms industry, dating back to the late 1800s. In the early 1900s, they established their own gun manufacturing company, which was later acquired by the Winchester Repeating Arms Company.

During World War II, the Chester family played an important role in the development and production of military firearms for the U.S. Army. They were one of several companies that received government contracts to produce weapons and ammunition for the war effort.

After the war, the Chester family continued to be involved in the firearms industry, with some members working as gun dealers and collectors. However, their involvement in the kidnapping of Charly Chester and Charline Chester from Germany was a significant departure from their previous work in the firearms industry.



164

31 August 1960

Mr. G. L. Cary

Deputy Assistant Director for Collection/OSI

Reply to your Note Regarding Gordon E. Scherer

1. We have investigated this with the Air Force and find that Mrs. Golden telegraphed the Secretary of State along the same lines. She has been carrying on correspondence with the Air Force for quite some time on the general subject of UFO's. (Attached is their reply to Mrs. Golden.) The State Department referred the telegram to the Air Force who, in turn, answered Mrs. Golden to the effect that the U.S. Naval Attache evaluation indicates that the picture was false. The photo was taken by a free lance photographer noted for his trick photography. It was not, as Mrs. Golden states, developed in the presence of anyone.

2. I do not believe we should concern ourselves with questions in Mrs. Golden's letter that do not concern CIA; therefore, we have covered only those questions. The Air Force is responsible and is doing a very good job of public information in this field and it has been our past procedure to refer all matters to them when it does not implicate CIA.

3. I think our Naval attache's final comment on the whole affair sums it up very well: "It is the reporting officer's private opinion that a flying saucer sighting would be unlikely at the very barren island of Trinidad, as everyone knows Martians are extremely comfort loving creatures."

4. Attached is a draft reply for Congressman Scherer per your request.

[Signature]
F. G. STONE

B3

Approved for Release

2/20/0

164

214

DRAFT
31 August 1960

Mrs. Catherine Carter Golden
334 Thrall Street
Cincinnati 20, Ohio

Dear Mrs. Golden:

In regard to your letter of 15 August 1960,
I have inquired of the CIA as to their interest in
UFO's. The CIA is not responsible for these matters
nor are they involved in any UFO investigations.
When any such item does come to their attention,
their policy is to refer the matter or the information
to the Air Force for the latter's evaluation and reporting.
They have never regarded such matters with secrecy.

By common agreement, in order to eliminate dupli-
cation and overlapping of effort, the Air Force has
been singled out as the responsible component of the
government for all matters pertaining to UFO's. CIA
states, therefore, that they have never made any charge
concerning UFO's to or about the head of any friendly
government, inasmuch as they are not in a position to do so
either from the standpoint of knowledgeability or
responsibility.

GORDON H. SCHERER

163

122
B3

Mr. J. L. Cary

31 August 1960

Deputy Assistant Director for Collection/OSI

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P. G. STROCK

B3

Approved for Release

2/2010

August 15, 1960

Hon. Gordon Scherer
House Office Building
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Scherer:

Several weeks ago a picture of a UFO was shown on the Dave Garroway show. It was the famous Brazilian UFO. It was taken on board the Brazilian Navy IGY ship in daylight and in full view of about a hundred persons. It was developed aboard in the presence of the officers of the ship. It was certified as being authentic by the Navy, released to the press by the Brazilian President himself. It was in the headlines of all the Brazilian newspapers for a week. It created such tremendous public interest that a Congressional investigation followed, and as a result much more UFO information was made public.

Now the American Air Force has labeled this picture a hoax!

Of course I am concerned about the effect of this on our campaign to get the UFO situation opened up in this country. But I am even more concerned as to what effect this will have on our relations with Brazil. The Brazilians know about their UFOs. I have copies of the magazine O THUZEIRO in which many outstanding incidents are frankly and openly discussed. I recently received a seven page report on censorship in Brazil from Dr. Olavo Fontes, Brazil's best known UFO researcher. What censorship there is in Brazil is largely at our insistence and the authorities don't like even that much. There have been an average of six to eight sightings/month for fifty months, and sometimes there are as many as thirty in a two hour period. How are these well informed people going to react to hearing their President and several high Navy officials called frauds?

You may not agree with this at present, Mr. Scherer, but the American Air Force is withholding evidence even from Congressmen, and I feel strongly that the time has long since come when this dangerous situation should be cleared up. ATIC has now admitted hiding the Project Grudge report by marking it "secret", and admitted that the CIA is involved in the UFO investigation. On the other hand it has denied many serious incidents it had previously confirmed. Why, why does there have to be secrecy at all? What is the CIA covering so desperately that it is necessary to make such incredible charges against the head of a friendly government? I have a good understanding of scientific method, and I am not a crackpot. The Air Force "explanations" many times simply do not explain, and their statistics are obviously contrived. The feeling about UFOs has changed in Cincinnati. There hasn't been a tongue-in-cheek article published for over a year. As General O'Keefe said last December, and Senator Johnson has said recently, UFOs are serious business.

Won't you, Sir, lend your help by making a stand for open Congressional hearings? And if you feel you can't do that, at least do something about the Brazilian affair. Thank you.

334 Thrall St, Apt 3
Cincinnati 20, Ohio

Sincerely
Catherine Carter Golden

UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: DCD/

DIVISION

NO.

DATE

27 May 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Dr.

Dr.

Regarding our recent discussion, [redacted], attached some material in which you may be interested.

In particular, please note attachment A. Our source obtained it

Our source felt that [redacted] work might be of interest to the US Government and that it should be evaluated by the Agency. The source also felt that it could be analyzed outside the context of its UFO connection if necessary to remove it from a controversial subject.

As before we are faced with the problem of having UFO related data which is deemed potentially important for the US by our S&T sources, evaluated. As you are aware, at this time there is no channel or working group to which we can turn for this type of analysis and dissemination. Thus, if it is acceptable to you, we will continue to periodically advise you or your designee of any new or potentially important FI

(continued)

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DATE 17 Oct 78

D- #128

Continued

developments which might arise from current independent scientific research on the UFO phenomena.

If you feel that [REDACTED] offers some potential we can obtain a more detailed report through our source.

Attachments:

Attachment A: [REDACTED]

Attachment B: [REDACTED]

Attachment C: [REDACTED]

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

28 SEP 66

COUNTRY: Iran/USSR

REPORT NO. CO- 8-321/15354-66

SUBJECT: Sighting of Unusual Phenomenon on
horizon Near Iranian/USSR Border

DATE DISTR 28 SEP 66

NO PAGES 2

REFERENCES

Responsive to:

DATE C- 27 Jun 66

PLACE &

DATE ACQ

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

1. On 17 Jun 66, at 2142 hours, local time, [redacted] Veteran, Iran, on an international flight, I observed a strange phenomenon on the horizon. As we were approaching the Rudeshur beacon, located approximately 25 miles WSW of Mehrabad Airport, Tehran, we suddenly observed a brilliant white sphere approximating the coloration and intensity of full bright moon. The sphere appeared suddenly and at the first sighting was approximately three times the size of a full moon. At the moment, we were flying at approximately 18,000 feet on a course of 070 degrees at a speed of about 200 knots. The sighting occurred just as we prepared to fly a circular pattern over the Rudeshur beacon prior to descending to a lower altitude and heading for Mehrabad Airport. We observed the sighting throughout the time we circled the Rudeshur beacon, a time we later calculated to be of four to five minutes duration. I would estimate the position of the sphere to be on a heading of 010 degrees and deep within the Soviet Union, perhaps north of 60 degrees latitude. During the four to five minutes that I observed the sphere, it continued to grow in size as its intensity diminished. Toward the end of this period it became very faint and its enormous size seemed to fill the sky. The base of the sphere appeared to rest on the horizon throughout the period it was observed, indicating that the center of the sphere was rising during the time that it was expanding. The weather conditions were excellent and the unusually clear sky afforded unlimited visibility.
2. Another airliner at a slightly lower altitude also observed the phenomenon and we exchanged remarks about it. On landing at Mehrabad Airport some 20 minutes later, we discovered that the phenomenon was not seen from the ground except possibly during the very last stages. At that point, since the intensity had so markedly diminished, it would go unnoticed unless

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE 6 JAN 77

D- (#63)

00-8-121/15354-66

- 2 -

unless one were alerted to look for it. The reason for its being obscured from the ground is attributed to the abrupt rise of the very high mountain range north of the city L. The direction of the phenomenon.

3. I don't know what caused this strange occurrence which we observed. I had never seen anything resembling it in over 30 years of flying experience. One theory advanced to me was that the sphere was a "false moon" and that such a phenomenon was seen near Rome, Italy. My feeling is that the sphere was formed by gases emanating perhaps from a man-made explosion. These gases forming the sphere may have been illuminated by the sun from the back side. If this were the case, it would account for the diminishing intensity as the density of the gases decreased with the expansion of the sphere.

- end -

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

12 SEP 1962

REPORT NO. OO- B-324/15354-66

DATE DISTR - 28 SEP 66

NO PAGES 2

REFERENCES

Responsive to:

PLACE &
DATE ACO

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE

1. On 17 Jun 66, at 2142 hours, local time, [redacted] Veteran, Iran, on an international flight, I observed a strange phenomenon on the horizon. As we were approaching the Rudashur beacon, located approximately 25 miles WSW of Mehrabad Airport, Teheran, we suddenly observed a brilliant white sphere approximating the coloration and intensity of full bright moon. The sphere appeared suddenly and at the first sighting was approximately three times the size of a full moon. At the moment, we were flying at approximately 18,000 feet on a course of 070 degrees at a speed of about 200 knots. The sighting occurred just as we prepared to fly a circular pattern over the Rudashur beacon prior to descending to a lower altitude and heading for Mehrabad Airport. We observed the sighting throughout the time we circled the Rudashur beacon, a time we later calculated to be of four to five minutes duration. I would estimate the position of the sphere to be on a heading of 010 degrees and deep within the Soviet Union, perhaps north of 60 degrees latitude. During the four to five minutes that I observed the sphere, it continued to grow in size as its intensity diminished. Toward the end of this period it became very faint and its enormous size seemed to fill the sky. The base of the sphere appeared to rest on the horizon throughout the period it was observed, indicating that the center of the sphere was rising during the time that it was expanding. The weather conditions were excellent and the unusually clear sky afforded unlimited visibility.
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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY Iran/USSR

REPORT NO. CO- B-321/15354-66

SUBJECT Sighting of Unusual Phenomenon on
horizon Near Iranian/USSR Border

DATE DISTR 28 SEP 66

NO PAGES 2

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Responsive to:

DATE OF
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PLACE &
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INFORMATION REPORT ON REPORT

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE 6 Dec 77

D- (43)

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- end -

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Concatenated JPRS Reports, 1992

Document 2 of 12

Page 1

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Status: [STAT]
Document Date: 26 Oct 91 Category: [CAT]
Report Type: JPRS Report Report Date:
Report Number: JPRS-ULS-92-003 UDC Number:

Author(s): A. Tarasov, special correspondent for IZVESTIYA, filed in Yekaterinburg: ''The Battle to Get the Harvest In Ended With Victims: Once More About the Mystery of the Ural Fields''; first paragraph is source introduction]

Headline: 'Sverdlovsk Syndrome' Studied

Source Line: 927C0105B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Oct 91 p 2

Subslug: [Article by A. Tarasov, special correspondent for IZVESTIYA, filed in Yekaterinburg: ''The Battle to Get the Harvest In Ended With Victims: Once More About the Mystery of the Ural Fields''; first paragraph is source introduction]

FULL TEXT OF ARTICLE:

1. [Article by A. Tarasov, special correspondent for IZVESTIYA, filed in Yekaterinburg: ''The Battle to Get the Harvest In Ended With Victims: Once More About the Mystery of the Ural Fields''; first paragraph is source introduction]

2. [Text] After another massive poisoning of students at the Krasnoufimskiy sovkhov (see details in IZVESTIYA, No 221), the harvest contingents from Ural University abandoned the fields. But the chain of tragic and as yet unexplained incidents was not broken: soon after, new victims of the potato fields were hospitalized.

3. Ten of them were students from Sverdlovsk Institute of the National Economy. They had been gathering potatoes at the Chatlykovskiy sovkhov, several dozen kilometers from the fields in which, in 1989, the phenomenon of the poisonous phantom was first officially recorded and about the same distance from the fields the unusual event had happened with the university students that fall. Two more stricken-students from Ural Polytechnical Institute. One had been doing a ''working semester'' in Kamenskiy Rayon of the oblast, the other in the Beloyarskiy Rayon. Cases of the illness had also been noted in the Sysertskiy and Polevskiy rayons.

4. There are a great multitude of versions of the cause of the incident. Among them are these: the sickness is the result of violations in the procedures for use of pesticides; the result of a complex of chemical compounds; acid rain; technogenic pollution formed in the course of the decomposition and interaction of a poison

333

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Concatenated JPRS Reports, 1992

Document 2 of 12

Page 2

unknown to science. And then there are these: the cause is an anomaly of geological structure of those territories; the specific composition of the soil; the mafia blocking the harvest of the potatoes in order to spiral up the prices for a 'second bread'; intrigues of UFOs; poisonous mosquitoes. Not a single one of the suggestions has been proven, but none has been refuted.

5. Such an array of versions is remarkable in and of itself. After all, many of them, except for perhaps only the last few, are not at all far-fetched, and there's some basis for most of the suggestions. It's ridiculous, of course, to blame weakened immunity or avitaminosis of the city people as the main cause of the group's injuries to the peripheral nervous system. But the USSR Ministry of Health commission, in investigating the circumstances of one of the unusual incidents, could not help but note the acute deficiency of vitamins B and C and the weakened state of the bodies of those stricken. Some specialists indicate that isolated incidents of the strange ailment were noted long before 1989. And maybe the worsened supply of fruits and vegetables to the Ural people of recent years played a role of its own in the outbreak of the illness.

6. Or how about the entirely improbable 'hypotheses' voiced 'in a delirium,' which bring into play the military, radiation, or some sort of natural anomalies? Were those versions born on arid soil? Issue No 162 of IZVESTIYA wrote of the Krasnoufimskiy storage facilities, where behind plank fences are kept ore that contain thorium-and the unusual incidents are occurring just a few kilometers from those facilities. The version about the military? The outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk in 1979 is not forgotten, and that's why the attitude toward the military is particularly suspicious. What goes on behind the 'postal box' fences is known to only a small circle of people. (It wasn't until 16 September of this year that the oblast executive committee allowed the oblast health-epidemiological station to visit, for 'reasons of environmental protection,' the facilities of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.) Natural anomalies? They exist, too. Above the fields of the village of Pridannikovo, where the students suffered the paralysis, local people observed a 'tipsy' rainbow several weeks before the arrival of the city people-the ends of the arc rested not on the ground, but above, in the clouds.

7. But the most mysterious thing about the 'potato' detective story is the position taken by the people in power. It remains unchanged, even though the people who formulated it have changed more than once. The people in power continue to fight for the harvest with the same valor. Two years ago, the number of those sent away could not stop the flow of new harvest contingents to the front with the unknown illness. It's the same today-the place where losses were

UNCLASSIFIED

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Concatenated JPRS Reports, 1992

Document 2 of 12

Page 3

taken and university students were demoralized on the Krasnoufimskiy fields has been filled with amazing persistence with students from the Institute of Railroad Engineers, local schoolchildren, and tank crews from the Volga-Ural Military District.

8. Two years ago, the Uralenergochermet enterprise refused to pay for the sick leave of Nadezhda B., a Uralenergochermet engineer who became ill after five and a half hours of work at the Khramtsovo sovkhos, despite the diagnosis made for her-the same one made for all the victims of the Ural fields, toxic polyneuropathy. Despite the note made on the sick leave chart (''production accident'') and despite the paperwork, signed by the sovkhos director, which named the cause of the poisoning as combined action of pesticides. Today, Nadezhda is working at a different facility, but when we were talking with her about meeting her, she asked that we not call her at work and not use her name in the newspaper-''people who are sick aren't needed in the workplace, especially people like us.'' Just as in 1989, the state is still doing what it can to make Nadezhda herself feel guilty for the illness.

9. The unusual incident of this year happened on fields where the health-epidemiological station has yet to find any traces of toxic substances. That's why, in the words of the chief neuropathologist of the oblast, Prof Ye. Krupin, a fairly difficult struggle lies ahead in the attempt to prove that the students aren't dragging their feet out of capriciousness.

10. So, in the ''Sverdlovsk syndrome,'' besides what's unique, there's also something that's standard, even hateful.

11. By the way, Krupin, who has seen those stricken with the mysterious sickness, has advanced his own version for the cause of the illness: the mystery lies in the incomprehensible use of a new generation of imported pesticides-pyrethroids. According to the professor's data, they have lost their ability to walk on the very farms in the oblast that have such toxins-particularly the neurotropic compounds tsimbush and sumicidin.

12. Indirectly supporting Krupin's version is this fact: in letters to IZVESTIYA about the mystery of the toxic fields, some readers have described in detail the symptoms they suffered after working in a field-and those symptoms are very similar to the symptoms of the Ural sickness. What's noteworthy is the return addresses on the letters-Belarus, Ukraine, the Volga region. There, as in the Urals, the use of pyrethroids has been sanctioned to control the Colorado beetle and other pests.

13. Krupin says this: there are influential officials who are

UNCLASSIFIED

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Concatenated JPRS Reports, 1992

Document 2 of 12

Page 4

actively obstructing the search for the causes of the tragedy, and powerful pressure is being exerted for the pesticides by the foreign firms that supply the pyrethroids. At the same time, people abroad can't even imagine exactly how the Soviet field managers can apply such powerful toxins. (In Khrantsov, for example, a concrete mixer is used to prepare the pesticide solutions.)

14. Obviously, the method chosen by the visitors from Moscow to study the problem—in assaults after each unusual incident—is ineffective. A systematic, comprehensive study is absolutely necessary. Leading specialists have to be involved. They have to have highly sensitive equipment. But what are the people supposed to do now, wait until next summer or fall? After all, there's no barrier at all today to protect against misfortune.

15. Whatever version about the cause of the poisonings turns out to be correct, this much can be said right now: The two-year drama on the fields is a drama about the Soviet state's stubborn neglect of the individual.

16. POSTSCRIPT: While this article was in press, a commission of the Russian Ministry of Health prepared a report on the results of work done in Sverdlovsk Oblast. The cause of the illness was said to be the combined action of a number of factors. The principal factors involved working conditions. Then there was weakened immunity, and adverse weather conditions. The pesticides were acquitted. Meanwhile, the "greens" don't agree with the conclusions of the medical people—they feel that the country's agroindustrial complex is a criminal organization, and they are getting ready to take it to court.

17. The commission's report did not bring any clarity to the matter—it failed to even comment on a number of things. What now? To a recent remark on the "Sverdlovsk syndrome" made by IZVESTIYA, the RSFSR State Committee for Health and Epidemiological Inspection answered this: "a temporary inspection committee is being formed....a temporary science group is being formed for further study....a letter has been sent with a request that an international group of experts be set up....being created in Sverdlovsk is a toxicological center equipped with modern imported equipment...." Those are all promises. They make people happy. But the enterprises that are supposed to buy the instruments for the toxicological center for hard currency are spending it for the time being primarily for sugar and meat.

18. Could this really be us, who have jabbered so much in the past about the importance of values common to all mankind?

UNCLASSIFIED

(63)

11/3

ER-7-4372 A

OCT 4 1955

Honorable Gordon H. Scherer
House of Representatives
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Scherer:

Thank you for your letter of 13 September 1955 with which you enclosed a letter to you from Thomas H. Eickhoff.

The questions which Mr. Eickhoff has raised in his letter to you are largely outside of the jurisdiction of this Agency. Section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 provides that CIA shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions. Insofar as Mr. Eickhoff appears interested in pursuing the problem of mail fraud in connection with George Adamski's book entitled "Inside The Space Ships", it would appear to be a problem of law-enforcement, from which we are specifically barred by statute.

CIA, as a matter of policy, does not comment on the truth or falsity of material contained in books or other published statements, and therefore it is not in a position to comment on Mr. Adamski's book or the authenticity of the pictures which it contains.

The subject matter of Mr. Adamski's book would appear to be more in the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense and the National Science Foundation, and it may be that you would wish to refer some of these questions to them for consideration.

Mr. Eickhoff's letter is returned herewith for your files.

With kindest regards.

CGC:WLP/blc (20 Sept. 55)

Orig. - 1 Add.

2 - Signer

2 - Legislative Counsel w/basic

1 - CSI w/cy of basic

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles

Director

OCT 4 1955

Honorable Gordon H. Scherer
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With kindest regards,

CGC:WLP/blc (20 Sept. 55)

Sincerely,

Orig. - 1 Add.

2 - Signer

2 - Legislative Counsel w/basic

1 - OSI w/cy of basic

Enclosure

200000

Allen W. Dulles
Director

356364-1

53

(12)

Honorable Gordon H. Scherer
House of Representatives
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Scherer:

In your letter of 24 August you forwarded a copy of a letter from Mrs. Catherine Carter Golden of Cincinnati in which she discussed the subject of unidentified flying objects. Mrs. Golden seemed particularly interested in the pictures taken in Brazil and shown on the Dave Garroway show.

The photograph referred to by Mrs. Golden was taken by a free-lance photographer. Contrary to her information, this photograph was not developed in the presence of persons other than the photographer.

Mrs. Golden has corresponded with the Department of State and the Air Force for some time on the general subject of unidentified flying objects. The Department of the Air Force has primary responsibility for investigating information pertaining to UFO's. Mrs. Golden recently contacted the State Department on the subject of the alleged Brazilian sighting and her query was referred to the Department of the Air Force whose reply is attached. This Agency has no information other than that which has already been provided the Air Force on this subject.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

John S. Warner
Legislative Counsel

Enclosure

Honorable Gordon H. Scherer
House of Representatives
Washington 25, D.C.

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Sincerely,

SIGNED

John S. Warner
Legislative Counsel

Enclosure

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee

1 - OSI

1 - Leg. Counsel - subject

1 - Leg. Counsel - chrono

Honorable Joseph E. Barth
House of Representatives
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Barth:

In response to your 30 June inquiry concerning statements made by Leon Davidson in his 26 June letter to you, please be advised that Mr. Davidson has been involved in rather extensive correspondence with this Agency and with the Air Force since early 1956 on the matter of UFO's.

Mr. Davidson believes that the Central Intelligence Agency is withholding information from him which would prove that this Agency is, to quote his letter to you "... solely responsible for creating the Flying Saucer Paradox. . . ." He believes further that this information is contained in the Scientific Advisory Panel Report on UFO's, dated 17 January 1953, (Secret). Mr. Davidson was supplied with the declassified and "Official" version of this report, but this apparently has only served to convince that what is being withheld is information which would prove his claim. This is in spite of the fact that he was informed as long ago as 20 May 1954 that "The complete formal report of the Panel has not been fully declassified for security reasons. The Formal Report is not available to the general public for distribution or reproduction," and "For your information, the classified portion of the Formal Report and the unofficial supplement did not deal specifically with UFO's but on other matters of intelligence significance which affect the national security." In addition, Major Tucker went to great lengths, in this four page letter, outlining to Mr. Davidson all of the information currently available on the subject of UFO's interpreting the Formal Report of the Scientific Advisory Panel, presenting an erroneous or

Walter F. Major Lawrence J. Tucker, U.S. Air Force Executive
Officer, Public Information Division, Office of Information
Services

Honorable Joseph E. Barth
House of Representatives
Washington 25, D. C.

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Letter from Major Lawrence J. Tacker, U.S. Air Force Executive Officer, Public Information Division, Office of Information Services

misleading statements on this report in Captain Farrell's book, "The Report of Unidentified Flying Objects", and explaining why a portion of the report was classified. A copy of this letter is enclosed for your information.

In summary, Mr. Davidson's belief that this Agency is involved in the "Flying Saucer rumors" and is using this as a tool in psychological warfare is entirely unfounded. His indication that CIA is misleading persons in leading them to believe in Flying Saucers is also entirely unfounded. This Agency in conjunction with the Air Force investigated, in 1953, the threat to national security of the then prevalent Flying Saucer rumors. Since that time, CIA has not participated in any Flying Saucer activities and has referred all correspondence to the U. S. Air Force.

Very truly yours,

Lawrence R. Burton
General Counsel

OK

Enclosures:

1. Letter, 26 June 1961,
from L. Davidson
2. Letter, 20 May 1958,
from Major Tucker

Distribution:

- Orig. & 1 - FBI
2 - General Counsel
1 - Inspector General
1 - AD/SI
2 - ASD/SI

CSI/ASD [JUSchert:ccv(6791)] 16X3

<u>DATE OF LETTER</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>SUBSTANCE</u>
11 March 1958	Davidson	DCI	Request for the Secret Panel Report.
14 April 1958	Exec/CIA	Davidson	Davidson's letter referred to Air Force.
27 April 1958	Davidson	DCI	Desires Secret report for public dissemination. (Air Force has action.)
15 May 1958	Davidson	Exec/CIA	Letter forwarded by Chapin to Air Force for reply with acknowledgment letter from Chapin to Davidson.
20 May 1958	Department of Air Force	Davidson	Answer to Davidson's letters of 27 April to Air Force and CIA. Attempts to clarify the purpose of withholding certain information for security reasons.
3 July 1958	Davidson	DCI	Inquires whether CIA is carrying out Sociological Warfare in creating UFO stories.
26 June 1961	Davidson	Congressman Karth	Accuses CIA of creating UFO furor and misleading persons such as Major Keyhue.

NOTE: In addition, we have on file letters from Mr. Davidson to Members of the 1953 Panel requesting in essence their supporting him in obtaining information which would implicate CIA or the OCB in a "1964 type of thought control developing in America."

(118)

(118)

OSI (G. Strong) (29 May 1958)

Distribution:

Orig. - Addressee

- 1 - Assistant to the Director (Mr. Chapin)
- 1 - Office of Security
- 2 - DAD/C/SI
- 1 - ASD/SI

1124 33rd Street, N. W.
Washington 7, D. C.
29 May 1958

B3

B3
B3

Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner
President
Associated Universities, Incorporated
Suite 1750, Coliseum Tower
10 Columbus Circle
New York 19, New York

Dear Lloyd:

This is in addition to my letter of 8 May, concerning the one to you from Mr. Davidson, and will also reply to your 19 May letter to me.

Since I wrote you on 8 May, Mr. Davidson has kept the pot boiling hard and many things have occurred. One of the most important of these is an exchange of correspondence between him and Bob Robertson. I am enclosing a copy of the two letters they exchanged and recommend strongly that you employ the general tenor of Bob's letter in your reply to Davidson.

I am also writing the other three panel members, Alvarez, Goldsmit, and Page, and sending them copies of the Robertson/Davidson exchange. This is being done in anticipation of their being bothered by Davidson as you and Bob have been. Perhaps a solid front erected between the panel members and Davidson will discourage him. He is taking far too much of all our time and effort.

In those cases where we have been required to correspond directly with Davidson, our reply has been solely one of acknowledging receipt and advising him that his queries had been forwarded to the Air Force for appropriate action.

Please contact me if you continue to be entangled in this matter.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

[Handwritten signature]

B3

OSI (Poststrong) (29 May 1958)

Distribution:

Orig. - Addressee

- 1 - Assistant to the Director (Mr. Chapin)
- 1 - Office of Security
- 2 - DAD/C/SI
- 1 - ASD/SI

1124 33rd Street, N. W.
Washington 7, D. C.
29 May 1958

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Best regards.

Sincerely,

Philip C. Strong

Enclosures:

- 1. Letter to Davidson
- 2. Letter to Robertson

118

(117)

(19)

B3

OSI: Strong (29 May 1958)

Distribution:

Orig. - Addressee

1 - Assistant to the Director (Mr. Chapin)

1 - Office of Security

2 - DAD/C/SI

1 - ASD/SI

B3

B3

1424 33rd Street, N. W.
Washington 7, D. C.
29 May 1958

Dear Dr. Alvarez:

Recently both Lloyd Donner and Bob Robertson have been harassed by a Mr. Leon Davidson with questions relative to their activities on and the results of the UFO panel which convened in Washington early in 1953. In anticipation that you might soon be harassed similarly, I am enclosing copies of an exchange of correspondence between Robertson and Davidson, and recommend strongly that you employ the general tenor of Bob's letter should the occasion arise.

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Best regards.

Sincerely,

Philip C. Strong

B3

Enclosures:

1. Letter to Davidson
2. Letter to Robertson

Dr. Luis V. Alvarez
University of California

OSI: [Signature] (29 May 1958)

Distribution:

Orig. - Addressee

1 - Assistant to the Director [Signature] (Mr. Chapin)

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[Signature] Philip G. Strong

B3

Enclosures:

1. Letter to Davidson
2. Letter to Robertson

Dr. Luis W. Alvarez
University of California
at Berkeley
Berkeley
California

117

(18)

Dr. Thorton Page
Johns Hopkins University
Baltimore, Maryland

Dear Dr. Page:

You will recall in January 1953, we constituted a Scientific Advisory Panel on Unidentified Flying Objects with Drs. H. P. Robertson as Chairman, Samuel Goudsmit, Luis W. Alvarez, Lloyd V. Berkner, and yourself as members. After its deliberation, the Panel reached two conclusions and made two recommendations which were included as Tab A of the report. Very recently, the Air Force has requested that the conclusions of this report be declassified so that they may be used in the press. A copy of the report is enclosed herewith for your information.

I have discussed this matter with Dr. Robertson and Dr. Goudsmit who agree that the conclusion contained in paragraph 2 and the recommendation contained in paragraph 4a can be declassified. But, they, as well as this Agency, will not agree to a declassification of the conclusion in paragraph 3 or the recommendation in paragraph 4b. It is our feeling that the association of the Panel with this Agency should not be disclosed; that paragraph 1 could be rewritten to eliminate this connection; and that the final six lines of paragraph 4 can stand as written.

I have queried the Air Force as to whether the names of the Panel members would be used. They have replied that names would be used only within official circles and would not be given to the press. But, as such information has a tendency at times to filter out, it should be recognized that, if approval is given for use of the names, they may well become common knowledge.


Dr. Thorton Page
Johns Hopkins University
Baltimore, Maryland

Dear Dr. Page:

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It would be very much appreciated if you could let me know as soon as possible what your reaction is to the Air Force declassification proposal; whether you agree with Dr. Robertson, Dr. Coudemut and myself on limiting any declassification; and whether you would approve or disapprove the use of your names, granted that Agency connection with the Panel is withheld.

Sincerely,

Philip G. Strong
Deputy Assistant Director

Enclosure

UFO Report (4/11/68)

A10

8 May 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: UFO Briefing for Dr. Edward Condon, 5 May 1967

1. At 0900 on 5 May 1967, _____ presented a briefing covering his analysis of the Zanesville, Ohio, UFO photography. The briefing was given in the _____ conference room, and in attendance were Dr. Edward Condon, University of Colorado; Dr. Robert Lowe, University of Colorado; Dr. William Hartman, University of Arizona; Dr. Charles Reed, National Research Council; Dr. Thomas Hatchford, U.S. Air Force, and _____ briefing was very well received by Dr. Condon and his colleagues, and they were most enthusiastic. They were impressed with the scope of the analysis _____ had conducted, which included ground survey techniques, established and new mathematical analysis, and photogrammetric techniques and densitometric traces. Dr. Condon stated he had for the first time a scientific analysis of a UFO that would stand up to investigation. Dr. Condon and members of his group questioned _____ in detail during and after the analysis and were very impressed with the quality of his work.

2. Preliminary arrangements were made to get _____ in contact with Dr. Lowe, University of Colorado, so that contractual arrangements could be made to carry on analysis by _____ but under financing from U.S. Air Force/University of Colorado. To start this procedure, _____ contacted _____ and suggested that he call Dr. Lowe to initiate the appropriate discussions. I understand this was followed through later in the day. This would transfer most of the future analysis to the University of Colorado control, but Dr. Condon indicated he wished to keep a channel open into our organization. He was most appreciative of the unofficial role NPIC had played in assisting the development of this special photogrammetric technique to analyze unscheduled photography.

3. There was discussion held concerning methods of interesting the American public in participating in UFO photography. No specific conclusions were drawn, but it was suggested that it might be advisable to review all the photography NICAP holds, and conduct photogrammetric analyses on any that have the appropriate and necessary information available. This would put Dr. Condon in a position to say that he had reviewed and analyzed

T-21

SUBJECT: UFO Briefing for Dr. Edward Condon, 5 May 1967

all the photography in NICAP files, and was now depending on the American public to furnish him new photography. Also discussed was the possibility of making available to police officers, on military posts, airline pilots, and such people, polaroid cameras for instant use. No conclusions were arrived at, but some interesting thoughts were tabled. It was, however, felt by all that more publicity was needed.

4. report on his analysis of the Zanesville photography will be forwarded to in the near future for distribution to Dr. Ratchford and Dr. Condon.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

COUNTRY Iran (Azerbaijan) REPORT NO. CS-3,325,417
 SUBJECT Unidentified Flying Object Observed on Iran/USSR border DATE DISTR. 13 August 1957
 NO. PAGES 1
 REQUIREMENT NO. RO
 REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. 11 June 1957

PLACE & DATE ACQ. [REDACTED]

SOURCE [REDACTED]

On 12 June at 11:00 a.m. local time, a flying object was seen from Iranian Julfa N 39-15, E 45-25 travelling on a course from Nakhichevan N 39-15, E 45-25 to Iran/USSR. The object appeared to be a ball about one-half meter in diameter and had a tail one-half meter in length. It travelled at high speed at a height of about 2,000 feet and was visible for only a few seconds. The smoke trail left by the object drifted over Iranian Julfa from the USSR and consisted of a trail about 5 or 10 centimeters in diameter.

Field Comment: [REDACTED] also reported seeing a flying object at the same time and described it as being about the size of a football and moving at a height of 2000 meters. He said the smoke track left behind the object was visible for about 15 minutes.

STATE	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	FBI	REC						
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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

NOTED FOR RELEASE
 6 JUN 58

DATE OF INFO 12 June 1957

PLACE &
DATE ACQ.

SOURCE:

On 12 June at 11:00 a.m. local time, a flying object was seen from Iranian Gulf. N 31-55, E 45-32 travelling on a course from Nakhichevan N 39-15, E 45-25 to Turk, USSR. The object appeared to be a ball about one-half meter in diameter and had a tail one-half meter in length. It travelled at high speed at a height of about 2,000 feet and was visible for only a few seconds. The smoke trail left by the object drifted over Iranian Gulf from the USSR and consisted of a trail about 5 or 10 centimeters in diameter.

Field Document: [REDACTED] also reported seeing a flying object at the same time and described it as being about the size of a football and moving at a height of 2000 meters. He said the smoke track left behind the object was visible for about 15 minutes.

[illegible]

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

1-10-1945

DATE 6 Nov 78

D - (#56)

USE NR34 ROUTINE C 30 251929Z

GICO CITE YA 16998

FROM SUPPORT

APR 25 2 52 PM '57

THE DCI X DCI HAS RECEIVED A LETTER FROM LEON DAVIDSON X
LEON DAVIDSON WHITE PLAINS NEW YORK REQUESTING INFORMATION ON THE
RECORDING YOU RECEIVED FROM [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] DAVIDSON REFERS TO SOME CORRESPONDENCE HE HAD WITH
YOU AND THEN GOES ON TO ASK FOR AGENCY COOPERATION IN LEARNING WHAT
THE CODE MESSAGE REVEALED. HE INDICATES THAT HE HAS RECENTLY TEST-
IFIED BEFORE THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVT INFORMATION AND SAYS THAT
HIS TESTIMONY WILL DISPLAY HIS INTEREST IN THIS SUBJECT.

WE ARE GETTING COPIES OF THIS TESTIMONY. MEANWHILE CAN YOU ADVISE
US AS TO HOW YOU GOT IN CORRESPONDENCE AND HOW HE LEARNED THAT THE
DCI WAS THE PROPER PERSON TO ADDRESS HIS REQUEST TO. ANY BACKGROUND
INFO YOU HAVE ON HIM WILL BE WELCOME.

ESE TOT: 251939Z

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE 24 Nov 78

D- (#91)

SUBJECT (Optional)

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)		DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Deputy Chief, OD&E Attn: Mr. [REDACTED]		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		Mr. [REDACTED]
2.					At a recent meeting to evaluate our material from [REDACTED], you mentioned a personal interest in the UFO phenomena. As you may recall, I mentioned my own interest in the subject as well as the fact that DCD had been receiving UFO related material from many of our S&T sources who are presently conducting related research. These scientists include some who have been associated with the Agency for years and whose credentials remove them from the "nut" variety.
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					The attached material came to my attention through these sources and it appears to have some legitimate FI or community interest potential.
8.					
9.					The [REDACTED] work being carried out by Dr. [REDACTED]
10. [REDACTED]					[REDACTED] should, in the view of our S&T sources, be evaluated by the Agency or community.
11.					
12. [REDACTED]					In view of the expertise associated with your office, as well as your interest in the subject, I felt you might like to see the material.
13. [REDACTED]					
14. [REDACTED]					[If you need additional information or if you feel there is some potential, I would be glad to discuss this with you. If not, please feel free to destroy the material.]
15. [REDACTED]					

616

USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

☐ SECRET☒ CONFIDENTIAL☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY☐ UNCLASSIFIED

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE 17 Dec 68

D- (#131)

ER 9-3325/a

C
O
P
Y

MAY 10 1957

Mr. Leon Davison
64 Prospect Street
White Plains, New York

Dear Mr. Davison:

On behalf of Mr. Dulles, may I acknowledge and reply to your letter of April 21.

We have found that the tape you mentioned was analyzed by another agency of the Government and understand that you will hear directly from that agency in the near future as to the nature of the recording.

Sincerely,

Sgd J. Arnold Shaw

J. Arnold Shaw
Assistant to the Director

O/DCI/JAShaw/rc/9 May 57

Distribution:

- 1 - Addressee
- 1 - OO/C thru AD/O
- 1 - JAS
- 1 - ER
- 1 - Reading

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE 24 Nov 78

D- (75)

ER 9-3325/a

C
O
P
Y

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64 Prospect Street
White Plains, New York

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O/DCI/JAShaw/rc/9 May 57

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- 1 - JAS
- 1 - ER
- 1 - Reading

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE 24 Jan 78

D-75

(118)

(118)

OSI [Strong] (20 May 1958)

Distribution:

Orig. - Addressee

- 1 - Assistant to the Director (Mr. Chapin)
 1 - Office of Security
 2 - DAD/C/SI
 1 - ASD/SI

1423 33rd Street, N. W.
 Washington 7, D. C.
 20 May 1958

B3

B3

B3

Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner
 President
 Associated Universities, Incorporated
 Suite 1750, Coliseum Tower
 10 Columbus Circle
 New York 19, New York

Dear Lloyd:

This is an addition to my letter of 8 May, concerning the one to you from Mr. Davidson, and will also reply to your 19 May letter to me.

Since I wrote you on 8 May, Mr. Davidson has kept the pot boiling hard and many things have occurred. Of the most important of these is an exchange of correspondence between him and Bob Robertson. I am enclosing a copy of the two letters they exchanged and recommend strongly that you employ the general tenor of Bob's letter in your reply to Davidson.

I am also writing the other three panel members, Alvarez, Goudsmit, and Fagn, and sending them copies of the Robertson/Davidson exchange. This is being done in anticipation of their being harassed by Davidson as you and Bob have been. Perhaps a solid front erected between the panel members and Davidson will discourage him. He is taking far too much of all our time and effort.

In those cases where we have been required to correspond directly with Davidson, our reply has been merely one of acknowledging receipt and advising him that his queries had been forwarded to the Air Force for appropriate action.

Please contact me if you continue to be embroiled in this matter.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
 Philip C. Strong

B3

Enclosures:

1. Letter to Davidson
2. Letter to Robertson

Approved for Release

2/2010

118

MEMO FOR THE FILE

On 25 June 1976, [redacted] met with [redacted] of ORD([redacted] regarding possible interest by that office in the UFO case. [redacted] was provided copies of the [redacted] and later [redacted] memo as well as the original [redacted]. These items were provided at his request.

[redacted] felt that there may be some ongoing ORD interest, ~~dependent~~ by depending on the evaluation of that office of the material provided.

[redacted] asked that we attempt to obtain additional info on the [redacted] system which we agreed to do. (a TWX was sent to this effect to the [redacted] Office on 25 June 1976). *requesting additional info*

~~Modification~~
[redacted] asked that the ORD interest be kept at a low profile until some evaluation could be made, but at the same time indicated that he would be in touch with me on a fairly ~~regular~~ regular basis.

25 June 1976

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE 17 Nov 78

D- (129)

10 APRIL 1967

ROUTINE

1103

1

1

75335

CONTACTS/NEW YORK

FROM [REDACTED]

NEW CASE [REDACTED]

1. ORD FOR TRAINING NEEDS THIRTY (30) DAY LOAN OF FILM - UFO-FACT
OR FANCY - SPONSORED BY IBM AND RECENTLY SHOWN ON THE CBS.
2. IF YOU CANNOT GET FILM ON LOAN, CAN YOU PURCHASE COPY AND AT
WHAT PRICE.
3. PLEASE TWX REPLY.

ORD - [REDACTED]

APR 10 11 33 AM '67

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE 17 DEC 78

D- (#121)

(53)

11-3

ER-7-4372 A

OCT 4 1955

Honorable Gordon H. Scherer
House of Representatives
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Scherer:

Thank you for your letter of 13 September 1955 with which you enclosed a letter to you from Thomas H. Eickhoff.

The questions which Mr. Eickhoff has raised in his letter to you are largely outside of the jurisdiction of this Agency. Section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 provides that CIA shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions. Insofar as Mr. Eickhoff appears interested in pursuing the problem of mail fraud in connection with George Adamski's book entitled "Inside The Space Ships", it would appear to be a problem of law-enforcement, from which we are specifically barred by statute.

CIA, as a matter of policy, does not comment on the truth or falsity of material contained in books or other published statements, and therefore it is not in a position to comment on Mr. Adamski's book or the authenticity of the pictures which it contains.

The subject matter of Mr. Adamski's book would appear to be more in the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense and the National Science Foundation, and it may be that you would wish to refer some of these questions to them for consideration.

Mr. Eickhoff's letter is returned herewith for your files.

With kindest regards.

CGC:WLP/bic (20 Sept. 55)
Orig. - 1 Add.
2 - Signer
2 - Legislative Counsel w/basic
1 - OSI w/cy of basic

Enclosure

Sincerely,

JOHN

Allen V. Dulles
Director

950067-0

53

(12)

Honorable Gordon H. Scherer
House of Representatives
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Scherer:

In your letter of 24 August you forwarded a copy of a letter from Mrs. Catherine Carter Golden of Cincinnati in which she discussed the subject of unidentified flying objects. Mrs. Golden seemed particularly interested in the pictures taken in Brazil and shown on the Dave Garroway show.

The photograph referred to by Mrs. Golden was taken by a free-lance photographer. Contrary to her information, this photograph was not developed in the presence of persons other than the photographer.

Mrs. Golden has corresponded with the Department of State and the Air Force for some time on the general subject of unidentified flying objects. The Department of the Air Force has primary responsibility for investigating information pertaining to UFO's. Mrs. Golden recently contacted the State Department on the subject of the alleged Brazilian sighting and her query was referred to the Department of the Air Force whose reply is attached. This Agency has no information other than that which has already been provided the Air Force on this subject.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

John S. Warner
Legislative Counsel

Enclosure

Approved for Release

2/2010

Honorable Gordon H. Scherer
House of Representatives
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Scherer:

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Sincerely,

SIGNED

John S. Warner
Legislative Counsel

Enclosure

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee

1 - OSI

1 - Leg. Counsel - subject

1 - Leg. Counsel - chrono

(36)

(22)

2200 Quince Street, N. W.
 Apartment 1217
 Washington 8, D. C.

28 January 1953

VIA AIR MAIL

Dr. E. P. Robertson
 Norman Bridge Laboratory of Physics
 California Institute of Technology
 Pasadena 4, California

Dear Bob:

Many thanks for your letter of 20 January. A copy of the Panel report, lists of personnel concerned and evidence received are being forwarded to you via another channel.

The report is on its way up the ladder with our concurrence and conclusions and recommendations. I do not believe that a rump Panel meeting will be indicated next week. However, we shall hope to see you Friday afternoon, 6 February, to bring you up to date on official action. Fred's memo has been delayed in completion but will be available at that time. Action is being taken on the requests in your telegram of 22 January.

And so, until next week.

Cordially yours,

Signed: H. Marshall Chadwell

H. Marshall Chadwell

Distribution: ✓

Ops/SI - 2

Admin/SI - 1

AD/SI - 1

OSI:FCD/mtw (28Jan53)

Approved for Release

2/2010

36

CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
PASADENA

Norman Bridge Laboratory of Physics

20 Jan 53

Dear [Chad:]

Und sssooo! Perhaps that'll take care of the Forteanas for a while. I'm glad that the members of the panel, with the possible exception of Thornton, were not handpicked by me - I really had no idea of the opinions of the others. Saw Gen. Sanford for a moment in the P-gon on Monday, and he seemed not too unhappy.

Expect Fred's draft - better have him send it to me at

Norman Bridge Laboratory of Physics
California Institute of Technology
Pasadena 4, California.

where I have facilities for taking care of such things. I should like him to send with it, for my retention, a copy of our Panel report.

Schedule: NSA group meeting on Thurs. 5 Feb. Could meet with ramp Panel if needed on afternoon of Fri 6 Feb, or Sat, 7 Feb (which would suit Sam Goudsmit and some of the others better). Let me know what you'd like.

Memo for Mary! Greetings and thanks to Peggy for the fine spread cum spirits she (and you, in a supporting role), put on.

Cordially

Bob

H.P. Robertson

(9)

Senator Joseph E. East
 House of Representatives
 Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. East:

In response to your 10 June inquiry concerning statements made by Leon Davidson in his 26 June letter to you, please be advised that Mr. Davidson has been involved in rather extensive correspondence with this Agency and with the Air Force since early 1958 on the matter of UFO's.

Mr. Davidson believes that the Central Intelligence Agency is withholding information from him which would prove that this Agency is, to quote his letter to you "... solely responsible for creating the Flying Saucer Furore. . . ." He believes further that this information is contained in the Scientific Advisory Panel Report on UFO's, dated 17 January 1953, (Secret). Mr. Davidson was supplied with the declassified and "Official" version of this report, but this apparently has only served to convince that what is being withheld is information which would prove his claim. This is in spite of the fact that he was informed as long ago as 10 May 1958 that "The complete formal report of the panel has not been fully declassified for security reasons. The Formal Report is not available to the general public for distribution or reproduction," and "For your information, the classified portion of the Formal Report and the unofficial supplement did not deal specifically with UFO's but on other matters of intelligence significance which affect the national security." In addition, Major Tucker went to great lengths, in this four page letter, outlining to Mr. Davidson all of the information currently available on the subject of UFO's interpreting the Formal Report of the Scientific Advisory Panel, commenting on omissions or

Letter from Major Lawrence J. Tucker, U.S. Air Force Executive
 Officer, Public Information Division, Office of Information
 Services

Approved for Release

2/2010

Copied From Nearly
 Illegible Original

9

misleading statements on this report in Captain Russell's book, "The Report of Unidentified Flying Objects", and explaining why a portion of the report was classified. A copy of this letter is appended for your information.

In summary, Mr. Davidson's belief that this Agency is involved in the "Flying Saucer Furore" and is using this as a tool in psychological warfare is entirely unfounded. His indication that CIA is misleading persons in leading them to believe in Flying Saucers is also entirely unfounded. This Agency in conjunction with the Air Force investigated, in 1951, the threat to national security of the then prevalent flying saucer rumors. Since that time, CIA has not participated in any Flying Saucer activities and has referred all correspondence to the U. S. Air Force.

Very truly yours,

Lawrence R. Houston
General Counsel.

OK

Enclosures:

1. Letter, 26 June 1961,
from L. Davidson
2. Letter, 20 May 1958,
from Major Tucker

Distribution:

- Orig. & 1 - Pnd
 2 - General Counsel
 1 - Inspector General
 1 - AD/CI
 2 - ASD/CI

OSI/AD [Subsistent] (8791) (15X)

<u>DATE OF LETTER</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>SUBSTANCE</u>
11 March 1958	Davidson	DCI	Request for the Secret Panel Report.
14 April 1958	Exec/CIA	Davidson	Davidson's letter referred to Air Force.
27 April 1958	Davidson	DCI	Desires Secret report for public dissemination. (Air Force has action.)
15 May 1958	Davidson	Exec/CIA	Letter forwarded by Chapin to Air Force for reply with acknowledgment letter from Chapin to Davidson.
20 May 1958	Department of Air Force	Davidson	Answer to Davidson's letters of 27 April to Air Force and CIA. Attempts to clarify the purpose of withholding certain information for security reasons.
3 July 1958	Davidson	DCI	Inquires whether CIA is carrying out Sociological Warfare in creating UFO stories.
26 June 1961	Davidson	Congressman Karth	Accuses CIA of creating UFO furor and misleading persons such as Major Keyhus.

NOTE: In addition, we have on file letters from Mr. Davidson to Members of the 1953 Panel requesting in essence their supporting him in obtaining information which would implicate CIA or the OGB in a "1984 type of thought control developing in America."

(1)

[]

Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner
President
Associated Universities, Incorporated
Room 6920
350 Fifth Avenue
New York 1, New York

Dear Lloyd:

You will recall in January 1953, we constituted a Scientific Advisory Panel on Unidentified Flying Objects with Drs. H. P. Robertson as Chairman, Samuel Goudsmit, Luis W. Alvarez, Thornton Page, and yourself as members. After its deliberation, the Panel reached two conclusions and made two recommendations which were included as Tab A of the report. Very recently, the Air Force has requested that the conclusions of this report be declassified so that they may be used in the press. A copy of the report is enclosed herewith for your information.

I have discussed this matter with Dr. Robertson and Dr. Goudsmit who agree that the conclusion contained in paragraph 2 and the recommendation contained in paragraph 4a can be declassified. But, they, as well as this Agency, will not agree to a declassification of the conclusion in paragraph 3 or the recommendation in paragraph 4b. It is our feeling that the association of the Panel with this Agency should not be disclosed; that paragraph 1 could be rewritten to eliminate this connection; and that the final six lines of paragraph 4 can stand as written.

I have queried the Air Force as to whether the names of the Panel members would be used. They have replied that names would be used only within official circles and would not be given to the press. But, as such information has a tendency at times to filter out, it should be recognized that, if approval is given for use of the names, they may well become common knowledge.

[]


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President
Associated Universities, Incorporated
Room 6920
350 Fifth Avenue
New York 1, New York

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It would be very much appreciated if you could let me know as soon as possible what your reaction is to the Air Force declassification proposal; whether you agree with Dr. Robertson, Dr. Goudsmit and myself on limiting any declassification; and whether you would approve or disapprove the use of your name, granted that Agency connection with the Panel is withheld.

Very best regards.

Sincerely,

Phillip G. Strong
Deputy Assistant Director

Enclosure
UFC Report (Secret)

Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner
President
Associated Universities, Incorporated
Room 6920
350 Fifth Avenue
New York 1, New York

Dear Lloyd:

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I have discussed this matter with Dr. Robertson and Dr. Goudsmit who agree that the conclusion contained in paragraph 2 and the recommendation contained in paragraph 4a can be declassified. But, they, as well as this Agency, will not agree to a declassification of the conclusion in paragraph 3 or the recommendation in paragraph 4b. It is our feeling that the association of the Panel with this Agency should not be disclosed; that paragraph 1 could be rewritten to eliminate this connection; and that the final six lines of paragraph 4 can stand as written.

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
Approved for Release

2/2010

7

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Very best regards.

Sincerely,

Philip G. Strong
Deputy Assistant Director

Enclosure
UTC Report (Secret)



(117)

190

OSI: ~~Castro~~ (29 May 1958)

Distribution:

Orig. - Addressee

- 1 - Assistant to the Director (Mr. Chapin)
- 1 - Office of Security
- 2 - DAD/C/SI
- 1 - ASD/SI

B3

B3

B3

1425 33rd Street, N. W.
 Washington 7, D. C.
 29 May 1958

Dear Dr. Alvarez:

Recently both Lloyd Barker and Bob Robertson have been harassed by a Mr. Leon Davidson with questions relative to their activities on and the results of the UFO panel which convened in Washington early in 1953. In anticipation that you might soon be harassed similarly, I am enclosing copies of an exchange of correspondence between Robertson and Davidson, and recommend strongly that you employ the general tenor of Bob's letter should the occasion arise.

In those cases where we have been required to correspond directly with Davidson, our reply has been merely one of acknowledging receipt and advising him that his queries had been forwarded to the Air Force for appropriate action.

Please advise me in the event you become caught up in this matter.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

Philip C. Strong

B3

Enclosures:

- 1. Letter to Davidson
- 2. Letter to Robertson

Dr. Luis W. Alvarez
 University of California
 at Berkeley
 Berkeley
 California

Approved for Release

2/2010

117

(62)

C
O
P
Y

ER 8-9383-A

8 January 1957

Honorable Margaret Chase Smith
United States Senate
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Senator Smith:

Thank you for your letter of 2 January 1957,
enclosing a letter from Mrs. Vincent J. Perry of Mexico,
Maine.

We will see to it that this letter is forwarded to
the proper authorities for action.

With kindest regards.

Sincerely,

/s/ Allen W. Dulles
Director

Approved for Release

2/20/0

62

(62)

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ER 8-9383-A

8 January 1957

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United States Senate
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With kindest regards.

Sincerely, —

/s/ Allen W. Dulles
Director —

62

(40)

(2)

[REDACTED]

Apartment 1217
2300 Quebec Street
Washington 6, D.C.

APR 7 1953

Dr. Samuel A. Goudsmit
Brookhaven National Laboratory
Associated Universities, Inc.
Department of Physics
Upton, L.I., New York

Dear Sam,

The following information is passed along in reply to your letter of 25 March 1953.

1. Aerial Phenomena Research Organization
Carol Lorenzen, National Director
P.O. Box 358
Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin

This organization publishes the APRO Bulletin containing reports of sightings.

2. Civilian Sancer Investigations

A Los Angeles post box (number unknown) is used for their correspondence. Some details are given in Life Magazine, 3 April 1952 issue. A Mr. Ed. Sullivan, whose home address is 11067 Canyon Drive, Lynwood, California, is active in this group. He was formerly employed by the North American Aviation, Inc., in public relations, reportedly.

Again let me express my appreciation for your willingness to help us on this problem last January on such short notice. Please bear with us if the nature of the work here has us running to you from time to time on a "fire drill" basis.

Cordially yours,

[REDACTED]
H. Marshall Chadwell

5-3

Distribution:
AD/JI - 2
Ops/JI - 1

[REDACTED]

Approved for Release

2/2010

40

DRAFT (6 April 1953)

2800 Quebec Street
Apartment 1217
Washington 8, D. C.Dr. Samuel A. Goudsmit
Brookhaven National Laboratory
Associated Universities, Inc.
Department of Physics
Upton, L. I., New York

Dear Sam:

The following information is passed along
In reply to your letter of 24 March 1953, ~~we have the following~~
~~information for you~~

1. Aerial Phenomena Research Organization
Coral Lorenzen, National Director
P. O. Box 358
Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin

This organization publishes the APRO Bulletin containing

reports of sightings.

2. Civilian Sancer Investigations

A Los Angeles post box (number unknown) is used for their correspondence. Some details are given in Life Magazine, 3 April 1952 issue. A Mr. Ed Sullivan, whose home address is 11067 Carson Drive, Lynwood, California, is active in this group. He was formerly employed by the North American Aviation, Inc., in public relations, reportedly.

Additional information on these organizations and others ~~mentioned~~ is being obtained. We would be pleased to pass any new information along to you when available, if you so desire. Perhaps it would be easier for you to drop by the office when you are next in Washington.

With best regards,

Again let me express my appreciation for your willingness to help us on this problem. Please let me know when you have time to drop by the office. This work has no money to you from time to time.

H. Marshall Chadwell

B-3 on a "five dollar" basis

BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY
ASSOCIATED UNIVERSITIES, INC.
UPTON, L.I., N.Y.
TEL. PATCHOGUE 2000

REFER:

DEPARTMENT OF
PHYSICS

26 March 1953

B-3
Mr. H. Marshall Chadwell
2800 Quebec Street, Apt. 1217
Washington 8, D.C.

Dear Chad:

When I spent those few days in your section last January, the file we studied contained one, or perhaps two, pamphlets from a crack-pot organization somewhere in the west. I am interested in following up this angle and, if possible, would like to get the name of that pamphlet and the address so that I can get a few more sample copies. I hope you know what I am referring to.

I was pleased to see Howard Osborn in New York. I am afraid that what I told him was a little too stale to be of any use. I also forwarded some memoranda via the New York office. *B-3*

Best regards.

Sincerely yours,

Sam
S. A. Goudsmit

[-]

(8)

Dr. Thorton Page
Johns Hopkins University
Baltimore, Maryland

Dear Dr. Page:

You will recall in January 1953, we constituted a Scientific Advisory Panel on Unidentified Flying Objects with Dr. H. P. Robertson as Chairman, Samuel Goudsmit, Luis W. Alvarez, Lloyd V. Berkner, and yourself as members. After its deliberation, the Panel reached two conclusions and made two recommendations which were included as Tab A of the report. Very recently, the Air Force has requested that the conclusions of this report be declassified so that they may be used in the press. A copy of the report is enclosed herewith for your information.

I have discussed this matter with Dr. Robertson and Dr. Goudsmit who agree that the conclusion contained in paragraph 2 and the recommendation contained in paragraph 4a can be declassified. But, they, as well as this Agency, will not agree to a declassification of the conclusion in paragraph 3 or the recommendation in paragraph 4b. It is our feeling that the association of the Panel with this Agency should not be disclosed; that paragraph 1 could be rewritten to eliminate this connection; and that the final six lines of paragraph 4 can stand as written.

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[]

Approved for Release

2 / 2010

8

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Sincerely,

Philip G. Strong
Deputy Assistant Director

Enclosure
UFO Report (signature)

ley,

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uly
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[REDACTED]
CIGCO CITE WA 26238

[REDACTED] FROM SUPPORT [REDACTED]

CASE [REDACTED] (CLOSED) [REDACTED]

AS WE INFORMED YOUR OFFICE THERE IS NO TRANSLATION AVAILABLE
NOR IS THERE ANY RECORD AVAILABLE EXCEPT FOR WHAT YOU ^{DEAN}KNOW, DAVIDSON
X DAVIDSON HAS BEEN APPROACHED BY [REDACTED]
ATIC X ATIC AND THIS SAME MESSAGE WAS GIVEN HIM AGAIN. HE ASKED
FOR IT IN WRITING WHICH [REDACTED] REFUSED TO DO. DAVIDSON THEN SAID
HE WOULD WRITE TO ATIC X ATIC. WE ARE ALL RESIGNED TO MORE LETTERS
BUT WE DO NOT THINK YOU SHOULD INJECT YOUR NAME INTO THE MATTER.
HE HAS ALREADY RECEIVED A COUPLE OF LETTERS FROM ATIC, TWO FROM
THE DCI'S X DCI'S OFFICE AND TWO VISITS FROM [REDACTED]

SUGGEST YOU SIMPLY IGNORE THE LETTER UNLESS IT WAS REGISTERED.
IF THIS WAS THE CASE PLEASE ADVISE. OTHERWISE DON'T DO ANYTHING MORE
ABOUT IT.

THIS COORDINATED WITH [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

19/29392

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE 24 DEC 75

D- (#103)

Chief, Contact Division, OO

25 February 1955

Chief, Support Staff, O/SI

Unusual Wire Recording

1. According to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] possesses a wire recording of an unidentified electrical transmission of unknown origin. The collector's attention is invited to [REDACTED] which is attached hereto for details relating to this incident.

2. It is requested that the Office of Operations attempt to obtain this recording for an investigation by this Office.

3. Recording should be sent to Support Staff/SI for transmittal to Physics and Electronics Division/SI.

[Signature]
R. H. HORNBECK
Deputy Chief

Enclosure: 1

Approved for Release

2/2010

204

Chief, Contact Division, OO

25 February 1955

Chief, Support Staff, O/SI

Unusual Wire Recording

Use
1. According to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] pc320323 a wire
recording of an unidentified electrical transmission of
unknown origin. The collector's attention is invited to
[REDACTED] which
is attached hereto for details relating to this incident.

2. It is requested that the Office of Operations
attempt to obtain this recording for an investigation by
this Office.

3. Recording should be sent to Support Staff/SI
for transmittal to Physics and Electronics Division/SI.

[Signature]
J. H. McQuinn
Deputy Chief

Enclosure; 1

Chief, Contact Division, OO

25 February 1955

Chief, Support Staff, O/SI

Unusual Wire Recording

Use

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[Signature]
J. H. NORMAN

Deputy Chief

Enclosure: 1

204